13 Remedies 13 Remedies
If it is true, as Blackstone opined, that "every right when withheld must have a remedy," then it follows that when there is no remedy provided under law, there is no right.
13.1 Expectations 13.1 Expectations
13.1.1 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 344 13.1.1 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 344
§ 344 Purposes of Remedies
-
Judicial remedies under the rules stated in this Restatement serve to protect one or more of the following interests of a promisee:
-
(a) his “expectation interest,” which is his interest in having the benefit of his bargain by being put in as good a position as he would have been in had the contract been performed,
-
(b) his “reliance interest,” which is his interest in being reimbursed for loss caused by reliance on the contract by being put in as good a position as he would have been in had the contract not been made, or
-
(c) his “restitution interest,” which is his interest in having restored to him any benefit that he has conferred on the other party.
-
-
Illustrations:
-
1. A contracts to build a building for B on B's land for $100,000. B repudiates the contract before either party has done anything in reliance on it. It would have cost A $90,000 to build the building. A has an expectation interest of $10,000, the difference between the $100,000 price and his savings of $90,000 in not having to do the work. Since A has done nothing in reliance, A's reliance interest is zero. Since A has conferred no benefit on B, A's restitution interest is zero.
-
2. The facts being otherwise as stated in Illustration 1, B does not repudiate until A has spent $60,000 of the $90,000. A has been paid nothing and can salvage nothing from the $60,000 that he has spent. A now has an expectation interest of $70,000, the difference between the $100,000 price and his saving of $30,000 in not having to do the work. A also has a reliance interest of $60,000, the amount that he has spent. If the benefit to B of the partly finished building is $40,000, A has a restitution interest of $40,000.
-
-
Illustrations:
-
3. A, who is about to produce a play, makes a contract with B, an actor, under which B is to play the lead in the play at a stated salary for the season. A breaks the contract and has the part played by another actor. B's expectation interest includes the extent to which B's reputation would have been enhanced if he had been allowed to play the lead in A's play, as well as B's loss in salary, both subject to the limitations stated in Topic 2.
-
4. A contracts to construct a monument in B's yard for $10,000 but abandons the work after the foundation has been laid. It will cost B $6,000 to have another contractor complete the work. The monument planned is so ugly that it would decrease the market price of the house. Nevertheless, B's expectation interest is the value of the monument to him, which, under the rule stated in § 348(2)(b), would be measured by the cost of completion, $6,000.
-
5. A makes a contract with B under which A is to pay B for drilling an oil well on B's land, adjacent to that of A, for development and exploration purposes. Both A and B believe that the well will be productive and will substantially enhance the value of A's land in an amount that they estimate to be $1,000,000. Before A has paid anything, B breaks the contract by refusing to drill the well. Other exploration then proves that there is no oil in the region. A's expectation interest is zero.
-
13.1.2 Restatement (2d) of Contracts 347 13.1.2 Restatement (2d) of Contracts 347
In the U.S., the Restatements of the Law are a set of treatises on legal subjects that seek to inform judges and lawyers about general principles of common law, organized by topic area. There are published by the American Law Institute, an organization of judges, legal academics, and practitioners founded in 1923.
The (First) Restatement of Contracts was published in 1932; the (Second) (revised) Restatement of Contracts was published in 1979.
Although not "binding" in any formal legal sense, and although they have been criticized from multiple perspectives (too progressive, too conservative, too elite, causing law to grow stale and not evolve), the restatements are highly persuasive on most topics, and are often cited by courts as if they were "law."
Some elements of the restatements deviate from the prior common law, although most do not; and some courts in some states have declined to follow elements of the restatements. We will note a few as we cover contract law.
§ 347 Measure of Damages in General
Subject to the limitations stated in §§ 350-53, the injured party has a right to damages based on his expectation interest as measured by
(a) the loss in the value to him of the other party's performance caused by its failure or deficiency, plus
(b) any other loss, including incidental or consequential loss, caused by the breach, less
(c) any cost or other loss that he has avoided by not having to perform.
13.1.3 Crabby's, Inc. v. Hamilton 13.1.3 Crabby's, Inc. v. Hamilton
CRABBY’S, INC., Plaintiff-Respondent, v. James T. HAMILTON, and Paragon Ventures, L.L.C., Defendants-Appellants.
No. 28591.
Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District.
Jan. 28, 2008.
*211Ron Mitchell and Brent Correll, of Blanchard, Robertson, Mitchell & Carter, P.C., of Joplin, MO, for appellants.
Abe R. Paul, The Paul Law Firm, of Pineville, MO, for respondent.
Buyers under a contract for sale of real estate appeal the trial court’s judgment awarding Seller damages due to Buyers’ breach of that contract. We affirm.
Standard of Review
This case was tried before the court without a jury. The standard of review in a court-tried case is set out in Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30 (Mo. banc 1976). Harrison v. DeHeus, 230 S.W.3d 68, 74 (Mo.App.2007). The judgment will be affirmed unless it is against the weight of the evidence, there is insufficient evidence to support it, or it erroneously declares or applies the law. Id. “We accept as true the evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom in favor of the prevailing party and disregard the contrary evidence.” Id.
Factual and Procedural Background
Fred and Carolyn Billingsly are the shareholders of a Missouri corporation called Crabby’s, Inc. (“Seller”), which owned and operated Crabby’s restaurant in Joplin, Missouri, for several years. In 2003, Seller listed the restaurant and ac*212companying real property with Dee Kas-sab of Pro 100 Realty. The original listing price was $325,000, and Seller rejected an initial purchase offer for $275,000. James Hamilton, through his real estate agent Kent Eastman of Pro 100 Realty,1 then offered to purchase the property for $290,000, and this offer was accepted on May 17, 2003. Hamilton thereafter assigned his interest in the contract to Paragon Ventures, L.L.C. (“Paragon”), a business that Hamilton and Richard Worley set up to operate a restaurant. Hamilton also remained as an individual buyer on the contract. Hamilton and Paragon are hereinafter referred to collectively as “Buyers.”
The contract contained the following financing contingency provision:
This contract is contingent on Buyer’s [sic] ability to obtain a conventional loan or loans in the amount of $232,000, payable over a period of not less than 15 years and bearing interest at a rate of not more than 5.5% per annum. Seller shall not be obligated to pay any of the expenses incidental to the obtaining of such loan or loans. Buyer shall use reasonable diligence in seeking to obtain such loan or loans, and if Buyer does not furnish seller with a copy of an effective written loan commitment within 30 days from the Effective Date, then this Contract shall automatically terminate and the Earnest Money shall be returned to Buyer.
Buyers never furnished Seller with a copy of an effective written loan commitment within 30 days of the effective date of the contract.
After entering into the contract on May 17, 2003, Buyers made arrangements for financing at the Bank of Joplin. Buyers applied for and were approved by the bank for a loan in the amount of $340,000.00. The bank agreed to loan them $225,000.00 amortized over fifteen years on the real estate, $65,000.00 amortized over seven years on the equipment, and a $50,000.00 revolving line of credit all at the rate of interest of prime plus 1.5%. Buyers did not apply for a loan with any other financial institution.
On June 10, 2003, Buyers’ real estate agent was furnished a title insurance commitment from Jasper County Title showing sales tax liens attached to the property.
The contract originally specified a June 30, 2003 closing date. Following an inspection of the property, certain repairs were made, and an appraisal was performed as a requirement of the financing by Bank of Joplin. As a result of some appraisal requirements, the parties, on a date not disclosed by the record, entered into an agreement extending the closing date to July 14, 2003. Following this extension,- the parties discussed other additional repairs and this led to an agreement whereby Buyers would receive a credit of $1,373.54 against the purchase price in lieu of additional repairs being made.
By a second extension agreement dated July 18, 2003, the closing date was again extended, this time to August 1, 2003. On that same date the parties also entered into an agreement that allowed Buyers to take possession of the property prior to closing so that they could start cleaning it. Also around this same time period, Buyers made application for appropriate licenses to operate a restaurant on the property and had the utilities for the property transferred into Buyers’ name.
*213Nothing in any of the subsequent agreements entered into between the parties altered any of the terms of the financing contingency contained in the original contract.
Immediately prior to July 30, 2003, all documentation was in place at the title company and ready for closing on August 1, 2003. Financing was in place from the Bank of Joplin. All parties were ready to close. The tax liens, mentioned in the title commitment provided to Buyers, were satisfied on the morning of August 1, as contemplated by the July 18 extension agreement between the parties, and Sellers obtained a certificate of “No Sales Tax Due” from the state. U.S. Bank (Seller’s lender) had agreed to accept $266,000.00 to apply on Sellers’ indebtedness and release its hen on the property. According to the closing statement prepared by the realtor, after payment of mortgages, real estate taxes, and hens, Seller was to receive a cash balance of $1,757.72 when the transaction closed.
On July 30, 2003, Buyers sent a letter to the realtor and SeUer stating their intention not to close the transaction. In this letter, Buyers claimed “items, which we consider fixtures, have been taken from the premises.” This missing property consisted of two used televisions, a couple of mirrors, a set of stereo speakers, and a computerized cash register. These items were not part of the hst of personal property that was to be transferred in the sale, which was itemized and attached to the contract. This letter also specified the existence of the tax hens as an additional reason for Buyers’ refusal to close the transaction as scheduled. Buyers made no mention of any inability to obtain satisfactory financing. Buyers failed to appear for closing as scheduled on August 1, 2003.
On August 5, 2003, Paragon offered to buy a building at 520 Main Street in Joplin, Missouri, for the purpose of establishing a restaurant. This offer was accepted by those sellers on August 6, 2003 and closed September 22, 2003. The purchase price for that property was $170,000.00.
After Buyers refused to close the sale with Seller on August 1, 2003, Seller’s realtor continuously tried to sell the property. However, no offers were received until May of 2004, when J and A Café of Kansas, L.L.C., offered to purchase the property for $235,000.00. Sellers accepted this offer, and the transaction closed on July 15, 2004.
Seller thereafter filed suit against Buyers for breach of contract. As part of its damages, Seller claimed the difference in sales price between Buyers’ $290,000 contract price which should have closed on August 1, 2003, and the $235,000 price actually obtained when the property subsequently sold eleven and one-half months later on July 15, 2004. Seller also claimed real estate and personal property taxes, utilities, and mortgage interest accruing during that period as damages.
The trial court entered judgment in favor of Seller and against Buyers in the total amount of $95,547.30. Buyers timely appeal this judgment.
Additional facts will hereinafter be disclosed as needed to appropriately discuss Buyers’ points relied on.
Discussion
Buyers Waived the Financing Contingency
Buyers’ first point claims that the trial court erred in finding they breached the contract, “because the contract terminated pursuant to its own financing contingency provision when [Buyers] could not obtain financing.” Buyers initially argue that as a matter of law they could not have breached the contract by refusing to close *214on August 1, 2003, because by its explicit terms the contract automatically terminated when Buyers did not “furnish Seller with a copy of an effective written loan commitment,” as required by the financing contingency provision in the contract. Buyers alternatively argue that “if the trial court’s judgment rests on an implicit finding that the contract had not automatically terminated under the financing contingency provision, then the trial court erred in interpreting the term ‘reasonable diligence’ and finding that the defendants had not used such diligence in finding a loan.” Seller counters Buyers’ point, contending that Buyers, by their conduct after entering into the contract, waived the financing contingency provisions in the contract.
“A provision in a real estate contract that makes the contract contingent upon the buyer’s obtaining financing is a condition.” Howard v. Youngman, 81 S.W.3d 101, 110 (Mo.App.2002). Because such conditions are meant to protect the buyer, they are a condition of the buyer’s duty, but not a condition of the seller’s duty under the contract. Id. “[I]n a real estate contract containing a contingency clause, upon the nonoccurrence of the condition (i.e., the buyers obtaining financing), the buyer is ipso facto excused from performance.” Id. However, “the buyer can elect to waive the contingency and proceed with the contract under the rule that a party may waive any condition of a contract in that party’s favor.” Id.
“Parties to an agreement may by their oral agreement or their conduct waive the provisions of a contract between them. This doctrine applies equally to provisions requiring written communications.” Pilla v. Estate of Pilla, 689 S.W.2d 727, 730 (Mo.App.1985).
Waiver of rights under a contract has been defined as follows:
“Waiver” has been defined as an intentional relinquishment of a known right, on the question of which intention of the party charged with waiver is controlling and, if not shown by express declarations but implied by conduct, there must be a clear, unequivocal, and decisive act of party showing such purpose, and so consistent with intention to waive that no other reasonable explanation is possible.
Keltner v. Sowell, 926 S.W.2d 528, 531 (Mo.App.1996) (quoting from Carroll’s Warehouse Paint Stores, Inc. v. Rainbow Paint & Coatings, Inc., 824 S.W.2d 147, 151-52 (Mo.App.1992) (quoting from Bartleman v. Humphrey, 441 S.W.2d 335, 343 (Mo.1969))).
The contract in the instant case defines its Effective Date as “the date and time of final acceptance on the signature page.” Seller finally accepted the contract by signing the signature page on May 17, 2003. Thus, the effective date of the contract was May 17, 2003. The financing contingency in paragraph five of the contract provided: “if Buyer does not furnish Seller with a copy of an effective written loan commitment within 30 days from the Effective Date, then this Contract shall automatically terminate and the Earnest Money shall be returned to Buyer.” This thirty-day time period expired on June 16, 2003. The evidence is undisputed that Buyers did not furnish Seller with a copy of an effective written loan commitment within this time period. Therefore, by its explicit terms, the contract “automatically terminated” on June 16, 2003. See L & K Realty Co. v. R.W. Farmer Constr. Co., 633 S.W.2d 274, 277-78 (Mo.App.1982). Yet, Buyers’ actions after that date were inconsistent with such a termination.
On July 17, 2003, a month after the contract supposedly automatically termi*215nated, Buyers executed a written amendment to the contract extending the closing date from July 14, 2003 to August 1, 2003.2 This amendment additionally provided for the assignment of the contract to Paragon as a buyer in addition to Hamilton and for a $1,373.54 credit against the purchase price in exchange for Buyers releasing Seller from any obligation to perform any further repairs to the property. Finally this amendment provided: “IT IS UNDERSTOOD BY ALL PARTIES THAT ALL OTHER TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF THE CONTRACT REMAIN UNCHANGED.” Buyers entered into this amendment with the intention of closing the contract on August 1, 2003.
Also on July 17, 2003, Buyers executed an “Agreement for Possession Prior to Closing — Contract Rider,” which granted them the right to take possession of the property as a tenant on July 21, 2003. This agreement provided that “this Rider shall become a part of the Contract” and “[possession is for the sole purpose of cleaning only.” To effectuate their possession, Buyers accepted a key to the property from Seller. During this time period, Buyers had the utilities to the property switched over and put in their name. Also during this time, and as late as July 25, 2003, Buyers were in the process of securing appropriate licenses to operate their restaurant on the property after closing.
Nothing in either the amendment or the agreement for possession purported to modify or extend any of the provisions of the financing contingency in the contract. Thus, by the specific provision of the amendment, in bold and all capital letters, the financing contingency “REMAINED UNCHANGED.” Furthermore, Buyers’ real estate agent, Kent Eastman, testified that if the parties had extended the financing contingency, it should have been accomplished through a written amendment to the contract. Because the time period for Buyers to “furnish Seller with a copy of an effective written loan commitment” contained in the financing contingency had already expired as of July 17, 2003, and the amendment and agreement for possession signed by Buyers on that date did not otherwise extend that time period, the only reasonable explanation possible for and consistent with Buyers’ signatures on these documents is their waiver of this contract requirement and the resulting automatic termination of the contract. See Keltner, 926 S.W.2d at 531.
Nevertheless, Buyers argue that, regardless of their waiver of the automatic termination provision in the financing contingency, their inability to obtain financing on the terms otherwise set forth in the financing contingency relieved them of their obligations under the contract. However, Seller counters that Buyers’ conduct evidenced a clear and unequivocal intention to waive all of the financing terms in the financing contingency.
Initially, there is no evidence in the record that Buyers ever made any application for a loan “in the amount of $232,000, payable over a period of not less than 15 years and bearing interest at a rate of not more than 5.5% per annum,” as provided in the financing contingency. Chris Crouch, the loan officer at Bank of Joplin testified that Buyers applied for a loan in the amount of $340,000.00. Other than this one application, Buyers did not apply for any other loans. Failing to seek a loan on the terms set forth in the financing contingency evidences Buyers’ failure to use reasonable diligence to obtain such *216financing as required by the contingency. Goldberg v. Charlie’s Chevrolet, Inc., 672 S.W.2d 177, 179 (Mo.App.1984). We need not address that issue, however, because such action, coupled with Buyers’ conduct on July 17, 2003, and thereafter, also evidences Buyers’ waiver of the entire financing contingency.
As of July 17, 2003, Buyers’ application for a loan in the amount of $340,000.00 to finance the purchase of the property and operate their new restaurant had been approved by the Bank of Joplin, loan documentation was being prepared and the bank, according to Crouch, was on a “countdown to closing.” Although the bank never gave Buyers formal written notification of its approval of their loan application, Buyers were proceeding during the time period of July 2003, upon the assumption that the loan had in fact been approved, which it had been, and were working toward the end of closing the transaction with proceeds from that loan.
Thus, on July 17, 2003, Buyers: (1) had never applied for financing on the exact terms set forth in the financing contingency; (2) had secured and been approved for financing on terms that were acceptable to them even in the absence of a written loan commitment; (3) executed an amendment to the contract extending the closing date of the contract without any extension of the financing contingency and without providing a written loan commitment within the time period called for by the financing contingency; (4) executed an agreement to take possession of the property prior to closing; (5) accepted and used a key to effectuate that possession, and, thereafter (6) proceeded to have the utilities to the property transferred to them and to secure appropriate licensing to operate a restaurant on the property. Between July 17, 2003 and July 30, 2003, the record is void of any evidence that the approval of Buyers’ financing with the Bank of Joplin had been withdrawn or that the bank was taking any action other than proceeding to closing as intended by Buyers. Buyers’ written notice to Seller on July 30, 2003, indicating they were not going to close the transaction, contained no mention of Buyers’ inability to obtain financing as provided in the financing contingency.
All of these actions by Buyers are clear, unequivocal, and decisive acts showing Buyers’ intentional relinquishment of the benefit of the entire financing contingency, and are so consistent with the intention to waive that contingency that no other reasonable explanation is possible. See Keltner, 926 S.W.2d at 531. Finding that the record supports a determination by the trial court that Buyers waived the financing contingency, we need not address Buyers’ argument regarding whether the trial court erred in interpreting the term “reasonable diligence” contained in the financing contingency or whether Buyers used reasonable diligence to obtain financing. Point I is denied.
The Trial Court’s Determination of Fair Market Value is Supported by Substantial Evidence
The Buyers’ second point claims that the trial court’s judgment is not supported by substantial evidence of the fair market value of the property as of the date the contract was breached by the Buyers— August 1, 2003 — in that Seller did not offer any direct evidence of the fair market value of the property on that date. Buyers contend that the actual sale price of $235,000.00 received by Seller on July 15, 2004, is not substantial evidence of the fair market value of the property on August 1, 2003 for two reasons: first, being eleven and one-half months after the relevant date, it is too remote in time; and, second, it was the product of a distress sale in that *217the Seller was compelled to sell the property in that transaction. We disagree with both contentions.
A seller’s measure of damages for a buyer’s breach of a contract for the sale of land with a structure on it is the difference between the purchase price and the fair market value of the property on the date of breach. Wooten v. DeMean, 788 S.W.2d 522, 527-28 (Mo.App.1990). That is, the measure of damages is the difference between the contract price and the fair market value of the property on the date the sale should have been completed. Leonard v. American Walnut Co., Inc., 609 S.W.2d 452, 455 (Mo.App.1980). “An essential element of the seller’s case is proof of market value, and if he does resell within a reasonable time after the breach, the price obtained is some evidence of market value.” Id. Conflicts in the evidence concerning real estate values are for resolution by the fact finder. State ex rel. Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. Salmark Home Builders, Inc., 875 S.W.2d 92, 100 (Mo.1964). It is sufficient if the value set by the fact finder is “within the range” of the evidence. City of Lee’s Summit v. Hinck, 618 S.W.2d 719, 721 (Mo.App.1981).
While Buyers acknowledge that the sale price received by a seller from a subsequent sale of the property is substantial evidence to support a trial court’s determination of the fair market value of a property as of the date of the breach if the subsequent sale occurs within a reasonable time after the date of the breach, they claim that a sale eleven and one-half months after the breach, as occurred in this case, is not within a reasonable period of time as a matter of law. Buyers cite no Missouri cases supporting their contention. They cite only Chris v. Epstein, 113 N.C.App. 751, 440 S.E.2d 581 (1994), for the proposition that a resale of realty that occurred an entire year after the contract breach was not only not representative of fair market value a year earlier, but irrelevant.
Seller points us to Hawkins v. Foster, 897 S.W.2d 80 (Mo.App.1995), where we held that the price obtained in a subsequent sale which occurred a little over eleven and one-half months after the date of the buyer’s breach of a real estate contract supported an award of damages in favor of the seller based upon the fair market value of the property. Buyers have failed to distinguish how the time period approved by us in Hawkins materially differs from the essentially same time period in the instant case. Thus, Buyers have not convinced us that we should depart from our holding in Hawkins. Based upon that holding, the subsequent sale by Seller in the case at bar on July 15, 2004, occurred within a reasonable time after the date of Buyers’ breach of the contract, such that it provided substantial evidence to support the trial court’s determination of the fair market value of the property on the date of Buyer’s breach of the contract. See also Hoelscher v. Schenewerk, 804 S.W.2d 828 (Mo.App.1991) (subsequent sale approximately nine months after date of breach).
Buyers next contend that the subsequent sale price received by Seller is not substantial evidence of the fair market value of the property as of the date of the breach because the subsequent sale was a distress sale in that Seller was “compelled” to sell the property. Buyers claim that because fair market value is defined as “the price which property will bring when it is offered for sale by an owner who is willing but under no compulsion to sell and is bought by a buyer who is willing or desires to purchase but is not compelled to do so[,]” Turner v. Shalberg, 70 S.W.3d 653, 659 (Mo.App.2002) (quoting Carter v. Matthey Laundry & Dry Cleaning Co., *218350 S.W.2d 786, 794 (Mo.1961)) (emphasis added), and because Seller was compelled to sell the property, then the sale price could not, by definition, reflect the fair market value of the property. The flaw in Buyers’ argument is that the evidence they cite in support of their claim does not exist.
Buyers direct us to the testimony of Carolyn Billingsly, one of Seller’s owners, to support their contention. Buyers’ trial counsel asked Billingsly: “And so, you were compelled to sell it, I mean, you wanted to sell it bad; true?” She responded: “We did.” Counsel’s question was a compound question — “you were compelled to sell it” and “you wanted to sell it bad.” The wording of her response — “We did” — corresponded to the latter question and not the former. If she had been responding to the first question, her answer would have been in the form ‘We were.” Thus, while Billingsly’s testimony supports that Seller wanted badly to sell the property at the time of the subsequent sale, it does not support that Seller was compelled to do so.
Buyers fail to cite to any authority for the proposition that a sale in which the seller is highly motivated or badly wants to sell, as opposed to being compelled to sell, eliminates that sale from being considered as a fair market value sale of the property. Their reliance on Carter, 350 S.W.2d 786, is misplaced. In Carter, the sale was made pursuant to a plan of liquidation which had to be completed within a one-year period under a provision of the tax code, and, in addition, the property was under the threat of condemnation which would have compelled a forced sale. Id. at 794. While Seller here was financially motivated to sell and was highly desirous of selling the property at the time of the subsequent sale, it was not compelled to sell as was the seller in Carter.
Point II is denied.
Decision
The trial court’s judgment is affirmed.
BARNEY, P.J., and BARNES, SR., J., concur.
13.1.4 Hawkins v. McGee 13.1.4 Hawkins v. McGee
Coös,
June 4, 1929.
George Hawkins v. Edward R. B. McGee.
*115Ovide J. Coulombe and Ira W. Thayer (Mr. Thayer orally), for the plaintiff.
Matthew J. Ryan and Crawford D. Hening (by brief and orally), for the defendant.
1. The operation in question consisted in the removal of a considerable quantity of scar tissue from the palm of the plaintiff’s right hand and the grafting of skin taken from the plaintiff’s chest in place thereof. The scar tissue was the result of a severe burn caused by contact with an electric wire, which the plaintiff received about nine years before the time of the transactions here involved. There was evidence to the effect that before the operation was performed the plaintiff and his father went to the defendant’s office and that the defendant in answer to the question, “How long will the boy be in the hospital?”, replied, “Three or four days, . . . not over four; then the boy can go home, and it will be justafewdayswhenhe will be able to go back to work with a perfect hand.” Clearly this and other testimony to the same effect would not justify a finding that the doctor contracted to complete the hospital treatment in three or four days or that the plaintiff would be able to go back to work within a few days thereafter. The above statements could only be construed as expressions of opinion or predictions as to the probable duration of the treatment and plaintiff’s resulting disability, and the fact that these estimates were exceeded would impose no contractual liability upon the defendant. The only substantial basis for the plaintiff’s claim is the testimony that the defendant also said before the operation was decided upon, “ I will guarantee to make the hand a hundred per cent perfect hand” or “a hundred per cent good hand.” The plaintiff was present when these words were alleged to have been spoken, and if they are to be taken at their face value, it seems obvious *116that proof of their utterance would establish the giving of a warranty in accordance with his contention.
The defendant argues, however, that even if these words were uttered by him, no reasonable man would understand that they were used with the intention of entering into any “contractual relation whatever,” and that they could reasonably be understood only “as his expression in strong language that he believed and expected that as a result of the operation he would give the plaintiff a very good hand.” It may be conceded, as the defendant contends, that before the question of the making of a contract should be submitted to a jury, there is a preliminary question of law for the trial court to pass upon, i. e. “whether the words could possibly have the meaning imputed to them by the party who founds his case upon a certain interpretation,” but it cannot be held that the trial court decided this question erroneously in the present case. It is unnecessary to determine at this time whether the argument of the defendant based upon “common knowledge of the uncertainty which attends all surgical operations” and the improbability that a surgeon would ever contract to make a damaged part of the human body “ one hundred per cent perfect” would, in the absence of countervailing considerations, be regarded as conclusive, for there were other factors in the present case which tended to support the contention of the plaintiff. There was evidence that the defendant repeatedly solicited from the plaintiff’s father the opportunity to perform this operation, and the theory was advanced by plaintiff’s counsel in cross-examination of defendant, that he sought an opportunity to “experiment on skin grafting” in which he had had little previous experience. If the jury accepted this part of plaintiff’s contention, there would be a reasonable basis for the further conclusion that if defendant spoke the words attributed to him, he did so with the intention that they should be accepted at their face value, as an inducement for the granting of consent to the operation by the plaintiff and his father, and there was ample evidence that they were so accepted by them. The question of the making of the alleged contract was properly submitted to the jury.
2. The substance of the charge to the jury on the question of damages appears in the following quotation: “If you find the plaintiff entitled to anything, he is entitled to recover for what pain and suffering he has been made to endure and what injury he has sustained over and above the injury that he had before.” To this instruction the defendant seasonably excepted. By it, the jury was permitted to consider two elements of damage, (1) pain and suffering due to the *117operation, and (2) positive ill effects of the operation upon the plaintiff’s hand. Authority for any specific rule of damages in cases of this kind seems to be lacking, but when tested by general principle and by analogy, it appears that the foregoing instruction was erroneous.
“By ‘damages’ as that term is used in the law of contracts, is intended compensation for a breach, measured in the terms of the contract.” Davis v. Company, 77 N. H. 403, 404. The purpose of the law is to “put the plaintiff in as good a position as he would have been in had the defendant kept his contract.” 3 Williston, Cont., s. 1338; Hardie &c. Co. v. Company, 150 N. C. 150. The measure of recovery “is based upon what the defendant should have given the plaintiff, not what the plaintiff has given the defendant or otherwise expended.” 3 Williston, Cont., s. 1341. “The only losses that can be said fairly to come within the terms of a contract are such as the parties must have had in mind when the contract was made, or such as they either knew or ought to have known would probably result from a failure to comply with its terms.” Davis v. Company, 77 N. H. 403, 404; Hurd v. Dunsmore, 63 N. H. 171.
The present case is closely analogous to one in which a machine is built for a certain purpose and warranted to do certain work. In such cases, the usual rule of damages for breach of warranty in the sale of chattels is applied and it is held that the measure of damages is the difference between the value of the machine if it had corresponded with the warranty and its actual value, together with such incidental losses as the parties knew or ought to have known would probably result from a failure to comply with its terms. Hooper v. Story, 155 N. Y. 171, 175; Adams etc. Co. v. Wimbish, 201 Ala. 548; Isaacs v. Company, 108 Kan. 17; Paducah etc. Co. v. Proctor, 210 Ky. 806; Pioneer etc. Co. v. McCurdy, 151 Minn. 304; Christian &c. Co. v. Goodman, 132 Miss. 786; Hardie &c. Co. v. Company, 150 N. C. 150; York Mfg. Co. v. Company, 278 Pa. St. 351; General Motors &c. Co. v. Company, 47 R. I. 88; Cavanagh v. Company, 24 S. D. 349; Foutty v. Company, 99 W. Va. 300. The rule thus applied is well settled in this state. “As a general rule, the measure of the vendee’s damages is the difference between the value of the goods as they would have been if the warranty as to quality had been true, and the actual value at the time of the sale, including gains prevented and losses sustained, and such other damages as could be reasonably anticipated by the parties as likely to be caused by the vendor’s failure to keep his agreement, and could not by reasonable care on the part of the vendee have been avoided.” Union Bank v. Blanchard, 65 N. H. 21, *11823; Hurd v. Dunsmore, supra; Noyes v. Blodgett, 58 N. H. 502; P. L., c. 166, s. 69, vii. We, therefore, conclude that the true measure of the plaintiff’s damage in the present case is the difference between the value to him of a perfect hand or a good hand, such as the jury found the defendant promised him, and the value of his hand in its present condition, including any incidental consequences fairly within the contemplation of the parties when they made their contract. 1 Sutherland, Damages, (4th ed.), s. 92. Damages not thus limited, although naturally resulting, are not to be given.
The extent of the plaintiff’s suffering does not measure this difference in value. The pain necessarily incident to a serious surgical operation was a part of the contribution which the plaintiff was willing to make to his joint undertaking with the defendant to produce a good hand. It was a legal detriment suffered by him which constituted a part of the consideration given by him for the contract. It represented a part of the price which he was willing to pay for a good hand, but it furnished no test of the value of a good hand or the difference between the value of the hand which the defendant promised and the one which resulted from the operation.
It was also erroneous and misleading to submit to the jury as a separate element of damage any change for the worse in the condition of the plaintiff’s hand resulting from the operation, although this error was probably more prejudicial to the plaintiff than to the defendant. Any such ill effect of the operation would be included under the true rule of damages set forth above, but damages might properly be assessed for the defendant’s failure to improve the condition of the hand even if there were no evidence that its condition was made worse as a result of the operation.
It must be assumed that the trial court, in setting aside the verdict, undertook to apply the same rule of damages which he had previously given to the jury, and since this rule was erroneous, it is unnecessary for us to consider whether there was any evidence to justify his finding that all damages awarded by the jury above $500 were excessive.
3. Defendant’s requests for instructions were loosely drawn and were properly denied. A considerable number of issues of fact were raised by the evidence, and it would have been extremely misleading to instruct the jury in accordance with defendant’s request number 2, that “ The only issue on which you have to pass is whether or not there was a special contract between the plaintiff and the defendant to produce a perfect hand.” Equally inaccurate was defendant’s request number 5, which reads as follows: “You would have to find, in order *119to hold the defendant liable in this case, that Dr. McGee and the plaintiff both understood that the doctor was guaranteeing a perfect result from this operation.” If the defendant said that he would guarantee a perfect result and the plaintiff relied upon that promise, any mental reservations which he may have had are immaterial. The standard by which his conduct is to be judged is not internal but external. Woburn &c. Bank v. Woods, 77 N. H. 172; McConnell v. Lamontagne, 82 N. H. 423, 425; Eleftherion v. Company, ante, 32. Defendant’s request number 7 was as follows: “If you should get so far as to find that there was a special contract guaranteeing a perfect result, you would still have to find for the defendant unless you further found that a further operation would not correct the disability claimed by the plaintiff.” In view of the testimony that the defendant had refused to perform a further operation, it would clearly have been erroneous to give this instruction. The evidence would have justified a verdict for aLf amount sufficient to cover the cost of such an operation, even if the theory underlying this request were correct.
4. It is unlikely that the questions now presented in regard to the argument of plaintiff’s counsel will arise at another trial, and, therefore, they have not been considered.
New trial.
Marble, J., did not sit: the others concurred.
13.1.5 Cost vs. market value of completion 13.1.5 Cost vs. market value of completion
13.1.6 UCC Article 2 Scope and Buyer Remedies 13.1.6 UCC Article 2 Scope and Buyer Remedies
The Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) is a multistate legislative effort to develop various kinds of commercial laws that all or nearly all states will adopt with as little variation as possible, to encourage interstate commerce and reduce unpredictability and variation in the law applicable to commercial transactions. Article 2 governs sales of goods, as covered in Section 2-102. (Each section of the UCC is typically cited by reference to the article it is in (here, article 2), followed by the section, for 2-102.)
The UCC was not (as with the Restatements) generally intended to simply track prior common law, but was deliberately designed to deviate from some common law contract law principles, while preserving the common law otherwise if not addressed in the UCC itself.
Article 2 of the UCC was initially approved in 1956, long after the Missouri Cochran case you just read. Consider as you review the buyer remedies in the UCC set out below how these rules compare to the approach taken in that case.
Selected Sections on Scope of Article 2 and Buyer Remedies
- 2-102. Scope; Certain Security and Other Transactions Excluded From This Article.
Unless the context otherwise requires, this Article [i.e., Article 2 of the UCC] applies to transactions in goods; it does not apply to any transaction which although in the form of an unconditional contract to sell or present sale is intended to operate only as a security transaction nor does this Article impair or repeal any statute regulating sales to consumers, farmers or other specified classes of buyers.
- 2-105. Definitions: Transferability; "Goods"; "Future" Goods; "Lot"; "Commercial Unit".
(1) "Goods" means all things (including specially manufactured goods) which are movable at the time of identification to the contract for sale other than the money in which the price is to be paid, investment securities (Article 8) and things in action. "Goods" also includes the unborn young of animals and growing crops and other identified things attached to realty as described in the section on goods to be severed from realty (Section 2-107).
(2) Goods must be both existing and identified before any interest in them can pass. Goods which are not both existing and identified are "future" goods. A purported present sale of future goods or of any interest therein operates as a contract to sell.
(3) There may be a sale of a part interest in existing identified goods.
(4) An undivided share in an identified bulk of fungible goods is sufficiently identified to be sold although the quantity of the bulk is not determined. Any agreed proportion of such a bulk or any quantity thereof agreed upon by number, weight or other measure may to the extent of the seller's interest in the bulk be sold to the buyer who then becomes an owner in common.
- 2-711. Buyer's Remedies in General; Buyer's Security Interest in Rejected Goods.
(1) Where the seller fails to make delivery or repudiates or the buyer rightfully rejects or justifiably revokes acceptance then with respect to any goods involved, and with respect to the whole if the breach goes to the whole contract (Section 2-612), the buyer may cancel and whether or not he has done so may in addition to recovering so much of the price as has been paid
(a) "cover" and have damages under the next section as to all the goods affected whether or not they have been identified to the contract; or
(b) recover damages for non-delivery as provided in this Article (Section 2-713).
(2) Where the seller fails to deliver or repudiates the buyer may also
(a) if the goods have been identified recover them as provided in this Article (Section 2-502); or
(b) in a proper case obtain specific performance or replevy the goods as provided in this Article (Section 2-716).
(3) On rightful rejection or justifiable revocation of acceptance a buyer has a security interest in goods in his possession or control for any payments made on their price and any expenses reasonably incurred in their inspection, receipt, transportation, care and custody and may hold such goods and resell them in like manner as an aggrieved seller (Section 2-706).
- 2-712. "Cover"; Buyer's Procurement of Substitute Goods.
(1) After a breach within the preceding section the buyer may "cover" by making in good faith and without unreasonable delay any reasonable purchase of or contract to purchase goods in substitution for those due from the seller.
(2) The buyer may recover from the seller as damages the difference between the cost of cover and the contract price together with any incidental or consequential damages as hereinafter defined (Section 2-715), but less expenses saved in consequence of the seller's breach.
(3) Failure of the buyer to effect cover within this section does not bar him from any other remedy.
- 2-713. Buyer's Damages for Non-delivery or Repudiation.
(1) Subject to the provisions of this Article with respect to proof of market price (Section 2-723), the measure of damages for non-delivery or repudiation by the seller is the difference between the market price at the time when the buyer learned of the breach and the contract price together with any incidental and consequential damages provided in this Article (Section 2-715), but less expenses saved in consequence of the seller's breach.
(2) Market price is to be determined as of the place for tender or, in cases of rejection after arrival or revocation of acceptance, as of the place of arrival.
- 2-723. Proof of Market Price: Time and Place.
(1) If an action based on anticipatory repudiation comes to trial before the time for performance with respect to some or all of the goods, any damages based on market price (Section 2-708 or Section 2-713) shall be determined according to the price of such goods prevailing at the time when the aggrieved party learned of the repudiation.
(2) If evidence of a price prevailing at the times or places described in this Article is not readily available the price prevailing within any reasonable time before or after the time described or at any other place which in commercial judgment or under usage of trade would serve as a reasonable substitute for the one described may be used, making any proper allowance for the cost of transporting the goods to or from such other place.
(3) Evidence of a relevant price prevailing at a time or place other than the one described in this Article offered by one party is not admissible unless and until he has given the other party such notice as the court finds sufficient to prevent unfair surprise.
13.2 Forseeability & Consequential Damages 13.2 Forseeability & Consequential Damages
13.2.1 Hadley v. Baxendale 13.2.1 Hadley v. Baxendale
IN THE COURTS OF EXCHEQUER
| 23 February 1854 |
Before:
Alderson, B.
____________________
| HADLEY & ANOR | ||
| -v- | ||
| BAXENDALE & ORS |
The first count of the declaration stated, that, before and at the time of the making by the defendants of the promises hereinafter mentioned, the plaintiffs carried on the business of millers and mealmen in copartnership, and were proprietors and occupiers of the City Steam-Mills, in the city of Gloucester, and were possessed of a steam-engine, by means of which they worked the said mills, and therein cleaned corn, and ground the same into meal, and dressed the same into flour, sharps, and bran, and a certain portion of the said steam-engine, to wit, the crank shaft of the said steam-engine, was broken and out of repair, whereby the said steam-engine was prevented from working, and the plaintiffs were desirous of having a new crank shaft made for the said mill, and had ordered the same of certain persons trading under the name of W. Joyce & Co., at Greenwich, in the country of Kent, who had contracted to make the said new shaft for the plaintiffs; but before they could complete the said new shaft it was necessary that the said broken shaft should be forwarded to their works at Greenwich, in order that the said new shaft might be made so as to fit the other parts of the said engine which were not injured, and so that it might be substituted for the said broken shaft; and the plaintiffs were desirous of sending the said broken shaft to the said W. Joyce & Co. for the purpose aforesaid; and the defendants, before and at the time of the making of the said promises, were common carriers of business of common carriers, under the name of "Pickford & Co."; and the plaintiffs, at the request of the defendants, delivered to them as such carriers the said broken shaft, to be conveyed by the defendants as such carriers from Gloucester to the said W. Joyce & Co., at Greenwich, and there to be delivered for the plaintiffs on the second day after the day of such delivery, for reward to the defendants; and in consideration thereof the defendants then promised the plaintiffs to convey the said broken shaft from Gloucester to Greenwich, and there on the said second day to deliver the same to the said W. Joyce & Co. for the plaintiffs. And although such second day elapsed before the commencement of this suit, yet the defendants did not nor would deliver the said broken shaft at Greenwich on the said second day, but wholly neglected and refused so to do for the space of seven days after the said shaft was so delivered to them as aforesaid.
The second count stated, that, the defendants being such carriers as aforesaid, the plaintiffs, at the request of the defendants, caused to be delivered to them as such carriers the said broken shaft, to be conveyed by the defendants from Gloucester aforesaid to the said W. Joyce & Co., at Greenwich, and there to be delivered by the defendants for the plaintiffs, within a reasonable time in that behalf, for reward to the defendants; and in consideration of the premises in this count mentioned, the defendants promised the plaintiffs to use due and proper care and diligence in and about the carrying and conveying the said broken shaft from Gloucester aforesaid to the said W. Joyce & Co., at Greenwich, and there delivering the same for the plaintiffs in a reasonable time then following for the carriage, conveyance, and delivery of the said broken shaft as aforesaid; and although such reasonable time elapsed long before the commencement of this suit, yet the defendants did not nor would use due or proper care or diligence in or about the carrying or conveying or delivering the said broken shaft as aforesaid, within such reasonable time as aforesaid, but wholly neglected and refused so to do; and by reason of the carelessness, negligence, and improper conduct of the defendants, the said broken shaft was not delivered for the plaintiffs to the said W. Joyce & Co., or at Greenwich, until the expiration of a long and unreasonable time after the defendants received the same as aforesaid, and after the time when the same should have been delivered for the plaintiffs; and by reason of the several premises, the completing of the said new shaft was delayed for five days, and the plaintiffs were prevented form working their said steam-mills, and from cleaning corn, and grinding the same into meal, and dressing the meal into flour, sharps, or bran, and from carrying on their said business as millers and mealmen for the space of five days beyond the time that they otherwise would have been prevented from so doing, and they thereby were unable to supply many of their customers with flour, sharps, and bran during that period, and were obliged to buy flour to supply some of their other customers, and lost the mans and opportunity of selling flour, sharps, and bran, and were deprived of gains and profits which otherwise would have accrued to them, and were unable to employ their workmen, to whom they were compelled to pay wages during that period, and were otherwise injured, and the plaintiffs claim 300l.
The defendants pleaded non assumpserunt to the first count; and to the second payment of 25l. into Court in satisfaction of the plaintiffs' claim under that count. The plaintiffs entered a nolle prosequi as to the first count; and as to the second plea, they replied that the sum paid into the Court was not enough to satisfy the plaintiffs' claim in respect thereof; upon which replication issue was joined.
At the trial before Crompton, J., at the last Gloucester Assizes, it appeared that the plaintiffs carried on an extensive business as millers at Gloucester; and that, on the 11th of May, their mill was stopped by a breakage of the crank shaft by which the mill was worked. The steam-engine was manufactured by Messrs. Joyce & Co., the engineers, at Greenwich, and it became necessary to send the shaft as a pattern for a new one to Greenwich. The fracture was discovered on the 12th, and on the 13ththe plaintiffs sent one of their servants to the office of the defendants, who are the well-known carriers trading under the name of Pickford & Co., for the purpose of having the shaft carried to Greenwich. The plaintiffs' servant told the clerk that the mill was stopped, and that the shaft must be sent immediately; and in answer to the inquiry when the shaft would be taken, the answer was, that if it was sent up by twelve o'clock an day, it would be delivered at Greenwich on the following day. On the following day the shaft was taken by the defendants, before noon, for the purpose of being conveyed to Greenwich, and the sum of 2l. 4s. was paid for its carriage for the whole distance; at the same time the defendants' clerk was told that a special entry, if required, should e made to hasten its delivery. The delivery of the shaft at Greenwich was delayed by some neglect; and the consequence was, that the plaintiffs did not receive the new shaft for several days after they would otherwise have done, and the working of their mill was thereby delayed, and they thereby lost the profits they would otherwise have received.
