*69Mr. Justice Holmes

delivered the opinion of the Court.

This is a suit brought by the widow and administratrix of Nathan Goodman against the petitioner for causing his death by running him down at a grade crossing. The defence is that Goodman’s own negligence caused the death. At the trial, the defendant asked the Court to direct a verdict for it, but the request, and others looking to the same direction, were refused, and the plaintiff got a verdict and a judgment which was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals. 10 F. (2d) 58.

Goodman was driving an automobile truck in ah easterly direction and was killed by a train running southwesterly across the road at a rate of not less than sixty, miles an hour. The line was straight, but' it is said by the respondent that Goodman. ‘ had no practical view ’ beyond a section house two hundred and forty-three feet north of the crossing until he was about twenty feet from the first rail, or, as the respondent argues, twelve feet from danger, and that then the engine was still obscured by the section house. He had been driving at the rate of ten or twelve miles an hour, but had cut down his rate to fivé or six miles at about forty feet from the crossing. It is thought that there was an emergency in which, so far as appears, Goodman did all that he could.

We do. not go into further details as to Goodman’s precise situation, beyond mentioning that it was daylight arid that he was familiar with the crossing, for it appears to us plain that nothing is suggested by the evidence to relieve Goodman from responsibility for his own. death. When a man goes upon a railroad track he knows that he goes to a place where he will be killed if a train comes upon him before he is clear of the track. He knows that *70he must stop for the train, not the train stop for him. In such.circumstances it seems to us that if a driver cannot be sure otherwise whether a train is dangerously near he must stop and get out of his vehicle, although obviously he will not often be required to do more than to stop and look. - It seems to us that if he relies upon not hearing the train or any signal and takes no further precaution he does so at. his own risk.' If- at the last moment Goodman found himself in an emergency it was his own fault that he did not reduce his speed earlier or come to a stop. It is true as said in Flannelly v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 225 U. S. 597, 603, that the question of due care very generally is left to the jury. But we are dealing with a standard, of conduct, and when the standard is clear it should be laid down- once for all by the Courts. See Southern Pacific Co. v. Berkshire, 254 U. S. 415, 417, 419.

Judgment reversed.

Mr. Justice Cardozo delivered the opinion of the Court.

John Pokora, driving his truck across a railway grade crossing in the city of Springfield, Illinois, was struck by a train and injured. Upon the trial of his suit for damages, the District Court held that he had been guilty of contributory negligence, and directed a verdict for the defendant. The Circuit Court of Appeals (one judge dissenting) affirmed, 66 F. (2d) 166, resting its judgment on the opinion of this court in B. & O. R. Co. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66. A writ of certiorari brings the case here.

Pokora was an ice dealer, and had come to the crossing to load his truck with ice. The tracks of the Wabash Railway are laid along Tenth Street, which runs north and south. There is a crossing at Edwards Street running east and west. Two ice depots are on opposite comers of Tenth and Edward Streets, one at the northeast comer, the other at the southwest. Pokora, driving west along Edwards Street, stopped at the first of these corners to get his load of ice, but found so many trucks ahead of him that he decided to try the depot on the other side of the way. In this crossing of the railway, the accident occurred.

*100The defendant has four tracks on Tenth Street, a switch track on the east, then the main track, and then two switches. Pokora, as he left the northeast corner where his truck had been stopped, looked to the north for approaching trains. He did this at a point about ten or fifteen feet east of the switch ahead of him. A string of box cars standing on the switch, about five to ten feet from the north line of Edwards Street, cut off his view of the tracks beyond him to the north. At the same time he listened. There was neither bell nor whistle. Still listening, he crossed the switch, and reaching the main track was struck by a passenger train coming from the north at a speed of twenty-five to thirty miles an hour.

The burden of proof was on the defendant to make out the defense of contributory negligence. Miller v. Union Pacific R. Co., 290 U.S. 227, 232. The record does not show in any conclusive way that the train was visible to Pokora while there was still time to stop. A space of eight feet lay between the west rail of the switch and the east rail of the main track, but there was an overhang of the locomotive (perhaps two and a half or three feet), as well as an overhang of the box cars, which brought the zone of danger even nearer. When the front of the truck had come within this zone, Pokora was on his seat, and so was farther back (perhaps five feet or even more), just how far we do not know, for the defendant has omitted to make proof of the dimensions. Nice calculations are submitted in an effort to make out that there was a glimpse of the main track before the switch was fully cleared. Two feet farther back the track was visible, it is said, for about 130 or 140 feet. But the view from that position does not tell us anything of significance unless we know also the position of the train. Pokora was not protected by his glimpse of 130 feet if the train at the same moment was 150 feet away or farther. For all that appears he had no view of the main track northward, or none for *101a substantial distance, till the train was so near that escape had been cut off. Cf. Dobson v. St. Louis S. F. Ry. Co., 223 Mo. App. 812, 822; 10 S.W. (2d) 528; Turner v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. S. M. R. Co., 164 Minn. 335, 341; 205 N.W. 213.

