12 Workplace Discrimination and Religion 12 Workplace Discrimination and Religion
12.1 Religious Freedom to Discriminate 12.1 Religious Freedom to Discriminate
12.1.1 Exemption 12.1.1 Exemption
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1
United States Code, 2018 Edition
Title 42 - THE PUBLIC HEALTH AND WELFARE
CHAPTER 21 - CIVIL RIGHTS
SUBCHAPTER VI - EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES
Sec. 2000e-1 - Exemption
From the U.S. Government Publishing Office,
(a) Inapplicability of subchapter to certain aliens and employees of religious entities
This subchapter shall not apply to an employer with respect to the employment of aliens outside any State, or to a religious corporation, association, educational institution, or society with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion to perform work connected with the carrying on by such corporation, association, educational institution, or society of its activities.
(b) Compliance with statute as violative of foreign law
It shall not be unlawful under section 2000e–2 or 2000e–3 of this title for an employer (or a corporation controlled by an employer), labor organization, employment agency, or joint labor-management committee controlling apprenticeship or other training or retraining (including on-the-job training programs) to take any action otherwise prohibited by such section, with respect to an employee in a workplace in a foreign country if compliance with such section would cause such employer (or such corporation), such organization, such agency, or such committee to violate the law of the foreign country in which such workplace is located.
(c) Control of corporation incorporated in foreign country
(1) If an employer controls a corporation whose place of incorporation is a foreign country, any practice prohibited by section 2000e–2 or 2000e–3 of this title engaged in by such corporation shall be presumed to be engaged in by such employer.
(2) Sections 2000e–2 and 2000e–3 of this title shall not apply with respect to the foreign operations of an employer that is a foreign person not controlled by an American employer.
(3) For purposes of this subsection, the determination of whether an employer controls a corporation shall be based on—
(A) the interrelation of operations;
(B) the common management;
(C) the centralized control of labor relations; and
(D) the common ownership or financial control,
of the employer and the corporation.
Notes
Amendments
1991—Pub. L. 102–166 designated existing provisions as subsec. (a) and added subsecs. (b) and (c).
1972—Pub. L. 92–261 reenacted section catchline without change and amended text generally. Prior to amendment, text read as follows: "This subchapter shall not apply to an employer with respect to the employment of aliens outside any State, or to a religious corporation, association, or society with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion to perform work connected with the carrying on by such corporation, association, or society of its religious activities or to an educational institution with respect to the employment of individuals to perform work connected with the educational activities of such institution."
Effective Date of 1991 Amendment
Amendment by Pub. L. 102–166 inapplicable to conduct occurring before Nov. 21, 1991, see section 109(c) of Pub. L. 102–166, set out as a note under section 2000e of this title.
12.1.2 Unlawful employment practices 12.1.2 Unlawful employment practices
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2
United States Code, 2018 Edition
Title 42 - THE PUBLIC HEALTH AND WELFARE
CHAPTER 21 - CIVIL RIGHTS
SUBCHAPTER VI - EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES
Sec. 2000e-2 - Unlawful employment practices
From the U.S. Government Publishing Office,
(a) Employer practices
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer—
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
(b) Employment agency practices
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employment agency to fail or refuse to refer for employment, or otherwise to discriminate against, any individual because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, or to classify or refer for employment any individual on the basis of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
(c) Labor organization practices
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for a labor organization—
(1) to exclude or to expel from its membership, or otherwise to discriminate against, any individual because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin;
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify its membership or applicants for membership, or to classify or fail or refuse to refer for employment any individual, in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities, or would limit such employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee or as an applicant for employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(3) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an individual in violation of this section.
(d) Training programs
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for any employer, labor organization, or joint labor-management committee controlling apprenticeship or other training or retraining, including on-the-job training programs to discriminate against any individual because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in admission to, or employment in, any program established to provide apprenticeship or other training.
(e) Businesses or enterprises with personnel qualified on basis of religion, sex, or national origin; educational institutions with personnel of particular religion
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, (1) it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire and employ employees, for an employment agency to classify, or refer for employment any individual, for a labor organization to classify its membership or to classify or refer for employment any individual, or for an employer, labor organization, or joint labor-management committee controlling apprenticeship or other training or retraining programs to admit or employ any individual in any such program, on the basis of his religion, sex, or national origin in those certain instances where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise, and (2) it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for a school, college, university, or other educational institution or institution of learning to hire and employ employees of a particular religion if such school, college, university, or other educational institution or institution of learning is, in whole or in substantial part, owned, supported, controlled, or managed by a particular religion or by a particular religious corporation, association, or society, or if the curriculum of such school, college, university, or other educational institution or institution of learning is directed toward the propagation of a particular religion.
(f) Members of Communist Party or Communist-action or Communist-front organizations
As used in this subchapter, the phrase "unlawful employment practice" shall not be deemed to include any action or measure taken by an employer, labor organization, joint labor-management committee, or employment agency with respect to an individual who is a member of the Communist Party of the United States or of any other organization required to register as a Communist-action or Communist-front organization by final order of the Subversive Activities Control Board pursuant to the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950 [50 U.S.C. 781 et seq.].
(g) National security
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to fail or refuse to hire and employ any individual for any position, for an employer to discharge any individual from any position, or for an employment agency to fail or refuse to refer any individual for employment in any position, or for a labor organization to fail or refuse to refer any individual for employment in any position, if—
(1) the occupancy of such position, or access to the premises in or upon which any part of the duties of such position is performed or is to be performed, is subject to any requirement imposed in the interest of the national security of the United States under any security program in effect pursuant to or administered under any statute of the United States or any Executive order of the President; and
(2) such individual has not fulfilled or has ceased to fulfill that requirement.
(h) Seniority or merit system; quantity or quality of production; ability tests; compensation based on sex and authorized by minimum wage provisions
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply different standards of compensation, or different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment pursuant to a bona fide seniority or merit system, or a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production or to employees who work in different locations, provided that such differences are not the result of an intention to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, nor shall it be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to give and to act upon the results of any professionally developed ability test provided that such test, its administration or action upon the results is not designed, intended or used to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex or national origin. It shall not be an unlawful employment practice under this subchapter for any employer to differentiate upon the basis of sex in determining the amount of the wages or compensation paid or to be paid to employees of such employer if such differentiation is authorized by the provisions of section 206(d) of title 29.
(i) Businesses or enterprises extending preferential treatment to Indians
Nothing contained in this subchapter shall apply to any business or enterprise on or near an Indian reservation with respect to any publicly announced employment practice of such business or enterprise under which a preferential treatment is given to any individual because he is an Indian living on or near a reservation.
(j) Preferential treatment not to be granted on account of existing number or percentage imbalance
Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be interpreted to require any employer, employment agency, labor organization, or joint labor-management committee subject to this subchapter to grant preferential treatment to any individual or to any group because of the race, color, religion, sex, or national origin of such individual or group on account of an imbalance which may exist with respect to the total number or percentage of persons of any race, color, religion, sex, or national origin employed by any employer, referred or classified for employment by any employment agency or labor organization, admitted to membership or classified by any labor organization, or admitted to, or employed in, any apprenticeship or other training program, in comparison with the total number or percentage of persons of such race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in any community, State, section, or other area, or in the available work force in any community, State, section, or other area.
(k) Burden of proof in disparate impact cases
(1)(A) An unlawful employment practice based on disparate impact is established under this subchapter only if—
(i) a complaining party demonstrates that a respondent uses a particular employment practice that causes a disparate impact on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin and the respondent fails to demonstrate that the challenged practice is job related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity; or
(ii) the complaining party makes the demonstration described in subparagraph (C) with respect to an alternative employment practice and the respondent refuses to adopt such alternative employment practice.
(B)(i) With respect to demonstrating that a particular employment practice causes a disparate impact as described in subparagraph (A)(i), the complaining party shall demonstrate that each particular challenged employment practice causes a disparate impact, except that if the complaining party can demonstrate to the court that the elements of a respondent's decisionmaking process are not capable of separation for analysis, the decisionmaking process may be analyzed as one employment practice.
(ii) If the respondent demonstrates that a specific employment practice does not cause the disparate impact, the respondent shall not be required to demonstrate that such practice is required by business necessity.
(C) The demonstration referred to by subparagraph (A)(ii) shall be in accordance with the law as it existed on June 4, 1989, with respect to the concept of "alternative employment practice".
(2) A demonstration that an employment practice is required by business necessity may not be used as a defense against a claim of intentional discrimination under this subchapter.
(3) Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, a rule barring the employment of an individual who currently and knowingly uses or possesses a controlled substance, as defined in schedules I and II of section 102(6) of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 802(6)), other than the use or possession of a drug taken under the supervision of a licensed health care professional, or any other use or possession authorized by the Controlled Substances Act [21 U.S.C. 801 et seq.] or any other provision of Federal law, shall be considered an unlawful employment practice under this subchapter only if such rule is adopted or applied with an intent to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
(l) Prohibition of discriminatory use of test scores
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for a respondent, in connection with the selection or referral of applicants or candidates for employment or promotion, to adjust the scores of, use different cutoff scores for, or otherwise alter the results of, employment related tests on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
(m) Impermissible consideration of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in employment practices
Except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, an unlawful employment practice is established when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice.
(n) Resolution of challenges to employment practices implementing litigated or consent judgments or orders
(1)(A) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, and except as provided in paragraph (2), an employment practice that implements and is within the scope of a litigated or consent judgment or order that resolves a claim of employment discrimination under the Constitution or Federal civil rights laws may not be challenged under the circumstances described in subparagraph (B).
(B) A practice described in subparagraph (A) may not be challenged in a claim under the Constitution or Federal civil rights laws—
(i) by a person who, prior to the entry of the judgment or order described in subparagraph (A), had—
(I) actual notice of the proposed judgment or order sufficient to apprise such person that such judgment or order might adversely affect the interests and legal rights of such person and that an opportunity was available to present objections to such judgment or order by a future date certain; and
(II) a reasonable opportunity to present objections to such judgment or order; or
(ii) by a person whose interests were adequately represented by another person who had previously challenged the judgment or order on the same legal grounds and with a similar factual situation, unless there has been an intervening change in law or fact.
(2) Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to—
(A) alter the standards for intervention under rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or apply to the rights of parties who have successfully intervened pursuant to such rule in the proceeding in which the parties intervened;
(B) apply to the rights of parties to the action in which a litigated or consent judgment or order was entered, or of members of a class represented or sought to be represented in such action, or of members of a group on whose behalf relief was sought in such action by the Federal Government;
(C) prevent challenges to a litigated or consent judgment or order on the ground that such judgment or order was obtained through collusion or fraud, or is transparently invalid or was entered by a court lacking subject matter jurisdiction; or
(D) authorize or permit the denial to any person of the due process of law required by the Constitution.
(3) Any action not precluded under this subsection that challenges an employment consent judgment or order described in paragraph (1) shall be brought in the court, and if possible before the judge, that entered such judgment or order. Nothing in this subsection shall preclude a transfer of such action pursuant to section 1404 of title 28.
Notes
References in Text
The Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, referred to in subsec. (f), is title I (§§1–32) of act Sept. 23, 1950, ch. 1024, 64 Stat. 987, which is classified principally to subchapter I (§781 et seq.) of chapter 23 of Title 50, War and National Defense. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see Tables.
The Controlled Substances Act, referred to in subsec. (k)(3), is title II of Pub. L. 91–513, Oct. 27, 1970, 84 Stat. 1242, which is classified principally to subchapter I (§801 et seq.) of chapter 13 of Title 21, Food and Drugs. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see Short Title note set out under section 801 of Title 21 and Tables.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, referred to in subsec. (n)(2)(A), are set out in the Appendix to Title 28, Judiciary and Judicial Procedure.
Amendments
1991—Subsec. (k). Pub. L. 102–166, §105(a), added subsec. (k).
Subsec. (l). Pub. L. 102–166, §106, added subsec. (l).
Subsec. (m). Pub. L. 102–166, §107(a), added subsec. (m).
Subsec. (n). Pub. L. 102–166, §108, added subsec. (n).
1972—Subsec. (a)(2). Pub. L. 92–261, §8(a), inserted "or applicants for employment" after "his employees".
Subsec. (c)(2). Pub. L. 92–261, §8(b), inserted "or applicants for membership" after "membership".
Effective Date of 1991 Amendment
Amendment by Pub. L. 102–166 effective Nov. 21, 1991, except as otherwise provided, see section 402 of Pub. L. 102–166, set out as a note under section 1981 of this title.
Subversive Activities Control Board
Subversive Activities Control Board established by act Sept. 23, 1950, ch. 1024, §12, 64 Stat. 977, and ceased to operate on June 30, 1973.
12.1.3 Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos 12.1.3 Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos
CORPORATION OF THE PRESIDING BISHOP OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS et al. v. AMOS et al.
No. 86-179.
Argued March 31, 1987
Decided June 24, 1987*
*328White, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Powell, Stevens, and.ScALiA, JJ., joined. Brennan, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Marshall, J., joined, post, p. 340. Blackmun, J., post, p. 346, and O’Connor, J., post, p. 346, filed opinions concurring in the judgment.
Rex E. Lee argued the cause for appellants in No. 86-179. With him on the briefs were Wilford W. Kirton, Jr., Dan S. Bushnell, M. Karlynn Hinman, Benjamin W. Heineman, Jr., Carter G. Phillips, and Ronald S. Flagg. Assistant Attorney General Reynolds argued the cause for the United States in No. 86-401. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Fried, Deputy Solicitor General Ayer, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Carvin, and Andrew J. Pincus.
*329David B. Watkiss argued the cause for appellees in both cases. With him on the brief were Elizabeth T. Dunning, John A. Powell, Joan E. Berlin, and John E. Harvey †
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Section 702 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 255, as amended, 42 U. S. C. §2000e-l, exempts religious organizations from Title VII’s prohibition against discrimination in employment on the basis of religion.1 The question pre*330sented is whether applying the § 702 exemption to the secular nonprofit activities of religious organizations violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The District Court held that it does, and these cases are here on direct appeal pursuant to 28 U. S. C. §1252.2 We reverse.
I
The Deseret Gymnasium (Gymnasium) in Salt Lake City, Utah, is a nonprofit facility, open to the public, run by the Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (CPB), and the Corporation of the President of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (COP). The CPB and the COP are religious entities associated with The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Church), an unincorporated religious association sometimes called the Mormon or LDS Church.3
Appellee Mayson worked at the Gymnasium for some 16 years as an assistant building engineer and then as building engineer. He was discharged in 1981 because he failed to qualify for a temple recommend, that is, a .certificate that he is a member of the Church and eligible to attend its temples.4
*331Mayson and others purporting to represent a class of plaintiffs brought an action against the CPB and the COP alleging, among other things, discrimination on the basis of religion in violation of §703 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2.5 The defendants moved to dismiss this claim on the ground that § 702 shields them from liability. The plaintiffs contended that if construed to allow religious employers to discriminate on religious grounds in hiring for nonreligious jobs, §702 violates the Establishment Clause.
The District Court first considered whether the facts of these cases require a decision on the plaintiffs’ constitutional argument. Starting from the premise that the religious activities of religious employers can permissibly be exempted under § 702, the court developed a three-part test to determine whether an activity is religious.6 Applying this test to *332Mayson’s situation, the court found: first, that the Gymnasium is intimately connected to the Church financially and in matter's of management; second, that there is no clear connection between the primary function which the Gymnasium performs and the religious beliefs and tenets of the Mormon Church or church administration;7 and third, that none of Mayson’s duties at the Gymnasium are “even tangentially related to any conceivable religious belief or ritual of the Mormon Church or church administration,” 594 F. Supp. 791, 802 (Utah 1984). The court concluded that Mayson’s case involves nonreligious activity.8
The court next considered the plaintiffs’ constitutional challenge to § 702. Applying the three-part test set out in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 (1971), the court first held that § 702 has the permissible secular purpose of “assuring that the government remains neutral and does not meddle in religious affairs by interfering with the decision-making process in religions . . . .” 594 F. Supp, at 812.9 *333The court concluded, however, that § 702 fails the second part of the Lemon test because the provision has the primary effect of advancing religion.10 Among the considerations mentioned by the court were: that § 702 singles out religious enti-ties for a benefit, rather than benefiting a broad grouping of which religious organizations are only a part;11 that §702 is not supported by long historical tradition;12 and that §702 burdens the free exercise rights of employees of religious institutions who work in nonreligious jobs. Finding that § 702 impermissibly sponsors religious organizations by granting them “an exclusive authorization to engage in conduct which can directly and immediately advance religious tenets and practices,” id., at 825, the court declared the statute unconstitutional as applied to secular activity. The court entered summary judgment in favor of Mayson pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) and ordered him reinstated with backpay.13 Subsequently, the court vacated its judg*334ment so that the United States could intervene to defend the constitutionality of § 702. After further briefing and argument the court affirmed its prior determination and reentered a final judgment for Mayson.
II
“This Court has long recognized that the government may (and sometimes must) accommodate religious practices and that it may do so without violating the Establishment Clause.” Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n of Fla., 480 U. S. 136, 144-145 (1987) (footnote omitted). It is well established, too, that “[t]he limits of permissible state accommodation to religion are by no means co-extensive with the noninterference mandated by the Free Exercise Clause.” Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U. S. 664, 673 (1970). There is ample room under the Establishment Clause for “benevolent neutrality which will permit religious exercise to exist without sponsorship and without interference.” Id., at 669. At some point, accommodation may devolve into “an unlawful *335fostering of religion,” Hobbie, supra, at 145, but these are not such cases, in our view.
The private appellants contend that we should not apply the three-part Lemon approach, which is assertedly unsuited to judging the constitutionality of exemption statutes such as §702. Brief for Appellants in No. 86-179, pp. 24-26. The argument is that an exemption statute will always have the effect of advancing religion and hence be invalid under the second (effects) part of the Lemon test, a result claimed to be inconsistent with cases such as Walz v. Tax Comm’n, supra, which upheld property tax exemptions for religious organizations. The first two of the three Lemon factors, however, were directly taken from pre-Walz decisions, 403 U. S., at 612-613, and Walz did not purport to depart from prior Establishment Clause cases, except by adding a consideration that became the third element of the Lemon test. 403 U. S., at 613. In any event, we need not reexamine Lemon as applied in this context, for the exemption involved here is in no way questionable under the Lemon analysis.
Lemon requires first that the law at issue serve a “secular legislative purpose.” Id., at 612. This does not mean that the law’s purpose must be unrelated to religion — that would amount to a requirement “that the government show a callous indifference to religious groups,” Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U. S. 306, 314 (1952), and the Establishment Clause has never been so interpreted. Rather, Lemon’s “purpose” requirement aims at preventing the relevant governmental decisionmaker — in this case, Congress — from abandoning neutrality and acting with the intent of promoting a particular point of view in religious matters.
Under the Lemon analysis, it is a permissible legislative purpose to alleviate significant governmental interference with the ability of religious organizations to define and carry out their religious missions. Appellees argue that there is no such purpose here because §702 provided adequate protection for religious employers prior to the 1972 amendment, *336when it exempted only the religious activities of such employers from the statutory ban on religious discrimination. We may assume for the sake of argument that the pre-1972 exemption was adequate in the sense that the Free Exercise Clause required no more. Nonetheless, it is a significant burden on a religious organization to require it, on pain of substantial liability, to predict which of its activities a secular court will consider religious. The line is hardly a bright one, and an organization might understandably be concerned that a judge would not understand its religious tenets and sense of mission.14 Fear of potential liability might affect the way an organization carried out what it understood to be its religious mission.
After a detailed examination of the legislative history of the 1972 amendment, the District Court concluded that Congress’ purpose was to minimize governmental “interference] with the decision-making process in religions. ” 594 F. Supp., at 812. We agree with the District Court that this purpose does not violate the Establishment Clause.
The second requirement under Lemon is that the law in question have “a principal or primary effect. . . that neither advances nor inhibits religion.” 403 U. S., at 612. Undoubtedly, religious organizations are better able now to advance their purposes than they were prior to the 1972 amendment to § 702. But religious groups have been better able to advance their purposes on account of many laws that have passed constitutional muster: for example, the property tax exemption at issue in Walz v. Tax Comm’n, supra, or the loans of schoolbooks to schoolchildren, including parochial school students, upheld in Board of Education v. Allen, 392 *337U. S. 236 (1968). A law is not unconstitutional simply because it allows churches to advance religion, which is their very purpose. For a law to have forbidden “effects” under Lemon, it must be fair to say that the government itself has advanced religion through its own activities and influence. As the Court observed in Walz, “for the men who wrote the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment the ‘establishment’ of a religion connoted sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity.” 397 U. S., at 668. Accord, Lemon, 403 U. S., at 612.
The District Court appeared to fear that sustaining the exemption would permit churches with financial resources impermissibly to extend their influence and propagate their faith by entering the commercial, profit-making world. 594 F. Supp., at 825. The cases before us, however, involve a nonprofit activity instituted over 75 years ago in the hope that “all who assemble here, and who come for the benefit of their health, and for physical blessings, [may] feel that they are in a house dedicated to the Lord.” Dedicatory Prayer for the Gymnasium, quoted, 594 F. Supp., at 800-801, n. 15. These cases therefore do not implicate the apparent concerns of the District Court. Moreover, we find no persuasive evidence in the record before us that the Church’s ability to propagate its religious doctrine through the Gymnasium is any greater now than it was prior to the passage of the Civil Rights Act in 1964. In such circumstances, we do not see how any advancement of religion achieved by the Gymnasium can be fairly attributed to the Government, as opposed to the Church.15
*338We find unpersuasive the District Court’s reliance on the fact that §702 singles out religious entities for a benefit. Although the Court has given weight to this consideration in its past decisions, see n. 11, supra, it has never indicated that statutes that give special consideration to religious groups are per se invalid. That would run contrary to the teaching of our cases that there is ample room for accommodation of religion under the Establishment Clause. See supra, at 334-335. Where, as here, government acts with the proper purpose of lifting a regulation that burdens the exercise of religion, we see no reason to require that the exemption come packaged with benefits to secular entities.
We are also unpersuaded by the District Court’s reliance on the argument that § 702 is unsupported by long historical tradition. There was simply no need to consider the scope of the § 702 exemption until the 1964 Civil Rights Act was passed, and the fact that Congress concluded after eight years that the original exemption was unnecessarily narrow is a decision entitled to deference, not suspicion.
Appellees argue that § 702 offends equal protection principles by giving less protection to the employees of religious employers than to the employees of secular employers.16 Appellees rely on Larson v. Valente, 456 U. S. 228, 246 *339(1982), for the proposition that a law drawing distinctions on religious grounds must be strictly scrutinized. But Larson indicates that laws discriminating among religions are subject to strict scrutiny, ibid., and that laws “affording a uniform benefit to all religions” should be analyzed under Lemon, 456 U. S., at 252. In cases such as these, where a statute is neutral on its face and motivated by a permissible purpose of limiting governmental interference with the exercise of religion, we see no justification for applying strict scrutiny to a statute that passes the Lemon test. The proper inquiry is whether Congress has chosen a rational classification to further a legitimate end. We have already indicated that «Congress acted with a legitimate purpose in expanding the § 702 exemption to cover all activities of religious employers. Supra, at 336. To dispose of appellees’ equal protection argument, it suffices to hold — as we now do — that as applied to the nonprofit activities of religious employers, § 702 is rationally related to the legitimate purpose of alleviating significant governmental interference with the ability of religious organizations to define and carry out their religious missions.
It cannot be seriously contended that §702 impermissibly entangles church and state; the statute effectuates a more complete separation of the two and avoids the kind of intrusive inquiry into religious belief that the District Court engaged in in this case. The statute easily passes muster under the third part of the Lemon test.17
*340The judgment of the District Court is reversed, and the cases are remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
with whom
Justice Marshall joins, concurring in the judgment.
I write separately to emphasize that my concurrence in the judgment rests on the fact that these cases involve a challenge to the application of § 702’s categorical exemption to the activities of a nonprofit organization. I believe that the particular character of nonprofit activity makes inappropriate a case-by-case determination whether its nature is religious or secular.
These cases present a confrontation between the rights of religious organizations and those of individuals. Any exemption from Title VII’s proscription on religious discrimination necessarily has the effect of burdening the religious liberty of prospective and current employees. An exemption says that a person may be put to the choice of either conforming to certain religious tenets or losing a job opportunity, a promotion, or, as in these cases, employment itself.1 *341The potential for coercion created by such a provision is in serious tension with our commitment to individual freedom of conscience in matters of religious belief.2
At the same time, religious organizations have an interest in autonomy in ordering their internal affairs, so that they may be free to:
“select their own leaders, define their own doctrines, resolve their own disputes, and run their own institutions. Religion includes important communal elements for most believers. They exercise their religion through religious organizations, and these organizations must be protected by the [Free Exercise] [C]lause.” Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The *342Case of Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 Colum. L. Rev. 1373, 1389 (1981).
See also Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U. S. 696 (1976) (church has interest in effecting binding resolution of internal governance disputes); Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U. S. 94 (1952) (state statute purporting to transfer administrative control from one church authority to another violates Free Exercise Clause). For many individuals, religious activity derives meaning in large measure from participation in a larger religious community. Such a community represents an ongoing tradition of shared beliefs, an organic entity not reducible to a mere aggregation of individuals.3 Determining that certain activities are in furtherance of an organization’s religious mission, and that only those committed to that mission should conduct them, is thus a means by which a religious community defines itself. Solicitude for a church’s ability to do so reflects the idea that furtherance of the autonomy of religious organizations often furthers individual religious freedom as well.
The authority to engage in this process of self-definition inevitably involves what we normally regard as infringement on free exercise rights, since a religious organization is able to condition employment in certain activities on subscription to particular religious tenets. We are willing to countenance the imposition of such a condition because we deem it vital that, if certain activities constitute part of a religious community’s practice, then a religious organization should be able to *343require that only members of its community perform those activities.
This rationale suggests that, ideally, religious organizations should be able to discriminate on the basis of religion only with respect to religious activities, so that a determination should be made in each case whether an activity is religious or secular. This is because the infringement on religious liberty that results from conditioning performance of secular activity upon religious belief cannot be defended as necessary for the community’s self-definition. Furthermore, the authorization of discrimination in such circumstances is not an accommodation that simply enables a church to gain members by the normal means of prescribing the terms of membership for those who seek to participate in furthering the mission of the community. Rather, it puts at the disposal of religion the added advantages of economic leverage in the secular realm. As a result, the authorization of religious discrimination with respect to nonreligious activities goes beyond reasonable accommodation, and has the effect of furthering religion in violation of the Establishment Clause. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, 612 (1971).
What makes the application of a religious-secular distinction difficult is that the character of an activity is not self-evident. As a result, determining whether an activity is religious or secular requires a searching case-by-case analysis. This results in considerable ongoing government entanglement in religious affairs. See id., at 613. Furthermore, this prospect of government intrusion raises concern that a religious organization may be chilled in its free exercise activity. While a church may regard the conduct of certain functions as integral to its mission, a court may disagree. A religious organization therefore would have an incentive to characterize as religious only those activities about which there likely would be no dispute, even if it genuinely believed that religious commitment was important in performing other tasks as well. As a result, the community’s process *344of self-definition would be shaped in part by the prospects of litigation. A case-by-case analysis for all activities therefore would both produce excessive government entanglement with religion and create the danger of chilling religious activity.
