Me. Justice Powell

announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which The Chief Justice, Me. Justice Stewaet, and Me. Justice Rehnquist joined.

These appeals present a challenge to the constitutionality of a state statute regulating the access of minors to abortions. They require us to continue the inquiry we began in Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U. S. 52 (1976), and Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U. S. 132 (1976).

*625I

A

On August 2, 1974, the Legislature of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts passed, over the Governor’s veto, an Act pertaining to abortions performed within the State. 1974 Mass. Acts, ch. 706. According to its title, the statute was intended to regulate abortions “within present constitutional limits.” Shortly before the Act was to go into effect, the class action from which these appeals arise was commenced in the District Court1 to enjoin, as unconstitutional, the provision of the Act now codified as Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 112, § 12S (West Supp. 1979).2

Section 12S provides in part:

“If the mother is less than eighteen years of age and has not married, the consent of both the mother and her parents [to an abortion to be performed on the mother] is required. If one or both of the mother’s parents refuse such consent, consent may be obtained by order of a judge of the superior court for good cause shown, after such hearing as he deems necessary. Such a hearing will not require the appointment of a guardian for the mother. If one of the parents has died or has deserted his or her family, consent by the remaining parent is sufficient. If both parents have died or have deserted their family, consent of the mother’s guardian or other *626person having duties similar to a guardian, or any person who had assumed the care and custody of the mother is sufficient. The commissioner of public health shall prescribe a written form for such consent. Such form shall be signed by the proper person or persons and given to the physician performing the abortion who shall maintain it in his permanent files.”

Physicians performing abortions in the absence of the consent required by § 12S are subject to injunctions and criminal penalties. See Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 112, §§ 12Q, 12T, and 12U (West Supp. 1979).

A three-judge District Court was convened to hear the case pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 2281 (1970 ed.), repealed by Pub. L. 94-381, § 1, 90 Stat. 1119.3 Plaintiffs in the suit, appellees in both the cases before us now, were William Baird; Parents Aid Society, Inc. (Parents Aid), of which Baird is founder and director; Gerald Zupnick, M. D., who regularly performs abortions at the Parents Aid clinic; and an unmarried minor, identified by the pseudonym “Mary Moe,” who, at the commencement of the suit, was pregnant, residing at home with her parents, and desirous of obtaining an abortion without informing them.4

Mary Moe was permitted to represent the “class of unmarried minors in Massachusetts who have adequate capacity to give a valid and informed consent [to abortion], and who do not wish to involve their parents.” Baird v. Bellotti, 393 F. Supp. 847, 850 (Mass. 1975) (Baird I). Initially there was some confusion whether the rights of minors who wish abortions without parental involvement but who lack “adequate capacity” to give such consent also could be adjudicated in *627the suit. The District Court ultimately determined that Dr. Zupnick was entitled to assert the rights of these minors. See Baird v. Bellotti, 450 F. Supp. 997, 1001, and n. 6 (Mass. 1978).5

Planned Parenthood League of Massachusetts and Crit-tenton Hastings House & Clinic, both organizations that provide counseling to pregnant adolescents, and Phillip Stub-blefield, M. D. (intervenors),6 appeared as amici curiae on behalf of the plaintiffs. The District Court “accepted [this group] in a status something more than amici because of reservations about the adequacy of plaintiffs’ representation [of the plaintiff classes in the suit].” Id., at 999 n. 3.

Defendants in the suit, appellants here in No. 78-329, were the Attorney General of Massachusetts and the District Attorneys of all counties in the State. Jane Hunerwadel was permitted to intervene as a defendant and representative of the class of Massachusetts parents having unmarried minor daughters who then were, or might become, pregnant. She and the class she represents are appellants in No. 78-330.7

Following three days of testimony, the District Court issued an opinion invalidating § 12S. Baird I, supra. The court rejected appellees’ argument that all minors capable of becoming pregnant also are capable of giving informed consent *628to an abortion, or that it always is in the best interests of a minor who desires an abortion to have one. See 393 F. Supp., at 854. But the court was convinced that “a substantial number of females under the age of 18 are capable of forming a valid consent,” id., at 855, and “that a significant number of [these] are unwilling to tell their parents.” Id., at 853.