In such circumstances the question, we think, was for the jury whether reasonable caution forbade his going forward in reliance on the sense of hearing, unaided by that of sight. No doubt it was his duty to look along the track from his seat, if looking would avail to warn him of the danger. This does not mean, however, that if vision was cut off by obstacles, there was negligence in going on, any more than there would have been in trusting to his ears if vision had been cut off by the darkness of the night. Cf. Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Holbrook, 27 F. (2d) 326. Pokora made his crossing in the day time, but like the traveler by night he used the faculties available to one in his position. Johnson v. Seaboard Air Line R. Co., 163 N.C. 431; 79 S.E. 690; Parsons v. Syracuse, B. & N. Y. R. Co., 205 N.Y. 226, 228; 98 N.E. 331. A jury, but not the court, might say that with faculties thus limited, he should have found some other means of assuring himself of safety before venturing to cross The crossing was a frequented highway in a populous city. Behind him was a line of other cars, making ready to follow him. To some extent, at least, there was assurance in the thought that the defendant would not run its train at such a time and place without sounding bell or whistle. L. & N. R. Co. v. Summers, 125 Fed. 719, 721; Illinois Revised Statutes, (1933 ed.), c. 114, ¶ 84.1 Indeed, the *102statutory signals did not exhaust the defendant’s duty when to its knowledge there was special danger to the traveler through obstructions on the roadbed narrowing the field of vision. Wright v. St. Louis S. F. Ry. Co., 327 Mo. 557, 566; 37 S.W. (2d) 591; Hires v. Atlantic City R. Co., 66 N.J.L. 30; 48 Atl. 1002; Cordell v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. Co., 70 N.Y. 119. All this the plaintiff, like any other reasonable traveler, might fairly take into account. All this must be taken into account by us in comparing what he did with the conduct reasonably to be expected of reasonable men. Grand Trunk R. Co. v. Ives, 144 U.S. 408, 417; Flannelly v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 225 U.S. 597.

The argument is made, however, that our decision in B. & O. R. Co. v. Goodman, supra, is a barrier in the plaintiff’s path, irrespective of the conclusion that might commend itself if the question were at large. There is no doubt that the opinion in that case is correct in its result. Goodman, the driver, traveling only five or six miles an hour, had, before reaching the track, a clear space of eighteen feet within which the train was plainly visible.2 With that opportunity, he fell short of the legal standard of duty established for a traveler when he failed to look and see. This was decisive of the case. But the court did not stop there. It added a remark, unnecessary upon the facts before it, which has been a fertile source of controversy. “In such circumstances it seems to us that if a driver cannot be sure otherwise whether a train is dangerously near he must stop and get out of his vehicle, although obviously he will not often be required to do more than to stop and look.”

There is need at this stage to clear the ground of brushwood that may obscure the point at issue. We do *103not now inquire into the existence of a duty to stop, disconnected from a duty to get out and reconnoitre. The inquiry, if pursued, would lead us into the thickets of conflicting judgments.3 Some courts apply what is often spoken of as the Pennsylvania rule, and impose an unyielding duty to stop, as well as to look and listen, no matter how clear the crossing or the tracks on either side. See, e.g., Benner v. Philadelphia & Reading R. Co., 262 Pa. 307; 105 Atl. 283; Thompson v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 215 Pa. 113; 64 Atl. 323; Hines v. Cooper, 205 Ala. 70; 88 So. 133; cf. Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Yingling, 148 Md. 169; 129 Atl. 36. Other courts, the majority, adopt the rule that the traveler must look and listen, but that the existence of a duty to stop depends upon the circumstances, and hence generally, even if not invariably, upon the judgment of the jury. See, e.g., Judson v. Central Vermont R. Co., 158 N.Y. 597, 605, 606; 53 N.E. 514, and cases cited; Love v. Fort Dodge R. Co., 207 Iowa 1278, 1286; 224 N.W. 815; Turner v. Minneapolis R. Co., supra; Wisconsin & Arkansas Lumber Co. v. Brady, 157 Ark. 449, 454; 248 S.W. 278; cf. Metcalf v. Central Vermont R. Co., 78 Conn. 614; 63 Atl. 633; Gills v. N. Y. C. & St. L. R. Co., 342 Ill. 455; 174 N.E. 523. The subject has been less considered in this court, but in none of its opinions is there a suggestion that at any and every crossing the duty to stop is absolute, irrespective of the danger. Not even in B. & O. R. Co. v. Goodman, supra, which goes farther than the earlier cases, is there support for such a rule. To the contrary, the opinion makes it clear that the duty is conditioned upon the presence of impediments whereby sight and hearing become inadequate for the traveler’s protection. Cf. Murray v. So. Pacific Co., 177 Cal. 1, 10; 169 Pac. 675 Williams v. Iola Electric R. Co., 102 Kan. 268, 271; 170 Pac. 397.

*104Choice between these diversities of doctrine is unnecessary for the decision of the case at hand. Here the fact is not disputed that the plaintiff did stop before he started to cross the tracks. If we assume that by reason of the box cars, there was a duty to stop again when the obstructions had been cleared, that duty did not arise unless a stop could be made safely after the point of clearance had been reached. See, e.g., Dobson v. St. Louis S. F. Ry. Co., supra. For reasons already stated, the testimony permits the inference that the truck was in the zone of danger by the time the field of vision was enlarged. No stop would then have helped the plaintiff if he remained seated on his truck, or so the triers of the facts might find. His case was for the jury unless as a matter of law he was subject to a duty to get out of the vehicle before it crossed the switch, walk forward to the front, and then, afoot, survey the scene. We must say whether his failure to do this was negligence so obvious and certain that one conclusion and one only is permissible for rational and candid minds. Grand Trunk Ry. Co. v. Ives, supra.