On the part of the defendants, it was objected that these damages were too remote, and that the defendants were not liable with respect to them. The learned Judge left the case generally to the jury, who found a verdict with 25l. damages beyond the amount paid into Court.
Whateley, in last Michaelmas Term, obtained a rule nisi for a new trial, on the ground of misdirection.
Keating and Dowdeswell (Feb. 1) shewed cause. The plaintiffs are entitled to the amount awarded by the jury as damages. These damages are not too remote, for they are not only the natural and necessary consequence of the defendants' default, but they are the only loss which the plaintiffs have actually sustained. The principle upon which damages are assessed is founded upon that of rendering compensation to the injured party. The important subject is ably treated in Sedgwick on the Measure of Damages. And this particular branch of it is discussed in the third chapter, where, after pointing out the distinction between the civil and the French law, he says (page 64), "It is sometimes said, in regard to contracts, that the defendant shall be held liable for those damages only which both parties may fairly be supposed to have at the time contemplated as likely to result from the nature of the agreement, and this appears to be the rule adopted by the writers upon the civil law." In a subsequent passage he says, "In cases of fraud the civil law made a broad distinction" (page 66); and he adds, that "in such cases the debtor was liable for all consequences." It is difficult, however, to see what the ground of such principle is, and how the ingredient of fraud can affect the question. For instance, if the defendants had maliciously and fraudulently kept the shaft, it is not easy to see why they should have been liable for these damages, if they are not to be held so where the delay is occasioned by their negligence only. In speaking of the rule respecting the breach of a contract to transport goods to a particular place, and in actions brought on agreements for the sale and delivery of chattels, the learned author lays it down, that, "In the former case, the difference in value between the price at the point where the goods are and the place where they were to be delivered, is taken as the measure of damages, which, in fact, amounts to an allowance of profits; and in the latter case, a similar result is had by the application of the rule, which gives the vendee the benefit of the rise of the market price" (page 80). The several cases, English as well as American, are there collected and reviewed. If that rule is to be adopted, there was ample evidence in the present case of the defendants' knowledge of such a state of things as would necessarily result in the damage the plaintiffs suffered through the defendants' default. The authorities are in the plaintiffs' favour upon the general ground. In Nurse v. Barns (1 Sir T. Raym. 77) which was an action for breach of an agreement for the letting of certain iron mills, the plaintiff was held entitled to a sum of 500l., awarded by reason of loss of stock laid in, although he had only paid 10l. by way of consideration. InBorradaile v. Brunton (8 Taunt. 535, 2 B. Moo. 582), which was an action for the breach of the warranty of a chain cable that it should last two years as a substitute for a rope cable of sixteen inches, the plaintiff was held entitled to recover for the loss of the anchor, which was occasioned by the breaking of the cable within the specified time. These extreme cases, and the difficulty which consequently exists in the estimation of the true amount of damages, supports the view for which the plaintiffs contend, that the question is properly for the decision of a jury, and therefore that this matter could not properly have been withdrawn from their consideration. In Ingram v. Lawson (6 Bing. N.C. 212) the true principle was acted upon. That was an action for a libel upon the plaintiff, who was the owner and master of a ship, which he advertised to take passengers to the East Indies; and the libel imputed that the vessel was not seaworthy, and that Jews had purchased her to take out convicts. The Court held, that evidence shewing that the plaintiff's profits after the publication of the libel were 1500l below the usual average, was admissible, to enable the jury to form an opinion as to the nature of the plaintiff's business, and of his general rate of profit. Here, also, the plaintiffs have not sustained any loss beyond that which was submitted to the jury. Bodley v. Reynolds (8 Q. B. 779) and Kettle v. Hunt (Bull. N. P. 77) are similar in principle. In the latter, it was held that the loss of the benefit of trade, which a man suffers by the detention of his tools, is recoverable as special damage. The loss they had sustained during the time they were so deprived of their shaft, or until they could have obtained a new one. In Black v. Baxendale (1 Exch. 410), by reason of the defendant's omission to deliver the goods within a reasonable time at Bedford, the plaintiff's agent, who had been sent there to meet the goods, was put to certain additional expenses, and this Court held that such expenses might be given by the jury as damages. In Brandt v. Bowlby (2 B. & Ald. 932), which was an action of assumpsit against the defendants, as owners of a certain vessel, for not delivering a cargo of wheat shipped to the plaintiffs, the cargo reached the port of destination was held to be the true rule of damages." As between the parties in this cause," said Parke, J., "the plaintiffs are entitled to be put in the same situation as they would have been in, if the cargo had been delivered to their order at the time when it was delivered to the wrong party; and the sum it would have fetched at the time is the amount of the loss sustained by the non-performance of the defendants' contract." The recent decision of this Court, in Waters v. Towers (8 Ex. 401), seems to be strongly in the plaintiffs' favour. The defendants there had agreed to fit up the plaintiffs' mill within a reasonable time, but had not completed their contract within such time; and it was held that the plaintiffs were entitled to recover, by way of damages, the loss of profit upon a contract they had entered into with third parties, and which they were unable to fulfil by reason of the defendants' breach of contract. There was ample evidence that the defendants knew the purpose for which this shaft was sent, and that the result of its nondelivery in due time would be the stoppage of the mill; for the defendants' agent, at their place of business, was told that the mill was then stopped, that the shaft must be delivered immediately, and that if a special entry was necessary and natural result of their wrongful act. They also cited Ward v. Smith (11 Price, 19); and Parke, B., referred to Levy v. Langridge (4 M. & W. 337).
Whateley, Willes, and Phipson, in support of the rule (Feb. 2). It has been contended, on the part of the plaintiffs, that the damages found by the jury are a matter fit for their consideration; but still the question remains, in what way ought the jury to have been directed? It has been also urged, that, in awarding damages, the law gives compensation to the injured individual. But it is clear that complete compensation is not to be awarded; for instance, the non-payment of a bill of exchange might lead to the utter ruin of the holder, and yet such damage could not be considered as necessarily resulting from the breach of contract, so as to entitle the party aggrieved to recover in respect of it. Take the case of the breach of a contract to supply a rick-cloth, whereby and in consequence of bad weather the hay, being unprotected, is spoiled, that damage could not be recoverable. Many similar cases might be added. The true principle to be deduced form the authorities upon this subject is that which is embodied in the maxim: "In jure non remota cause sed proxima spectatur." Sedgwick says (page 38), "In regard to the quantum of damages, instead of adhering to the term compensation, it would be far more accurate to say, in the language of Domat, which we have cited above, 'that the object is discriminate between that portion of the loss which must be borne by the offending party and that which must be borne by the sufferer'. The law in fact aims not at the satisfaction but at a division of the loss." And the learned author also cites the following passage from Broom's Legal Maxims: "Every defendant," says Mr. Broom, "against whom an action is brought experiences some injury or inconvenience beyond what the costs will compensate him for."[1] Again, at page 78, after referring to the case of Flureau v. Thornhill (2 W. Blac. 1078), he says, "Both the English and American Courts have generally adhered to this denial of profits as any part of the damages to be compensated and that whether in cases of contract or of tort. So, in a case of illegal capture, Mr. Justice Story rejected the item of profits on the voyage, and held this general language: 'Independent, however, of all authority, I am satisfied upon principle, that an allowance of damages upon the basis of a calculation of profits is inadmissible. The rule would be in the highest degree unfavourable to the interests of the community. The subject would be involved in utter uncertainty. The calculation would proceed upon contingencies, and would require acknowledge of foreign markets to an exactness, in point of time and value, which would sometimes present embarrassing obstacles; much would depend upon the length of the voyage, and the season of arrival, much upon the vigilance and activity of the master, and much upon the momentary demand. After all, it would be a calculation upon conjectures, and not upon facts; such a rule therefore has been rejected by Courts of law in ordinary cases, and instead of deciding upon the gains or losses of parties in particular cases, a uniform interest has been applied as the measure of damages for the detention of property." There is much force in that admirably constructed passage. We ought to pay all due homage in this country to the decisions of the American Courts upon this important subject, to which they appear to have given much careful consideration. The damages here are too remote. Several of the cases which were principally relied upon by the plaintiffs are distinguishable. In Waters v. Towers (1 Exch. 401) there was a special contract to do the work in a particular time, and the damage occasioned by the non-completion of the contract was that to which the plaintiffs were held to be entitled. In Borradale v. Brunton (8 Taunt. 535) there was a direct engagement that the cable should hold the anchor. So, in the case of taking away a workman's tools, the natural and necessary consequence is the loss of employment: Bodley v. Reynolds (8 Q. B. 779). The following cases may be referred to as decisions upon the principle within which the defendants contend that the present case falls: Jones v. Gooday (8 M. & W. 146), Walton v. Fothergill (7 Car. & P. 392), Boyce v. Bayliffe (1 Camp. 58) and Archer v. Williams (2. C. & K. 26). The rule, therefore, that the immediate cause is to be regarded in considering the loss, is applicable here. There was no special contract between these parties. A carrier has a certain duty cast upon him by law, and that duty is not to be enlarged to an indefinite extent in the absence of a special contract, or of fraud or malice. The maxim "dolus circuitu non purgatur", does not apply. The question as to how far liability may be affected by reason of malice forming one of the elements to be taken into consideration, was treated of by the Court of Queen's Bench in Lumley v. Gye (2 E. & B. 216). Here the declaration is founded upon the defendants' duty as common carriers, and indeed there is no pretence for saying that they entered into a special contract to bear all the consequences of the non-delivery of the article in question. They were merely bound to carry it safely, and to deliver it within a reasonable time. The duty of the clerk, who was in attendance at the defendants' office, was to enter the article, and to take the amount of the carriage; but a mere notice to him, such as was here given, could not make the defendants, as carriers, liable as upon a special contract. Such matters, therefore, must be rejected from the consideration of the question. If carriers are to be liable in such a case as this, the exercise of a sound judgment would not suffice, but they ought to be gifted also with a spirit of prophecy. "I have always understood," said Patterson, J., in Kelly v. Partington (5 B. & Ad. 651), "that the special damage must be the natural result of the thing done." That sentence presents the true test. The Court of Queen's Bench acted upon that rule in Foxall v. Barnett (2 E. & B. 928). This therefore is a question of law, and the jury ought to have been told that these damages were too remote; and that, in the absence of the proof of any other damage, the plaintiffs were entitled to nominal damages only: Tindall v. Bell (11 M. & W. 232). Siordet v. Hall (4 Bing. 607) and De Vaux v. Salvador (4 A. & E. 420) are instances of cases where the Courts appear to have gone into the opposite extremes: in the one case of unduly favouring the carrier, in the other of holding them liable for results which would appear too remote. If the defendants should be held responsible for the damages awarded by the jury, they would be in a better position if they confined their business to the conveyance of gold. They cannot be responsible for results which, at the time the goods are delivered for carriage, and beyond all human foresight. Suppose a manufacturer were to contract with a coal merchant or min owner for the delivery of a boat load of coals, no intimation being given that the coals were required for immediate use, the vendor in that case would not be liable for the stoppage of the vendee's business for want of the article which he had failed to deliver: for the vendor has no knowledge that the goods are not to go to the vendee's general stock. Where the contracting party is shewn to be acquainted with all the consequences that must of necessity follow from a breach on his part of the contract, it may be reasonable to say that he takes the risk of such consequences. If, as between vendor and vendee, this species of liability has no existence, a fortiori, the carrier is not to be burthened with it. In cases of personal injury to passengers, the damage to which the sufferer has been held entitled is the direct and immediate consequence of the wrongful act.
Cur. adv. vult.
The judgment of the Court was now delivered by
ALDERSON, B. We think that there ought to be a new trial in this case; but, in so doing, we deem it to be expedient and necessary to state explicitly the rule which the Judge, at the next trial, ought, in our opinion, to direct the jury to be governed by when they estimate the damages.
It is. Indeed, of the last importance that we should do this; for, if the jury are left without any definite rule to guide them, it will, in such cases as these, manifestly lead to the greatest injustice. The Courts have done this on several occasions; and in Blake v. Midland Railway Company (18 Q. B. 93), the Court granted a new trial on this very ground, that the rule had not been definitely laid down to the jury by the learned Judge at Nisi Prius.
"There are certain establishing rules", this Court says, in Alder v. Keighley (15 M. & W. 117), "according to which the jury ought to find". And the Court, in that case, adds: "and here there is a clear rule, that the amount which would have been received if the contract had been kept, is the measure of damages if the contract is broken."
Now we think the proper rule in such a case as the present is this:-- Where two parties have made a contract which one of them has broken, the damages which the other party ought to receive in respect of such breach of contract should be such as may fairly and reasonably be considered either arising naturally, i.e., according to the usual course of things, from such breach of contract itself, or such as may reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of both parties, at the time they made the contract, as the probable result of the breach of it. Now, if the special circumstances under which the contract was actually made were communicated by the plaintiffs to the defendants, and thus known to both parties, the damages resulting from the breach of such a contract, which they would reasonably contemplate, would be the amount of injury which would ordinarily follow from a breach of contract under these special circumstances so known and communicated. But, on the other hand, if these special circumstances were wholly unknown to the party breaking the contract, he, at the most, could only be supposed to have had in his contemplation the amount of injury which would arise generally, and in the great multitude of cases not affected by any special circumstances, from such a breach of contract. For, had the special circumstances been known, the parties might have specially provided for the breach of contract by special terms as to the damages in that case; and of this advantage it would be very unjust to deprive them. Now the above principles are those by which we think the jury ought to be guided in estimating the damages arising out of any breach of contract. It is said, that other cases such as breaches of contract in the nonpayment of money, or in the not making a good title of land, are to be treated as exceptions from this, and as governed by a conventional rule. But as, in such cases, both parties must be supposed to be cognizant of that well-known rule, these cases may, we think, be more properly classed under the rule above enunciated as to cases under known special circumstances, because there both parties may reasonably be presumed to contemplate the estimation of the amount of damages according to the conventional rule. Now, in the present case, if we are to apply the principles above laid down, we find that the only circumstances here communicated by the plaintiffs to the defendants at the time of the contract was made, were, that the article to be carried was the broken shaft of a mill, and that the plaintiffs were the millers of the mill.
But how do these circumstances shew reasonably that the profits of the mill must be stopped by an unreasonable delay in the delivery of the broken shaft by the carrier to the third person? Suppose the plaintiffs had another shaft in their possession put up or putting up at the time, and that they only wished to send back the broken shaft to the engineer who made it; it is clear that this would be quite consistent with the above circumstances, and yet the unreasonable delay in the delivery would have no effect upon the intermediate profits of the mill. Or, again, suppose that, at the time of the delivery to the carrier, the machinery of the mill had been in other respects defective, then, also, the same results would follow. Here it is true that the shaft was actually sent back to serve as a model for the new one, and that the want of a new one was the only cause of the stoppage of the mill, and that the loss of profits really arose from not sending down the new shaft in proper time, and that this arose from the delay in delivering the broken one to serve as a model. But it is obvious that, in the great multitude of cases of millers sending off broken shafts to third persons by a carrier under ordinary circumstances, such consequences would not, in all probability, have occurred; and these special circumstances were here never communicated by the plaintiffs to the defendants. It follows therefore, that the loss of profits here cannot reasonably be considered such a consequence of the breach of contract as could have been fairly and reasonably contemplated by both the parties when they made this contract. For such loss would neither have flowed naturally from the breach of this contract in the great multitude of such cases occurring under ordinary circumstances, nor were the special circumstances, which, perhaps, would have made it a reasonable and natural consequence of such breach of contract, communicated to or known by the defendants. The Judge ought, therefore, to have told the jury that upon the facts then before them they ought not to take the loss of profits into consideration at all in estimating the damages. There must therefore be a new trial in this case.
Rule absolute.
13.2.2 Restatement (second) of contracts 351 13.2.2 Restatement (second) of contracts 351
§ 351 Unforeseeability and Related Limitations on Damages
Restatement (Second) of Contracts (1981)
- 351 Unforeseeability and Related Limitations on Damages [Illustrations Omitted]
|
(1) Damages are not recoverable for loss that the party in breach did not have reason to foresee as a probable result of the breach when the contract was made. (2) Loss may be foreseeable as a probable result of a breach because it follows from the breach (a) in the ordinary course of events, or (b) as a result of special circumstances, beyond the ordinary course of events, that the party in breach had reason to know. (3) A court may limit damages for foreseeable loss by excluding recovery for loss of profits, by allowing recovery only for loss incurred in reliance, or otherwise if it concludes that in the circumstances justice so requires in order to avoid disproportionate compensation. |
Comment:
-
Illustrations:
-
1. A, a carrier, contracts with B, a miller, to carry B's broken crankshaft to its manufacturer for repair. B tells A when they make the contract that the crankshaft is part of B's milling machine and that it must be sent at once, but not that the mill is stopped because B has no replacement. Because A delays in carrying the crankshaft, B loses profit during an additional period while the mill is stopped because of the delay. A is not liable for B's loss of profit. That loss was not foreseeable by A as a probable result of the breach at the time the contract was made because A did not know that the broken crankshaft was necessary for the operation of the mill.
-
2. A contracts to sell land to B and to give B possession on a stated date. Because A delays a short time in giving B possession, B incurs unusual expenses in providing for cattle that he had already purchased to stock the land as a ranch. A had no reason to know when they made the contract that B had planned to purchase cattle for this purpose. A is not liable for B's expenses in providing for the cattle because that loss was not foreseeable by A as a probable result of the breach at the time the contract was made.
-
-
Illustrations:
-
3. A and B make a written contract under which A is to recondition by a stated date a used machine owned by B so that it will be suitable for sale by B to C. A knows when they make the contract that B has contracted to sell the machine to C but knows nothing of the terms of B's contract with C. Because A delays in returning the machine to B, B is unable to sell it to C and loses the profit that he would have made on that sale. B's loss of reasonable profit was foreseeable by A as a probable result of the breach at the time the contract was made.
-
4. A, a manufacturer of machines, contracts to make B his exclusive selling agent in a specified area for the period of a year. Because A fails to deliver any machines, B loses the profit on contracts that he would have made for their resale. B's loss of reasonable profit was foreseeable by A as a probable result of the breach at the time the contract was made.
-
5. A and B make a contract under which A is to recondition by a stated date a used machine owned by B so that it will be suitable for use in B's canning factory. A knows that the machine must be reconditioned by that date if B's factory is to operate at full capacity during the canning season, but nothing is said of this in the written contract. Because A delays in returning the machine to B, B loses its use for the entire canning season and loses the profit that he would have made had his factory operated at full capacity. B's loss of reasonable profit was foreseeable by A as a probable result of the breach at the time the contract was made.
-
6. The facts being otherwise as stated in Illustration 3, the profit that B would have made under his contract with A was extraordinarily large because C promised to pay an exceptionally high price as a result of a special need for the machine of which A was unaware. A is not liable for B's loss of profit to the extent that it exceeds what would ordinarily result from such a contract. To that extent the loss was not foreseeable by A as a probable result of the breach at the time the contract was made.
-
7. The facts being otherwise as stated in Illustration 5, the profit that B would have made from the use of the machine was unusually large because of an abnormal use to which he planned to put it of which A was unaware. A is not liable for B's loss of profit to the extent that it exceeds what would ordinarily result from the use of such a machine. To that extent the loss was not foreseeable by A at the time the contract was made as a probable result of the breach.
-
13.2.3 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 352 13.2.3 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 352
§ 352 Uncertainty as a Limitation on Damages
-
Damages are not recoverable for loss beyond an amount that the evidence permits to be established with reasonable certainty.
-
Illustrations:
-
1. A contracts to publish a novel that B has written. A repudiates the contract and B is unable to get his novel published elsewhere. If the evidence does not permit B's loss of royalties and of reputation to be estimated with reasonable certainty, he cannot recover damages for that loss, although he can recover nominal damages. See Illustration 1 to § 347.
-
2. A contracts to sell B a tract of land on which B plans to build an outdoor drive-in theatre. A breaks the contract by selling the land to C, and B is unable to build the theatre. If, because of the speculative nature of the new enterprise the evidence does not permit B's loss of profits to be estimated with reasonable certainty, his recovery will be limited to expenses incurred in reliance or, if none can be proved with reasonable certainty, to nominal damages.
-
3. A and B make a contract under which A is to construct a building of radical new design for B for $5,000,000. After A has spent $3,000,000 in reliance, B repudiates the contract and orders A off the site. If the evidence does not permit A's lost profits to be estimated with reasonable certainty, he can recover the $3,000,000 that he has spent in reliance. He must, however, then prove that amount with reasonable certainty.
-
4. A, a manufacturer, makes a contract with B, a wholesaler, to sell B a quantity of plastic. B resells the plastic to dealers. The plastic is discovered to be defective and B has many complaints from dealers, some of which refuse to place further orders with him. B can recover the loss of good will if his loss can be estimated with reasonable certainty by such evidence as his business records before and after the transaction and the testimony of his salespersons and that of dealers.
-
-
Illustrations:
-
5. A contracts with B to remodel B's existing outdoor drive-in theatre, work to be completed on June 1. A does not complete the work until September 1. B can use records of the theatre's prior and subsequent operation, along with other evidence, to prove his lost profits with reasonable certainty.
-
6. A contracts with B to construct a new outdoor drive-in theatre, to be completed on June 1. A does not complete the theatre until September 1. Even though the business is a new rather than an established one, B may be able to prove his lost profits with reasonable certainty. B can use records of the theatre's subsequent operation and of the operation of similar theatres in the same locality, along with other evidence including market surveys and expert testimony, in attempting to do this.
-
7. A contracts with B to make B his exclusive agent for the sale of machine tools in a specified territory and to supply him with machine tools at stated prices. After B has begun to act as A's agent, A repudiates the agreement and replaces him with C. B can use evidence as to sales and profits made by him before the repudiation and made by C after the repudiation in attempting to prove his lost profits with reasonable certainty. It would be more difficult, although not necessarily impossible, for B to succeed in this attempt if his agency were not exclusive.
-
-
Illustration:
-
8. A, a steel manufacturer, and B, a dealer in scrap steel, contract for the sale by A to B of all of A's output of scrap steel for five years at a price fixed in terms of the market price. B's profit will depend largely on the amount of A's output and the cost of transporting the scrap to B's purchasers. A repudiates the contract at the end of one year. Whether B can recover damages based on lost profits over the remaining four years will depend on whether he can prove A's output and the transportation costs with reasonable certainty. If he can do so for part of the remaining four years, he can recover damages based on lost profits for that period. The availability of the remedy of specific performance is a factor that will influence a court in requiring greater certainty.
-
13.2.4 UCC Incidental and Consequential Damages 13.2.4 UCC Incidental and Consequential Damages
UCC Sections on Incidental and Consequential Damages
- 2-710. Seller's Incidental Damages.
Incidental damages to an aggrieved seller include any commercially reasonable charges, expenses or commissions incurred in stopping delivery, in the transportation, care and custody of goods after the buyer's breach, in connection with return or resale of the goods or otherwise resulting from the breach.
- 2-715. Buyer's Incidental and Consequential Damages.
(1) Incidental damages resulting from the seller's breach include expenses reasonably incurred in inspection, receipt, transportation and care and custody of goods rightfully rejected, any commercially reasonable charges, expenses or commissions in connection with effecting cover and any other reasonable expense incident to the delay or other breach.
(2) Consequential damages resulting from the seller's breach include (a) any loss resulting from general or particular requirements and needs of which the seller at the time of contracting had reason to know and which could not reasonably be prevented by cover or otherwise; and (b) injury to person or property proximately resulting from any breach of warranty.
13.3 Duty to Mitigate 13.3 Duty to Mitigate
Restrictions on Expectation Damages –Foreseeability
- 874-79, 888-90 – Hadley v. Baxendale
- Rstmt: § 351-52
13.3.1 Rockingham County v. Luten Bridge Co. 13.3.1 Rockingham County v. Luten Bridge Co.
ROCKINGHAM COUNTY
v.
LUTEN BRIDGE CO.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
[302] F. P. Hobgood, Jr., of Greensboro, N. C., and W. M. Hendren, of Winston-Salem, N. C., for appellant.
Edward S. Parker, Jr., of Greensboro, N. C. (Aubrey L. Brooks, of Greensboro, N. C., Julius C. Smith, of Robersonville, N. C., and C. R. Wharton, of Greensboro, N. C., on the brief), for appellee.
Before PARKER, Circuit Judge, and McCLINTIC and SOPER, District Judges.
PARKER, Circuit Judge.
This was an action at law instituted in the court below by the Luten Bridge Company, as plaintiff, to recover of Rockingham county, North Carolina, an amount alleged to be due under a contract for the construction of a bridge. The county admits the execution and breach of the contract, but contends that notice of cancellation was given the bridge company before the erection of the bridge was commenced, and that it is liable only for the damages which the company would have sustained, if it had abandoned construction at that time. The judge below refused to strike out an answer filed by certain members of the board of commissioners of the county, admitting liability in accordance with the prayer of the complaint, allowed this pleading to be introduced in evidence as the answer of the county, excluded evidence offered by the county in support of its contentions as to notice of cancellation and damages, and instructed a verdict for plaintiff for the full amount of its claim. From judgment on this verdict the county has appealed.
The facts out of which the case arises, as shown by the affidavits and offers of proof appearing in the record, are as follows: On January 7, 1924, the board of commissioners of Rockingham county voted to award to plaintiff a contract for the construction of the bridge in controversy. Three of the five commissioners favored the awarding of the contract and two opposed it. Much feeling was engendered over the matter, with the result that on February 11, 1924, W. K. Pruitt, one of the commissioners who had voted in the affirmative, sent his resignation to the clerk of the superior court of the county. The clerk received this resignation on the same day, and immediately accepted same and noted his acceptance thereon. Later in the day, Pruitt called him over the telephone and stated that he wished to withdraw the resignation, and later sent him written notice [303] to the same effect. The clerk, however, paid no attention to the attempted withdrawal, and proceeded on the next day to appoint one W. W. Hampton as a member of the board to succeed him.
After his resignation, Pruitt attended no further meetings of the board, and did nothing further as a commissioner of the county. Likewise Pratt and McCollum, the other two members of the board who had voted with him in favor of the contract, attended no further meetings. Hampton, on the other hand, took the oath of office immediately upon his appointment and entered upon the discharge of the duties of a commissioner. He met regularly with the two remaining members of the board, Martin and Barber, in the courthouse at the county seat, and with them attended to all of the business of the county. Between the 12th of February and the first Monday in December following, these three attended, in all, 25 meetings of the board.
At one of these meetings, a regularly advertised called meeting held on February 21st, a resolution was unanimously adopted declaring that the contract for the building of the bridge was not legal and valid, and directing the clerk of the board to notify plaintiff that it refused to recognize same as a valid contract, and that plaintiff should proceed no further thereunder. This resolution also rescinded action of the board theretofore taken looking to the construction of a hard-surfaced road, in which the bridge was to be a mere connecting link. The clerk duly sent a certified copy of this resolution to plaintiff.
At the regular monthly meeting of the board on March 3d, a resolution was passed directing that plaintiff be notified that any work done on the bridge would be done by it at its own risk and hazard, that the board was of the opinion that the contract for the construction of the bridge was not valid and legal, and that, even if the board were mistaken as to this, it did not desire to construct the bridge, and would contest payment for same if constructed. A copy of this resolution was also sent to plaintiff. At the regular monthly meeting on April 7th, a resolution was passed, reciting that the board had been informed that one of its members was privately insisting that the bridge be constructed. It repudiated this action on the part of the member and gave notice that it would not be recognized. At the September meeting, a resolution was passed to the effect that the board would pay no bills presented by plaintiff or any one connected with the bridge. At the time of the passage of the first resolution, very little work toward the construction of the bridge had been done, it being estimated that the total cost of labor done and material on the ground was around $1,900; but, notwithstanding the repudiation of the contract by the county, the bridge company continued with the work of construction.
On November 24, 1924, plaintiff instituted this action against Rockingham county, and against Pruitt, Pratt, McCollum, Martin, and Barber, as constituting its board of commissioners. Complaint was filed, setting forth the execution of the contract and the doing of work by plaintiff thereunder, and alleging that for work done up until November 3, 1924, the county was indebted in the sum of $18,301.07. On November 27th, three days after the filing of the complaint, and only three days before the expiration of the term of office of the members of the old board of commissioners, Pruitt, Pratt, and McCollum met with an attorney at the county seat, and, without notice to or consultation with the other members of the board, so far as appears, had the attorney prepare for them an answer admitting the allegations of the complaint. This answer, which was filed in the cause on the following day, did not purport to be an answer of the county, or of its board of commissioners, but of the three commissioners named.
On December 1, 1924, the newly elected board of commissioners held its first meeting and employed attorneys to defend the action which had been instituted by plaintiff against the county. These attorneys immediately moved to strike out the answer which had been filed by Pruitt, Pratt, and McCollum, and entered into an agreement with opposing counsel that the county should have 30 days from the action of the court on the motion within which to file answer. The court denied the motion on June 2, 1927, and held the answer filed by Pruitt, Pratt, and McCollum to be the answer of the county. An order was then entered allowing the county until August 1st to file answer, pursuant to stipulation, within which time the answer of the county was filed. This answer denied that the contract sued on was legal or binding, and for a further defense set forth the resolutions of the commissioners with regard to the building of the bridge, to which we have referred, and their communication to plaintiff. A reply was filed to this, and the case finally came to trial.
At the trial, plaintiff, over the objection [304] of the county, was allowed to introduce in evidence the answer filed by Pruitt, Pratt, and McCollum, the contract was introduced, and proof was made of the value under the terms of the contract of the work done up to November 3, 1924. The county elicited on cross-examination proof as to the state of the work at the time of the passage of the resolutions to which we have referred. It then offered these resolutions in evidence, together with evidence as to the resignation of Pruitt, the acceptance of his resignation, and the appointment of Hampton; but all of this evidence was excluded, and the jury was instructed to return a verdict for plaintiff for the full amount of its claim. The county preserved exceptions to the rulings which were adverse to it, and contends that there was error on the part of the judge below in denying the motion to strike out the answer filed by Pruitt, Pratt, and McCollum; in allowing same to be introduced in evidence; in excluding the evidence offered of the resignation of Pruitt, the acceptance of his resignation, and the appointment of Hampton, and of the resolutions attempting to cancel the contract and the notices sent plaintiff pursuant thereto; and in directing a verdict for plaintiff in accordance with its claim.
As the county now admits the execution and validity of the contract, and the breach on its part, the ultimate question in the case is one as to the measure of plaintiff's recovery, and the exceptions must be considered with this in mind. Upon these exceptions, three principal questions arise for our consideration, viz.: (1) Whether the answer filed by Pruitt, Pratt, and McCollum was the answer of the county. If it was, the lower court properly refused to strike it out, and properly admitted it in evidence. (2) Whether, in the light of the evidence offered and excluded, the resolutions to which we have referred, and the notices sent pursuant thereto, are to be deemed action on the part of the county. If they are not, the county has nothing upon which to base its position as to minimizing damages, and the evidence offered was properly excluded. And (3) whether plaintiff, if the notices are to be deemed action by the county, can recover under the contract for work done after they were received, or is limited to the recovery of damages for breach of contract as of that date.
With regard to the first question the learned District Judge held that the answer of Pruitt, Pratt, and McCollum was the answer of the county, but we think that this holding was based upon an erroneous view of the law. It appears, without contradiction, not only that their answer purports to have been filed by them individually, and not in behalf of the county or of the board of commissioners, but also that it was not authorized by the board of commissioners, acting as a board at a meeting regularly held. It appears that Pruitt, Pratt, and McCollum merely met at the county seat to consider the filing of an answer to plaintiff's complaint. This was not a "regular" meeting of the board, held on the first Mondays of December and June. It was not a "special" meeting held on the first Monday in some other month. It was not shown to be a meeting "called" by the chairman upon the written request of a member of the board, and advertised at the courthouse door and in a newspaper as provided by statute. Consol. St. § 1296. And between the filing of the complaint and the filing of the answer there was not sufficient time for the advertising of a called meeting of the board. Consequently any action taken by Pruitt, Pratt, and McCollum with regard to filing an answer was not taken at a meeting of the board in legal session. Even if it be assumed that Pruitt continued to be a member of the board, and that he, Pratt, and McCollum constituted a majority thereof, nevertheless such majority could bind the county only by action taken at a meeting regularly held. The rule is well settled that the governing board of a county can act only as a body and when in legal session as such. 7 R. C. L. 941; 15 C. J. 460 and cases cited; O'Neal v. Wake County, 196 N. C. 184, 145 S. E. 28, 29; Grand Island & N. W. R. Co. v. Baker, 6 Wyo. 369, 45 P. 494, 34 L. R. A. 835, 71 Am. St. Rep. 926; Board of Com'rs of Jasper County v. Allman, 142 Ind. 573, 42 N. E. 206, 39 L. R. A. 58, 68; Campbell County v. Howard & Lee, 133 Va. 19, 112 S. E. 876; Paola, etc., R. Co. v. Anderson County Com'rs, 16 Kan. 302, 310. As said in the case last cited: "* * * Commissioners casually meeting have no power to act for the county. There must be a session of the `board.' This single entity, the `board,' alone can by its action bind the county. And it exists only when legally convened."
The North Carolina case of Cleveland Cotton-Mills v. Commissioners, 108 N. C. 678, 13 S. E. 271, 274, established the rule in North Carolina. That case arose under the old law, which required bridge contracts involving more than $500 to be made with the concurrence of a majority of the justices [305] of the peace of the county. Such a contract was made, and a majority of the justices of the county, who were not then in session, executed a written instrument approving it. Afterwards, at a regular meeting of the justices with the board of commissioners, a majority of the quorum of the justices present voted to ratify the contract. A divided court held that this ratification at the regular meeting was sufficient, although the majority of the quorum which voted for ratification was less than a majority of all of the justices of the county; but all of the members of the court agreed that the execution of the instrument by a majority of the justices when not in session was without effect. As to this, it was said in the majority opinion:
"We attach no importance to the paper signed by an actual majority of the whole number of justices of the peace of the county. The action contemplated by the law was that of the justices of the peace in a lawfully constituted meeting as a body, as in cases where the validity of an agreement made by the governing officials of any other corporation is drawn in question. Duke v. Markham, 105 N. C. 131, 10 S. E. 1017 [18 Am. St. Rep. 889]."
It will be seen that the court applied to this case, where the validity of the action of the governing officials of a public corporation was drawn in question, the rule laid down in Duke v. Markham, which is, of course, the well-settled rule in the case of private corporations, viz. that such officials can exercise their powers as members of the governing board only at a meeting regularly held. See, also, First National Bank v. Warlick, 125 N. C. 593, 34 S. E. 687; Everett v. Staton, 192 N. C. 216, 134 S. E. 492.
But in the case of O'Neal v. Wake County, supra, decided in 1928, the Supreme Court of North Carolina set at rest any doubt which may have existed in that state as to the question here involved. In holding that the county could not be held liable on a contract made at a joint meeting of the county commissioners, the county board of education, and a representative of the insurance department, the court said:
"A county makes its contracts through the agency of its board of commissioners; but to make a contract which shall be binding upon the county the board must act as a body convened in legal session, regular, adjourned, or special. A contract made by members composing the board when acting in their individual and not in their corporate capacity while assembled in a lawful meeting is not the contract of the county. As a rule authorized meetings are prerequisite to corporate action based upon deliberate conference and intelligent discussion of proposed measures. 7 R. C. L. 941; 15 C. J. 460; 43 C. J. 497; P. & F. R. Ry. Co. v. Com'rs of Anderson County, 16 Kan. 302; Kirkland v. State, 86 Fla. 84, 97 So. 502. The principle applies to corporations generally, and by the express terms of our statute, as stated above, every county is a corporate body."
We think, therefore, that Pruitt, Pratt, and McCollum, even if they constituted a majority of the board of commissioners, did not bind the county by their action in filing an answer admitting its liability, where no meeting of the board of commissioners was held according to law, and where, so far as appears, the other commissioners were not even notified of what was being attempted. It is unthinkable that the county should be held bound by such action, especially where the commissioners attempting to bind it had taken no part in its government for nearly 10 months, and where the answer filed did not defend it in any particular, but, on the contrary, asserted its liability. If, therefore, the answer be considered as an attempt to answer on behalf of the county, it must be stricken out, because not authorized by its governing board; if considered as the answer of Pruitt, Pratt, and McCollum individually, it must go out because, having been sued in their official capacity, they had no right to answer individually. And, of course, not having been authorized by the county, the answer was not admissible as evidence against it on the trial of the cause.
Coming to the second inquiry — i. e., whether the resolutions to which we have referred and the notices sent pursuant thereto are to be deemed the action of the county, and hence admissible in evidence on the question of damages — it is to be observed that, along with the evidence of the resolutions and notices, the county offered evidence to the effect that Pruitt's resignation had been accepted before he attempted to withdraw same, and that thereafter Hampton was appointed, took the oath of office, entered upon the discharge of the duties of the office, and with Martin and Barber transacted the business of the board of commissioners until the coming into office of the new board. We think that this evidence, if true, shows (1) that Hampton, upon his appointment and qualification, became a member of the board in place of Pruitt, and that he, Martin, and [306] Barber constituted a quorum for the transaction of its business; and (2) that, even if this were not true, Hampton was a de facto commissioner, and that his presence at meetings of the board with that of the other two commissioners was sufficient to constitute a quorum, so as to give validity to its proceedings.
The North Carolina statutes make no provision for resignations by members of the boards of county commissioners. A public officer, however, has at common law the right to resign his office, provided his resignation is accepted by the proper authority. Hoke v. Henderson, 15 N. C. 1, 25 Am. Dec. 677; U. S. v. Wright, Fed. Cas. No. 16,775; Rowe v. Tuck, 149 Ga. 88, 99 S. E. 303, 5 A. L. R. 113; Van Orsdall v. Hazard, 3 Hill (N. Y.) 243; Philadelphia v. Marcer, 8 Phila. (Pa.) 319; Gates v. Delaware County, 12 Iowa, 405; 22 R. C. L. 556, 557; note, 19 A. L. R. 39, and cases there cited. And, in the absence of statute regulating the matter, his resignation should be tendered to the tribunal or officer having power to appoint his successor. 22 R. C. L. 558; State v. Popejoy, 165 Ind. 177, 74 N. E. 994, 6 Ann. Cas. 687, and note; State ex rel. Conley v. Thompson, 100 W. Va. 253, 130 S. E. 456; State v. Huff, 172 Ind. 1, 87 N. E. 141, 139 Am. St. Rep. 355; State v. Augustine, 113 Mo. 21, 20 S. W. 651, 35 Am. St. Rep. 696. In the case last cited it is said:
"It is well-established law that, in the absence of express statutory enactment, the authority to accept the resignation of a public officer rests with the power to appoint a successor to fill the vacancy. The right to accept a resignation is said to be incidental to the power of appointment. 1 Dillon on Municipal Corporations (3d Ed.) § 224; Mechem on Public Offices, § 413; Van Orsdall v. Hazard, 3 Hill (N. Y.) 243; State v. Boecker, 56 Mo. 17."
In North Carolina, the officer having power to appoint the successor of a member of the board of county commissioners is the clerk of the superior court of the county. Consolidated Statutes of North Carolina, § 1294. It is clear, therefore, that, when Pruitt tendered his resignation to the clerk of the superior court, he tendered it to the proper authority.
The mere filing of the resignation with the clerk of the superior court did not of itself vacate the office of Pruitt, it was necessary that his resignation be accepted. Hoke v. Henderson, supra; Edwards v. U. S., 103 U. S. 471, 26 L. Ed. 314. But, after its acceptance, he had no power to withdraw it. Mimmack v. U. S., 97 U. S. 426, 24 L. Ed. 1067; Murray v. State, 115 Tenn. 303, 89 S. W. 101, 5 Ann. Cas. 687, and note; State v. Augustine, supra; Gates v. Delaware County, supra; 22 R. C. L. 559. If, as the offer of proof seems to indicate, the resignation of Pruitt was accepted by the clerk prior to his attempt to withdraw it, the appointment of Hampton was unquestionably valid, and the latter, with Martin and Barber, constituted a quorum of the board of commissioners, with the result that action taken by them in meetings of the board regularly held was action by the county.
But, irrespective of the validity of Hampton's appointment, we think that he must be treated as a de facto officer, and that the action taken by him, Martin, and Barber in meetings regularly held is binding upon the county and upon those dealing with it. Hampton was appointed by the lawful appointing power. He took the oath of office and entered upon the discharge of the duties of a commissioner. The only government which the county had for a period of nearly 10 months was that which he and his associates, Martin and Barber, administered. If their action respecting this contract is to be ignored, then, for the same reason, their tax levy for the year must be treated as void, and the many transactions carried through at their 25 meetings, which were not attended by Pruitt, Pratt, or McCollum, must be set aside. This cannot be the law. It ought not be the law anywhere; it certainly is not the law in North Carolina. Section 3204 of the Consolidated Statutes provides:
"3204. Persons admitted to office deemed to hold lawfully. Any person who shall, by the proper authority, be admitted and sworn into any office, shall be held, deemed, and taken, by force of such admission, to be rightfully in such office until, by judicial sentence, upon a proper proceeding, he shall be ousted therefrom, or his admission thereto be, in due course of law, declared void."
In the case of State v. Lewis, 107 N. C. 967, 12 S. E. 457, 458, 13 S. E. 247, 11 L. R. A. 105, the court quotes with approval the widely accepted definition and classification of de facto officers by Chief Justice Butler in the case of State v. Carroll, 38 Conn. 449, 9 Am. Rep. 409, as follows:
"An officer de facto is one whose acts, though not those of a lawful officer, the law, upon principles of policy and justice, will hold valid so far as they involve the interests of the public and third persons, where the duties of the office were exercised — First, without a known appointment or election, [307] but under such circumstances of reputation or acquiescence as were calculated to induce people, without inquiry, to submit to or invoke his action, supposing him to be the officer he assumed to be; second, under color of a known and valid appointment or election, but where the officer failed to conform to some precedent requirement or condition, as to take an oath, give a bond, or the like; third, under color of a known election or appointment, void because there was a want of power in the electing or appointing body, or by reason of some defect or irregularity in its exercise, such ineligibility, want of power, or defect being unknown to the public; fourth, under color of an election or appointment by or pursuant to a public unconstitutional law before the same is adjudged to be such."
