OPINION OF THE COURT

Ciparick, J.

The parties entered into a letter agreement setting forth certain conditions precedent to the formation and existence of a sublease between them. The agreement provided that there would be no sublease between the parties "unless and until” plaintiff delivered to defendant the prime landlord’s written consent to certain "tenant work” on or before a specified deadline. If this condition did not occur, the sublease was to be deemed "null and void.” Plaintiff provided only oral notice on the specified date. The issue presented is whether the doctrine of substantial performance applies to the facts of this case. We conclude it does not for the reasons that follow.

I.

In 1986, plaintiff Oppenheimer & Co. moved to the World Financial Center in Manhattan, a building constructed by Olympia & York Company (O & Y). At the time of its move, plaintiff had three years remaining on its existing lease for the 33rd floor of the building known as One New York Plaza. As an incentive to induce plaintiff’s move, O & Y agreed to make the rental payments due under plaintiff’s rental agreement in the event plaintiff was unable to sublease its prior space in One New York Plaza.

In December 1986, the parties to this action entered into a *688conditional letter agreement to sublease the 33rd floor. Defendant already leased space on the 29th floor of One New York Plaza and was seeking to expand its operations. The proposed sublease between the parties was attached to the letter agreement. The letter agreement provided that the proposed sublease would be executed only upon the satisfaction of certain conditions. Pursuant to paragraph 1 (a) of the agreement, plaintiff was required to obtain "the Prime Landlord’s written notice of confirmation, substantially to the effect that [defendant] is a subtenant of the Premises reasonably acceptable to Prime Landlord.” If such written notice of confirmation were not obtained "on or before December 30, 1986, then this letter agreement and the Sublease * * * shall be deemed null and void and of no further force and effect and neither party shall have any rights against nor obligations to the other.”

Assuming satisfaction of the condition set forth in paragraph 1 (a), defendant was required to submit to plaintiff, on or before January 2, 1987, its plans for "tenant work” involving construction of a telephone communication linkage system between the 29th and 33rd floors. Paragraph 4 (c) of the letter agreement then obligated plaintiff to obtain the prime landlord’s "written consent” to the proposed "tenant work” and deliver such consent to defendant on or before January 30, 1987. Furthermore, if defendant had not received the prime landlord’s written consent by the agreed date, both the agreement and the sublease were to be deemed "null and void and of no further force and effect,” and neither party was to have "any rights against nor obligations to the other.” Paragraph 4 (d) additionally provided that, notwithstanding satisfaction of the condition set forth in paragraph 1 (a), the parties "agree not to execute and exchange the Sublease unless and until * * * the conditions set forth in paragraph (c) above are timely satisfied.”

The parties extended the letter agreement’s deadlines in writing and plaintiff timely satisfied the first condition set forth in paragraph 1 (a) pursuant to the modified deadline. However, plaintiff never delivered the prime landlord’s written consent to the proposed tenant work on or before the modified final deadline of February 25, 1987. Rather, plaintiff’s attorney telephoned defendant’s attorney on February 25 and informed defendant that the prime landlord’s consent had been secured. On February 26, defendant, through its attorney, informed plaintiff’s attorney that the letter agreement and sublease were invalid for failure to timely deliver the *689prime landlord’s written consent and that it would not agree to an extension of the deadline. The document embodying the prime landlord’s written consent was eventually received by plaintiff on March 20, 1987, 23 days after expiration of paragraph 4 (c)’s modified final deadline.

Plaintiff commenced this action for breach of contract, asserting that defendant waived and/or was estopped by virtue of its conduct1 from insisting on physical delivery of the prime landlord’s written consent by the February 25 deadline. Plaintiff further alleged in its complaint that it had substantially performed the conditions set forth in the letter agreement.

At the outset of trial, the court issued an order in limine barring any reference to substantial performance of the terms of the letter agreement. Nonetheless, during the course of trial, the court permitted the jury to consider the theory of substantial performance, and additionally charged the jury concerning substantial performance. Special interrogatories were submitted. The jury found that defendant had properly complied with the terms of the letter agreement, and answered in the negative the questions whether defendant failed to perform its obligations under the letter agreement concerning submission of plans for tenant work, whether defendant by its conduct waived the February 25 deadline for delivery by plaintiff of the landlord’s written consent to tenant work, and whether defendant by its conduct was equitably estopped from requiring plaintiff’s strict adherence to the February 25 deadline. Nonetheless, the jury answered in the affirmative the question, "Did plaintiff substantially perform the conditions set forth in the Letter Agreement?,” and awarded plaintiff damages of $1.2 million.