The risk of chilling religious organizations is most likely to arise with respect to nonprofit activities. The fact that an operation is not organized as a profit-making commercial enterprise makes colorable a claim that it is not purely secular in orientation. In contrast to a for-profit corporation, a nonprofit organization must utilize its earnings to finance the continued provision of the goods or services it furnishes, and may not distribute any surplus to the owners. See generally Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 Yale L. J. 835 (1980). This makes plausible a church’s contention that an entity is not operated simply in order to generate revenues for the church, but that the activities themselves are infused with a religious purpose. Furthermore, unlike for-profit corporations, nonprofits historically have been organized specifically to provide certain community services, not simply to engage in commerce. Churches often regard the provision of such services as a means of fulfilling religious duty and of providing an example of the way of life a church seeks to foster.4
*345Nonprofit activities therefore are most likely to present cases in which characterization of the activity as religious or secular will be a close question. If there is a danger that a religious organization will be deterred from classifying as religious those activities it actually regards as religious, it is likely to be in this domain.5 This substantial potential for chilling religious activity makes inappropriate a case-by-case determination of the character of a nonprofit organization, and justifies a categorical exemption for nonprofit activities. Such an exemption demarcates a sphere of deference with respect to those activities most likely to be religious. It permits infringement on employee free exercise rights in those instances in which discrimination is most likely to reflect a religious community’s self-definition. While not every nonprofit activity may be operated for religious purposes, the likelihood that many are makes a categorical rule a suitable means to avoid chilling the exercise of religion.6
Sensitivity to individual religious freedom dictates that religious discrimination be permitted only with respect to employment in religious activities. Concern for the autonomy of religious organizations demands that we avoid the entanglement and the chill on religious expression that a case-by-case determination would produce. We cannot escape the fact that these aims are in tension. Because of the nature of nonprofit activities, I believe that a categorical exemption for *346such enterprises appropriately balances these competing concerns. As a result, I concur in the Court’s judgment that the nonprofit Deseret Gymnasium may avail itself of an automatic exemption from Title VII’s proscription on religious discrimination.
concurring in the judgment.
Essentially for the reasons set forth in Justice O’Con-nor’s opinion, particularly the third and final paragraphs thereof, I too, concur in the judgment of the Court. I fully agree that the distinction drawn by the Court seems “to obscure far more than to enlighten,” as Justice O’Connor states, post, at 347, and that, surely, the “question of the constitutionality of the §702 exemption as applied to for-profit activities of religious organizations remains open,” post, at 349.
concurring in the judgment.
Although I agree with the judgment of the Court, I write separately to note that this action once again illustrates certain difficulties inherent in the Court’s use of the test articulated in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, 612-613 (1971). See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U. S. 38, 67 (1985) (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U. S. 668, 687 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring). As a result of this problematic analysis, while the holding of the opinion for the Court extends only to nonprofit organizations, its reasoning fails to acknowledge that the amended § 702, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-1, raises different questions as it is applied to profit and nonprofit organizations.
In Wallace v. Jaffree, supra, I noted a tension in the Court’s use of the Lemon test to evaluate an Establishment Clause challenge to government efforts to accommodate the free exercise of religion:
“On the one hand, a rigid application of the Lemon test would invalidate legislation exempting religious observers from generally applicable government obligations. *347By definition, such legislation has a religious purpose and effect in promoting the free exercise of religion. On the other hand, judicial deference to all legislation that purports to facilitate the free exercise of religion would completely vitiate the Establishment Clause. Any statute pertaining to religion can be viewed as an ‘accommodation’ of free exercise rights.” Wallace v. Jaffree, supra, at 82.
In my view, the opinion for the Court leans toward the second of the two unacceptable options described above. While acknowledging that “[undoubtedly, religious organizations are better able now to advance their purposes than they were prior to the 1972 amendment to § 702,” the Court seems to suggest that the “effects” prong of the Lemon test is not at all implicated as long as the government action can be characterized as “allowing” religious organizations to advance religion, in contrast to government action directly advancing religion. Ante, at 337. This distinction seems to me to obscure far more than to enlighten. Almost any government benefit to religion could be recharacterized as simply “allowing” a religion to better advance itself, unless perhaps it involved actual proselytization by government agents. In nearly every case of a government benefit to religion, the religious mission would not be advanced if the religion did not take advantage of the benefit; even a direct financial subsidy to a religious organization would not advance religion if for some reason the organization failed to make any use of the funds. It is for this same reason that there is little significance to the Court’s observation that it was the Church rather than the Government that penalized Mayson’s refusal to adhere to Church doctrine. Ante, at 337, n. 15. The Church had the power to put Mayson to a choice of qualifying for a temple recommend or losing his job because the Government had lifted from religious organizations the general regulatory burden imposed by § 702.
*348The necessary first step in evaluating an Establishment Clause challenge to a government action lifting from religious organizations a generally applicable regulatory burden is to recognize that such government action does have the effect of advancing religion. The necessary second step is to separate those benefits to religion that constitutionally accommodate the free exercise of religion from those that provide unjustifiable awards of assistance to religious organizations. As I have suggested in earlier opinions, the inquiry framed by the Lemon test should be “whether government’s purpose is to endorse religion and whether the statute actually conveys a message of endorsement.” Wallace, 472 U. S., at 69. To ascertain whether the statute conveys a message of endorsement, the relevant issue is how it would be perceived by an objective observer, acquainted with the text, legislative history, and implementation of the statute. Id., at 76. Of course, in order to perceive the government action as a permissible accommodation of religion, there must in fact be an identifiable burden on the exercise of religion that can be said to be lifted by the government action. The determination whether the objective observer will perceive an endorsement of religion “is not a question of simple historical fact. Although evidentiary submissions may help answer it, the question is, like the question whether racial or sex-based classifications communicate an invidious message, in large part a legal question to be answered on the basis of judicial interpretation of social facts.” Lynch v. Donnelly, supra, at 693-694.
The above framework, I believe, helps clarify why the amended §702 raises different questions as it is applied to nonprofit and for-profit organizations. As Justice Brennan observes in his concurrence: “The fact that an operation is not organized as a profit-making commercial enterprise makes colorable a claim that it is not purely secular in orientation.” Ante, at 344 (opinion concurring in judgment). These cases involve a Government decision to lift from a non*349profit activity of a religious organization the burden of demonstrating that the particular nonprofit activity is religious as well as the burden of refraining from discriminating on the basis of religion. Because there is a probability that a nonprofit activity of a religious organization will itself be involved in the organization’s religious mission, in my view the objective observer should perceive the Government action as an accommodation of the exercise of religion rather than as a Government endorsement of religion.
It is not clear, however, that activities conducted by religious organizations solely as profit-making enterprises will be as likely to be directly involved in the religious mission of the organization. While I express no opinion on the issue, I emphasize that under the holding of the Court, and under my view of the appropriate Establishment Clause analysis, the question of the constitutionality of the § 702 exemption as applied to for-profit activities of religious organizations remains open.
12.1.4 Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 12.1.4 Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
HOSANNA-TABOR EVANGELICAL LUTHERAN CHURCH AND SCHOOL v. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION et al.
No. 10-553.
Argued October 5, 2011
Decided January 11, 2012
*175Douglas Laycock argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Kevin J. Hasson, Eric C. Rassbach, Hannah C. Smith, Luke W. Goodrich, Lori H. Windham, and James W. Erwin.
Leondra R. Kruger argued the cause for the federal respondent. With her on the brief were Solicitor General Verrilli, Assistant Attorney General Perez, Joseph R. Pal-more, Dennis J. Dimsey, Sharon M. McGowan, P. David Lopez, Lorraine C. Davis, and Carolyn L. Wheeler. Walter Dellinger argued the cause for respondent Perich. With him on the brief were Sri Srinivasan, Anton Metlit-sky, Loren L. Alikhan, James E. Roach, and Robert M. Vercruysse.*
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Certain employment discrimination laws authorize employees who have been wrongfully terminated to sue their employers for reinstatement and damages. The question presented is whether the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment bar such an action when *177the employer is a religious group and the employee is one of the group’s ministers.
I
A
Petitioner Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School is a member congregation of the Lutheran Church — Missouri Synod, the second largest Lutheran denomination in America. Hosanna-Tabor operated a small school in Redford, Michigan, offering a “Christ-centered education” to students in kindergarten through eighth grade. 582 F. Supp. 2d 881, 884 (ED Mich. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The Synod classifies teachers into two categories: “called” and “lay.” “Called” teachers are regarded as having been called to their vocation by God through a congregation. To be eligible to receive a call from a congregation, a teacher must satisfy certain academic requirements. One way of doing so is by completing a “colloquy” program at a Lutheran college or university. The program requires candidates to take eight courses of theological study, obtain the endorsement of their local Synod district, and pass an oral examination by a faculty committee. A teacher who meets these requirements may be called by a congregation. Once called, a .teacher receives the formal title “Minister of Religion, Commissioned.” App. 42, 48. A commissioned minister serves for an open-ended term; at Hosanna-Tabor, a call could be rescinded only for cause and by a supermajority vote of the congregation.
“Lay” or “contract” teachers, by contrast, are not required to be trained by the Synod or even to be Lutheran. At Hosanna-Tabor, they were appointed by the school board, without a vote of the congregation, to one-year renewable terms. Although teachers at the school generally performed the same duties regardless of whether they were lay or called, lay teachers were hired only when called teachers were unavailable.
*178Respondent Cheryl Perich was first employed by Hosanna-Tabor as a lay teacher in 1999. After Perich completed her colloquy later that school year, Hosanna-Tabor asked her to become a called teacher. Perich accepted the call and received a “diploma of vocation” designating her a commissioned minister. Id., at 42.
Perich taught kindergarten during her first four years at Hosanna-Tabor and fourth grade during the 2003-2004 school year. She taught math, language arts, social studies, science, gym, art, and music. She also taught a religion class four days a week, led the students in prayer and devotional exercises each day, and attended a weekly school-wide chapel service. Perich led the chapel service herself about twice a year.
Perich became ill in June 2004 with what was eventually diagnosed as narcolepsy. Symptoms included sudden and deep sleeps from which she could not be roused. Because of her illness, Perich began the 2004-2005 school year on disability leave. On January 27, 2005, however, Perich notified the school principal, Stacey Hoeft, that she would be able to report to work the following month. Hoeft responded that the school had already contracted with a lay teacher to fill Perich’s position for the remainder of the school year. Hoeft also expressed concern that Perich was not yet ready to return to the classroom.
On January 30, Hosanna-Tabor held a meeting of its congregation at which school administrators stated that Perich was unlikely to be physically capable of returning to work that school year or the next. The congregation voted to offer Perich a “peaceful release” from her call, whereby the congregation would pay a portion of her health insurance premiums in exchange for her resignation as a called teacher. Id., at 178, 186. Perich refused to resign and produced a note from her doctor stating that she would be able to return to work on February 22. The school board urged Perich to *179reconsider, informing her that the school no longer had a position for her, but Perich stood by her decision not to resign.
On the morning of February 22 — the first day she was medically cleared to return to work — Perich presented herself at the school. Hoeft asked her to leave but she would not do so until she obtained written documentation that she had reported to work. Later that afternoon, Hoeft called Perich at home and told her that she would likely be fired. Perich responded that she had spoken with an attorney and intended to assert her legal rights.
Following a school board meeting that evening, board chairman Scott Salo sent Perich a letter stating that Hosanna-Tabor was reviewing the process for rescinding her call in light of her “regrettable” actions. Id., at 229. Salo subsequently followed up with a letter advising Perich that the congregation would consider whether to rescind her call at its next meeting. As grounds for termination, the letter cited Perich’s “insubordination and disruptive behavior” on February 22, as well as the damage she had done to her “working relationship” with the school by “threatening to take legal action.” Id., at 55. The congregation voted to rescind Perich’s call on April 10, and Hosanna-Tabor sent her a letter of termination the next day.
B
Perich filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, alleging that her employment had been terminated in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 104 Stat. 327, 42 U. S. C. § 12101 et seq. The ADA prohibits an employer from discriminating against a qualified individual on the basis of disability. § 12112(a). It also prohibits an employer from retaliating “against any individual because such individual has opposed any act or practice made unlawful by [the ADA] or because such individual *180made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under [the ADA].” § 12203(a).1
The EEOC brought suit against Hosanna-Tabor, alleging that Perich had been fired in retaliation for threatening to file an ADA lawsuit. Perich intervened in the litigation, claiming unlawful retaliation under both the ADA and the Michigan Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act, Mich. Comp. Laws § 37.1602(a) (1979). The EEOC and Perich sought Perich’s reinstatement to her former position (or frontpay in lieu thereof), along with backpay, compensatory and punitive damages, attorney’s fees, and other injunctive relief.
Hosanna-Tabor moved for summary judgment. Invoking what is known as the “ministerial exception,” the Church argued that the suit was barred by the First Amendment because the claims at issue concerned the employment relationship between a religious institution and one of its ministers. According to the Church, Perich was a minister, and she had been fired for a religious reason — namely, that her threat to- sue the Church violated the Synod’s belief that Christians should resolve their disputes internally.
The District Court agreed that the suit was barred by the ministerial exception and granted summary judgment in *181Hosanna-Tabor’s favor. The court explained that “Hosanna-Tabor treated Perich like a minister and held her out to the world as such long before this litigation began,” and that the “facts surrounding Perich’s employment in a religious school with a sectarian mission” supported the Church’s characterization. 582 F. Supp. 2d, at 891-892. In light of that determination, the court concluded that it could “inquire no further into her claims of retaliation.” Id., at 892.
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded, directing the District Court to proceed to the merits of Perich’s retaliation claims. The Court of Appeals recognized the existence of a ministerial exception barring certain employment discrimination claims against religious institutions — an exception “rooted in the First Amendment’s guarantees of religious freedom.” 597 F. 3d 769, 777 (2010). The court concluded, however, that Perich did not qualify as a “minister” under the exception, noting in particular that her duties as a called teacher were identical to her duties as a lay teacher. Id., at 778-781. Judge White concurred. She viewed the question whether Perich qualified as a minister to be closer than did the majority, but agreed that the “fact that the duties of the contract teachers are the same as the duties of the called teachers is telling.” Id., at 782, 784. We granted certiorari. 563 U. S. 903 (2011).
II
The First Amendment provides, in part, that Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” We have said that these two Clauses “often exert conflicting pressures,” Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U. S. 709, 719 (2005), and that there can be “internal tension ... between the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause,” Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 672, 677 (1971) (plurality opinion). Not so here. Both Religion Clauses bar the government from interfering with the decision of a religious group to fire one of its ministers.
*182A
Controversy between church and state over religious offices is hardly new. In 1215, the issue was addressed in the very first clause of Magna Carta. There, King John agreed that “the English church shall be free, and shall have its rights undiminished and its liberties unimpaired.” The King in particular accepted the “freedom of elections,” a right “thought to be of the greatest necessity and importance to the English church.” J. Holt, Magna Carta App. IV, p. 317, cl. 1 (1965).
That freedom in many cases may have been more theoretical than real. See, e. g., W. Warren, Henry II 312 (1973) (recounting the writ sent by Henry II to the electors of a bishopric in Winchester, stating: “I order you to hold a free election, but forbid you to elect anyone but Richard my clerk”). In any event, it did not survive the reign of Henry VIII, even in theory. The Act of Supremacy of 1534, 26 Hen. 8, ch. 1, made the English monarch the supreme head of the Church, and the Act in Restraint of Annates, 25 Hen. 8, ch. 20, passed that same year, gave him the authority to appoint the Church’s high officials. See G. Elton, The Tudor Constitution: Documents and Commentary 331-332 (1960). Various Acts of Uniformity, enacted subsequently, tightened further the government’s grip on the exercise of religion. See, e. g., Act of Uniformity, 1559, 1 Eliz., ch. 2; Act of Uniformity, 1549, 2 & 3 Edw. 6, ch. 1. The Uniformity Act of 1662, for instance, limited service as a minister to those who formally assented to prescribed tenets and pledged to follow the mode of worship set forth in the Book of Common Prayer. Any minister who refused to make that pledge was “deprived of all his Spiritual Promotions.” Act of Uniformity, 1662, 14 Car. 2, ch. 4.
Seeking to escape the control of the national church, the Puritans fled to New England, where they hoped to elect their own ministers and establish their own modes of worship. See T. Curry, The First Freedoms: Church and State *183in America to the Passage of the First Amendment 3 (1986); McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1409, 1422 (1990). William Penn, the Quaker proprietor of what would eventually become Pennsylvania and Delaware, also sought independence from the Church of England. The charter creating the province of Pennsylvania contained no clause establishing a religion. See S. Cobb, The Rise of Religious Liberty in America 440-441 (1970).
Colonists in the South, in contrast, brought the Church of England with them. But even they sometimes chafed at the control exercised by the Crown and its representatives over religious offices. In Virginia, for example, the law vested the governor with the power to induct ministers presented to him by parish vestries, 2 Hening’s Statutes at Large 46 (1642), but the vestries often refused to make such presentations and instead chose ministers on their own. See H. Eck-enrode, Separation of Church and State in Virginia 13-19 (1910). Controversies over the selection of ministers also arose in other Colonies with Anglican establishments, including North Carolina. See C. Antieau, A. Downey, & E. Roberts, Freedom From Federal Establishment: Formation and Early History of the First Amendment Religion Clauses 10-11 (1964). There, the royal governor insisted that the right of presentation lay with the Bishop of London, but the colonial assembly enacted laws placing that right in the vestries. Authorities in England intervened, repealing those laws as inconsistent with the rights of the Crown. See id., at 11; Weeks, Church and State in North Carolina, Johns Hopkins U. Studies in Hist. & Pol. Sci., 11th Ser., Nos. 5-6, pp. 29-36 (1893).
It was against this background that the First Amendment was adopted. Familiar with life under the established Church of England, the founding generation sought to foreclose the possibility of a national church. See 1 Annals of Cong. 730-731 (1789) (remarks of J. Madison) (noting that the *184Establishment Clause addressed the fear that “one sect might obtain a pre-eminence, or two combine together, and establish a religion to which they would compel others to conform”). By forbidding the “establishment of religion” and guaranteeing the “free exercise thereof,” the Religion Clauses ensured that the new Federal Government — unlike the English Crown — would have no role in filling ecclesiastical offices. The Establishment Clause prevents the Government from appointing ministers, and the Free Exercise Clause prevents it from interfering with the freedom of religious groups to select their own.
This understanding of the Religion Clauses was reflected in two events involving James Madison, “ ‘the leading architect of the religion clauses of the First Amendment.’ ” Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization v. Winn, 563 U. S. 125, 141 (2011) (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S. 83, 103 (1968)). The first occurred in 1806, when John Carroll, the first Catholic bishop in the United States, solicited the Executive’s opinion on who should be appointed to direct the affairs of the Catholic Church in the territory newly acquired by the Louisiana Purchase. After consulting with President Jefferson, then-Seeretary of State Madison responded that the selection of church “functionaries” was an “entirely ecclesiastical” matter left to the Church’s own judgment. Letter from James Madison to Bishop Carroll (Nov. 20, 1806), reprinted in 20 Records of the American Catholic Historical Society 63 (1909). The “scrupulous policy of the Constitution in guarding against a political interference with religious affairs,” Madison explained, prevented the Government from rendering an opinion on the “selection of ecclesiastical individuals.” Id., at 63-64.
The second episode occurred in 1811, when Madison was President. Congress had passed a bill incorporating the Protestant Episcopal Church in the town of Alexandria in what was then the District of Columbia. Madison vetoed the bill, on the ground that it “exceeds the rightful authority *185to which Governments are limited, by the essential distinction between civil and religious functions, and violates, in particular, the article of the Constitution of the United States, which declares, that ‘Congress shall make no law respecting a religious establishment.’” 22 Annals of Cong. 982-983 (1811). Madison explained:
“The bill enacts into, and establishes by law, sundry rules and proceedings relative purely to the organization and polity of the church incorporated, and comprehending even the election and removal of the Minister of the same; so that no change could be made therein by the particular society, or by the general church of which it is a member, and whose authority it recognises.” Id., at 983 (emphasis added).
B
Given this understanding of the Religion Clauses — and the absence of government employment regulation generally — it was some time before questions about government interference with a church’s ability to select its own ministers came before the courts. This Court touched upon the issue indirectly, however, in the context of disputes over church property. Our decisions in that area confirm that it is impermissible for the government to contradict a church’s determination of who can act as its ministers.
In Watson v. Jones, 13 Wall. 679 (1872), the Court considered a dispute between antislavery and proslavery factions over who controlled the property of the Walnut Street Presbyterian Church in Louisville, Kentucky. The General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church had recognized the antislavery faction, and this Court — applying not the Constitution but a “broad and sound view of the relations of church and state under our system of laws” — declined to question that determination. Id., at 727. We explained that “whenever the questions of discipline, or of faith, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law have been decided by the highest of [the] *186church judicatories to which the matter has been carried, the legal tribunals must accept such decisions as final, and as binding on them.” Ibid. As we would put it later, our opinion in Watson “radiates ... a spirit of freedom for religious organizations, an independence from secular control or manipulation — in short, power to decide for themselves, free from state interference, matters of church government as well as those of faith and doctrine.” Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church in North America, 344 U. S. 94, 116 (1952).
Confronting the issue under the Constitution for the first time in Kedroff, the Court recognized that the “[f]reedom to select the clergy, where no improper methods of choice are proven,” is “part of the free exercise of religion” protected by the First Amendment against government interference. Ibid. At issue in Kedroff was the right to use a Russian Orthodox cathedral in New York City. The Russian Orthodox churches in North America had split from the Supreme Church Authority in Moscow, out of concern that the Authority had become a tool of the Soviet Government. The North American churches claimed that the right to use the cathedral belonged to an archbishop elected by them; the Supreme Church Authority claimed that it belonged instead to an archbishop appointed by the patriarch in Moscow. New York’s highest court ruled in favor of the North American churches, based on a state law requiring every Russian Orthodox church in New York to recognize the determination of the governing body of the North American churches as authoritative. Id., at 96-97, 99, n. 3, 106, n. 10.
This Court reversed, concluding that the New York law violated the First Amendment. Id., at 107. We explained that the controversy over the right to use the cathedral was “strictly a matter of ecclesiastical government, the power of the Supreme Church Authority of the Russian Orthodox Church to appoint the ruling hierarch of the archdiocese of *187North America.” Id., at 115. By “passing] the control of matters strictly ecclesiastical from one church authority to another,” the New York law intruded the “power of the state into the forbidden area of religious freedom contrary to the principles of the First Amendment.” Id., at 119. Accordingly, we declared the law unconstitutional because it “directly prohibited] the free exercise of an ecclesiastical right, the Church’s choice of its hierarchy.” Ibid.
This Court reaffirmed these First Amendment principles in Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for United States and Canada v. Milivojevich, 426 U. S. 696 (1976), a case involving a dispute over control of the American-Canadian Diocese of the Serbian Orthodox Church, including its property and assets. The Church had removed Dionisije Milivojevich as bishop of the American-Canadian Diocese because of his defiance of the church hierarchy. Following his removal, Dio-nisije brought a civil action in state court challenging the Church’s decision, and the Illinois Supreme Court “purported in effect to reinstate Dionisije as Diocesan Bishop,” on the ground that the proceedings resulting in his removal failed to comply with church laws and regulations. Id., at 708.
Reversing that judgment, this Court explained that the First Amendment “permit[s] hierarchical religious organizations to establish their own rules and regulations for internal discipline and government, and to create tribunals for adjudicating disputes over these matters.” Id., at 724. When ecclesiastical tribunals decide such disputes, we further explained, “the Constitution requires that civil courts accept their decisions as binding upon them.” Id., at 725. We thus held that by inquiring into whether the Church had followed its own procedures, the State Supreme Court had “unconstitutionally undertaken the resolution of quintessentially religious controversies whose resolution the First Amendment commits exclusively to the highest ecclesiastical tribunals” of the Church. Id., at 720.
*188C
Until today, we have not had occasion to consider whether this freedom of a religious organization to select its ministers is implicated by a suit alleging discrimination in employment. The Courts of Appeals, in contrast, have had extensive experience with this issue. Since the passage of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. §2000e et seq., and other employment discrimination laws, the Courts of Appeals have uniformly recognized the existence of a “ministerial exception,” grounded in the First Amendment, that precludes application of such legislation to claims concerning the employment relationship between a religious institution and its ministers.2
We agree that there is such a ministerial exception. The members of a religious group put their faith in the hands of their ministers. Requiring a church to accept or retain an unwanted minister, or punishing a church for failing to do so, intrudes upon more than a mere employment decision. Such action interferes with the internal governance of the church, depriving the church of control over the selection of those who will personify its beliefs. By imposing an unwanted minister, the state infringes the Free Exercise Clause, which protects a religious group’s right to shape its own faith and mission through its appointments. According the state *189the power to determine which individuals will minister to the faithful also violates the Establishment Clause, which prohibits government involvement in such ecclesiastical decisions.
The EEOC and Perich acknowledge that employment discrimination laws would be unconstitutional as applied to religious groups in certain circumstances. They grant, for example, that it would violate the First Amendment for courts to apply such laws to compel the ordination of women by the Catholic Church or by an Orthodox Jewish seminary. Brief for Federal Respondent 31; Brief for Respondent Perich 35-36. According to the EEOC and Perich, religious organizations could successfully defend against employment discrimination claims in those circumstances by invoking the constitutional right to freedom of association — a right “implicit” in the First Amendment. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U. S. 609, 622 (1984). The EEOC and Perich thus see no need — and no basis — for a special rule for ministers grounded in the Religion Clauses themselves.
We find this position untenable. The right to freedom of association is a right enjoyed by religious and secular groups alike. It follows under the EEOC’s and Perich’s view that the First Amendment analysis should be the same, whether the association in question is the Lutheran Church, a labor union, or a social club. See Perich Brief 31; Tr. of Oral Arg. 28. That result is hard to square with the text of the First Amendment itself, which gives special solicitude to the rights of religious organizations. We cannot accept the remarkable view that the Religion Clauses have nothing to say about a religious organization’s freedom to select its own ministers.
The EEOC and Perich also contend that our decision in Employment Div., Dept, of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U. S. 872 (1990), precludes recognition of a ministerial exception. In Smith, two members of the Native American Church were denied state unemployment benefits *190after it was determined that they had been fired from their jobs for ingesting peyote, a crime under Oregon law. We held that this did not violate the Free Exercise Clause, even though the peyote had been ingested for sacramental purposes, because the “right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes).” Id., at 879 (internal quotation marks omitted).