In its analysis of the relevant constitutional principles, the court stated that “there can be no doubt but that a female’s constitutional right to an abortion in the first trimester does not depend upon her calendar age.” Id., at 855-856. The court found no justification for the parental consent limitation placed on that right by § 12S. since it concluded that the statute was “cast not in terms of protecting the minor, . . . but in recognizing independent rights of parents.” Id., at 856. The “independent” parental rights protected by § 12S, as the court understood them, were wholly distinct from the best interests of the minor.8

B

Appellants sought review in this Court, and we noted probable jurisdiction. Bellotti v. Baird, 423 U. S. 982 (1975). After briefing and oral argument, it became apparent that § 12S was susceptible of a construction that “would avoid or substantially modify the federal constitutional challenge to the statute.” Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U. S. 132, 148 (1976) (Bel-lotti I). We therefore vacated the judgment of the District Court, concluding that it should have abstained and certified to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts appropriate questions concerning the meaning of § 12S, pursuant to exist*629ing procedure in that State. See Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct. Rule 3:21.

On remand, the District Court certified nine questions to the Supreme Judicial Court.9 These were answered in an *630opinion styled Baird v. Attorney General, 371 Mass. 741, 360 N. E. 2d 288 (1977) (Attorney General). Among the more important aspects of § 12S, as authoritatively construed by the Supreme Judicial Court, are the following:

1. In deciding whether to grant consent to their daughter’s abortion, parents are required by § 12S to consider exclusively what will serve her best interests. See id., at 746-747, 360 N. E. 2d, at 292-293.

2. The provision in § 12S that judicial consent for an abortion shall be granted, parental objections notwithstanding, “for good cause shown” means that such consent shall be granted if found to be in the minor’s best interests.' The judge “must disregard all parental objections, and other considerations, which are not based exclusively” on that standard. Id., at 748, 360 N. E. 2d, at 293.

3. Even if the judge in a § 12S proceeding finds “that the minor is capable of making, and has made, an informed and reasonable decision to have an abortion,” he is entitled to withhold consent “in circumstances where he determines that the best interests of the minor will not be served by an abortion.” Ibid., 360 N. E. 2d, at 293.

4. As a general rule, a minor who desires an abortion may not obtain judicial consent without first seeking both parents’ consent. Exceptions to the rule exist when a parent is not available or when the need for the abortion constitutes “ ‘an emergency requiring immediate action.’ ” 10 Id., at 750, 360 N. E. 2d, at 294. Unless a parent is not available, he must be notified of any judicial proceedings brought under § 12S. Id., at 755-756, 360 N. E. 2d, at 297.

*6315. The resolution of § 12S cases and any appeals that follow can be expected to be prompt. The name of the minor and her parents may be held in confidence. If need be, the Supreme Judicial Court and the superior courts can promulgate rules or issue orders to ensure that such proceedings are handled expeditiously. Id., at 756-758, 360 N. E. 2d, at 297-298.

6. Massachusetts Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 112, § 12F (West Supp. 1979), which provides, inter alia, that certain classes of minors may consent to most kinds of medical care without parental approval, does not apply to abortions, except as to minors who are married, widowed, or divorced. See 371 Mass., at 758-762, 360 N. E. 2d, at 298-300. Nor does the State’s common-law “mature minor rule” create an exception to § 12S. Id., at 749-750, 360 N. E. 2d, at 294. See n. 27, infra.

C

Following the judgment of the Supreme Judicial Court, appellees returned to the District Court and obtained a stay of the enforcement of § 12S until its constitutionality could be determined. Baird v. Bellotti, 428 F. Supp. 854 (Mass. 1977) (Baird II). After permitting discovery by both sides, holding a pretrial conference, and conducting further hearings, the District Court again declared § 12S unconstitutional and enjoined its enforcement. Baird v. Bellotti, 450 F. Supp. 997 (Mass. 1978) (Baird III). The court identified three particular aspects of the statute which, in its view, rendered it unconstitutional.

First, as construed by the Supreme Judicial Court, § 12S requires parental notice in virtually every case where the parent is available. The court believed that the evidence warranted a finding “that many, perhaps a large majority of 17-year olds are capable of informed consent, as are a not insubstantial number of 16-year olds, and some even younger.” Id., at 1001. In addition, the court concluded that it would not be in *632the best interests of some “immature” minors — those incapable of giving informed consent — even to inform their parents of their intended abortions. Although the court declined to decide whether the burden of requiring a minor to take her parents to court was, per se, an impermissible burden on her right to seek an abortion, it concluded that Massachusetts could not constitutionally insist that parental permission be sought or notice given “in those cases where a court, if given free rein, would find that it was to the minor’s best interests that one or both of her parents not be informed . . . Id., at 1002.