Defendant moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Supreme Court granted the motion, ruling as a matter of law that "the doctrine of substantial performance has no application to this dispute, where the Letter Agreement is free of all ambiguity in setting the deadline that plaintiff concededly did not honor.” The Appellate Division reversed the judgment on the law and facts, and reinstated the jury verdict. The Court concluded that the question of substantial compliance was *690properly submitted to the jury and that the verdict should be reinstated because plaintiffs failure to deliver the prime landlord’s written consent was inconsequential.

This Court granted defendant’s motion for leave to appeal and we now reverse.

II.

Defendant argues that no sublease or contractual relationship. ever arose here because plaintiff failed to satisfy the condition set forth in paragraph 4 (c) of the letter agreement. Defendant contends that the doctrine of substantial performance is not applicable to excuse plaintiffs failure to deliver the prime landlord’s written consent to defendant on or before the date specified in the letter agreement and that the Appellate Division erred in holding to the contrary. Before addressing defendant’s arguments and the decision of the court below, an understanding of certain relevant principles is helpful.

A condition precedent is "an act or event, other than a lapse of time, which, unless the condition is excused, must occur before a duty to perform a promise in the agreement arises” (Calamari and Perillo, Contracts § 11-2, at 438 [3d ed]; see, Restatement [Second] of Contracts § 224; see also, Merritt Hill Vineyards v Windy Hgts. Vineyard, 61 NY2d 106, 112-113). Most conditions precedent describe acts or events which must occur before a party is obliged to perform a promise made pursuant to an existing contract, a situation to be distinguished conceptually from a condition precedent to the formation or existence of the contract itself (see, M.K. Metals v Container Recovery Corp., 645 F2d 583). In the latter situation, no contract arises "unless and until the condition occurs” (Calamari and Perillo, Contracts § 11-5, at 440 [3d ed]).

Conditions can be express or implied. Express conditions are those agreed to and imposed by the parties themselves. Implied or constructive conditions are those "imposed by law to do justice” (Calamari and Perillo, Contracts § 11-8, at 444 [3d ed]). Express conditions must be literally performed, whereas constructive conditions, which ordinarily arise from language of promise, are subject to the precept that substantial compliance is sufficient. The importance of the distinction has been explained by Professor Williston:

"Since an express condition * * * depends for its validity on the manifested intention of the parties, *691it has the same sanctity as the promise itself. Though the court may regret the harshness of such a condition, as it may regret the harshness of a promise, it must, nevertheless, generally enforce the will of the parties unless to do so will violate public policy. Where, however, the law itself has imposed the condition, in absence of or irrespective of the manifested intention of the parties, it can deal with its creation as it pleases, shaping the boundaries of the constructive condition in such a way as to do justice and avoid hardship”. (5 Williston, Contracts § 669, at 154 [3d ed].)

In determining whether a particular agreement makes an event a condition courts will interpret doubtful language as embodying a promise or constructive condition rather than an express condition. This interpretive preference is especially strong when a finding of express condition would increase the risk of forfeiture by the obligee (see, Restatement [Second] of Contracts § 227 [1]).

Interpretation as a means of reducing the risk of forfeiture cannot be employed if "the occurrence of the event as a condition is expressed in unmistakable language” (Restatement [Second] of Contracts § 229, comment a, at 185; see, § 227, comment b [where language is clear, "(t)he policy favoring freedom of contract requires that, within broad limits, the agreement of the parties should be honored even though forfeiture results”]). Nonetheless, the nonoccurrence of the condition may yet be excused by waiver, breach or forfeiture. The Restatement posits that "[t]o the extent that the nonoccurrence of a condition would cause disproportionate forfeiture, a court may excuse the non-occurrence of that condition unless its occurrence was a material part of the agreed exchange” (Restatement [Second] of Contracts § 229).

Turning to the case at bar, it is undisputed that the critical language of paragraph 4 (c) of the letter agreement unambiguously establishes an express condition precedent rather than a promise, as the parties employed the unmistakable language of condition ("if,” "unless and until”). There is no doubt of the parties’ intent and no occasion for interpreting the terms of the letter agreement other than as written.