It is clear that, if the appointment of Hampton be considered invalid, the case falls under the third class in the above classification; for Hampton was discharging the duties of a county commissioner under color of a known appointment, the invalidity of which, if invalid, arose from a want of power or irregularity unknown to the public. Other North Carolina cases supporting this conclusion are Burke v. Elliott, 26 N. C. 355, 42 Am. Dec. 142; Burton v. Patton, 47 N. C. 124, 62 Am. Dec. 194; Norfleet v. Staton, 73 N. C. 546, 21 Am. Rep. 479; Markham v. Simpson, 175 N. C. 135, 95 S. E. 106; State v. Harden, 177 N. C. 580, 98 S. E. 782; 22 R. C. L. 596, 597. This is not a case like Baker v. Hobgood, 126 N. C. 149, 35 S. E. 253, where there were rival boards, both attempting to discharge the duties of office; for, upon the appointment of Hampton, Pruitt attended no further meetings and left him in the unchallenged possession of the office.
The rule is well settled in North Carolina, as it is elsewhere, that the acts of a de facto officer will be held valid in respect to the public whom he represents and to third persons with whom he deals officially, notwithstanding there was a want of power to appoint him in the person or body which professed to do so. Norfleet v. Staton, supra; Markham v. Simpson, supra; 22 R. C. L. 601, 602, and cases cited.
Coming, then, to the third question — i. e., as to the measure of plaintiff's recovery — we do not think that, after the county had given notice, while the contract was still executory, that it did not desire the bridge built and would not pay for it, plaintiff could proceed to build it and recover the contract price. It is true that the county had no right to rescind the contract, and the notice given plaintiff amounted to a breach on its part; but, after plaintiff had received notice of the breach, it was its duty to do nothing to increase the damages flowing therefrom. If A enters into a binding contract to build a house for B, B, of course, has no right to rescind the contract without A's consent. But if, before the house is built, he decides that he does not want it, and notifies A to that effect, A has no right to proceed with the building and thus pile up damages. His remedy is to treat the contract as broken when he receives the notice, and sue for the recovery of such damages as he may have sustained from the breach, including any profit which he would have realized upon performance, as well as any other losses which may have resulted to him. In the case at bar, the county decided not to build the road of which the bridge was to be a part, and did not build it. The bridge, built in the midst of the forest, is of no value to the county because of this change of circumstances. When, therefore, the county gave notice to the plaintiff that it would not proceed with the project, plaintiff should have desisted from further work. It had no right thus to pile up damages by proceeding with the erection of a useless bridge.
The contrary view was expressed by Lord Cockburn in Frost v. Knight, L. R. 7 Ex. 111, but, as pointed out by Prof. Williston (Williston on Contracts, vol. 3, p. 2347), it is not in harmony with the decisions in this country. The American rule and the reasons supporting it are well stated by Prof. Williston as follows:
"There is a line of cases running back to 1845 which holds that, after an absolute repudiation or refusal to perform by one party to a contract, the other party cannot continue to perform and recover damages based on full performance. This rule is only a particular application of the general rule of damages that a plaintiff cannot hold a defendant liable for damages which need not have been incurred; or, as it is often stated, the plaintiff must, so far as he can without loss to himself, mitigate the damages caused by the defendant's wrongful act. The application of this rule to the matter in question is obvious. If a man engages to have work done, and afterwards repudiates his contract before the work has been begun or when it has been only partially done, it is inflicting damage on the defendant without benefit to the plaintiff to allow the latter to insist on proceeding with the contract. The work may be useless to the defendant, and yet he would be forced to pay the full contract price. On [308] the other hand, the plaintiff is interested only in the profit he will make out of the contract. If he receives this it is equally advantageous for him to use his time otherwise."
The leading case on the subject in this country is the New York case of Clark v. Marsiglia, 1 Denio (N. Y.) 317, 43 Am. Dec. 670. In that case defendant had employed plaintiff to paint certain pictures for him, but countermanded the order before the work was finished. Plaintiff, however, went on and completed the work and sued for the contract price. In reversing a judgment for plaintiff, the court said:
"The plaintiff was allowed to recover as though there had been no countermand of the order; and in this the court erred. The defendant, by requiring the plaintiff to stop work upon the paintings, violated his contract, and thereby incurred a liability to pay such damages as the plaintiff should sustain. Such damages would include a recompense for the labor done and materials used, and such further sum in damages as might, upon legal principles, be assessed for the breach of the contract; but the plaintiff had no right, by obstinately persisting in the work, to make the penalty upon the defendant greater than it would otherwise have been."
And the rule as established by the great weight of authority in America is summed up in the following statement in 6 R. C. L. 1029, which is quoted with approval by the Supreme Court of North Carolina in the recent case of Novelty Advertising Co. v. Farmers' Mut. Tobacco Warehouse Co., 186 N. C. 197, 119 S. E. 196, 198:
"While a contract is executory a party has the power to stop performance on the other side by an explicit direction to that effect, subjecting himself to such damages as will compensate the other party for being stopped in the performance on his part at that stage in the execution of the contract. The party thus forbidden cannot afterwards go on, and thereby increase the damages, and then recover such damages from the other party. The legal right of either party to violate, abandon, or renounce his contract, on the usual terms of compensation to the other for the damages which the law recognizes and allows, subject to the jurisdiction of equity to decree specific performance in proper cases, is universally recognized and acted upon."
This is in accord with the earlier North Carolina decision of Heiser v. Mears, 120 N. C. 443, 27 S. E. 117, in which it was held that, where a buyer countermands his order for goods to be manufactured for him under an executory contract, before the work is completed, it is notice to the seller that he elects to rescind his contract and submit to the legal measure of damages, and that in such case the seller cannot complete the goods and recover the contract price. See, also, Kingman & Co. v. Western Mfg. Co. (C. C. A. 8th) 92 F. 486; Davis v. Bronson, 2 N. D. 300, 50 N. W. 836, 16 L. R. A. 655 and note, 33 Am. St. Rep. 783, and note; Richards v. Manitowoc & Northern Traction Co., 140 Wis. 85, 121 N. W. 837, 133 Am. St. Rep. 1063.
We have carefully considered the cases of Roehm v. Horst, 178 U. S. 1, 20 S. Ct. 780, 44 L. Ed. 953, Roller v. George H. Leonard & Co. (C. C. A. 4th) 229 F. 607, and McCoy v. Justices of Harnett County, 53 N. C. 272, upon which plaintiff relies; but we do not think that they are at all in point. Roehm v. Horst merely follows the rule of Hockster v. De La Tour, 2 El. & Bl. 678, to the effect that where one party to any executory contract refuses to perform in advance of the time fixed for performance, the other party, without waiting for the time of performance, may sue at once for damages occasioned by the breach. The same rule is followed in Roller v. Leonard. In McCoy v. Justices of Harnett County the decision was that mandamus to require the justices of a county to pay for a jail would be denied, where it appeared that the contractor in building same departed from the plans and specifications. In the opinions in all of these some language was used which lends support to plaintiff's position, but in none of them was the point involved which is involved here, viz. whether, in application of the rule which requires that the party to a contract who is not in default do nothing to aggravate the damages arising from breach, he should not desist from performance of an executory contract for the erection of a structure when notified of the other party's repudiation, instead of piling up damages by proceeding with the work. As stated above, we think that reason and authority require that this question be answered in the affirmative. It follows that there was error in directing a verdict for plaintiff for the full amount of its claim. The measure of plaintiff's damage, upon its appearing that notice was duly given not to build the bridge, is an amount sufficient to compensate plaintiff for labor and materials expended and expense incurred in the part performance of the contract, prior to its repudiation, plus the profit which would have been realized if it had been carried out in accordance with its terms. See [309] Novelty Advertising Co. v. Farmers' Mut. Tobacco Warehouse Co., supra.
Our conclusion, on the whole case, is that there was error in failing to strike out the answer of Pruitt, Pratt, and McCollum, and in admitting same as evidence against the county, in excluding the testimony offered by the county to which we have referred, and in directing a verdict for plaintiff. The judgment below will accordingly be reversed, and the case remanded for a new trial.
Reversed.
13.3.2 Maness v. Collins 13.3.2 Maness v. Collins
2010 Tenn. App. LEXIS 719 | 2010 WL 4629614
This document is formatted weirdly. You can read it on westlaw or lexis instead. See Sammie Maness and SKM Wood Products, LLC v. Joannie Collins, Mike Smith, Josh Smith, and SKM, LLC, 2010 Tenn. App. LEXIS 719 | 2010 WL 4629614
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT JACKSON
July 27, 2010 Session
SAMMIE MANESS and SKM WOOD PRODUCTS, LLC
v.
JOANNIE COLLINS, MIKE SMITH, JOSH SMITH and SKM, LLC
Appeal from the Chancery Court for McNairy County
No. 8319 William C. Cole, Chancellor
No. W2008-00941-COA-R3-CV - Filed November 17, 2010
This appeal involves an employment contract. The plaintiff employee owned a
manufacturing business. He sold the business to the defendant new owners, and agreed to
stay on as a management-level employee. To that end, the plaintiff entered into a three-year
employment agreement with the company, and signed a non-competition agreement. After
a few months, the company’s new owners terminated the plaintiff employee on the basis that
he had not fulfilled his job duties. The plaintiff filed this lawsuit against the company and
the new owners, alleging breach of the employment agreement. After a bench trial, the trial
court held that the company breached the employment agreement by terminating the
plaintiff’s employment without cause, finding that one of the new owners prevented the
plaintiff from performing his job duties. However, the trial court declined to award damages
to the plaintiff employee because the plaintiff did not seek other employment, and thus failed
to mitigate his damages. Both parties appeal. We affirm the trial court’s finding that the
company breached the employment agreement, finding that one of the new owners prevented
the plaintiff from performing his job duties, and therefore the plaintiff’s failure to perform
under the employment agreement was excused. We reverse the trial court’s holding on
mitigation of damages, finding that the defendant company and the new owners were
required to prove the availability of suitable and comparable substitute employment, and
failed to do so.
Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed in
Part, Reversed in Part and Remanded
H OLLY M. K IRBY, J.,, delivered the opinion of the Court, in which D AVID R. F ARMER, J., and
J. S TEVEN S TAFFORD, J., joined.
Terry L. Wood, Wilson, Hunton & Wood, P.A., Corinth, Mississippi, for Plaintiff/ Appellant,
Sammie Maness and SKM Wood Products, LLC.
Terry Abernathy, Selmer, Tennessee, for Defendants/Appellees, Joannie Collins, Mike
Smith, Josh Smith, and SKM, LLC.
OPINION
F ACTS AND P ROCEEDINGS BELOW
Plaintiff/Appellant Sammie Maness (“Maness”), in his 50s at all pertinent times, lived most
of his life in McNairy County, Tennessee. Much of his work life was spent doing hourly
work, such as construction, maintenance, working as a mill operator, or working as a
carpenter. In 1997, Maness incorporated his own wood manufacturing business in
Adamsville, Tennessee, making table tops for a local sewing company. For a couple of
years, Maness worked part-time for his new business. In time, the sewing company business
diminished, but Maness’s new company began making wooden bases and support parts for
bath tubs for Aqua Glass, a local company whose business apparently involved
manufacturing bath tubs. As the work from Aqua Glass increased, by 1999, Maness’s
company became his full-time occupation. In 2001, Maness’s manufacturing company,
Plaintiff SKM Wood Products, LLC (“ SKM”), moved to a new facility in Adamsville.
Within several years, SKM grew to have annual sales of several million dollars, with
approximately twenty-five employees. SKM’s primary customer remained bath tub
manufacturer Aqua Glass.
In 2005, Defendant/Appellee Joannie Collins (“Collins”) approached Maness about the
possibility of purchasing SKM.1 After several meetings, Collins told Maness that her
brother-in-law, Defendant/Appellee Mike Smith (“Mike Smith”), and his son, Collins’
nephew, Defendant/ Appellee Josh Smith (“Josh Smith”), would be her partners in
purchasing and operating the business. Mike Smith took the lead role in negotiating the sale.
Not long before the negotiations began, Josh Smith was hospitalized for treatment for drug
addiction issues; this fact was not disclosed to Maness during the negotiations.
The three purchasers expected to take on different roles in the newly acquired business.
Collins, a certified public accountant, expected to maintain her full-time employment as a
financial advisor and handle the new business’s payroll and financial matters on a part-time
1
Collins had been a friend of Maness’s deceased wife. Maness had known both Collins and Mike Smith for
many years. Prior to 2005, Collins and Mike Smith, with others, approached Maness about investing in
SKM, but nothing was done at that time.
-2-
basis. Similarly, Mike Smith expected to keep his full-time employment elsewhere and work
part-time at SKM. Josh Smith had a college degree in business and marketing and had
worked for a woodworking company; he was expected to be the “managing member,” that
is, to work full-time at SKM, supervising and managing the day-to-day operations. Part of
Mike Smith’s motivation in acquiring SKM was to have a business for Josh Smith as well
as his other son. All parties expected that, after the acquisition, Maness would remain with
SKM as an employee.
In anticipation of the acquisition, in the fall of 2005, Josh Smith was hired by SKM and
began working under Maness’s supervision. Maness was somewhat disappointed by Josh
Smith’s job performance at that point, but the record does not indicate that he voiced any
concerns about Josh Smith to any of the purchasers.
On January 13, 2006, the parties executed an asset purchase agreement under which SKM’s
assets were sold to SKM, LLC, with Collins, Mike Smith, and Josh Smith as guarantors.2
Part of the total $1,300,000 purchase price was paid by a $300,000 promissory note
guaranteed by Collins, Mike Smith, and Josh Smith. The new ownership of SKM was
structured such that Collins owned one-third, Mike Smith owned one-third, and Josh Smith
owned one-third.
The asset purchase agreement provided for SKM to employ Maness for three years, at an
annual salary of $67,600. It stated:
As an integral part of this Agreement, the Purchaser [SKM, LLC] agrees to
employ Sammie Maness, with the beginning date of such employment to be
the date of the closing of this transaction for a period thereafter of not less than
three (3) years, provided that the Company shall maintain the current sales
volume and for so long as the Company shall not suffer any material
interruption of its business by causes beyond its control. During the term of
Maness’ employment, he shall generally serve as the Company’s Production
Manager and shall be paid an annual salary of Sixty-Seven Thousand Six
Hundred Dollars ($67,600.00). . . .
2
After the acquisition, the name of the business was changed to SKM, LLC. For simplicity, in this opinion,
we shall continue to refer to the business as “SKM.”
-3-
Attached to the asset purchase agreement was a job description for Maness as an employee
of SKM.3
On the same day, in conjunction with the asset purchase agreement, Maness also signed a
non-competition and non-solicitation agreement. The non-competition provision stated that
Maness would not:
...for a period of five (5) years following his termination of employment, for
whatever reasons, with SKM, LLC by himself or by or through any other
person or entity, whether as a shareholder, owner partner, joint venturer,
employee, agent, contractor, consultant, directly or indirectly compete with the
Company within the Restricted Area. The “Restricted Area” shall mean within
the continental United States of America.
Thus, the noncompetition agreement had a geographic area of the entire continental United
States, for a time period of five years after Maness’s employment with SKM ended.
On the effective date of the asset purchase agreement, in mid-January 2006, Maness began
his employment as SKM’s Production Manager. As expected, Collins and Mike Smith
worked at SKM no more than a few hours per week. Josh Smith worked full-time at SKM.
At the time of the purchase, most of SKM’s sales came from customer Aqua Glass. A
primary aim of purchasers Collins, Mike Smith and Josh Smith was to bring in additional
customers and to diversify SKM’s customer base.
Initially, the parties’ working relationship was reasonably harmonious. However, conflicts
quickly arose. As Maness continued to discipline employees as he always had, the new
owners perceived his interactions with the employees as unacceptably confrontational.
Maness felt that, under the new ownership, SKM’s employees became increasingly
disrespectful toward him.
3
The job description states that Maness was to:
Schedule the cutting department;
Work with Josh Smith on purchasing and scheduling incoming materials;
Coordinate maintenance on all equipment, forklifts, and vehicles;
Work with Chad Smith on maintenance and training on safety and OSHA compliance;
Work with Josh Smith, so he can schedule the frame-line, panel saw, and CNC;
Work on special projects;
Work with Josh Smith on developing new business; and
Train all new hires.
-4-
The problems came to a head in March 2006, when Maness fired an employee after a heated
confrontation in which the employee spoke to Maness in a manner that he perceived as
disrespectful of his authority. Afterward, the new owners admonished Maness for the
termination and rehired the employee. The new owners indicated to Maness that he did not
have the authority to discharge employees.
Maness’s working relationship with the new owners deteriorated precipitously after that. By
all accounts, Maness became unhappy and did much less work, spending considerable time
in his office, essentially idle. The parties disputed the reason for Maness’s behavior.
Finally, on May 16, 2006, the new owners terminated Maness’s employment with SKM. As
reason for termination, the termination notice stated: “Have not fulfilled job duties, according
to our original agreement, your actions and attitude have been detrimental to the success of
this Company.”
On July 6, 2006, Maness filed a lawsuit in the Chancery Court of McNairy County against
Collins, Mike Smith, Josh Smith, and SKM, LLC.4 The complaint alleged breach of
Maness’s employment agreement, and asserted that the non-competition agreement was
unenforceable. The complaint sought a judgment for the unpaid compensation under
Maness’s employment contract, pre-judgment interest, post-judgment interest, attorney fees
and costs, as well as a declaration that the non-competition agreement was unenforceable.
SKM, Collins, Mike Smith, and Josh Smith filed an answer to the complaint, asserting that
Maness’s employment was terminated for legal and justifiable cause, and that the non-
competition agreement was valid and enforceable. Discovery ensued.
The trial court conducted a bench trial over two days in March 2008, specifically March 17
and 28, 2008. The trial court heard testimony from Maness, Mike Smith, Collins, and Josh
Smith, as well as some former and current employees of SKM.
Maness testified at the outset of the trial. Prior to the acquisition, Maness said, Josh Smith
was not a particularly good employee, but Maness was able to work with him on some tasks.
After the acquisition, as Maness would walk through the plant correcting employees on
transgressions such as safety violations, Maness noticed that the employees acted in an
increasingly disrespectful and belligerent manner towards him. After Maness fired the
4
In the complaint, SKM Wood Products, LLC was also a Plaintiff; it sought acceleration of the payments due
under the promissory note. The claim on the promissory note was the only claim asserted by SKM Wood
Products, LLC. This claim was dismissed by the trial court at the conclusion of the Plaintiff’s proof and is
not an issue in this appeal. Thus, SKM Wood Products, LLC raises no issues in this appeal.
-5-
disrespectful problem employee and the new owners reinstated him, Maness said, he told the
new owners that they had undercut his authority. Maness said that the new owners responded
by telling him that he no longer had the authority to discipline or terminate employees.
After that, Maness claimed, Josh Smith held a meeting with the SKM employees in which
he told them that Maness no longer had any authority to correct employees or tell them what
to do. Josh Smith did not inform Maness of this meeting. Maness alleged that “every time
[he] tried to do anything, correct people, quality, safety or anything, [he] was told that wasn’t
[his] job, [and] not to do it.” When he complained, Maness claimed, Mike Smith told him
to just stay in his office at his desk and draw his money.
Subsequently, on an occasion when Maness came to SKM at an unusually early hour, he
observed Josh Smith in what appeared to be a drug transaction. He told Collins what he had
seen. Not long after that, the new owners terminated Maness’s employment.
On cross-examination, Maness conceded that the new owners told him that his management
style was too confrontational; Maness disagreed with their characterization. He also admitted
that the new owners wanted to expand SKM’s customer base beyond Aqua Glass, and that
he did not care about such expansion.
Since his employment with SKM ended, Maness said, he had not been employed. Maness
conceded that, after his termination, he did not seek new employment, but instead focused
on building a new house for himself.
After Maness’s testimony, a former SKM employee testified that Josh Smith talked with him
about ideas for getting Maness to leave SKM. The former employee corroborated Maness’s
testimony that Josh Smith held a meeting at which SKM employees were told that Maness
was no longer an owner, so they did not need to listen to him. Another former SKM
employee testified that, several weeks after the acquisition, Josh Smith told employees that
Maness would not be with SKM much longer. Both former employees described Josh
Smith’s extensive drug use while on the job at SKM and his drug transactions with SKM
employees. That concluded Maness’s case-in-chief.
Collins and Mike Smith both testified that the working relationship with Maness started
amicably, but soon inexplicably deteriorated. Both acknowledged that their work time at the
SKM plant was limited; for information on Maness’s job performance, they relied in part on
Josh Smith and others. Prior to the acquisition, neither Collins nor Mike Smith were aware
that Josh Smith had undergone treatment for drug addiction. Both Collins and Mike Smith
received some indication, only shortly before Maness’s termination, that Josh Smith was
using drugs; however, neither was aware of the extent of the younger Smith’s drug problem
-6-
until after Maness was let go. At the time Maness’s employment was terminated, neither
were aware of reports that Josh Smith had tried to get rid of Maness or that he had held a
meeting with employees to tell them that they need not listen to Maness; in their testimony,
neither would concede that such a meeting in fact occurred.
Collins and Mike Smith both testified that Maness was resistant to the new owners’ efforts
to get customers beyond Aqua Glass. Both maintained that, after SKM decided to rehire the
problem employee whom Maness had fired, Maness’s work attitude soured and he essentially
stopped working. Collins testified that Maness “sulked up like an old possum.” Mike Smith
denied telling Maness to just sit in his office and draw his pay. Both Collins and Mike Smith
insisted that there was just cause to terminate Maness’s employment.
Josh Smith testified as well. He said that his drug problems begin in 2005, and that he was
addicted to a variety of drugs, prescription and otherwise. He underwent treatment for
substance abuse in September 2005, shortly before he began working for SKM.5 To his
knowledge, neither his father, Mike Smith, nor his aunt, Collins, nor Maness were aware of
his past substance abuse. Josh Smith admitted that he used drugs on the premises of SKM
throughout his employment there. He denied buying or selling drugs on the premises of
SKM, and maintained that his drug use did not affect his work performance.
In his testimony, Josh Smith denied having a meeting with the SKM employees in which
he told them that they were no longer required to listen to Maness, and he denied asking
employees to help him get rid of Maness. He maintained that Maness was often
confrontational with the employees, and that Maness made no attempt to get new customers.
After the new owners rehired the employee Maness had fired, Josh Smith testified, Maness
did little work, and began spending most of his work time in his office playing solitaire, and
repeatedly asking Collins, Mike Smith, and Josh Smith to buy out the remainder of his
contract. Josh Smith confirmed that, at this point, he did not want Maness dealing directly
with the employees. He testified that the decision to terminate Maness’s employment was
made by he, Collins and Mike Smith together, and that the decision was not made hastily.6
At the conclusion of the testimony, the trial court issued an oral ruling. At the outset of its
ruling, the trial court noted that no proof had been presented on the enforceability of the
noncompete agreement. Consequently, Maness’s claim for declaratory relief on the
noncompetition agreement was dismissed without prejudice. The trial court then addressed
5
Josh Smith did not complete the recommended drug treatment at that time.
6
By the time of trial, Josh Smith was enrolled in a drug treatment program and had been drug-free for many
months.
-7-
whether the defendants had breached the employment agreement by terminating Maness’s
employment.
The trial judge found that Josh Smith was responsible for the daily operations of SKM, and
that he suffered from “extreme drug addiction.” It found that Maness’s work performance
was generally satisfactory until the new owners rescinded Maness’s firing of the problem
employee. After that, the trial court said, “everything went downhill.” The trial judge
credited the testimony of witnesses who testified that, unbeknownst to Mike Smith and
Collins, Josh Smith attempted to undercut Maness’s authority and to have Maness’s
employment terminated. The trial judge observed that Maness, by “sulk[ing] up and sitting
at a desk, and saying send me home,” conducted himself in a less-than-professional manner,
but the trial judge noted as well that Maness was dealing daily with “a drug-addicted business
owner,” namely, Josh Smith. The trial court found that the defendants did not meet their
burden of proof to show just cause for terminating Maness’s employment under the
employment agreement.
Regarding the issue of damages, the trial court noted that, after his termination, Maness spent
a year building a house and did not take any action to seek employment. The trial court
found that Maness, as a wrongfully terminated employee, had a duty to mitigate his damages,
but instead took no action. At that point, the trial court asked the attorneys for argument on
the issue of mitigation of damages. Maness’s attorney argued that the defendants’ attorney
had the burden to show that there was comparable, suitable employment available to Maness,
had he looked for a job. Especially in light of the noncompetition agreement, he contended,
the defendants’ burden was not met. In response, the defendants’ attorney argued that, since
Maness made no effort to find work, employer SKM had no obligation to show the
availability of substantially similar employment in the geographic area. After hearing the
arguments, the trial judge determined that, in light of Maness’s failure to make any effort to
find work, Maness failed to mitigate his damages. It concluded that Maness’s failure to
mitigate damages prohibited any award for damages.
On April 21, 2008, the trial court entered a written order, attaching a transcript of its prior
oral ruling. It found that the defendants did not have cause to terminate Maness’s
employment, but that Maness failed to mitigate his damages. Thus, it awarded Maness no
damages.
Maness now appeals, and Collins, Mike Smith, and Josh Smith cross-appeal.
-8-
ISSUES ON A PPEAL AND S TANDARD OF R EVIEW
On appeal, SKM, Collins, Mike Smith, and Josh Smith argue that the trial court erred in
finding that Maness was terminated from his employment with SKM without cause. Maness
asserts on appeal that the trial court erred in considering the affirmative defense of mitigation
of damages when neither SKM nor the new owners asserted, either in their pleadings or at
trial, that Maness had a duty to mitigate his damages. In addition, Maness argues that the
trial court erred in denying Maness damages when SKM and the new owners produced no
evidence that comparable employment was available to Maness.
On appeal, the trial court’s findings of fact are reviewed de novo with a presumption of
correctness, unless the evidence preponderates to the contrary. T ENN. R.A PP. P. 13(d). To
the extent that a trial court’s factual determinations were based on its assessment of witness
credibility, this Court will not reevaluate that assessment absent clear and convincing
evidence to the contrary. Jones v. Barrett, 92 S.W.3d 835, 838 (Tenn. 2002). The trial court’s conclusions of law are reviewed de novo with no presumption of correctness. Nashville Ford Tractor, Inc. v. Great American Insurance Co.,194 S.W.3d 415
, 425 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) (citing Johnson v. Johnson,37 S.W.3d 892
, 894 (Tenn. 2001); Nutt v. Champion Int’l Corp.,980 S.W.2d 365
, 367 (Tenn. 1998).
A NALYSIS
Breach of Employment Contract
We consider first the issue raised on appeal by SKM, Collins, Mike Smith, and Josh Smith,
that the trial court erred in determining that SKM breached the employment agreement with
Maness by terminating Maness’s employment without cause. They assert that Maness was
terminated for cause, citing the description of good cause for termination contained in Biggs
v. Reinsman Equestrian Products, Inc., 169 S.W.3d 218, 221 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004) (citing Video Catalog Channel, Inc. v. Blackwelder, No. 03A01-9705-CH-00155,1997 WL 581120
(Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 19, 1997) (“good cause exists . . . where the discharge is objectively
reasonable.”).
SKM, Collins, Mike Smith, and Josh Smith acknowledge that the trial court’s finding of no
cause was based in part on the trial court’s assessment of the credibility of the witnesses.
They argue that Josh Smith’s admitted drug use was no excuse for Maness to “sulk” and
refuse to do his job. Relying on Maness’s own testimony and the testimony of witnesses
credited by the trial court, they argue that the undisputed proof shows that Maness utilized
an inappropriately confrontational management style when dealing with SKM employees,
and that he spent most of his time at work doing nothing or playing games on his computer.
-9-
They assert that Maness’s “failure to perform express or implied duties” gave SKM the right
to terminate his employment contract for cause, prior to the expiration of its term, without
incurring liability, citing Biggs, 169 S.W.3d at 221. They also contend that Maness’s
conduct amounted to job-related grounds for termination of his employment, which also
constitutes cause. They cite Lawrence v. Rollins, No. M1997-002233-COA-R3-CV, 2001
WL 76266(Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 30, 2001), in support. Tennessee has long adhered to the doctrine of employment-at-will, which recognizes the right of either the employer or the employee to terminate the employment relationship at any time, for good cause, bad cause, or no cause at all, without being guilty of a legal wrong. Guy v. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co., 79 S.w.3d 528, 534-35 (Tenn. 2002); Cummings, Inc. v. Dorgan,320 S.W.3d 316
, 332 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009). In Tennessee, employees are presumed to be employed at will in the absence of an agreement for employment for a term certain. Cummings, Inc., 320 S.W.3d at 332; King v. TFE, Inc.,15 S.W.3d 457
, 460 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999). In this case, Maness’s employment with SKM is governed by Article 8 of the asset purchase agreement, which provides for Maness’s employment as a Production Manager for SKM. Generally, the interpretation of a contract is a question of law, subject to de novo review. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Watson,195 S.W.3d 609
, 611 (Tenn. 2006); Cummings, 320 S.W.3d at 333. The interpretation of contracts is governed by well-settled principles. “[T]he cardinal rule for interpretation of contracts is to ascertain the intention of the parties and to give effect to that intention as best can be done consistent with legal principles.” Cummings, 320 S.W.3d at 333 (quoting Petty v. Sloan,277 S.W.2d 355
, 360 (Tenn. 1955)). We ascertain the parties’ intent from what was “actually embodied and expressed in the instrument as written.” Petty, 277 S.W.2d at 361. In the case at bar, the asset purchase agreement provides for Maness’s employment by SKM for a term of three years. Often, an employment contract for a term certain will expressly provide that the employee may be terminated “for cause” or “for good cause.” See, e.g., Worley v. Lister Distribution, Inc., No. E2005-02932-COA-R3-CV,2006 WL 1684748
(Tenn. Ct. App. June 20, 2006). In this case, the employment agreement contains no such
language. It states only that SKM “agrees to employ [Maness] for a period . . . of not less
than three (3) years . . . .” The only stated proviso to SKM’s obligation to employ Maness
is that SKM maintain its sales volume and not suffer any “material interruption of its
business.” The record contains no indication of a business interruption for SKM, and the
trial court specifically found that SKM’s sales volume had increased. The contract indicates
no other circumstance under which SKM is relieved of its obligation to employ Maness for
the mandated term. Thus, under the plain language of the employment agreement, SKM had
an essentially unqualified obligation to employ Maness for a period of three years, at a salary
-10-
of $67,600 per year. In general, courts will not rewrite an agreement and “will not relieve
parties of their contractual obligations simply because these obligations later prove to be
burdensome or unwise.” Wages v. Life Care Centers of America, Inc., No. 2006-01054-
COA-R3-CV, 2007 WL 4224723, at *11 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2007) (quoting Vargo v. Lincoln Brass Works, Inc.,115 S.W.3d 487
, 492 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003)). However, there is authority in Tennessee to the effect that, even where an employment agreement is for a definite term, the employer may nevertheless discharge the employee for just cause. See Trabue, Inc. v. Professional Management-Automotive, Inc.,589 S.W.2d 661
, 663 (Tenn. 1970); Curtis v. Reeves,736 S.W.2d 108
, 110-11 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987) (citing Trabue). Thus, we assume that, despite the unambiguous language in Maness’s employment agreement, SKM retained the right to terminate his employment for just cause. As noted by SKM and the new owners, the trial court found that Maness “was sulked up and sitting at a desk,” and “saying send me home.” We agree that this indicates that Maness did not perform his job duties under the employment contract. Viewed in isolation, this could be seen as cause for termination under the caselaw cited by SKM, Collins, Mike Smith, and Josh Smith. See Biggs, 169 S.W.3d at 221 (“Sub-performance that compromises the employer’s interest or impedes the company’s progress will justify the termination for cause.”) (citations omitted); Lawrence,2001 WL 76266
, at *5 (“poor job performance, or failure in the execution of assigned duties,” may constitute cause for termination.) (citation omitted). The trial court, however, did not view Maness’s actions in isolation; rather, it viewed Maness’s failure to perform his function as Production Manager in the context of the workplace disruption it found that Josh Smith created. Specifically, the trial court noted that Maness dealt each day with an owner, Josh Smith, who undercut Maness’s authority as a manager, tried to “foment dissent with the employees,” sought Maness’s removal, and generally prevented him from effectively carrying out his job duties. On this basis, the trial court held that SKM, Collins, Mike Smith, and Josh Smith did not meet their burden of proof to show cause for the termination of Maness’s employment. Our courts have recognized that each party to a contract is “under an implied obligation to restrain from doing any act that would delay or prevent the other party’s performance of the contract” and that “[e]ach party has the right to proceed free of hindrance by the other party.” ACG, Inc. v. Southeast Elevator, Inc.,912 S.W.2d 163
, 168 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995). In German v. Ford,300 S.W.3d 692
, 706 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009), this Court elaborated on this
principle:
-11-
[E]very contract imposes on the parties a duty of good faith and fair dealing
in its performance. R ESTATEMENT (S ECOND) OF C ONTRACTS § 205 (1981).
For example, every contract includes an implied condition that one party will
not prevent performance by the other party. See Moody Realty Co. v. Huestis,
237 S.W.3d 666, 678 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007) (citation omitted). This is easily
seen where the prevention of the other party’s performance takes the form of
active hindrance:
In any kind of contract, if the right of one party to compensation is conditional
upon the rendition of some service or other performance by him . . ., it is
nearly always a breach of contract for the other party to act so as to prevent .
. . the performance of the condition. It is a breach of duty, only because the
court finds a promise by implication not to prevent or hinder.
6 A RTHUR L INTON C ORBIN, C ORBIN ON C ONTRACTS § 571 (Interim ed.). See
Frank Fitzgerald, Inc. v. Pacella Bros., 310 N.E.2d 379, 381 (Mass. App. Ct.
1974) (holding that the subcontractor had a right to recover from the general
contractor under the contract despite the subcontractor’s failure to fully
perform because the subcontractor’s work was halted by an agent of the
general contractor). Where the plaintiff’s performance has been wrongfully
prevented or hindered by the conduct of the defendant, “[o]nly the law of the
jungle would say that plaintiff’s failure to perform should not be excused.”
P ERILLO, supra, § 11.28.
German v. Ford, 300 S.W.3d at 706. The German Court noted the consequence of such
active hindrance of the other party’s performance of his contractual obligations: “[A]ctive
prevention of another’s performance . . . may excuse performance by the other party.” Id.
at 707; accord, United States v. Peck, 102 U.S. 64, 66,1880 WL 18883
, at ** 1 (1880) (“the
conduct of one party to a contract which prevents the other from performing his part is an
excuse for non-performance.”). If performance under the contract is excused, it means that
even if performance of the plaintiff’s contractual obligation “did not take place, the plaintiff
may recover on the contract provided it is proved that plaintiff would have been ready,
willing and able to perform but for the prevention.” JOSEPH M. P ERILLO, C ALAMARI AND
P ERILLO ON CONTRACTS 453-54 ThomsonWest (5th ed. 2003) (emphasis in original).
In the instant case, the trial court made a factual finding that Josh Smith’s actions effectively
prevented Maness from functioning as a Production Manager for SKM. This factual finding
hinged on the trial court’s assessment of the witnesses’ credibility. Josh Smith’s disavowal
of any such actions was not credited by the trial court. Instead, the testimony of Maness and
the former SKM employees, that Josh Smith fomented dissent against Maness, undercut his
-12-
authority, and sought to get rid of him, was credited. On appeal, the appellate court is
obliged to give great deference to the trial court’s assessment of the witnesses’ credibility.
Cornelius v. DCS, 314 S.W.3d 902, 907 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009) (citing McCaleb v. Saturn Corp.,910 S.W.2d 412
, 415 (Tenn. 1995). According appropriate deference to the
credibility determinations of the trial court below, we find that the trial court’s factual
findings in this regard are supported by the preponderance of the evidence. Under these
circumstances, if Josh Smith prevented Maness from performing his job duties under the
employment agreement, then Maness’s performance was excused. This means that SKM
and the new owners were without cause to terminate his employment, and that Maness may
recover under the contract. Therefore, we affirm the finding of the trial court that Maness
was terminated from his employment without cause.
Mitigation of Damages
Maness asserts on appeal that the trial court erred in applying the affirmative defense of
mitigation of damages, when there was no claim either in the pleadings or during the trial that
Maness had a duty to mitigate his damages and failed to do so. In response, Collins, Mike
Smith, and Josh Smith argue that, under Rule 15.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil
Procedure, the issue was tried by express or implied consent. See Farrar v. Farrar, 553
S.W.2d 741, 744 (Tenn. 1977). On the substantive issue of mitigation of damages, Maness asserts that the trial court erred in declining to award Maness damages where there was no evidence at trial that comparable, suitable employment was available to Maness. Maness maintains that, under Frye v. Memphis State Univ.,806 S.W.2d 170
(Tenn. 1991), it would have been futile for Maness to seek other employment. Id. at 173. He contends that the noncompetition agreement, prohibiting employment with a competitor anywhere in the United States for a period of five years, prevented him from seeking comparable employment. Maness asserts that, under Frye, “the employer must prove both the availability of suitable and comparable substitute employment and a lack of reasonable diligence on the part of the employee.” Id. (citing Raismas v. Michigan Dept. of Mental Health,714 F.2d 614
, 624 (6th
Cir. 1983). Maness argues that at no point during the trial did SKM and the new owners offer
evidence of comparable, suitable employment for Maness.
In response, SKM and the new owners note that, without question, Maness had a duty to
mitigate his damages, and that it is undisputed that he made no effort whatsoever to find
substitute employment. They acknowledge candidly that they offered no proof of suitable,
comparable alternative employment available to Maness. They argue somewhat hopefully
on appeal that this case would be an excellent opportunity for this Court to adopt the
-13-
exception noted in the case of Barnes v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., No. W2000-01607-
COA-RM-CV, 2001 WL 568033 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 25, 2001). In Barnes, the Court
stated:
Some courts have carved out another exception to the general rule, holding that
an employer is released from the duty to prove the availability of substantially
equivalent employment if the employer proves that an employee has not made
any reasonable efforts to obtain such work . . . . This exception has not been
addressed in Tennessee.
Id. at *6 (citations omitted). The Barnes Court declined to adopt the exception based on the
facts in that case. Id. at *7.
In the alternative, SKM and the new owners argue that Maness should be bound by the
following language in the noncompetition agreement: “Maness acknowledges that his skills
are such that he could easily find alternative, commensurate employment or work that would
not violate the provisions of this Agreement. . . .”
In the instant case, Maness seeks damages for the breach of his employment contract; he
contends that, had his employment not been wrongfully terminated, he would have been paid
the agreed-upon salary for three years. “Although liability for breach of contract is primarily
based on a no-fault principle, . . . a party who has been wronged by a breach of contract may
not unreasonably sit idly by and allow damages to accumulate.” P ERILLO, supra, at 584.
This is the doctrine of avoidable consequences, often referred to as the plaintiff’s obligation
to mitigate his damages. See 22 A M. J UR.2 D Damages §§ 340, 345, 360 (2010). Thus, where
a party seeks damages for breach of contract, courts will enforce the plaintiff’s duty to
mitigate or reduce his damages incurred after the other party’s breach. See Feldman 22
T ENN. P RAC. C ONTRACT L AW AND P RACTICE § 2:32 (2010). In the context of the breach of
an employment contract by the employer, the terminated employee’s damages “consist of
compensation that the employee who has been wrongfully discharged would have received
if the contract had been carried out according to its terms, provided that the employee has
been unable to find comparable employment . . . .” 22 A M.J UR.2d § 101 (2010). See Frye,
806 S.W.2d at 173. See also Denney v. Lovett, No. M2004-03020-COA-R3-CV, 2006 WL
1915303, at *9 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 11, 2006).
The failure to mitigate damages is an affirmative defense. Id. In Tennessee, “the employer
must prove both availability of suitable and comparable substitute employment and a lack of
reasonable diligence on the part of the employee.” Frye, 806 S.W.2d at 173. In light of their
failure to proffer evidence of suitable comparable substitute employment for Maness, SKM
and the new owners urge this Court to adopt the exception referred to in Barnes. We must
-14-
respectfully decline to do so. First, adopting such an exception renders problematic the
calculation of the plaintiff employee’s damages. The plaintiff’s failure to mitigate his
damages does not per se preclude him from recovering any damages whatsoever; rather,
“recovery is diminished only to the extent that the plaintiff fails to mitigate the damages as
they would be mitigated by an ordinary, reasonable person under similar circumstances.” 22
A M. J UR.2d § 336 (2010). Thus, only the amount that the plaintiff would have earned in the
exercise of reasonable diligence is applied to reduce his contractual damages. See, e.g.,
Barnes, 2001 WL 568033, at *5 (“A back pay award must be reduced by any . . . amounts that [the employee] could have earned had the employee exercised reasonable diligence.”) (citations omitted). Therefore, the plaintiff is precluded from recovering damages only if the proof shows that the amount he would have earned in the exercise of reasonable diligence equaled or exceeded the amount he would have earned under the original employment agreement. See, e.g., Denney,2006 WL 1915303
, at *10. If no proof of comparable, suitable substitute employment is presented to the trial court, then the trial court has no basis on which to determine the amount by which the plaintiff’s damages should be reduced.7 In the alternative, SKM and the new owners argue that the language in the noncompetition agreement, in which Maness “acknowledges . . . that he could easily find alternative, commensurate employment or work,” relieves them of the burden of proving suitable, comparable substitute employment for the purpose of mitigation of damages. First, this argument was not raised in the trial court, and consequently cannot appropriately be raised for the first time on appeal. See Coleman Management, Inc. v. Meyer,304 S.W.3d 340
, 355 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009). Here, not only was the argument not raised to the trial court, but in this case the trial court expressly declined to consider the noncompetition agreement or Maness’s request for declaratory relief that it was unenforceable.8 7 Thus, in the absence of supporting evidence, the trial court below clearly erred in holding that Maness’s alleged failure to mitigate precluded him from any award of damages at all. 8 Such circumstances present particular problems where, as here, the noncompetition agreement is likely unenforceable. While it is conceivable that a draconian noncompetition agreement such as the one in this case might be enforceable in a case involving a high-level executive with a global corporation, it is difficult to imagine that a 25-employee manufacturing company could assert a protectable business interest that would justify a noncompetition agreement with a geographic area of the entire United States for a time period of five years. See generally, Columbus Med. Serv., LLC v. Thomas,308 S.W.3d 368
(Tenn. Ct. App. 2009); Corbin v. Tom Lange Co., Inc., No. M2002-01162-COA-R3-CV,2003 WL 22843167
(Tenn. Ct. App. Dec.
1, 2003).
-15-
Moreover, whatever the effect of such a provision in the consideration of whether the
noncompetition agreement is enforceable,9 it does not obviate the need for the employer to
submit evidence of suitable, comparable employment to prove the plaintiff’s failure to
mitigate damages. As noted above, the plaintiff’s recovery is only diminished by the amount
he would have earned in the exercise of reasonable diligence. A contractual
acknowledgement that he could find “alternative, commensurate employment or work” is not
equivalent to a stipulation that Maness would have earned compensation that equaled or
exceeded the compensation he would have received pursuant to the employment agreement
with SKM. Thus, even if the trial court had been presented with this argument, consideration
of the language in the noncompete provision would not have enabled the trial court to
determine the amount by which Maness’s damages should be reduced. Therefore, in the
absence of evidence that suitable alternative employment was available to Maness, SKM and
new owners Collins, Mike Smith, and Josh Smith cannot rely on the affirmative defense of
mitigation of damages.