Second, the District Court held that § 12S was defective in permitting a judge to veto the abortion decision of a minor found to be capable of giving informed consent. The court reasoned that upon a finding of maturity and informed consent, the State no longer was entitled to impose legal restrictions upon this decision. Id., at 1003. Given such a finding, the court could see “no reasonable basis” for distinguishing between a minor and an adult, and it therefore concluded that § 12S was not only “an undue burden in the due process sense, [but] a discriminatory denial of equal protection [as well].” Id., at 1004.

Finally, the court decided that § 12S suffered from what it termed “formal overbreadth,” ibid., because the statute failed explicitly to inform parents that they must consider only the minor’s best interests in deciding whether to grant consent. The court believed that, despite the Supreme Judicial Court’s construction of § 12S, parents naturally would infer from the statute that they were entitled to withhold consent for other, impermissible reasons. This was thought to create a “chilling effect” by enhancing the possibility that parental consent would be denied wrongfully and that the minor would have to proceed in court.

Having identified these flaws in § 12S, the District Court considered whether it should engage in “judicial repair.” Id., at 1005. It declined either to sever the statute or to give *633it a construction different from that set out by the Supreme Judicial Court, as that tribunal arguably had invited it to do. See Attorney General, 371 Mass., at 745-746, 360 N. E. 2d, at 292. The District Court therefore adhered to its previous position, declaring § 12S unconstitutional and permanently enjoining its enforcement.11 Appellants sought review in this Court a second time, and we again noted probable jurisdiction. 439 TJ. S. 925 (1978).

II

A child, merely on account of his minority, is not beyond the protection of the Constitution. As the Court said in In re Gault, 387 U. S. 1, 13 (1967), “whatever may be their precise impact, neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone.” 12 This observation, of course, is but the beginning of the analysis. The Court long has recognized that the status of minors under the law is unique in many respects. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter aptly put it: “Children have a very special place in life which law should reflect. Legal theories and their phrasing in other cases readily lead to fallacious reasoning if uncritically transferred to determination *634of a State’s duty towards children.” May v. Anderson, 345 U. S. 528, 536 (1953) (concurring opinion). The unique role in our society of the family, the institution by which “we inculcate and pass down many, of our most cherished values, moral and cultural,” Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U. S. 494, 503-504 (1977) (plurality opinion), requires that constitutional principles be applied with sensitivity and flexibility to the special needs of parents and children. We have recognized three reasons justifying the conclusion that the constitutional rights of children cannot be equated with those of adults: the peculiar vulnerability of children; their inability to make critical decisions in an informed, mature manner; and the importance of the parental role in child rearing.

A

The Court’s concern for the vulnerability of children is demonstrated in its decisions dealing with minors’ claims to constitutional protection against deprivations of liberty or property interests by the State. With respect to many of these claims, we have concluded that the child’s right is virtually coextensive with that of an adult. For example, the Court has held that the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee against the deprivation of liberty without due process of law is applicable to children in juvenile delinquency proceedings. In re Gault, supra. In particular, minors involved in such proceedings are entitled to adequate notice, the assistance of counsel, and the opportunity to confront their accusers. They can be found guilty only upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and they may assert the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. In re Winship, 397 U. S. 358 (1970) ; In re Gault, supra. See also Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651, 674 (1977) (corporal punishment of schoolchildren implicates constitutionally protected liberty interest); cf. Breed v. Jones, 421 U. S. 519 (1975) (Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits prosecuting juvenile as an adult after an adjudicatory finding in juvenile court that he had violated a criminal statute). *635Similarly, in Goss v. Lopez, 419 U. S. 565 (1975), the Court held that children may not be deprived of certain property interests without due process.

These rulings have not been made on the uncritical assumption that the constitutional rights of children are indistinguishable from those of adults. Indeed, our acceptance of juvenile courts distinct from the adult criminal justice system assumes that juvenile offenders constitutionally may be treated differently from adults. In order to preserve this separate avenue for dealing with minors, the Court has said that hearings in juvenile delinquency cases need not necessarily “ ‘conform with all of the requirements of a criminal trial or even of the usual administrative hearing.’ ” In re Gault, supra, at 30, quoting Kent v. United States, 383 U. S. 541, 562 (1966). Thus, juveniles are not constitutionally entitled to trial by jury in delinquency adjudications. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U. S. 528 (1971). Viewed together, our cases show that although children generally are protected by the same constitutional guarantees against governmental deprivations as are adults, the State is entitled to adjust its legal system to account for children’s vulnerability and their needs for “concern, .. . sympathy, and ... paternal attention.” Id., at 550 (plurality opinion).