Furthermore, plaintiff has never argued, and does not now contend, that the nonoccurrence of the condition set forth in *692paragraph 4 (c) should be excused on the ground of forfeiture.2 Rather, plaintiffs primary argument from the inception of this litigation has been that defendant waived or was equitably estopped from invoking paragraph 4 (c). Plaintiff argued secondarily that it substantially complied with the express condition of delivery of written notice on or before February 25th in that it gave defendant oral notice of consent on the 25th.

Contrary to the decision of the Court below, we perceive no justifiable basis for applying the doctrine of substantial performance to the facts of this case. The flexible concept of substantial compliance "stands in sharp contrast to the requirement of strict compliance that protects a party that has taken the precaution of making its duty expressly conditional” (2 Farnsworth, Contracts § 8.12, at 415 [2d ed 1990]). If the parties "have made an event a condition of their agreement, there is no mitigating standard of materiality or substantiality applicable to the non-occurrence of that event” (Restatement [Second] of Contracts § 237, comment d, at 220). Substantial performance in this context is not sufficient, "and if relief is to be had under the contract, it must be through excuse of the non-occurrence of the condition to avoid forfeiture” (id.; see, Brown-Marx Assocs. v Emigrant Sav. Bank, 703 F2d 1361, 1367-1368 [11th Cir]; see also, Childres, Conditions in the Law of Contracts, 45 NYU L Rev 33, 35).

Here, it is undisputed that plaintiff has not suffered a forfeiture or conferred a benefit upon defendant. Plaintiff alludes to a $1 million licensing fee it allegedly paid to the prime landlord for the purpose of securing the latter’s consent to the subleasing of the premises. At no point, however, does plaintiff claim that this sum was forfeited or that it was expended for the purpose of accomplishing the sublease with defendant. It is further undisputed that O & Y, as an inducement to effect plaintiff’s move to the World Financial Center, promised to indemnify plaintiff for damages resulting from failure to sublease the 33rd floor of One New York Plaza. Consequently, because the critical concern of forfeiture or unjust enrichment is simply not present in this case, we are not presented with an occasion to consider whether the doc*693trine of substantial performance is applicable, that is, whether the courts should intervene to excuse the nonoccurrence of a condition precedent to the formation of a contract.

The essence of the Appellate Division’s holding is that the substantial performance doctrine is universally applicable to all categories of breach of contract, including the nonoccurrence of an express condition precedent. However, as discussed, substantial performance is ordinarily not applicable to excuse the nonoccurrence of an express condition precedent.

Our precedents are consistent with this general principle. In Maxton Bldrs. v Lo Galbo (68 NY2d 373) the defendants contracted on August 3 to buy a house, but included in the contract the condition that if real estate taxes were found to be above $3,500 they would have the right to cancel the contract upon written notice to the seller within three days. On August 4 the defendants learned that real estate taxes would indeed exceed $3,500. The buyers’ attorney called the seller’s attorney and notified him that the defendants were exercising their option to cancel. A certified letter was sent notifying the seller’s attorney of that decision on August 5 but was not received by the seller’s attorney until August 9. We held the cancellation ineffective and rejected defendants’ argument that reasonable notice was all that was required, stating: "It is settled * * * that when a contract requires that written notice be given within a specified time, the notice is ineffective unless the writing is actually received within the time prescribed” (id., at 378). We so held despite the fact that timely oral notice was given and the contract did not provide that time was of the essence.

In Jungmann & Co. v Atterbury Bros. (249 NY 119) the parties entered into a written contract for the sale of 30 tons of casein. The contract contained the following clause: "Shipment: May-June from Europe. Advice of shipment to be made by cable immediately goods are dispatched” (id.). Plaintiff shipped the first 15 tons but gave no notice to the defendant, who rejected the shipment. Plaintiff thereafter shipped the remaining 15 tons to defendant, but again failed to provide notice by cable and instead sent two letters. Defendant rejected the remaining 15 tons. This Court was not persuaded by the argument that the defendant had received notice of shipment by other means and thus suffered no harm. "Even if that be true,” we stated, "the fact remains that the plaintiff was obligated under its contract to see that defendant ob*694tained advice of shipment by cable” (id., at 121). Plaintiffs failure to "perform[ ] all conditions precedent required of it,” and "to give notice according to the terms of the contract” barred it from recovery (id., at 122).