Standards of prudent conduct are declared at times by courts, but they are taken over from the facts of life. To get out of a vehicle and reconnoitre is an uncommon precaution, as everyday experience informs us. Besides being uncommon, it is very likely to be futile, and sometimes even dangerous. If the driver leaves his vehicle when he nears a cut or curve, he will learn nothing by getting out about the perils that lurk beyond. By the time he regains his seat and sets his car in motion, the hidden train may be upon him. See, e.g., Torgeson v. Missouri-K.-T. R. Co., 124 Kan. 798, 800, 801; 262 Pac. 564; Dobson v. St. Louis S. F. R. Co., supra; Key v. Carolina & N. W. R. Co., 150 S.C. 29, 35; 147 S.E. 625; Georgia Railroad & Banking Co. v. Stanley, 38 Ga. App. 773, 778; 145 S.E. 530. Often the added safeguard will be dubious though the track happens to be straight, as *105it seems that this one was, at all events as far as the station, about five blocks to the north. A train traveling at a speed of thirty miles an hour will cover a quarter of a mile in the space of thirty seconds. It may thus emerge out of obscurity as the driver turns his back to regain the waiting car, and may then descend upon him suddenly when his car is on the track. Instead of helping himself by getting out, he might do better to press forward with. all his faculties alert. So a train at a neighboring station, apparently at rest and harmless, may be transformed in a few seconds into an instrument of destruction. At times the course of safety may be different. One can figure to oneself a roadbed so level and unbroken that getting out will be a gain. Even then the balance of advantage depends on many circumstances and can be easily disturbed. Where was Pokora to leave his truck after getting out to reconnoitre? If he was to leave it on the switch, there was the possibility that the box cars would be shunted down upon him before he could regain his seat. The defendant did not show whether there was a locomotive at the forward end, or whether the cars were so few that a locomotive could be seen. If he was to leave his vehicle near the curb, there was even stronger reason to believe that the space to be covered in going back and forth would make his observations worthless. One must remember that while the traveler turns his eyes in one direction, a train or a loose engine may be approaching from the other.

Illustrations such as these bear witness to the need for caution in framing standards of behavior that amount to rules of law. The need is the more urgent when there is no background of experience out of which the standards have emerged. They are then, not the natural flowerings. of behavior in its customary forms, but rules artificially developed, and imposed from without. Extraordinary situations may not wisely or fairly be subjected to *106tests or regulations that are fitting for the common-place or normal. In default of the guide of customary conduct, what is suitable for the traveler caught in a mesh where the ordinary safeguards fail him is for the judgment of a jury. Dolan v. D. & H. C. Co., 71 N.Y. 285, 288, 289; Davis v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. Co., 47 N.Y. 400, 402. The opinion in Goodman’s case has been a source of confusion in the federal courts to the extent that it imposes a standard for application by the judge, and has had only wavering support in the courts of the states.4 We limit it accordingly.

The judgment should be reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

Reversed.

HILL, Justice.

[¶1] Gretchen Howard, Audrey Kinion, and Steve Winn (Plaintiffs) individually filed separate claims in circuit court asserting invasion of privacy claims against Aspen Way Enterprises, Inc. (Aspen Way). The circuit court concluded that Wyoming does not recognize a cause of action for Plaintiffs’ privacy claims and granted Aspen Way summary judgment on those claims. Plaintiffs appealed, and the district court affirmed on the same basis. We granted the Plaintiffs’ petitions for writ of review, consolidated their petitions, and now reverse and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

ISSUES

[¶2] Plaintiffs present three issues on appeal, which they state as follows:

1. Whether Wyoming recognizes the tort of invasion of privacy.

2. If so, whether Wyoming recognizes the elements of the tort of invasion of privacy/intrusion upon seclusion as set forth in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B (1977).

3. Whether genuine issues of material fact preclude entry of summary judgment.

FACTS

[¶3] Aspen Way owns a rent-to-own franchise in Casper, Wyoming, operating under the name Aaron’s Sales and Leasing. Plaintiffs each leased a computer from Aspen Way pursuant to lease-purchase agreements, and in May 2015, Plaintiffs individually filed separate complaints against Aspen Way related to those agreements. The complaints each generally alleged that Aspen Way installed software on Plaintiffs’ leased computers, without Plaintiffs’ knowledge, that enabled Aspen Way to track the leased computers’ locations, remotely activate the computers’ webcams, and capture screen shots and key strokes.1 Based on these allegations, Plaintiffs asserted that claims for invasion of privacy/intrusion upon seclusion' and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

*1273[¶4] Plaintiffs filed their separate complaints in the circuit court for Natrona County. Aspen Way answered each complaint and subsequently filed motions for summary judgment on each complaint. As grounds for summary judgment, Aspen Way asserted Wyoming does not recognize a cause of action for Plaintiffs’ privacy claims and that even if Wyoming did recognize such a claim, no genuine issue of. material fact exists with respect to either Plaintiffs’ privacy claims or their claims for breach of the .covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Plaintiffs responded with their oppositions.