This holding pretermits the issue of whether the issue of mitigation of damages was tried by
implied consent.
C ONCLUSION
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s holding that the termination of Maness’s employment
was a breach of the employment provisions contained in Article 8 of the parties’ asset
purchase agreement. We reverse the trial court’s holding that Maness’s failure to mitigate
his damages precludes him from recovering any damages for the breach of his employment
contract. The cause must be remanded to the trial court for entry of judgment in favor of
Maness and for calculation of Maness’s damages resulting from the breach of Article 8 of
the asset purchase agreement. The Appellees, having failed to offer proof of suitable
alternative employment available to Maness in the proceedings below, are precluded on
remand from submitting such proof. Otherwise, the trial court may consider any other
matters which the trial court, in its discretion, deems it necessary to consider.
The decision of the trial court is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded, as set forth
above. Cost on appeal are to be taxed to Appellees SKM, LLC, Joannie Collins, Mike Smith,
and Josh Smith, for which execution may issue, if necessary.
_______________________________________
HOLLY M. KIRBY, JUDGE
9
We expressly do not address this issue in this appeal.
-16-
13.3.3 Restatement (Second) Contracts § 350 13.3.3 Restatement (Second) Contracts § 350
§ 350 Avoidability as a Limitation on Damages
-
(1) Except as stated in Subsection (2), damages are not recoverable for loss that the injured party could have avoided without undue risk, burden or humiliation.
-
(2) The injured party is not precluded from recovery by the rule stated in Subsection (1) to the extent that he has made reasonable but unsuccessful efforts to avoid loss.
13.3.4 Parker v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. 13.3.4 Parker v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp.
SHIRLEY MacLAINE PARKER, Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
TWENTIETH CENTURY-FOX FILM CORPORATION, Defendant and Appellant.
Supreme Court of California. In Bank.
COUNSEL
Musick, Peeler & Garrett and Bruce A. Bevan, Jr., for Defendant and Appellant.
Benjamin Neuman for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
BURKE, J.
Defendant Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corporation appeals from a summary judgment granting to plaintiff the recovery of agreed compensation under a written contract for her services as an actress in a motion picture. As will appear, we have concluded that the trial court correctly ruled in plaintiff's favor and that the judgment should be affirmed.
Plaintiff is well known as an actress, and in the contract between plaintiff and defendant is sometimes referred to as the "Artist." Under the contract, dated August 6, 1965, plaintiff was to play the female lead in defendant's contemplated production of a motion picture entitled "Bloomer Girl." The contract provided that defendant would pay plaintiff a minimum "guaranteed compensation" of $53,571.42 per week for 14 weeks commencing May 23, 1966, for a total of $750,000. Prior to May 1966 defendant decided not to produce the picture and by a letter dated April 4, 1966, it notified plaintiff of that decision and that it would not "comply with our obligations to you under" the written contract.
By the same letter and with the professed purpose "to avoid any damage to you," defendant instead offered to employ plaintiff as the leading actress in another film tentatively entitled "Big Country, Big Man" (hereinafter, "Big Country"). The compensation offered was identical, as were 31 of the 34 numbered provisions or articles of the original contract.[1] Unlike "Bloomer Girl," however, which was to have been a musical production, "Big Country" was a dramatic "western type" movie. "Bloomer Girl" was to have been filmed in California; "Big Country" was to be produced in Australia. Also, certain terms in the proffered contract varied from those of the original.[2] Plaintiff was given one week within which to accept; she did not and the offer lapsed. Plaintiff then commenced this action seeking recovery of the agreed guaranteed compensation.
The complaint sets forth two causes of action. The first is for money due under the contract; the second, based upon the same allegations as the first, is for damages resulting from defendant's breach of contract. Defendant in its answer admits the existence and validity of the contract, that plaintiff complied with all the conditions, covenants and promises and stood ready to complete the performance, and that defendant breached and "anticipatorily repudiated" the contract. It denies, however, that any money is due to plaintiff either under the contract or as a result of its breach, and pleads as an affirmative defense to both causes of action plaintiff's allegedly deliberate failure to mitigate damages, asserting that she unreasonably refused to accept its offer of the leading role in "Big Country."
Plaintiff moved for summary judgment under Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, the motion was granted, and summary judgment for $750,000 plus interest was entered in plaintiff's favor. This appeal by defendant followed.
(1a) The familiar rules are that the matter to be determined by the trial court on a motion for summary judgment is whether facts have been presented which give rise to a triable factual issue. The court may not pass upon the issue itself. (2) Summary judgment is proper only if the affidavits or declarations[3] in support of the moving party would be sufficient to sustain a judgment in his favor and his opponent does not by affidavit show facts sufficient to present a triable issue of fact. The affidavits of the moving party are strictly construed, and doubts as to the propriety of summary judgment should be resolved against granting the motion. Such summary procedure is drastic and should be used with caution so that it does not become a substitute for the open trial method of determining facts. (3) The moving party cannot depend upon allegations in his own pleadings to cure deficient affidavits, nor can his adversary rely upon his own pleadings in lieu or in support of affidavits in opposition to a motion; however, a party can rely on his adversary's pleadings to establish facts not contained in his own affidavits. (Slobojan v. Western Travelers Life Ins. Co. (1969) 70 Cal.2d 432, 436-437 [74 Cal. Rptr. 895, 450 P.2d 271]; and cases cited.) (1b) Also, the court may consider facts stipulated to by the parties and facts which are properly the subject of judicial notice. (Ahmanson Bank & Trust Co. v. Tepper (1969) 269 Cal. App.2d 333, 342 [74 Cal. Rptr. 774]; Martin v. General Finance Co. (1966) 239 Cal. App.2d 438, 442 [48 Cal. Rptr. 773]; Goldstein v. Hoffman (1963) 213 Cal. App.2d 803, 814 [29 Cal. Rptr. 334]; Thomson v. Honer (1960) 179 Cal. App.2d 197, 203 [3 Cal. Rptr. 791].)
As stated, defendant's sole defense to this action which resulted from its deliberate breach of contract is that in rejecting defendant's substitute offer of employment plaintiff unreasonably refused to mitigate damages.
(4) The general rule is that the measure of recovery by a wrongfully discharged employee is the amount of salary agreed upon for the period of service, less the amount which the employer affirmatively proves the employee has earned or with reasonable effort might have earned from other employment. (W.F. Boardman Co. v. Petch (1921) 186 Cal. 476, 484 [182] [199 P. 1047]; De Angeles v. Roos Bros., Inc. (1966) 244 Cal. App.2d 434, 441-442 [52 Cal. Rptr. 783]; de la Falaise v. Gaumont-British Picture Corp. (1940) 39 Cal. App.2d 461, 469 [103 P.2d 447], and cases cited; see also Wise v. Southern Pac. Co. (1970) 1 Cal.3d 600, 607-608 [83 Cal. Rptr. 202, 463 P.2d 426].)[4] (5) However, before projected earnings from other employment opportunities not sought or accepted by the discharged employee can be applied in mitigation, the employer must show that the other employment was comparable, or substantially similar, to that of which the employee has been deprived; the employee's rejection of or failure to seek other available employment of a different or inferior kind may not be resorted to in order to mitigate damages. (Gonzales v. Internat. Assn. of Machinists (1963) 213 Cal. App.2d 817, 822-824 [29 Cal. Rptr. 190]; Harris v. Nat. Union etc. Cooks, Stewards (1953) 116 Cal. App.2d 759, 761 [254 P.2d 673]; Crillo v. Curtola (1949) 91 Cal. App.2d 263, 275 [204 P.2d 941]; de la Falaise v. Gaumont-British Picture Corp., supra, 39 Cal. App.2d 461, 469; Schiller v. Keuffel & Esser Co. (1963) 21 Wis.2d 545 [124 N.W.2d 646, 651]; 28 A.L.R. 736, 749; 22 Am.Jur.2d, Damages, §§ 71-72, p. 106.)
In the present case defendant has raised no issue of reasonableness of efforts by plaintiffs to obtain other employment; the sole issue is whether plaintiff's refusal of defendant's substitute offer of "Big Country" may be used in mitigation. Nor, if the "Big Country" offer was of employment different or inferior when compared with the original "Bloomer Girl" employment, is there an issue as to whether or not plaintiff acted reasonably in refusing the substitute offer. Despite defendant's arguments to the contrary, no case cited or which our research has discovered holds or suggests that reasonableness is an element of a wrongfully discharged employee's option to reject, or fail to seek, different or inferior employment lest the possible earnings therefrom be charged against him in mitigation of damages.[5]
(6) Applying the foregoing rules to the record in the present case, with all intendments in favor of the party opposing the summary judgment motion — here, defendant — it is clear that the trial court correctly ruled that plaintiff's failure to accept defendant's tendered substitute employment could not be applied in mitigation of damages because the offer of the "Big Country" lead was of employment both different and inferior, and that no factual dispute was presented on that issue. The mere circumstance that "Bloomer Girl" was to be a musical review calling upon plaintiff's talents as a dancer as well as an actress, and was to be produced in the City of Los Angeles, whereas "Big Country" was a straight dramatic role in a "Western Type" story taking place in an opal mine in Australia, demonstrates the difference in kind between the two employments; the female lead as a dramatic actress in a western style motion picture can by no stretch of imagination be considered the equivalent of or substantially similar to the lead in a song-and-dance production.
(7) Additionally, the substitute "Big Country" offer proposed to eliminate or impair the director and screenplay approvals accorded to plaintiff under the original "Bloomer Girl" contract (see fn. 2, ante), and thus constituted an offer of inferior employment. No expertise or judicial notice is required in order to hold that the deprivation or infringement of an employee's rights held under an original employment contract converts the available "other employment" relied upon by the employer to mitigate damages, into inferior employment which the employee need not seek or accept. (See Gonzales v. Internat. Assn. of Machinists, supra, 213 Cal. App.2d 817, 823-824; and fn. 5, post.)
(8) Statements found in affidavits submitted by defendant in opposition to plaintiff's summary judgment motion, to the effect that the "Big County" offer was not of employment different from or inferior to that under the "Bloomer Girl" contract, merely repeat the allegations of defendant's answer to the complaint in this action, constitute only conclusionary assertions with respect to undisputed facts, and do not give rise to a triable factual issue so as to defeat the motion for summary judgment. (See Colvig v. KSFO (1964) 224 Cal. App.2d 357, 364 [36 Cal. Rptr. 701]; Dashew v. Dashew Business Machines, Inc. (1963) 218 Cal. App.2d 711, 715 [32 Cal. Rptr. 682]; Hatch v. Bush (1963) 215 Cal. App.2d 692, 707 [30 Cal. Rptr. 397, 13 A.L.R.3d 503]; Barry v. Rodgers (1956) 141 Cal. App.2d 340, 342 [296 P.2d 898].)
In view of the determination that defendant failed to present any facts showing the existence of a factual issue with respect to its sole defense — plaintiff's rejection of its substitute employment offer in mitigation of damages — we need not consider plaintiff's further contention that for various reasons, including the provisions of the original contract set forth in footnote 1, ante, plaintiff was excused from attempting to mitigate damages.
The judgment is affirmed.
McComb, J., Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Kaus, J.,[6] and Roth, J.,[6] concurred.
SULLIVAN, Acting C.J.
The basic question in this case is whether or not plaintiff acted reasonably in rejecting defendant's offer of alternate employment. The answer depends upon whether that offer (starring in "Big Country, Big Man") was an offer of work that was substantially similar to her former employment (starring in "Bloomer Girl") or of work that was of a different or inferior kind. To my mind this is a factual issue which the trial court should not have determined on a motion for summary judgment. The majority have not only repeated this error but have compounded it by applying the rules governing mitigation of damages in the employer-employee context in a misleading fashion. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
The familiar rule requiring a plaintiff in a tort or contract action to mitigate damages embodies notions of fairness and socially responsible behavior which are fundamental to our jurisprudence. Most broadly stated, it precludes the recovery of damages which, through the exercise of due diligence, could have been avoided. Thus, in essence, it is a rule requiring reasonable conduct in commercial affairs. This general principle governs the obligations of an employee after his employer has wrongfully repudiated or terminated the employment contract. Rather than permitting the employee simply to remain idle during the balance of the contract period, the law requires him to make a reasonable effort to secure other employment.[7] He is not obliged, however, to seek or accept any and all types of work which may be available. Only work which is in the same field and which is of the same quality need be accepted.[8]
Over the years the courts have employed various phrases to define the type of employment which the employee, upon his wrongful discharge, is under an obligation to accept. Thus in California alone it has been held that he must accept employment which is "substantially similar" (Lewis v. Protective Security Life Ins. Co. (1962) 208 Cal. App.2d 582, 584 [25 Cal. Rptr. 213]; de la Falaise v. Gaumont-British Picture Corp. (1940) 39 Cal. App.2d 461, 469 [103 P.2d 447]); "comparable employment" (Erler v. Five Points Motors, Inc. (1967) 249 Cal. App.2d 560, 562 [57 Cal. Rptr. 516]; Harris v. Nat. Union etc. Cooks, Stewards (1953) 116 Cal. App.2d 759, 761 [254 P.2d 673]); employment "in the same general line of the first employment" (Rotter v. Stationers Corp. (1960) 186 Cal. App.2d 170, 172 [8 Cal. Rptr. 690]); "equivalent to his prior position" (De Angeles v. Roos Bros., Inc. (1966) 244 Cal. App.2d 434, 443 [52 Cal. Rptr. 783]); "employment in a similar capacity" (Silva v. McCoy (1968) 259 Cal. App.2d 256, 260 [66 Cal. Rptr. 364]); employment which is "not ... of a different or inferior kind...." (Gonzales v. Internat. Assn. of Machinists (1963) 213 Cal. App.2d 817, 822 [29 Cal. Rptr. 190].)[9]
For reasons which are unexplained, the majority cite several of these cases yet select from among the various judicial formulations which they contain one particular phrase, "Not of a different or inferior kind," with which to analyze this case. I have discovered no historical or theoretical reason to adopt this phrase, which is simply a negative restatement of the affirmative standards set out in the above cases, as the exclusive standard. Indeed, its emergence is an example of the dubious phenomenon of the law responding not to rational judicial choice or changing social conditions, but to unrecognized changes in the language of opinions or legal treatises.[10] However, the phrase is a serviceable one and my concern is not with its use as the standard but rather with what I consider its distortion.
The relevant language excuses acceptance only of employment which is of a different kind. (Gonzales v. Internat. Assn. of Machinists, supra, 213 Cal. App.2d 817, 822; Harris v. Nat. Union etc. Cooks, Stewards, supra, 116 Cal. App.2d 759, 761; de la Falaise v. Gaumont-British Picture Corp., supra, 39 Cal. App.2d 461, 469.) It has never been the law that the mere existence of differences between two jobs in the same field is sufficient, as a matter of law, to excuse an employee wrongfully discharged from one from accepting the other in order to mitigate damages. Such an approach would effectively eliminate any obligation of an employee to attempt to minimize damage arising from a wrongful discharge. The only alternative job offer an employee would be required to accept would be an offer of his former job by his former employer.
Although the majority appear to hold that there was a difference "in kind" between the employment offered plaintiff in "Bloomer Girl" and that offered in "Big Country" (ante, at p. 183), an examination of the opinion makes crystal clear that the majority merely point out differences between the two films (an obvious circumstance) and then apodically assert that these constitute a difference in the kind of employment. The entire rationale of the majority boils down to this: that the "mere circumstances" that "Bloomer Girl" was to be a musical review while "Big Country" was a straight drama "demonstrates the difference in kind" since a female lead in a western is not "the equivalent of or substantially similar to" a lead in a musical. This is merely attempting to prove the proposition by repeating it. It shows that the vehicles for the display of the star's talents are different but it does not prove that her employment as a star in such vehicles is of necessity different in kind and either inferior or superior.
I believe that the approach taken by the majority (a superficial listing of differences with no attempt to assess their significance) may subvert a valuable legal doctrine.[11] The inquiry in cases such as this should not be whether differences between the two jobs exist (there will always be differences) but whether the differences which are present are substantial enough to constitute differences in the kind of employment or, alternatively, whether they render the substitute work employment of an inferior kind.
It seems to me that this inquiry involves, in the instant case at least, factual determinations which are improper on a motion for summary judgment. Resolving whether or not one job is substantially similar to another or whether, on the other hand, it is of a different or inferior kind, will often (as here) require a critical appraisal of the similarities and differences between them in light of the importance of these differences to the employee. This necessitates a weighing of the evidence, and it is precisely this undertaking which is forbidden on summary judgment. (Garlock v. Cole (1962) 199 Cal. App.2d 11, 14 [18 Cal. Rptr. 393].)
This is not to say that summary judgment would never be available in an action by an employee in which the employer raises the defense of failure to mitigate damages. No case has come to my attention, however, in which summary judgment has been granted on the issue of whether an employee was obliged to accept available alternate employment. Nevertheless, there may well be cases in which the substitute employment is so manifestly of a dissimilar or inferior sort, the declarations of the plaintiff so complete and those of the defendant so conclusionary and inadequate that no factual issues exist for which a trial is required. This, however, is not such a case.
It is not intuitively obvious, to me at least, that the leading female role in a dramatic motion picture is a radically different endeavor from the leading female role in a musical comedy film. Nor is it plain to me that the rather qualified rights of director and screenplay approval contained in the first contract are highly significant matters either in the entertainment industry in general or to this plaintiff in particular. Certainly, none of the declarations introduced by plaintiff in support of her motion shed any light on these issues.[12] Nor do they attempt to explain why she declined the offer of starring in "Big Country, Big Man." Nevertheless, the trial court granted the motion, declaring that these approval rights were "critical" and that their elimination altered "the essential nature of the employment."
The plaintiff's declarations were of no assistance to the trial court in its effort to justify reaching this conclusion on summary judgment. Instead, it was forced to rely on judicial notice of the definitions of "motion picture," "screenplay" and "director" (Evid. Code, § 451, subd. (e)) and then on judicial notice of practices in the film industry which were purportedly of "common knowledge." (Evid. Code, § 451, subd. (f) or § 452, subd. (g).) This use of judicial notice was error. Evidence Code section 451, subdivision (e) was never intended to authorize resort to the dictionary to solve essentially factual questions which do not turn upon conventional linguistic usage. More important, however, the trial court's notice of "facts commonly known" violated Evidence Code section 455, subdivision (a).[13] Before this section was enacted there were no procedural safeguards affording litigants an opportunity to be heard as to the propriety of taking judicial notice of a matter or as to the tenor of the matter to be noticed. Section 455 makes such an opportunity (which may be an element of due process, see Evid. Code, § 455, Law Revision Com. Comment (a)) mandatory and its provisions should be scrupulously adhered to. "[J]udicial notice can be a valuable tool in the adversary system for the lawyer as well as the court" (Kongsgaard, Judicial Notice (1966) 18 Hastings L.J. 117, 140) and its use is appropriate on motions for summary judgment. Its use in this case, however, to determine on summary judgment issues fundamental to the litigation without complying with statutory requirements of notice and hearing is a highly improper effort to "cut the Gordion knot of involved litigation." (Silver Land & Dev. Co. v. California Land Title Co. (1967) 248 Cal. App.2d 241, 242 [56 Cal. Rptr. 178].)
The majority do not confront the trial court's misuse of judicial notice. They avoid this issue through the expedient of declaring that neither judicial notice nor expert opinion (such as that contained in the declarations in opposition to the motion)[14] is necessary to reach the trial court's conclusion. Something, however, clearly is needed to support this conclusion. Nevertheless, the majority make no effort to justify the judgment through an examination of the plaintiff's declarations. Ignoring the obvious insufficiency of these declarations, the majority announce that "the deprivation or infringement of an employee's rights held under an original employment contract" changes the alternate employment offered or available into employment of an inferior kind.
I cannot accept the proposition that an offer which eliminates any contract right, regardless of its significance, is, as a matter of law, an offer of employment of an inferior kind. Such an absolute rule seems no more sensible than the majority's earlier suggestion that the mere existence of differences between two jobs is sufficient to render them employment of different kinds. Application of such per se rules will severely undermine the principle of mitigation of damages in the employer-employee context.
I remain convinced that the relevant question in such cases is whether or not a particular contract provision is so significant that its omission creates employment of an inferior kind. This question is, of course, intimately bound up in what I consider the ultimate issue: whether or not the employee acted reasonably. This will generally involve a factual inquiry to ascertain the importance of the particular contract term and a process of weighing the absence of that term against the countervailing advantages of the alternate employment. In the typical case, this will mean that summary judgment must be withheld.
In the instant case, there was nothing properly before the trial court by which the importance of the approval rights could be ascertained, much less evaluated. Thus, in order to grant the motion for summary judgment, the trial court misused judicial notice. In upholding the summary judgment, the majority here rely upon per se rules which distort the process of determining whether or not an employee is obliged to accept particular employment in mitigation of damages.
I believe that the judgment should be reversed so that the issue of whether or not the offer of the lead role in "Big Country, Big Man" was of employment comparable to that of the lead role in "Bloomer Girl" may be determined at trial.
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied October 28, 1970. Mosk, J., did not participate therein. Sullivan, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted.
[1] Among the identical provisions was the following found in the last paragraph of Article 2 of the original contract: "We [defendant] shall not be obligated to utilize your [plaintiff's] services in or in connection with the Photoplay hereunder, our sole obligation, subject to the terms and conditions of this Agreement, being to pay you the guaranteed compensation herein provided for."
[2] Article 29 of the original contract specified that plaintiff approved the director already chosen for "Bloomer Girl" and that in case he failed to act as director plaintiff was to have approval rights of any substitute director. Article 31 provided that plaintiff was to have the right of approval of the "Bloomer Girl" dance director, and Article 32 gave her the right of approval of the screenplay.
Defendant's letter of April 4 to plaintiff, which contained both defendant's notice of breach of the "Bloomer Girl" contract and offer of the lead in "Big Country," eliminated or impaired each of those rights. It read in part as follows: "The terms and conditions of our offer of employment are identical to those set forth in the `BLOOMER GIRL' Agreement, Articles 1 through 34 and Exhibit A to the Agreement, except as follows:
"1. Article 31 of said Agreement will not be included in any contract of employment regarding `BIG COUNTRY, BIG MAN' as it is not a musical and it thus will not need a dance director.
"2. In the `BLOOMER GIRL' agreement, in Articles 29 and 32, you were given certain director and screenplay approvals and you had preapproved certain matters. Since there simply is insufficient time to negotiate with you regarding your choice of director and regarding the screenplay and since you already expressed an interest in performing the role in `BIG COUNTRY, BIG MAN,' we must exclude from our offer of employment in `BIG COUNTRY, BIG MAN' any approval rights as are contained in said Articles 29 and 32; however, we shall consult with you respecting the director to be selected to direct the photoplay and will further consult with you with respect to the screenplay and any revisions or changes therein, provided, however, that if we fail to agree ... the decision of ... [defendant] with respect to the selection of a director and to revisions and changes in the said screenplay shall be binding upon the parties to said agreement."
[3] In this opinion "affidavits" includes "declarations under penalty of perjury." (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2015.5.)
[4] Although it would appear that plaintiff was not discharged by defendant in the customary sense of the term, as she was not permitted by defendant to enter upon performance of the "Bloomer Girl" contract, nevertheless the motion for summary judgment was submitted for decision upon a stipulation by the parties that "plaintiff Parker was discharged."
[5] Instead, in each case the reasonableness referred to was that of the efforts of the employee to obtain other employment that was not different or inferior; his right to reject the latter was declared as an unqualified rule of law. Thus, Gonzales v. Internat. Assn. of Machinists, supra, 213 Cal. App.2d 817, 823-824, holds that the trial court correctly instructed the jury that plaintiff union member, a machinist, was required to make "such efforts as the average [member of his union] desiring employment would make at that particular time and place" (italics added); but, further, that the court properly rejected defendant's offer of proof of the availability of other kinds of employment at the same or higher pay than plaintiff usually received and all outside the jurisdiction of his union, as plaintiff could not be required to accept different employment or a nonunion job.
In Harris v. Nat. Union etc. Cooks, Stewards, supra, 116 Cal. App.2d 759, 761, the issues were stated to be, inter alia, whether comparable employment was open to each plaintiff employee, and if so whether each plaintiff made a reasonable effort to secure such employment. It was held that the trial court properly sustained an objection to an offer to prove a custom of accepting a job in a lower rank when work in the higher rank was not available, as "The duty of mitigation of damages ... does not require the plaintiff `to seek or to accept other employment of a different or inferior kind.'" (P. 764 [5].)
See also: Lewis v. Protective Security Life Ins. Co. (1962) 208 Cal. App.2d 582, 584 [25 Cal. Rptr. 213]: "honest effort to find similar employment...." (Italics added.)
de la Falaise v. Gaumont-British Picture Corp., supra, 39 Cal. App.2d 461, 469: "reasonable effort."
Erler v. Five Points Motors, Inc. (1967) 249 Cal. App.2d 560, 562 [57 Cal. Rptr. 516]: Damages may be mitigated "by a showing that the employee, by the exercise of reasonable diligence and effort, could have procured comparable employment...." (Italics added.)
Savitz v. Gallaccio (1955) 179 Pa.Super. 589 [118 A.2d 282, 286]; Atholwood Dev. Co. v. Houston (1941) 179 Md. 441 [19 A.2d 706, 708]; Harcourt & Co. v. Heller (1933) 250 Ky. 321 [62 S.W.2d 1056]; Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Stephenson (1954) 217 F.2d 295, 299 [15 Alaska 272]; United Protective Workers v. Ford Motor Co. (7th Cir.1955) 223 F.2d 49, 52 [48 A.L.R.2d 1285]; Chisholm v. Preferred Bankers' Life Assur. Co. (1897) 112 Mich. 50 [70 N.W. 415]; each of which held that the reasonableness of the employee's efforts, or his excuses for failure, to find other similar employment was properly submitted to the jury as a question of fact. NB: Chisholm additionally approved a jury instruction that a substitute offer of the employer to work for a lesser compensation was not to be considered in mitigation, as the employee was not required to accept it.
Williams v. National Organization, Masters, etc. (1956) 384 Pa. 413 [120 A.2d 896, 901 [13]]: "Even assuming that plaintiff ... could have obtained employment in ports other than ... where he resided, legally he was not compelled to do so in order to mitigate his damages." (Italics added.)
[6] Assigned by the Acting Chairman of the Judicial Council.
[7] The issue is generally discussed in terms of a duty on the part of the employee to minimize loss. The practice is long-established and there is little reason to change despite Judge Cardozo's observation of its subtle inaccuracy. "The servant is free to accept employment or reject it according to his uncensored pleasure. What is meant by the supposed duty is merely this, that if he unreasonably reject, he will not be heard to say that the loss of wages from then on shall be deemed the jural consequence of the earlier discharge. He has broken the chain of causation, and loss resulting to him thereafter is suffered through his own act." (McClelland v. Climax Hosiery Mills (1930) 252 N.Y. 347, 359 [169 N.E. 605, 609], concurring opinion.)
[8] This qualification of the rule seems to reflect the simple and humane attitude that it is too severe to demand of a person that he attempt to find and perform work for which he has no training or experience. Many of the older cases hold that one need not accept work in an inferior rank or position nor work which is more menial or arduous. This suggests that the rule may have had its origin in the bourgeois fear of resubmergence in lower economic classes.
[9] See also 28 A.L.R. 736, 740-742; 15 Am.Jur. 431.
[10] The earliest California case which the majority cite is de la Falaise v. Gaumont-British Picture Corp., supra, 39 Cal. App.2d at p. 469. de la Falaise states "The `other employment' which the discharged employee is bound to seek is employment of a character substantially similar to that of which he has been deprived; he need not enter upon service of a different or inferior kind, ..." de la Falaise cites, in turn, two sources as authority for this proposition. The first is 18 R.C.L. (Ruling Case Law) 529. That digest, however, states only that the "discharged employee ... need not enter upon service of a more menial kind." (Italics added.) It was in this form that the rule entered California law explicitly, Gregg v. McDonald (1925) 73 Cal. App. 748, 757 [239 P. 373], quoting the text verbatim. The second citation is to 28 A.L.R. 737. The author of the annotation states: "The principal question with which this annotation is concerned is the kind of employment which the employee is under a duty to seek or accept in order to reduce the damages caused by his wrongful discharge. Must one who is skilled in some special work he is employed to do, as an actor, musician, accountant, etc., seek or accept employment of an entirely different nature?" (Italics added.) (28 A.L.R. 736.) In answering that question in the negative, the annotation employs the language adopted by the majority: The employee is "not obliged to seek or accept other employment of a different or inferior kind, ..." (Id. at p. 737.) Rather than a restatement of a generally agreed upon rule, however, the phrase is an epitomization of the varied formulations found in the cases cited. (See 28 A.L.R. 740-742.)
[11] The values of the doctrine of mitigation of damages in this context are that it minimizes the unnecessary personal and social (e.g., nonproductive use of labor, litigation) costs of contractual failure. If a wrongfully discharged employee can, through his own action and without suffering financial or psychological loss in the process, reduce the damages accruing from the breach of contract, the most sensible policy is to require him to do so. I fear the majority opinion will encourage precisely opposite conduct.
[12] Plaintiff's declaration states simply that she has not received any payment from defendant under the "Bloomer Girl" contract and that the only persons authorized to collect money for her are her attorney and her agent.
The declaration of Herman Citron, plaintiff's theatrical agent, alleges that prior to the formation of the "Bloomer Girl" contract he discussed with Richard Zanuck, defendant's vice president, the conditions under which plaintiff might be interested in doing "Big Country"; that it was Zanuck who informed him of Fox's decision to cancel production of "Bloomer Girl" and queried him as to plaintiff's continued interest in "Big Country"; that he informed Zanuck that plaintiff was shocked by the decision, had turned down other offers because of her commitment to defendant for "Bloomer Girl" and was not interested in "Big Country." It further alleges that "Bloomer Girl" was to have been a musical review which would have given plaintiff an opportunity to exhibit her talent as a dancer as well as an actress and that "Big Country" was a straight dramatic role; the former to have been produced in California, the latter in Australia. Citron's declaration concludes by stating that he has not received any payment from defendant for plaintiff under the "Bloomer Girl" contract.
Benjamin Neuman's declaration states that he is plaintiff's attorney; that after receiving notice of defendant's breach he requested Citron to make every effort to obtain other suitable employment for plaintiff; that he (Neuman) rejected defendant's offer to settle for $400,000 and that he has not received any payment from defendant for plaintiff under the "Bloomer Girl" contract. It also sets forth correspondence between Neuman and Fox which culminated in Fox's final rejection of plaintiff's demand for full payment.
[13] Evidence Code section 455 provides in relevant part: "With respect to any matter specified in Section 452 or in subdivision (f) of Section 451 that is of substantial consequence to the determination of the action: (a) If the trial court has been requested to take or has taken or proposes to take judicial notice of such matter, the court shall afford each party reasonable opportunity, before the jury is instructed or before the cause is submitted for decision by the court, to present to the court information relevant to (1) the propriety of taking judicial notice of the matter and (2) the tenor of the matter to be noticed."
[14] Fox filed two declarations in opposition to the motion; the first is that of Frank Ferguson, Fox's chief resident counsel. It alleges, in substance, that he has handled the negotiations surrounding the "Bloomer Girl" contract and its breach; that the offer to employ plaintiff in "Big Country" was made in good faith and that Fox would have produced the film if plaintiff had accepted; that by accepting the second offer plaintiff was not required to surrender any rights under the first (breached) contract nor would such acceptance have resulted in a modification of the first contract; that the compensation under the second contract was identical; that the terms and conditions of the employment were substantially the same and not inferior to the first; that the employment was in the same general line of work and comparable to that under the first contract; that plaintiff often makes pictures on location in various parts of the world; that article 2 of the original contract which provides that Fox is not required to use the artist's services is a standard provision in artists' contracts designed to negate any implied covenant that the film producer promises to play the artist in or produce the film; that it is not intended to be an advance waiver by the producer of the doctrine of mitigation of damages.
The second declaration is that of Richard Zanuck. It avers that he is Fox's vice president in charge of production; that he has final responsibility for casting decisions; that he is familiar with plaintiff's ability and previous artistic history; that the offer of employment for "Big Country" was in the same general line and comparable to that of "Bloomer Girl"; that plaintiff would not have suffered any detriment to her image or reputation by appearing in it; that elimination of director and script approval rights would not injure plaintiff; that plaintiff has appeared in dramatic and western roles previously and has not limited herself to musicals; and that Fox would have complied with the terms of its offer if plaintiff had accepted it.
13.4 Reliance 13.4 Reliance
13.4.1 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 349 13.4.1 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 349
§ 349 Damages Based on Reliance Interest
As an alternative to the measure of damages stated in § 347, the injured party has a right to damages based on his reliance interest, including expenditures made in preparation for performance or in performance, less any loss that the party in breach can prove with reasonable certainty the injured party would have suffered had the contract been performed.
-
Illustrations:
-
1. A gives B a “dealer franchise” to sell A's products in a stated area for one year. In preparation for performance, B spends money on advertising, hiring sales personnel, and acquiring premises that cannot be used for other purposes. A then repudiates before performance begins. If neither party proves with reasonable certainty what profit or loss B would have made if the contract had been performed, B can recover as damages his expenditures in preparation for performance. See Illustration 8 to § 90.
-
2. A contracts with B to stage a series of performances in B's theater, each to have 50 per cent of the gross receipts. After A has spent $20,000 in getting ready for the performances, B rents the theater to others and repudiates the contract, and A stages the performance at another theater. A's expenditures in preparation for performance of the contract with B are worth $8,000 to him in connection with staging the performances at the other theater. If neither party proves with reasonable certainty what profit or loss A would have made if the contract had been performed, A can recover as damages the $12,000 balance of his expenditures in preparation for performance.
-
3. A contracts to build for B a factory of experimental design for $1,000,000. After A has spent $250,000 and been paid $150,000 in progress payments, B repudiates the contract and A stops work. A's expenditures include materials worth $10,000 that he can use on other jobs. If neither party proves with reasonable certainty what profit or loss A would have made if the contract had been performed, A can recover as damages the $90,000 balance of his expenditures in preparation for performance.
-
4. A contracts to sell his retail store to B. After B has spent $100,000 for inventory, A repudiates the contract and B sells the inventory for $60,000. If neither party proves with reasonable certainty what profit or loss B would have made if the contract had been performed, B can recover as damages the $40,000 loss that he sustained on the sale of the inventory.
-
13.4.2 Restatement (2d) 90 Promise Reasonably Inducing Action or Forbearance 13.4.2 Restatement (2d) 90 Promise Reasonably Inducing Action or Forbearance
90 Promise Reasonably Inducing Action or Forbearance
|
(1) A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise. The remedy granted for breach may be limited as justice requires.
|
13.4.3 Wartzman v. Hightower Productions, Ltd. 13.4.3 Wartzman v. Hightower Productions, Ltd.
PAUL WARTZMAN et al. v. HIGHTOWER PRODUCTIONS, LTD.
[No. 587,
September Term, 1982.]
Decided February 7, 1983.
*657The cause was argued before Moylan and Garrity, JJ., and James S. Getty, Chief Judge of the Fourth Judicial Circuit, specially assigned.
Mark D. Gately, with whom were James R. Eyler and Miles & Stockbridge on the brief, for appellants.
Leo Howard Lubow, with whom were Freishtat & Sandler on the brief, for appellee.
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Woody Hightower did not succeed in breaking the Guiness World Record for flagpole sitting; his failure to accomplish *658this seemingly nebulous feat, however, did generate protracted litigation. We are concerned here with whether Judge Robert L. Karwacki, presiding in the Superior Court of Baltimore City, correctly permitted a jury to consider the issue of "reliance damages” sustained by the appellees. Additionally, we are requested by the appellees, as cross-appellants, to determine if the trial court’s refusal to permit the jury to consider prejudgment interest is error.
Hightower Productions LTD. (appellees and cross-appellants) came into being in 1974 as a promotional venture conceived by Ira Adler, Frank Billitz and J. Daniel Quinn. The principals intended to employ a singer-entertainer who would live in a specially constructed mobile flagpole perch from April 1, 1975, until New Years Eve at which time he would descend in Times Square in New York before a nationwide television audience having established a new world record for flagpole sitting.
The young man selected to perform this feat was to be known as "Woody Hightower”. The venture was to be publicized by radio and television exposure, by adopting a theme song and by having the uncrowned champion make appearances from his perch throughout the country at concerts, state fairs and shopping centers.
In November, 1974, the three principals approached Michael Kaminkow of the law firm of Wartzman, Rombro, Rudd and Omansky, P.A., for the specific purpose of incorporating their venture. Mr. Kaminkow, a trial attorney, referred them to his partner, Paul Wartzman.
The three principals met with Mr. Wartzman at his home and reviewed the promotional scheme with him. They indicated that they needed to sell stock to the public in order to raise the $250,000 necessary to finance the project. Shortly thereafter, the law firm prepared and filed the articles of incorporation and Hightower Productions Ltd. came into existence on November 6, 1974. The Articles of Incorporation authorized the issuance of one million shares of stock of the par value of 100 per share, or a total of $100,000.00.
*659Following incorporation, the three principals began developing the project. With an initial investment of $20,000, they opened a corporate account at Maryland National Bank and an office in the Pikesville Plaza Building. Then began the search for "Woody Hightower”. After numerous interviews, twenty-three year old John Jordan emerged as "Woody Hightower”.
After selecting the flagpole tenant, the corporation then sought and obtained a company to construct the premises to house him. This consisted of a seven foot wide perch that was to include a bed, toilet, water, refrigerator and heat. The accommodations were atop an hydraulic lift system mounted upon a flat bed tractor trailer.
Hightower employed two public relations specialists to coordinate press and public relations efforts and to obtain major corporate backers. "Woody” received a proclamation from the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore and after a press breakfast at the Hilton Hotel on "All Fools Day” ascended his home in the sky.
Within ten days, Hightower obtained a live appearance for "Woody” on the Mike Douglas Show, and a commitment for an appearance on the Wonderama television program. The principals anticipated a "snow-balling” effect from commercial enterprises as the project progressed with no substantial monetary commitments for approximately six months.
Hightower raised $43,000.00 by selling stock in the corporation. Within two weeks of "Woody’s” ascension, another stockholders’ meeting was scheduled, because the corporation was low on funds. At that time, Mr. Wartzman informed the principals that no further stock could be sold, because the corporation was "structured wrong”, and it would be necessary to obtain the services of a securities attorney to correct the problem. Mr. Wartzman had acquired this information in a casual conversation with a friend who recommended that the corporation should consult with a securities specialist.
The problem was that the law firm had failed to prepare *660an offering memorandum and failed to assure that the corporation had made the required disclosures to prospective investors in accordance with the provisions of the Maryland Securities Act Article 32A. (The Act was repealed and re-enacted in 1975 as C A Sec. 11-101 to 11-805). Mr. Wartzman advised Hightower that the cost of the specialist would be between $10,000.00 and $15,000.00. Hightower asked the firm to pay for the required services and the request was rejected.
Hightower then employed substitute counsel and scheduled a shareholders’ meeting on April 28,1975. At that meeting, the stockholders were advised that Hightower was not in compliance with the securities laws; that $43,000.00, the amount investors had paid for issued stock, had to be covered by the promoters and placed in escrow; that the fee of a securities specialist would be $10,000.00 to $15,000.00 and that the additional work would require between six and eight weeks. In the interim, additional stock could not be sold, nor could "Woody” be exhibited across state lines. Faced with these problems, the shareholders decided to discontinue the entire project.
On October 8, 1975, Hightower filed suit alleging breach of contract and negligence for the law firm’s failure to have created a corporation authorized to raise the capital necessary to fund the venture. At the trial, Hightower introduced into evidence its obligations and expenditures incurred in reliance on the defendant law firm’s creation of a corporation authorized to raise the $250,000.00, necessary to fund the project. The development costs incurred included corporate obligations amounting to $155,339 including: initial investments by Adler and Billitz, $20,000; shareholders, excluding the three promoters, $43,010; outstanding liabilities exclusive of salaries, $58,929; liability to talent consultants, $25,000; and accrued salaries to employees, $8,400.
Individual liabilities to the three promoters, Adler, Billitz and Quinn, totaled $88,608, including loans to the corporation, $44,692; repayment of corporate debt to *661Maryland National Bank, $8,016; and loss of salaries, $36,000. The trial court disposed of the individual suit filed by the promoters, Adler, Billitz and Quinn and the cross complaint filed by the appellants. The only claim submitted for the jury’s consideration was the claim of the corporation, Hightower, against the defendant law firm.
The jury returned a verdict in favor of Hightower in the amount of $170,508.43. Wartzman, Rombro, Rudd and Omansky, P.A., appealed to this Court. Hightower filed a cross appeal alleging that the jury should have been permitted to consider prejudgment interest.
The appellants raise four issues for our consideration:
1. The trial court erred in permitting Hightower to recover "reliance damages” or "development costs”.
2. If "reliance damages” were recoverable, the trial court failed to properly instruct the jury on the law concerning their recovery.
3. The trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the duty to mitigate damages.
4. The trial court erroneously permitted a member of the plaintiffs law firm to testify as a witness in the case.
Reliance Damages
The appellants first contend that the jury verdict included all of Hightower’s expenditures and obligations incurred during its existence resulting in the law firm being absolute surety for all costs incurred in a highly speculative venture. While they do not suggest the analogy, the appellants would no doubt equate the verdict as tantamount to holding the blacksmith liable for the value of the kingdom where the smith left out a nail in shoeing the king’s horse, because of which the shoe was lost, the horse was lost, the king was lost and the kingdom was lost. Appellants contend that there is a lack of nexus or causation between the alleged failure of Mr. Wartzman to discharge his duties as an attorney and the loss claimed by Hightower. Stated differently, an unjust result will obtain where a person performing a collateral *662service for a new venture will, upon failure to fully perform the service, be liable as full guarantor for all costs incurred by the enterprise.
Ordinarily, profits lost due to a breach of contract are recoverable. Where anticipated profits are too speculative to be determined, monies spent in part performance, in preparation for or in reliance on the contract are recoverable. 5 Corbin, Contracts, Sec. 1031, Restatement of Contracts, Sec. 333, cited with approval in Dialist Co. v. Pulford, 42 Md. App. 173 (1979).
In Dialist, supra, a distributor, Pulford, brought suit for breach of an exclusive contract that he had with Dialist. Pulford paid $2500.00 for the distributorship, terminated his employment with another company and expended funds in order to begin developing the area where the product was to be sold. When Pulford learned that another distributor was also given part of his territory he terminated his services.
This Court upheld the award of development costs to Pulford which included out of pocket expenses, telephone installation, office furniture, two months of forfeited salary and the value of medical insurance lost. The Court determined that the expenditures were not in preparation for or part performance of a contract, but in reliance upon it. "Such expenditures are not brought about by reason of the breach. They are induced by reliance on the contract itself and rendered worthless by its breach.” Id. at 181.