Plaintiffs reliance on the well-known case of Jacob & Youngs v Kent (230 NY 239) is misplaced. There, a contractor built a summer residence and the buyer refused to pay the remaining balance of the contract price on the ground that the contractor used a different type of pipe than was specified in the contract. The buyer sought to enforce the contract as written. This would have involved the demolition of large parts of the structure at great expense and loss to the seller. This Court, in an opinion by then-Judge Cardozo, ruled for the contractor on the ground that "an omission, both trivial and innocent, will sometimes be atoned for by allowance of the resulting damage, and will not always be the breach of a condition to be followed by a forfeiture” (230 NY, at 241). But Judge Cardozo was careful to note that the situation would be different in the case of an express condition:

"This is not to say that the parties are not free by apt and certain words to effectuate a purpose that performance of every term shall be a condition of recovery. That question is not here. This is merely to say that the law will be slow to impute the purpose, in the silence of the parties, where the significance of the default is grievously out of proportion to the oppression of the forfeiture” (id., at 243-244).

The quoted language contradicts the Appellate Division’s proposition that the substantial performance doctrine applies universally, including when the language of the agreement leaves no doubt that an express condition precedent was intended (see, 205 AD2d, at 414). More importantly, Jacob & Youngs lacks determinative significance here on the additional ground that plaintiff conferred no benefit upon defendant. The avoidance-of-forfeiture rationale which engendered the rule of Jacob & Youngs is simply not present here, and the case therefore "should not be extended by analogy where the reason for the rule fails” (Van Iderstine Co. v Barnet Leather Co., 242 NY 425, 434).

The lease renewal and insurance cases relied upon by plaintiff are clearly distinguishable and explicable on the basis of the risk of forfeiture existing therein. For example, in Sy *695 Jack Realty Co. v Pergament Syosset Corp. (27 NY2d 449, 452), this Court gave effect to a late notice of lease renewal. Importantly, while we reaffirmed the general rule "that notice, when required to be 'given’ by a certain date, is insufficient and ineffectual if not received within the time specified,” we held that the prior courts properly invoked the rule that equity "relieves against * * * forfeitures of valuable lease terms when default in notice has not prejudiced the landlord” (id,., quoting Jones v Gianferante, 305 NY 135, 138; see also, J. N. A. Realty Corp. v Cross Bay Chelsea, 42 NY2d 392, 397 ["when a tenant in possession under an existing lease has neglected to * * * renew, he might suffer a forfeiture if he has made valuable improvements on the property”]). We stated: "Since a long-standing location for a retail business is an important part of the good will of that enterprise, the tenant stands to lose a substantial and valuable asset” (id., 22 NY2d, at 453).

III.

In sum, the letter agreement provides in the clearest language that the parties did not intend to form a contract "unless and until” defendant received written notice of the prime landlord’s consent on or before February 25, 1987. Defendant would lease the 33rd floor from plaintiff only on the condition that the landlord consent in writing to a telephone communication linkage system between the 29th and 33rd floors and to defendant’s plans for construction effectuating that linkage. This matter was sufficiently important to defendant that it would not enter into the sublease "unless and until” the condition was satisfied. Inasmuch as we are not dealing here with a situation where plaintiff stands to suffer some forfeiture or undue hardship, we perceive no justification for engaging in a "materiality-of-the-nonoccurrence” analysis. To do so would simply frustrate the clearly expressed intention of the parties. Freedom of contract prevails in an arm’s length transaction between sophisticated parties such as these, and in the absence of countervailing public policy concerns there is no reason to relieve them of the consequences of their bargain. If they are dissatisfied with the consequences of their agreement, "the time to say so [was] at the bargaining table” (Maxton, supra, at 382).

Finally, the issue of substantial performance was not for the jury to resolve in this case. A determination whether *696there has been substantial performance is to be answered, "if the inferences are certain, by the judges of the law” (Jacob & Youngs v Kent, 230 NY 239, 243, supra).

Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be reversed, with costs, and the complaint dismissed.

Chief Judge Kaye and Judges Simons, Titone, Bellacosa, Smith and Levine concur.

Order reversed, etc.