It is true that the ADA’s prohibition on retaliation, like Oregon’s prohibition on peyote use, is a valid and neutral law of general applicability. But a church’s selection of its ministers is unlike an individual’s ingestion of peyote. Smith involved government regulation of only outward physical acts. The present case, in contrast, concerns government interference with an internal church decision that affects the faith and mission of the church itself. See id., at 877 (distinguishing the government’s regulation of “physical acts” from its “lending] its power to one or the other side in controversies over religious authority or dogma”). The contention that Smith forecloses recognition of a ministerial exception rooted in the Religion Clauses has no merit.
HH J — I h-i
Having concluded that there is a ministerial exception grounded in the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, we consider whether the exception applies in this case. We hold that it does.
Every Court of Appeals to have considered the question has concluded that the ministerial exception is not limited to the head of a religious congregation, and we agree. We are reluctant, however, to adopt a rigid formula for deciding when an employee qualifies as a minister. It is enough for us to conclude, in this our first case involving the ministerial exception, that the exception covers Perich, given all the circumstances of her employment.
*191To begin with, Hosanna-Tabor held Perich out as a minister, with a role distinct from that of most of its members. When Hosanna-Tabor extended her a call, it issued her a “diploma of vocation” according her the title “Minister of Religion, Commissioned.” App. 42. She was tasked with performing that office “according to the Word of God and the confessional standards of the Evangelical Lutheran Church as drawn from the Sacred Scriptures.” Ibid. The congregation prayed that God “bless [her] ministrations to the glory of His holy name, [and] the building of His church.” Id., at 43. In a supplement to the diploma, the congregation undertook to periodically review Pencil's “skills of ministry” and “ministerial responsibilities,” and to provide for her “continuing education as a professional person in the ministry of the Gospel.” Id., at 48.
Perieh’s title as a minister reflected a significant degree of religious training followed by a formal process of commissioning. To be eligible to become a commissioned minister, Perich had to complete eight college-level courses in subjects including biblical interpretation, church doctrine, and the ministry of the Lutheran teacher. She also had to obtain the endorsement of her local Synod district by submitting a petition that contained her academic transcripts, letters of recommendation, personal statement, and written answers to various ministry-related questions. Finally, she had to pass an oral examination by a faculty committee at a Lutheran college. It took Perich six years to fulfill these requirements. And when she eventually did, she was commissioned as a minister only upon election by the congregation, which recognized God’s call to her to teach. At that point, her call could be rescinded only upon a supermajority vote of the congregation — a protection designed to allow her to “preach the Word of God boldly.” Brief for Lutheran Church — Missouri Synod as Amicus Curiae 15.
Perich held herself out as a minister of the Church by accepting the formal call to religious service, according to its terms. She did so in other ways as well. For example, she *192claimed a special housing allowance on her taxes that was available only to employees earning their compensation “ ‘in the exercise of the ministry.’” App. 220 (“If you are not conducting activities ‘in the exercise of the ministry/ you cannot take advantage of the parsonage or housing allowance exclusion” (quoting Lutheran Church — Missouri Synod Brochure on Whether the IRS Considers Employees as a Minister (2007)). In a form she submitted to the Synod following her termination, Perich again indicated that she regarded herself as a minister at Hosanna-Tabor, stating: “I feel that God is leading me to serve in the teaching ministry.... Iam anxious to be in the teaching ministry again soon.” App. 53.
Perich’s job duties reflected a role in conveying the Church’s message and carrying out its mission. Hosanna-Tabor expressly charged her with “lead[ing] others toward Christian maturity” and “teaching] faithfully the Word of God, the Sacred Scriptures, in its truth and purity and as set forth in all the symbolical books of the Evangelical Lutheran Church.” Id., at 48. In fulfilling these responsibilities, Perich taught her students religion four days a week, and led them in prayer three times a day. Once a week, she took her students to a school-wide chapel service, and — about twice a year — she took her turn leading it, choosing the liturgy, selecting the hymns, and delivering a short message based on verses from the Bible. During her last year of teaching, Perich also led her fourth graders in a brief devotional exercise each morning. As a source of religious instruction, Perich performed an important role in transmitting the Lutheran faith to the next generation.
In light of these considerations — the formal title given Perich by the Church, the substance reflected in that title, her own use of that title, and the important religious functions she performed for the Church — we conclude that Per-ich was a minister covered by the ministerial exception.
In reaching a contrary conclusion, the Court of Appeals committed three errors. First, the Sixth Circuit failed to *193see any relevance in the fact that Perich was a commissioned minister. Although such a title, by itself, does not automatically ensure coverage, the fact that an employee has been ordained or commissioned as a minister is surely relevant, as is.the fact that significant religious training and a recognized religious mission underlie the description of the employee’s position. It was wrong for the Court of Appeals — and Per-ich, who has adopted the court’s view, see Perich Brief 45— to say that an employee’s title does not matter.
Second, the Sixth Circuit gave too much weight to the fact that lay teachers at the school performed the same religious duties as Perich. We express no view on whether someone with Perich’s duties would be covered by the ministerial exception in the absence of the other considerations we have discussed. But though relevant, it cannot be dispositive that others not formally recognized as ministers by the church perform the same functions — particularly when, as here, they did so only because commissioned ministers were unavailable.
Third, the Sixth Circuit placed too much emphasis on Per-ich’s performance of secular duties. It is true that her religious duties consumed only 45 minutes of each workday, and that the rest of her day was devoted to teaching secular subjects. The EEOC regards that as conclusive, contending that any ministerial exception “should be limited to those employees who perform exclusively religious functions.” Brief for Federal Respondent 51. We cannot accept that view. Indeed, we are unsure whether any such employees exist. The heads of congregations themselves often have a mix of duties, including secular ones such as helping to manage the congregation’s finances, supervising purely secular personnel, and overseeing the upkeep of facilities.
Although the Sixth Circuit did not adopt the extreme position pressed here by the EEOC, it did regard the relative amount of time Perich spent performing religious functions as largely determinative. The issue before us, however, is *194not one. that can be resolved by a stopwatch. The amount of time an employee spends on particular activities is relevant in assessing that employee’s status, but that factor cannot be considered in isolation, without regard to the nature of the religious functions performed and the other considerations discussed above.
Because Perich was a minister within the meaning of the exception, the First Amendment requires dismissal of this employment ■ discrimination suit against her religious employer. The EEOC and Perich originally sought an order reinstating Perich to her former position as a called teacher. By requiring the Church to accept a minister it did not want, such an order would have plainly violated the Church’s freedom under the Religion Clauses to select its own ministers.
Perich no longer seeks reinstatement, having abandoned that relief before this Court. See Perich Brief 58. But that is immaterial. Perich continues to seek frontpay in lieu of reinstatement, backpay, compensatory and punitive damages, and attorney’s fees. An award of such relief would operate as a penalty on the Church for terminating an unwanted minister, and would be no less prohibited by the First Amendment than an order overturning the termination. Such relief would depend on a determination that Hosanna-Tabor was wrong to have relieved Perich of her position, and it is precisely such a ruling that is barred by the ministerial exception.3
The EEOC and Perich suggest that Hosanna-Tabor’s asserted religious reason for firing Perich — that she violated the Synod’s commitment to internal dispute resolution — was pretextual. That suggestion misses the point of the ministerial exception. The purpose of the exception is not to safeguard a church’s decision to fire a minister only when it is made for a religious reason. The exception instead ensures *195that the authority to select and control who will minister to the faithful — a matter “strictly ecclesiastical,” Kedroff, 344 U. S., at 119 — is the church’s alone.4
IV
The EEOC and Perich foresee a parade of horribles that will follow our recognition of a ministerial exception to employment discrimination suits. According to the EEOC and Perich, such an exception could protect religious organizations from liability for retaliating against employees for reporting criminal misconduct or for testifying before a grand jury or in a criminal trial. What is more, the EEOC contends, the logic of the exception would confer on religious employers “unfettered discretion” to violate employment laws by, for example, hiring children or aliens not authorized to work in the United States. Brief for Federal Respondent 29.
Hosanna-Tabor responds that the ministerial exception would not in any way bar criminal prosecutions for interfering with law enforcement investigations or other proceedings. Nor, according to the Church, would the exception bar government enforcement of general laws restricting eligibil*196ity for employment, because the exception applies only to suits by or on behalf of ministers themselves. Hosanna-Tabor also notes that the ministerial exception has been around in the lower courts for 40 years, see McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F. 2d 563, 558 (CA5 1972), and has not given rise to the dire consequences predicted by the EEOC and Perich.
The case before us is an employment discrimination suit brought on behalf of a minister, challenging her church’s decision to fire her. Today we hold only that the ministerial exception bars such a suit. We express no view on whether the exception bars other types of suits, including actions by employees alleging breach of contract or tortious conduct by their religious employers. There will be time enough to address the applicability of the exception to other circumstances if and when they arise.
* * *
The interest of society in the enforcement of employment discrimination statutes is undoubtedly important. But so too is the interest of religious groups in choosing who will preach their beliefs, teach their faith, and carry out their mission. When a minister who has been fired sues her church alleging that her termination was discriminatory, the First Amendment has struck the balance for us. The church must be free to choose those who will guide it on its way.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit is reversed.
It is so ordered.
concurring.
I join the Court’s opinion. I write separately to note that, in my view, the Religion Clauses require civil courts to apply the ministerial exception and to defer to a religious organization’s good-faith understanding of who qualifies as its minister. As the Court explains, the Religion Clauses guarantee *197religious organizations autonomy in matters of internal governance, including the selection of those who will minister the faith. A religious organization’s right to choose its ministers would be hollow, however, if secular courts could second-guess the organization’s sincere determination that a given employee is a “minister” under the organization’s theological tenets. Our country’s religious landscape includes organizations with different leadership structures and doctrines that influence their conceptions of ministerial status. The question whether an employee is a minister is itself religious in nature, and the answer will vary widely. Judicial attempts to fashion a civil definition of “minister” through a bright-line test or multifactor analysis risk disadvantaging those religious groups whose beliefs, practices, and membership are outside of the “mainstream” or unpalatable to some. Moreover, uncertainty about whether its ministerial designation will be rejected, and a corresponding fear of liability, may cause a religious group to conform its beliefs and practices regarding “ministers” to the prevailing secular understanding. See Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U. S. 327, 336 (1987) (“[I]t is a significant burden on a religious organization to require it, on pain of substantial liability, to predict which of its activities a secular court will consider religious. The line is hardly a bright one, and an organization might understandably be concerned that a judge would not understand its religious tenets and sense of mission. Fear of potential liability might affect the way an organization carried out what it understood to be its religious mission” (footnote omitted)). These are certainly dangers that the First Amendment was designed to guard against.
The Court thoroughly sets forth the facts that lead to its conclusion that Cheryl Perich was one of Hosanna-Tabor’s ministers, and I agree that these facts amply demonstrate Perich’s ministerial role. But the evidence demonstrates *198that Hosanna-Tabor sincerely considered Perieh a minister. That would be sufficient for me to conclude that Perich’s suit is properly barred by the ministerial exception.
with whom Justice Kagan joins,
concurring.
I join the Court’s opinion, but I write separately to clarify my understanding of the significance of formal ordination and designation as a “minister” in determining whether an “employee”1 of a religious group falls within the so-called “ministerial” exception. The term “minister” is commonly used by many Protestant denominations to refer to members of their clergy, but the term is rarely if ever used in this way by Catholics, Jews, Muslims, Hindus, or Buddhists.2 In addition, the concept of ordination as understood by most Christian churches and by Judaism has no clear counterpart in some Christian denominations and some other religions. Because virtually every religion in the world is represented in the population of the United States, it would be a mistake if the term “minister” or the concept of ordination were viewed as central to the important issue of religious autonomy that is presented in cases like this one. Instead, courts should focus on the function performed by persons who work for religious bodies.
*199The First Amendment protects the freedom of religious groups to engage in certain key religious activities, including the conducting of worship services and other religious ceremonies and rituals, as well as the critical process of communicating the faith. Accordingly, religious groups must be free to choose the personnel who are essential to the performance of these functions.
The “ministerial” exception should be tailored to this purpose. It should apply to any “employee” who leads a religious organization, conducts worship services or important religious ceremonies or rituals, or serves as a messenger or teacher of its faith. If a religious group believes that the ability of such an employee to perform these key functions has been compromised, then the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom protects the group’s right to remove the employee from his or her position.
I
Throughout our Nation’s history, religious bodies have been the preeminent example of private associations that have “act[ed] as critical buffers between the individual and the power of the State.” Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U. S. 609, 619 (1984). In a case like the one now before us — where the goal of the civil law in question, the elimination of discrimination against persons with disabilities, is so worthy — it is easy to forget that the autonomy of religious groups, both here in the United States and abroad, has often served as a shield against oppressive civil laws. To safeguard this crucial autonomy, we have long recognized that the Religion Clauses protect a private sphere within which religious bodies are free to govern themselves in accordance with their own beliefs. The Constitution guarantees religious bodies “independence from secular control or manipulation — in short, power to decide for themselves, free from state interference, matters of church government as well as *200those of faith and doctrine.” Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church in North America, 344 U. S. 94, 116 (1952).
Religious autonomy means that religious authorities must be free to determine who is qualified to serve in positions of substantial religious importance. Different religions will have different views on exactly what qualifies as an important religious position, but it is nonetheless possible to identify a general category of “employees” whose functions are essential to the independence of practically all religious groups. These include those who serve in positions of leadership, those who perform important functions in worship services and in the performance of religious ceremonies and rituals, and those who are entrusted with teaching and conveying the tenets of the faith to the next generation.
Applying the protection of the First Amendment to roles of religious leadership, worship, ritual, and expression focuses on the objective functions that are important for the autonomy of any religious group, regardless of its beliefs. As we have recognized in a similar context, “[fjorcing a group to accept certain members may impair [its ability] to express those views, and only those views, that it intends to express.” Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U. S. 640, 648 (2000). That principle applies with special force with respect to religious groups, whose very existence is dedicated to the collective expression and propagation of shared religious ideals. See Employment Div., Dept, of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U. S. 872, 882 (1990) (noting that the constitutional interest in freedom of association may be “reinforced by Free Exercise Clause concerns”). As the Court notes, the First Amendment “gives special solicitude to the rights of religious organizations,” ante, at 189, but our expressive-association cases are nevertheless useful in pointing out what those essential rights are. Religious groups are the archetype of associations formed for expressive purposes, and their fundamental rights surely include the free*201dom to choose who is qualified to serve as a voice for their faith.
When it comes to the expression and inculcation of religious doctrine, there can be. no doubt that the messenger matters. Religious teachings cover the gamut from moral conduct to metaphysical truth, and both the content and credibility of a religion’s message depend vitally on the character and conduct of its teachers. A religion cannot depend on someone to be an effective advocate for its religious vision if that person’s conduct fails to live up to the religious precepts that he or she espouses. For this reason, a religious body’s right to self-governance must include the ability to select, and to be selective about, those who will serve as the very “embodiment of its message” and “its voice to the faithful.” Petrusha v. Gannon Univ., 462 F. 3d 294, 306 (CA3 2006). A religious body’s control over such “employees” is an essential component of its ireedom to speak in its own voice, both to its own members and to the outside world.
The connection between church governance and the free dissemination of religious doctrine has deep roots in our legal tradition:
“The right to organize voluntary religious associations to assist in the expression and dissemination of any religious doctrine, and to create tribunals for the decision of controverted questions of faith within the association, and for the ecclesiastical government of all the individual members, congregations, and officers within the general association, is unquestioned. All who unite themselves to such a body do so with an implied consent to this government, and are bound to submit to it. But it would be a vain consent and would lead to the total subversion of such religious bodies, if any one aggrieved by one of their decisions could appeal to the secular courts and have them reversed.” Watson v. Jones, 13 Wall. 679, 728-729 (1872).
*202The “ministerial” exception gives concrete protection to the free “expression and dissemination of any religious doctrine.” The Constitution leaves it to the collective conscience of each religious group to determine for itself who is qualified to serve as a teacher or messenger of its faith.
I — I ⅜-H
A
The Court’s opinion today holds that the “ministerial” exception applies to Cheryl Perich (hereinafter respondent), who is regarded by the Lutheran Church — Missouri Synod as a commissioned minister. But while a ministerial title is undoubtedly relevant in applying the First Amendment rule at issue, such a title is neither necessary nor sufficient. As previously noted, most faiths do not employ the term “minister,” and some eschew the concept of formal ordination.3 And at the opposite end of the spectrum, some faiths consider the ministry to consist of all or a very large percentage of their members.4 Perhaps this explains why, although every circuit to consider the issue has recognized the “ministerial” exception, no circuit has made ordination status or formal title determinative of the exception’s applicability. The Fourth Circuit was the first to use the term “ministerial exception,” but in doing so it took pains to clarify that the label was a mere shorthand. See Rayburn v. General Conference of Seventh-day Adventists, 772 F. 2d 1164, 1168 *203(1985) (noting that the exception’s applicability “does not depend upon ordination but upon the function of the position”). The Fourth Circuit traced the exception back to McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F. 2d 553 (CA5 1972), which invoked the Religion Clauses to bar a Title VII sex-discrimination suit brought by a woman who was described by the court as a Salvation Army “minister,” id., at 554, although her actual title was “officer.” See McClure v. Salvation Army, 323 F. Supp. 1100, 1101 (ND Ga. 1971). A decade after McClure, the Fifth Circuit made clear that formal ordination was not necessary for the “ministerial” exception to apply. The court held that the members of the faculty at a Baptist seminary were covered by the exception because of their religious function in conveying church doctrine, even though some of them were not ordained ministers. See EEOC v. Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary, 651 F. 2d 277 (1981).
The functional consensus has held up over time, with the D. C. Circuit recognizing that “[t]he ministerial exception has not been limited to members of the clergy.” EEOC v. Catholic Univ., 83 F. 3d 455, 461 (1996). The court in that case rejected a Title VII suit brought by a Catholic nun who claimed that the Catholic University of America had denied her tenure for a canon-law teaching position because of her gender. The court noted that “members of the Canon Law Faculty perform the vital function of instructing those who will in turn interpret, implement, and teach the law governing the Roman Catholic Church and the administration of its sacraments. Although Sister McDonough is not a priest, she is a member of a religious order who sought a tenured professorship in a field that is of fundamental importance to the spiritual mission of her Church.” Id., at 464. See also Natal v. Christian and Missionary Alliance, 878 F. 2d 1575, 1578 (CA1 1989) (stating that “a religious organization’s fate is inextricably bound up with those whom it entrusts with the responsibilities of preaching its word and ministering to *204its adherents,” and noting “the difficulties inherent in separating the message from the messenger”).
The Ninth Circuit too has taken a functional approach, just recently reaffirming that “the ministerial exception encompasses more than a church’s ordained ministers.” Alcazar v. Corporation of Catholic Archbishop of Seattle, 627 P. 3d 1288,1291 (2010) (en banc); see also Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church, 375 F. 3d 951, 958 (2004). The Court’s opinion today should not be read to upset this consensus.
B
The ministerial exception applies to respondent because, as the Court notes, she played a substantial role in “conveying the Church’s message and carrying out its mission.” Ante, at 192. She taught religion to her students four days a week and took them to chapel on the fifth day. She led them in daily devotional exercises, and led them in prayer three times a day. She also alternated with the other teachers in planning and leading worship services at the school chapel, choosing liturgies, hymns, and readings, and composing and delivering a message based on Scripture.
It makes no difference that respondent also taught secular subjects. While a purely secular teacher would not qualify for the “ministerial” exception, the constitutional protection of religious teachers is not somehow diminished when they take on secular functions in addition to their religious ones. What matters is that respondent played an important role as an instrument of her church’s religious message and as a leader of its worship activities. Because of these important religious functions, Hosanna-Tabor had the right to decide for itself whether respondent was religiously qualified to remain in her office.
Hosanna-Tabor discharged respondent because she threatened to file suit against the church in a civil court. This threat contravened the Lutheran doctrine that disputes among Christians should be resolved internally without re*205sort to the civil court system and all the legal wrangling it entails.5 In Hosanna-Tabor’s view, respondent’s disregard for this doctrine compromised her religious function, disqualifying her from serving effectively as a voice for the church’s faith. Respondent does not dispute that the Lutheran Church subscribes to a doctrine of internal dispute resolution, but she argues that this was a mere pretext for her firing, which was really done for nonreligious reasons.
For civil courts to engage in the pretext inquiry that respondent and the Solicitor General urge us to sanction would dangerously undermine the religious autonomy that lower court ease law has now protected for nearly four decades. In order to probe the real reason for respondent’s firing, a civil court — and perhaps a jury — would be required to make a judgment about church doctrine. The credibility of Hosanna-Tabor’s asserted reason for terminating respondent’s employment could not be assessed without taking into account both the importance that the Lutheran Church attaches to the doctrine of internal dispute resolution and the degree to which that tenet compromised respondent’s religious function. If it could be shown that this belief is an obscure and minor part of Lutheran doctrine, it would be much more plausible for respondent to argue that this doctrine was not the real reason for her firing. If, on the other hand, the doctrine is a central and universally known tenet of Lutheranism, then the church’s asserted reason for her discharge would seem much more likely to be nonpretextual. But whatever the truth of the matter might be, the mere adjudication of such questions would pose grave problems *206for religious autonomy: It would require calling witnesses to testify about the importance and priority of the religious doctrine in question, with a civil factfinder sitting in ultimate judgment of what the accused church really believes, and how important that belief is to the church’s overall mission.
At oral argument, both respondent and the United States acknowledged that a pretext inquiry would sometimes be prohibited by principles of religious autonomy, and both conceded that a Roman Catholic priest who is dismissed for getting married could not sue the church and claim that his dismissal was actually based on a ground forbidden by the federal antidiscrimination laws. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 38-39, 50. But there is no principled basis for proscribing a pretext inquiry in such a case while permitting it in a case like the one now before us. The Roman Catholic Church’s insistence on clerical celibacy may be much better known than the Lutheran Church’s doctrine of internal dispute resolution, but popular familiarity with a religious doctrine cannot be the determinative factor.
What matters in the present case is that Hosanna-Tabor believes that the religious function that respondent performed made it essential that she abide by the doctrine of internal dispute resolution; and the civil courts are in no position to second-guess that assessment. This conclusion rests not on respondent’s ordination status or her formal title, but rather on her functional status as the type of employee that a church must be free to appoint or dismiss in order to exercise the religious liberty that the First Amendment guarantees.
12.2 Religious Freedom From Discrimination 12.2 Religious Freedom From Discrimination
12.2.1 What is Religion? 12.2.1 What is Religion?
EEOC, Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Religion, 29 CFR 1605.1 (2009).
In most cases whether or not a practice or belief is religious is not at issue. However, in those cases in which the issue does exist, the Commission will define religious practices to include moral or ethical beliefs as to what is right and wrong which are sincerely held with the strength of traditional religious views. This standard was developed in United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965) and Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970). The Commission has consistently applied this standard in its decisions. 1 The fact that no religious group espouses such beliefs or the fact that the religious group to which the individual professes to belong may not accept such belief will not determine whether the belief is a religious belief of the employee or prospective employee. The phrase “religious practice” as used in these Guidelines includes both religious observances and practices.
Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 207-210 (3d Cir. 1979) (per curiam) (Adams, J. concurring).
There appear to be three useful indicia that are basic to our traditional religions and that are themselves related to the values that undergird the first amendment.
The first and most important of these indicia is the nature of the ideas in question. This means that a court must, at least to a degree, examine the content of the supposed religion, not to determine its truth or falsity, or whether it is schismatic or orthodox, but to determine whether the subject matter it comprehends is consistent with the assertion that it is, or is not, a religion. Thus the court was able to remark in Founding Church of Scientology:
It might be possible to show that a self-proclaimed religion was merely a commercial enterprise, without the underlying theories of man's nature or his place in the Universe which characterize recognized religions.
Similarly, one of the conscientious objectors whose appeal was coupled with Seeger, submitted a long memorandum, noted by the Court, in which he defined religion as the "sum and essence of one's basic attitudes to the fundamental problems of human existence."
Expectation that religious ideas should address fundamental questions is in some ways comparable to the reasoning of the Protestant theologian Dr. Paul Tillich, who expressed his view on the essence of religion in the phrase "ultimate concern." Tillich perceived religion as intimately connected to concepts that are of the greatest depth and utmost importance. His thoughts have been influential both with courts and commentators. Nor is it difficult to see why this philosophy would prove attractive in the American constitutional framework. One's views, be they orthodox or novel, on the deeper and more imponderable questions — the meaning of life and death, man's role in the Universe, the proper moral code of right and wrong — are those likely to be the most "intensely personal" and important to the believer. They are his ultimate concerns. As such, they are to be carefully guarded from governmental interference, and never converted into official government doctrine. The first amendment demonstrates a specific solicitude for religion because religious ideas are in many ways more important than other ideas. New and different ways of meeting those concerns are entitled to the same sort of treatment as the traditional forms.
Thus, the "ultimate" nature of the ideas presented is the most important and convincing evidence that they should be treated as religious. Certain isolated answers to "ultimate" questions, however, are not necessarily "religious" answers, because they lack the element of comprehensiveness, the second of the three indicia. A religion is not generally confined to one question or one moral teaching; it has a broader scope. It lays claim to an ultimate and comprehensive "truth." Thus the so-called "Big Bang" theory, an astronomical interpretation of the creation of the universe, may be said to answer an "ultimate" question, but it is not, by itself, a "religious" idea. Likewise, moral or patriotic views are not by themselves "religious," but if they are pressed as divine law or a part of a comprehensive belief-system that presents them as "truth," they might well rise to the religious level.
The component of comprehensiveness is particularly relevant in the context of state education. A science course may touch on many ultimate concerns, but it is unlikely to proffer a systematic series of answers to them that might begin to resemble a religion. St. Thomas Aquinas once defined theology by asserting,
. . . this science commands all the other sciences as the ruling science. . . This science uses for its service all the other sciences, as though its vassals, . . ..
The teaching of isolated theories that might be thought to address "ultimate" questions is not the teaching of such a "ruling science." When these theories are combined into a comprehensive belief system, however, the result may well become such a "ruling science" that overflows into other academic disciplines as the guiding idea of the student's pursuits. It is just such a "ruling science" that the establishment clause guards against.
A third element to consider in ascertaining whether a set of ideas should be classified as a religion is any formal, external, or surface signs that may be analogized to accepted religions. Such signs might include formal services, ceremonial functions, the existence of clergy, structure and organization, efforts at propagation, observation of holidays and other similar manifestations associated with the traditional religions. Of course, a religion may exist without any of these signs, so they are not determinative, at least by their absence, in resolving a question of definition. But they can be helpful in supporting a conclusion of religious status given the important role such ceremonies play in religious life. These formal signs of religion were found to be persuasive proofs of religious character for tax exemption purposes in Washington Ethical Society and Fellowship of Humanity, discussed supra. They are noted as well in Founding Church of Scientology supra. Thus, even if it is true that a religion can exist without rituals and structure, they may nonetheless be useful signs that a group or belief system is religious.
Although these indicia will be helpful, they should not be thought of as a final "test" for religion. Defining religion is a sensitive and important legal duty. Flexibility and careful consideration of each belief system are needed. Still, it is important to have some objective guidelines in order to avoid ad hoc justice.