[¶5] On May 11, 2016, the circuit court issued orders in the three cases seeking certification of questions of law to the district court, including the question of whether Wyoming recognizes a cause of action for Plaintiffs’ privacy claims.2 The district court rejected the certified questions in each case, and the circuit court then ruled on Aspen Way’s summary judgment motions, granting them in part and denying them in part. With respect to Plaintiffs’ privacy claims, the court ruled such claims were not recognized in Wyoming and granted Aspen Way summary judgment. With respect to the claims for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, the court found genuine issues of material fact and denied summary judgment on those claims. As to the privacy claims, the court ruled its judgment was final and ap-pealable.

[¶6] Plaintiffs filed timely notices of appeal to the district court in each case. On February 23, 2017, the district court issued orders affirming the circuit court orders. In so ruling, the court observed:

* * * [A]t this time, there is simply not the historical and judicial context to declare that Wyoming definitively recognizes the tort of invasion of privacy/intrusion upon seclusion. In the absence of a clear indication that Wyoming would recognize such a claim, this Court will not presume upon the functions of the Wyoming Supreme Court with regard to the proper development of the common law in Wyoming.'

[¶7] On March 10, 2017, Plaintiffs filed petitions for writ of review in each ease, and on April 4, 2017, this Court issued orders granting the petitions and consolidating the cases for appeal.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶8] We review the circuit court’s entry of summary judgment de novo, meaning we consider the same materials and apply the same standards as the circuit court. Elec. Wholesale Supply Co., Inc. v. Fraser, 2016 WY 105, ¶ 13, 356 P.3d 254, 258 (Wyo. 2015). “We examine the record from the vantage point most favorable to the party opposing the motion, and we give that party the benefit of all favorable inferences which may fairly be drawn from the record.” Id. (quoting Baker v. Speaks, 2014 WY 117, ¶ 9, 334 P.3d 1215, 1219 (Wyo. 2014)). The question of whether a cause of action is or will be recognized, in Wyoming is a question of law we review de novo. Townsend v. Living Centers Rocky Mountain, Inc., 947 P.2d 1297, 1298 (Wyo. 1997).

DISCUSSION

[¶9] Plaintiffs ask this Court to recognize a common law cause of action for the invasion of privacy tort defined by the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1977) as intrusion upon seclusion. Aspen Way argues against recognizing a common law cause of action for Plaintiffs’ privacy claims, contending that if such a cause of action is to be recognized in Wyoming, it should be created and defined by legislative action. We agree with Plaintiffs that the Restatement cause of action for intrusion upon seclusion is consistent with the value our state places on privacy, and we therefore recognize the tort as part of Wyoming’s common law.

*1274A. Intrusion upon Seclusion as Defined by Restatement (Second) of Torts

[¶10] The Restatement (Second) of Tqrts generally defines liability for an invasion of privacy as follows:

(1) One who invades the right of privacy of another is subject to liability for the resulting harm to the interests of the other.

(2) The right of privacy is invaded by

(a) unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another, as stated in § 652B; or

(b) appropriation of the other’s name or likeness, as stated in § 662C; or

(c) unreasonable- publicity given to the other’s private life, as stated in § 652D; or

(d) publicity that unreasonably places the other in a false light before the public, as stated in § 662E.

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 662A (1977).

[¶11] The strand of the privacy tort Plaintiffs assert, and the one they ask this Court to recognize,, is intrusion upon seclusion, which the Restatement defines as follows:

One who intentionally intrudes, physically or- otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the other- for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B (1977).

[¶12] The comments, to the section 652B explain the tort’s parameters and the showing required to establish its elements.

а. The form of invasion of privacy covered by this Section does not depend upon any publicity given to the person whose interest is invaded or- to his affairs. It consists solely of an intentional interference with his interest in solitude or seclusion, either as to his person or as to his private affairs or concerns, of a kind that would be highly offensive to a reasonable man.

б, The invasion may be by physical intrusion into a place in which the plaintiff has secluded himself, as when the defendant forces his way into the plaintiffs room in a hotel or insists over the plaintiffs objection in entering his home. It may also be by the use of the defendant’s senses, with or without mechanical aids, to oversee or overhear the plaintiffs private affairs, as by looking into his upstairs windows with binoculars or tapping his telephone wires. It may be by some other form of investigation or examination into his private concerns, as by opening his private and personal mail, searching his safe or his wallet, examining his private bank account, or compelling him by a forged court order to permit an inspection of his personal documents, The intrusion itself makes the defendant subject to liability, even though there is no publication or other use of any kind of the photograph or information outlined,

c. The defendant is subject to liability under the rule stated in this Section only when he has intruded into a private place, or has otherwise invaded a private seclusion that the plaintiff has thrown about his person or affairs. Thus there is no liability for the examination of a public record concerning the plaintiff, or of documents that the plaintiff is required to keep and make available for public, inspection. Nor is there liability for observing him or even taking his photograph while he is walking on the public highway, since he is not then in seclusion, and his appearance is public and open to,.the public eye. Even in a public place, however, there may be some matters about the plaintiff, such as his underwear or lack of it, that are not exhibited to the public gaze; and there may still be invasion of privacy when there is intrusion upon these matters.

d. There is likewise no liability unless the interference with the plaintiff’s seclusion is a substantial one, of a kind that would be highly offensive to the ordinary reasonable man, as the result of conduct to which the reasonable man would strongly object. Thus there is no liability for knocking at the plaintiffs door, or calling him to the telephone on one occasion or even two or three, to demand payment of a debt. It is only when the telephone calls are repeated with such persistence and frequency as to amount to a course of hounding the plaintiff, that becomes a substantial *1275burden to his existence, that his privacy is invaded.