PRESIDING JUSTICE KNECHT

delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiff Truman L. Flatt & Sons Co., Inc., filed a complaint seeking specific performance of a real estate contract made with defendants Sara Lee Schupf, Ray H. Neiswander, Jr., and American National Bank and Trust Company of Chicago (American), as trustee *984under trust No. 23257. Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, which the trial court granted. Plaintiff now appeals from the trial court’s grant of the motion for summary judgment. We reverse and remand.

In March 1993, plaintiff and defendants entered a contract in which defendants agreed to sell plaintiff a parcel of land located in Springfield, Illinois. The contract stated the purchase price was to be $160,000. The contract also contained the following provisions:

"1. This transaction shall be closed on or before June 30, 1993, or upon approval of the relief requested from the Zoning Code of the City of Springfield, Illinois, whichever first occurs ('Closing Date’). The closing is subject to contingency set forth in paragraph 14.

14. This Contract to Purchase Real Estate is contingent upon the Buyer obtaining, within one hundred twenty (120) days after the date hereof, amendment of, or other sufficient relief of, the Zoning Code of the City of Springfield to permit the construction and operation of an asphalt plant. In the event the City Council of the City of Springfield denies the request for such use of the property, then this contract shall be voidable at Buyer’s option and if Buyer elects to void this contract Buyer shall receive a refund of the earnest money paid.”

On May 21, plaintiff’s attorney sent a letter to defendants’ attorney informing him of substantial public opposition plaintiff encountered at a public meeting concerning its request for rezoning. The letter concluded:

"The day after the meeting all of the same representatives of the buyer assembled and discussed our chances for successfully pursuing the re-zoning request. Everyone who was there was in agreement that our chances were zero to none for success. As a result, we decided to withdraw the request for re-zoning, rather than face almost certain defeat.

The bottom line is that we are still interested in the property, but the property is not worth as much to us [as] a 35-acre parcel zoned 1-1, as it would be if it were zoned 1-2. At this juncture, I think it is virtually impossible for anyone to get that property rezoned 1-2, especially to accommodate the operation of an asphalt plant. In an effort to keep this thing moving, my clients have authorized me to offer your clients the sum of $142,500.00 for the property, which they believe fairly represents its value with its present zoning classification. Please check with your clients and advise whether or not that revision in the contract is acceptable. If it is, I believe we can accelerate the closing and bring this mat*985ter to a speedy conclusion. Your prompt attention will be appreciated. Thanks.”

Defendants’ attorney responded in a letter dated June 9, the body of which stated, in its entirety:

"In reply to your May 21 letter, be advised that the owners of the property in question are not interested in selling the property for $142,500 and, accordingly, the offer is not accepted.

I regret that the zoning reclassification was not approved.” Plaintiff’s attorney replied back in a letter dated June 14, the body of which stated, in its entirety:

"My clients received your letter of June 9, 1993[,] with some regret, however upon some consideration they have elected to proceed with the purchase of the property as provided in the contract. At your convenience please give me a call so that we can set up a closing date.”

After this correspondence, plaintiff’s attorney sent two more brief letters to defendants’ attorney, dated June 23 and July 6, each requesting information concerning the status of defendants’ preparation for fulfillment of the contract. Defendants’ attorney replied in a letter dated July 8. The letter declared it was the defendants’ position plaintiff’s failure to waive the rezoning requirement and elect to proceed under the contract at the time the rezoning was denied, coupled with the new offer to buy the property at less than the contract price, effectively voided the contract. Plaintiff apparently sent one more letter in an attempt to convince defendants to honor the contract, but defendants declined. Defendants then arranged to have plaintiff’s earnest money returned.

Plaintiff filed a complaint for specific performance and other relief against defendants and American, asking the court to direct defendants to comply with the terms of the contract. Defendants responded by filing a "motion to strike, motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, motion for summary judgment.” The motion for summary judgment sought summary judgment on the basis plaintiff repudiated the contract.

Prior to the hearing on the motions, plaintiff filed interrogatories requesting, among other things, information concerning the current status of the property. Defendants’ answers to the interrogatories stated defendants had no knowledge of any third party’s involvement in a potential sale of the property, defendants had not made any offer to sell the property to anyone, no one had made an offer to purchase the property or discussed the possibility of purchasing the property, and defendants had not sold the property to, received any offer from, or discussed a sale of the property with, any other trust member.