12.2.2 Definitions 12.2.2 Definitions
42 U.S.C. § 2000e
United States Code, 2018 Edition
Title 42 - THE PUBLIC HEALTH AND WELFARE
CHAPTER 21 - CIVIL RIGHTS
SUBCHAPTER VI - EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES
Sec. 2000e - Definitions
From the U.S. Government Publishing Office,
For the purposes of this subchapter—
(a) The term "person" includes one or more individuals, governments, governmental agencies, political subdivisions, labor unions, partnerships, associations, corporations, legal representatives, mutual companies, joint-stock companies, trusts, unincorporated organizations, trustees, trustees in cases under title 11, or receivers.
(b) The term "employer" means a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such a person, but such term does not include (1) the United States, a corporation wholly owned by the Government of the United States, an Indian tribe, or any department or agency of the District of Columbia subject by statute to procedures of the competitive service (as defined in section 2102 of title 5), or (2) a bona fide private membership club (other than a labor organization) which is exempt from taxation under section 501(c) of title 26, except that during the first year after March 24, 1972, persons having fewer than twenty-five employees (and their agents) shall not be considered employers.
(c) The term "employment agency" means any person regularly undertaking with or without compensation to procure employees for an employer or to procure for employees opportunities to work for an employer and includes an agent of such a person.
(d) The term "labor organization" means a labor organization engaged in an industry affecting commerce, and any agent of such an organization, and includes any organization of any kind, any agency, or employee representation committee, group, association, or plan so engaged in which employees participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours, or other terms or conditions of employment, and any conference, general committee, joint or system board, or joint council so engaged which is subordinate to a national or international labor organization.
(e) A labor organization shall be deemed to be engaged in an industry affecting commerce if (1) it maintains or operates a hiring hall or hiring office which procures employees for an employer or procures for employees opportunities to work for an employer, or (2) the number of its members (or, where it is a labor organization composed of other labor organizations or their representatives, if the aggregate number of the members of such other labor organization) is (A) twenty-five or more during the first year after March 24, 1972, or (B) fifteen or more thereafter, and such labor organization—
(1) is the certified representative of employees under the provisions of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended [29 U.S.C. 151 et seq.], or the Railway Labor Act, as amended [45 U.S.C. 151 et seq.];
(2) although not certified, is a national or international labor organization or a local labor organization recognized or acting as the representative of employees of an employer or employers engaged in an industry affecting commerce; or
(3) has chartered a local labor organization or subsidiary body which is representing or actively seeking to represent employees of employers within the meaning of paragraph (1) or (2); or
(4) has been chartered by a labor organization representing or actively seeking to represent employees within the meaning of paragraph (1) or (2) as the local or subordinate body through which such employees may enjoy membership or become affiliated with such labor organization; or
(5) is a conference, general committee, joint or system board, or joint council subordinate to a national or international labor organization, which includes a labor organization engaged in an industry affecting commerce within the meaning of any of the preceding paragraphs of this subsection.
(f) The term "employee" means an individual employed by an employer, except that the term "employee" shall not include any person elected to public office in any State or political subdivision of any State by the qualified voters thereof, or any person chosen by such officer to be on such officer's personal staff, or an appointee on the policy making level or an immediate adviser with respect to the exercise of the constitutional or legal powers of the office. The exemption set forth in the preceding sentence shall not include employees subject to the civil service laws of a State government, governmental agency or political subdivision. With respect to employment in a foreign country, such term includes an individual who is a citizen of the United States.
(g) The term "commerce" means trade, traffic, commerce, transportation, transmission, or communication among the several States; or between a State and any place outside thereof; or within the District of Columbia, or a possession of the United States; or between points in the same State but through a point outside thereof.
(h) The term "industry affecting commerce" means any activity, business, or industry in commerce or in which a labor dispute would hinder or obstruct commerce or the free flow of commerce and includes any activity or industry "affecting commerce" within the meaning of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 [29 U.S.C. 401 et seq.], and further includes any governmental industry, business, or activity.
(i) The term "State" includes a State of the United States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, American Samoa, Guam, Wake Island, the Canal Zone, and Outer Continental Shelf lands defined in the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act [43 U.S.C. 1331 et seq.].
(j) The term "religion" includes all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee's or prospective employee's religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business.
(k) The terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" include, but are not limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions; and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes, including receipt of benefits under fringe benefit programs, as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work, and nothing in section 2000e–2(h) of this title shall be interpreted to permit otherwise. This subsection shall not require an employer to pay for health insurance benefits for abortion, except where the life of the mother would be endangered if the fetus were carried to term, or except where medical complications have arisen from an abortion: Provided, That nothing herein shall preclude an employer from providing abortion benefits or otherwise affect bargaining agreements in regard to abortion.
(l) The term "complaining party" means the Commission, the Attorney General, or a person who may bring an action or proceeding under this subchapter.
(m) The term "demonstrates" means meets the burdens of production and persuasion.
(n) The term "respondent" means an employer, employment agency, labor organization, joint labor-management committee controlling apprenticeship or other training or retraining program, including an on-the-job training program, or Federal entity subject to section 2000e–16 of this title.
Notes
References in Text
The National Labor Relations Act, as amended, referred to in subsec. (e)(1), is act July 5, 1935, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449, which is classified generally to subchapter II (§151 et seq.) of chapter 7 of Title 29, Labor. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see section 167 of Title 29 and Tables.
The Railway Labor Act, referred to in subsec. (e)(1), is act May 20, 1926, ch. 347, 44 Stat. 577, which is classified principally to chapter 8 (§151 et seq.) of Title 45, Railroads. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see section 151 of Title 45 and Tables.
The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, referred to in subsec. (h), is Pub. L. 86–257, Sept. 14, 1959, 73 Stat. 519, which is classified principally to chapter 11 (§401 et seq.) of Title 29, Labor. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see Short Title note set out under section 401 of Title 29 and Tables.
For definition of Canal Zone, referred to in subsec. (i), see section 3602(b) of Title 22, Foreign Relations and Intercourse.
The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, referred to in subsec. (i), is act Aug. 7, 1953, ch. 345, 67 Stat. 462, which is classified generally to subchapter III (§1331 et seq.) of chapter 29 of Title 43, Public Lands. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see Short Title note set out under section 1301 of Title 43 and Tables.
Amendments
1991—Subsec. (f). Pub. L. 102–166, §109(a), inserted at end "With respect to employment in a foreign country, such term includes an individual who is a citizen of the United States."
Subsecs. (l) to (n). Pub. L. 102–166, §104, added subsecs. (l) to (n).
1986—Subsec. (b). Pub. L. 99–514 substituted "Internal Revenue Code of 1986" for "Internal Revenue Code of 1954", which for purposes of codification was translated as "title 26" thus requiring no change in text.
1978—Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 95–598 substituted "trustees in cases under title 11" for "trustees in bankruptcy".
Subsec. (k). Pub. L. 95–555 added subsec. (k).
1972—Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 92–261, §2(1), included within "person" governments, governmental agencies, and political subdivisions.
Subsec. (b). Pub. L. 92–261, §2(2), substituted "fifteen or more employees" for "twenty-five or more employees", extended coverage to include State and local governments, excepted from coverage any department or agency of the District of Columbia subject by statute to procedures of the competitive service, as defined in section 2102 of title 5, and substituted provisions under which persons having fewer than twenty-five employees during the first year after March 24, 1972, were not to be considered employers, for provisions under which persons having fewer than a specified number of employees during the first year after the effective date of this section, and the second and third years after such date were not to be considered employers.
Subsec. (c). Pub. L. 92–261, §2(3), struck out from term "employment agency" exemption from coverage for agencies of the United States, States or political subdivisions of States, other than the United States Employment Service and the system of State and local employment services receiving Federal assistance.
Subsec. (e). Pub. L. 92–261, §2(4), substituted provisions which set forth the number of members for a labor organization to be deemed to be engaged in an industry affecting commerce as twenty-five or more during the first year after March 24, 1972, and fifteen or more thereafter, for provisions which set forth the number of members for a labor organization to be deemed to be engaged in an industry affecting commerce as one hundred or more during the first year after the effective date of this section, seventy-five or more during the second year after such date, fifty or more during the third year after such date, and twenty-five or more thereafter.
Subsec. (f). Pub. L. 92–261, §2(5), inserted provisions enumerating persons excepted from term "employee".
Subsec. (h). Pub. L. 92–261, §2(6), inserted ", and further includes any governmental industry, business, or activity" after "Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959".
Subsec. (j). Pub. L. 92–261, §2(7), added subsec. (j).
1966—Subsec. (b). Pub. L. 89–554 struck out proviso which stated that it shall be the policy of the United States to insure equal employment opportunities for Federal employees without discrimination because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin and directed the President to utilize his existing authority to effectuate this policy.
Effective Date of 1991 Amendment
Amendment by section 104 of Pub. L. 102–166 effective Nov. 21, 1991, except as otherwise provided, see section 402 of Pub. L. 102–166, set out as a note under section 1981 of this title.
Pub. L. 102–166, title I, §109(c) Nov. 21, 1991, 105 Stat. 1078, provided that: "The amendments made by this section [amending this section and sections 2000e–1, 12111, and 12112 of this title] shall not apply with respect to conduct occurring before the date of the enactment of this Act [Nov. 21, 1991]."
Effective Date of 1978 Amendment
Amendment by Pub. L. 95–598 effective Oct. 1, 1979, see section 402(a) of Pub. L. 95–598, set out as Effective Date note preceding section 101 of Title 11, Bankruptcy.
Effective Date of 1978 Amendment; Exceptions to Application
Pub. L. 95–555, §2, Oct. 31, 1978, 92 Stat. 2076, provided that:
"(a) Except as provided in subsection (b), the amendment made by this Act [amending this section] shall be effective on the date of enactment [Oct. 31, 1978].
"(b) The provisions of the amendment made by the first section of this Act [amending this section] shall not apply to any fringe benefit program or fund, or insurance program which is in effect on the date of enactment of this Act [Oct. 31, 1978] until 180 days after enactment of this Act."
Effective Date
Pub. L. 88–352, title VII, §716(a), (b), July 2, 1964, 78 Stat. 266, provided that:
"(a) This title [enacting this section and sections 2000e–1, 2000e–4, 2000e–7 to 2000e–15 of this title, and amending sections 2204 and 2205(a)(45) of former Title 5, Executive Departments and Government Officers and Employees] shall become effective one year after the date of its enactment [July 2, 1964].
"(b) Notwithstanding subsection (a), sections of this title other than sections 703, 704, 706, and 707 [sections 2000e–2, 2000e–3, 2000e–5, and 2000e–6 of this title] shall become effective immediately [July 2, 1964]."
Glass Ceiling
Pub. L. 102–166, title II, Nov. 21, 1991, 105 Stat. 1081–1087, entitled the "Glass Ceiling Act of 1991", established a Glass Ceiling Commission which was to submit to Congress, no later than 15 months after Nov. 21, 1991, study and recommendations concerning eliminating artificial barriers to advancement of women and minorities in the workplace and increasing opportunities and developmental experiences of women and minorities to foster advancement to management and decisionmaking positions in businesses, authorized creation of a National Award for Diversity and Excellence in American Executive Management which was to be awarded annually by the Commission to a qualified business concern which promoted more diverse skilled work force at management and decisionmaking levels in business, and further provided for composition of Commission, powers, staff and consultants, confidentiality of information, appropriations, and termination of Commission and authority to make awards 4 years after Nov. 21, 1991.
Readjustment of Benefits
Pub. L. 95–555, §3, Oct. 31, 1978, 92 Stat. 2076, provided that: "Until the expiration of a period of one year from the date of enactment of this Act [Oct. 31, 1978] or, if there is an applicable collective-bargaining agreement in effect on the date of enactment of this Act, until the termination of that agreement, no person who, on the date of enactment of this Act is providing either by direct payment or by making contributions to a fringe benefit fund or insurance program, benefits in violation with this Act [amending this section and enacting provisions set out above] shall, in order to come into compliance with this Act, reduce the benefits or the compensation provided any employee on the date of enactment of this Act, either directly or by failing to provide sufficient contributions to a fringe benefit fund or insurance program: Provided, That where the costs of such benefits on the date of enactment of this Act are apportioned between employers and employees, the payments or contributions required to comply with this Act may be made by employers and employees in the same proportion: And provided further, That nothing in this section shall prevent the readjustment of benefits or compensation for reasons unrelated to compliance with this Act."
Executive Order No. 11126
Ex. Ord. No. 11126, Nov. 1, 1963, 28 F.R. 11717, as amended by Ex. Ord. No. 11221, May 6, 1965, 30 F.R. 6427; Ex. Ord. No. 12007, Aug. 22, 1977, 42 F.R. 42839, which related to the Interdepartmental Committee on the Status of Women and the Citizens' Advisory Council on the Status of Women, was revoked by Ex. Ord. No. 12050, Apr. 4, 1978, 43 F.R. 14431, formerly set out below.
Ex. Ord. No. 11246. Equal Opportunity in Federal Employment
Ex. Ord. No. 11246, Sept. 24, 1965, 30 F.R. 12319, as amended by Ex. Ord. No. 11375, Oct. 13, 1967, 32 F.R. 14303; Ex. Ord. No. 11478, Aug. 8, 1969, 34 F.R. 12985; Ex. Ord. No. 12086, Oct. 5, 1978, 43 F.R. 46501; Ex. Ord. No. 13279, §4, Dec. 12, 2002, 67 F.R. 77143; Ex. Ord. No. 13665, §2, Apr. 8, 2014, 79 F.R. 20749; Ex. Ord. No. 13672, §2, July 21, 2014, 79 F.R. 42971, provided:
Under and by virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the United States by the Constitution and statutes of the United States, it is ordered as follows:
Part I—Nondiscrimination in Government Employment
[Superseded. Ex. Ord. No. 11478, eff. Aug. 8, 1969, 34 F.R. 12985.]
Part II—Nondiscrimination in Employment by Government Contractors and Subcontractors
subpart a—duties of the secretary of labor
subpart b—contractors' agreements
"During the performance of this contract, the contractor agrees as follows:
"(1) The contractor will not discriminate against any employee or applicant for employment because of race, color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, or national origin. The contractor will take affirmative action to ensure that applicants are employed, and that employees are treated during employment, without regard to their race, color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, or national origin. Such action shall include, but not be limited to the following: employment, upgrading, demotion, or transfer; recruitment or recruitment advertising; layoff or termination; rates of pay or other forms of compensation; and selection for training, including apprenticeship. The contractor agrees to post in conspicuous places, available to employees and applicants for employment, notices to be provided by the contracting officer setting forth the provisions of this nondiscrimination clause.
"(2) The contractor will, in all solicitations or advertisements for employees placed by or on behalf of the contractor, state that all qualified applicants will receive consideration for employment without regard to race, color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, or national origin.
"[(3)] The contractor will not discharge or in any other manner discriminate against any employee or applicant for employment because such employee or applicant has inquired about, discussed, or disclosed the compensation of the employee or applicant or another employee or applicant. This provision shall not apply to instances in which an employee who has access to the compensation information of other employees or applicants as a part of such employee's essential job functions discloses the compensation of such other employees or applicants to individuals who do not otherwise have access to such information, unless such disclosure is in response to a formal complaint or charge, in furtherance of an investigation, proceeding, hearing, or action, including an investigation conducted by the employer, or is consistent with the contractor's legal duty to furnish information.
"(4) The contractor will send to each labor union or representative of workers with which he has a collective bargaining agreement or other contract or understanding, a notice, to be provided by the agency contracting officer, advising the labor union or workers' representative of the contractor's commitments under Section 202 of Executive Order No. 11246 of September 24, 1965, and shall post copies of the notice in conspicuous places available to employees and applicants for employment.
"(5) The contractor will comply with all provisions of Executive Order No. 11246 of Sept. 24, 1965, and of the rules, regulations, and relevant orders of the Secretary of Labor.
"(6) The contractor will furnish all information and reports required by Executive Order No. 11246 of September 24, 1965, and by the rules, regulations, and orders of the Secretary of Labor, or pursuant thereto, and will permit access to his books, records, and accounts by the contracting agency and the Secretary of Labor for purposes of investigation to ascertain compliance with such rules, regulations, and orders.
"(7) In the event of the contractor's noncompliance with the nondiscrimination clauses of this contract or with any of such rules, regulations, or orders, this contract may be cancelled, terminated or suspended in whole or in part and the contractor may be declared ineligible for further Government contracts in accordance with procedures authorized in Executive Order No. 11246 of Sept. 24, 1965, and such other sanctions may be imposed and remedies invoked as provided in Executive Order No. 11246 of September 24, 1965, or by rule, regulation, or order of the Secretary of Labor, or as otherwise provided by law.
"(8) The contractor will include the provisions of paragraphs (1) through (7) in every subcontract or purchase order unless exempted by rules, regulations, or orders of the Secretary of Labor issued pursuant to Section 204 of Executive Order No. 11246 of September 24, 1965 [section 204 of this Order] so that such provisions will be binding upon each subcontractor or vendor. The contractor will take such action with respect to any subcontract or purchase order as may be directed by the Secretary of Labor as a means of enforcing such provisions including sanctions for noncompliance: Provided, however, that in the event the contractor becomes involved in, or is threatened with, litigation with a subcontractor or vendor as a result of such direction, the contractor may request the United States to enter into such litigation to protect the interests of the United States."
(b) Bidders or prospective contractors or subcontractors may be required to state whether they have participated in any previous contract subject to the provisions of this Order, or any preceding similar Executive order, and in that event to submit, on behalf of themselves and their proposed subcontractors, Compliance Reports prior to or as an initial part of their bid or negotiation of a contract.
(c) Whenever the contractor or subcontractor has a collective bargaining agreement or other contract or understanding with a labor union or an agency referring workers or providing or supervising apprenticeship or training for such workers, the Compliance Report shall include such information as to such labor union's or agency's practices and policies affecting compliance as the Secretary of Labor may prescribe: Provided, That to the extent such information is within the exclusive possession of a labor union or any agency referring workers or providing or supervising apprenticeship or training and such labor union or agency shall refuse to furnish such information to the contractor, the contractor shall so certify to the Secretary of Labor as part of its Compliance Report and shall set forth what efforts he has made to obtain such information.
(d) The Secretary of Labor may direct that any bidder or prospective contractor or subcontractor shall submit, as part of his Compliance Report, a statement in writing, signed by an authorized officer or agent on behalf of any labor union or any agency referring workers or providing or supervising apprenticeship or other training, with which the bidder or prospective contractor deals, with supporting information, to the effect that the signer's practices and policies do not discriminate on the grounds of race, color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, or national origin, and that the signer either will affirmatively cooperate in the implementation of the policy and provisions of this order or that it consents and agrees that recruitment, employment, and the terms and conditions of employment under the proposed contract shall be in accordance with the purposes and provisions of the order. In the event that the union, or the agency shall refuse to execute such a statement, the Compliance Report shall so certify and set forth what efforts have been made to secure such a statement and such additional factual material as the Secretary of Labor may require.
(b) The Secretary of Labor may, by rule or regulation, exempt certain classes of contracts, subcontracts, or purchase orders (1) whenever work is to be or has been performed outside the United States and no recruitment of workers within the limits of the United States is involved; (2) for standard commercial supplies or raw materials; (3) involving less than specified amounts of money or specified numbers of workers; or (4) to the extent that they involve subcontracts below a specified tier.
(c) Section 202 of this Order shall not apply to a Government contractor or subcontractor that is a religious corporation, association, educational institution, or society, with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion to perform work connected with the carrying on by such corporation, association, educational institution, or society of its activities. Such contractors and subcontractors are not exempted or excused from complying with the other requirements contained in this Order.
(d) The Secretary of Labor may also provide, by rule, regulation, or order, for the exemption of facilities of a contractor that are in all respects separate and distinct from activities of the contractor related to the performance of the contract: provided, that such an exemption will not interfere with or impede the effectuation of the purposes of this Order: and provided further, that in the absence of such an exemption all facilities shall be covered by the provisions of this Order.
subpart c—powers and duties of the secretary of labor and the contracting agencies
(b) The Secretary of Labor may receive and investigate complaints by employees or prospective employees of a Government contractor or subcontractor which allege discrimination contrary to the contractual provisions specified in Section 202 of this Order.
(b) The Secretary of Labor may hold, or cause to be held, hearings in accordance with Subsection (a) of this Section prior to imposing, ordering, or recommending the imposition of penalties and sanctions under this Order. No order for debarment of any contractor from further Government contracts under Section 209(a)(6) shall be made without affording the contractor an opportunity for a hearing.
subpart d—sanctions and penalties
(1) Publish, or cause to be published, the names of contractors or unions which it has concluded have complied or have failed to comply with the provisions of this Order or of the rules, regulations, and orders of the Secretary of Labor.
(2) Recommend to the Department of Justice that, in cases in which there is substantial or material violation or the threat of substantial or material violation of the contractual provisions set forth in Section 202 of this Order, appropriate proceedings be brought to enforce those provisions, including the enjoining, within the limitations of applicable law, of organizations, individuals, or groups who prevent directly or indirectly, or seek to prevent directly or indirectly, compliance with the provisions of this Order.
(3) Recommend to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission or the Department of Justice that appropriate proceedings be instituted under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [this subchapter].
(4) Recommend to the Department of Justice that criminal proceedings be brought for the furnishing of false information to any contracting agency or to the Secretary of Labor as the case may be.
(5) After consulting with the contracting agency, direct the contracting agency to cancel, terminate, suspend, or cause to be cancelled, terminated, or suspended, any contract, or any portion or portions thereof, for failure of the contractor or subcontractor to comply with equal employment opportunity provisions of the contract. Contracts may be cancelled, terminated, or suspended absolutely or continuance of contracts may be conditioned upon a program for future compliance approved by the Secretary of Labor.
(6) Provide that any contracting agency shall refrain from entering into further contracts, or extensions or other modifications of existing contracts, with any noncomplying contractor, until such contractor has satisfied the Secretary of Labor that such contractor has established and will carry out personnel and employment policies in compliance with the provisions of this Order.
(b) Pursuant to rules and regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Labor, the Secretary shall make reasonable efforts, within a reasonable time limitation, to secure compliance with the contract provisions of this Order by methods of conference, conciliation, mediation, and persuasion before proceedings shall be instituted under subsection (a)(2) of this Section, or before a contract shall be cancelled or terminated in whole or in part under subsection (a)(5) of this Section.
subpart e—certificates of merit
Part III—Nondiscrimination Provisions in Federally Assisted Construction Contracts
(b) The provisions of Part II of this Order shall apply to such construction contracts, and for purposes of such application the administering department or agency shall be considered the contracting agency referred to therein.
(c) The term "applicant" as used in this Order means an applicant for Federal assistance or, as determined by agency regulation, other program participant, with respect to whom an application for any grant, contract, loan, insurance, or guarantee is not finally acted upon prior to the effective date of this Part, and it includes such an applicant after he becomes a recipient of such Federal assistance.
(b) In the event an applicant fails and refuses to comply with the applicant's undertakings pursuant to this Order, the Secretary of Labor may, after consulting with the administering department or agency, take any or all of the following actions: (1) direct any administering department or agency to cancel, terminate, or suspend in whole or in part the agreement, contract or other arrangement with such applicant with respect to which the failure or refusal occurred; (2) direct any administering department or agency to refrain from extending any further assistance to the applicant under the program with respect to which the failure or refusal occurred until satisfactory assurance of future compliance has been received by the Secretary of Labor from such applicant; and (3) refer the case to the Department of Justice or the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission for appropriate law enforcement or other proceedings.
(c) In no case shall action be taken with respect to an applicant pursuant to clause (1) or (2) of subsection (b) without notice and opportunity for hearing.
Part IV—Miscellaneous
(b) Nothing in this Order shall be deemed to relieve any person of any obligation assumed or imposed under or pursuant to any Executive Order superseded by this Order. All rules, regulations, orders, instructions, designations, and other directives issued by the President's Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity and those issued by the heads of various departments or agencies under or pursuant to any of the Executive orders superseded by this Order, shall, to the extent that they are not inconsistent with this Order, remain in full force and effect unless and until revoked or superseded by appropriate authority. References in such directives to provisions of the superseded orders shall be deemed to be references to the comparable provisions of this Order.
Ex. Ord. No. 11478. Equal Employment Opportunity in Federal Government
Ex. Ord. No. 11478, Aug. 8, 1969, 34 F.R. 12985, as amended by Ex. Ord. No. 11590, Apr. 23, 1971, 36 F.R. 7831; Ex. Ord. No. 12106, Dec. 26, 1978, 44 F.R. 1053; Ex. Ord. No. 13087, May 28, 1998, 63 F.R. 30097; Ex. Ord. No. 13152, May 2, 2000, 65 F.R. 26115; Ex. Ord. No. 13672, §1, July 21, 2014, 79 F.R. 42971, provided:
NOW THEREFORE, under and by virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the United States by the Constitution and statutes of the United States, it is ordered as follows:
(a) a biological parent;
(b) an adoptive parent;
(c) a foster parent;
(d) a stepparent;
(e) a custodian of a legal ward;
(f) in loco parentis over such an individual; or
(g) actively seeking legal custody or adoption of such an individual.
Executive Order No. 12050
Ex. Ord. No. 12050, Apr. 4, 1978, 43 F.R. 14431, as amended by Ex. Ord. No. 12057, May 8, 1978, 43 F.R. 19811; Ex. Ord. No. 12135, May 9, 1979, 44 F.R. 27639; Ex. Ord. No. 12336, Dec. 21, 1981, 46 F.R. 62239, which established a National Advisory Committee for Women, was omitted in view of the revocation of sections 1 to 5 and 7 and 8 by Ex. Ord. No. 12135, May 9, 1979, 44 F.R. 27639 and the revocation of section 6 by Ex. Ord. No. 12336, Dec. 21, 1981, 46 F.R. 62239.
Ex. Ord. No. 12067. Coordination of Federal Equal Employment Opportunity Programs
Ex. Ord. No. 12067, June 30, 1978, 43 F.R. 28967, as amended by Ex. Ord. No. 12107, Dec. 28, 1978, 44 F.R. 1055, provided:
By virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the United States by the Constitution and statutes of the United States, including Section 9 of Reorganization Plan Number 1 of 1978 (43 FR 19807) [set out under section 2000e–4 of this title and in the Appendix to Title 5, Government Organizations and Employees], it is ordered as follows:
1–1. Implementation of Reorganization Plan
1–101. The transfer to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission of all the functions of the Equal Employment Opportunity Coordinating Council, and the termination of that Council, as provided by Section 6 of Reorganization Plan Number 1 of 1978 (43 FR 19807) [set out under section 2000e–4 of this title and in the Appendix to Title 5, Government Organization and Employees] shall be effective on July 1, 1978.
1–2. Responsibilities of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
1–201. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission shall provide leadership and coordination to the efforts of Federal departments and agencies to enforce all Federal statutes, Executive orders, regulations, and policies which require equal employment opportunity without regard to race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age or handicap. It shall strive to maximize effort, promote efficiency, and eliminate conflict, competition, duplication and inconsistency among the operations, functions and jurisdictions of the Federal departments and agencies having responsibility for enforcing such statutes, Executive orders, regulations and policies.