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B (Í977) (illustrations omitted),

[¶13] As to damages for invasion of. privacy, the Restatement provides:

One who has established a cause, of action for invasion of his privacy is entitled to recover damages for

(a) the harm to his interest in privacy resulting from the invasion;

(b) his mental distress proved to have been suffered if it is of a kind that normally results from such an invasion; and

(c) special dairiage of which the invasion is a legal cause.'

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652H (1977).

B, Recognition of Claim in Other Jurisdictions

[¶14] A recent survey of the intrusion upon seclusion claim’s recognition in other jurisdictions shows majority support for the Restatement approach to the claim.

This section provides a survey of the recognition of intrusion upon seclusion in the fifty states, whether it is recognized under common law or statute, and whether the jurisdiction follows the Restatement (Second) of Tort’s formulation or deviates from the definition of intrusion in section 6B2B. Currently, the vast majority of states recognize the intrusion, strand of invasion -of privacy either under common law or by statute. The following states recognize intrusion upon seclusion under common law and follow the Restatement’s formulation, either explicitly adopting it or closely mirroring the Restatement’s definition and description of the cause of action: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, .Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, • South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washington, and West Virginia.

Decisions from several other jurisdictions indicate that intrusion is recognized under common law, but these states haye not adopted or have not followed the Restatement’s formulation. These states are Florida, Indiana, Michigan, Montana, and South Carolina.

Several other states recognize intrusion by statute: Massachusetts, Nebraska, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin. Utah, while recognizing intrusion under common law, also has a criminal statute that is of particular ■.interest to this Note. Utah’s statute provides that .an individual is guilty of a privacy violation if-he “[ijnstalls in any private place, without the consent of the person or persons entitled to privacy there, any device for observing, photographing, recording, amplifying, or broadcasting sounds or events in the place or uses any such unauthorized installation.” Michigan has a similar statute.

Two states explicitly have refused to recognize intrusion; these states are New York and Virginia, both of which limit recovery for invasion of privacy claims by statute and only recognize a cause of action for misappropriation of one’s name, picture, or portrait for commercial purposes without consent.

Finally, two states do not appear to have decided if they will recognize intrusion claims: North Dakota and Wyoming. ,

Eli A. Meltz, Note, No Harm, No Foul? “Attempted” Invasion of Privacy and the Tort of Intrusion Upon Seclusion, 83 Ford-ham L. Rev. 3431, 3440-43 (2015) (footnotes omitted).

[¶16] In adopting the Restatement approach to invasion of privacy, rather than deferring to legislative enactment, one court explained:

“Although there was no distinctive tort of invasion of privacy in early common law, it has evolved in most jurisdictions based on common law principles sometimes eom-pared to trespass. It is unnecessary for the Legislature to. enact a law to create this tort in. abrogation of the common law. The common law ... refers not only to the ancient unwritten law of England, but also to that body of law created and preserved by decisions of courts. The common law is not static, but is a dynamic and growing thing and its rules arise from the applica*1276tion of reason to the changing conditions of society.” McCormack v. Oklahoma Publishing Co., 613 P.2d 737, 740 (Okl.1980). Indeed, as the United States Supreme Court noted in Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 530, 4 S.Ct. 111, 118, 28 L.Ed. 232 (1884), “[t]his flexibility and capacity for growth and adaptation is the peculiar boast and excellence of the common law,” and this reasoning has been followed by a number of courts that have recognized the privacy right of action. See, e.g., Birnbaum v. United States, 436 F.Supp. 967, 978 (E.D.N.Y.1977), aff'd in part, rev’d in part, 588 F.2d 319, 325 (2d Cir. 1978).

Goodrich v. Waterbury Republican-American, Inc., 188 Conn. 107, 448 A.2d 1317, 1328-29 (1982).

[¶16] We turn then to the question of whether this Court should likewise join the majority recognition of the intrusion upon seclusion tort.

C. Wyoming Common Law

[¶17] The Wyoming legislature long ago adopted the common law, making it “the rule of decision in this state when not inconsistent with the laws thereof,” and “of full force until repealed by legislative authority.” Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 8-1-101 (LexisNexis 2017). The determination we must therefore make is not whether this Court should “adopt” the tort of intrusion upon seclusion, but rather whether the tort has been repealed by statute or is otherwise inconsistent with Wyoming law— that is, whether the tort is part of Wyoming’s common law. See Briefing.com v. Jones, 2006 WY 16, ¶ 12, 126 P.3d 928 (Wyo. 2006) (noting that the question is not whether to adopt a common law tort but is instead whether the tort exists as part of Wyoming’s common law).