*986After a hearing on the motions, the trial court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment without explaining the basis for its ruling. Plaintiff filed a post-trial motion to vacate the judgment. The trial court denied the post-trial motion, declaring defendants’ motion for summary judgment was granted because plaintiff had repudiated the contract. Plaintiff now appeals the trial court’s grant of summary judgment, arguing the trial court erred because (1) it did not repudiate the contract, and (2) even if it did repudiate the contract, it timely retracted that repudiation.

Plaintiff contends the trial court erred in granting summary judgment. Summary judgment is proper when the resolution of a case hinges on a question of law and the moving party’s right to judgment is clear and free from doubt. In considering a motion for summary judgment, the court must consider the affidavits, depositions, admissions, exhibits, and pleadings on file and has a duty to construe the evidence strictly against the movant and liberally in favor of the nonmoving party. (In re Estate of Hoover (1993), 155 Ill. 2d 402, 410-11, 615 N.E.2d 736, 739-40.) The motion will be granted if the court finds there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (735 ILCS 5/2— 1005 (West 1992).) A triable issue of fact exists where there is a dispute as to material facts or where the material facts are undisputed but reasonable persons might draw different inferences from those facts. In a case involving summary judgment, a reviewing court reviews the evidence in the record de novo. (Hoover, 155 Ill. 2d at 411, 615 N.E.2d at 740.) Here, there are no facts in dispute. Thus, the question is whether the trial court erred in declaring defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law based on those facts.

Plaintiff first argues summary judgment was improper because the trial court erred in finding plaintiff had repudiated the contract.

"The doctrine of anticipatory repudiation requires a clear manifestation of an intent not to perform the contract on the date of performance. *** That intention must be a definite and unequivocal manifestation that he will not render the promised performance when the time fixed for it in the contract arrives. [Citation.] Doubtful and indefinite statements that performance may or may not take place are not enough to constitute anticipatory repudiation.” (In re Marriage of Olsen (1988), 124 Ill. 2d 19, 24, 528 N.E.2d 684, 686.)

These requirements exist because "[ajnticipatory breach is not a remedy to be taken lightly.” (Olsen, 124 Ill. 2d at 25, 528 N.E.2d at 687.) The Restatement (Second) of Contracts adopts the view of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) and states "language that under a *987fair reading 'amounts to a statement of intention not to perform except on conditions which go beyond the contract’ constitutes a repudiation. Comment 2 to Uniform Commercial Code § 2 — 610.” (Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 250, Comment b, at 273 (1981).) Whether an anticipatory repudiation occurred is a question of fact and the judgment of the trial court thereon will not be disturbed unless it is against the manifest weight of evidence. Leazzo v. Dunham (1981), 95 Ill. App. 3d 847, 850, 420 N.E.2d 851, 854.

As can be seen, whether a repudiation occurred is determined on a case-by-case basis, depending on the particular language used. Both plaintiff and defendants, although they cite Illinois cases discussing repudiation, admit the cited Illinois cases are all factually distinguishable from the case at hand because none of those cases involved a request to change a term in the contract. According to the commentators, a suggestion for modification of the contract does not amount to a repudiation. (J. Calamari & J. Perillo, Contracts § 12 — 4, at 524 n.74 (3d ed. 1987) (hereinafter Calamari), citing Unique Systems Inc. v. Zotos International, Inc. (8th Cir. 1980), 622 F.2d 373.) Plaintiff also cites cases in other jurisdictions holding a request for a change in the price term of a contract does not constitute a repudiation. (Wooten v. DeMean (Mo. Ct. App. 1990), 788 S.W.2d 522; Stolper Steel Products Corp. v. Behrens Manufacturing Co. (1960), 10 Wis. 2d 478, 103 N.W.2d 683.) Defendants attempt to distinguish these cases by arguing here, under the totality of the language in the letter and the circumstances surrounding the letter, the request by plaintiff for a decrease in price clearly implied a threat of nonperformance if the price term was not modified. We disagree.