1–202. In carrying out its functions under this order the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission shall consult with and utilize the special expertise of Federal departments and agencies with equal employment opportunity responsibilities. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission shall cooperate with such departments and agencies in the discharge of their equal employment responsibilities.
1–203. All Federal departments and agencies shall cooperate with and assist the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in the performance of its functions under this order and shall furnish the Commission such reports and information as it may request.
1–3. Specific Responsibilities
1–301. To implement its responsibilities under Section 1–2, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission shall, where feasible:
(a) develop uniform standards, guidelines, and policies defining the nature of employment discrimination on the ground of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age or handicap under all Federal statutes, Executive orders, regulations, and policies which require equal employment opportunity;
(b) develop uniform standards and procedures for investigations and compliance reviews to be conducted by Federal departments and agencies under any Federal statute, Executive order, regulation or policy requiring equal employment opportunity;
(c) develop procedures with the affected agencies, including the use of memoranda of understanding, to minimize duplicative investigations or compliance reviews of particular employers or classes of employers or others covered by Federal statutes, Executive orders, regulations or policies requiring equal employment opportunity;
(d) ensure that Federal departments and agencies develop their own standards and procedures for undertaking enforcement actions when compliance with equal employment opportunity requirements of any Federal statute, Executive order, regulation or policy cannot be secured by voluntary means;
(e) develop uniform record-keeping and reporting requirements concerning employment practices to be utilized by all Federal departments and agencies having equal employment enforcement responsibilities;
(f) provide for the sharing of compliance records, findings, and supporting documentation among Federal departments and agencies responsible for ensuring equal employment opportunity;
(g) develop uniform training programs for the staff of Federal departments and agencies with equal employment opportunity responsibilities;
(h) assist all Federal departments and agencies with equal employment opportunity responsibilities in developing programs to provide appropriate publications and other information for those covered and those protected by Federal equal employment opportunity statutes, Executive orders, regulations, and policies; and
(i) initiate cooperative programs, including the development of memoranda of understanding between agencies, designed to improve the coordination of equal employment opportunity compliance and enforcement.
1–302. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission shall assist the Office of Personnel Management, or its successor, in establishing uniform job-related qualifications and requirements for job classifications and descriptions for Federal employees involved in enforcing all Federal equal employment opportunity provisions.
1–303. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission shall issue such rules, regulations, policies, procedures or orders as it deems necessary to carry out its responsibilities under this order. It shall advise and offer to consult with the affected Federal departments and agencies during the development of any proposed rules, regulations, policies, procedures or orders and shall formally submit such proposed issuances to affected departments and agencies at least 15 working days prior to public announcement. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission shall use its best efforts to reach agreement with the agencies on matters in dispute. Departments and agencies shall comply with all final rules, regulations, policies, procedures or orders of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.
1–304. All Federal departments and agencies shall advise and offer to consult with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission during the development of any proposed rules, regulations, policies, procedures or orders concerning equal employment opportunity. Departments and agencies shall formally submit such proposed issuances to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and other interested Federal departments and agencies at least 15 working days prior to public announcement. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission shall review such proposed rules, regulations, policies, procedures or orders to ensure consistency among the operations of the various Federal departments and agencies. Issuances related to internal management and administration are exempt from this clearance process. Case handling procedures unique to a single program also are exempt, although the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission may review such procedures in order to assure maximum consistency within the Federal equal employment opportunity program.
1–305. Before promulgating significant rules, regulations, policies, procedures or orders involving equal employment opportunity, the Commission and affected departments and agencies shall afford the public an opportunity to comment.
1–306. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission may make recommendations concerning staff size and resource needs of the Federal departments and agencies having equal employment opportunity responsibilities to the Office of Management and Budget.
1–307. (a) It is the intent of this order that disputes between or among agencies concerning matters covered by this order shall be resolved through good faith efforts of the affected agencies to reach mutual agreement. Use of the dispute resolution mechanism contained in Subsections (b) and (c) of this Section should be resorted to only in extraordinary circumstances.
(b) Whenever a dispute which cannot be resolved through good faith efforts arises between the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and another Federal department or agency concerning the issuance of an equal employment opportunity rule, regulation, policy, procedure, order or any matter covered by this Order, the Chairman of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission or the head of the affected department or agency may refer the matter to the Executive Office of the President. Such reference must be in writing and may not be made later than 15 working days following receipt of the initiating agency's notice of intent publicly to announce an equal employment opportunity rule, regulation, policy, procedure or order. If no reference is made within the 15 day period, the decision of the agency which initiated the proposed issuance will become effective.
(c) Following reference of a disputed matter to the Executive Office of the President, the Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs and Policy (or such other official as the President may designate) shall designate an official within the Executive Office of the President to meet with the affected agencies to resolve the dispute within a reasonable time.
1–4. Annual Report
1–401. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission shall include in the annual report transmitted to the President and the Congress pursuant to Section 715 of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2000e–14), a statement of the progress that has been made in achieving the purpose of this order. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission shall provide Federal departments and agencies an opportunity to comment on the report prior to formal submission.
1–5. General Provisions
1–501. Nothing in this order shall relieve or lessen the responsibilities or obligations imposed upon any person or entity by Federal equal employment law, Executive order, regulation or policy.
1–502. Nothing in this order shall limit the Attorney General's role as legal adviser to the Executive Branch.
Jimmy Carter.
Ex. Ord. No. 12086. Consolidation of Contract Compliance Functions for Equal Employment Opportunity
Ex. Ord. No. 12086, Oct. 5, 1978, 43 F.R. 46501, as amended by Ex. Ord. No. 12608, Sept. 9, 1987, 52 F.R. 34617, provided:
By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and statutes of the United States of America, including Section 202 of the Budget and Accounting Procedures Act of 1950 (31 U.S.C. 581c) [31 U.S.C. 1531], in order to provide for the transfer to the Department of Labor of certain contract compliance functions relating to equal employment opportunity, it is hereby ordered as follows:
1–1. Transfer of Functions
1–101. The functions concerned with being primarily responsible for the enforcement of the equal employment opportunity provisions under Parts II and III of Executive Order. No. 11246, as amended [set out as a note above], are transferred or reassigned to the Secretary of Labor from the following agencies:
(a) Department of the Treasury.
(b) Department of Defense.
(c) Department of the Interior.
(d) Department of Commerce.
(e) Department of Health and Human Services.
(f) Department of Housing and Urban Development.
(g) Department of Transportation.
(h) Department of Energy.
(i) Environmental Protection Agency.
(j) General Services Administration.
(k) Small Business Administration.
1–102. The records, property, personnel and positions, and unexpended balances of appropriations or funds related to the functions transferred or reassigned by this Order, that are available and necessary to finance or discharge those functions, are transferred to the Secretary of Labor.
1–103. The Director of the Office of Management and Budget shall make such determinations, issue such orders, and take all actions necessary or appropriate to effectuate the transfers or reassignments provided by this Order, including the transfer of funds, records, property, and personnel.
1–2. Conforming Amendments to Executive Order No . 11246
1–201(a). In order to reflect the transfer of enforcement responsibility to the Secretary of Labor, Section 201 of Executive Order No. 11246, as amended, is amended to read:
"
(b) Paragraph (7) of the contract clauses specified in Section 202 of Executive Order No. 11246, as amended, is amended to read:
"(7) The contractor will include the provisions of paragraphs (1) through (7) in every subcontract or purchase order unless exempted by rules, regulations, or orders of the Secretary of Labor issued pursuant to Section 204 of Executive Order No. 11246 of September 24, 1965, so that such provisions will be binding upon each subcontractor or vendor. The contractor will take such action with respect to any subcontract or purchase order as may be directed by the Secretary of Labor as a means of enforcing such provisions including sanctions for noncompliance: Provided, however, that in the event the contractor becomes involved in, or is threatened with, litigation with a subcontractor or vendor as a result of such direction, the contractor may request the United States to enter into such litigation to protect the interests of the United States.".
1–202. In subsection (c) of Section 203 of Executive Order No. 11246, as amended, delete "contracting agency" in the proviso and substitute "Secretary of Labor" therefor.
1–203. In both the beginning and end of subsection (d) of Section 203 of Executive Order No. 11246, as amended, delete "contracting agency or the" in the phrase "contracting agency or the Secretary".
1–204. Section 205 of Executive Order No. 11246, as amended, is amended by deleting the last two sentences, which dealt with agency designation of compliance officers, and revising the rest of that Section to read:
"
1–205. In order to delete references to the contracting agencies conducting investigations, Section 206 of Executive Order No. 11246, as amended, is amended to read:
"
"(b) The Secretary of Labor may receive and investigate complaints by employees or prospective employees of a Government contractor or subcontractor which allege discrimination contrary to the contractual provisions specified in Section 202 of this Order.".
1–206. In Section 207 of Executive Order No. 11246, as amended, delete "contracting agencies, other" in the first sentence.
1–207. The introductory clause in Section 209(a) of Executive Order No. 11246, as amended, is amended by deleting "or the appropriate contracting agency" from "In accordance with such rules, regulations, or orders as the Secretary of Labor may issue or adopt, the Secretary or the appropriate contracting agency may:".
1–208. In paragraph (5) of Section 209(a) of Executive Order No. 11246, as amended, insert at the beginning the phrase "After consulting with the contracting agency, direct the contracting agency to", and at the end of paragraph (5) delete "contracting agency" and substitute therefor "Secretary of Labor" so that paragraph (5) is amended to read:
"(5) After consulting with the contracting agency, direct the contracting agency to cancel, terminate, suspend, or cause to be cancelled, terminated, or suspended, any contract, or any portion or portions thereof, for failure of the contractor or subcontractor to comply with equal employment opportunity provisions of the contract. Contracts may be cancelled, terminated, or suspended absolutely or continuance of contracts may be conditioned upon a program for future compliance approved by the Secretary of Labor.".
1–209. In order to reflect the transfer from the agencies to the Secretary of Labor of the enforcement functions, substitute "Secretary of Labor" for "each contracting agency" in Section 209(b) of Executive Order No. 11246, as amended, so that Section 209(b) is amended to read:
"(b) Pursuant to rules and regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Labor, the Secretary shall make reasonable efforts, within a reasonable time limitation, to secure compliance with the contract provisions of this Order by methods of conference, conciliation, mediation, and persuasion before proceedings shall be instituted under subsection (a)(2) of this Section, or before a contract shall be cancelled or terminated in whole or in part under subsection (a)(5) of this Section.".
1–210. In order to reflect the responsibility of the contracting agencies for prompt compliance with the directions of the Secretary of Labor, Sections 210 and 211 of Executive Order No. 11246, as amended, are amended to read:
"
"
1–211. Section 212 of Executive Order No. 11246, as amended, is amended to read:
"
1–212. In order to reflect the transfer of enforcement responsibility to the Secretary of Labor, references to the administering department or agency are deleted in clauses (1), (2), and (3) of Section 301 of Executive Order No. 11246, as amended, and those clauses are amended to read:
"(1) to assist and cooperate actively with the Secretary of Labor in obtaining the compliance of contractors and subcontractors with those contract provisions and with the rules, regulations and relevant orders of the Secretary, (2) to obtain and to furnish to the Secretary of Labor such information as the Secretary may require for the supervision of such compliance, (3) to carry out sanctions and penalties for violation of such obligations imposed upon contractors and subcontractors by the Secretary of Labor pursuant to Part II, Subpart D, of this Order,".
1–213. In order to reflect the transfer from the agencies to the Secretary of Labor of the enforcement functions "Secretary of Labor" shall be substituted for "administering department or agency" in Section 303 of Executive Order No. 11246, as amended, and Section 303 is amended to read:
"
"(b) In the event an applicant fails and refuses to comply with the applicant's undertakings pursuant to this Order, the Secretary of Labor may, after consulting with the administering department or agency, take any or all of the following actions: (1) direct any administering department or agency to cancel, terminate, or suspend in whole or in part the agreement, contract or other arrangement with such applicant with respect to which the failure or refusal occurred; (2) direct any administering department or agency to refrain from extending any further assistance to the applicant under the program with respect to which the failure or refusal occurred until satisfactory assurance of future compliance has been received by the Secretary of Labor from such applicant; and (3) refer the case to the Department of Justice or the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission for appropriate law enforcement or other proceedings.".
"(c) In no case shall action be taken with respect to an applicant pursuant to clause (1) or (2) of subsection (b) without notice and opportunity for hearing.".
1–214. Section 401 of Executive Order No. 11246, as amended, is amended to read:
"
1–3. General Provisions
1–301. The transfers or reassignments provided by Section 1–1 of this Order shall take effect at such time or times as the Director of the Office of Management and Budget shall determine. The Director shall ensure that all such transfers or reassignments take effect within 60 days.
1–302. The conforming amendments provided by Section 1–2 of this Order shall take effect on October 8, 1978; except that, with respect to those agencies identified in Section 1–101 of this Order, the conforming amendments shall be effective on the effective date of the transfer or reassignment of functions as specified pursuant to Section 1–301 of this Order.
Executive Order No. 12135
Ex. Ord. No. 12135, May 9, 1979, 44 F.R. 27639, which established the President's Advisory Committee for Women, was revoked by Ex. Ord. No. 12336, Dec. 21, 1981, 46 F.R. 62239, set out below.
Ex. Ord. No. 12336. Task Force on Legal Equity for Women
Ex. Ord. No. 12336, Dec. 21, 1981, 46 F.R. 62239, as amended by Ex. Ord. No. 12355, Apr. 1, 1982, 47 F.R. 14479, provided:
By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution of the United States of America, and in order to provide for the systematic elimination of regulatory and procedural barriers which have unfairly precluded women from receiving equal treatment from Federal activities, it is hereby ordered as follows:
(b) The Task Force members shall be appointed by the President from among nominees by the heads of the following Executive agencies, each of which shall have one representative on the Task Force.
(1) Department of State.
(2) Department of The Treasury.
(3) Department of Defense.
(4) Department of Justice.
(5) Department of The Interior.
(6) Department of Agriculture.
(7) Department of Commerce.
(8) Department of Labor.
(9) Department of Health and Human Services.
(10) Department of Housing and Urban Development.
(11) Department of Transportation.
(12) Department of Energy.
(13) Department of Education.
(14) Agency for International Development.
(15) Veterans Administration [now Department of Veterans Affairs].
(16) Office of Management and Budget.
(17) International Communication Agency.
(18) Office of Personnel Management.
(19) Environmental Protection Agency.
(20) ACTION [now Corporation for National and Community Service].
(21) Small Business Administration.
(c) The President shall designate one of the members to chair the Task Force. Other agencies may be invited to participate in the functions of the Task Force.
(b) The Task Force shall periodically report to the President on the progress made throughout the Government in implementing the President's directives.
(c) The Attorney General shall complete the review of Federal laws, regulations, policies, and practices which contain language that unjustifiably differentiates, or which effectively discriminates, on the basis of sex. The Attorney General or his designee shall, on a quarterly basis, report his findings to the President through the Cabinet Council on Legal Policy.
(b) The agency with its representative chairing the Task Force shall, to the extent permitted by law, provide the Task Force with such administrative support as may be necessary for the effective performance of its functions.
(c) The head of each agency represented on the Task Force shall, to the extent permitted by law, furnish its representative such administrative support as is necessary and appropriate.
(b) Executive Order No. 12135 is revoked.
(c) Section 6 of Executive Order No. 12050, as amended, is revoked.
Ronald Reagan.
[The International Communication Agency was redesignated the United States Information Agency, see section 303 of Pub. L. 97–241, title III, Aug. 24, 1982, 96 Stat. 291, set out as a note under section 1461 of Title 22, Foreign Relations and Intercourse. For abolition of United States Information Agency (other than Broadcasting Board of Governors and International Broadcasting Bureau), transfer of functions, and treatment of references thereto, see sections 6531, 6532, and 6551 of Title 22.]
Ex. Ord. No. 13171. Hispanic Employment in the Federal Government
Ex. Ord. No. 13171, Oct. 12, 2000, 65 F.R. 61251, provided:
By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, and in order to improve the representation of Hispanics in Federal employment, within merit system principles and consistent with the application of appropriate veterans' preference criteria, to achieve a Federal workforce drawn from all segments of society, it is hereby ordered as follows:
(a) provide a plan for recruiting Hispanics that creates a fully diverse workforce for the agency in the 21st century;
(b) assess and eliminate any systemic barriers to the effective recruitment and consideration of Hispanics, including but not limited to:
(1) broadening the area of consideration to include applicants from all appropriate sources;
(2) ensuring that selection factors are appropriate and achieve the broadest consideration of applicants and do not impose barriers to selection based on nonmerit factors; and
(3) considering the appointment of Hispanic Federal executives to rating, selection, performance review, and executive resources panels and boards;
(c) improve outreach efforts to include organizations outside the Federal Government in order to increase the number of Hispanic candidates in the selection pool for the Senior Executive Service;
(d) promote participation of Hispanic employees in management, leadership, and career development programs;
(e) ensure that performance plans for senior executives, managers, and supervisors include specific language related to significant accomplishments on diversity recruitment and career development and that accountability is predicated on those plans;
(f) establish appropriate agency advisory councils that include Hispanic Employment Program Managers;
(g) implement the goals of the Government-wide Hispanic Employment Initiatives issued by the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) in September 1997 (Nine-Point Plan), and the Report to the President's Management Council on Hispanic Employment in the Federal Government of March 1999;
(h) ensure that managers and supervisors receive periodic training in diversity management in order to carry out their responsibilities to maintain a diverse workforce; and
(i) reflect a continuing priority for eliminating Hispanic underrepresentation in the Federal workforce and incorporate actions under this order as strategies for achieving workforce diversity goals in the agency's Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) Annual Performance Plan.
(a) provide Federal human resources management policy guidance to address Hispanic underrepresentation where it occurs;
(b) take the lead in promoting diversity to executive agencies for such actions as deemed appropriate to promote equal employment opportunity;
(c) within 180 days from the date of this order, prescribe such regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this order;
(d) within 60 days from the date of this order, establish an Interagency Task Force, chaired by the Director and composed of agency officials at the Deputy Secretary level, or the equivalent. This Task Force shall meet semi-annually to:
(1) review best practices in strategic human resources management planning, including alignment with agency GPRA plans;
(2) assess overall executive branch progress in complying with the requirements of this order;
(3) provide advice on ways to increase Hispanic community involvement; and
(4) recommend any further actions, as appropriate, in eliminating the underrepresentation of Hispanics in the Federal workforce where it occurs; and
(e) issue an annual report with findings and recommendations to the President on the progress made by agencies on matters related to this order. The first annual report shall be issued no later than 1 year from the date of this order.
William J. Clinton.
Ex. Ord. No. 13506. Establishing a White House Council on Women And Girls
Ex. Ord. No. 13506, Mar. 11, 2009, 74 F.R. 11271, provided:
By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, I hereby order as follows:
Despite this progress, certain inequalities continue to persist. On average, American women continue to earn only about 78 cents for every dollar men make, and women are still significantly underrepresented in the science, engineering, and technology fields. Far too many women lack health insurance, and many are unable to take time off to care for a new baby or an ailing family member. Violence against women and girls remains a global epidemic. The challenge of ensuring equal educational opportunities for women and girls endures. As the current economic crisis has swept across our Nation, women have been seriously affected.
These issues do not concern just women. When jobs do not offer family leave, that affects men who wish to help care for their families. When women earn less than men for the same work, that affects families who have to work harder to make ends meet. When our daughters do not have the same educational and career opportunities as our sons, that affects entire communities, our economy, and our future as a Nation.
The purpose of this order is to establish a coordinated Federal response to issues that particularly impact the lives of women and girls and to ensure that Federal programs and policies address and take into account the distinctive concerns of women and girls, including women of color and those with disabilities.
(a) Membership of the Council. The Council shall consist of the following members:
(1) the Senior Advisor and Assistant to the President for Intergovernmental Affairs and Public Liaison, who shall serve as Chair of the Council;
(2) the Secretary of State;
(3) the Secretary of the Treasury;
(4) the Secretary of Defense;
(5) the Attorney General;
(6) the Secretary of the Interior;
(7) the Secretary of Agriculture;
(8) the Secretary of Commerce;
(9) the Secretary of Labor;
(10) the Secretary of Health and Human Services;
(11) the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development;
(12) the Secretary of Transportation;
(13) the Secretary of Energy;
(14) the Secretary of Education;
(15) the Secretary of Veterans Affairs;
(16) the Secretary of Homeland Security;
(17) the Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations;
(18) the United States Trade Representative;
(19) the Director of the Office of Management and Budget;
(20) the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency;
(21) the Chair of the Council of Economic Advisers;
(22) the Director of the Office of Personnel Management;
(23) the Administrator of the Small Business Administration;
(24) the Assistant to the President and Director of the Domestic Policy Council;
(25) the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy and Director of the National Economic Council; and
(26) the heads of such other executive branch departments, agencies, and offices as the President may, from time to time, designate.
A member of the Council may designate, to perform the Council functions of the member, a senior-level official who is a part of the member's department, agency, or office, and who is a full-time officer or employee of the Federal Government. At the direction of the Chair, the Council may establish subgroups consisting exclusively of Council members or their designees under this section, as appropriate.
(b) Administration of the Council. The Department of Commerce shall provide funding and administrative support for the Council to the extent permitted by law and within existing appropriations. The Chair shall convene regular meetings of the Council, determine its agenda, and direct its work. The Chair shall designate an Executive Director of the Council, who shall coordinate the work of the Council and head any staff assigned to the Council.
(b) Nothing in this order shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:
(i) authority granted by law to an executive department, agency, or the head thereof; or
(ii) functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.
(c) This order shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations.
(d) This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.
Barack Obama.
Ex. Ord. No. 13583. Establishing a Coordinated Government-Wide Initiative to Promote Diversity and Inclusion in the Federal Workforce
Ex. Ord. No. 13583, Aug. 18, 2011, 76 F.R. 52847, provided:
By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, and in order to promote the Federal workplace as a model of equal opportunity, diversity, and inclusion, it is hereby ordered as follows:
A commitment to equal opportunity, diversity, and inclusion is critical for the Federal Government as an employer. By law, the Federal Government's recruitment policies should "endeavor to achieve a work force from all segments of society." (5 U.S.C. 2301(b)(1)). As the Nation's largest employer, the Federal Government has a special obligation to lead by example. Attaining a diverse, qualified workforce is one of the cornerstones of the merit-based civil service.
Prior Executive Orders, including but not limited to those listed below, have taken a number of steps to address the leadership role and obligations of the Federal Government as an employer. For example, Executive Order 13171 of October 12, 2000 (Hispanic Employment in the Federal Government), directed executive departments and agencies to implement programs for recruitment and career development of Hispanic employees and established a mechanism for identifying best practices in doing so. Executive Order 13518 of November 9, 2009 (Employment of Veterans in the Federal Government), required the establishment of a Veterans Employment Initiative. Executive Order 13548 of July 26, 2010 (Increasing Federal Employment of Individuals with Disabilities), and its related predecessors, Executive Order 13163 of July 26, 2000 (Increasing the Opportunity for Individuals With Disabilities to be Employed in the Federal Government), and Executive Order 13078 of March 13, 1998 (Increasing Employment of Adults With Disabilities), sought to tap the skills of the millions of Americans living with disabilities.
To realize more fully the goal of using the talents of all segments of society, the Federal Government must continue to challenge itself to enhance its ability to recruit, hire, promote, and retain a more diverse workforce. Further, the Federal Government must create a culture that encourages collaboration, flexibility, and fairness to enable individuals to participate to their full potential.
Wherever possible, the Federal Government must also seek to consolidate compliance efforts established through related or overlapping statutory mandates, directions from Executive Orders, and regulatory requirements. By this order, I am directing executive departments and agencies (agencies) to develop and implement a more comprehensive, integrated, and strategic focus on diversity and inclusion as a key component of their human resources strategies. This approach should include a continuing effort to identify and adopt best practices, implemented in an integrated manner, to promote diversity and remove barriers to equal employment opportunity, consistent with merit system principles and applicable law.
(a) establish a coordinated Government-wide initiative to promote diversity and inclusion in the Federal workforce;
(b) within 90 days of the date of this order:
(i) develop and issue a Government-wide Diversity and Inclusion Strategic Plan (Government-wide Plan), to be updated as appropriate and at a minimum every 4 years, focusing on workforce diversity, workplace inclusion, and agency accountability and leadership. The Government-wide Plan shall highlight comprehensive strategies for agencies to identify and remove barriers to equal employment opportunity that may exist in the Federal Government's recruitment, hiring, promotion, retention, professional development, and training policies and practices;
(ii) review applicable directives to agencies related to the development or submission of agency human capital and other workforce plans and reports in connection with recruitment, hiring, promotion, retention, professional development, and training policies and practices, and develop a strategy for consolidating such agency plans and reports where appropriate and permitted by law; and
(iii) provide guidance to agencies concerning formulation of agency-specific Diversity and Inclusion Strategic Plans prepared pursuant to section 3(b) of this order;
(c) identify appropriate practices to improve the effectiveness of each agency's efforts to recruit, hire, promote, retain, develop, and train a diverse and inclusive workforce, consistent with merit system principles and applicable law; and
(d) establish a system for reporting regularly on agencies' progress in implementing their agency-specific Diversity and Inclusion Strategic Plans and in meeting the objectives of this order.
(a) designate the agency's Chief Human Capital Officer to be responsible for enhancing employment and promotion opportunities within the agency, in collaboration with the agency's Director of Equal Employment Opportunity and Director of Diversity and Inclusion, if any, and consistent with law and merit system principles, including development and implementation of the agency-specific Diversity and Inclusion Strategic Plan;
(b) within 120 days of the issuance of the Government-wide Plan or its update under section 2(b)(i) of this order, develop and submit for review to the Director of OPM and the Deputy Director for Management of OMB an agency-specific Diversity and Inclusion Strategic Plan for recruiting, hiring, training, developing, advancing, promoting, and retaining a diverse workforce consistent with applicable law, the Government-wide Plan, merit system principles, the agency's overall strategic plan, its human capital plan prepared pursuant to Part 250 of title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, and other applicable workforce planning strategies and initiatives;
(c) implement the agency-specific Diversity and Inclusion Strategic Plan after incorporating it into the agency's human capital plan; and
(d) provide information as specified in the reporting requirements developed under section 2(d).
(i) authority granted to a department or agency or the head thereof, including the authority granted to EEOC by other Executive Orders (including Executive Order 12067) or any agency's authority to establish an independent Diversity and Inclusion Office; or
(ii) functions of the Director of OMB relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.
(b) This order shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations.
(c) This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.
Barack Obama.