[¶18] The legislature has not repealed any of the common law privacy torts, and Aspen Way does not contend otherwise. The question then is whether the intrusion upon seclusion tort, and the protection it provides an injured party, is consistent with Wyoming law. We conclude that it is.

[¶19] In considering whether to recognize a causé of action as part of Wyoming’s common law, we have said:

[T]he common law is “applicable” within the intent of the adopting statute [Wyo. Stat. Ann. 8-1-101] if it is “applicable to the habits and condition of our society, and in harmony with the genius, spirit and objects of our institutions.” Crawford v. Barber, 385 P.2d 655, 657 (Wyo.1963) (quoting Fuchs v. Goe, 62 Wyo. 134, 163 P.2d 783, 792 (1945)). The principles of the common law adopted for this State are only those “adapted to our circumstances, state of society, and form of government.” Fuchs, 163 P.2d at 792 (emphasis in original).

Briefing.com, ¶ 13, 126 P.3d at 935.

[¶20] In keeping with this appi-oach, we have also expressed our willingness to reject common law principles not in keeping with our circumstances.

We have not hesitated to overrule cases that were based on what was perceived to be the common law at the time the decisions were handed down. McClellan v. Tottenhoff, 666 P.2d 408 (Wyo.1983); and Collins v. Memorial Hospital of Sheridan County, 521 P.2d 1339 (Wyo.1974). We are justified in overruling prior cases grounded on the common law if they stand for an unfair and improper rule or have outlived their usefulness, and do not meet changing needs.

Nulls v. Gillette-Campbell Cty. Joint Powers Fire Bd., 797 P.2d 1171, 1173 (Wyo. 1990) (quoting Weaver v. Mitchell, 715 P.2d 1361, 1368 (Wyo. 1986)).

[¶21] When the common law cause of action we are considering is a tort, we begin with our understanding that a tort is a “civil wrong * * *; a breach of a duty that the law imposes on persons who stand in a particular relation to one another.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1717 (10th ed. 2014); see also Garner v. Hickman, 709 P.2d 407, 413 (Wyo. 1985) (“Generally speaking, and without at tempting an all-inclusive definition, a tort has a meaning similar to wrong and is an unlawful act injurious to another, independent of contract.”). In determining whether a tort should be recognized as part of the Wyoming common law, we must therefore consider the duty imposed by the tort, which -we have defined as follows:

*1277The statement that there is or is not a duty begs the essential question — whether the plaintiffs interests are entitled to legal protection against the defendant’s conduct. * * * ‘[D]uty’ is not sacrosanct in itself, but is only an expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the plaintiff is entitled to protection.

Gates v. Richardson, 719 P.2d 193, 196 (Wyo. 1986) (quoting W. Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on Torts § 54 at 357-58 (1984)).3

[¶22] Turning to considerations of policy, Wyoming’s commitment to individual privacy interests is well established. In 1936, this Court observed that “[t]he home is a favorite of the law. It is there that the citizen can claim the right of privacy, the right to be let alone, on clear grounds.” Town of Green River v. Bunger, 50 Wyo. 52, 58 P.2d 456, 460 (1936). We later affirmed this commitment, stating that “we regard highly the federal constitutional guarantees to privacy as well as the right to privacy in Wyoming.” Employment Sec. Com’n of Wyo. v. Western Gas Processors, Ltd., 786 P.2d 866, 872 (Wyo. 1990) (footnotes omitted).

[¶23] We also understand, however, that constitutional protections limit government rather than private intrusions. Western Gas, 786 P.2d at 872, n.10 (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478, 48 S.Ct. 564, 572, 72 L.Ed. 944, 956 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)) (emphasis altered) (“[The con stitutional framers] conferred, as against the government, the right to be left alone — the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.”). The United States Supreme Court has explained:

[T]he Fourth Amendment cannot be translated into a general constitutional ‘right to privacy.’ That Amendment protects individual privacy against certain kinds of governmental intrusion, but its protections go further, and often have nothing to do with privacy at all. Other provisions of the Constitution protect personal privacy from other forms of governmental invasion. But the protection of a person’s general right to privacy — his right to be let alone by other people — is, like the protection of his property and of his very life, left largely to the law of the individual States.

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350-51, 88 S.Ct. 507, 510-11, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967) (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).

[¶24] The Wyoming legislature has recognized the need to protect its citizens’ privacy interests and has acted on this need. See, e.g., Wyo; Stat. Ann. § Í6-4-203(d)(xi) (LexisNex-is 2017) (exempting from public disclosure records “the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy”); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-4-304(a)' (LexisNexis 2017) (criminalizing the act of “looking in a clandestine, surreptitious, prying or secretive nature into an enclosed area where the person being viewed has a reasonable expectation of privacy”); Wyo. Stat. Ann. 6-6-103(b)(i) (LexisNexis 2017) (criminalizing the making of repeated, anonymous tele*1278phone calls that disturb the privacy of persons where the calls were received); Wyo. Stat. Ann. 6-3-504(a)(i) (LexisNexis 2017) (criminalizing act of knowingly and.without authorization accessing a computer, computer system, or computer network); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 21-17-124(b) (LexisNexis 2017) (recognizing university students’ expectation of privacy in electronic writings and communications); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 21-18-318(b) (LexisNexis 2017) (recognizing community college students’ expectation of privacy in electronic writings and communications).