The language in the May 21 letter did not constitute a clearly implied threat of nonperformance. First, although the language in the May 21 letter perhaps could be read as implying plaintiff would refuse to perform under the contract unless the price was modified, given the totality of the language in the letter, such an inference is weak. More important, even if such an inference were possible, Illinois law requires a repudiation be manifested clearly and unequivocally. Plaintiffs May 21 letter at most created an ambiguous implication whether performance would occur. Indeed, during oral argument defense counsel conceded the May 21 letter was "ambiguous” on whether a repudiation had occurred. This is insufficient to constitute a repudiation under well-settled Illinois law. Therefore, the trial court erred in declaring the May 21 letter anticipatorily repudiated the real estate contract as a matter of law.

Moreover, even if plaintiff had repudiated the contract, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on this basis because *988plaintiff timely retracted its repudiation. Only one published decision has discussed and applied Illinois law regarding retraction of an anticipatory repudiation, Refrigeradora Del Noroeste, S.A. v. Appelbaum (1956), 138 F. Supp. 354 (holding the repudiating party has the power of retraction unless the injured party has brought suit or otherwise materially changed position), aff’d in part & rev’d in part on other grounds (1957), 248 F.2d 858. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts states:

"The effect of a statement as constituting a repudiation under § 250 or the basis for a repudiation under § 251 is nullified by a retraction of the statement if notification of the retraction comes to the attention of the injured party before he materially changes his position in reliance on the repudiation or indicates to the other party that he considers the repudiation to be final.” (Emphasis added.) (Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 256(1), at 293 (1981).)

The UCC adopts the same position:

"Retraction of Anticipatory Repudiation. (1) Until the repudiating party’s next performance is due he can retract his repudiation unless the aggrieved party has since the repudiation cancelled or materially changed his position or otherwise indicated that he considers the repudiation final.” (Emphasis added.) (810 ILCS 5/2 — 611(1) (West 1992).)

Professors Calamari and Perillo declare section 2 — 611 of the UCC:

"is in general accord with the common law rule that an anticipatory repudiation may be retracted until the other party has commenced an action thereon or has otherwise changed his position. The Code is explicit that no other act of reliance is necessary where the aggrieved party indicates 'that he considers the repudiation final.’ ” (Emphasis added.) (Calamari § 12.7, at 528.)

"The majority of the common law cases appear to be in accord with this position.” (Calamari § 12.7, at 528 n.93.) Other commentators are universally in accord. Professor Farnsworth states: "The repudiating party can prevent the injured party from treating the contract as terminated by retracting before the injured party has acted in response to it.” (Emphasis added.) (2 E. Farnsworth, Contracts § 8.22, at 482 (1990).) Professor Corbin declares one who has anticipatorily repudiated his contract has the power of retraction until the aggrieved party has materially changed his position in reliance on the repudiation. (4 A. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 980, at 930-31 (1951) (hereinafter Corbin).) Corbin goes on to say the assent of the aggrieved party is necessary for retraction only when the repudiation is no longer merely anticipatory, but has become an actual breach at the time performance is due. (4 Corbin § 980, at 935.) Williston states *989an anticipatory repudiation can be retracted by the repudiating party "unless the other party has, before the withdrawal, manifested an election to rescind the contract, or changed his position in reliance on the repudiation.” (Emphasis added.) 11 W. Jaeger, Williston on Contracts § 1335, at 180 (3d ed. 1968) (hereinafter Williston).

Defendants completely avoid discussion of the common-law right to retract a repudiation other than to say Illinois is silent on the issue. Defendants then cite Stonecipher v. Pillatsch (1975), 30 Ill. App. 3d 140, 332 N.E.2d 151, Builder’s Concrete Co. v. Fred Faubel & Sons, Inc. (1978), 58 Ill. App. 3d 100, 373 N.E.2d 863, and Leazzo v. Dunham (1981), 95 Ill. App. 3d 847, 420 N.E.2d 851, as well as Williston § 1337, at 185-86. These authorities stand for the proposition that after an anticipatory repudiation, the aggrieved party is entitled to choose to treat the contract as rescinded or terminated, to treat the anticipatory repudiation as a breach by bringing suit or otherwise changing its position, or to await the time for performance. The UCC adopts substantially the same position. (810 ILCS 5/2 — 610 (West 1992).) Defendants here assert they chose to treat the contract as rescinded, as they had a right to do under well-settled principles of law.