Ex. Ord. No. 13665. Non-Retaliation for Disclosure of Compensation Information
Ex. Ord. No. 13665, Apr. 8, 2014, 79 F.R. 20749, provided:
By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act [of 1949], 40 U.S.C. 101 et seq., and in order to take further steps to promote economy and efficiency in Federal Government procurement, it is hereby ordered as follows:
When employees are prohibited from inquiring about, disclosing, or discussing their compensation with fellow workers, compensation discrimination is much more difficult to discover and remediate, and more likely to persist. Such prohibitions (either express or tacit) also restrict the amount of information available to participants in the Federal contracting labor pool, which tends to diminish market efficiency and decrease the likelihood that the most qualified and productive workers are hired at the market efficient price. Ensuring that employees of Federal contractors may discuss their compensation without fear of adverse action will enhance the ability of Federal contractors and their employees to detect and remediate unlawful discriminatory practices, which will contribute to a more efficient market in Federal contracting.
(b) Nothing in this order shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:
(i) the authority granted by law to a department, agency, or the head thereof; or
(ii) the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.
(c) This order shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations.
(d) This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.
Barack Obama.
Ex. Ord. No. 13672. Further Amendments to Executive Order 11478, Equal Employment Opportunity in the Federal Government, and Executive Order 11246, Equal Employment Opportunity
Ex. Ord. No. 13672, July 21, 2014, 79 F.R. 42971, provided:
By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including 40 U.S.C. 121, and in order to provide for a uniform policy for the Federal Government to prohibit discrimination and take further steps to promote economy and efficiency in Federal Government procurement by prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity, it is hereby ordered as follows:
(i) the authority granted by law to an agency or the head thereof; or
(ii) the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.
(b) This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.
Barack Obama.
Enhanced Collection of Relevant Data and Statistics Relating to Women
Memorandum of President of the United States, Mar. 4, 2011, 76 F.R. 12823, provided:
Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies
I am proud to work with the White House Council on Women and Girls, the Office of Management and Budget, and the Department of Commerce on this week's release of Women in America, a report detailing the status of American women in the areas of families and income, health, employment, education, and violence and crime. This report provides a snapshot of the status of American women today, serving as a valuable resource for Government officials, academics, members of non-profit, nongovernmental, and news organizations, and others.
My Administration is committed to ensuring that Federal programs achieve policy goals in the most cost-effective manner. The Women in America report, together with the accompanying website collection of relevant data, will assist Government officials in crafting policies in light of available statistical evidence. It will also assist the work of the nongovernmental sector, including journalists, public policy analysts, and academic researchers, by providing data that allow greater understanding of policies and programs.
Preparation of this report revealed the vast data resources of the Federal statistical agencies. It also revealed some gaps in data collection. Gathering and analyzing additional data to fill in the gaps could help policymakers gather a more accurate and comprehensive view of the status and needs of American women.
Accordingly, I hereby request the heads of executive departments and agencies, where possible within existing collections of data and in light of budgetary constraints, to identify and to seek to fill in gaps in statistics and improve survey methodology relating to women wherever appropriate, including in the broad areas covered by the Women in America report: families and income, health, employment, education, and violence and crime.
Examples of some of the efforts that could be undertaken by departments and agencies with respect to the gathering or design of comprehensive data related to women include the following:
(a) Maternal Mortality. I encourage the National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS) to continue to work with States and other registration areas to complete the expeditious adoption of the most current standards for the collection of information on vital events, as well as the transition to electronic reporting systems. Maternal mortality is an important indicator of women's health both internationally and nationally. In the United States, maternal mortality statistics are based upon the information recorded on death certificates and collected by State and local vital records offices. The NCHS compiles the data across the 50 States and other registration areas. Due to concerns about data quality in the ascertainment of maternal mortality statistics, the 2003 revision of the standard death certificate introduced improved standards for collecting data. Until all 50 States and registration areas adopt the new data standards, formulating a national-level maternal mortality ratio remains difficult.
(b) Women in Leadership in Corporate America. Women participate in every sector of the workforce. Their current role in corporate leadership is an important indicator of their progress. I encourage the Chair of the Securities and Exchange Commission to seek to supplement the information it already collects by seeking to collect, among other data, information on the presence of women in governance positions in corporations, in order to shed further light on the role of women in corporate America.
(c) Women in Leadership in Public Service. I encourage the Corporation for National and Community Service to include statistics about the role of women in diverse aspects of public service within its planned work on measuring civic engagement.
This memorandum shall be carried out to the extent permitted by law, consistent with the legal authorities of executive departments and agencies and subject to the availability of appropriations. Nothing in this memorandum shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect the authority granted by law to a department or agency, or the head thereof; or the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.
This memorandum is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.
The Director of the Office of Management and Budget is hereby authorized and directed to publish this memorandum in the Federal Register.
Barack Obama.
Promoting Diversity and Inclusion in the National Security Workforce
Memorandum of President of the United States, Oct. 5, 2016, 81 F.R. 69993, provided:
Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies
Our greatest asset in protecting the homeland and advancing our interests abroad is the talent and diversity of our national security workforce. Under my Administration, we have made important progress toward harnessing the extraordinary range of backgrounds, cultures, perspectives, skills, and experiences of the U.S. population toward keeping our country safe and strong. As the United States becomes more diverse and the challenges we face more complex, we must continue to invest in policies to recruit, retain, and develop the best and brightest from all segments of our population. Research has shown that diverse groups are more effective at problem solving than homogeneous groups, and policies that promote diversity and inclusion will enhance our ability to draw from the broadest possible pool of talent, solve our toughest challenges, maximize employee engagement and innovation, and lead by example by setting a high standard for providing access to opportunity to all segments of our society.
The purpose of this memorandum is to provide guidance to the national security workforce in order to strengthen the talent and diversity of their respective organizations. That workforce, which comprises more than 3 million people, includes the following departments, agencies, offices, and other entities (agencies) that are primarily engaged in diplomacy, development, defense, intelligence, law enforcement, and homeland security: 1) Department of State: Civil Service and Foreign Service; 2) United States Agency for International Development (USAID): Civil Service and Foreign Service; 3) Department of Defense (DOD): commissioned officers, enlisted personnel, and civilian personnel; 4) the 17 members of the Intelligence Community; 5) Department of the Treasury: Office of International Affairs and Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection; 6) Department of Justice: National Security Division and Federal Bureau of Investigation; and 7) Department of Homeland Security.
The data collected by these agencies do not capture the full range of diversity in the national security workforce, but where data allow for broad comparison, they indicate that agencies in this workforce are less diverse on average than the rest of the Federal Government. For example, as of 2015, only the Department of State and USAID Civil Services were more diverse in terms of gender, race, and ethnicity than the Federal workforce as a whole. When comparing the agencies' workforces to their leadership personnel (Senior Executive Service (SES) or its equivalent), all agencies' leadership staffs were less diverse than their respective workforces in terms of gender, and all but DOD enlisted personnel and USAID Civil Service had less diverse leadership in terms of race and ethnicity. While these data do not necessarily indicate the existence of barriers to equal employment opportunity, we can do more to promote diversity in the national security workforce, consistent with merit system principles and applicable law.
When I issued Executive Order 13583 of August 18, 2011 (Establishing a Coordinated Government-wide Initiative to Promote Diversity and Inclusion in the Federal Workforce), I directed all departments and agencies to develop and implement a more comprehensive, integrated, and strategic focus on diversity and inclusion. This memorandum supports that effort by providing guidance that 1) emphasizes a data-driven approach in order to increase transparency and accountability at all levels; 2) takes into account leading practices, research, and experience from the private and public sectors; and 3) complements ongoing actions that agencies are taking pursuant to Executive Order 13583 and under the leadership of the Diversity and Inclusion in Government Council, including but not limited to efforts related to gender, race, ethnicity, disability status, veterans, sexual orientation and gender identity, and other demographic categories. This memorandum also supports Executive Order 13714 of December 15, 2015 (Strengthening the Senior Executive Service), by directing agencies to take additional steps to expand the pipeline of diverse talent into senior positions.
This memorandum also aligns with congressional efforts to promote the diversity of the national security workforce, which have been reflected in legislation such as the:
•
•
•
Promoting diversity and inclusion within the national security workforce must be a joint effort and requires engagement by senior leadership, managers, and the entire workforce, as well as effective collaboration among those responsible for human resources, equal employment opportunity, and diversity and inclusion issues. In implementing the guidance in this memorandum, agencies shall ensure their diversity and inclusion practices are fully integrated into broader succession planning efforts and supported by sufficient resource allocations and effective programs that invest in personnel development and engagement. Where appropriate, they shall also support, coordinate, and encourage research and other efforts by the Federal Government to expand the knowledge base of best practices for broadening participation and understanding the impact of diversity and inclusion on national security, including in the fields of science and technology.
Therefore, by the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, I hereby direct the following:
(a) Make aggregate demographic data and other information available to the public and broader workforce. Agencies shall make available to the general public information on the state of diversity and inclusion in their workforces. That information, which shall be updated at least once a year, shall include aggregate demographic data by workforce or service and grade or rank; attrition and promotion demographic data; validated inclusion metrics such as the New Inclusion Quotient (New IQ) index score; demographic comparisons to the relevant civilian labor force; and unclassified reports and barrier analyses related to diversity and inclusion. Agencies may publish data in proportions or percentages to account for classification concerns, and the Intelligence Community may publish a community-wide report with the data outlined in this section. In addition, agencies shall provide to their workforces, including senior leadership at the Secretary or Director level, a report that includes demographic data and information on the status of diversity and inclusion efforts no later than 90 days after the date of this memorandum and on an annual basis thereafter (or in line with existing annual reporting requirements related to these issues, if any).
(b) Expand the collection and analysis of voluntary applicant flow data. Applicant flow data tracks the selection rate variances for job positions among different demographic categories and can assist agencies in examining the fairness and inclusiveness of their recruitment efforts. Agencies shall develop a system to collect and analyze applicant flow data for as many positions as practicable in order to identify future areas for improvement in attracting diverse talent, with particular attention to senior and management positions. The collection of data may be implemented in a phased approach commensurate with agency resources. Agencies shall include such analysis, including the percentage and level of positions for which data are collected, and any resulting policy changes or recommendations in the report required by section 1(a) of this memorandum.
(c) Identify additional categories for voluntary data collection of current employees. The Federal Government provides minimum reporting categories for agencies collecting race and ethnicity information in the Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) Statistical Policy Directive "Standards for Maintaining, Collecting, and Presenting Federal Data on Race and Ethnicity." That standard also encourages agencies to collect more detailed data, which can be compared by aggregating such data into minimum categories when necessary. Further, agencies may also collect additional demographic data, such as information regarding sexual orientation or gender identity. No later than 90 days after the date of this memorandum, agencies shall determine whether they recommend the voluntary collection of more detailed demographic data on additional categories. This process shall involve close consultation with internal stakeholders, such as employee resource or affinity groups; clear communication with the workforce to explain the purpose of, legal protections related to, and anticipated use of such data; and adherence to relevant standards and guidance issued by the Federal Government. Any determinations shall be submitted to OMB, the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, and the Department of Labor for consideration.
(a) Conduct stay and exit interviews or surveys. Agencies shall conduct periodic interviews with a representative cross-section of personnel to understand their reasons for staying with their organization, as well as to receive feedback on workplace policies, professional development opportunities, and other issues affecting their decision to remain. They shall also provide an opportunity for exit interviews or surveys of all departing personnel to understand better their reasons for leaving. Agencies shall include analysis from the interviews and surveys—including if and how the results of the interviews differ by gender, race and national origin, sexual orientation, gender identity, disability status, and other demographic variables—and any resulting policy changes or recommendations in the report required by section 1(a) of this memorandum.
(b) Expand provision of professional development and career advancement opportunities. Agencies shall prioritize resources to expand professional development opportunities that support mission needs, such as academic programs, private-public exchanges, and detail assignments to relevant positions in private or international organizations; State, local, and tribal governments; or other branches of the Federal Government. In addition, agencies in the national security workforce shall offer, or sponsor employees to participate in, an SES Candidate Development Program (CDP) or other programs that train employees to gain the skills required for senior-level agency appointments. In determining which employees are granted professional development or career advancement opportunities, agencies shall ensure their SES CDP comports with the provisions of 5 C.F.R. part 412, subpart C, including merit staffing and assessment requirements. Agencies shall also consider the number of expected senior-level vacancies as a factor in determining the number of candidates to select for such programs. Agencies shall track the demographics of program participants as well as the rate of placement into senior-level positions for participants in such programs, evaluate such data on an annual basis to look for ways to improve outreach and recruitment for these programs consistent with merit system principles, and include such data in the report required by section 1(a) of this memorandum.
(c) Institute a review process for security and counterintelligence determinations that result in assignment restrictions. For agencies in the national security workforce that place assignment restrictions on personnel or otherwise prohibit certain geographic assignments due to a security determination, these agencies shall ensure a review process exists consistent with the Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified Information, as well as applicable counterintelligence considerations. Agencies shall ensure that affected personnel are informed of the right to seek review and the process for doing so.
(a) Reward and recognize efforts to promote diversity and inclusion. Agencies are strongly encouraged to consider implementing performance and advancement requirements that reward and recognize senior leaders' and supervisors' efforts in fostering an inclusive environment and cultivating talent consistent with merit system principles, such as through participation in mentoring programs or sponsorship initiatives, recruitment events, and other opportunities. They are also encouraged to create opportunities for senior leadership and supervisors to participate in outreach events and to discuss issues related to diversity and inclusion with the workforce on a regular basis, including with employee resource groups.
(b) Collect and disseminate voluntary demographic data of external advisory committees and boards. For agencies in the national security workforce that have external advisory committees or boards to which their senior leadership appoints members, they are strongly encouraged to collect voluntary demographic data from the members of committee[s] and boards, and to include such data in the information and report required by section 1(a) of this memorandum.
(c) Expand training on unconscious bias, inclusion, and flexible work policies. Agencies shall expand their provision of training on implicit or unconscious bias, inclusion, and flexible work policies and make implicit or unconscious bias training mandatory for senior leadership and management positions, as well as for those responsible for outreach, recruitment, hiring, career development, promotion, and security clearance adjudication. The provision of training may be implemented in a phased approach commensurate with agency resources. Agencies shall also make available training for bureaus, directorates, or divisions whose inclusion scores, such as those measured by the New IQ index, consistently rank below the agency-wide average 3 or more years in a row. Agencies should give special attention to ensuring the continuous incorporation of research-based best practices, including those to address the intersectionality between certain demographics and job positions.
(i) the authority granted by law to an executive department, agency, or the head thereof, or the status of that department or agency within the Federal Government; or
(ii) the functions of the Director of OMB relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.
(b) This memorandum shall be implemented consistent with applicable law, and subject to the availability of appropriations.
(c) This memorandum is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.
(d) The Director of OPM is hereby authorized and directed to publish this memorandum in the Federal Register.
Barack Obama.
Promoting Diversity and Inclusion in Our National Parks, National Forests, and Other Public Lands and Waters
Memorandum of President of the United States, Jan. 12, 2017, 82 F.R. 6179, provided:
Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies
Our Federal lands and waters are among our Nation's greatest treasures—from our National Parks and National Forests, to our wild and scenic rivers, recreation areas, and other public lands and waters. These natural and historic sites give us fresh air and clean water, places for recreation and inspiration, and support for our local communities and economies. As a powerful sign of our democratic ideals, these lands belong to all Americans—rich and poor, urban and rural, young and old, from all backgrounds, genders, cultures, religious viewpoints, and walks of life.
Our public lands and waters are treasured in part because they tell the story of our Nation. They preserve the history from our Nation's wars, protect cultural sites considered sacred to countless Americans, and honor the accomplishments of distinctly American leaders ranging from Harriet Tubman to Abraham Lincoln to Cesar Chavez. I am proud that my Administration has greatly expanded the stories that our protected public lands and waters tell about our Nation through designating a diverse collection of cultural and historic sites as new parks and monuments and by restoring the Koyukon Athabascan name of Denali to the tallest mountain in North America. I am proud, too, that my Administration has sought to expand access to our public lands and waters and to make them more welcoming to all Americans, especially those who have not regularly visited our Nation's great outdoors or had the means to do so easily. Initiatives like "Every Kid in a Park" complement additional, ongoing efforts by Federal agencies to improve accessibility, but more work must be done to honor the promise and opportunity of the idea that our public lands belong to every American. Over the last 8 years, Federal land and water management agencies have also shown a renewed commitment to promoting equal opportunity for all employees and in creating work environments where everyone is empowered to reach their full potential.
The purpose of this memorandum is to ensure that all Americans have the opportunity to experience and enjoy our public lands and waters, that all segments of the population have the chance to engage in decisions about how our lands and waters are managed, and that our Federal workforce—not just the sites it manages—is drawn from the rich range of the diversity in our Nation. In this memorandum, "diversity" refers to a range of characteristics including national origin, language, race, color, disability, ethnicity, age, religion, sexual orientation, gender (including gender identity), socioeconomic status, veteran status, and family structure. The term "inclusion" refers to a culture that connects each employee to the organization; encourages collaboration, flexibility, and fairness; and promotes diversity throughout the organization so that all individuals have opportunities to participate and contribute to their full potential.
This memorandum is directed at the Department of the Interior, the U.S. Forest Service, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works, and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (covered agencies).
Promoting diversity and inclusion is not the sole responsibility of one office within a Federal agency but a joint effort that requires engagement by senior leadership and the entire workforce. In implementing the guidance in this memorandum, each covered agency shall ensure its diversity and inclusion practices are fully integrated into broader planning efforts and supported by sufficient resource allocations and effective programs that promote a wide range of investments in personnel development, public engagement, and opportunities for inclusive access.
Therefore, by the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, I hereby direct the following:
Federal agencies are subject to existing authorities aimed at addressing the leadership role and obligations of the Federal Government as an employer. For example, Executive Order 13583 of August 18, 2011 (Establishing a Coordinated Government-wide Initiative to Promote Diversity and Inclusion in the Federal Workforce), requires Federal agencies to take action to promote equal opportunity, diversity, and inclusion in the Federal workforce. Federal agencies also are required by section 717 of title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to take proactive steps to ensure equal opportunity for all Federal employees and applicants for Federal employment. This memorandum directs each of the covered agencies to pursue additional actions that create and maintain a diverse and inclusive Federal workforce. Toward that end, each covered agency shall integrate the following activities in its efforts to comply with related statutory mandates, Executive Orders, regulatory requirements, and individual agency policies:
(a) Provide professional development opportunities and tools. A diverse and inclusive work environment enhances the ability of each covered agency to create, retain, and sustain a strong workforce by allowing all employees to perform to their full potential and talent. Professional development opportunities and tools are key to fostering that potential, and ensuring that all employees have access to them should be a priority for all agencies, consistent with merit system principles. Accordingly, each covered agency shall:
(i) Develop a mechanism to conduct periodic interviews with a voluntary representative cross-section of its workforce to gain a more complete understanding of the reasons that employees choose to stay with their organizations, as well as to receive feedback on workplace policies, professional development opportunities, and other issues;
(ii) Provide optional exit interviews or surveys for all departing personnel;
(iii) Collect information as needed to identify methods for attracting applicants to Federal employment and retaining diverse workplace talent through existing workforce programs and initiatives;
(iv) Prioritize resources, as appropriate, to expand professional development opportunities that support mission needs, such as academic and fellowship programs, private-public exchanges, and detail assignments to private or international organizations, State, local and tribal governments, or other branches of the Federal Government;
(v) Offer, or sponsor employees to participate in, a Senior Executive Service Candidate Development Program or other program that trains employees to gain the skills required for senior-level appointments. Each covered agency shall consider the number of expected senior-level vacancies as one factor in determining the number of candidates to select for such programs. In the selection process for these programs, each covered agency shall consider redacting personal information, including applicant names, from all materials provided for review to reduce the potential for unconscious bias. Each covered agency also shall evaluate on a retroactive basis the placement rate of program graduates into senior-level positions, including available demographic data, on an annual basis to look for ways to improve outreach and recruitment for these programs consistent with merit system principles. Each covered agency shall consult with the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) on the development or enhancement of data-collection tools to conduct these evaluations; and
(vi) Seek additional opportunities for the development and implementation of upward mobility programs.
(b) Strengthen leadership engagement and accountability. Senior leadership and supervisors play an important role in fostering diversity and inclusion in the workforce they lead and setting an example for cultivating this and future generations of talent. Toward that end, each covered agency shall:
(i) Reward and recognize efforts to promote diversity and inclusion in the workforce. Consistent with merit system principles, each covered agency is strongly encouraged to consider implementing performance and advancement requirements that reward and recognize senior leaders' and supervisors' success in fostering diverse and inclusive workplace environments and in cultivating talent, such as through participation in mentoring programs or sponsorship initiatives, recruitment events, and other opportunities. Each covered agency also is encouraged to identify opportunities for senior leadership and supervisors to participate in outreach events and discuss issues related to promoting diversity and inclusion in its workforce on a regular basis with support from any existing employee resource group, as appropriate; and
(ii) Expand training on unconscious bias, diversity and inclusion, and flexible work policies. Each covered agency shall expand its provision of training on unconscious bias, diversity and inclusion, and flexible work policies and make unconscious bias training mandatory for senior leadership and management positions, including for employees responsible for outreach, recruitment, hiring, career development, promotion, and law enforcement. The provision of training may be implemented in a phased approach commensurate with agency resources. Each covered agency shall also make available training on a 2-year cycle for bureaus, directorates, or divisions for which inclusion scores, such as those measured by the New IQ index, demonstrate no improvement since the previous training cycle. Special attention should be given to ensure the continuous incorporation of research-based best practices, including those to address the relationship between certain demographics and job positions.
(c) Analyze existing data and identify opportunities for improvement. Each covered agency shall continue to evaluate and eliminate existing barriers to the successful growth of diversity and inclusion in the Federal workplace. The following actions shall be taken to ensure continued progress on this issue:
(i) Each covered agency shall integrate the activities described under subsections (a) and (b) of this section in the priorities and actions outlined in Executive Order 13583 and the periodic agency self-assessments and barrier analyses required by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Management Directive 715, and shall make such assessments and analyses publicly available;
(ii) Human resources and any appropriate diversity and leadership staff from each of the covered agencies shall meet at least twice each year with agency leadership to discuss actions pursued under sections 1(a) and 1(b) of this memorandum, including working to identify and eliminate barriers to promoting diversity and inclusion in agency workforces and to discuss potential actions to improve hiring programs, recruitment, and workforce training and development. Where data gaps are identified, each covered agency is encouraged to collect additional information as needed in order to identify methods for attracting and retaining talent from diverse populations, with particular attention to senior and management positions. Each covered agency shall consult with OPM on the development or enhancement of data-collection tools to collect this information; and
(iii) OPM shall continue to review covered agency-specific diversity and inclusion plans and provide recommended modifications for agency consideration, including recommendations on strategies to promote diversity and inclusion in agency workforces and potential improvements to the use of existing agency hiring authorities.
(i) Identify site-specific opportunities. As each covered agency periodically updates or develops new management plans for its lands and waters, it shall evaluate specific barriers and opportunities, as appropriate, to improve visitation, access, and recreational opportunities for diverse populations;
(ii) Update policies to ensure engagement with diverse constituencies. As policy manuals and handbooks are updated, each covered agency shall ensure that these materials reflect the importance of engaging with diverse populations in resource protection, land and water management, and program planning and decisionmaking, as appropriate;
(iii) Establish internal policies for recipients of Federal funding. Each covered agency shall ensure that State, local, tribal, and private sector recipients of Federal funding are taking action to improve visitation, access, and recreational opportunities for diverse populations;
(iv) Identify public liaisons. Within 90 days of the issuance of this memorandum, each covered agency shall identify multiple public liaisons with a diversity of backgrounds and perspectives to be charged with facilitating input from and engaging with diverse populations in land and water management processes;
(v) Identify opportunities on advisory councils and stakeholder committees. Within 120 days of the issuance of this memorandum, each covered agency shall identify opportunities to promote participation by diverse populations in advisory councils and stakeholder committees established to support public land or water management; environmental, public health, or energy development planning; and other relevant decisionmaking; and
(vi) Develop an action plan. Within 1 year of the issuance of this memorandum, each covered agency shall provide a publicly available action plan to the Chair of the White House Council on Environmental Quality identifying specific actions the agency will take to 1) improve access for diverse populations—particularly for minority, low-income, and disabled populations and tribal communities—to experience and enjoy our Federal lands and waters, and 2) address barriers to their participation in the protection and management of important historic, cultural, or natural areas. Each covered agency shall identify in its action plan any critical barriers to achieving both of these goals. This barrier evaluation should draw on internal staff input as well as external perspectives, including interviews, surveys, and engagement with non-governmental entities, as appropriate and as resources allow. Each action plan should include specific steps that the covered agency will take to address identified barriers, including national as well as regional strategies, and, where appropriate, site-specific initiatives. Each covered agency should work through the Federal Recreation Council (FRC) to assist with the development of this action plan and use the FRC to share best practices and recommendations regarding specific programs and initiatives.
(b) In identifying actions to improve opportunities for all Americans to experience our Federal lands and waters, each covered agency should consider a range of actions including the following:
(i) Conducting active outreach to diverse populations—particularly minority, low-income, and disabled populations and tribal communities—to increase awareness about specific programs and opportunities;
(ii) Focusing on the mentoring of new environmental, outdoor recreation, and preservation leaders to increase diverse representation in these areas and on our public lands;
(iii) Forging new partnerships with State, local, tribal, private, and non-profit partners to expand access for diverse populations, particularly those in the immediate vicinity of a protected area;
(iv) Identifying and making improvements to existing programs to increase visitation and access by diverse populations—particularly minority, low-income, and disabled populations and tribal communities;
(v) Creating new programs, especially those that could address certain gaps that are identified;
(vi) Expanding the use of multilingual and culturally appropriate materials, including American Sign Language, in public communications and educational strategies, including through social media strategies, as appropriate, that target diverse populations;
(vii) Continuing coordinated, interagency efforts to promote youth engagement and empowerment, including fostering new partnerships with diversity- and youth-serving organizations and new partnerships with urban areas and programs; and
(viii) Identifying possible staff liaisons to diverse populations, particularly those in the immediate vicinity of a given protected area.
(c) In identifying actions to improve opportunities for all Americans to participate in the protection and management of important historic, cultural, and natural areas, each covered agency shall consider a range of actions including the following:
(i) Considering recommendations and proposals from diverse populations to protect at-risk historic, cultural, and natural sites;
(ii) Improving the availability and distribution of relevant information about ongoing land and water management planning and policy revisions;
(iii) Identifying agency staff charged with outreach to diverse populations;
(iv) Identifying opportunities to facilitate public participation from interested diverse populations facing financial barriers, including through partnerships, where appropriate, with philanthropic organizations and tribal, State, and local governments; and
(v) Taking other actions to increase opportunities for diverse populations to provide input and recommendations on protecting, improving access to, or otherwise managing important historic, cultural, or natural areas, with an emphasis on stakeholders facing significant barriers to participation.
(i) the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency, or the head thereof, or the status of that department or agency within the Federal Government; or
(ii) the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.
(b) This memorandum shall be implemented consistent with applicable law, and subject to the availability of appropriations.