Recovery based upon reliance interest is not without limitation. If it can be shown that full performance would have resulted in a net loss, the plaintiff cannot escape the consequences of a bad bargain by falling back on his reliance interest. Where the breach has prevented an anticipated gain and made proof of loss difficult to ascertain, the injured party has a right to damages based upon his reliance interest, including expenditures made in preparation for performance, or in performance, less any loss that the party in breach can prove with reasonable certainty the injured party would have suffered had the contract been performed. Restatement, Second, Contracts, Sec. 349, Holt v. United *663 Security Life Ins. & Trust Co., 72 Atl. 301 (N.J.) (1909), In Re Yeager Company, 227 Fed. Supp. 92 (N.D. Ohio, E.D. 1963).
The appellants’ contention that permitting the jury to consider reliance damages in this case rendered the appellants’ insurers of the venture is without merit. Section 349 of the Restatement, cited above, expressly authorizes the breaching party to prove any loss that the injured party would have suffered had the contract been performed. Such proof would avoid making the breaching party a guarantor of the success of the venture.
As Judge Learned Hand stated in Albert & Son v. Armstrong Rubber Company, 178 F. 2d 182, (2d Cir. 1949),
"It is often very hard to learn what the value of the performance would have been; and it is a common expedient, and a just one, in such situations to put the peril of the answer upon that party who by his wrong has made the issue relevant to the rights of the other. On principle therefore the proper solution would seem to be that the promisee may recover his outlay in preparation for the performance, subject to the privilege of the promisor to reduce it by as much as he can show that the promisee would have lost if the contract had been performed.”
In the present case the appellants knew, or should have known, that the success of the venture rested upon the ability of Hightower to sell stock and secure advertising as public interest in the adventure accelerated. Appellants’ contention that their failure to properly incorporate Hightower was collateral and lacked the necessary nexus to permit consideration of reliance damages is not persuasive. The very life blood of the project depended on the corporation’s ability to sell stock to fund the promotion. This is the reason for the employment of the appellants. In reliance thereon, Hightower sold stock and incurred substantial obligations. When it could no longer sell its stock, the entire project failed. No greater nexus need be established. Aside from questioning the expertise of the *664promoters based upon their previous employment, the appellants were unable to establish that the stunt was doomed to fail. The inability to establish that financial chaos was inevitable does not make the appellants insurers and does not preclude Hightower from recovering reliance damages. The issue was properly submitted to the jury.
Appellants contend that the appellees should be limited to the recovery of damages under traditional contract and negligence concepts, citing Meyerberg, Sawyer and Rue v. Agee, 51 Md. App. 711, (1982).
Meyerberg, supra, involved a breach of contract action for certification of a title that was not marketable. The trial judge permitted the jury, in assessing damages, to consider:
1. Economic loss occasioned by increased costs of construction and financing.
2. Attorneys’ fees expended to establish access to the property.
3. Capital gains taxes paid for failure to purchase another property within the time limitations prescribed by law.
4. The amount of earned hazard insurance premium the appellees were required to purchase.
In affirming the decision of the trial court, this Court acknowledged that a contracting party is expected to take account of only those risks that are foreseeable at the time he makes the contract and is not liable in the event of breach for loss that he did not at the time of contracting have reason to foresee as a probable result of such a breach. This limitation is set forth in Restatement, Contracts, (2d), Sec. 351.
In Meyerberg, we noted that exceptional perception is not relevant to the test of foreseeability when applied to an attorney who is relied upon by a layman to protect his investment from pitfalls which are not readily apparent to those in foreign fields of endeavor.
*665Relying on Cochrane v. Little, 71 Md. 323, (1889) we further stated:
"A client who has employed an attorney has a right to his diligence, his knowledge and his skill; and whether he had not so much of these qualities as he was bound to have, or having them, neglected to employ them, the law properly makes him liable for the loss that has accrued to his employer.”
We find little solace for the appellants’ cause in the cases cited above.
The appellants are aggrieved by the amount of the verdict which they consider to be excessive. According to the docket entries, the appellants did not seek any modification of the verdict. It is difficult and arduous for this court to determine precisely the various costs that were presented for the jury’s consideration. Jury arguments were not transcribed and the court apparently gave limiting instructions and permitted counsel to argue specific development cost items. After reviewing nine hundred and seventy-five pages of testimony and a maze of exhibits, we note that in answer to interrogatories filed in October, 1981, corporate damages were stated to be $155,339.00. This figure included shareholders investments and accrued salaries amounting to $51,410. The court’s instructions precluded inclusion of these items as recoverable damages. It would appear, therefore, that the verdict may well have exceeded the guidelines set forth by the trial court. That issue is not before us, however, except that the appellants contend generally that reliance damages are improper in this case.
Instructions on Reliance Damages
Appellants’ primary exception to the court’s damage instruction relates to the failure to include suggested instruction 23b which states:
"You are instructed that you may not award any damages for unpaid expense of Hightower unless *666you find that these expenses were incurred by Hightower in justifiable reliance on the defendant’s causing Hightower to comply with the securities laws. If you find that the expenses were not incurred in reliance on the defendant’s performance, or if such reliance was not justified, then you may not award unpaid expenses as damages.”
The Court instructed the jury that in order to find liability that the plaintiff must prove three things:
"First, the employment of the defendants in behalf of the Plaintiff and the extent of the duties for which the Defendants were employed; secondly, that the Defendants neglected the duties undertaken in the employment and, thirdly, that such negligence resulted in and was the proximate cause of loss by the Plaintiff, that is that the Plaintiff was deprived of any right or parted with anything of value in reliance upon the negligence of the Defendants.”
The instruction given fairly apprised the jury of the Plaintiffs’ burden and adequately covered the reliance damage concept. Additionally, the court instructed the jury that they could not consider unpaid salaries due its officers or employees or amounts invested by stockholders as recoverable damages.
Appellants further object to the court’s refusal to grant its suggested instructions 23C and D designed to forbid recovery if the jury found that Hightower would not have been able to secure funds to remain in business regardless of the defendants’ breach. The instruction was properly refused. The very nature of reliance damages is that future gain cannot be measured with any reasonable degree of reliability. Had Hightower been able to show lost profits the theory of their right to recover may not have been development costs in reliance on the contract but loss based upon expectation interest instead. Appellants had the *667opportunity to minimize the recovery by showing that the venture could not succeed. This was difficult, but their failure to do so does not entitle them to an instruction that requires the jury to speculate on the ultimate success of the venture. We find no error in the instructions given by Judge Karwacki.
Duty to Mitigate Damages
Appellants further except to the trial court’s refusal to grant any instruction on the issue of Hightower’s obligation to mitigate its damages. The instruction offered by appellants is a correct statement of the law. Correctness alone, however, is insufficient to require the court to grant the prayer; there must be evidence to support the proposition to which it relates. Dorough v. Lockman, 224 Md. 168, (1961).
The evidence in this case establishes that Hightower did not have the $43,000.00 to place in escrow covering stock sold, did not have the $10,000.00 or $15,000.00 to employ a securities specialist and could not continue stock sales or exhibitions to obtain the necessary funds. Mr. Wartzman’s offer to set up an appointment for Hightower with an expert in security transactions at Hightower’s expense can hardly be construed as a mitigating device that Hightower was obligated to accept. The party who is in default may not mitigate his damages by showing that the other party could have reduced those damages by expending large amounts of money or incurring substantial obligations. Myerberg, supra. Since such risks arose because of the breach, they are to be borne by the defaulting party. 22 Am. Jur. 2d, Damages, Sec. 37, Griffin v. Bredouw, (Okla.), 420 Pac. 2d 546, (1966).
The doctrine of avoidable consequences, moreover, does not apply where both parties have an equal opportunity to mitigate damages. Appellants had the same opportunity to employ and pay a securities specialist as they contend Hightower should have done. They refused. Having rejected Hightower’s request to assume the costs of an additional *668attorney, they are estopped from asserting a failure by Hightower to reduce its loss. See D. Dobbs, Remedies, Sec. 37, (1973), 11 Williston, Contracts Sec. 1353, (1979).
There is no evidence in this case that the additional funds necessary to continue the operation pending a restructuring of the corporation were within the financial capabilities of Hightower. The Court properly declined to instruct the jury on the issue of mitigation.
Disqualiñcation of Counsel
Appellants’ final contention relates to its motion to disqualify David Freishtat, a member of the firm representing Hightower, from acting as counsel in this case. The litigation was ongoing for more than four years before the motion was made which may well have caused additional delay and hardship if granted.
The basis of the motion was that the appellants intended to call Mr. Freishtat as a witness in a counter claim filed against the promoters of Hightower and this would prejudice the plaintiffs’ case.1 Appellants now contend that Mr. Freishtat’s testimony in the principal case, prejudiced the appellants. One cannot espouse one theory at trial and then resort to another alternative on appeal. Neither rule is applicable to the facts herein. Disciplinary Rule 5-101 permits a lawyer, to testify:
"(4) As to any matter, if refusal would work a substantial hardship on the client, because of the distinctive value of the lawyer or his firm as counsel in the particular case.”
Denial of appellants’ motion to disqualify rested in the sound discretion of the court and we discern no error.
Prejudgment Interest
Hightower, in its cross-appeal, alleges that the issue of pre-judgment interest should have been presented to the jury for its consideration. Applicable Maryland law provides *669that where a claim is for unliquidated damages, interest may run from the date of the judgment, but not before. Affiliated Distillers, 213 Md. 509, (1957), Taylor v. Wahby, 271 Md. 101, (1974).
The reliance damages sought in this case are not subject to pre-judgment valuation. "Reasonable and justified” damages incurred by reason of Mr. Wartzman’s representation of Hightower were not reasonably ascertainable until the jury rendered its verdict. Refusal to permit the jury to consider prejudgment interest, therefore, was not an abuse of discretion.
In conclusion, the final comment of Judge Lowe in Myerherg, supra, is equally apposite here.
"The unfortunate oversight on which this case was based was a costly one, but it was made by one who was hired precisely for the purpose of averting the consequent losses. It is he, and his firm, who must bear them.”
Judgment affirmed.
Costs assessed to appellants.
13.4.4 Paul Martin Walser Philip Martin McLaughlin v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. 13.4.4 Paul Martin Walser Philip Martin McLaughlin v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc.
Paul Martin WALSER; Philip Martin McLaughlin, Plaintiffs/Appellants, v. TOYOTA MOTOR SALES, U.S.A., INC., Defendant/Appellee.
Nos. 93-2342, 93-2575.
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
Submitted March 16, 1994.
Decided Dec. 27, 1994.
*398 Robert Arthur Brunig, Minneapolis, MN, argued, for appellant.
Hildy Bowbeer, Minneapolis, MN, argued (John Q. McShane and Kim Schmid, on the brief), for appellee.
HANSEN, Circuit Judge.
The plaintiffs, Paul Martin Walser and Philip Martin McLaughlin, appeal from a jury verdict in this diversity case awarding them $232,131 in damages on their promissory estoppel claim against Toyota Motor Sales. The plaintiffs argue that the district court 1 erred by instructing the jury that the plaintiffs’ damages on their promissory es-toppel claim were limited to out-of-pocket expenses. The plaintiffs also argue that the district court erred in declining to award specific performance as an alternative remedy on their promissory estoppel claim, in denying their motion for judgment ás a matter of law on their contract claim, in instructing the jury on their contract claim, in requiring them to accept payment from Toyota for $.89 less than the amount of damages and interest awarded, in granting summary judgment on their claim under the Minnesota Motor Vehicle Sale and Distribution Regulations, and in precluding them from taxing costs prior to a final determination of this case on appeal. We affirm.
I.
In 1987, Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., conducted market surveys throughout the United States to identify the best markets for the new line of “Lexus” automobiles that Toyota planned to introduce in 1989. The market studies identified the Minneapolis/St. Paul, Minnesota, metropolitan area as a two-dealership market and recommended establishing dealerships in two suburban areas — Wayzata and the Bloomington/Richfield area.
*399 In April 1988, Toyota issued letters of intent for the prospective dealerships in the two locations. The recipient of the letter for the Bloomington/Richfield dealership was unwilling or unable to comply with the conditions of the letter of intent and returned it to Toyota in early 1989. Soon after, Toyota began to search anew for a dealer for the Bloomington/Richfield location. Lexus Central Region Area Manager, James Melton, asked Stephen Haag, the Central Region Market Manager, to contact Walser, who was then co-owner with McLaughlin of a BMW dealership and a Lineoln-Mercury dealership both located in Bloomington. Both Walser and McLaughlin met with Haag and indicated that they would be interested in obtaining the Lexus dealership.
Toyota had instituted a three-step process to establish dealerships. First, the prospective dealer would fill out a formal application and propose a dealership plan to Toyota. If acceptable, then Toyota would issue a letter of intent signed by the head of the Lexus division and to be signed by the prospective dealer, which would contain final conditions that had to be satisfied before the agreement was finalized. If all conditions were satisfied, then a formal dealership agreement would be approved by Toyota and signed by the parties to establish the dealership.
Walser and McLaughlin applied for the Lexus dealership by completing and signing the formal application for the dealership. The application specifically provided that a dealership agreement was not effective until a formal dealership agreement was approved and signed by an officer of Toyota. Walser’s preliminary proposals, to have the Lexus dealership share space with the BMW dealership or to move the BMW business and to retrofit the BMW facility for Lexus, were both rejected by Toyota, but negotiations continued between the parties. However, unknown to Toyota, Walser and McLaughlin were also negotiating at the same time to buy a Mazda/BMW dealership in St. Paul.
After the retrofit proposal was rejected, Walser and McLaughlin began negotiating to acquire additional property adjacent to the their Bloomington BMW dealership as a site for the Lexus dealership. On October 15, 1989, Walser’s father, R.J. Walser, reached a “handshake deal” to purchase that property for the proposed Lexus dealership from its owner. On October 16, 1989, Walser and McLaughlin wrote Haag and informed him of the agreement to purchase the land but did not disclose that R.J. Walser was buying the land.
On October 17, 1989, Walser and McLaughlin traveled to California to meet with Lexus management and to present their new dealership proposal and financing arrangements. The fact that R.J. Walser was buying the land and that McLaughlin and Walser were in the process of purchasing a Mazda/BMW dealership in St. Paul were not disclosed. Lexus management viewed the proposal favorably, and one executive stated that he was with Walser and McLaughlin.
On October 24, 1989, Walser called Haag to ask whether the letter of intent for the dealership was forthcoming. Haag told Wal-ser that while the letter was not yet executed, things looked positive, the deal was done, only one more signature was needed, and finalizing the deal was basically a rubber stamp. Later that day, R.J. Walser entered into a purchase agreement and paid $50,000 in earnest money for the land for the proposed Lexus dealership.
In December 1989, the letter of intent was formally approved by Lexus management. Haag called Walser and congratulated him and told him that “you’re our dealer” and the letter would be coming by mail. Later in the day, however, Melton told Haag that based on new information Lexus had received regarding Walser and McLaughlin’s financing for the new dealership, the letter of intent would be put on hold. A couple days later, Haag called Walser to tell him that a mistake had been made and that the letter had not been finally approved. Haag requested additional financial information.
On January 3, 1990, R.J. Walser closed on the property he was purchasing for the proposed Lexus dealership. On February 5, 1990, Walser and McLaughlin provided additional financial information and disclosed that R.J. Walser was available, but not necessary, to supply the required financing. On Febru *400 ary 23, 1990, Haag informed Walser that Lexus would not be issuing the letter of intent to him and McLaughlin.
On March 7,1990, Walser and McLaughlin filed a seven-count complaint in Minnesota state court against Toyota. Walser and McLaughlin sought relief under the following theories: breach of the Minnesota motor vehicle franchise statute (count I); breach of contract (count II); promissory estoppel (count III); joint venture (count IV); fraud (count V); intentional interference with contractual relations (count VI); and interference with a prospective business advantage (count VII). Toyota removed this action to the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota.
The district court granted Toyota’s motion for partial summary judgment and dismissed the claims for breach of the Minnesota motor vehicle franchise statute and for recovery on a joint venture theory. Prior to trial, the parties filed a joint stipulation to dismiss without prejudice the claims for intentional interference with contractual relations and interference with a prospective business advantage. The case went to trial in February 1992 on the breach of contract, promissory estoppel, and fraud claims. Walser and McLaughlin sought approximately $7,600,000 in damages, which included expected lost profits. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Toyota on the contract and fraud claims but in favor of Walser and McLaughlin on the promissory estoppel claim. The jury awarded Walser and McLaughlin $232,131 in accordance with the district court’s instruction to limit damages on the promissory es-toppel claim to Walser and McLaughlin’s out-of-pocket expenses.
The district court denied Walser and McLaughlin’s posttrial request for specific performance and their motions for judgment as a matter of law or for a new trial. Walser and McLaughlin filed a notice of appeal. Subsequently, Toyota tendered a check to Walser and McLaughlin for $276,782.82, which Toyota claimed represented the full amount of the judgment, prejudgment interest, and postjudgment interest due. Walser and McLaughlin refused to accept the check because it was $44.98 short of the full amount due. The district court initially entered an order directing them to accept the $276,-782.82. Toyota subsequently realized that the amount indeed was short, and the district court entered an amended order to increase the amount due by $44.09. Walser again rejected the payment claiming it was still $.89 short of the full amount due and that additional postjudgment interest continued to accrue. Walser asked the district court to amend its order again to reflect these additional amounts, but the district court refused to do so. Walser then filed an amended notice of appeal to include this issue.
II.
This is a diversity case governed by Minnesota law. We review the district court’s analysis of Minnesota law de novo. Salve Regina College v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 231, 111 S.Ct. 1217, 1220-21, 113 L.Ed.2d 190 (1991). Walser and McLaughlin raise eight issues in this appeal. 2 We will address them in the order presented in the briefs.
A.
Walser and McLaughlin’s principal argument in this appeal is that the district court erred in instructing the jury that damages on their promissory estoppel claim were limited to the out-of-pocket expenditures they made in reliance on Toyota’s promise. The jury awarded $232,131 in out-of-pocket expenses. Walser and McLaughlin argue that under Minnesota law, the court should have allowed the jury to consider awarding lost profits of up to $7,600,000 allegedly flowing from Toyota’s failure to keep its promise.
Minnesota has adopted the statement of the doctrine of promissory estoppel found at Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90 (1981). Christensen v. Minneapolis Mun. Employees Retirement Bd., 331 N.W.2d 740, *401 749 (Minn.1983). Section 90 provides, in relevant part:
A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise. The remedy granted for breach may be limited as justice requires.
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90(1) (1981); see also Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 479 N.W.2d 387, 391-92 (Minn.1992) (relying on and quoting from portions of section 90); Christensen, 331 N.W.2d at 749 (quoting section 90). Of particular significance to this case is the meaning of the last phrase of the quoted section: “The remedy granted for breach may be limited as justice requires.” The commentary to section 90 elaborates on the nature of the remedy available for breach based on promissory estoppel:
A promise binding under this section is a contract, and full-scale enforcement by normal remedies is often appropriate. But the same factors which bear on whether any relief should be granted also bear on the character and extent of the remedy. In particular, relief may sometimes be limited to restitution or to damages or specific relief measured by the extent of the promisee’s reliance rather than by the terms of the promise.
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90 cmt. d (emphasis added). Minnesota courts have incorporated the underlined language stating: “When a promise is enforced pursuant to section 90 ‘[t]he remedy granted for breach may be limited as justice requires.’ Relief may be limited to damages measured by the promisee’s reliance.” Grouse v. Group Health Plan, 306 N.W.2d 114, 116 (Minn.1981) (alterations in original) (emphasis added). The Minnesota Court of Appeals, relying on Grouse, further stated that “relief may be limited to the party’s out-of-pocket expenses made in reliance on the promise.” Dallum v. Farmers Union Cent. Exch., Inc., 462 N.W.2d 608, 613 (Minn.Ct.App.1990) (emphasis added).
The critical question in this case is whether the language of section 90 as interpreted by the Minnesota courts authorized the district court to limit damages to Walser and McLaughlin’s out-of-pocket expenses. We conclude that it did. This language is permissive — courts may limit relief as justice requires. The Minnesota Court of Appeals specifically stated that “relief may be limited to the party’s out-of-pocket expenses made in reliance on the promise.” Dallum, 462 N.W.2d at 613 (emphasis added). This permissive language and the Minnesota courts’ interpretation of it indicate to us that Minnesota courts, like the other courts addressing this issue, treat the damages decision under section 90 as being within the district court’s discretion. See, e.g., Chedd-Angier Prod. Co., Inc. v. Omni Publications Int'l, Ltd., 766 F.2d 930, 937 (1st Cir.1985) (in determining damages under section 90 “whether to charge full contract damages, or something less, is a matter of discretion delegated to district courts”); Green v. Interstate United Management Serv. Corp., 748 F.2d 827, 831 (3d Cir.1984) (concluding that district court did not abuse its “equitable discretion” under section 90 “in refusing to allow full-scale enforcement of the promise”); Signal Hill Aviation Co. v. Stroppe, 96 Cal.App.3d 627, 158 Cal.Rptr. 178, 186 (1979) (“California Supreme Court appeared to emphasize ... the exercise of judicial discretion in promissory estoppel cases to fashion relief to do justice”) (citing C & K Eng’g Contractors v. Amber Steel Co., 23 Cal.3d 1, 151 Cal.Rptr. 323, 587 P.2d 1136 (1978)); Gerson Elec. Constr. Co. v. Honeywell, Inc., 117 Ill.App.3d 309, 72 Ill.Dec. 851, 453 N.E.2d 726, 728 (1983) (decision under section 90 whether the damage award prevents injustice is a policy decision and “necessarily embraces an element of discretion”).
We are left then to determine only whether the district court abused its discretion in limiting the damages to out-of-pocket expenses. We will not disturb a district court’s discretionary decision if that decision remains within “the range of choice” available to the district court, accounts for all relevant factors, does not rely on any irrelevant factors, and does not constitute a “clear error of judgment.” Kern v. TXO Prod. Corp., 738 F.2d 968, 970 (8th Cir.1984). We *402 cannot find that the district court abused its discretion in limiting the award of damages on the promissory estoppel claim to out-of-pocket expenses.
The district court’s limitation of damages was within the “range of choices” approved by Minnesota courts and our court. The Minnesota Supreme Court has provided that “relief may be limited to damages measured by the promisee’s reliance.” Grouse, 306 N.W.2d at 116. We noted earlier that the Minnesota Court of Appeals specifically provided that “relief may be limited to the party’s out-of-pocket expenses made in reliance on the promise.” Dallum, 462 N.W.2d at 613. Similarly, we have observed that comment d to section 90 specifically states that “relief may sometimes be limited to restitution or to damages or specific relief measured by the extent of the promisee’s reliance rather than by the terms of the promise.” Westside Galvanizing Serv., Inc. v. Georgia-Pacific, Corp., 921 F.2d 735, 739 (8th Cir.1990) (quoting comment d). We went on to find that the district court “did not err” in limiting damages to the amount of reliance instead of the full unpaid balance. Id. at 740. Hence, we believe that the district court acted within the “range of choice” available under the law in instructing the jury on the remedy available after a finding of promissory estoppel. 3
Our review of the record also reveals that the district court did not make a “clear error of judgment” in finding that justice required limiting Walser and McLaughlin to out-of-pocket expenses. Toyota presented evidence that the dealership was far from a certainty and that Walser and McLaughlin would have great difficulty in meeting the capitalization requirements. The negotiations were still in a preliminary stage and broke down at that point. The promise on which they relied did not guarantee that they would get the dealership, as there were other conditions in the letter of intent that still would have had to be satisfied. Walser and McLaughlin could have relied on the promise for only a short period of time, as they were informed by Haag only a couple of days later that he had misinformed them about the status of the letter of intent. Moreover, Walser and McLaughlin have not demonstrated any opportunity they lost by virtue of relying on the promise by Toyota. Accordingly, the district court did not make a clear error of judgment in limiting Walser and McLaughlin’s damages on their promissory estoppel claim to out-of-pocket expenses.
We agree with Walser and McLaughlin that the district court is not required under Minnesota law to limit the remedy in promissory estoppel eases to out-of-pocket expenses. However, such a limitation is firmly within the range of choices available to the district court, and the district court is free to exercise its discretion in selecting the one which it believes best serves the interests of justice. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in electing to *403 limit Walser and McLaughlin’s recovery on their promissory estoppel claim to out-of-pocket expenses.
B.
Walser and McLaughlin next argue that the district court erred in limiting out-of-pocket expenses to “the difference between the actual value of the property and the price paid for it.” (Jury Instr. No. 84.) They argue that they should have been allowed to “recoup” at least the full amount of the “unamortized capital investments” they made in attempting to obtain the dealership. They claim the full value of their investment totals more than $1,000,000 including the $676,864 they paid for the land and the various expenses in maintaining it.
Athough not argued by the parties, we point out that the instruction Walser and McLaughlin complain about defines out-of-pocket expenses only in the damage instruction for fraud and misrepresentation. The promissory estoppel damage instruction provides only that damages are limited to out-of-pocket expenses with no further limitation on out-of-pocket expenses. Even if the fraud damage instruction could be read as a further limitation on promissory estoppel damages, the language of that instruction is not as limited as Walser and McLaughlin represent here. That instruction provides that out-of-pocket expenses are “the difference between the actual value of the property received and the price paid for it, together with such other damages as were naturally and directly caused by the fraud or misrepresentation.” (Jury Instr. No. 34.) (emphasis added). If that instruction defined promissory estoppel damages, the jury was still free to add any other damages directly caused by reliance on Toyota’s promise but simply chose not to do so in this case.
Moreover, we find no error in the district court’s instruction to the extent that it defined their out-of-pocket expenses to be only the difference between the actual value and the amount paid for the property. Such an instruction reflects the amount of damage Walser and McLaughlin suffered from relying on Toyota’s promise. ■ For example, while the purchase price of the land totalled $676,-864 Walser acknowledged in his trial testimony that .the land still had significant value, worth at least $550,000. (Tr. Vol. VI at 23-24.) Their damage from relying on Toyota’s promise is essentially the difference between the two amounts. Accordingly, the district court committed no error in instructing the jury on how to determine the damage award.
C.
Walser and McLaughlin next argue that the district court erred in declining to order specific performance of the dealership agreement as an alternative to the monetary award on their promissory estoppel claim. “Specific performance is an equitable remedy ... ‘addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court.’ ” Lilyerd v. Carlson, 499 N.W.2d 803, 811 (Minn.1993) (quoting Flynn v. Sawyer, 272 N.W.2d 904, 910 (Minn.1978)). The district court declined to order specific performance noting that the monetary damage award was adequate relief given the facts of this case. (Appellants’ App. at 815.) For the same reasons outlined above, we cannot find the district court’s decision to deny specific performance to be an abuse of discretion.
D.
Walser and McLaughlin next argue that the district court erred after trial by requiring them to accept payment from Toyota for less than the total amount of the judgment and interest due. Walser and McLaughlin’s complaint here, boiled down, is that the district court ordered them to accept payment from Toyota that was $.89 short of full compensation (plus whatever interest could accrue on $.89 in the 'three days between May 17, 1993, and May 20, 1993). Even if we assume that the district court erred by requiring Walser and McLaughlin to take $.89 less than they were lawfully entitled to, that error was harmless in this case because we cannot begin to perceive how the deprivation of $.89 harmed Walser and McLaughlin’s “substantial rights” in this case. See 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (in any appeal the court shall disregard “errors or defects which do not. affect the substantial rights of the parties”); *404 see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 61 (“The court at every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties”). This argument merits the phrase, de minimus non curat lex.
E.
Walser and McLaughlin next argue that the district court erred in denying their motion for judgment as a matter of law on their contract claim. We disagree. “Judgment as a matter of law is appropriate only when all of the evidence points one way and is ‘susceptible of no reasonable inference sustaining the position of the nonmoving party.’ ” Keenan v. Computer Assoc. Int’l, Inc., 13 F.3d 1266, 1269 (8th Cir.1994) (quoting White v. Pence, 961 F.2d 776, 779 (8th Cir.1992)). There is abundant evidence in this case which would sustain Toyota’s position that the letter of intent did not form a contract. First, the letter of intent was never delivered to or signed by Walser and McLaughlin. Moreover, the initial application for the dealership specified very clearly that there was no dealership contract until the final dealership agreement was formed. The parties never agreed otherwise. We conclude that the district court committed no error in allowing the jury to determine the breach of contract issue.
F.
Walser and McLaughlin next argue that the district court erred by declining to give two requested jury instructions dealing with the effect of the dealership application and its language indicating that no contract would be formed or would take effect until the dealership agreement was signed. They argue that the district court should have instructed the jury that a contract could be modified by oral agreement even if the parties specified in the contract that it could not be modified or, alternatively, that the dealership application itself was not a binding contract.
The district court decided not to give the oral modification instruction because it found that the application was not a written contract and that there was no evidence in the record of an oral agreement to modify. (Tr. Vol. IX at 2.) Walser and McLaughlin made no objection to the ruling and instead asked the court to give the alternative instruction that the dealership application itself was not a binding contract. The district court then denied the request for the alternative instruction, noting that “it is getting awfully close to the court reciting the facts, invading the province of the jury.” (Id. at 4.)
“We review jury instructions as a whole to determine whether they fairly and adequately instruct the jury as to the substantive law.” Brown v. Stites Concrete, Inc., 994 F.2d 553, 559 (8th Cir.1993). “The district court has wide discretion in the formulation of jury instructions.” Id. We find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in formulating the jury instructions in this case.
We first point out that Walser and McLaughlin made no timely objection to the district court’s decision not to give the oral modification instruction. Accordingly, review for plain error is appropriate. However, under any standard of review we find the district court committed no error in denying the instruction because there was no evidence of an oral modification in this case. “A party that fails to introduce sufficient evidence to support a jury instruction is not entitled to it.” First Dakota Nat’l Bank v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins., 2 F.3d 801, 815 (8th Cir.1993).
Similarly, we conclude the district court committed no error in denying Walser and McLaughlin’s request for an instruction that the dealership application was not a binding contract. First, there is no basis in the record for the instruction. Toyota never argued that the dealership application was a contract that Walser and McLaughlin should have legally enforced against them. It argued only that the dealership application was objective evidence that the parties fully understood that the dealership contract would be formed only upon both parties signing onto the dealership agreement. Moreover, we agree with the district court’s assessment that Walser and McLaughlin’s requested instruction would risk invading the jury’s province to determine the effect of the language *405 in the dealership application. See United States v. White Horse, 807 F.2d 1426, 1430-31 (8th Cir.1986) (reversing because trial court invaded jury’s province). Accordingly, we conclude that the district court committed no error in refusing Walser and McLaughlin’s requested instructions to support their contract claim.
G.
Walser and McLaughlin next argue that the district court erred by granting summary judgment to Toyota on their claim against Toyota under a provision of the Minnesota Motor Vehicle Sale and Distribution Regulations, which provides:
Notwithstanding the terms of any franchise agreement or waiver to the contrary, no manufacturer shall cancel, terminate, or fail to renew any franchise relationship with a licensed new motor vehicle dealer unless the manufacturer has:
(a) satisfied the notice requirement of section 80E.08;
(b) acted in good faith as defined in section 80E.03, subdivision 9; and
(c) good cause for the cancellation, termination, or nonrenewal.
Minn.Stat. § 80E.06(1) (West Supp.1994). Walser and McLaughlin alleged that Toyota cancelled or terminated their Lexus franchise without notice or good cause.
Summary judgment is mandatory under Rule 56(c) “against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). We review the district court’s summary judgment decision de novo using the same standards as the district court. Egan v. Wells Fargo Alarm Serv., 23 F.3d 1444, 1446 (8th Cir.1994). We conclude that the district court committed no error because summary judgment was mandatory here given the fact that Walser and McLaughlin failed to establish that they were qualified for the protection they sought from the Motor Vehicle Franchise statutes.
The cancellation/termination provision to which Walser and McLaughlin look does not apply in this case because Walser and McLaughlin are not “new motor vehicle dealers” as defined in the statute. See Minn. Stat. § 80E.02 (80E.01-80E.17 apply only to new motor vehicle dealers). “New motor vehicle dealer” is defined as a person holding “a valid sales and service agreement, franchise, or contract, granted by a manufacturer, distributor, or wholesaler for the sale of its motor vehicles.” Minn.Stat. 80E.03(3). In their verified complaint, Walser and McLaughlin alleged Toyota had granted them a “franchise.” “Franchise” is defined as “written agreement or contract” between the manufacturer and dealer. Minn.Stat. § 80E.03(8).
We conclude that Walser and McLaughlin failed to present any evidence that they had a “vnitten agreement or contract,” id. (emphasis added), which is a necessary element of the breach of the Motor Vehicle Franchise Statute they pleaded. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court committed no error in granting summary judgment to Toyota.
H.
Walser and McLaughlin’s final argument is that the district court’s procedure for taxing costs is contrary to law. We need not reach the issue, however, as they did not raise it before the district court.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.
. The Honorable Robert G. Renner, Senior United States District Judge for the District of Minnesota.
. At oral argument, the parties only addressed the first issue, which both recognized as the most important in the appeal. Hence, we will treat that claim with the most attention in deciding this appeal.
. An illustration provided by the Restatement itself provides additional support for the district court’s decision:
A, who owns and operates a bakery, desires to go into the grocery business. He approaches B, a franchisor of supermarkets. B states to A that for $18,000 B will establish A in a store. B also advises A to move to another town and buy a small grocery to gain experience. A does so. Later B advises A to sell the grocery, which A does, taking a capital loss and foregoing expected profits from the summer tourist trade. B also advises A to sell his bakery to raise capital for the supermarket franchise saying "Everything is ready to go. Get your money together and we are set.” A sells the bakery taking a capital loss on this sale as well. Still later, B tells A that considerably more than an $18,000 investment will be needed, and the negotiations between the parties collapse. At the point of collapse many details of the proposed agreement between the parties are unresolved. The assurances from B to A are promises on which B reasonably should have expected A to rely, and A is entitled to his actual losses on the sales of the bakery and for his moving and temporary living expenses. Since the proposed agreement was never made, however, A is not entitled to lost profits from the sale of the grocery or to his expectation interest in the proposed franchise from B.
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90 cmt. d, illus. 10 (emphasis added). This illustration provides a close analogy to our case and further indicates that the district court correctly denied the recovery of lost profits because the "proposed agreement was never made” in this case. Walser and McLaughlin were still in the negotiation stages with Toyota when the deal broke down, and the jury found for Toyota on the breach of contract claim.
13.5 Restitution 13.5 Restitution
13.5.1 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 373 13.5.1 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 373
§ 373 Restitution When Other Party Is in Breach
-
(1) Subject to the rule stated in Subsection (2), on a breach by non-performance that gives rise to a claim for damages for total breach or on a repudiation, the injured party is entitled to restitution for any benefit that he has conferred on the other party by way of part performance or reliance.
-
(2) The injured party has no right to restitution if he has performed all of his duties under the contract and no performance by the other party remains due other than payment of a definite sum of money for that performance.
-
Illustrations:
-
1. A contracts to sell a tract of land to B for $100,000. After B has made a part payment of $20,000, A wrongfully refuses to transfer title. B can recover the $20,000 in restitution. The result is the same even if the market price of the land is only $70,000, so that performance would have been disadvantageous to B.
-
2. A contracts to build a house for B for $100,000, progress payments to be made monthly. After having been paid $40,000 for two months, A commits a breach that is not material by inadvertently using the wrong brand of sewer pipe. B has a claim for damages for partial breach but cannot recover the $40,000 that he has paid A.
-
3. On February 1, A and B make a contract under which, as consideration for B's immediate payment of $50,000, A promises to convey to B a parcel of land on May 1. On March 1, A repudiates by selling the parcel to C. On April 1, B commences an action against C. Although under the rule stated in § 253(1), B has no claim against A for damages for breach of contract until performance is due on May 1, B can recover $50,000 from A in restitution. See Illustration 4 to § 253.
-
4. A, who holds a mortgage on B's land, promises B that he will not foreclose the mortgage for another year, even if B makes no payments. In reliance on A's promise, B makes valuable improvements. A forecloses in breach of his promise and buys the land at a judicial sale for the amount of the mortgage debt. B can recover in restitution for the value of the improvements. Compare Illustration 1 to § 370; see also Illustration 12 to § 90.
-
-
Illustrations:
-
5. A contracts to work for B for one month for $10,000. After A has fully performed, B repudiates the contract and refuses to pay the $10,000. A can get damages against B for $10,000, together with interest, but cannot recover more than that sum even if he can show that the benefit to B from the services was greater than $10,000.
-
6. A contracts to sell a tract of land to B for $100,000. After B has paid the full $100,000, A repudiates and refuses to transfer title. B has a right to $100,000 in restitution.
-
7. A contracts to build a building for B in return for B's promise to transfer a tract of land to A and to pay $10,000. After A has built the building, B refuses to transfer title or to pay the $10,000. A has a right to the reasonable value of his work and materials.
-
-
Illustrations:
-
8. A contracts to work as a consultant for B for a fee of $50,000, payable at the end of the year, together with a payment of $200 a month for A's use of his own car and reimbursement of A's expenses. B wrongfully discharges A at the end of six months. A cannot recover in restitution for the use of his car or for his expenses, but can recover for these items as provided in the contract. As to his recovery for his services, see Illustration 12.
-
9. A contracts to build a house for B for $50,000, progress payments to be made monthly in an amount equal to 85% of the price of the work performed during the preceding month, the balance to be paid on the architect's certificate of satisfactory completion of the house. B makes the first three payments and then repudiates the contract and has another builder finish the house. A can recover in restitution for the reasonable value of his work, labor and materials, less the amount of the three payments. The performance during each month and the corresponding progress payments are not agreed equivalents under the rule stated in § 240. See Illustration 7 to § 240.
-
-
Illustrations:
-
10. A, a plumbing subcontractor, contracts with B, a general contractor, to install the plumbing in a factory being built by B for C. B promises to pay A $100,000. After A has spent $40,000, B repudiates the contract and has the plumbing finished by another subcontractor at a cost of $80,000. The market price to have a similar plumbing subcontractor do the work done by A is $40,000. A can recover the $40,000 from B in restitution.
-
11. A contracts to build a house for B for $100,000. After A has spent $40,000, B discovers that he does not have good title to the land on which the house is to be built. B repudiates the contract and abandons the project. A's work results in no actual benefit to B. A cannot recover in restitution from B, but under the rule stated in § 349 he can recover as damages the $40,000 that he has spent unless B proves with reasonable certainty that A would have sustained a net loss if the contract had been performed. See Illustration 4 to § 349.
-
12. A contracts to work as a consultant for B for a fee of $50,000, payable at the end of the year. B wrongfully discharges A at the end of eleven months. A can recover in restitution based on the reasonable value of his services. The terms of the contract are evidence of this value but are not conclusive.
-
-
Illustration:
-
13. A contracts to build a bridge for B for $100,000. B repudiates the contract shortly after A has begun work on the bridge, telling A that he no longer has need for it. A nevertheless spends an additional $10,000 in continuing to perform. A's restitution interest under the rule stated in § 370 does not include the benefit conferred on B by the $10,000. See Illustration 1 to § 350.
-
13.5.2 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 374 13.5.2 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 374
§ 374 Restitution in Favor of Party in Breach
-
(1) Subject to the rule stated in Subsection (2), if a party justifiably refuses to perform on the ground that his remaining duties of performance have been discharged by the other party's breach, the party in breach is entitled to restitution for any benefit that he has conferred by way of part performance or reliance in excess of the loss that he has caused by his own breach.
-
(2) To the extent that, under the manifested assent of the parties, a party's performance is to be retained in the case of breach, that party is not entitled to restitution if the value of the performance as liquidated damages is reasonable in the light of the anticipated or actual loss caused by the breach and the difficulties of proof of loss.
-
Illustrations:
-
1. A contracts to sell land to B for $100,000, which B promises to pay in $10,000 installments before transfer of title. After B has paid $30,000 he fails to pay the remaining installments and A sells the land to another buyer for $95,000. B can recover $30,000 from A in restitution less $5,000 damages for B's breach of contract, or $25,000. If A does not sell the land to another buyer and obtains a decree of specific performance against B, B has no right to restitution.
-
2. A contracts to make repairs to B's building in return for B's promise to pay $10,000 on completion of the work. After spending $8,000 on the job, A fails to complete it because of insolvency. B has the work completed by another builder for $4,000, increasing the value of the building to him by a total of $9,000, but he loses $500 in rent because of the delay. A can recover $5,000 from B in restitution less $500 in damages for the loss caused by the breach, or $4,500.
-
3. A contracts to make repairs to B's building in return for B's promise to pay $10,000 on completion of the work. A makes repairs costing him $8,000 but inadvertently fails to follow the specifications in such material respects that there is no substantial performance. See Comment d to § 237. The defects cannot be corrected without the destruction of large parts of the building, but the work confers a benefit on B by increasing the value of the building to him by $4,000. A can recover $4,000 from B in restitution.
-
4. The facts being otherwise as stated in Illustration 3, the defects do not require destruction of large parts of the building and can be corrected for $4,000, which will confer a benefit on B by increasing the value of the building to him by a total of $9,000. A can recover $5,000 from B in restitution.
-
5. A contracts to tutor B's son for six months in preparation for an examination, in return for which B promises to pay A $2,000 at the end of that time. After A has worked for three months, he leaves to take another job and B is unable to find a suitable replacement. In the absence of any reliable basis for measuring the benefit to B from A's part performance, restitution will be denied.
-
-
Illustrations:
-
6. The facts being otherwise as stated in Illustration 1, the contract provides that on default by B, A has the right to retain the first $10,000 installment paid by B. If $10,000 is a reasonable amount, B can recover only $20,000 from A in restitution.
-
7. The facts being otherwise as stated in Illustration 1, the contract provides that on default by B, A has the right to retain any installments paid by B. The provision is not valid, and B can still recover $30,000 from A in restitution less $5,000 damages for B's breach of contract, or $25,000.
-
13.5.3 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 375 13.5.3 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 375
§ 375 Restitution When Contract Is Within Statute of Frauds
-
Illustrations:
-
1. A makes an oral contract to furnish services to B that are not to be performed within a year (§ 130). After A has worked for two months B discharges him without paying him anything. A can recover from B as restitution the reasonable value of the services rendered during the two months.
-
2. A makes an oral contract to sell a tract of land to B for $100,000 (§ 125). B pays $50,000, takes possession and makes improvements. A then refuses to convey the land to B, and B sues A for restitution of $50,000 plus $20,000, the reasonable value of the improvements, less $5,000, the value to B of the use of the land. B can recover $65,000 from A.
-
3. A, a home owner, makes an oral contract with B, a real estate broker, to pay B the usual 5% commission if B succeeds in selling A's house. The state Statute of Frauds contains a provision providing that a real estate broker shall have no right to such a commission unless there is a written memorandum of the contract. B sells A's house for $100,000 and sues A in restitution for $5,000, the reasonable value of B's services. B cannot recover in restitution because the purpose of the Statute would be frustrated if B were allowed to recover as restitution the same amount that had been promised under the contract.