[¶25] Given our state’s' policy favoring privacy interests and the legislative enactments protecting those interests, we find the tort -of intrusion upon seclusion to.be well adapted to our circumstances and state of society. It is therefore appropriate to recognize the tort as part of Wyoming’s common law. See Briefing.com, ¶ 13, 126 P.3d at 936.

[¶26] We also agree with Plaintiffs that the Restatement version of the tort is the approach best suited to our common law.. First, we have relied on the Restatement on numerous occasions to develop our common law. See, e.g., Briefing.com, ¶ 15, 126 P.3d at 936 (using Restatement formulation of trademark infringement tort); Birt v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., Inc., 2003 WY 102, ¶ 47, 75 P.3d 640, 657-58 (Wyo. 2003) (using Restatement to define tort of negligent misrepresentation); Baker v. Pena, 2001 WY 122, ¶ 1, 36 P.3d 602, 604 (Wyo. 2001) (using Restatement to define exception to landlord immunity from liability); Wilder v. Cody Country Chamber of Commerce, 868 P.2d 211, 225 (Wyo. 1994) (using Restatement to define intentional infliction of emotional distress tort). Additionally, the Restatement formulation of the tort is longstanding, represents the majority rule, and provides an established body of precedent to guide its application, We therefore recognize the tort of intrusion upon seclusion as defined by the Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 652B, with damages as defined by the Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 652H,4

D. Application of Restatement to Present Case

[¶27] The circuit court granted summary judgment to Aspen Way without determining whether there existed any genuine issues of material fact with respect to Plaintiffs’ privacy claims. We addressed a similar circumstance in Baker, where we reversed a district court’s entry of summary judgment on the basis of our decision to recognize a Restatement-defined exception to landlord immunity from liability. We said:

As an appellate court, we are not fact finders in the first instance. The district court’s grant of summary judgment did not determine whether a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether, viewed in the light most favorable to the, tenant, the landlord’s repair made the land more dangerous for use or gave the deck a deceptive appearance of safety. We therefore reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment and remand the case for' such further proceedings as are appropriate and consistent with this decision.

Baker, ¶ 16, 36 P.3d at 608.

[¶28] This Court has also long held that it will not issue advisory opinions. State v. Beazer, 2016 WY 111, ¶ 18, 384 P.3d 267, 273, n.7 (Wyo. 2016);, Cranston v. Thomson, 530 P.2d 726, 728-29 (Wyo. 1975). We have explained that “binding legal determinations made in the abstract and decisions rendered without concrete factual background would be imprecise, subject to speculation, and *1279would create rather than diminish future controversies.” Cranston, 530 P.2d at 729.

[¶29] There have been no factual findings in this case with regard to either the elements of the intrusion upon seclusion tort or Plaintiffs’ claimed damages. Without the context provided by the required factual findings, any determination we might make concerning application of the Restatement provisions to this case would be at risk of being imprecise and speculative. It is thus premature for this Court to make any determinations concerning application of the Restatement provisions to Plaintiffs’ claims, and we agree with Plaintiffs that the proper course is to remand to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

CONCLUSION

[¶30] This Court récognizes the tort of intrusion upon seclusion as defined by the Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 652B (1977). We therefore reverse and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

DONIELSON, Judge.

Daniel, John, Michael and Mark Regan were playing darts at Katie McButts Tavern in Davenport when an altercation occurred. While Michael Ortega confronted Daniel Re-gan, Patrick Wilcox apparently struck Daniel in the face, knocking him to the ground. A fight ensued between Ortega and his friend's and the Regan brothers.

Matt Schwartz, the sole bartender, interceded and asked the Regans to leave the premises. The Regans asked Schwartz to summon the police because they feared they would be attacked on the way to their vehicle. Schwartz refused and escorted them out the back door.

A man whom the Regans claim was Wilcox was outside at a picnic table. The man told Schwartz he was just “cooling off.” The bartender returned to the tavern and shut the door. Shortly thereafter, Wilcox attacked the Regans, and Ortega and a number of other patrons joined in the fray.

The Regans sustained injuries in the fights; Wilcox, Ortega and Timothy Bateman were subsequently convicted of assault.

The Regans filed suit against Denbar, Inc., d/b/a Katie McButts Tavern seeking damages for their injuries. The Regans claimed the tavern had a duty to protect them from the criminal acts of their assailants both inside and outside the premises. They maintained the tavérn’s employees were aware of their assailants’ violent propensities and intoxication and should have prevented the initial fight. They further asserted the tavern was negligent in forcing them to leave the premises despite the foreseeable danger of a renewed' attack.

Following the presentation of plaintiffs’ evidence at trial, the district court granted defendant’s motion for directed verdict. The court found plaintiffs failed to present any evidence that their assailants had a reputation for violence or concerning any past fights inside or outside the tavern. The court ruled that there was no evidence that an assault was foreseeable.

The Regans appeal. We reverse the trial court’s grant of a directed verdict and remand for a new trial.