(c) The Secretary of the Interior is hereby authorized and directed to publish this memorandum in the Federal Register.
Barack Obama.
12.2.3 Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. 12.2.3 Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc.
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Petitioner
v.
ABERCROMBIE & FITCH STORES, INC.
No. 14-86.
Supreme Court of the United States
Argued Feb. 25, 2015.
Decided June 1, 2015.
Ian H. Gershengorn, Washington, DC, for Petitioner.
Shay Dvoretzky, Washington, DC, for Respondent.
Mark A. Knueve, Daniel J. Clark, Vorys, Sater, Seymour and Pease LLP, Columbus, OH, Shay Dvoretzky, Counsel of Record, Eric S. Dreiband, Yaakov M. Roth, Jeffrey R. Johnson, Jones Day, Washington, DC, for Respondent.
P. David Lopez, General Counsel, Carolyn L. Wheeler, Acting Associate General Counsel, Jennifer S. Goldstein, Acting Assistant General Counsel, James M. Tucker, Attorney, U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Washington, DC, Donald B. Verrilli, Jr., Solicitor General, Counsel of Record, Ian Heath Gershengorn, Deputy Solicitor General, Rachel P. Kovner, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department *2031of Justice, Washington, DC, for Petitioner.
Opinion
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits a prospective employer from refusing to hire an applicant in order to avoid accommodating a religious practice that it could accommodate without undue hardship. The question presented is whether this prohibition applies only where an applicant has informed the employer of his need for an accommodation.
I
We summarize the facts in the light most favorable to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), against whom the Tenth Circuit granted summary judgment. Respondent Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., operates several lines of clothing stores, each with its own "style." Consistent with the image Abercrombie seeks to project for each store, the company imposes a Look Policy that governs its employees' dress. The Look Policy prohibits "caps"-a term the Policy does not define-as too informal for Abercrombie's desired image.
Samantha Elauf is a practicing Muslim who, consistent with her understanding of her religion's requirements, wears a headscarf. She applied for a position in an Abercrombie store, and was interviewed by Heather Cooke, the store's assistant manager. Using Abercrombie's ordinary system for evaluating applicants, Cooke gave Elauf a rating that qualified her to be hired; Cooke was concerned, however, that Elauf's headscarf would conflict with the store's Look Policy.
Cooke sought the store manager's guidance to clarify whether the headscarf was a forbidden "cap." When this yielded no answer, Cooke turned to Randall Johnson, the district manager. Cooke informed Johnson that she believed Elauf wore her headscarf because of her faith. Johnson told Cooke that Elauf's headscarf would violate the Look Policy, as would all other headwear, religious or otherwise, and directed Cooke not to hire Elauf.
The EEOC sued Abercrombie on Elauf's behalf, claiming that its refusal to hire Elauf violated Title VII. The District Court granted the EEOC summary judgment on the issue of liability, 798 F.Supp.2d 1272 (N.D.Okla.2011), held a trial on damages, and awarded $20,000. The Tenth Circuit reversed and awarded Abercrombie summary judgment. 731 F.3d 1106 (2013). It concluded that ordinarily an employer cannot be liable under Title VII for failing to accommodate a religious practice until the applicant (or employee) provides the employer with actual knowledge of his need for an accommodation. Id., at 1131. We granted certiorari. 573 U.S. ----, 135 S.Ct. 44, 189 L.Ed.2d 897 (2014).
II
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 78 Stat. 253, as amended, prohibits two categories of employment practices. It is unlawful for an employer:
"(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment *2032in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
These two proscriptions, often referred to as the "disparate treatment" (or "intentional discrimination") provision and the "disparate impact" provision, are the only causes of action under Title VII. The word "religion" is defined to "includ[e] all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to" a "religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business." § 2000e(j).1
Abercrombie's primary argument is that an applicant cannot show disparate treatment without first showing that an employer has "actual knowledge" of the applicant's need for an accommodation. We disagree. Instead, an applicant need only show that his need for an accommodation was a motivating factor in the employer's decision.2
The disparate-treatment provision forbids employers to: (1) "fail ... to hire" an applicant (2) "because of" (3) "such individual's ... religion" (which includes his religious practice). Here, of course, Abercrombie (1) failed to hire Elauf. The parties concede that (if Elauf sincerely believes that her religion so requires) Elauf's wearing of a headscarf is (3) a "religious practice." All that remains is whether she was not hired (2) "because of" her religious practice.
The term "because of" appears frequently in antidiscrimination laws. It typically imports, at a minimum, the traditional standard of but-for causation. University of Tex. Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar,570 U.S. ----, 133 S.Ct. 2517, 186 L.Ed.2d 503 (2013). Title VII relaxes this standard, however, to prohibit even making a protected characteristic a "motivating factor" in an employment decision. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m). "Because of" in § 2000e-2(a)(1)links the forbidden consideration to each of the verbs preceding it; an individual's actual religious practice may not be a motivating factor in failing to hire, in refusing to hire, and so on.
It is significant that § 2000e-2(a)(1)does not impose a knowledge requirement. As Abercrombie acknowledges, some antidiscrimination statutes do. For example, *2033the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 defines discrimination to include an employer's failure to make "reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations" of an applicant. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (emphasis added). Title VII contains no such limitation.
Instead, the intentional discrimination provision prohibits certain motives,regardless of the state of the actor's knowledge. Motive and knowledge are separate concepts. An employer who has actual knowledge of the need for an accommodation does not violate Title VII by refusing to hire an applicant if avoiding that accommodation is not his motive. Conversely, an employer who acts with the motive of avoiding accommodation may violate Title VII even if he has no more than an unsubstantiated suspicion that accommodation would be needed.
Thus, the rule for disparate-treatment claims based on a failure to accommodate a religious practice is straightforward: An employer may not make an applicant's religious practice, confirmed or otherwise, a factor in employment decisions. For example, suppose that an employer thinks (though he does not know for certain) that a job applicant may be an orthodox Jew who will observe the Sabbath, and thus be unable to work on Saturdays. If the applicant actually requires an accommodation of that religious practice, and the employer's desire to avoid the prospective accommodation is a motivating factor in his decision, the employer violates Title VII.
Abercrombie urges this Court to adopt the Tenth Circuit's rule "allocat[ing] the burden of raising a religious conflict." Brief for Respondent 46. This would require the employer to have actual knowledge of a conflict between an applicant's religious practice and a work rule. The problem with this approach is the one that inheres in most incorrect interpretations of statutes: It asks us to add words to the law to produce what is thought to be a desirable result. That is Congress's province. We construe Title VII's silence as exactly that: silence. Its disparate-treatment provision prohibits actions taken with the motive of avoiding the need for accommodating a religious practice. A request for accommodation, or the employer's certainty that the practice exists, may make it easier to infer motive, but is not a necessary condition of liability.3
Abercrombie argues in the alternative that a claim based on a failure to accommodate an applicant's religious practice must be raised as a disparate-impact claim, not a disparate-treatment claim. We think not. That might have been true if Congress had limited the meaning of "religion" in Title VII to religious belief-so that discriminating against a particular religious practicewould not be disparate treatment though it might have disparate impact. In fact, however, Congress defined "religion," for Title VII's purposes, as "includ[ing] all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j). Thus, religious practice is one of the protected characteristics *2034that cannot be accorded disparate treatment and must be accommodated.
Nor does the statute limit disparate-treatment claims to only those employer policies that treat religious practices less favorably than similar secular practices. Abercrombie's argument that a neutral policy cannot constitute "intentional discrimination" may make sense in other contexts. But Title VII does not demand mere neutrality with regard to religious practices-that they be treated no worse than other practices. Rather, it gives them favored treatment, affirmatively obligating employers not "to fail or refuse to hire or discharge any individual ... because of such individual's" "religious observance and practice." An employer is surely entitled to have, for example, a no-headwear policy as an ordinary matter. But when an applicant requires an accommodation as an "aspec[t] of religious ... practice," it is no response that the subsequent "fail[ure] ... to hire" was due to an otherwise-neutral policy. Title VII requires otherwise-neutral policies to give way to the need for an accommodation.
* * *
The Tenth Circuit misinterpreted Title VII's requirements in granting summary judgment. We reverse its judgment and remand the case for further consideration consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice ALITO, concurring in the judgment.
This case requires us to interpret a provision of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 that prohibits an employer from taking an adverse employment action (refusal to hire, discharge, etc.) "against any individual ... because of1such individual's ... religion." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). Another provision states that the term "religion" "includes all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee's or prospective employee's religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business." § 2000e(j). When these two provisions are put together, the following rule (expressed in somewhat simplified terms) results: An employer may not take an adverse employment action against an applicant or employee because of any aspect of that individual's religious observance or practice unless the employer demonstrates that it is unable to reasonably accommodate that observance or practice without undue hardship.
In this case, Samantha Elauf, a practicing Muslim, wore a headscarf for a religious reason when she was interviewed for a job in a store operated by Abercrombie & Fitch. She was rejected because her scarf violated Abercrombie's dress code for employees. There is sufficient evidence in the summary judgment record to support a finding that Abercrombie's decisionmakers knew that Elauf was a Muslim and that she wore the headscarf for a religious reason. But she was never asked why she wore the headscarf and did not volunteer that information. Nor was she told that she would be prohibited from wearing the headscarf on the job. The Tenth Circuit held that Abercrombie was entitled to summary judgment because, except perhaps in unusual circumstances, "[a]pplicants or employees must initially inform employers of their religious practices that conflict with a work requirement and their *2035need for a reasonable accommodation for them." 731 F.3d 1106, 1142 (2013)(emphasis deleted).
The relevant provisions of Title VII, however, do not impose the notice requirement that formed the basis for the Tenth Circuit's decision. While I interpret those provisions to require proof that Abercrombie knew that Elauf wore the headscarf for a religious reason, the evidence of Abercrombie's knowledge is sufficient to defeat summary judgment.
The opinion of the Court states that "§ 2000e-2(a)(1)does not impose a knowledge requirement," ante,at 2032, but then reserves decision on the question whether it is a condition of liability that the employer know or suspect that the practice he refuses to accommodate is a religious practice, ante,at 2033, n. 3, but in my view, the answer to this question, which may arise on remand,2is obvious. I would hold that an employer cannot be held liable for taking an adverse action because of an employee's religious practice unless the employer knows that the employee engages in the practice for a religious reason. If § 2000e-2(a)(1)really "does not impose a knowledge requirement," ante at 2032, it would be irrelevant in this case whether Abercrombie had any inkling that Elauf is a Muslim or that she wore the headscarf for a religious reason. That would be very strange.
The scarves that Elauf wore were not articles of clothing that were designed or marketed specifically for Muslim women. Instead, she generally purchased her scarves at ordinary clothing stores. In this case, the Abercrombie employee who interviewed Elauf had seen her wearing scarves on other occasions, and for reasons that the record does not make clear, came to the (correct) conclusion that she is a Muslim. But suppose that the interviewer in this case had never seen Elauf before. Suppose that the interviewer thought Elauf was wearing the scarf for a secular reason. Suppose that nothing else about Elauf made the interviewer even suspect that she was a Muslim or that she was wearing the scarf for a religious reason. If "§ 2000e-2(a)(1)does not impose a knowledge requirement," Abercrombie would still be liable. The EEOC, which sued on Elauf's behalf, does not adopt that interpretation, see, e.g.,Brief for Petitioner 19, and it is surely wrong.
The statutory text does not compel such a strange result. It is entirely reasonable to understand the prohibition against an employer's taking an adverse action because of a religious practice to mean that an employer may not take an adverse action because of a practice that the employer knows to be religious. Consider the following sentences. The parole board granted the prisoner parole because of an exemplaryrecord in prison. The court sanctioned the attorney because of a flagrantviolation of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. No one is likely to understand these sentences to mean that the parole board granted parole because of a record that, unbeknownst to the board, happened to be exemplary or that the court sanctioned the attorney because of a violation that, unbeknownst to the court, happened to be flagrant. Similarly, *2036it is entirely reasonable to understand this statement-"The employer rejected the applicant because of a religious practice"-to mean that the employer rejected the applicant because of a practice that the employer knew to be religious.
This interpretation makes sense of the statutory provisions. Those provisions prohibit intentional discrimination, which is blameworthy conduct, but if there is no knowledge requirement, an employer could be held liable without fault. The prohibition of discrimination because of religious practices is meant to force employers to consider whether those practices can be accommodated without undue hardship. See § 2000e(j). But the "no-knowledge" interpretation would deprive employers of that opportunity. For these reasons, an employer cannot be liable for taking adverse action because of a religious practice if the employer does not know that the practice is religious.
A plaintiff need not show, however, that the employer took the adverse action because of the religious nature of the practice. Cf. post,at 2038 - 2039 (THOMAS, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Suppose, for example, that an employer rejected all applicants who refuse to work on Saturday, whether for religious or nonreligious reasons. Applicants whose refusal to work on Saturday was known by the employer to be based on religion will have been rejected because of a religious practice.
This conclusion follows from the reasonable accommodation requirement imposed by § 2000e(j). If neutral work rules (e.g.,every employee must work on Saturday, no employee may wear any head covering) precluded liability, there would be no need to provide that defense, which allows an employer to escape liability for refusing to make an exception to a neutral work rule if doing so would impose an undue hardship.
This brings me to a final point. Under the relevant statutory provisions, an employer's failure to make a reasonable accommodation is not an element that the plaintiff must prove. I am therefore concerned about the Court's statement that it "isthe plaintiff's burden [to prove failure to accommodate]." Ante, at 2032 n. 2. This blatantly contradicts the language of the statutes. As I noted at the beginning, when § 2000e-2(a)and § 2000e(j)are combined, this is the result:
"It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer ... to fail or refuse to hire ... any individual ... because of [any aspect of] such individual's ... religious ... practice ... unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to [the] employee's or prospective employee's religious... practice... without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business." (Emphasis added.)
The clause that begins with the term "unless" unmistakably sets out an employer defense. If an employer chooses to assert that defense, it bears both the burden of production and the burden of persuasion. A plaintiff, on the other hand, must prove the elements set out prior to the "unless" clause, but that portion of the rule makes no mention of accommodation. Thus, a plaintiff need not plead or prove that the employer wished to avoid making an accommodation or could have done so without undue hardship. If a plaintiff shows that the employer took an adverse employment action because of a religious observance or practice, it is then up to the employer to plead and prove the defense. The Court's statement subverts the statutory text, and in close cases, the Court's reallocation of the burden of persuasion may be decisive.
*2037In sum, the EEOC was required in this case to prove that Abercrombie rejected Elauf because of a practice that Abercrombie knew was religious. It is undisputed that Abercrombie rejected Elauf because she wore a headscarf, and there is ample evidence in the summary judgment record to prove that Abercrombie knew that Elauf is a Muslim and that she wore the scarf for a religious reason. The Tenth Circuit therefore erred in ordering the entry of summary judgment for Abercrombie. On remand, the Tenth Circuit can consider whether there is sufficient evidence to support summary judgment in favor of the EEOC on the question of Abercrombie's knowledge. The Tenth Circuit will also be required to address Abercrombie's claim that it could not have accommodated Elauf's wearing the headscarf on the job without undue hardship.
I agree with the Court that there are two-and only two-causes of action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as understood by our precedents: a disparate-treatment (or intentional-discrimination) claim and a disparate-impact claim.Ante,at 2031 - 2032. Our agreement ends there. Unlike the majority, I adhere to what I had thought before today was an undisputed proposition: Mere application of a neutral policy cannot constitute "intentional discrimination." Because the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) can prevail here only if Abercrombie engaged in intentional discrimination, and because Abercrombie's application of its neutral Look Policy does not meet that description, I would affirm the judgment of the Tenth Circuit.
I
This case turns on whether Abercrombie's conduct constituted "intentional discrimination" within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1). That provision allows a Title VII plaintiff to "recover compensatory and punitive damages" only against an employer "who engaged in unlawful intentional discrimination (not an employment practice that is unlawful because of its disparate impact)." The damages award EEOC obtained against Abercrombie is thus proper only if that company engaged in "intentional discrimination"-as opposed to "an employment practice that is unlawful because of its disparate impact"-within the meaning of § 1981a(a)(1).
The terms "intentional discrimination" and "disparate impact" have settled meanings in federal employment discrimination law. "[I]ntentional discrimination ... occur[s] where an employer has treated a particular person less favorably than others because of a protected trait." Ricci v. DeStefano,557 U.S. 557, 577, 129 S.Ct. 2658, 174 L.Ed.2d 490 (2009)(internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). "[D]isparate-impact claims," by contrast, "involve employment practices that are facially neutral in their treatment of different groups but that in fact fall more harshly on one group than another and cannot be justified by business necessity." Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez,540 U.S. 44, 52, 124 S.Ct. 513, 157 L.Ed.2d 357 (2003)(internal quotation marks omitted). Conceived by this Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,401 U.S. 424, 91 S.Ct. 849, 28 L.Ed.2d 158 (1971), this "theory of discrimination" provides that "a facially neutral employment practice may be deemed illegally discriminatory without evidence of the employer's subjective intent to discriminate that is required in a disparate-treatment case," Raytheon, supra,at 52-53, 124 S.Ct. 513(internal quotation marks and alteration omitted).
*2038I would hold that Abercrombie's conduct did not constitute "intentional discrimination." Abercrombie refused to create an exception to its neutral Look Policy for Samantha Elauf's religious practice of wearing a headscarf. Ante,at 2031. In doing so, it did not treat religious practices less favorably than similar secular practices, but instead remained neutral with regard to religious practices. To be sure, the effectsof Abercrombie's neutral Look Policy, absent an accommodation, fall more harshly on those who wear headscarves as an aspect of their faith. But that is a classic case of an alleged disparate impact. It is not what we have previously understood to be a case of disparate treatment because Elauf received the sametreatment from Abercrombie as any other applicant who appeared unable to comply with the company's Look Policy. See ibid.; App. 134, 144. Because I cannot classify Abercrombie's conduct as "intentional discrimination," I would affirm.
II
A
Resisting this straightforward application of § 1981a, the majority expands the meaning of "intentional discrimination" to include a refusal to give a religious applicant "favored treatment." Ante,at 2033 - 2034. But contrary to the majority's assumption, this novel theory of discrimination is not commanded by the relevant statutory text.
Title VII makes it illegal for an employer "to fail or refuse to hire ... any individual ... because of such individual's ... religion." § 2000e-2(a)(1). And as used in Title VII, "[t]he term 'religion' includes all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee's or prospective employee's religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business." § 2000e(j). With this gloss on the definition of "religion" in § 2000e-2(a)(1), the majority concludes that an employer may violate Title VII if he "refuse[s] to hire ... any individual ... because of such individual's ... religious ... practice" (unless he has an "undue hardship" defense). See ante,at 2031 - 2032.
But inserting the statutory definition of religion into § 2000e-2(a)does not answer the question whether Abercrombie's refusal to hire Elauf was "because of her religious practice." At first glance, the phrase "because of such individual's religious practice" could mean one of two things. Under one reading, it could prohibit taking an action because of the religious nature of an employee's particular practice. Under the alternative reading, it could prohibit taking an action because of an employee's practice that happensto be religious.
The distinction is perhaps best understood by example. Suppose an employer with a neutral grooming policy forbidding facial hair refuses to hire a Muslim who wears a beard for religious reasons. Assuming the employer applied the neutral grooming policy to all applicants, the motivation behind the refusal to hire the Muslim applicant would not be the religious nature of his beard, but its existence. Under the first reading, then, the Muslim applicant would lack an intentional-discrimination claim, as he was not refused employment "because of" the religious nature of his practice. But under the second reading, he would have such a claim, as he was refused employment "because of" a practice that happens to be religious in nature.
One problem with the second, more expansive reading is that it would punish *2039employers who have no discriminatory motive. If the phrase "because of such individual's religious practice" sweeps in any case in which an employer takes an adverse action because of a practice that happens to be religious in nature, an employer who had no idea that a particular practice was religious would be penalized. That strict-liability view is plainly at odds with the concept of intentional discrimination. Cf. Raytheon, supra,at 54, n. 7, 124 S.Ct. 513("If [the employer] were truly unaware that such a disability existed, it would be impossible for her hiring decision to have been based, even in part, on [the applicant's] disability. And, if no part of the hiring decision turned on [the applicant's] status as disabled, he cannot, ipso facto,have been subject to disparate treatment"). Surprisingly, the majority leaves the door open to this strict-liability theory, reserving the question whether an employer who does not even "suspec[t] that the practice in question is a religious practice" can nonetheless be punished for intentionaldiscrimination. Ante,at 2033, n. 3.
For purposes of today's decision, however, the majority opts for a compromise, albeit one that lacks a foothold in the text and fares no better under our precedents. The majority construes § 2000e-2(a)(1)to punish employers who refuse to accommodate applicants under neutral policies when they act "with the motive of avoiding accommodation." Ante,at 2033. But an employer who is aware that strictly applying a neutral policy will have an adverse effect on a religious group, and applies the policy anyway, is not engaged in intentional discrimination, at least as that term has traditionally been understood. As the Court explained many decades ago, " 'Discriminatory purpose' "-i.e.,the purpose necessary for a claim of intentional discrimination-demands "more than ... awareness of consequences. It implies that the decisionmaker ... selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects upon an identifiable group." Personnel Administrator of Mass. v. Feeney,442 U.S. 256, 279, 99 S.Ct. 2282, 60 L.Ed.2d 870 (1979)(internal citation and footnote omitted).
I do not dispute that a refusal to accommodate can, in some circumstances, constitute intentional discrimination. If an employer declines to accommodate a particular religious practice, yet accommodates a similar secular (or other denominational) practice, then that may be proof that he has "treated a particular person less favorably than others because of [a religious practice]." Ricci,557 U.S., at 577, 129 S.Ct. 2658(internal quotation marks and alteration omitted); see also, e.g., Dixon v. Hallmark Cos.,627 F.3d 849, 853 (C.A.11 2010)(addressing a policy forbidding display of "religious items" in management offices). But merely refusing to create an exception to a neutral policy for a religious practice cannot be described as treating a particular applicant "less favorably than others." The majority itself appears to recognize that its construction requires something more than equal treatment. See ante,at 2034 ("Title VII does not demand mere neutrality with regard to religious practices," but instead "gives them favored treatment"). But equal treatment is not disparate treatment, and that basic principle should have disposed of this case.
B
The majority's novel theory of intentional discrimination is also inconsistent with the history of this area of employment discrimination law. As that history shows, cases arising out of the application of a neutral policy absent religious accommodations have traditionally been understood to involve only disparate-impact liability.
*2040When Title VII was enacted in 1964, it prohibited discrimination "because of ... religion" and did not include the current definition of "religion" encompassing "religious observance and practice" that was added to the statute in 1972. Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§ 701, 703(a), 78 Stat. 253-255. Shortly thereafter, the EEOC issued guidelines purporting to create "an obligation on the part of the employer to accommodate to the religious needs of employees." 31 Fed.Reg. 8370 (1966). From an early date, the EEOC defended this obligation under a disparate-impact theory. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiaein Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co.,O.T. 1970, No. 835, pp. 7, 13, 29-32. Courts and commentators at the time took the same view. See, e.g., Reid v. Memphis Publishing Co.,468 F.2d 346, 350 (C.A.6 1972); Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co.,300 F.Supp. 709, 713 (W.D.Mich.1969), rev'd, 429 F.2d 324 (C.A.6 1970), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 402 U.S. 689, 91 S.Ct. 2186, 29 L.Ed.2d 267 (1971)(per curiam); 1 B. Lindemann & P. Grossman, Employment Discrimination Law 187-188 (3d ed. 1976).
This Court's first decision to discuss a refusal to accommodate a religious practice, Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison,432 U.S. 63, 97 S.Ct. 2264, 53 L.Ed.2d 113 (1977), similarly did not treat such conduct as intentional discrimination. Hardisoninvolved a conflict between an employer's neutral seniority system for assigning shifts and an employee's observance of a Saturday Sabbath. The employer denied the employee an accommodation, so he refused to show up for work on Saturdays and was fired. Id.,at 67-69, 97 S.Ct. 2264. This Court held that the employer was not liable under Title VII because the proposed accommodations would have imposed an undue hardship on the employer. Id.,at 77, 97 S.Ct. 2264. To bolster its conclusion that there was no statutory violation, the Court relied on a provision of Title VII shielding the application of a " 'bona fide seniority or merit system' " from challenge unless that application is " 'the result of an intention to discriminate because of ... religion.' " Id.,at 81-82, 97 S.Ct. 2264(quoting § 2000e-2(h)). In applying that provision, the Court observed that "[t]here ha[d] been no suggestion of discriminatory intent in th [e] case." Id.,at 82, 97 S.Ct. 2264. But if the majority's view were correct-if a mere refusal to accommodate a religious practice under a neutral policy could constitute intentional discrimination-then the Court in Hardisonshould never have engaged in such reasoning. After all, the employer in Hardisonknew of the employee's religious practice and refused to make an exception to its neutral seniority system, just as Abercrombie arguably knew of Elauf's religious practice and refused to make an exception to its neutral Look Policy.*
*2041Lower courts following Hardisonlikewise did not equate a failure to accommodate with intentional discrimination. To the contrary, many lower courts, including the Tenth Circuit below, wrongly assumed that Title VII creates a freestanding failure-to-accommodate claim distinct from either disparate treatment or disparate impact. See, e.g.,731 F.3d 1106, 1120 (2013)("A claim for religious discrimination under Title VII can be asserted under several different theories, including disparate treatment and failure to accommodate" (internal quotation marks omitted)); Protos v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc.,797 F.2d 129, 134, n. 2 (C.A.3 1986)("In addition to her religious accommodation argument, [the plaintiff] maintains that she prevailed in the district court on a disparate treatment claim"). That assumption appears to have grown out of statements in our cases suggesting that Title VII's definitional provision concerning religion created an independent duty. See, e.g., Ansonia Bd. of Ed. v. Philbrook,479 U.S. 60, 63, n. 1, 107 S.Ct. 367, 93 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986)("The reasonable accommodation duty was incorporated into the statute, somewhat awkwardly, in the definition of religion"). But in doing so, the lower courts correctly recognized that a failure-to-accommodate claim based on the application of a neutral policy is not a disparate-treatment claim. See, e.g., Reed v. International Union, United Auto., Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of Am.,569 F.3d 576, 579-580 (C.A.6 2009);Chalmers v. Tulon Co. of Richmond,101 F.3d 1012, 1018 (C.A.4 1996).
At least before we granted a writ of certiorari in this case, the EEOC too understood that merely applying a neutral policy did not automatically constitute intentional discrimination giving rise to a disparate-treatment claim. For example, the Commission explained in a recent compliance manual, "A religious accommodation claim is distinct from a disparate treatment claim, in which the question is whether employees are treated equally." EEOC Compliance Manual § 12-IV, p. 46 (2008). Indeed, in asking us to take this case, the EEOC dismissed one of Abercrombie's supporting authorities as "a case addressing intentional discrimination, not religious accommodation." Reply to Brief in Opposition 7, n. Once we granted certiorari in this case, however, the EEOC altered course and advanced the intentional-discrimination theory now adopted by the majority. The Court should have rejected this eleventh-hour request to expand our understanding of "intentional discrimination" to include merely applying a religion-neutral policy.