-
-
Illustration:
-
4. A makes an oral contract to buy a tract of land from B for $100,000 (§ 125). Payment is to be made in $10,000 installments, conveyance to be made on the payment of the third installment. A pays $10,000 and then refuses to pay any more and sues B to recover in restitution the $10,000 that he has paid. If B signs a sufficient memorandum, A's refusal to pay is a defense to his action under the rule stated in § 141(1) and A cannot get restitution. See Illustration 6 to § 374. If B refuses to sign a sufficient memorandum, A's refusal to pay is not a defense under the rule stated in § 141(2) and A can get restitution. See Illustration 1 to § 373.
-
13.5.4 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 376 13.5.4 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 376
§ 376 Restitution When Contract Is Voidable
-
A party who has avoided a contract on the ground of lack of capacity, mistake, misrepresentation, duress, undue influence or abuse of a fiduciary relation is entitled to restitution for any benefit that he has conferred on the other party by way of part performance or reliance.
-
Illustrations:
-
1. A contracts to sell an automobile to B, an infant, for $2,000. After A has delivered the automobile and B has paid the $2,000, B disaffirms the contract on the ground of infancy (§ 14), tenders the automobile back to A, and sues A for $2,000. B can recover the $2,000 from A in restitution.
-
2. A contracts to sell and B to buy for $100,000 a tract of land, the value of which has depended mainly on the timber on it. Both A and B believe that the timber is still there, but in fact it has been destroyed by fire. After A has conveyed the land to B and B has paid the $100,000, B discovers the mistake. B disaffirms the contract for mistake (§ 152), tenders a deed to the land to A, and sues A for $100,000. B can recover $100,000 from A in restitution. See Illustration 1 to § 152.
-
3. A submits a $150,000 offer in response to B's invitation for bids on the construction of a building. A believes that this is the total of a column of figures, but he has made an error by inadvertently omitting $50,000, and in fact the total is $200,000. Because B had estimated the expected cost as $180,000 and the 10 other bids were all in the range between $180,000 and $200,000, B had reason to know of A's mistake. A discovers the mistake after he has done part of the work, disaffirms the contract on the ground of mistake (§ 153), and sues B in restitution for the benefit conferred on B as measured by the reasonable value of A's performance. A can recover the reasonable value of his performance in restitution and if the cost of the work done can be determined under the next lowest bid, that cost is evidence of its reasonable value. See Illustration 9 to § 153.
-
4. A fraudulently induces B to make a contract to buy a tract of land for $100,000. After A has conveyed the land and B has paid the price, B makes improvements on the land with a reasonable value of $20,000. B then discovers the fraud, disaffirms the contract for misrepresentation (§ 164), tenders a deed to the land to A, and sues A for $100,000 plus $20,000, the reasonable value of the improvements, less $5,000, the value to B of the use of the land. B can recover $115,000 in restitution from A. See Illustration 1 to § 164.
-
5. A fraudulently induces B to make a contract to sell a tract of land for $100,000. After B has conveyed the land and A has paid the price, A farms the land at a net profit of $10,000. B then discovers the fraud, disaffirms the contract for misrepresentation, tenders back the $100,000, and sues A for specific restitution plus the $10,000 profit that A made by farming the land. B can recover the land and $10,000 in restitution from A.
-
13.5.5 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 377 13.5.5 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 377
§ 377 Restitution in Cases of Impracticability, Frustration, Non-Occurrence of Condition or Disclaimer by Beneficiary
-
A party whose duty of performance does not arise or is discharged as a result of impracticability of performance, frustration of purpose, non-occurrence of a condition or disclaimer by a beneficiary is entitled to restitution for any benefit that he has conferred on the other party by way of part performance or reliance.
-
Illustrations:
-
1. A contracts to employ B as a confidential secretary for a month for $2,000, to be paid at the end of that time. B falls ill after working for two weeks and the duties of performance of both A and B are discharged as a result of impracticability of performance (§ 262). B is entitled to restitution from A for the services that he has performed. See Illustration 1 to § 262. The result is the same if B's duty is discharged as a result of A's illness rather than B's. See Illustration 2 to § 262.
-
2. A contracts to employ B as a confidential secretary for a month for $2,000, to be paid in advance. B falls ill after A has paid the $2,000 but before B has begun work and the duties of performance of both A and B are discharged as a result of impracticability of performance (§ 262). A is entitled to restitution of $2,000 from B. If B had fallen ill after working for two weeks, B would also be entitled to restitution from A for the services that he has performed.
-
3. A contracts to sell and B to buy a house for $50,000, conditional on approval by X Bank of B's pending mortgage application. B pays A $5,000 when the contract is signed. In spite of reasonable efforts by B, the X Bank does not approve his application and his duty of performance is discharged (§ 225). B is entitled to restitution of $5,000 from A. See Illustration 8 to § 225.
-
-
Illustrations:
-
4. A contracts with B to shingle the roof of B's house for $5,000, payable as the work progresses. After A has spent $2,000 doing part of the work and has been paid $1,800, much of the house including the roof is destroyed by fire without his fault, and the duties of performance of both A and B are discharged as a result of impracticability of performance (§ 263). The work done before the fire increased the market price and the insurable value of the house by $1,500. A is entitled to restitution of $1,500 from B and B is entitled to restitution of $1,800 from A. See Illustration 3 to § 263.
-
5. The facts being otherwise as stated in Illustration 4, the fire also destroyed shingles that had cost A $500 and that were piled near the house for the rest of the work. A is not entitled to restitution of this loss from B. Nor can A subtract the $500 from the $1,800 he has been paid in determining the benefit that he has received. The court may, however, take this loss into consideration in deciding whether to allow A restitution of $1,500 or $2,000. See also § 272.
-
6. A contracts to paint some bizarre frescoes in B's house for $10,000. The frescoes will not increase the market value of the house. A dies after the frescoes have been partly completed. Other artists can adequately complete the work and will do so for $6,000. A's executors are entitled to restitution of $4,000 from B. If they can prove that A's price was unusually low because of A's lack of employment and an economic depression and that the work was roughly half finished, the court may properly allow restitution of $5,000.
-
7. A contracts to tutor B's son for six months in preparation for an examination, in return for which B promises to pay A $2,000 at the end of that time. After A has worked for three months, B's son becomes ill and the duties of performance of both A and B are discharged as a result of impracticability of performance. Other tutors would have charged $800 to do the work that A has done. A is entitled to restitution of $800 from B. Even if other tutors would have charged $1,200, A is entitled to restitution of only $1,000 from B unless he can show that the first half of the work was more burdensome.
-
13.5.6 United States v. Algernon Blair, Inc. 13.5.6 United States v. Algernon Blair, Inc.
UNITED STATES of America, for the use of Coastal Steel Erectors, Inc., Appellant,
v.
ALGERNON BLAIR, INCORPORATED, and United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company, Appellees.
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
[639] Morris D. Rosen, Charleston, S. C. (George B. Bishop, Moncks Corner, S. C., on brief) for appellant.
[640] Herman H. Hamilton, Jr., Montgomery, Ala., and Ben Scott Whaley, Charleston, S. C. (Nathaniel L. Barnwell, Charleston, S. C., on brief) for appellees.
Before HAYNSWORTH, Chief Judge, BRYAN, Senior Circuit Judge, and CRAVEN, Circuit Judge.
CRAVEN, Circuit Judge:
May a subcontractor, who justifiably ceases work under a contract because of the prime contractor's breach, recover in quantum meruit the value of labor and equipment already furnished pursuant to the contract irrespective of whether he would have been entitled to recover in a suit on the contract? We think so, and, for reasons to be stated, the decision of the district court will be reversed.
The subcontractor, Coastal Steel Erectors, Inc., brought this action under the provisions of the Miller Act, 40 U.S.C.A. § 270a et seq., in the name of the United States against Algernon Blair, Inc., and its surety, United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company. Blair had entered a contract with the United States for the construction of a naval hospital in Charleston County, South Carolina. Blair had then contracted with Coastal to perform certain steel erection and supply certain equipment in conjunction with Blair's contract with the United States. Coastal commenced performance of its obligations, supplying its own cranes for handling and placing steel. Blair refused to pay for crane rental, maintaining that it was not obligated to do so under the subcontract. Because of Blair's failure to make payments for crane rental, and after completion of approximately 28 percent of the subcontract, Coastal terminated its performance. Blair then proceeded to complete the job with a new subcontractor. Coastal brought this action to recover for labor and equipment furnished.
The district court found that the subcontract required Blair to pay for crane use and that Blair's refusal to do so was such a material breach as to justify Coastal's terminating performance. This finding is not questioned on appeal. The court then found that under the contract the amount due Coastal, less what had already been paid, totaled approximately $37,000. Additionally, the court found Coastal would have lost more than $37,000 if it had completed performance. Holding that any amount due Coastal must be reduced by any loss it would have incurred by complete performance of the contract, the court denied recovery to Coastal. While the district court correctly stated the "`normal' rule of contract damages,"[1] we think Coastal is entitled to recover in quantum meruit.[2]
In United States for Use of Susi Contracting Co. v. Zara Contracting Co., 146 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1944), a Miller Act action, the court was faced with a situation similar to that involved here—the prime contractor had unjustifiably breached a subcontract after partial performance by the subcontractor. The court stated:
For it is an accepted principle of contract law, often applied in the case of construction contracts, that the promisee upon breach has the option to forego any suit on the contract and claim only the reasonable value of his performance.
146 F.2d at 610. The Tenth Circuit has also stated that the right to seek recovery under quantum meruit in a Miller [641] Act case is clear.[3] Quantum meruit recovery is not limited to an action against the prime contractor but may also be brought against the Miller Act surety, as in this case.[4] Further, that the complaint is not clear in regard to the theory of a plaintiff's recovery does not preclude recovery under quantum meruit. Narragansett Improvement Co. v. United States, 290 F.2d 577 (1st Cir. 1961). A plaintiff may join a claim for quantum meruit with a claim for damages from breach of contract.[5]
In the present case, Coastal has, at its own expense, provided Blair with labor and the use of equipment. Blair, who breached the subcontract, has retained these benefits without having fully paid for them. On these facts, Coastal is entitled to restitution in quantum meruit.
The "restitution interest," involving a combination of unjust impoverishment with unjust gain, presents the strongest case for relief. If, following Aristotle, we regard the purpose of justice as the maintenance of an equilibrium of goods among members of society, the restitution interest presents twice as strong a claim to judicial intervention as the reliance interest, since if A not only causes B to lose one unit but appropriates that unit to himself, the resulting discrepancy between A and B is not one unit but two.
Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 46 Yale L.J. 52, 56 (1936).[6]
The impact of quantum meruit is to allow a promisee to recover the value of services he gave to the defendant irrespective of whether he would have lost money on the contract and been unable to recover in a suit on the contract. Scaduto v. Orlando, 381 F.2d 587, 595 (2d Cir. 1967). The measure of recovery for quantum meruit is the reasonable value of the performance, Restatement of Contracts § 347 (1932); and recovery is undiminished by any loss which would have been incurred by complete performance. 12 Williston on Contracts § 1485, at 312 (3d ed. 1970). While the contract price may be evidence of reasonable value of the services, it does not measure the value of the performance or limit recovery.[7] Rather, the standard for measuring the reasonable value of the services rendered is the amount for which such services could have been purchased from one in the plaintiff's position at the time and place the services were rendered.[8]
[642] Since the district court has not yet accurately determined the reasonable value of the labor and equipment use furnished by Coastal to Blair, the case must be remanded for those findings.[9] When the amount has been determined, judgment will be entered in favor of Coastal, less payments already made under the contract. Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, the decision of the district court is
Reversed and remanded with instructions.
[1] Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 46 Yale L.J. 52 (1936); Restatement of Contracts § 333 (1932).
[2] Where there is a distinction between federal and state substantive law, federal law controls in actions under the Miller Act. United States for Use and Benefit of Astro Cleaning & Packaging Co. v. Jamison Co., 425 F.2d 1281, 1282 n. 1 (6th Cir. 1970). But in this case the result would be the same, we think, under either state or federal law. Compare United States for Use of Susi Contracting Co. v. Zara Contracting Co., 146 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1944), with Gantt v. Morgan, 199 S.C. 138, 18 S.E.2d 672 (1942).
[3] Southern Painting Co. v. United States, 222 F.2d 431, 433 (10th Cir. 1955). See also Great Lakes Constr. Co. v. Republic Creosoting Co., 139 F.2d 456 (8th Cir. 1943) (dealing with a prior statute).
[4] Central Steel Erection Co. v. Will, 304 F.2d 548, 552 (9th Cir. 1962); Zara Contracting, 146 F.2d at 612. This is consistent with the liberal construction which is given to the Miller Act to effectuate its protective purposes. See United States ex rel. Sherman v. Carter, 353 U.S. 210, 216-217, 77 S.Ct. 793, 1 L.Ed.2d 776 (1957).
[5] North Am. Graphite Corp. v. Allan, 87 U.S.App.D.C. 154, 184 F.2d 387, 389 (1950); 12 Williston on Contracts § 1469, at 210 (3d ed. 1970).
[6] This case also comes within the requirements of the Restatements for recovery in quantum meruit. Restatement of Restitution § 107 (1937); Restatement of Contracts §§ 347-357 (1932).
[7]Scaduto v. Orlando, 381 F.2d 587, 595-596 (2d Cir. 1967); St. Paul-Mercury Indem. Co. v. United States ex rel. Jones, 238 F.2d 917, 924 (10th Cir. 1956); United States for Use of Susi Contracting Co. v. Zara Contracting Co., 146 F.2d 606, 610-611 (2d Cir. 1944).
It should be noted, however, that in suits for restitution there are many cases permitting the plaintiff to recover the value of benefits conferred on the defendant, even though this value exceeds that of the return performance promised by the defendant. In these cases it is no doubt felt that the defendant's breach should work a forfeiture of his right to retain the benefits of an advantageous bargain.
Fuller & Perdue, supra at 77.
[8] See United States for Use of F. E. Robinson Co. v. Alpha-Continental, 273 F.Supp. 758, 777 (E.D.N.C.1967), aff'd 404 F.2d 343 (4th Cir. 1968), and aff'd sub nom. Ling Elec., Inc. v. Federal Ins. Co., 406 F.2d 561 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 922, 89 S.Ct. 1774, 23 L.Ed.2d 239 (1969), and the cases cited in note 7, supra.
[9] Under the view of the case taken by the district court it was unnecessary to precisely appraise the value of services and materials rendered; an approximation was thought to suffice because the hypothetical loss had the contract been fully performed was greater in amount.
13.5.7 Lancellotti v. Thomas 13.5.7 Lancellotti v. Thomas
John LANCELLOTTI, Appellant, v. Albert THOMAS and Lillian Thomas.
Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
Argued March 21, 1984.
Filed March 22, 1985.
*2 Irwin Paul, Philadelphia, for appellant.
James G. Buckler, Upper Darby, for appellees.
SPAETH, President Judge:
This appeal raises the question of whether a defaulting purchaser of a business who has also entered into a related lease for the property can recover any part of his payments made prior to default. The common law rule precluded a breaching buyer from recovering these payments. Today, we reject this rule, which created a forfeiture of the breaching buyer’s payments and unjustly enriched the nonbreaching seller, and adopt § 374 of the Restatement (Second) Contracts (1979), which permits limited restitution. This case is remanded for further proceedings so that the trial court may apply the Restatement rule.
*3-l-
On July 25, 1973, the parties entered into an agreement in which appellant agreed to purchase appellees’ luncheonette business and to rent from appellees the premises on which the business was located. Appellant agreed to buy the name of the business, the goodwill, and equipment; the inventory and real estate were not included in the agreement for the sale of the business. Appellees agreed to sell the business for the following consideration: $25,000 payable on signing of the agreement; appellant’s promise that only he would own and operate the business; and appellant’s promise to build an addition to the existing building, which would measure 16 feet by 16 feet, cost at least $15,000, and be 75 percent complete by May 1, 1973.1
It was also agreed that appellees would lease appellant the property on which the business was operated for a period of five years, with appellant having the option of an additional five-year term. The rent was $8,000 per year for a term from September 1, 1973, to August 31, 1978. A separate lease providing for this rental was executed by the parties on the same date that the agreement was executed. This lease specified that the agreement to build the existing building was a condition of the lease. In exchange for appellant’s promise to build the addition, there was to be no rental charge for the property until August 31, 1973. Further, if the addition was not constructed as agreed, the lease would terminate automatically. An addendum, executed by the parties on August 14, 1973, modified this agreement, providing that “if the addition to the building as described in the Agreement is not constructed in accordance with the Agreement, the Buyer shall owe the Sellers $6,665 as rental for the property ...” for the period from July 25, 1973, to the end of that summer season. The addendum also provided that all the equipment would revert to appellees upon the appellant’s default in regard to the addition.
Appellant paid appellees the $25,000 as agreed, and began to operate the business. However, at the end of the 1973 *4season, problems arose regarding the construction of the addition. Appellant claims that the building permit necessary to construct the addition was denied. Appellees claim that they obtained the building permit and presented it to appellant, who refused to begin construction. Additionally appellees claim that appellant agreed to reimburse them if they built the addition. At a cost of approximately $11,000, appellees did build a 20 feet by 40 feet addition. In the spring of 1974 appellees discovered that appellant was no longer interested in operating the business. There is no evidence in the record that appellant paid any rent from September 1, 1973, as the first rental payment was not due until May 15, 1974. Appellees resumed possession of the business and, upon opening the business for the 1974 summer season, found some of their equipment missing.
Appellant’s complaint in assumpsit demanded that appellees return the $25,000 plus interest. Appellees denied that appellant was entitled to recovery of this sum and counterclaimed for damages totalling $52,000: $6,665 as rental for the property for the 1973 summer season and the remainder as compensation for “grievous damage to [appellees’] business, its goodwill and its physical operation ...” and appellee Lillian Thomas suffering “nervous illness, pain and suffering inclusive of serious bodily injury and necessitating bed rest and physicians’ supervision for one year after [appellant’s] default.” Defendants’ Counterclaim and New Matter, paras. 9-11. In his answer, Appellant only conceded liability for the $6,665 rent under the terms of the addendum. Plaintiff’s Answer to Counterclaim and New Matter, para. 9. The trial court, sitting without a jury, found against appellant on the original claim, allowing appellees to retain the $25,000 paid by appellant, and for appellees on the counterclaim, allowing them to recover the $6,665 rent.
-2-
At one time the common law rule prohibiting a defaulting party on a contract from recovering was the majority rule. J. Calamari and J. Perillo, The Law of Contracts § 11-26, at *5427 (2d ed. 1977). However, a line of cases, apparently beginning with Britton v. Turner, 6 N.H. 481 (1834), departed from the common law rule. The merit of the common law rule was its recognition that the party who breaches should not be allowed “to have advantage from his own wrong.” Corbin, The Right of a Defaulting Vendee to the Restitution of Instalments Paid, 40 Yale L.J. 1013, 1014 (1931). As Professor Perillo states, allowing recovery “invites contract-breaking and rewards morally unworthy conduct.” Restitution in the Second Restatement of Contracts, 81 Colum.L.Rev. 37, 50 (1981). Its weakness, however, was its failure to recognize that the nonbreaching party should not obtain a windfall from the breach. The party who breaches after almost completely performing should not be more severely penalized than the party who breaches by not acting at all or after only beginning to act. Under the common law rule the injured party retains more benefit the more completely the breaching party has performed prior to the default. Thus it has been said that “to allow the injured party to retain the benefit of the part performance ..., without making restitution of any part of such value, is the enforcement of a penalty or forfeiture against the contract-breaker.” Corbin, supra, at 1013.
Critics of the common law rule have been arguing for its demise for over fifty years. See Corbin, supra. See also Calamari and Perillo, supra, at § 11-26; 5A Corbin on Contracts §§ 1122-1135 (1964); 12 S. Williston, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts §§ 1473-78 (3d ed. 1970). In response to this criticism an alternative rule has been adopted in the Restatement of Contracts.
The first Restatement of Contracts (1932) adopted the following rule:
§ 357. Restitution in Favor of a Plaintiff Who Is Himself In Default.
(1) Where the defendant fails or refuses to perform his contract and is justified therein by the plaintiffs own breach of duty or non-performance of a condition, but the plaintiff has rendered a part performance under the contract that is a net benefit to the defendant, the plaintiff *6can get judgment, except as stated in Subsection (2), for the amount of such benefit in excess of the harm that he has caused to the defendant by his own breach, in no case exceeding a ratable proportion of the agreed compensation, if
(a) the plaintiffs breach or non-performance is not wilful and deliberate; or
(b) the defendant, with knowledge that the plaintiffs breach of duty or non-performance of condition has occurred or will thereafter occur, assents to the rendition of the part performance, or accepts the benefit of it, or retains property received although its return in specie is still not unreasonably difficult or injurious.
(2) The plaintiff has no right to compensation for his part performance if it is merely a payment of earnest money, or if the contract provides that it may be retained and it is not so greatly in excess of the defendant’s harm that the provision is rejected as imposing a penalty.
(3) The measure of the defendant’s benefit from the plaintiff’s part performance is the amount by which he has been enriched as a result of such performance unless the facts are those stated in Subsection (lb), in which case it is the price fixed by the contract for such part performance, or, if no price is so fixed, a ratable proportion of the total contract price.
In 1979, this rule was liberalized. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 374 (1979) provides:
§ 374. Restitution in Favor of Party in Breach
(1) Subject to the rule stated in Subsection (2), if a party justifiably refuses to perform on the ground that his remaining duties of performance have been discharged by the other party’s breach, the party in breach is entitled to restitution for any benefit that he has conferred by way of part performance or reliance in excess of the loss that he has caused by his own breach.
(2) To the extent that, under the manifested assent of the parties, a party’s performance is to be retained in the case of breach, that party is not entitled to restitution if *7the value of the performance as liquidated damages is reasonable in the light of the anticipated or actual loss caused by the breach and the difficulties of proof of loss.
Thus the first Restatement’s exclusion of the willful defaulting purchaser from recovery was deleted, apparently in part due to the influence of the Uniform Commercial Code’s permitting recovery by a buyer who willfully defaults.2 Id., Reporter’s Note at 218. Professor Perillo suggests that the injured party has adequate protection without the common law rule.3 Choosing “the just path,” he therefore rejects the common law rule, explaining this choice by saying that times have changed. “What appears to be just to one generation may be viewed differently by another.” Perillo, supra, at 50. See also 12 S. Williston, supra, § 1473, at 222 (“The mores of the time and place will often determine which policy will be followed.”).
*8Many jurisdictions have rejected the common law rule and permit recovery by the defaulting party. See, e.g., Amtorg Trading Corp. v. Miehle Printing Press and Manufacturing Co., 206 F.2d 103 (2d Cir.1953) (noting with approval § 357 of Restatement (First) of Contracts); Nordin Construction Company v. City of Nome, 489 P.2d 455 (Alaska 1971) (citing with approval § 357 of Restatement (First) of Contracts in analyzing a theory of recovery based on unjust enrichment); Freedman v. Rector, Wardens, Vestrymen of St. Mathias Parish, 37 Cal.2d 16, 230 P.2d 629 (1951); Boyce Construction Corp. v. District Board of Trustees of Valencia Community College, 414 So.2d 634 (Fla.Dist.Ct. App.1982) (following rule stated in § 374, Restatement (Second) of Contracts); Nelson v. Hazel, 91 Idaho 850, 433 P.2d 120 (1967) (negligent contractor can recover for benefits conferred, citing comment c of Restatement (First) of Contracts § 357); Broersma v. Sinor, 106 Idaho 155, 676 P.2d 730 (Idaho App.1984) (approving the rule in Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 374); Washington v. Claassen, 218 Kan. 577, 545 P.2d 387 (1976) (breaching purchaser of land cannot obtain recovery where vendor able and willing to perform, citing comment on § 357 Restatement (First) of Contracts); Kitchin v. Mori, 84 Nev. 181, 437 P.2d 865 (1968) (adopting rule of Restatement (First) of Contracts § 357 and holding that even a willful vendee who defaults can recover); Newcomb v. Ray, 99 N.H. 463, 114 A.2d 882 (1955) (following Restatement (First) of Contracts § 357); Comerata v. Chaumont, Inc., 52 N.J.Super. 299, 145 A.2d 471 (1958) (following Restatement (First) of Contracts § 357); Kulseth v. Rotenberger, 320 N.W.2d 920 (North Dakota 1982) (following rule in Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 374); Golden v. Golden, 273 Or. 506, 541 P.2d 1397 (1975) (restitution permitted in land sale contract must be offset by loss to vendor, citing Restatement (First) of Contracts § 357 for this principle); De Leon v. Aldrete, 398 S.W.2d 160 (Tex.Civ.App.1965); Fuller v. Rosinski, 79 Wash.2d 719, 488 P.2d 1061 (1971) (breaching plaintiff entitled to some compensation under § 357 of Restatement *9(First) of Contracts); Hartford Elevator, Inc. v. Lauer, 94 Wis.2d 571, 289 N.W.2d 280 (1980) (approving of § 357 of Restatement (First) of Contracts).
This development has been called the modern trend. See Quillen v. Kelley, 216 Md. 396, 140 A.2d 517 (1958). See also 12 S. Williston, supra, § 1473, at 222 (cases permitting recovery are now the weight of the authority); 5A Corbin on Contracts, supra, § 1122, at 3 (common law rule is broad statement not supported by the actual decisions). But see 1 G. Palmer, The Law of Restitution 568 (1978) (no valid generalization may be made regarding when a defaulting vendee can recover). It may be that the growing number of jurisdictions permitting recovery have been influenced by the widespread adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code § 2-718. See, e.g., Maxey v. Glindmeyer, 379 So.2d 297 (Miss.1980) (allowing recovery of excess of seller’s actual damages in land sale contract by following the logic of the state statute equivalent to § 2-718 of the Uniform Commercial Code). Indeed, the common law rule is no longer intact even with respect to land sales contracts. See, e.g., Honey v. Henry’s Franchise Leasing Corp., 64 Cal.2d 801, 415 P.2d 833, 52 Cal.Rptr. 18 (1966); McLendon v. Safe Realty Corp., 401 N.E.2d 80 (Ind.App.1980); Newcomb v. Ray, supra; De Leon v. Aldrete, supra; and see 1 G. Palmer, supra, at 596 n. 15 (citing cases).
In Pennsylvania, the- common law rule has been applied to contracts for the sale of real property. Kaufman Hotel & Restaurant Co. v. Thomas, 411 Pa. 87, 190 A.2d 434 (1963); Luria v. Robbins, 223 Pa.Super. 456, 302 A.2d 361 (1973). In such cases, however, the seller has several remedies against a breaching buyer, including, in appropriate cases, an action for specific performance or for the purchase price. See Trachtenburg v. Sibarco Stations, Inc., 477 Pa. 517, 384 A.2d 1209 (1978). See also 5A Corbin on Contracts, supra, § 1145. As long as the seller remains ready, able, and willing to perform a contract for the sale of real property, the breaching buyer has no right to restitution of payments made prior to default. See 5A Corbin on Contracts, supra, at § 1130.
*10The common law rule has also been applied in Pennsylvania to contracts for the sale of goods. Atlantic City Tire and Rubber Corp. v. Southwark Foundry & Machine Co., 289 Pa. 569, 137 A. 807 (1927). However, Pennsylvania has since adopted the Uniform Commercial Code, which, as to contracts for the sale of goods, has modified the common law rule by 13 Pa.C.S. § 2718(b), which permits a breaching party to recover restitution. See note 2, supra.
The viability of the common law rule permitting forfeiture has also been undermined in other areas of Pennsylvania law. In Estate of Cahen, 483 Pa. 157, 168 n. 10, 394 A.2d 958, 964 n. 10 (1978), the Supreme Court held that assuming that a breaching fiduciary could recover in unjust enrichment, the basis would be Restatement of Contracts § 357 (1932), which allows recovery by a breaching party to the extent that the benefits exceed the losses sustained by the other party.4
-3-
In regard to the present case, § 374 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts represents a more enlightened approach than the common law rule. “Rules of contract law are not rules of punishment; the contract breaker is not an outlaw.” Perillo, supra, at 50. The party who committed a breach should be entitled to recover “any benefit ... in excess of the loss that he has caused by his own breach.” Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 374(1).
This conclusion leads to the further conclusion that we should remand this case to the trial court. The trial court rested its decision on the common law rule. Slip op. of trial court at 7-8. Thus it never considered whether appellant is entitled to restitution, Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 374(1), nor, if appellant is not entitled to resti*11tution, whether retention of the $25,000 was “reasonable in the light of the anticipated or actual loss caused by the breach and the difficulties of proof of loss,” id., § 374(2).5
Remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Jurisdiction relinquished.
. The parties agree that this date was incorrect, and that the date the parties intended was May 1, 1974.
. In Pennsylvania, 13 Pa.C.S. § 2718, provides:
§ 2718. Liquidation or limitation of damages; deposits
(a) Liquidated damages in agreement. — Damages for breach by cither party may be liquidated in the agreement but only at an amount which is reasonable in the light of the anticipated or actual harm caused by the breach, the difficulties of proof of loss, and the inconvenience or nonfeasibility of otherwise obtaining an adequate remedy. A term fixing unreasonably large liquidated damages is void as a penalty.
(b) Right of buyer to restitution. — Where the seller justifiably withholds delivery of goods because of the breach of the buyer, the buyer is entitled to restitution of any amount by which the sum of his payments exceeds:
(1) the amount to which the seller is entitled by virtue of terms liquidating the damages of the seller in accordance with subsection (a); or
(2) in the absence of such terms, 20% of the value of the total performance for which the buyer is obligated under the contract or $500, whichever is smaller.
. He identifies four types of protection:
First, the defaulting party’s right to recovery is subject to the aggrieved party’s right to offset his damages. Second, the measure of benefit is limited to the actual enrichment and cannot exceed a ratable portion of the contract price. Third, restitution is denied to the extent that the criteria for a valid liquidated damages clause are present. F’ourth, restitution is denied if the aggrieved party seeks and is entitled to specific performance.
Perillo, supra, at 50 (footnotes omitted).
. The assertion in the dissenting opinion that "the majority does not and cannot cite any Pennsylvania authority” allowing a breaching party recovery, dissent op. at 11-12, fails to acknowledge the Supreme Court’s decision in Cahen. While not citing Cahen, the dissenting opinion does cite Luria v. Robbins, 223 Pa.Super. 456, 302 A.2d 361 (1973), but as we have already discussed, we find Luria distinguishable.
. We do not share the view expressed in the dissenting opinion that "the most important determinant of the proper result in this case is the trial judge’s assessment of the witness[es]’ credibility.” Dissent op., at 11-12. To the contrary, as we have discussed, the trial court did not base its decision on an assessment of credibility but on the common law rule. Thus the court did not even consider the possibility of recovery by the breaching plaintiff. We are remanding so that the trial court may consider whether appellant is entitled to restitution. If the trial court again finds that it was the intention of the parties that the $25,000 be retained in the event of a breach, see slip op. of trial court at 7, then the court must determine whether this sum is reasonable. If the sum is unreasonable,' appellant is entitled to restitution. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 374 comment c.
TAMILIA, Judge,
dissenting:
I strongly dissent. In the first instance, the majority does not and cannot cite any Pennsylvania authority adopting the rule cited in § 374 of the Second Restatement of Contracts. Although the ostensible basis for remand is the trial court’s reliance on outmoded law, the majority relies on law so new as to be virtually unknown in this jurisdiction. The law in Pennsylvania has been and continues to be that where a binding contract exists, and there is no allegation that the contract itself is void or voidable, a breaching party is not entitled to recovery. Luria v. Robinson, 223 Pa.Super. 456, 302 A.2d 361 (1978). While our Supreme Court may yet abrogate the forfeiture principle in this Commonwealth, it has not yet seen fit to do so, and we may not usurp its prerogatives, particularly when the result would be unjust.
Secondly, the Uniform Commercial Code § 2718, cited by the majority in (partial) support, is applicable only to the sale of goods, and, while it and some of the equally inapplicable cases referred to by the majority may be part of a trend, the mainstream of contract law in Pennsylvania has *12not yet been diverted by it. Indeed the identification of the jurisdictions cited as the vanguard of change is for the most part questionable, as of those states relied upon to confer legitimacy on the majority’s somewhat arbitrary conclusion, only one may be termed authoritative.
Lastly, and given the current state of the law, the most important determinant of the proper result in this case is the trial judge’s assessment of the witness’ credibility, here resolved in appellee’s favor. The majority, far from according these findings their due, ignores them, contrary to law and our mandate. Knepp v. Nationwide Insurance Co., 324 Pa.Super. 479, 471 A.2d 1257 (1984).
The trial court correctly points out that the understanding of the parties is clearly evidenced by the agreements they signed. In breaching those agreements, appellant has engaged in what might charitably be termed sharp practice. The facts reasonably support the inference that appellant learned the hoagie business, benefited from the acquired trade and good will at appellees’ place of business, then conducted the hoagie business at its previously owned pizza shop in the following season. Restitution in this instance constitutes a wholly unmerited reward for bad faith. We do not feel that such a result is consistent with the intent of law or the expectations of equity.
13.5.8 Restatement (3d) Restitution 36, 38 and 39 13.5.8 Restatement (3d) Restitution 36, 38 and 39
Restatement (Third) of the Law of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment
36 Restitution to a Party in Default
(1) A performing party whose material breach prevents a recovery on the contract has a claim in restitution against the recipient of performance, as necessary to prevent unjust enrichment.
(2) Enrichment from receipt of an incomplete or defective contractual performance is measured by comparison to the recipient's position had the contract been fully performed. The claimant has the burden of establishing the fact and amount of any net benefit conferred.
(3) A claim under this section may be displaced by a valid agreement of the parties establishing their rights and remedies in the event of default.
(4) If the claimant's default involves fraud or other inequitable conduct, restitution may on that account be denied (§ 63).
38 Performance-Based Damages
(1) As an alternative to damages based on the expectation interest (Restatement Second, Contracts § 347), a plaintiff who is entitled to a remedy for material breach or repudiation may recover damages measured by the cost or value of the plaintiff's performance.
(2) Performance-based damages are measured by
(a) uncompensated expenditures made in reasonable reliance on the contract, including expenditures made in preparation for performance or in performance, less any loss the defendant can prove with reasonable certainty the plaintiff would have suffered had the contract been performed (Restatement Second, Contracts § 349); or
(b) the market value of the plaintiff's uncompensated contractual performance, not exceeding the price of such performance as determined by reference to the parties' agreement.
(3) A plaintiff whose damages are measured by the rules of subsection (2) may also recover for any other loss, including incidental or consequential loss, caused by the breach.
39 Profit From Opportunistic Breach
(1) If a deliberate breach of contract results in profit to the defaulting promisor and the available damage remedy affords inadequate protection to the promisee's contractual entitlement, the promisee has a claim to restitution of the profit realized by the promisor as a result of the breach. Restitution by the rule of this section is an alternative to a remedy in damages.
(2) A case in which damages afford inadequate protection to the promisee's contractual entitlement is ordinarily one in which damages will not permit the promisee to acquire a full equivalent to the promised performance in a substitute transaction.
(3) Breach of contract is profitable when it results in gains to the defendant (net of potential liability in damages) greater than the defendant would have realized from performance of the contract. Profits from breach include saved expenditure and consequential gains that the defendant would not have realized but for the breach, as measured by the rules that apply in other cases of disgorgement (§ 51(5)).
13.5.9 Britton v. Turner 13.5.9 Britton v. Turner
Britton versus Turner.
Where a party undertakes to pay, upon a special contract for the performance of labour, he is not liable to be charged upon such special contract, until the money'is earned according to the terms of the agreement ; and where the parties have made an express contract, the law will not imply and raise a contract different from that which the parties have entered into, except upon some farther transaction between them.
In case of a failure to peiform such special contract, by the default of the party contracting to do the service, if the money is not due by the terms of the special agreement, and the nature of the contract be such that the employer can reject what has been done, and refuse to receive any benefit from the part performance, he is entitled so to do, unless he have before assented to and accepted of what has been done, and in such case the party performing'lhe labor is not entitled to recover however much he may have done.
But if, upon a contract of such a character, a party actually receives useful labor, and thereby derives a benefit and advantage, over and above the damage which has resulted from a breach of the contract by the other party, the labor actually done, and the value received, furnish a new consideration, and the law thereupon raises a promise to pay to the extent of the reasonable worth of the excess. And the rule is the same, whether the labor was received and accepted, by the assent of the party prior to the breach, and under a contract, by which, from its nature, the party was to receive the labour from time to time until the completion of the whole contract, or whether it was received and accepted by an assent subsequent to the performance of all which was in fact done.
In case such contract is broken, by the fault of the party employed after part performance has been received, the employer is entitled, if he so elect, to put the breach of the contract in defence, for the purpose of reducing the damages, or showing that nothing is due, and the benefits for which he is liable to be charged, in that case, is the amount of value which he has* received, if any, beyond the amount of the damage — and the implied promise which the law will raise, is, to pay such amount of the stipulated price for the whole labour, as remains after deducting what it would cost to procure a completion of the whole service, and also qny damage which has been sustained by reason of the non fulfilment of the contract.
If in such case it be found that the damages are equal to, or greafSr than the amount of the value of the labour performed, so that the employer, having a right to the performance of the whole contract, has not upon the whole case received a beneficial service, the plaintiff cannot recover.
*482If the employer elects to permit himself to be charged for the value of the labor, without interposing the damages in defence, he is entith d to do so, .and may have an action to recover his damages for the non performance of the contract.
If he elects to have the damages considered in the action against him, he must be understood as conceding that they are not to be extended beyond the amount of what he has received, and he cannot therefore afterwards sustain an action for further damages.
Assumpsit for work and labour, performed by the plaintiff, in the service of the defendant, from March 9th, 1831, to December 27, 1831.
The declaration contained the common counts, and among them a count in quantum meruit, for the labor, averring it to be worth one hundred dollars.
At the trial in the C. C. Pleas, the plaintiff proved the performance of the labor as set forth in the declaration.
The defence was that it was performed under a special contract — -that the plaintiff agreed to work one year, from some time in March, 1831, to March 1832, and that the defendant was to pay him for said year’s labor the sum of one hundred and twenty dollars ; and the defendant offered’ evidence tending to show that such was the contract under which the work was done.
Evidence was also offered to show that the plaintiff left the defendant’s service without his consent, and it was contended by the defendant that the plaintiff had no good cause for not continuing in his employment.
There was no evidence offered of any damage arising from the plaintiff's departure, farther than was to be inferred from his non fulfilment of the entire contract.
The court instructed the jury, that if they were satisfied from the evidence that the labor was performed, under a contract to labor a year, for the sum of one hundred and twenty dollars, and if they were satisfied that the plaintiff labored only the time specified in the declaration, and then left the defendant’s service, against his consent, and without any good cause, yet the plaintiff was entitled to recover, under his quantum meruit count, *483as much as the labor he performed was reasonably worth, and under this direction the jury gave a verdict for the plaintiff for the sum of $95.
The defendant excepted to the instructions thus given to the jury.
llanderson for the defendant.
The general principle established by all the old eases, is, that where the contract is entire, as where Aj agrees to do a certain thing, for which B is to make*a certain compensation, the doing of the thing by A is a condition precedent, and he has no remedy until he has fully performed his part-
There are several leading cases relating to the subject. Culler Air. v. Powell, 6 D. & E. 320 ; McMillen v. Wander-lip, 12 Johns. 165 ; Hudson v. Swift, 20 Johns. 24 ; Lantry v. Parks, 8 Cowen, 63 ¡Ellis v. Hamlin, 4 Taunt. 52 ; 11 Com. Law Hep. 254 ; 17 ditto, 340- ; Faxon v. Mansfield and Holbrook, Trustee, 2 Mass. Rep. 147 ; Stark v. Parker, 2 Pick. 267 ; Mores v. Stevens, 2 Pick. 332.
Hayward v. Leonard, 7 Pick. 181, was a contract to build a house on the plaintiff’s land, at a certain price, and in a particular manner. The first count was upon the contract, the second quantum meruit for work’andja-bor, and materials found. The court there decided that the count in quantum meruit might be sustained, and refer with approbation to 14 Mass. 282, and 2 Pick. 267. They say, the defendant saw the work go on from day to day, and found no fault, either with the work or materials, and may be presumed to have agreed to receive the work as it was done, &c.
The case of Wadleigh v. Sutton, emit 15, is like the case in the 7th Pickering, and may be sustained without affecting the case under consideration.
On a full examination of the decisions upon this subject, no doubt it will be found, that in modern times courts have, to a certain extent, relaxed from the strict rules *484formerly adopted, and have sustained a count in quantum meruit in cases where the plaintiff had not fully performed his contract. But all the cases where it has been so held may be distinguished from this case — none have gone the length of maintaining the present action.
Take the cases of contracts to build a house, a bridge, or highway, and all the variety of cases where the agreement consists in certain labor to be done, and materials provided — the contract is not fulfilled according to its terms — the house, or bridge, or highway are built, but not so well done as agreed. No action, therefore, will lie upon the contract- But the court in those cases say when the party for whose benefit the materials are furnished, and the labor done, sees the work from day to day, as it proceeds, sees also the materials, and suffers the building to go on without objection, or without putting an end to the work, it shall be considered that he accepts it — that he in fact consents to abandon the strict terms of the contract, and makes a new one, which is to pay what the labor and materials are reasonably worth.
So also in another class of cases, where an agreement is made for the sale and delivery of articles estimated by weight or measure — Suppose A agrees to deliver me 150 bushels of wheat,at §1,50 per bushel,to he paid when it is all delivered, but he delivers only fifty. If I keep the fifty bushels I make a new contract, and agree to pay what the fifty bushels are worth. But if I decline keeping it, and request A to take it away, he cannot force it upon me nolens, nolens, and compel me to pay for it against my consent.
In the foregoing cases the person with whom the contract is made, it is presumed from his conduct, has consented, in the one case to receive less than the whole amount agreed to be delivered, and in the other to receive the labor and materials of a different kind, or in a different form and manner, from that stipulated. He has in short made a new contract, and abandoned the old, *485and it is on this ground, and this only,'that ..those'decisions can be sustained.
Bat the case before the court is different from those where it has been held a quantum meruit lies. It cannot be contended that the defendant consented to receive a part of the labor, and be accountable for such part ; no contract to this effect can be implied. He had it not in his power to prevent this part execution, as in the case of building the house, bridge, &c. nor could he deliver back the labor done. If any contract is fastened upon him, it is put upon him against his consent. He made a contract for an entire year’s work. He has never consented to receive and pay for any time less than a year. No such consent can be implied.
The cases before cited, in .2 Mass. 147 ; 2 Pick. 267 ; 12 Johns. 165 ; and 8 Cowen, 63 ; are as fully in point as if made for the occasion ; and although courts in modern times may have succeeded in getting around the old law, in sundry cases, it is believed that the decisions last referred to yet stand, having never been overruled, but remain in lull force, and they seem fully to support this de-fence.