We review the district court’s grant of a directed verdict for correction of errors at law. Iowa RApp.P. 4. When considering a motion for a directed verdict, the trial court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Iowa RApp.P. 14(f)(2). “The movant is considered to have admitted the truth of all evidence offered by his adversary and every favorable inference which may fairly and reasonably be deduced from it.” Wernimont v. State, 312 N.W.2d 568, 570 (Iowa 1981) (quoting Brown v. Ellison, 304 N.W.2d 197, 202 (Iowa 1981). “[A] fact question is generated if reasonable minds can differ on how the issue should be resolved.” Knapp v. Simmons, 345 N.W.2d 118, 121 (Iowa 1984) (citations omitted). Generally, questions of negligence or proximate cause are for the jury; only in exceptional eases should they be decided as a matter of law. Iowa R.App.P. 14(f)(10).

The general rule in torts is a person does not have a duty to protect another from harm caused by a third person. Davis v. Kwik-Shop, Inc., 504 N.W.2d 877, 878 (Iowa 1993); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 315 (1965). This general rule, however, is inapplicable in certain situations such as business premises open to the public. Section 344 of the Restatement provides:

A possessor of land who holds it open to the public for entry for his business purposes is subject to liability to members of the public while they are upon the land for such a purpose, for physical harm caused by the accidental, negligent, or intentionally harmful acts of third persons or animals, and by the failure of the possessor to exercise reasonable care to

(a) discover that such acts are being done or are likely to be done, or

*753(b) give a warning adequate to enable the visitors to avoid the harm or otherwise protect them against it.

Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 344 (1965).

An altercation between the Regan brothers and several other patrons of the bar had already occurred. The bartender intervened. One brother made the reasonable request that the bartender call the police. The bartender refused. The brothers were afraid to leave since their car was parked far from the building and they were from out of town. As the bartender sent them out the back door, he saw one of those involved in the fight outside and spoke with him, but did not allow the brothers to stay inside under his protection or call the police. The brothers were attacked outside, first by Wilcox, to whom the bartender had spoken, and then by others who came outside.

Taking the testimony of the brothers as true in evaluating the motion for a directed verdict, we conclude there is sufficient evidence of the foreseeability of this incident to avoid a directed verdict and allow the issue to go to the jury. The bartender broke up the fight in the bar. He was asked to call the police and refused. He expressed concern he would not be able “to hold back” the attackers. One of the attackers was already outside when the brothers were forced to leave by the back door. Others quickly joined him and the fight ensued. We determine the trial court erred in holding there was no evidence to support the claim and in directing a verdict. We therefore reverse the grant of a directed verdict and remand for a new trial.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

All Judges concur, except SACKETT and HABHAB, JJ., who dissent.

SACKETT, Judge

(dissenting).

I dissent. I would affirm the trial court.

Plaintiffs-appellants Daniel Regan, John Regan, Michael Regan and Mark Regan appeal a trial court order granting summary judgment and dismissing their action against defendant-appellee Denbar, Inc. for injuries suffered in a fight. I would affirm.

Defendant operates a bar in Davenport, Iowa. Plaintiffs filed suit against defendant for injuries they received both inside and outside defendant’s premises. The issue was whether there was substantial evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could determine an intentional assault by another was foreseeable by defendant’s bartender. I agree with the trial court that there was not substantial evidence.

. There were two assaults. The first occurred when a customer of defendant assaulted plaintiffs in the bar. There is no evidence from which the bartender could have concluded the customer would have thrown a punch.

The second incident happened off defendant’s premises. Plaintiffs’ position is the bartender should have known another assault was about to occur. The only evidence is one of the plaintiffs asked the bartender to call the police. This is not substantial. I would affirm.

The general rule is a person has no duty to prevent a third person from causing harm to another. Davis v. Kwik-Shop, Inc., 504 N.W.2d 877, 878 (Iowa 1993); Leonard v. State, 491 N.W.2d 508, 509-10 (Iowa 1992); Kelly v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 476 N.W.2d 341, 354 (Iowa 1991).

Restatement (Second) of Torts section 315 (1965), provides:

There is no duty so to control the conduct of a third person as to prevent him from causing physical harm to another unless

(a) a special relation exists between the actor and the third person which imposes a duty upon the actor to control the third person’s conduct, or

(b) a special relation exists between the actor and the other which gives to the other a right to protection.

Restatement (Second) of Torts section 314A(3) sets out a special relation giving rise to the claimed duty:

A possessor of land who holds it open to the public is under a similar duty to members of the public who enter in response to his invitation.

*754Restatement (Second) of Torts section 314A comment c specifically states as follows:

The rules stated in this Section apply only where the relation exists between the parties, and the risk of harm, or of further harm, arises in the course of that relation. A carrier is under no duty to one who has left the vehicle and ceased to be a passenger, nor is an innkeeper under a duty to a guest who is injured or endangered while he is away from the premises. Nor is a possessor of land under any such duty to one who has ceased to be an invitee. (Emphasis added).

The undisputed facts of this case are there is no evidence defendant’s bartender knew plaintiffs would be punched in the bar, nor after they were asked to leave. See Kelly, 476 N.W.2d at 355. The trial court was correct in sustaining the motion for summary judgment.

I would affirm the trial court.

HABHAB, J., joins this dissent.