* * *
The Court today rightly puts to rest the notion that Title VII creates a freestanding religious-accommodation claim, ante,at 2031 - 2032, but creates in its stead an entirely new form of liability: the disparate-treatment-based-on-equal-treatment claim. Because I do not think that Congress'
*20421972 redefinition of "religion" also redefined "intentional discrimination," I would affirm the judgment of the Tenth Circuit. I respectfully dissent from the portions of the majority's decision that take the contrary view.
12.2.4 Ansonia Board of Education v. Philbrook 12.2.4 Ansonia Board of Education v. Philbrook
ANSONIA BOARD OF EDUCATION et al. v. PHILBROOK et al.
No. 85-495.
Argued October 14, 1986
Decided November 17, 1986
*61Rehnquist, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Brennan, White, Blackmun, Powell, O’Connor, and Scalia, JJ., joined. Marshall, J., post, p. 71, and Stevens, J., post, p. 75, filed opinions concurring in part and dissenting in part.
Thomas N. Sullivan argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs was Robert J. Murphy. Robert F. McWeeny argued the cause and filed a brief for Ansonia Fed*62eration of Teachers, respondent under this Court’s Rule 19.6, in support of petitioners.
David N. Rosen argued the cause for respondent Philbrook. With him on the brief was Paul Gewirtz.
Solicitor General Fried argued the cause for the United States et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance. With him on the brief were Assistant Attorneys General Reynolds and Willard, Deputy Solicitor General Carolyn B. Kuhl, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Carvin, Richard J. Lazarus, Brian K. Landsberg, Louise A. Lerner, and Johnny J. Butler. *
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner Ansonia Board of Education has employed respondent Ronald Philbrook since 1962 to teach high school business and typing classes in Ansonia, Connecticut. In 1968, Philbrook was baptized into the Worldwide Church of God. The tenets of the church require members to refrain from secular employment during designated holy days, a *63practice that has caused respondent to miss approximately six schooldays each year. We are asked to determine whether the employer’s efforts to adjust respondent’s work schedule in light of his belief fulfill its obligation under § 701 (j) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 86 Stat. 103, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e(j), to “reasonably accommodate to an employee’s . . . religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.”1
Since the 1967-1968 school year, the school board’s collective-bargaining agreements with the Ansonia Federation of Teachers have granted to each teacher 18 days of leave per year for illness, cumulative to 150 and later to 180 days. Accumulated leave may be used for purposes other than illness as specified in the agreement. A teacher may accordingly use five days’ leave for a death in the immediate family, one day for attendance at a wedding, three days per year for attendance as an official delegate to a national veterans organization, and the like. See, e. g., App. 98-99. With the exception of the agreement covering the 1967-1968 school year, each contract has specifically provided three *64days’ annual leave for observance of mandatory religious holidays, as defined in the contract. Unlike other categories for which leave is permitted, absences for religious holidays are not charged against the teacher’s annual or accumulated leave.
The school board has also agreed that teachers may use up to three days of accumulated leave each school year for “necessary personal business.” Recent contracts limited permissible personal leave to those uses not otherwise specified in the contract. This limitation dictated, for example, that an employee who wanted more than three leave days to attend the convention of a national veterans organization could not use personal leave to gain extra days for that purpose. Likewise, an employee already absent three days for mandatory religious observances could not later use personal leave for “[a]ny religious activity,” id., at 80, 83, 86, 89, 92, or “[a]ny religious observance.” Id., at 96, 100. Since the 1978-1979 school year, teachers have been allowed to take one of the three personal days without prior approval; use of the remaining two days requires advance approval by the school principal.
The limitations on the use of personal business leave spawned this litigation. Until the 1976-1977 year, Philbrook observed mandatory holy days by using the three days granted in the contract and then taking unauthorized leave. His pay was reduced accordingly.2 In 1976, however, respondent stopped taking unauthorized leave for religious reasons, and began scheduling required hospital visits on church holy days. He also worked on several holy days. Dissatisfied with this arrangement, Philbrook repeatedly asked the school board to adopt one of two alternatives. His preferred alternative would allow use of personal business leave for religious observance, effectively giving him three addi*65tional days of paid leave for that purpose. Short of this arrangement, respondent suggested that he pay the cost of a substitute and receive full pay for additional days off for religious observances.3 Petitioner has consistently rejected both proposals.
In 1973 Philbrook filed a complaint with the Connecticut Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission against the school board and the Ansonia Federation of Teachers. After exhausting the available administrative avenues, he filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, alleging that the prohibition on the use of “necessary personal business” leave for religious observance violated §§ 703(a)(1), (2) of Title VII, 42 U. S. C. §§2000e-2(a)(l), (2), and seeking both damages and injunc-tive relief.4
After a 2-day trial, the District Court concluded that Philbrook had failed to prove a case of religious discrimination because he had not been placed by the school board in a position of violating his religion or losing his job.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed and remanded for further proceedings. It held that a prima facie case of discrimination is established when an employee shows that
“ ‘(1) he or she has a bona fide religious belief that conflicts with an employment requirement; (2) he or she informed the employer of this belief; (3) he or she was disciplined for failure to comply with the conflicting em*66ployment requirement.’ ” 757 F. 2d 476, 481 (1985), quoting Turpen v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R. Co., 736 F. 2d 1022, 1026 (CA5 1984).
Philbrook established his case, the court held, by showing that he had a sincere religious belief that conflicted with the employer’s attendance requirements, that the employer was aware of the belief, and that he suffered a detriment— namely, a loss of pay — from the conflict.5 The court then assumed that the employer’s leave policy constituted a reasonable accommodation to Philbrook’s belief. It held, however, that “[w]here the employer and the employee each propose a reasonable accommodation, Title VII requires the employer to accept the proposal the employee prefers unless that accommodation causes undue hardship on the employer’s conduct of his business.” 757 F. 2d, at 484. The Court of Appeals remanded for consideration of the hardship that would result from Philbrook’s suggestions.
We granted certiorari to consider the important questions of federal law presented by the decision of the Court of Appeals. 474 U. S. 1080 (1986). Specifically, we are asked to address whether the Court of Appeals erred in finding that Philbrook established a prima facie case of religious discrimination and in opining that an employer must accept the employee’s preferred accommodation absent proof of undue hardship. We find little support in the statute for the approach adopted by the Court of Appeals, but we agree that the ultimate issue of reasonable accommodation cannot be resolved without further factual inquiry. We accordingly affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals remanding the case to the District Court for additional findings.
*67As we noted in our only previous consideration of § 701(j), its language was added to the 1972 amendments on the floor of the Senate with little discussion. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U. S. 63, 74, n. 9 (1977). See 118 Cong. Rec. 705-706 (1972). In Hardison, supra, at 84, we determined that an accommodation causes “undue hardship” whenever that accommodation results in “more than a de minimis cost” to the employer. Hardison had been discharged because his religious beliefs would not allow him to work on Saturdays and claimed that this action violated the employer’s duty to effect a reasonable accommodation of his beliefs. Because we concluded that each of the suggested accommodations would impose on the employer an undue hardship, we had no occasion to consider the bounds of a prima facie case in the religious accommodation context or whether an employer is required to choose from available accommodations the alternative preferred by the employee. The employer in Hardison simply argued that all conceivable accommodations would result in undue hardship, and we agreed.
Petitioner asks us to establish for religious accommodation claims a proof scheme analogous to that developed in other Title VII contexts, delineating the plaintiff’s prima facie case and shifting production burdens. See Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U. S. 248 (1981); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U. S. 792 (1973). But the present case raises no such issue. As in United States Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U. S. 711 (1983), the defendant here failed to persuade the District Court to dismiss the action for want of a prima facie case, and the case was fully tried on the merits. We held in Aikens that these circumstances place the ultimate Title VII question of discrimination vel non directly before the court. “Where the defendant has done everything that would be required of him if the plaintiff had properly made out a prima facie case, whether the plaintiff really did so is no longer-rele*68vant.” Id., at 715. We may therefore proceed to the question whether the employer’s proposed accommodation of respondent’s religious practices comports with the statutory mandate of §701(j).
In addressing this question, the Court of Appeals assumed that the employer had offered a reasonable accommodation of Philbrook’s religious beliefs. This alone, however, was insufficient in that court’s view to allow resolution of the dispute. The court observed that the duty to accommodate “cannot be defined without reference to undue hardship.” 757 F. 2d, at 484. It accordingly determined that the accommodation obligation includes a duty to accept “the proposal the employee prefers unless that accommodation causes undue hardship on the employer’s conduct of his business.” Ibid. Cf. American Postal Workers Union v. Postmaster General, 781 F. 2d 772, 776 (CA9 1986) (Title VII does not dictate that “an employer must accept any accommodation, short of ‘undue hardship,’ proposed by an employee . . .”). Because the District Court had not considered whether Philbrook’s proposals would impose undue hardship, the Court of Appeals remanded for further consideration of those proposals.
We find no basis in either the statute or its legislative history for requiring an employer to choose any particular reasonable accommodation. By its very terms the statute directs that any reasonable accommodation by the employer is sufficient to meet its accommodation obligation. The employer violates the statute unless it “demonstrates that [it] is unable to reasonably accommodate ... an employee’s ... religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.” 42 U. S. C. §2000e(j). Thus, where the employer has already reasonably accommodated the employee’s religious needs, the statutory inquiry is at an end. The employer need not further show that each of the employee’s alternative accommodations would result in undue hardship. As Hardison illustrates, the extent of *69undue hardship on the employer’s business is at issue only where the employer claims that it is unable to offer any reasonable accommodation without such hardship. Once the Court of Appeals assumed that the school board had offered to Philbrook a reasonable alternative, it erred by requiring the Board to nonetheless demonstrate the hardship of Phil-brook’s alternatives.
The legislative history of § 701(j), as we noted in Hardison, supra, at 74-75, and n. 9, is of little help in defining the employer’s accommodation obligation. To the extent it provides any indication of congressional intent, however, we think that the history supports our conclusion. Senator Randolph, the sponsor of the amendment that became §701(j), expressed his hope that accommodation would be made with “flexibility” and “a desire to achieve an adjustment.” 118 Cong. Rec. 706 (1972). Consistent with these goals, courts have noted that “bilateral cooperation is appropriate in the search for an acceptable reconciliation of the needs of the employee’s religion and the exigencies of the employer’s business.” Brener v. Diagnostic Center Hospital, 671 F. 2d 141, 145-146 (CA5 1982). See also American Postal Workers, supra, at 777. Under the approach articulated by the Court of Appeals, however, the employee is given every incentive to hold out for the most beneficial accommodation, despite the fact that an employer offers a reasonable resolution of the conflict. This approach, we think, conflicts with both the language of the statute and the views that led to its enactment. We accordingly hold that an employer has met its obligation under § 701(j) when it demonstrates that it has offered a reasonable accommodation to the employee.6
*70The remaining issue in the case is whether the school board’s leave policy constitutes a reasonable accommodation of Philbrook’s religious beliefs. Because both the District Court and the Court of Appeals applied what we hold to be an erroneous view of the law, neither explicitly considered this question. We- think that there are insufficient factual findings as to the manner in which the collective-bargaining agreements have been interpreted in order for us to make that judgment initially. We think that the school board policy in this case, requiring respondent to take unpaid leave for holy day observance that exceeded the amount allowed by the collective-bargaining agreement, would generally be a reasonable one. In enacting § 701(j), Congress was understandably motivated by a desire to assure the individual additional opportunity to observe religious practices, but it did not impose a duty on the employer to accommodate at all costs. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U. S. 63 (1977). The provision of unpaid leave eliminates the conflict between employment requirements and religious practices by allowing the individual to observe fully religious holy days and requires him only to give up compensation for a day that he did not in fact work. Generally speaking, “[t]he direct effect of [unpaid leave] is merely a loss of income for the period *71the employee is not at work; such an exclusion has no direct effect upon either employment opportunities or job status.” Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U. S. 136, 145 (1977).
But unpaid leave is not a reasonable accommodation when paid leave is provided for all purposes except religious ones. A provision for paid leave “that is part and parcel of the employment relationship may not be doled out in a discriminatory fashion, even if the employer would be free . . . not to provide the benefit at all.” Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U. S. 69, 75 (1984). Such an arrangement would display a discrimination against religious practices that is the antithesis of reasonableness. Whether the policy here violates this teaching turns on factual inquiry into past and present administration of the personal business leave provisions of the collective-bargaining agreement. The school board contends that the necessary personal business category in the agreement, like other leave provisions, defines a limited purpose leave. Philbrook, on the other hand, asserts that the necessary personal leave category is not so limited, operating as an open-ended leave provision that may be used for a wide range of secular purposes in addition to those specifically provided for in the contract, but not for similar religious purposes. We do not think that the record is sufficiently clear on this point for us to make the necessary factual findings, and we therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals remanding the case to the District Court. The latter court on remand should make the necessary findings as to past and existing practice in the administration of the collective-bargaining agreements.
It is so ordered.
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I agree with the Court’s conclusion that, if the school board provides paid leave “for all purposes except religious ones,” ante this page, its accommodation of Philbrook’s religious needs would be unreasonable and thus violate Title VII. *72But I do not find the specificity of the personal business leave, or the possibility that it may be used for activities similar to the religious activities Philbrook seeks leave to pursue, necessarily dispositive of whether the Board has satisfied its affirmative duty under § 701(j), 42 U. S. C. § 2000e(j), to reasonably accommodate Philbrook’s religious needs. Even if the District Court should find that the personal leave is restricted to specific secular uses having no similarity with Philbrook’s religious activities, Philbrook would still encounter a conflict between his religious needs and work requirements. In my view, the question would remain whether, without imposing an undue hardship on the conduct of its educational program, the school board could further reasonably accommodate Philbrook’s need for additional religious leave.
If, for example, the personal business leave were so limited that it allowed teachers paid leave for the sole purpose of meeting with their accountants to prepare their income tax returns (a purely secular activity), a proposal from Philbrook that he be allowed to prepare his tax return on his own time and use this paid leave for religious observance might be found imminently reasonable and lacking in undue hardship. The Board’s prior determination that the conduct of its educational program can withstand the paid absence of its teachers for up to six days each year for religious and personal reasons tends to indicate that granting Philbrook’s similar request in this case for a total of six days paid religious leave and no personal leave is reasonable, would cause the Board no undue hardship, and hence falls within the scope of the Board’s affirmative obligation under Title VII.
The Court suggests that requiring an employer to consider an employee’s proposals would enable the employee to hold his employer hostage in exchange for a particular accommodation. Ante, at 69. If the employer has offered a reasonable accommodation that fully resolves the conflict between the employee’s work and religious requirements, I agree that *73no further consideration of the employee’s proposals would normally be warranted. But if the accommodation offered by the employer does not completely resolve the employee’s conflict, I would hold that the employer remains under an obligation to consider whatever reasonable proposals the employee may submit.
I do not accept the Court’s conclusion that the statute, “[b]y its very terms,” reheves the Board from this continuing duty to accommodate the special religious practices of its employees where doing so is reasonable and causes no undue hardship. Ante, at 68. The statute simply creates an affirmative duty to accommodate; it does not specify who must respond to whom. Nor am I persuaded that the legislative history cited by the Court disposes of this issue. The statement of Senator Randolph, who sponsored the amendment, that he hoped the “accommodation would be made with ‘flexibility’ and ‘a desire to achieve an adjustment,’ ” lends at least as much support to the concept of the employer’s continuing duty as it does to the Court’s reading of the statute. Ante, at 69 (quoting 118 Cong. Rec. 706 (1972)).
The EEOC’s guidelines on religious discrimination support an interpretation of the statute placing this continuing duty to accommodate on the employer.* Just last Term, in *74 Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U. S. 57, 65 (1986), we expressly relied on an EEOC guideline in holding that sexual harassment charges could provide the basis for a Title VII claim. The Court’s reluctance to accord similar weight to the EEOC’s interpretation here rests on nothing more than a selective reading of the express provisions of Title VII and the guidelines. Ante, at 69-70, n. 6. Title VII prohibits discrimination not only with respect to employment opportunities, § 708(a)(2), 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2(a)(2), but also with respect to “compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.” § 703(a)(1), 42 U. S. C. §2000e-2(a)(l) (emphasis added). The EEOC guidelines consider compensation encompassed within the concept of “employment opportunities.” 29 CFR § 1605.2(c) (1986). A forced reduction in compensation based on an employee’s religious beliefs can be as much a violation of Title VII as a refusal to hire or grant a promotion.
In this case, contrary to the Court’s conclusion, ante, at 70-71, the school board’s accommodation of Philbrook’s religious needs by merely allowing unpaid leave does not eliminate the conflict. Rather, the offer forces Philbrook to choose between following his religious precepts with a partial forfeiture of salary and violating these precepts for work with full pay. It is precisely this loss of compensation that entitles Philbrook to further accommodation, if reasonably possible without undue hardship to the school board’s educational program. It may be that unpaid leave will generally amount to a reasonable accommodation, but this does not mean that unpaid leave will always be the reasonable accommodation which best resolves the conflict between the needs of the employer and employee. In my view, then, an offer of unpaid leave does not end the inquiry: If an employee, in turn, offers another reasonable proposal that results in a more effective resolution without causing undue hardship, the employer should be required to implement it.
*75The Court’s analysis in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U. S. 63 (1977), is difficult to reconcile with its holding today. In Hardison, the Court held that the employer’s chosen work schedule was a reasonable accommodation but nonetheless went on to consider and reject each of the alternative suggested accommodations. The course followed in Hardison should have been adopted here as well. “Once it is determined that the duty to accommodate sometimes requires that an employee be exempted from an otherwise valid work requirement, the only remaining question is ... : Did [the employer] prove that it exhausted all reasonable accommodations, and that the only remaining alternatives would have caused undue hardship on [the employer’s] business?” Id., at 91 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
Accordingly, I would remand this case for factual findings on both the intended scope of the school board’s leave provision and the reasonableness and expected hardship of Philbrook’s proposals.
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
While I agree with the Court’s rejection of the rationale of the Court of Appeals’ opinion, I would simply reverse its judgment. Remanding for further proceedings in the District Court is both unnecessary and confusing. Whether respondent Philbrook’s complaint is analyzed as an outright claim that he is entitled to six paid days of leave for religious observance or as an argument that petitioner’s employment policies, while facially neutral, fail to accommodate his religious beliefs, the record before us plainly discloses that he cannot prevail.
I
The school board has a clear duty not to discriminate against Philbrook because of his religious faith. Section 703(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 flatly prohibits an em*76ployer from discriminating against any individual by basing employment and workplace decisions on the employee’s or prospective employee’s religion. This stricture against disparate treatment based on religion is simultaneously extended and qualified by § 701, which defines religion for purposes of the Act. Congress defines religion to include “all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee’s or prospective employee’s religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.” §701(j). The statute therefore imposes a duty on the employer to make reasonable accommodations, short of undue hardship, for the religious practices of his employees. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U. S. 63, 74 (1977). The effect of § 703(a) is to impose a special duty upon the employer when— and only when — a conflict arises between an individual’s religious observance or practice and the employer’s policy.
The statute does not allow a plaintiff raising a claim under § 701(j) to charge immediately onto the field of undue hardship. Folded within § 701(j) are certain preliminary inquiries. First, the court must ask whether the employee’s job obligations are in conflict with his religious obligations. “The accommodation issue by definition arises only when a neutral rule of general applicability conflicts with the religious practices of a particular employee.” Hardison, supra, at 87 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Absent a conflict, it makes no sense to speak of a duty to accommodate; there is no competing claim on the employee for which the employer must make adjustments. If the duty does arise, the statute requires the employer to resolve the conflict if it can do so without undue hardship. As the Court correctly holds, the employer has no statutory duty to resolve the conflict in the way the employee requests as long as the solution that is adopted is reasonable. I find it equally clear that the em*77ployer has no statutory duty to do anything more than strictly necessary to resolve the conflict.
Because the existence and scope of the duty to accommodate depend solely on the nature of the conflict between the terms of the job and the requirements of the religion, it is essential to identify the alleged conflict as precisely as possible. In this case Philbrook’s faith prevents him from working on certain schooldays. The school board does not require him to work on any of those days; on three of those days each year it pays him even though he does not work, and on the other days it declines to pay him for the time that he spends discharging his religious obligations. The existence of a conflict is thus not immediately apparent.
Philbrook argues, however, that the contractual arrangement occasions two conflicts between his religious requirements and his employer’s job requirements. First, he argues that the employer’s practice of excluding religious observance as a permissible use of the three days of paid annual leave for “necessary personal business” is directly in conflict with his religious practice, because he needs to take those days as days of religious obligation. Second, during his unpaid absence from work on days of religious obligation, he is unable to do work and must later — or earlier — perform this work without separate compensation. In essence, he argues that the employer’s practice of requiring him to complete this work, which is an integral part of his job duties as a salaried employee, conflicts with his religious obligation to be absent on the days when he would otherwise have performed this work and been paid for it. An examination of these claims discloses that neither has merit.
H > — i
Philbrook has contended that the school board has discriminated on the basis of religion in the allocation of its paid annual leave, or more specifically, in the limitation it has placed on the use of three days of paid annual leave for neces*78sary personal business. Properly viewed, the conflict Phil-brook alleges is one which is not cognizable under § 703 and therefore entitles him to no relief. He points to the conflict, by no means specific to the practice of religion, between the Board’s leave policy and the needs of an employee who wishes to use the three days of necessary personal business leave for any purpose not allowed by the contract. The Board allows all of its teachers three days of paid annual leave for “necessary personal business” but prohibits them from using any of those days for “[a]ny religious activity.” On its face, this prohibition might appear to discriminate against employees who need to take a day off to attend church in favor of those who need a day off for secular reasons. The argument fails, however, because it does not fully describe either the scope of the separate provision for paid leave for religious purposes or the restricted scope of the provision for leave for necessary personal business.
The collective-bargaining agreement between the school board and the teachers’ union contains generous provisions for paid leave for various specific purposes. After stating that 18 days of annual leave shall be granted “for personal illness and/or illness in the immediate family,” the contract specifies 11 additional categories of personal leave, including 5 days for a death in the immediate family, 1 day each for attendance at funerals, weddings, graduations, and immediate family religious services, and 3 days each for “[m]andated religious observances” and “[n]ecessary personal business.” The teacher is not required to identify the specific character of his personal business, but the contract limits the teacher’s discretion by stating:
“Necessary personal business shall not include (without limitations):
“1. Marriage attendance or participation;
“2. Day following marriage or wedding trip;
“3. Attendance or participation in a sporting or recreational event;
*79“4. Any religious observance;
“5. Travel associated with any provision of annual leave;
“6. Purposes set forth under annual leave or another leave provision of this contract.” App. 100.
Philbrook does not contend that the leave policy is discriminatory because he is eligible for, or has actually received, fewer days of paid leave than members of other religious faiths or than teachers who have no religious obligations on schooldays. The basis of his principal discrimination argument is that the total of six days for mandated religious observances and necessary personal business is not adequate to enable him to take care of “the personal business that is most important and pressing to him: religious activity and observance,”1 whereas this combination of six days of paid leave is adequate for some teachers who have different religious and ethical commitments. Quite clearly, however, this argument rests on the premise that Philbrook’s special, that is, religious, needs entitle him to extraordinary treatment. His “discrimination” argument states a grievance against equal treatment rather than a claim that he has been the recipient of unequal treatment.2
*80This point comes into sharp focus when the contractual prohibition against using the three days of personal leave for “any religious observance” is seen for what it is, merely a part of the broader prohibition against using personal business leave for any of the purposes specifically authorized in the contract. The existing leave policy denies paid days to any teacher who proposes to take more paid days of personal business leave per year to fulfill his or her commitments than the contract allows. Philbrook’s wish to use his secular leave for religious purposes is thwarted by the same policy that denies an avid official delegate to a national veterans’ organization use of secular leave days for that activity in excess of the days specifically allotted for it under the contract. In fact, since three days are expressly authorized for mandated religious observances — events that recur each year— whereas most other categories of paid leave cover relatively infrequent contingencies such as a death in the family or attendance at a family wedding, it is highly probable that the leave policy as a whole tends to favor, rather than to disfavor, persons who must observe religious days during the school year. For example, an atheist who attends a wedding, a funeral, and a graduation on schooldays receives a total of three days of paid personal leave, but a religious person who attends the same three events on paid days also receives pay for three religious days.
I — I I — I
Philbrook’s second claim is that the board has a duty of reasonable accommodation “to mitigate the burden of the Board’s requirement that [he] work without pay in connection with his absence for religious observance.” Brief for *81Respondent Philbrook 24.3 This claim founders because it discloses no conflict between Philbrook’s religion and his employment. If he had been disciplined, or discharged, for taking too many days off for religious services, the result would be different, but the only inconvenience to which he is subjected is the necessity of doing work on paid days that he was unable to do during his days of religious observance. This inconvenience arises not because of any discrimination against religion, but because the employee’s missed day of work is unpaid. Every' employee who takes a day off from work for an unauthorized purpose suffers the same inconvenience as Philbrook; each loses a day of pay and must make up the work associated with that day. The obligation to perform the work carries over, not because the employee has exercised his religion in the one case or satisfied a secular business need in another, but for the generic and shared reason that the employee was not paid for a day on which he was hired to do work. Since no statutory conflict between Philbrook’s religion and his work duties occurred, the duty to accommodate his religious practices never arose.
> b — H
The present state of the record enables me to conclude that Philbrook states no claim of religious discrimination under § 703(a). In remanding the case, the Court apparently overlooks the plain fact that its rejection of the Court of Appeals’ view of the duty of reasonable accommodation eliminates the necessity for further factual findings. Under the Court of *82Appeals’ theory that the employer has a duty to accept any reasonable accommodation proposal made by the employee as long as it does not result in “undue hardship,” a remand to the District Court was appropriate to resolve the “undue hardship” issue. I do not understand why a remand is appropriate now. The Court of Appeals has already concluded that if no analysis of undue hardship is required, the Board’s policy of granting three days of paid leave and additional days of unpaid leave for religious observances complies with the statute.4 Neither that court nor the District Court saw any reason to make a special analysis of the “past and present administration of the personal business leave provisions of the collective-bargaining agreement.” Ante, at 71.
In view of the record, the factual analysis the Court calls for may satisfy the demands of the Court’s curious holding in Icicle Seafoods, Inc. v. Worthington, 475 U. S. 709, 714 (1986), but it cannot affect the outcome of this case. Whether the Board has administered the provisions for paid leave for secular purposes strictly or permissively has no bearing on Philbrook’s legally insufficient complaint that he *83has some but not enough leave for religious purposes.5 The employer has no duty to provide Philbrook with additional days of paid leave. Nor can the uses for which the board has historically allowed personal leave days possibly create a duty to pay Philbrook to perform the work he missed on days of religious obligation.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the part of the Court’s judgment that remands the case for further proceedings.