To {¡old out inducements to men to violate their contracts, when fairly entered into, is of immoral tendency, and whether the decisions have not gone quite far enough, and held out inducements enough to men disposed to disregard their engagements, may perhaps deserve consideration.
Wilson, for the plaintiff".
delivered the opinion of the court.
It may be assumed, that the labor performed by the plaintiff, and for which he seeks to recover a compensation in this action, was commenced under a special contract to labor for the defendant the term of one year/for the sum of one hundred and twenty dollars, and that the *486plaintiff has labored but a portion of that time, and has voluntarily failed to complete the entire contract.
It is clear, then, that he is not entitled to recover upon the contract itself, because the service, which was to entitle him to the sum agreed upon, has never been performed.
But. the question arises, can the plaintiff, under these circumstances, recover a reasonable sum lor the service he has actually performed, under the count m quantum meruit.
Upon this, and questions of a similar nature, the decisions to be found in the books are not easily reconciled.
It has been held, upon contracts of this kind for labor to be performed ai a specified price, that the party who voluntarily fails to fulfil the contract by performing the whole labor contracted for, is not entitled to recover any thing for the labor actually performed, however much he may have done towards the performance, and this has been considered the settled rule of law upon this subject.
2 Pick. 267, Stark v. Parker; 2 Mass. 147, Faxon v. Mansfield; 12 Johns. 165, McMillen v. Vanderlip; 13 Johns. 94, Jennings v. Camp; 19 Johns, 337, Reab v. Moor; 8 Cowen, 63, Lantry v. Parks; 9 Barn, & Cres. 92, Sinclair v. Bowles; 2 Stark. Rep. 256, Spain v. Arnott.
That such rule in its operation may be very unequal, not to say unjust, is apparent.
A party who contracts to perform certain specified labor, and who breaks his contract in the first instance, without any attempt to perform it, can only be made liable to pay the damages which the other party has sustained by reaso# of such non performance, which in many instances may be trifling — whereas a party who in good faith has entered upon the performance of his contract, and nearly completed it, and then abandoned the further performance — although the other party has had the full benefit of all that has been done, and has pur-haps sustained no actual damage — is in fact subjected to *487a loss of all which lias been performed, in the nature of damages for the non fulfilment of the remainder, upon the technical rule, that the contract must be fully performed in order to a recovery of any part of the compensation.
By the operation of this rule, then, the party who attempts performance muy be placed in a much worse situation than he who wholly disregards his contract, and the other party may receive much more, by the breach of the contract, than the injury which he has sustained by such breach, and more than he could be entitled to were he seeking to recover damages by an action.
The case before os presents an illustration. Had the plaintiff in this case never entered upon the performance of his contract, the damage could not probably have been greater than some small expense and trouble incurred in procuring another to do the labor which he had contracted to perform. Rut having entered upon the performance, and labored nine and a half months, the value of which labor to the defendant as found by the jury is ⅜95, if the defendant can succeed in this defence,he in fact receives nearly five sixths of the value of a whole year’s labor, by reason of the breach of contract by the plaintiff a sum not only utterly disproportionate to any probable, not to say possible damage which could have resulted from the neglect of the plaintiff to continue the remaining two and an half months, but altogether beyond any damage which could have been recovered by the defendant, liad the plaintiff done nothing towards the fulfilment of his contract.
Another illustration is furnished in Lantry v. Parks, 8 Cowen, 83. There the defendant hired the plaintiff fora year, at ten dollars per month. The plaintiff worked ten and an half months, and then left saying he would work no more for him. This was on Saturday — on Monday the plaintiff returned, and offered to resume his work, but the defendant said he would employ him no longer. *488The court held that the refusal of the defendant on Saturday was a violation of his contract, and that he could recover nothing for the labor performed.
There are other cases, however, in which principles have been adopted leading to a different result.
It is said, that where a party contracts to perform certain work, and to furnish materials, as, for instance, to build a house, and the work is done, but with some variations from the mode prescribed by the contract, yet if the other party has the benefit of the labor and materials he should be bound to pay so much as they are reasonably worth. 2 Stark. Ev. 97, 98; 7 Pick. 181, Hayward v. Leonard; 8 Pick. 178, Smith v. First Cong. Meeting House in Lowell; 4 Cowen, 564, Jewell v. Schroeppel; 7 Green. 78, Hayden v. Madison; Bull. N. P. 139; 4 Bos. & Pul. 355; 10 Johns. 36; 13 Johns. 97; 7 East, 479.
A different doctrine seems to have been holden in Ellis v. Hamlen, 3 Taunt. 52, and it is apparent, in such cases, that if the house has not been built in the manner specified in the contract, the work has not been done. The party has no more performed what he contracted to perform, than he who has contracted to labor for a certain period, and failed to complete the time.
It is in truth virtually conceded in such cases that the work has not been done, for if it had been, the party performing it would be entitled to recover upon the contract itself, which it is held he cannot do.
Those cases are not to be distinguished, in principle, from the present, unless it be in the circumstance, that where the party has contracted to furnish materials, and do certain labor, as to build a house in a specified manner, if it is not done according to the contract, the party for whom it is built may refuse to receive it — elect to take no benefit from what has been performed — and therefore if he does receive, he shall be bound to pay the value— whereas in a contract for labor, merely, from day to day, the party is continually receiving the benefit of the con*489tract under an expectation that it will be fulfilled, and cannot, upon the breach of' it, have an. election to refuse to receive what has been done, and thus discharge himself from payment.
Rut we think this difference in the nature of the contracts docs not justify the application of a different rule in relation to them.
The party who contracts for labor merely, for a certain period, does so with full knowledge that he must, from the nature of the case, be accepting part performance from day to day, if the other party commences the performance, and with knowledge also that the other may eventually fail of completing the entire term.
If under such circumstances he actually receives a benefit from the labor performed, over and above the damage occasioned by the failure to complete, there is as much reason why he should pay the reasonable worth of what has thus been done for his benefit, as there is when he enters and occupies the house which has been built for him, but not according to the stipulations of the contract, and which lie perhaps enters, not because he is satisfied with what has been done, but because circumstances compel him to accept it such as it is, that lie should pay for the value of the house.
Where goods are sold upon a special contract as to their nature, quality, and price, and have been used before their inferiority has been discovered, or other circumstances have occurred which have rendered it impracticable or inconvenient for the vendee to rescind the contract in toto, it seems to have been the practice formerly to allow the vendor to recover the stipulated price, and the vendee recovered by a cross action damages for the breach of the contract. “ But according to the later and more convenient practice, the vendee in such case is allowed, in an action for the price, to give evidence of the inferiority of the goods in reduction of damages, and the plaintiff who has broken his contract is not entitled *490to recover more than the value of the benefits which the defendant has actually derived from the goods ; and where the latter has derived no benefit, the plaintiff'cannot recover at all.” 2 Stark. Ev. 640, 642; 1 Starkie’s Rep. 107, Okell v. Smith.
So where a person contracts for the purchase of a quantity of merchandize, at a certain price, and receives a delivery of part only, and he keeps that part, without any offer of a return, it has been held that he must pay the value of it. 5 Barn. & Cres. Shipton v. Casson; Com. Dig. Action F. Baker v. Sutton; 1 Camp. 55, note.
A different opinion seems to have been entertained, 5 Bos. & Pul. 61, Waddington v. Oliver, and a different decision was had, 2 Stark. Rep. 281, Walker v. Dixon.
There is a close analogy between all these classes of cases, in which such diverse decisions have been made.
If the party who has contracted to receive merchandize, takes a part and uses it, in expectation that the whole will be delivered, which is never done, there seems to be no greater reason that he should pay for what he has received, than there is that the party who has received labor in part, under similar circumstances, should pay the value of what has been done for his benefit.
It is said, that in those cases where the plaintiff has-been permitted to recover there was an acceptance of what had been done. The answer is, that where the contract is to labor from day to day, for a certain period, the party for whom the labor is done in truth stipulates to receive it from day to day, as it is performed, and although the other may not eventually do all he has contracted to do, there has been, necessarily, an acceptance of what has been done in pursuance of the contract, and the party must have understood when he made the contract that there was to he such acceptance.
If then the party stipulates in the outset to receive part performance from time to time, with a knowledge that the whole may not be completed, we see no reason *491why he should not equally he holden to pay for the amount of value received, as where he afterwards takes the benefit of what has been done, with a knowledge that the whole which was contracted for has not been performed.
In neither case has the contract been performed. In neither can an action be sustained on the original contract.
In both the party has assented to receive what is done. The only difference is, that in the one case the assent is prior, with a knowledge that all may not be performed, in the other it is subsequent, with a knowledge that the whole has not been accomplished.
We have no hesitation in holding that the same rule should be applied to both classes of cases, especially, as the operation of the rule will be to make the party who has failed to fulfil his contract, liable to such amount of damages as the other party has sustained, instead of subjecting him to an entire loss for a partial failure, and thus making the amount received in many cases wholly disproportionate to the injury. 1 Saund. 320, c; 2 Stark. Evid. 643.
It is as “ hard upon the plaintiff to preclude him from recovering at all, because he has failed as to part of his entire undertaking,” vvhere his contract is to labor for a certain period, as it can be in any other description of contract, provided the defendant has received a benefit and value from the labor actually performed.
We hold then, that where a party undertakes to pay upon a special contract for the performance of labor, or the furnishing of materials, he is not to be charged upon such special agreement until the money is earned according to the terms of it, and where the parties have made, an express contract the law will not imply and raise a contract different from that which the parties have entered into, except upon some farther transaction between the parties.
*492In case of a failure to perform such special contract, by the default of the party contracting to do the service, if the money is not due by the terms of the special agreement he is not entitled to recover for his labor, or for the materials furnished, unless the other party receives what has been done, or furnished, and upon the whole case derives a benefit from it. 14 Mass. 282, Taft v. Montague; 2 Stark. Ev. 644.
But if, where a contract is made of such a character, a party actually receives labor, or materials, and thereby derives a benefit and advantage, over and above the damage which has resulted from the breach of the contract by the other party, the labor actually done, and the value received, furnish a new consideration, and the law thereupon raises a promise to pay to the extent of the reasonable worth of such excess. This may be considered as making a new case, one not within the original agreement, and the party is entitled to “ recover on his new case, for the work done, not as agreed, but yet accepted by the defendant.” 1 Dane’s Abr. 224.
If on such failure to perform the whole, the nature of the contract be such that the employer can reject what has been done, and refuse to receive any benefit from the part performance, he is entitled so to do, and in such case is not liable to be charged, unless he has before assented to and accepted of what has been done, however much the other party may have done towards the performance. He has in such case received nothing, and having contracted to receive nothing but the entire mat. ter contracted for, he is not bound to pay, because his express promise was only to pay on receiving the whole, and having actually received nothing the law cannot and ought not to raise an implied promise to pay. But where the party receives value — takes and uses the materials, or has advantage from the labor, he is liabe to pay the reasonable worth of what he has received. 1 Camp. 38, Farnsworth v. Garrard. And the rule is the same wheth' *493er it was received and accepted by the assent of the party prior to the breach, under a contract by which, from its nature, he was to receive labor, from time to time until the completion of the whole contract ; or whether it was received and accepted by an assent subsequent to the performance of all which was in fact done. If he received it under such circumstances as precluded him from rejecting it afterwards, that does not alter the case • — it has still been received by his assent.^
In fact we think the technical reasoning, that the performance of the whole labor is a condition precedent, and the right to recover any thing dependent upon it — that the contract being entire there can be no apportionment —and that there being an express contract no other can be implied, even upon the subsequent performance of service — is not properly applicable to this species of contract, where a beneficial service has been actually performed ; for we have abundant reason to believe, that the general understanding of the community is, that the the hired laborer shall be entitled to compensation for the service actually performed, though he do not continue the entire term contracted for, and such contracts must be presumed to be made with reference to that understanding, unless an express stipulation shows the contrary.
Where a beneficial service has been performed and received, therefore, under contracts of this kind, the mutual agreements cannot be considered as going to the whole of the consideration, so as to make them mutual conditions, the one precedent to the other, without a specific proviso to that effect. 1 H. Black. 213, note, Boone v Eyre; 6 D. & E. 570, Campbell v. Jones; 10 East, 295, Ritchie v. Atkinson; 4 Taunt. 745, Burn v. Miller.
It is easy, if parties so choose, to provide by an ex-prés agreement that nothing shall be earned, if the laborer leaves his employer without having performed the whole service contemplated, and then there can be in *494pretence for a recovery if he voluntarily deserts the service before the expiration of the time.
The amount, however, for which the employer ought to be charged, where the laborer abandons Ins contract, is only the reasonable worth, or the amount of advantage lie receives upon the whole transaction, (ante 15, Wad-leigh v. Sutton,) and, in estimating the value of the labor, the contract price for the service cannot be exceeded. 7 Green. 78; 4 Wendell, 285, Dubois v. Delaware & Hudson Canal Company; 7 Wend. 121, Koon v. Greenman.
If a person makes a contract fairly he is entitled to have it fully performed, and if this is not done he is entitled to damages. He ¡nay maintain a suit to recover the amount of damage sustained by the non performance.
The benefit and advantage which the party takes by the labor, therefore, is the amount of value which lie receives, if any, after deducting the amount of damage ; and if he elects to put this in defence he is entitled so to do, and the implied promise which the law will raise, in such case, is to pay such amount of the stipulated price for the whole labor, as remains after deducting what it would cost to procure a completion of the residue of the service, and also any damage which has been sustained by reason of the non fulfilment of the contract.
If in such case it be found that the damages are equal to, or greater than the amount of the labor performed, so that the employer, having a right to the full performance of the contract, has not upon the whole case received a beneficial service, the plaintiff cannot recover.
This rule, by binding the employer to pay the value of the service he actually receives, and the laborer to answer in damages where he does not complete the entire contract, will leave no temptation to the former to drive the laborer from his service, near the close of his term, by ill treatment, in order to escape from payment ; nor to the latter to desert his service before the stipulated time, without a sufficient reason ; and it will in most in*495stances settle the whole controversy in one action, and prevent a multiplicity of suits and cross actions.
There may be instances, however, where the damage occasioned is much greater than the value of the labor performed, and if the party elects to permit himself to be charged for the value of the labor, without interposing the damages in defence, he is entitled to do so, and may have an action to recover his damages for the non-perlormanee, whatever, they may be. 1 Mason’s Rep. Crowninshield v. Robinson.
And he nuiy commence such action at any time after the contract is broken, notwithstanding no suit has been instituted against him ; but if he elects to have the damages considered in the action against him, he must be understood as conceding that they are not to be extended beyond the amount of what he has received, and he cannot afterwards sustain an action for farther damages.
Applying the principles thus laid down, to this case, the plaintiff is entitled to judgment on the verdict.
The defendant sets up a mere breach of the contract in defence of the action, but this cannot avail him. He does not appear to have offered evidence to show that he was damnified by such breach, or to have asked that a deduction should be made upon that account. The direction to the jury was therefore correct, that the plaintiff was entitled to recover as much as the labor performed was reasonably worth, and the jury appear to have allowed a pro rata compensation, for the time which the plaintiff labored in the defendant’s service.
As the defendant has not claimed or had any adjustment of damages, for the breach of the contract, in this action, if he has actually sustained damage he is still entitled to a suit to recover the amount.
Whether it is not necessary, in cases of this kind, that notice should be given to the employer that the contract is abandoned, with an offer of adjustment and demand of payment ; and whether the laborer must not wait until *496the time when the money would have been clue according- to the contract, before commencing an action, (5 B. & P. 61) are questions not necessary to be settled in this case, no objections of that nature having been taken here,
Judgment on the verdict.
13.6 Theory and Application 13.6 Theory and Application
13.6.1 Damages Hypotheticals 13.6.1 Damages Hypotheticals
Please develop your answers to the following hypotheticals before class, and be prepared to discuss in teams with your classmates before discussing with the full class.
Consider the Craswell & Schwartz readings and your views on whether expectations damages is a better measure than reliance damages or restitution damages and why.
Alternative Measures of Damages - Hypotheticals
I agree to
- give you a copy of the restatement of contracts tomorrow,
in return for
- your agreement to pay me $10 and give me a copy of your class notes.
Assume:
- Restatement has market value of $15.
- Notes have a market value of $1.
- It costs $3 to copy notes.
You pay me $10 and give me a copy of your notes.
I refuse to deliver or return money or notes.
You sue.
What’s your recovery – i.e., what’s the measure of damages?
Expectation:
Reliance:
Restitution:
What if the notes were worth $4?
Expectation:
Reliance:
Restitution:
What if you had copied notes and given them to me but hadn’t paid in advance:
Expectation:
Reliance:
Restitution:
Suppose you hadn’t paid or copied notes yet?
Expectation:
Reliance:
Restitution:
13.6.2 Craswell & Schwartz 2.1 Excerpts 13.6.2 Craswell & Schwartz 2.1 Excerpts
Three Takes on the Economics of Expectations Damages
Anglo-American law ordinarily awards expectation damages as the remedy for breach of contract. These damages are meant to make a promisee as well off as he or she would have been had the promise been performed.
§ 2.1 Expectation Damages
Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen, Law and Economics
Breach of contract can be regarded as something that happens as a consequence of the bargaining or transaction costs of forming contracts. If bargaining and drafting were costless, we could imagine that a contract would be created that explicitly provided for every contingency that could possibly arise. Included in the contract would be remedies for every type of non-performance under every possible circumstance. Since every type of nonperformance in every possible circumstance would have a remedy explicitly attached to it in the contract, there would be no occasion for the law to prescribe a remedy.
Because bargaining and drafting are costly, an efficient contract will not explicitly cover every contingency. In fact, the majority of contracts do not specify any remedies for breach. The existence of such gaps in contracts creates a need for the law to supply remedies.
One of the most enlightening insights of law and economics is the recognition that there are circumstances where breach of contract is more efficient than performance. We define efficient breach as follows: a breach of contract is more efficient than performance of the contract when the costs of performance exceed the benefits to all the parties. We need to characterize the circumstances under which this will be true. The costs of performance exceed the benefits when a contingency arises such that resources necessary for performance are more valuable in an alternative use. These contingencies come in two types. First, a fortunate contingency or windfall might arise that makes non-performance even more profitable than performance. Second, an unfortunate contingency or accident might arise that imposes a larger loss for performance than for nonperformance.
To illustrate a windfall, suppose that A promises to sell a house to B for $100,000. Let us assume that A values living in the house at $90,000, and B values living in the house at $110,000.
Thus, at A's asking price, A realizes a seller's surplus of $10,000, B realizes a consumer's surplus of $10,000, and the total surplus from the exchange is $20,000.
But suppose that before the sale is completed another buyer, C, appears on the scene and offers A $120,000 for the same house that he has contracted to sell to B for $100,000. C's appearance is a windfall that has increased the total available surplus from $20,000 to at least $30,000 ....
Let us refine this notion of efficient breach by briefly discussing the question,
"Which court-designed remedy -- the payment of money damages or specific performance-will induce only efficient breach?"
[We will cover specific performance in upcoming classes -- for now, know simply that it means a court compels the parties to perform, rather than requiring the breacher to pay expectation damages to the non-breacher.]
Analyzing this problem in terms of bargaining theory is useful. Recall that transferring the house from A to B creates a surplus of $20,000. Furthermore, transferring the house from B to C creates an additional surplus of at least $10,000. (Alternatively, the house could be transferred directly from A to C; in that event, the surplus would still be at least $30,000.)
If bargaining is costless, the house will eventually end up being owned by C, regardless of whether the court-designated remedy is damages or specific performance. However, the distribution of the surplus from exchange is different under the two court-designed remedies.
To see why, assume that A has a binding contract to sell the house to B and the remedy for breach is damages. Further assume that the damages have been designed by the court so as to put B in the position he expected to be in if A had delivered the house, and B kept it. Because B anticipated a surplus of $10,000 from the performance of the contract, he is entitled to damages in that amount. Under this formulation of the damage remedy, A can breach the contract, pay $10,000 in damages to B, and sell the house to C for $120,000. As a result, A will enjoy $20,000 of the surplus and B will enjoy $10,000.
But suppose that the court-designed remedy is specific performance. Under that remedy, the court requires A to sell the house to B as promised. Thus, A will have to deliver the house to B for $100,000, who will then resell the house to C for $120,000. As a result, B will enjoy $20,000 in surplus and A will enjoy $10,000 in surplus, precisely the opposite shares of the surplus as occurred under court-designed damages. The important point of this example is that when bargaining costs are zero, efficient incentives for breach are created under either courtdesigned remedy, but the surplus from exchange is distributed differently.
An implication of this analysis is that there is a distinction between the efficiency of the court-designed remedies only when bargaining or transaction costs are not zero [as in the Coase Theorem] ....
[Hopefully, you have encountered or will encounter the Coase Theorem in other courses. If not, here is a short version:
[If transaction costs (e.g., bargaining costs, taxes) are sufficiently low, resources that can be bargained over will end up in the hands of whichever party values them most, regardless of who initially has those resources. It won't matter to contract performance if the law explicitly gives the performing party a right to breach and pay damages, or whether it gives the nonperforming party the right to obtain specific performance. If breach is "efficient" and the law does not give the performing party the right to breach, that party will buy that right from the other party.]
Daniel Friedman, The Efficient Breach Fallacy
"The only universal consequence of a legally binding promise is that the law makes the promisor pay damages if the promised event does not come to pass. In every case it leaves him free from interference until the time for fulfillment has gone by, and therefore free to break his contract if he chooses."
So wrote Oliver Wendell Holmes in his seminal discussion of contract remedies in The Common Law. That position, while widely discussed, is not acceptable as a normative (nor, as will be shown, as a positive) account of the question of contract remedies. Stated in a phrase, the weakness ofHolmes's approach lies in its conclusion that the remedy provides a perfect substitute for the right, when in truth the purpose of the remedy is to vindicate that right, not to replace it. Holmes 's analysis mistakenly converts the remedy into a kind of indulgence that the wrongdoer is unilaterally always entitled to purchase.
As with any unifying ideal, Holmes's proposition is difficult to confine to the contract cases to which it was originally applied. Why not generalize the proposition so that every person has an "option" to transgress another's rights and to violate the law, so long as he is willing to suffer the consequences? The legal system could thus be viewed only as establishing a set of prices, some high and some low, which then act as the only constraints to induce lawful conduct.
The modem theory of "efficient breach" is a variation and systematic extension of Holmes's outlook on contractual remedy. It assumes that role because of the dominance that it gives to the expectation measure of damages in cases of contract breach: the promisor is allowed to breach at will so long as he leaves the promisee as well off after breach as he would have been had the promise been performed, while any additional gain is retained by the contract breaker ....
The essence of the theory is "efficiency." The "right" to break a contract is not predicated on the nature of the contractual right, its relative "weakness," or its status as merely in personam, as opposed to the hardier rights in rem. Rather it is on the ground that the breach is supposed to lead to a better use of resources. The theory, therefore, is, in principle, equally applicable to property rights, where it leads to the adoption of a theory of "efficient theft" or "efficient conversion." To see the point, observe how this account of efficiency plays out in two cases. In the first, A promises to sell a machine to B for $10,000 but then turns around and sells it instead to C for $18,000. In the second, B owns a machine for which he has paid $10,000, which A takes and sells to C for $18,000.
To keep matters simple, assume that B values the machine at exactly $12,000 in both cases. If the willful contract breach is justified in the first case, then the willful conversion is justified in the second. In the first, B gets $2,000 in expectation damages and is released from paying the $10,000 purchase price. In the second, B obtains damages for conversion equal to $12,000 because he has already paid the $10,000 purchase price to his seller. The two cases thus look identical even though they derive from distinct substantive fields.
No doubt in the contract situation, A may negotiate with B a release from his contractual obligation. But this, in Posner's view, would lead to additional transaction costs. It is, therefore, preferable to permit the "efficient breach." But the property example is indistinguishable on this ground, for in the second, A, when he takes the machine from B, avoids the transaction cost of having to purchase it from him. The similarity between the two situations (breach of contract and conversion) becomes more striking if the converter did not wrongfully deprive the owner of his possession.
Thus, suppose that A is a bailee who keeps B's goods. C offers A for the goods an amount that exceeds their value to B. A can negotiate with B for the purchase of the goods and, if he is successful, sell them to C at a profit. The cost of this transaction could be saved, just as in the contract example, if A were allowed to sell the goods to C, while limiting his liability to B's expectation-like damages.
Nevertheless, the better rule, which has been universally adopted by Anglo-American law, is that the plaintiff is entitled to recover in restitution the proceeds of the sale from the defendant who converted the plaintiff's property and sold it to a third party. Efficient breach theory does not provide an explanation why the promisee in a contract of sale should not be accorded similar rights.
There are, of course, refinements. Where the promisor is a merchant engaged in selling these types of goods, he may be in a better position to find a buyer willing to pay a higher price for them, so that his transaction costs may be somewhat lower. This, however, is not necessarily the case, and in any event it does not justify the breach. Again, the situation can be compared to conversion. The fact that A, for example, is a car dealer who is likely to know that C is an excellent buyer for B's car does not justify him to take B's car from his driveway in order to sell it to C. Nor if B's car has been left with A for repairs can A sell it to C.
The real issue in both the conversion and the breach situation is who should benefit from C's willingness to pay a high price for the goods owned by B (the conversion example) or promised to him (the breach example).
In principle, there should be in both situations only one transaction; in my view, it should be between C and B (the owner or the promisee). If A promised to sell a piece of property to B for $10,000 and C is willing to have it for $18,000, he should negotiate its purchase from B. A is simply not entitled to sell to C something he has promised to return or transfer to B, and A is therefore not the right party to negotiate with. Consequently, if C negotiates such a purchase, he may be exposed to liability toward B, the promisee. Similarly, with a bailment, C must negotiate with B (the owner) and not with the bailee. Hence, the question of additional transaction costs does not arise.
It is, of course, conceivable that a person (in the above example, A) would like to take advantage of a potential transaction between two other parties (B and C). In some instances this can legitimately be done. A may know that C is the best buyer for B's property (or for the property promised to B), while B and C are unaware of each other. A may buy the property from B and sell it to C, or he may reach an agreement (with B or C or with both) for the payment of a commission. If this is done, the inevitable result would be that the transfer from B to C would involve two or more transactions (and, arguably, additional transaction costs). This course of dealing is not objectionable. What is, however, objectionable is an attempt by A to obtain through the commission of a wrong (breach of contract or a tort such as conversion) the benefit of a transaction that should have been concluded between B and C ....
Richard Craswell, Contract Remedies, Renegotiation, and the Theory of Efficient Breach
Redistribution and Risk-Aversion
Even if noncompensatory contract remedies do not distort a seller's decision to perform or breach-say because costless ex post renegotiation [by "ex post" Craswell means "after the breach"] is available to prevent inefficient breaches and enable efficient ones -- the remedies can still produce distributional effects by affecting the parties' bargaining status in post-breach negotiations.
Consider the situation modeled in the standard literature, where a seller is deciding whether or not to break a contract and sell to another buyer at a higher price. If the remedy is exactly compensatory, a seller who decides to break the contract will only have to pay the first buyer a compensatory amount. If the remedy is overcompensatory, however, a seller who decides to break the contract may have to pay the first buyer a larger amount to be released from the contract. If the remedy is under-compensatory, a breaching seller will be able to get away with paying the first buyer less.
For example, suppose that a good is only worth $100 to the first buyer (who has contracted with the seller), but the seller now has a chance to earn $300 by selling the good to a second buyer who values the good more highly than does the first buyer. If the law lets the first buyer insist on a remedy that would cost the seller $500, this will not prevent the seller from selling the good to the second buyer (if renegotiation costs are low), for the seller could offer to pay the first buyer to be released from the contract.
However, the amount the seller will have to pay under such a damage rule will be somewhere between $100 and $300. The buyer will not accept anything less than $100 to give up the right to performance, as that is what performance is worth to the buyer; the seller will not agree to pay anything more than $300, as that is the maximum the seller could get by breaching. The exact amount the parties agree on will be somewhere between these figures, depending on their respective bargaining abilities, but the amount will clearly be at least as large as the amount the seller would have to pay under a regime of compensatory damages ($100). Thus, even if ex post renegotiation is costless so that only efficient breaches take place, the legal remedy will still affect the distribution of wealth that the ex post negotiations produce.
From the standpoint of efficiency, this redistribution is often viewed as neither desirable nor undesirable, which may be why most economic analyses have not concerned themselves with it. Instead, the redistributional effects have been of more concern to noneconomists, who have sometimes seen them as a reason for favoring overcompensatory or punitive remedies. Since these remedies put the breacher in the weakest bargaining position, they redistribute wealth away from the "guilty" breacher and toward the "innocent" non-breacher, a result which is often seen as normatively desirable.
However, the actual redistributive effects of contract remedies are not this simple, for the legal remedy will also affect the price that the first buyer will have to pay. If the legal rule allows the seller to keep most of the gains in those cases where a better offer is later received, the seller will be able to quote a lower price than that which could be quoted under a rule allowing buyers to capture most of those gains. In the former case, the seller's operations can be subsidized with the profits from the occasional profitable breach; in the latter, the amount of that subsidy will be reduced and the price will have to be raised to compensate. Thus, the availability of punitive remedies does not really "give" buyers the right to more of the profits. Instead, it "sells" that right to them.
This effect is easiest to see if all parties are risk-neutral, in which case the amount of the price increase should equal the actuarial value of the chance at a share of the profits from breach. It would be like participating in a lottery: every buyer will pay extra to create a pool that is just large enough to compensate sellers for the loss of those profits that will eventually have to be paid back to the "winners" (that is, those buyers who are lucky enough to have a second buyer appear and offer a higher price for the goods specified in their contracts).
For example, if there is a one in ten chance that another buyer will come along and offer $200 more for the product, and if the first buyer would get none of that $200 under a compensatory remedy but will be able to negotiate for half of it ($100) if some more favorable remedy is available, then the introduction of the more favorable remedy will be exactly equivalent to making the seller give the buyer a lottery ticket along with each purchase: a ticket that pays the buyer an extra $100 in one out of every ten cases. Needless to say, the seller will not include such a ticket without demanding a higher price for it. In a market with risk-neutral buyers and sellers, the price increase would usually equal the ticket's actuarial value of 1/10 times $100, or $10.
If buyers are really risk-neutral, then they are indifferent between paying for such a lottery ticket and going without one, so the introduction of such a remedy would leave them no better or worse off than before. This may be another reason why many economic analyses ignore this effect, since it is often plausible to assume that real actors (especially businesses) are risk-neutral. However, since risk-neutral buyers will be indifferent concerning the availability of such remedies, their preferences should be ignored in deciding which remedies will be most efficient. The most efficient remedy as far as the allocation of risk is concerned is that which best satisfies the risk-preferences of those buyers and sellers who are not risk-neutral, as these are the only ones whose welfare will be affected by the redistribution effect.
There are only a few combinations of attitudes toward risk that might justify punitive remedies and a transfer of more of the gains from the breaching to the nonbreaching buyers. First, if buyers are risk-preferring and sellers are risk-neutral (or less risk-preferring than buyers are), then buyers might be willing to "gamble" by paying a higher price in exchange for a chance to receive extra compensation in the event of breach. As noted earlier, this redistribution is equivalent to including a lottery ticket with each purchase, and risk-preferring buyers (by definition) will want such a lottery.
However, this is a very weak argument for overcompensatory remedies, for most risk-preferring buyers can find other ways to satisfy their taste for gambling-by going to the horse races, for instance. Unless the buyers have some particular reason for wanting to gamble on the chance that the seller will find a profitable opportunity for breach, rather than on the outcome of a horse race, overcompensatory remedies are not needed to satisfy these buyers' tastes.
Similarly, overcompensatory remedies might be justified if sellers are risk-averse and buyers are risk-neutral (or again, less risk-averse than sellers are). A risk-averse seller would prefer to give up any chance of an extra gain in the event of breach (by agreeing to pay all of those gains over to the buyer) in exchange for a higher price up front, since the higher price is guaranteed and the chance for extra gains from breach may never materialize. But a seller with these tastes has other ways to exchange those risky potential profits for their equivalent in certain forms of compensation -- for example, by selling on a commission basis rather than as a profit taking entrepreneur, or by selling stock to outsiders who are willing to take more of the business's risk.
The only reason an overcompensatory remedy succeeds in transferring some of this risk is that it requires buyers to invest in the seller's business, by making them pay a higher price up front in exchange for extra gains if the higher bid appears. Thus, to the extent that the redistribution effect provides an argument either way, it probably argues against making buyers pay a higher price for the chance to impose overcompensatory or punitive remedies.
My main point, however, is more fundamental. The level of contract damages will have an effect on the distribution of risks between the parties, and this effect will be independent of the ease of ex post renegotiation when the seller is considering whether to breach. Even when ex post renegotiation is costless, the choice of contract remedies can still make a difference.
The Precaution Decision
As noted above, many traditional analyses modeled the seller's decision to breach upon the option of selling to a second buyer. In such a situation, the only decision affecting breach is the seller's final decision about to whom to sell. A different decision, however, is implicated by breaches that take place when, for example, a product turns out to be defective, or a building collapses because the foundation was improperly laid. The decision that has to be optimized in these cases is not a decision about to whom to sell, but rather a decision about how much to spend on precautions to prevent such a problem.
The efficient level of precautions can be defined by principles similar to the Learned Hand negligence formula.
[Hopefully you learned or will learn about this formula in Torts. Basically, the formula says that
the owner's duty is a function of three variables:
(1) The probability of an injury;
(2) the gravity of the resulting injury;
(3) the burden of adequate precautions.
[Under this formula, an act is in breach of the duty of care -- i.e., is negligent -- if:
where
- B is the cost (burden) of taking precautions,
- P is the probability of loss, and
- L is the gravity of loss.
[The product of P x L must be a greater amount than B to create a duty of due care for the defendant.]
For example, if nonperformance would inflict a $10,000 loss on a risk-neutral buyer, and a given precaution would reduce the chance of non-performance from three percent to two percent, that precaution is efficient if and only if it costs less than $100 ($10,000 x (.03-.02)).
If the precaution costs more than $100, it would be better on balance to accept the incrementally increased risk and spend the $100 on something else. This is the decision rule that maximizes the expected surplus created by the contract; it is therefore also the rule to which the parties would negotiate if they could. lf the legal system is attempting to replicate what most parties would want, it should provide a remedy that will induce this efficient level of precaution.
Many economists have pointed out that perfectly compensatory remedies will create incentives for the seller to take an efficient level of precautions, as they make the seller liable for all of the buyer's costs. In the numerical example given above, the seller will realize that a reduction in the chance of nonperformance from three percent to two percent will reduce by one percent the chance of having to pay compensatory damages of $10,000. The seller will thus take that precaution if and only if it costs less than $100, just as efficiency would dictate. The argument is essentially the same as the argument for the efficiency (with respect to the defendant's precaution decision) of strict liability in torts. Indeed, this similarity should be expected, as liability for breach of contract is itself a form of strict liability.
If the law makes punitive remedies [against contract breach] available, though, the seller may not choose an efficient level of precaution. For example, suppose that in the event of a breach the seller will be liable for a remedy that costs $15,000 -- or, equivalently, a remedy that would cost some larger amount, but from which the seller expects to be released by paying the buyer $15,000 in ex post negotiations.
The desire to avoid being subjected to so costly a remedy will lead the seller to take the precaution even if it costs as much as $150 ($15,000 x (.03-.02)). In other words, any remedy that costs the seller more than the subjective value of performance to the buyer will induce excessive precautions against breach. The opposite would occur if the law limits the buyer to undercompensatory remedies, for in that case the seller would take too few precautions. For example, if the seller is only liable for $5,000 in the event of breach, it will not be worth the seller's while to spend any more than $50 ($5,000 x (.03-.02)) on the precaution ....
The Selection Decision
Noncompensatory remedies can also distort another decision: the choice of a contracting partner. Suppose, for example, that certain parcels of land are especially prone to earthquakes, erosion, or other natural disasters; and that there is nothing either party can do to prevent the disaster, so that the precaution decision discussed in the preceding subsection is not an issue.
To continue the numerical example used before, suppose that the risky parcels of land have a 3% chance of disaster while other, safer parcels have only a 2% chance -- and suppose that the sellers of each parcel of land know the risk associated with their parcel, while potential buyers do not. Suppose further that if the disaster does occur it will damage the buyer (who plans to build on the land) to the extent of $10,000.
These assumptions do not necessarily imply that it is a bad idea for buyers to build on the riskier parcels of land. They only imply that this difference in risk should be taken into account, and that buyers should not build there unless the riskier parcels have some advantage that more than offsets the extra risk.
Compensatory remedies will induce just this kind of consideration. If the sellers know they will be liable if the disaster occurs, each seller will have to charge a price that is high enough to cover the risk of liability. The price charged by the seller of the risky land will reflect a.03 x $10,000 = $300 risk; the price charged by the seller of the safer land need only reflect a.02 x $10,000 = $200 risk, so the seller of the risky land will be at a $100 disadvantage. This will make it unprofitable for the seller of the risky land to sell that land, unless it has some offsetting advantage that makes buyers willing to pay a $100 higher price. This is exactly the result that efficiency requires.
However, a punitive remedy will distort this process. If the seller must pay (say) $15,000 in the event of a $10,000 disaster, the price for the risky land will have to reflect a.03 x $15,000 = $450 risk, while the price for the safer land need only reflect a.02 x $15,000 = $300 risk. This gives the seller of the risky land a $150 disadvantage, thus deterring buyers from purchasing that land unless its offsetting advantages are enough to overcome the $150 difference. If the risky land has offsetting advantages worth less than $150 but more than $100, the risky land is actually more desirable when all the advantages and disadvantages are taken into account, but the $15,000 remedy would discourage the purchase of that land. In effect, the punitive remedy exaggerates the actual risk posed by each seller, thus distorting buyers' purchase decisions.
The opposite is true of an undercompensatory remedy. If the seller is liable for only $5,000 if the disaster occurs, the seller of the safer land will have expected liability costs of.02 x $5,000 = $100, while the seller of the risky land will have expected liability costs of.03 x $5,000 = $150, leaving a difference between the two of only $50. Thus, just as punitive remedies would overstate the difference between the two sellers' risks, undercompensatory remedies would understate the differences. Moreover, both will have this effect regardless of the ease or difficulty of ex post renegotiation, since ex post renegotiation (after the disaster takes place) will clearly be too late to change the decision about which parcel to build on. The ease or difficulty of ex post renegotiation is therefore irrelevant to this effect as well.
This analysis of the selection decision should also be familiar from products liability law [again, which hopefully, you learned about or will learn about in Torts].
The notion of "enterprise liability" rests in part on the idea that the accident costs associated with risky products should be internalized by their manufacturers and thereby reflected in their prices, so that the use of risky products will be appropriately deterred. Steven Shavell's more rigorous analysis of the effect of strict liability in inducing consumers to adapt the level of their consumption of different products to each product's riskiness rests on a similar analysis, as does much work in the economics of product warranties. Indeed, the analysis here is similar in many respects to the analysis of the incentive to take precautions....
The only difference is that the "precaution" decision takes the other party to the contract as given, and attempts to reduce the risks involved in dealing with that party. The "selection" decision is an attempt to reduce the risk by finding some other, less-risky party to deal with....
The distinction between the precaution and selection decisions also illuminates another problem case: sellers who have cost-effective precautions available, but who are unlikely to take those precautions regardless of liability because, for example, the question of what precautions to take is never rationally considered, or because they do not know that the law will make them bear any resulting loss. If there is really no way the law can correct the sellers' behavior, then the risks resulting from their lack of precautions might as well be classed with other "inherent" or "unavoidable" risks, in the sense that there is nothing the law can do about them.
But even in this situation, there can still be efficiency gains from inducing others not to deal with the risky party (assuming that no offsetting advantages are offered), and in eventually driving that party from the market. This, too, is a familiar conclusion in the torts literature, where analysts have often questioned the actual effect of legal incentives on changing peoples' precaution decisions.
In short, even in cases where the precaution decision seems to be irrelevant to an efficiency analysis, the selection decision may still be very important.. ..
Punishing Inefficient Breachers
The argument to this point has implicitly assumed that any legal remedy must apply to all breachers, whether or not they have behaved efficiently. This is, of course, the normal rule for contract remedies, for most contract liability is based on something more akin to strict liability than to negligence. For example, a seller will be liable for failing to deliver a product even if the excuse is that the product was sold to another buyer who valued it more highly. The seller will also be liable for selling a product that fails to live up to its warranty, even if it can be shown that the optimal amount was spent on quality control to try to prevent the defect.
This "strict liability" aspect of contract damages is crucial to the economic analysis of the preceding parts. Under strict liability, if even those sellers who behave perfectly efficiently will occasionally find it desirable to breach (or will take a level of precautions that occasionally results in a breach), then even the best of sellers will have to build the risk of liability into their price. This then gives rise to the "lottery" objection ... and to the distortion of the selection decision discussed [earlier in the excerpt] .... The risk of having to pay that extra liability will also lead sellers to take too many precautions to avoid being put in that situation, thus distorting the precaution decision....
These distortions would disappear, however, if liability for the punitive remedy could be conditioned on the seller's having behaved inefficiently. For example, one could imagine a rule that imposed liability for overcompensatory damages only if it were shown that the seller had sold to another buyer who valued the good less highly than did the plaintiff, or if it were shown that the seller had taken a suboptimal level of precautions.
This would make the seller's liability for the punitive remedy tum on something more like negligence than strict liability -- and under a perfectly operating negligence system, even damages far above the compensatory level should not distort the defendant's level of precautions. As long as the seller can entirely avoid that liability by taking the optimal level of care, the threatened liability can (in theory) be increased to infinity without inducing the seller to take more than the optimal level; this is so because once the optimal level of care is taken, the seller (by assumption) will no longer be exposed to the punitive damages. This ability to reduce the risk of punitive liability to zero also means that an efficient seller would have no need to reflect that risk in the price, so that there would be no distortion of the selection decision and no bundling of a lottery with the underlying contract.
However, this argument is only valid as long as there is no chance that a defendant who behaves efficiently will be subjected to the punitive remedy. If this condition is not met, then either (1) the punitive remedy will deter some defendants from behaving efficiently; or (2) defendants will still behave efficiently but the risk of extra liability will have to be reflected in their price, thus giving rise to all of the problems discussed above. Consequently, this case for punitive remedies must depend on the remedies' being applied only to truly inefficient conduct.
For example, a rule making punitive remedies available only for deliberate or "willful" breaches would not suffice, for even efficient breaches can be deliberate -- unless perhaps "willful" is interpreted to mean something like "willful and unjustified."
Indeed, even a test like "willful and unjustified" would only work if defendants could be confident that the application of that test by judges and juries would never result in its application to efficient conduct. Otherwise, efficient defendants would still face a risk of incorrectly imposed punitive remedies, thus requiring them to take this into account in their prices and their precaution decisions, and thereby giving rise to all of the distortions discussed above.
Of course, most "negligence" type tests (including the Learned Hand cost-benefit analysis) do not yield such certainty in their application. Consequently, making liability contingent on the defendant's having been found to violate a cost-benefit standard would still create some risk of punishing efficient behavior.