Plaintiff admits the law stated by defendants is well settled, and admits if the May 21 letter was an anticipatory breach, then defendants had the right to treat the contract as being terminated or rescinded. However, plaintiff points out defendants’ assertions ignore the great weight of authority, discussed earlier, which provides a right of the repudiating party to retract the repudiation before the aggrieved party has chosen one of its options allowed under the common law and listed in Stonecipher, Builder’s Concrete, and Leazzo. Plaintiff argues defendants’ letter of June 9 failed to treat the contract as rescinded, and absent notice or other manifestation defendants were pursuing one of their options, plaintiff was free to retract its repudiation. Plaintiff is correct.

Defendants’ precise theory that plaintiff should not be allowed to retract any repudiation in this instance is ambiguous and may be given two interpretations. The first is Illinois should not follow the common-law rule allowing retraction of an anticipatory repudiation before the aggrieved party elects a response to the repudiation. This theory warrants little discussion, because the rule is well settled. Further, defendants have offered no public policy reason to disallow retraction of repudiation other than the public interest in upholding the "sanctity of the contract.”

The second possible interpretation of defendants’ precise theory is an aggrieved party may treat the contract as terminated or rescinded without notice or other indication being given to the *990repudiating party, and once such a decision is made by the aggrieved party, the repudiating party no longer has the right of retraction. It is true no notice is required to be given to the repudiating party if the aggrieved party materially changes its position as a result of the repudiation. (See, e.g., Calamari § 12 — 7, at 528 n.92, citing Bu-Vi-Bar Petroleum Corp. v. Krow (10th Cir. 1930), 40 F.2d 488, 493.) Here, however, the defendants admitted in their answers to plaintiffs interrogatories they had not entered another agreement to sell the property, nor even discussed or considered the matter with another party. Defendants had not changed their position at all, nor do defendants make any attempt to so argue. As can be seen from the language of the Restatement, the UCC, and the commentators, shown earlier, they are in accord that where the aggrieved party has not otherwise undergone a material change in position, the aggrieved party must indicate to the other party it is electing to treat the contract as rescinded. This can be accomplished either by bringing suit, by notifying the repudiating party, or by in some other way manifesting an election to treat the contract as rescinded. Prior to such indication, the repudiating party is free to retract its repudiation. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts provides the following illustrations:

"2. On February 1, A contracts to supply B with natural gas for one year beginning on May 1, payment to be made each month. On March 1, A repudiates. On April 1, before B has taken any action in response to the repudiation, A notifies B that he retracts his repudiation. B’s duties under the contract are not discharged, and B has no claim against A.

4. The facts being otherwise as stated in Illustration 2, on March 15, B notifies A that he cancels the contract. B’s duties under the contract are discharged and B has a claim against A for damages for total breach ***„” (Emphasis added.) Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 256, Comments a, c (1981).

This rule makes sense as well. If an aggrieved party could treat the contract as rescinded or terminated without notice or other indication to the repudiating party, the rule allowing retraction of an anticipatory repudiation would be eviscerated. No repudiating party ever would be able to retract a repudiation, because after receiving a retraction, the aggrieved party could, if it wished, simply declare it had already decided to treat the repudiation as a rescission or termination of the contract. Defendants’ theory would effectively rewrite the common-law rule regarding retraction of anticipatory *991repudiation so that the repudiating party may retract an anticipatory repudiation only upon assent from the aggrieved party. This is not the common-law rule, and we decline to adopt defendants’ proposed revision of it.

Applying the actual common-law rule to the facts here, plaintiff sent defendants a letter dated June 14, which clearly and unambiguously indicated plaintiff intended to perform under the contract. However, defendants did not notify plaintiff, either expressly or impliedly, of an intent to treat the contract as rescinded until July 8. Nor is there anything in the record demonstrating any indication to plaintiff, prior to July 8, of an intent by defendants to treat the contract as rescinded or terminated. Thus, assuming plaintiff’s May 21 request for a lower purchase price constituted an anticipatory repudiation of the contract, plaintiff successfully retracted that repudiation in the letter dated June 14 because defendants had not yet materially changed their position or indicated to plaintiff an intent to treat the contract as rescinded. Therefore, because plaintiff had timely retracted any alleged repudiation of the contract, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment for defendants on the basis plaintiff repudiated the contract. Defendants were not entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

The trial court’s grant of summary judgment for defendants is reversed, and the cause is remanded.

Reversed and remanded.

COOK and McCULLOUGH, JJ„ concur.