[end of readings]
13.6.3 Further Remedies Hypotheticals 13.6.3 Further Remedies Hypotheticals
Further Hypotheticals on the Measures of Damages
I agree to
- sell you 100 widgets,
in return for
- $100 and your mowing my lawn.
Assume:
Each widget has a market value of $1.05.
Alternative lawn mowing services would cost $10.
To mow the lawn, you have to buy $10 worth of gas.
You buy the gas, mow the lawn and pay me $100.
I deliver only 90 widgets.
You sue.
What’s your recovery – i.e., what’s the measure of damages?
Expectation:
Reliance:
Restitution:
What if you bought gas but hadn’t done anything else, and I breach by canceling deal:
Expectation:
Reliance:
Restitution:
13.7 Hypos 13.7 Hypos
13.7.1 Craswell & Schartz 2.3.2 Excerpts 13.7.1 Craswell & Schartz 2.3.2 Excerpts
§ 2.3.2 Liquidated Damages
Charles J. Goetz and Robert E. Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties, and the Just Compensation Principle
Applying an efficiency analysis to contract damage rules suggest the following enforcement hypothesis:
In the absence of evidence of unfairness or other bargaining abnormalities, efficiency would be maximized by the enforcement of the agreed allocation of risks embodied in a liquidated damages clause.
This hypothesis is based on the assumption that liquidated damage provisions will
(1) reduce transaction costs where the parties determine that the costs of negotiation are less than the expected costs of litigation upon breach; and
(2) reduce the error costs produced upon breach when the promisee is denied recovery for his non-provable idiosyncratic value.
It follows, unless enforcement produces other inefficiencies, that enforcing agreements negotiated ex ante will enhance efficiency by permitting the parties to minimize the cost of transacting. The current penalty rule seems to produce significant inefficient effects by limiting the possibilities of mutually beneficial exchange. In addition, negotiated damage agreements are now subject to post-breach attack as penal sanctions. This increases the direct costs of litigation in all cases—even where the agreement is upheld.
The situational model which will be used to test the hypothesis can be illustrated by the hypothetical Case of the Anxious Alumnus. Assume the following facts:
Dean Smith, a 1957 graduate of the University of Virginia, is a loyal, some would say fanatical, fan of the University of Virginia Cavalier college basketball team. For the 1976 season, after years of second division performances in the highly competitive Atlantic Coast Conference, the Cavaliers finally produce a team that advances to the finals of the conference championship tournament at the end of the season. Through hard work and financial sacrifice, Smith acquires twenty-five tickets to the conference championship game in Landover, Maryland. Smith enters into contract negotiations with the Reliable Charter Service, Inc., to arrange for a bus to transport himself and twenty-four other Virginia fans to Landover on the day of the game. The standard price for this service is $500.
Smith considers his attendance at the game to be of supreme importance and does not relish the thought of anxious and sleepless hours worrying whether the bus will arrive and successfully accomplish the desired purpose. He is eager to quiet his fears by securing adequate protection in case Reliable fails to perform. However, under the current legal rule Smith cannot protect his unprovable reliance either by securing fully compensating post-breach damages or a bargained-for stipulation of the value of performance. Consequently, he is forced to consider other protective alternatives.
One option is to attempt to insure against the subjective consequences of breach with a third party (Lloyd’s of London, for example). Assuming that a policy could be secured and enforced up to the assessed valuation of performance, adding the proceeds of the policy to the award of provable expectation damage which Smith could recover under existing law would provide him with full recovery for his idiosyncratic value upon breach by Reliable.
Alternatively, Smith could negotiate for direct insurance from Reliable or any of its competitors offering the same service. Dean might propose to pay Reliable $1,000 for the charter service if, in return for the additional premium, Reliable would agree to a penal sanction of $10,000 upon failure of performance. The stipulated sum of $10,000 would represent that amount at which Dean would be indifferent between performance and breach. Unfortunately, insurance purchased directly from the promisor, Reliable, is not a real alternative; the mere labelling of the idiosyncratic damages as pursuant to an “insurance” contract is unlikely to prevent a perceptive court from recognizing that such payments are de facto equivalent to a penalty. Hence, legally enforceable insurance for damages not recoverable as breach damages is in practice obtainable only from third parties.
This insurance model and the enforcement hypothesis pose the following issues for resolution:
1. As between the third-party insurance company and the promisor, which is the more efficient provider of insurance?
2. To what extent do the rationales supporting the “indemnity principle” suggest significant additional social costs due to enforcement of agreements at stipulated values?
3. Assuming changed conditions after an insurance agreement has been negotiated, such that the value of performance to the promisor is reduced, does enforcement of a penal sanction produce a high probability of inefficient effects?
4. What presumptions of unfairness can be developed to cope with those special classes of cases where bargaining abnormalities would produce inefficient effects if stipulated damage provisions were enforced?
The Efficient Insurer Model
Identifying the efficient insurer requires an analysis of the costs of providing insurance. At what price would a profit-making commercial enterprise be willing to offer Smith $10,000 worth of protection against the contingency of bus failure en route to the fabled final game of the championship?
Perhaps the overwhelming element in the cost of this insurance would be the expected value of the underwriting loss to the insurer. This expected value is defined as the product pR where p is the probability of nonperformance and R is the recovery payable to the insured. In addition, an insurer will also have other transactions costs, such as the costs of ascertaining the true probability p and the costs of negotiation and communication with the insured. These transaction costs will be subsumed in the portmanteau variable T, so that the total cost C of a policy paying R on the occurrence of an event with probability p can be summarized as
C = pR + T.
We assume that since the services in question are marketed competitively in the presence of alternative sellers, the cost of breach insurance to Smith will be (1 + α) C where α is the competitive rate of return or profit for the insurer. The question, then, is whether C would differ between the bus company and the third-party insurer.
An obvious focal point of interest is the transaction cost element T. Here, it is tempting to argue that the advantage lies with the bus company. In the first place, the bus company is in a superior position to know the breakdown probability p. Secondly, many of the other transaction costs normally incident to customer communication may be negligible when communication is already being undertaken relative to the carriage service itself. Hence, T may be lower for the bus company and thus so would C and the offering price of the insurance to Smith.
Actually, however, the transaction cost element is not the strongest argument in favor of the bus company as the most efficient insurer. The bus company’s main advantage derives from its power to exercise some control over the breakdown probability p....
Absent the $10,000 liquidated damage agreement, the bus company anticipates that D [its legal liability] will embody only the standard objective damage recovery which, let us assume, amounts to $1,000 for the Smith bus trip. [This anticipation leads the bus company to choose a relatively low level of care, which will result in a breakdown probability that can be labelled p0.] In computing the expected underwriting loss, the third party insurance company will therefore arrive at a value (p0 x $10,000).
Suppose, however, that the bus company can offer the same insurance. The expected value of damages is now based, not on a D of $1,000, but on a D of $1,000 actual provable damages plus $10,000 insurance recovery.... The company will expend additional maintenance costs A, ... and the breakdown probability will consequently decline to p1.
What are the implications of these adjustments on cost? For the bus company, the insurance cost must now be modified to reflect the net benefits of possible risk-avoidance efforts. Hence, the appropriate cost function for the provision by the bus company of $10,000 coverage is C = (p0 x $10,000) [$11,000 (p0 - P1) + T where the terms in the square bracket are net gains from adjusting maintenance levels: (p0 p1) is the change in breakdown probability, its product with $11,000 is the expected damage reduction, and A is the added cost of maintenance. We know that these net gains are positive from the nature of their computation and that they would not be achieved when the third-party insurance is purchased. Hence, even where the transaction cost component T is identical for the alternative insurers, the bus company has an efficiency advantage equal to the square-bracketed term in the equation above...
The preceding argument has been that non-enforcement of liquidated damages provisions has the result of inducing individuals to protect against otherwise non-recoverable losses through special third-party insurance. This is likely to be an extremely inefficient alternative since there are strong economic arguments that suggest that the vendor is the lowest-cost insurer against non-performance. Although our argument has been framed in terms of the bus company example, a similar conclusion may be generalized to all cases in which the vendor has some control over the probability of externally caused non-performance.
In sum, many people may not want to make deals unless they can shift to others the risk that they will suffer idiosyncratic harm or otherwise uncompensated damages. To the extent that the law altogether prevents such shifts from being made or reduces their number by unnecessarily high costs, it creates efficiency losses; that is, it prevents some welfare-increasing deals from being achieved....
Unfairness and Bargaining Abnormalities -- Presumption of Fair Exchange
The underlying premise of the enforcement hypothesis is that, in the absence of bargaining unfairness, a stipulated damage clause reflects equivalent value. The possibility that a given provision does not reflect subjective compensation, but is penal in nature, is irrelevant to the question of enforcement unless this fact is caused by bargaining abnormalities. This premise is a derivative of what can be described as the flexibility principle of private exchange. Assuming no violation of process constraints, the subjective value of exchange is not amenable to judicial scrutiny.
Except by controlling the subject matter, no neutral principle has been devised to evaluate the relative worth of a voluntary, freely-bargained exchange. Instead, contracts doctrine has developed fairness constraints which focus on the maintenance of process values—full access to information and competitive market opportunities. The enforcement hypothesis relies on this jurisprudential tradition by incorporating a presumption of fair exchange. Under this presumption, evidence that equivalent value was not exchanged for the liquidated damages provision would be relevant only to the extent that it permitted an inference as to the relative unfairness of the bargaining process. This analysis has been consistently applied by courts and legislatures to agreements for underliquidated or “limited” damages. These partial allocations of the risk of breach to the nonbreacher have been enforced absent specific evidence of unfairness. The enforcement hypothesis, by validating liquidated damage clauses which allocate similar risks to the breacher, does not raise any unique dangers of fraud or duress. [Fraud and duress are legal doctrines to which we will return later in the course.] Rather, the two situations present perfectly symmetrical fairness issues.
Unfairness and the Efficiency Criterion
The enforcement hypothesis identifies unfairness or other bargaining aberrations as the only limitations on the use of liquidated damages provisions. The normative notions of fairness implicit in the common law tradition are consistent with the analytical model of economic efficiency. Bargaining unfairness precludes the assumption of fair exchange and increases the risk of allocative inefficiencies. The inefficient effects of unfairness include an increase in the incidence of erroneously valued exchange as well as the increased social costs of fraud, misrepresentation, and duress. Asserting the inefficiencies of unfairness is not helpful analytically unless neutral principles can be identified within the fairness rubric. In the bargain context, two neutral principles may justify constraints on contracting flexibility.
Access to information at minimum cost is the first principle of bargain fairness. Where the bargain reflects processes which inhibit information exchange, the risk of allocative inefficiencies is enhanced. This constraint, identified in the unconscionability doctrine as “unfair surprise,” would incorporate contracting behavior ranging from fraudulent exchange of false or misleading information to failures to reasonably disclose essential contract terms. This incentive to information exchange will maximize efficiency by reducing the transaction costs of acquiring information.
The second fairness principle supports the maximizing of competitive market opportunities. Bargaining aberrations which inhibit competitive exchange will tend to produce inefficient resource allocation. The identifiable bargaining abnormalities would encompass duress as well as the more traditional cases of monopoly. The fairness value of enhanced market opportunities has also traditionally been reflected in the unconscionability doctrine. Scrutinizing a bargain produced by “oppression” or “absence of meaningful choice” is a response to the perceived inefficiencies of reduced markets. The benefits of this response by the private law doctrine of unconscionability, however, remain indeterminate. [We will return to that doctrine later in the course.]
If this elaborated definition of unfairness is incorporated into the enforcement hypothesis, the following decision rule would be proposed:
Liquidated damage provisions should be enforced in all cases unless evidence of information barriers or reduced competitive opportunities rebuts the presumption of fair exchange.
Party Sophistication and Presumptions of Unfairness
The jurisprudential anomaly of the penalty rule is the imposition of a second level fairness constraint. There is no reason to presume that liquidated damages provisions are more susceptible to duress or other bargaining aberrations than other contractual allocations of risk. Consequently, the extraordinary limitation seems to produce many more costly effects than are warranted by the perceived risk of unfairness. Nonetheless, it is clear that party sophistication will often be a relevant issue in determining the fairness of a stipulated damages provision. Many contracting parties may not be capable of calculating the risks necessary to bargain for the in terror em clause at an equivalent price. It is clear that some parties are incompetent to act as direct insurers of idiosyncratic value.
The problem of status does not justify the current rule under which these agreements are conclusively unenforceable in all cases. Nonetheless, a presumption of unfairness (and unenforceability) might well be appropriate in those factual contexts where the expected unfairness costs exceed the expected gains from unlimited contracting flexibility. For instance, if there exists an identifiable class of cases where application of the enforcement hypothesis predictably produces a high incidence of unfairness, the social costs can be reduced by attaching the unfairness presumption to those cases alone. This less restrictive limitation on contracting flexibility could be rebutted by the promisee’s demonstrating that the clause was a product of a fairly-bargained exchange. As part of his burden of proof, the promisee would be required to demonstrate that the parties had sufficient commercial sophistication and access to information to allocate fairly the identified risks.
Samuel A. Rea, Jr., Efficiency Implications of Penalties and Liquidated Damages
Posner suggested that courts are taking a stand against gambling contracts when they refuse to enforce such clauses. Clarkson, Miller, and Muris point out that this motivation is historically flawed because wagers were enforced for a long time after courts ceased enforcing penalties. It seems likely that the parties to most contracts are risk averse or at least risk neutral. None of the commentators has pointed out a case in which gambling was the motivation for unreasonable damages, and it is unlikely that a preference for risk prevails in the commercial world.
Goetz and Scott argue that the court’s unwillingness to compensate nonpecuniary losses following breach of contract has led courts to under-compensate victims of breach and has induced contracting parties to attempt to contract around the courts’ rules. Goetz and Scott conclude that damage clauses calling for apparently excessive payments should be enforced in order to insure these losses.
However, I have shown that it is usually irrational to insure such losses. The insurance decision involves transferring income from the state of the world in which the contract is not breached (a higher price will be paid for the contract) to the state of the world in which the contract is breached (damages will be received if breach occurs). If the loss is nonpecuniary, it is likely that the utility of the additional income in the breach state will fall short of the utility of the forgone income in the nonbreach state. Consequently nonpecuniary losses would not usually be fully compensated in an efficient contract. Therefore there will be few situations in which nonpecuniary losses provide an explanation for damages that are viewed as unreasonable by courts. ...
In summary, it appears that the penalty doctrine is not as anomalous as has been generally believed. The heart of the doctrine is that those damage clauses that were unreasonably large ex ante will not be enforced. [By "ex ante," Rea means "before or at the time the contract was agreed.] A careful examination of the factors influencing predetermined contractual damages suggests that there are few instances in which excessive damages will be desired by the contracting parties. The courts are correct in viewing such clauses with suspicion. Their refusal to enforce the clauses when losses can be easily measured is consistent with the doctrines of mistake and unconscionability. [Again, we will return to those doctrines later in the course.]
13.7.2 Jumbo v. AIG problem 13.7.2 Jumbo v. AIG problem
In 2012, AIG entered into an agreement to sell 90% of ILFC (its international aircraft leasing subsidiary, and the last non-core asset its restructuring plan, adopted in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis). The buyer was Jumbo, a company formed by a group of Chinese investors. The deal valued ILFC at $5 billion, with Jumbo agreeing to pay $4.75 billion in cash for 90% of ILFC, and AIG retaining 10%. The deal was negotiated at arm’s length by sophisticated parties aided by some of the world’s most experienced advisors. The resulting agreement was over 100 pages long. In the event of a dispute, the parties agreed to arbitrate in Hong Kong, with each choosing an arbitrator and their choices choosing a third.
The deal was conditioned on regulatory approvals in the U.S. and China, as well as Jumbo’s borrowing or finding investors to fund the deal. In the agreement, Jumbo agreed to deposit 10% of the purchase price (roughly $475 million) into an escrow. That amount would be applied to the purchase price at closing. The agreement also provided that if Jumbo breached the agreement, the full deposit would serve as a source of liquidated damages, as well as serve as a termination fee if a trigger event occurred, i.e., if the agreement was terminated after the failure of the deal to be completed due to Jumbo’s inability to obtain sufficient financing for the deal by a specified “long-stop date."
Clause 7.18 of the agreement recited that the deposit:
constitutes a reasonable estimate of the damages that will be suffered by [AIG] as a result of any breach or failure giving rise to a [trigger event] and that the payment of the Deposit amount by way of liquidated damages in respect of [a trigger event] is not a penalty, and [Jumbo] waives any right it may otherwise have to challenge the payment of the Deposit or as a penalty or as unenforceable in any way.
Clause 7.19 recited that 7.18 and the deposit were integral parts of the agreement and that without them AIG would not enter into the agreement.
Jumbo caused the deposit to be put into escrow, and the parties proceeded to try to complete the deal. Shortly before the long-stop date, however, Jumbo advised AIG it would not be able to fund the deal, so the deal could not close. Subsequently, AIG terminated the agreement and began the process specified in the agreement to collect the deposit as liquidated damages.
Soon thereafter, AIG entered into a new deal to sell ILFC to another buyer. In the new deal, AIG was to receive $3 billion in cash and a 46% interest in the new buyer. At the time, this 46% stake had a market value of $2 billion, but its final value would depend on market prices between the signing and completion of the new deal, which was expected to take 9 to 15 months. During that time, AIG would not be able to sell its interest in the new buyer. Upon learning of the new deal, Jumbo’s agents sought a refund of the escrowed deposit, while AIG continued to seek payment of the escrowed deposit.
- Advise AIG about whether it should expect to recover the deposit.
- How would you decide if you were an arbitrator?
13.8 Specific Performance 13.8 Specific Performance
13.8.1 Craswell & Schartz 2.3.1 Excerpts 13.8.1 Craswell & Schartz 2.3.1 Excerpts
§ 2.3.1 Specific Performance
Alan Schwartz, The Case for Specific Performance
[T]here are three reasons why [specific performance] should be routinely available. The first reason is that in many cases damages actually are undercompensatory. Although promisees are entitled to incidental damages, such damages are difficult to monetize. They consist primarily of the costs of finding and making a second deal, which generally involve the expenditure of time rather than cash; attaching a dollar value to such opportunity costs is quite difficult. Breach can also cause frustration and anger, especially in a consumer context, but these costs also are not recoverable...
Second, promisees have economic incentives to sue for damages when damages are likely to be fully compensatory. A breaching promisor is reluctant to perform and may be hostile. This makes specific performance an unattractive remedy in cases in which the promisor’s performance is complex, because the promisor is more likely to render a defective performance when that performance is coerced, and the defectiveness of complex performances is sometimes difficult to establish in court.
Further, when the promisor’s performance must be rendered over time, as in construction or requirements contracts, it is costly for the promisee to monitor a reluctant promisor’s conduct. If the damage remedy is compensatory, the promisee would prefer it to incurring these monitoring costs. Finally, given the time necessary to resolve lawsuits, promisees would commonly prefer to make substitute transactions promptly and sue later for damages rather than hold their affairs in suspension while awaiting equitable relief. The very fact that a promisee requests specific performance thus implies that damages are an inadequate remedy.
The third reason why courts should permit promisees to elect routinely the remedy of specific performance is that promisees possess better information than courts as to both the adequacy of damages and the difficulties of coercing performance. Promisees know better than courts whether the damages a court is likely to award would be adequate because promisees are more familiar with the costs that breach imposes on them. In addition, promisees generally know more about their promisors than do courts; thus they are in a better position to predict whether specific performance decrees would induce their promisors to render satisfactory performances.
In sum, restrictions on the availability of specific performance cannot be justified on the basis that damage awards are usually compensatory. On the contrary, the compensation goal implies that specific performance should be routinely available. This is because damage awards actually are undercompensatory in more cases than is commonly supposed; the fact of a specific performance request is itself good evidence that damages would be inadequate; and courts should delegate to promisees the decision of which remedy best satisfies the compensation goal....
Post-Breach Negotiations
... [One] efficiency argument for restricting the availability of specific performance is that making specific performance freely available would generate higher post-breach negotiation costs than the damage remedy now generates.
For example, suppose that a buyer (B1) contracts with a seller (S) to buy a widget for $100. Prior to delivery, demand unexpectedly increases. The widget market is temporarily in disequilibrium as buyers make offers at different prices. While the market is in disequilibrium, a second buyer (B2) makes a contract with S to purchase the same widget for $130. Subsequently, the new equilibrium price for widgets is $115.
If specific performance is available in this case, B1 is likely to demand it, in order to compel S to pay him some of the profit that S will make from breaching. B1 could, for example, insist on specific performance unless S pays him $20 ($15 in substitution damages plus a $5 premium). If S agrees, B1 can cover at $115, and be better off by $5 than he would have been under the damage remedy, which would have given him only the difference between the cover price and the contract price ($15). Whenever S’s better offer is higher than the new market price, the seller has an incentive to breach, and the first buyer has an incentive to threaten specific performance in order to capture some of the seller’s gains from breach.
The post-breach negotiations between S and B1 represent a “dead-weight” efficiency loss; the negotiations serve only to redistribute wealth between S and B1, without generating additional social wealth. If society is indifferent as to whether sellers or buyers as a group profit from an increase in demand, the law should seek to eliminate this efficiency loss. Limiting buyers to the damage remedy apparently does so by foreclosing post-breach negotiations.
This analysis is incomplete, however. Negotiation costs are also generated when B1 attempts to collect damages. If the negotiations by which first buyers (B1 here) capture a portion of their sellers’ profits from breach are less costly than the negotiations (or lawsuits) by which first buyers recover the market contract differential, then specific performance would generate lower post-breach negotiation costs than damages.
This seems unlikely, however. The difference between the contract and market prices is often easily determined, and breaching sellers have an incentive to pay it promptly so as not to have their extra profit consumed by lawyers’ fees.
By contrast, if buyers can threaten specific performance and thereby seek to capture some of the sellers’ profits from breach, sellers will bargain hard to keep as much of the profits as they can. Therefore, the damage remedy would probably result in quick payments by breaching sellers while the specific performance remedy would probably give rise to difficult negotiations. Thus the post-breach negotiation costs associated with the specific performance remedy would seem to be greater than those associated with the damage remedy.
This analysis makes the crucial assumption, however, that the first buyer, B1 has access to the market at a significantly lower cost than the seller; though both pay the same market price for the substitute, B1 is assumed to have much lower cover costs. If this assumption is false, specific performance would not give rise to post-breach negotiations.
Consider the illustration again. Suppose that B1 can obtain specific performance, but that S can cover as conveniently as B1. If B1 insists on a conveyance, S would buy another widget in the market for$115 and deliver on his contracts with both B1 and B2. A total of three transactions would result: S-Bl; S-B2; S2-S (S’s purchase of a second widget). None of these transactions involves post-breach negotiations.
Thus if sellers can cover conveniently, the specific performance remedy does not generate post-breach negotiation costs.
The issue, then, is whether sellers and buyers generally have similar cover costs. Analysis suggests that they do. Sellers as well as buyers have incentives to learn market conditions. Because sellers have to “check the competition,” they will have a good knowledge of market prices and quality ranges. Also, when a buyer needs goods or services tailored to his own needs, he will be able to find such goods or services more cheaply than sellers in general could, for they would first have to ascertain the buyer’s needs before going into the market.
However, in situations in which the seller and the first buyer have already negotiated a contract, the seller is likely to have as much information about the buyer’s needs as the buyer has. Moreover, in some markets, such as those for complex machines and services, sellers are likely to have a comparative advantage over buyers in evaluating the probable quality of performance and thus would have lower cover costs. Therefore, no basis exists for assuming that buyers generally have significantly lower cover costs than sellers. It follows that expanding the availability of specific performance would not generate higher post-breach negotiation costs than the damage remedy....
[A possible objection to this analysis] assumes that sellers breach partly because their cover costs are higher than those of their buyers; it then argues that when cover costs do diverge, allowing specific performance seemingly is less efficient than having damages be the sole remedy.
Returning to the widget hypothetical, let Cb = the first buyer’s (B1’s) cover costs; Cs = the seller’s cover costs.
Assume that S has higher cover costs than B1, that is, Cs > Cb. If specific performance were available, B1 could threaten to obtain it, so as to force S to pay him part of the cover cost differential, Cs Cb. If B1 made a credible threat, S would be better off negotiating than covering.
Because only the availability of specific performance enables B1 to force this negotiation, one could argue that it is less efficient than having damages as the sole remedy.
This objection is incorrect, even if differential cover costs influence seller decisions to breach. A credible threat by B1 to seek specific performance would usually require preparing or initiating a lawsuit. This would entail costs of lost business time, lost goodwill and lawyer’s fees, and these costs usually exceed any cover cost differential (Cs Cb) that may exist.
This is because the magnitude of cover costs—and hence of the differential—are low in relation to legal costs. Locating and arranging for substitute transactions are routine, relatively inexpensive business activities. Since the legal and related costs necessary for a credible threat commonly exceed the cover cost differential, it would rarely pay buyers to threaten specific performance to capture part of this differential. Thus no post-breach negotiations would be engendered by any differences in the parties’ cover costs.
The second objection to the conclusion that post-breach negotiation costs are no higher under specific performance than under damages follows from the fact that in some cases sellers cannot cover at all. In these cases, buyers can always compel post-breach negotiations by threatening specific performance.
There are two situations in which a seller cannot cover:
- if he is a monopolist or
- if the goods are unique.
In either event, the first buyer would also be unable to cover. If neither the seller nor the first buyer can cover, no reason exists to believe that there would be higher post-breach negotiation costs with specific performance than with damages.
If specific performance were available, B1 and S would negotiate over B1’s share of the profit that S’s deal with B2 would generate, or B1 would insist on a conveyance from S and then sell to B2.
If only the damages remedy is available, B1 would negotiate with S respecting his expected net gain from performance rather than over the contract market difference, because he could not purchase a substitute.
This expected gain is often difficult to calculate, and easy for the buyer to exaggerate. There is no reason to believe that negotiations or litigation over this gain would be less costly than the negotiations over division of the profit that B2’s offer creates, or the costs of a second conveyance between B1 and B2.
Thus even when the seller cannot cover, specific performance has not been shown to generate higher postbreach negotiation costs than damages. Moreover, when neither party can cover—the case under discussion—buyers have a right to specific performance under current law.
To summarize, if the initial buyer has access to the market at a significantly lower cost than the seller, a damages rule generates lower post-breach negotiation costs than a rule that makes specific performance routinely available. It seems likely, however, that both parties will be able to cover at similar, relatively low cost, or that neither will be able to cover at all. In either event, post-breach negotiation costs are similar under the two rules.
13.8.2 Restatement (2d) Sections on Specific Performance 13.8.2 Restatement (2d) Sections on Specific Performance
Section 357 – Availability of Specific Performance and Injunction
(1) Subject to the rules stated in §§ 359-69, specific performance of a contract duty will be granted in the discretion of the court against a party who has committed or is threatening to commit a breach of the duty.
(2) Subject to the rules stated in §§ 359-69, an injunction against breach of a contract duty will be granted in the discretion of the court against a party who has committed or is threatening to commit a breach of the duty if
(a) the duty is one of forbearance, or
(b) the duty is one to act and specific performance would be denied only for reasons that are inapplicable to an injunction.
Section 359 – Effect of Adequacy of Damages
(1) Specific performance or an injunction will not be ordered if damages would be adequate to protect the expectation interest of the injured party.
(2) The adequacy of the damage remedy for failure to render one part of the performance due does not preclude specific performance or injunction as to the contract as a whole.
(3) Specific performance or an injunction will not be refused merely because there is a remedy for breach other than damages [e.g., restitution], but such a remedy may be considered in exercising discretion under the rule stated in § 357.
Section 361 -- Effect of Provision for Liquidated Damages
Specific performance or an injunction may be granted to enforce a duty even though there is a provision for liquidated damages for breach of that duty.
Section 362 -- Effect of Uncertainty of Terms
Specific performance or an injunction will not be granted unless the terms of the contract are sufficiently certain to provide a basis for an appropriate order.
Section 363 -- Effect of Insecurity as to the Agreed Exchange
Specific performance or an injunction may be refused if a substantial part of the agreed exchange for the performance to be compelled is unperformed and its performance is not secured to the satisfaction of the court.
Section 364 – Effect of Unfairness
(1) Specific performance or an injunction will be refused if such relief would be unfair because
(a) the contract was induced by mistake or by unfair practices,
(b) the relief would cause unreasonable hardship or loss to the party in breach or to third persons, or
(c) the exchange is grossly inadequate or the terms of the contract are otherwise unfair.
(2) Specific performance or an injunction will be granted in spite of a term of the agreement if denial of such relief would be unfair because it would cause unreasonable hardship or loss to the party seeking relief or to third persons.
Section 366 – Effect of Difficulty in Enforcement or Supervision
A promise will not be specifically enforced if the character and magnitude of the performance would impose on the court burdens in enforcement or supervision that are disproportionate to the advantages to be gained from enforcement and to the harm to be suffered from its denial.
Section 367 – Contracts for Personal Service or Supervision
(1) A promise to render personal service will not be specifically enforced.
(2) A promise to render personal service exclusively for one employer will not be enforced by an injunction against serving another if its probable result will be to compel a performance involving personal relations the enforced continuance of which is undesirable or will be to leave the employee without other reasonable means of making a living.
13.8.3 Dow Chemical v. Rohm & Haas Problem 13.8.3 Dow Chemical v. Rohm & Haas Problem
In July 2008, Dow Chemical, one of the world’s largest independent chemical companies, agreed to buy Rohm & Haas (R&H), a smaller but still large competitor, for a fixed cash price of $15 billion. That price was 74% higher than Rohm & Haas’s prior market price. Dow viewed the deal a key strategic play, justifying the high price. The deal would give it access to “specialty” chemicals that would provide higher profit margins than the more basic chemicals which Dow already sold, and giving it an edge in a highly concentrated industry over Dow’s two other, large competitors (DuPont and BASF).
As typical, the deal was conditioned on approval from R&H’s shareholders, and regulatory clearances, which were expected to take nine to twelve months from signing of the contract. The agreement did not contain any condition related to financing. Dow’s obligations were subject to the condition that R&H had not suffered a “material adverse effect” during the deal process. That phrase was defined to focus on the companies themselves, and so explicitly excluded effects from adverse changes in the chemical industry, in R&H’s stock price, in political or economic conditions, or changes in law, among other things. (Not necessary for class, but if you’re curious to see what the actual agreement looked like, you can find it here.)
In the contract, the parties agreed:
Irreparable damage would occur in the event that any of the provisions of this Agreement were not performed in accordance with their specific terms or were otherwise breached and that the parties would not have any adequate remedy at law,
And, accordingly:
The parties shall be entitled to an injunction … to prevent … threatened breaches of this Agreement and to enforce specifically [its] terms and provisions …. The foregoing is in addition to any other remedy to which any party is entitled at law, in equity or otherwise.
Dow planned to generate most ($9.5 billion) of the cash to use in the deal by completing a separate transaction with the Kuwaiti national oil company, which was scheduled to close by year end.
R&H shareholders approved the deal on October 29. Meanwhile, however, the US’s financial crisis – begun in 2007, but initially seemingly limited to the “subprime” housing sector – had deepened and broadened dramatically. R&H’s forecasted cash flow was down by 33%, and its value down by 40% – even with “synergies,” less than $55 per share, compared to the deal price of $78. Dow announced 11,000 layoffs, brought 180 plants to a halt, and shuttered 20. Dow’s stock price fell 75%, but because R&H’s stock price was trading based on the expectation of the deal closing, R&H’s market value actually came to exceed Dow’s. Several other chemical companies went bankrupt. The S&P 500 overall fell 50%. Congress passed a $700 billion bailout bill in October 2008.
In November, the Kuwaitis renegotiated their deal with Dow, reducing the cash Dow would receive by $500 million. On January 2, 2009, the day of the planned Kuwaiti closing, 2,000 documents were laid out in conference rooms in NY law firms – but instead of closing, the Kuwaitis walked away (without justification, as arbitrators would eventually find, four years later).
At the same time, the banks who were to loan Dow much of the money for the R&H deal were teetering on failure. Bear Stearns and Lehman failed, AIG was bailed out, and Citigroup and Bank of America sought support from the Fed, and banks generally stopped lending even to one another. Dow’s credit rating had been cut, so that if it used bank loans to replace the Kuwaiti cash, it would fall to “junk” status. If that happened, some at Dow believed would threaten its solvency, and would certainly impose massive unexpected financing costs.
On January 23, the last regulatory approval for the deal was obtained, which meant that under the agreement the deal was to “close” (i.e., be completed) on January 25. Dow requested an extension to June 30. R&H resisted, noting that it would need to get a new shareholder approval for such a change. On January 25, Dow notified R&H it would not close on time. The next day, the R&H board authorized its lawyers to sue for specific performance.
The court granted a hearing date for March 9. As the stock market continued to fall, Dow defended itself by saying that a forced merger would call into question the viability of the combined companies and damage the larger economy, which was already falling into a tailspin. Dow asserted it needed more time to cut costs, arrange for replacement financing, and sell assets.
Based on the Sections of the Restatement (2d) of Contracts and the cases on specific performance included in this unit, advise on these questions:
- Why didn’t Dow claim R&H had suffered a material adverse effect?
- What factors would the court consider in considering R&H’s request for specific performance?
- How would a court come out? If you’re uncertain, guesstimate how likely R&H is to win.
- How should a court come out?
13.9 Lost volume sellers 13.9 Lost volume sellers
13.9.1 Kenco Homes, Inc. v. Williams 13.9.1 Kenco Homes, Inc. v. Williams
[No. 20907-1-II.
Division Two.
February 26, 1999.]
Kenco Homes, Inc., Appellant, v. Dale E. Williams, et al., Respondents.
*220 Roger J. Sharp of The Sharp Law Firm, for appellant.
Alfred A. Bennett, for respondents.
— Kenco Homes, Inc., sued Dale E. Williams and Debi A. Williams, husband and wife,1 for breaching a contract to purchase a mobile home. After a bench trial, the trial court ruled primarily for Williams. Kenco appealed, claiming the trial court used an incorrect measure of damages. We reverse.
Kenco buys mobile homes from the factory and sells them *221to the public. Sometimes, it contracts to sell a home that the factory has not yet built. It has “a virtually unlimited supply of product,”2 according to the trial court’s finding of fact.
On September 27, 1994, Kenco and Williams signed a written contract whereby Kenco agreed to sell, and Williams agreed to buy, a mobile home that Kenco had not yet ordered from the factory. The contract called for a price of $39,400, with $500 down.
The contract contained two conditions pertinent here. According to the first, the contract would be enforceable only if Williams could obtain financing. According to the second, the contract would be enforceable only if Williams later approved a bid for site improvements. Financing was to cover the cost of the mobile home and the cost of the land on which the mobile home would be placed.
The contract provided for damages. It stated, “I [Williams] understand that you [Kenco] shall have all the rights of a seller upon breach of contract under the Uniform Commercial Code, except the right to seek and collect ‘liquidated damages’ under Section 2-718.”3
The contract provided for reasonable attorney’s fees. It stated, “If you prevail in any legal action which you bring against me, or which I bring against you, concerning this contract, I agree to reimburse you for reasonable attorneys’ fees, court costs and expenses.”4
In early October, Williams accepted Kenco’s bid for site improvements. As a result, the parties (a) formed a second contract and (b) fulfilled the first contract’s site-improvement-approval condition.5 Also in early October, Williams received preliminary approval on the needed financing.
*222On or about October 12, Williams gave Kenco a $600 check so Kenco could order an appraisal of the land on which the mobile home would be located. Before Kenco could act, however, Williams stopped payment on the check and repudiated the entire transaction. His reason, according to the trial court’s finding of fact, was that he “had found a better deal elsewhere.”6
When Williams repudiated, Kenco had not yet ordered the mobile home from the factory. After Williams repudiated, Kenco simply did not place the order. As a result, Kenco’s only out-of-pocket expense was a minor amount of office overhead.
On November 1, 1994, Kenco sued Williams for lost profits. After a bench trial, the superior court found that Williams had breached the contract; that Kenco was entitled to damages; and that Kenco had lost profits in the amount of $11,133 ($6,720 on the mobile home, and $4,413 on the site improvements). The court further found, however, that Kenco would be adequately compensated by retaining Williams’ $500 down payment7; that Williams was the prevailing party; and that Williams should receive reasonable attorney’s fees in the amount of $1,800. Because Kenco had already received its $500, the court entered an $1,800 judgment for Williams, and Kenco filed this appeal.
In this court, Williams does not contest the trial court’s finding that he breached the contract.8 Thus, the only issues are (1) whether the superior court used the correct *223measure of damages, and (2) whether the superior court properly awarded attorneys’ fees to Williams.
I.
Under the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), a non-breaching seller may recover “damages for non-acceptance” from a breaching buyer.9 The measure of such damages is as follows:
(1) Subject to subsection (2) and to the provisions of this Article with respect to proof of market price (RCW 62A.2-723), the measure of damages for non-acceptance or repudiation by the buyer is the difference between the market price at the time and place for tender and the unpaid contract price together with any incidental damages provided in this Article (RCW 62A.2-710), but less expenses saved in consequence of the buyer’s breach.
(2) If the measure of damages provided in subsection (1) is inadequate to put the seller in as good a position as performance would have done then the measure of damages is the profit (including reasonable overhead) which the seller would have made from full performance by the buyer, together with any incidental damages provided in this Article (RCW 62A.2-710), due allowance for costs reason- • ably incurred and due credit for payments or proceeds of resale.10
As the italicized words demonstrate, the statute’s purpose is to put the nonbreaching seller in the position that he or she would have occupied if the breaching buyer had fully performed (or, in alternative terms, to give the nonbreaching seller the benefit of his or her bargain).11 A party claiming damages under subsection (2) bears the burden of show*224ing that an award of damages under subsection (1) would be inadequate.12
In general, the adequacy of damages under subsection (1) depends on whether the nonbreaching seller has a readily available market on which he or she can resell the goods that the breaching buyer should have taken.13 When a buyer breaches before either side has begun to perform, the amount needed to give the seller the benefit of his or her bargain is the difference between the contract price and the seller’s expected cost of performance. Using market price, this difference can, in turn, be subdivided into two smaller differences: (a) the difference between the contract price and the market price, and (b) the difference between the market price and the seller’s expected cost of performance. So long as a nonbreaching seller can reasonably resell the breached goods on the open market, he or she can recover the difference between contract price and market price by invoking subsection (1), and the difference between market price and his or her expected cost of performance by reselling the breached goods on the open market. Thus, he or she is made whole by subsection (1), and subsection (1) damages should be deemed “adequate.” But if a nonbreaching seller cannot reasonably resell the breached goods on the open market, he or she cannot recover, merely by invoking subsection (1), the difference between market price and his or her expected cost of performancé. Hence, he or she is not made whole by subsection (1); subsection (1) damages are “inadequate to put the seller in as good a position as performance would have done”; and subsection (2) comes into play.
*225The cases illustrate at least three specific situations in which a nonbreaching seller cannot reasonably resell on the open market. In the first, the seller never comes into possession of the breached goods; although he or she plans to acquire such goods before the buyer’s breach, he or she rightfully elects not to acquire them after the buyer’s breach.14 In the second, the seller possesses some or all of the breached goods, but they are of such an odd or peculiar nature that the seller lacks a postbreach market on which to sell them; they are, for example, unfinished, obsolete, or highly specialized.15 In the third situation, the seller again possesses some or all of the breached goods, but because the market is already oversupplied with such goods (i.e., the available supply exceeds demand), he or she cannot resell the breached goods without displacing another sale.16 Frequently, these sellers are labelled “jobber,” “components seller,” and “lost volume seller,” respectively17; in our view, however, such labels confuse more than clarify.
To illustrate the first situation, we examine Copymate *226 Marketing v. Modern Merchandising, Inc., 18 a case cited and discussed by both parties. In that case, Copymate had an option to purchase three thousand copiers from Dowling for $51,750. Before Copymate had exercised its option, it contracted to sell the copiers to Modern for $165,000. It also promised Modern that it would spend $47,350 for advertising that would benefit Modern. It told Dowling it was exercising its option, but before it could finish its purchase from Dowling, Modern repudiated. Acting with commercial reasonableness, Copymate responded by cancel-ling its deal with Dowling and never acquiring the copiers. It then sued Modern for its lost profits and prevailed in the trial court. Modern appealed, but this court affirmed. Because Copymate had rightfully elected not to acquire the copiers, it had no way to resell them on the open market; subsection (1) was inadequate; and subsection (2) applied. Thus, Copymate recovered its contract price with Modern ($165,000), minus the expected cost of performing its contract with Modern ($51,750 for Dowling, $47,350 for advertising, and $180 for a miscellaneous import fee), for a total of $65,720.
To illustrate the second situation, we again examine Copymate. Based on substantial evidence, the Copymate trial court found that after Modern’s repudiation, Copy-mate had “no active or reasonably available market for the resale of the . . . copiers.”19 One reason was that the copiers had been in storage in Canada for nine years; thus, they seem to have been obsolete. Again, then, Copymate could not resell the copiers on the open market; subsection (1) was inadequate; and subsection (2) provided for an award of “lost profits.”
To illustrate the third situation, we examine R.E. Davis Chem. Corp. v. Diasonics, Inc. 20 In that case, Davis breached his contract to buy medical equipment from Diasonics. Dia*227sonics was in possession of the equipment, which it soon resold on the open market. Diasonics then sued Davis for “lost profits” under subsection (2), arguing that “it was a Tost volume seller,’ and, as such, it lost the profit from one sale when Davis breached its contract.”21 The trial court granted summary judgment to Davis, but the appellate court reversed and remanded for trial. Other courts, the appellate court noted, “have defined a lost volume seller as one that has a predictable and finite number of customers and that has the capacity either to sell to all new buyers or to make the one additional sale represented by the resale after the breach.”22 This definition, the appellate court ruled, lacks an essential element; whether the seller would have sold an additional unit but for the buyer’s breach.23 On remand, then, Diasonics would have to prove (a) that it could have produced and sold the breached unit in addition to its actual volume, and (b) that it would have produced and sold the breached unit in addition to its actual volume.24
In this case, Kenco did not order the breached goods before Williams repudiated. After Williams repudiated, Kenco was not required to order the breached goods from the factory25; it rightfully elected not to do so; and it could not resell the breached goods on the open market. Here, *228then, “the measure of damages provided in subsection (1) is inadequate to put [Kenco] in as good a position as [Williams’] performance would have done”26; subsection (2) states the applicable measure of damages; and Kenco is entitled to-its lost profit of $11,133.
II.
The second issue is whether Kenco is entitled to reasonable attorneys fees. The parties’ contract provided that the prevailing party would be entitled to such fees. Kenco is the prevailing party. On remand, the trial court shall award Kenco reasonable attorneys’ fees incurred at trial and on appeal.
Reversed with directions to enter an amended judgment awarding Kenco its lost profit of $11,133, reasonable attorneys’ fees incurred at trial and on appeal, and any ancillary amounts required by law.
Bridgewater, C.J., and Seinfeld, J., concur.
Reconsideration denied May 3, 1999.