B

Second, the Court has held that the States validly may limit the freedom of children to choose for themselves in the making of important, affirmative choices with potentially serious consequences. These rulings have been grounded in the recognition that, during the formative years of childhood and adolescence, minors often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid choices that could be detrimental to them.13

*636 Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U. S. 629 (1968), illustrates well the Court’s concern over the inability of children to make mature choices, as the First Amendment rights involved are clear examples of constitutionally protected freedoms of choice. At issue was a criminal conviction for selling sexually oriented magazines to a minor under the age of 17 in violation of a New York state law. It was conceded that the conviction could not have stood under the First Amendment if based upon a sale of the same material to an adult. Id., at 634. Notwithstanding the importance the Court always has attached to First Amendment rights, it concluded that “even where there is an invasion of protected freedoms 'the power of the state to control the conduct of children reaches beyond the scope of its authority over adults id., at 638, quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158, 170 (1944).14 The Court was convinced that the New York Legislature rationally could conclude that the sale to children of the magazines in question presented a danger against which they should be guarded. Ginsberg, supra, at 641. It therefore rejected the *637argument that the New York law violated the constitutional rights of minors.15

C

Third, the guiding role of parents in the upbringing of their children justifies limitations on the freedoms of minors. The State commonly protects its youth from adverse governmental action and from their own immaturity by requiring parental consent to or involvement in important decisions by minors.16 But an additional and more important justification for state deference to parental control over children is that “[t]he child is not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.” Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510, 535 (1925). “The duty to prepare the child for ‘additional obligations’ . . . *638must be read to include the inculcation of moral standards, religious beliefs, and elements of good citizenship.” Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205, 233 (1972). This affirmative process of teaching, guiding, and inspiring by precept and example is essential to the growth of young people into mature, socially responsible citizens.

We have believed in this country that this process, in large part, is beyond the competence of impersonal political institutions. Indeed, affirmative sponsorship of particular ethical, religious, or political beliefs is something we expect the State not to attempt in a society constitutionally committed to the ideal of individual liberty and freedom of choice. Thus, “[i]t is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder.” Prince v. Massachusetts, supra, at 166 (emphasis added).

Unquestionably, there are many competing theories about the most effective way for parents to fulfill their central role in assisting their children on the way to responsible adulthood. While we do not pretend any special wisdom on this subject, we cannot ignore that central to many of these theories, and deeply rooted in our Nation's history and tradition, is the belief that the parental role implies a substantial measure of authority over one’s children. Indeed, “constitutional interpretation has consistently recognized that the parents’ claim to authority in their own household to direct the rearing of their children is basic in the structure of our society.” Ginsberg v. New York, supra, at 639.

Properly understood, then, the tradition of parental authority is not inconsistent with our tradition of individual liberty; rather, the former is one of the basic presuppositions of the latter. Legal restrictions on minors, especially those supportive of the parental role, may be important to the child’s chances for the full growth and maturity that make eventual *639participation in a free society meaningful and rewarding.17 Under the Constitution, the State can “properly conclude that parents and others, teachers for example, who have [the] primary responsibility for children's well-being are entitled to the support of laws designed to aid discharge of that responsibility.” Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U. S., at 639.18

Ill

With these principles in mind, we consider the specific constitutional questions presented by these appeals. In § 12S, Massachusetts has attempted to reconcile the constitutional right of a woman, in consultation with her physician, to choose to terminate her pregnancy as established by Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113 (1973), and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U. S. 179 (1973), with the special interest of the State in encouraging an unmarried pregnant minor to seek the advice of her parents in making the important decision whether or not to bear a child. As noted above, § 12S was before us in Bellotti I, 428 U. S. 132 (1976), where we remanded the case for interpretation of its provisions by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. We previously had held in Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U. S. 52 (1976), that a State could not lawfully authorize an absolute parental veto over the decision of a minor to terminate her pregnancy. Id., at 74. In *640 Bellotti I, supra, we recognized that § 12S could be read as “fundamentally different from a statute that creates a ‘parental veto,’ ” 428 U. S., at 145, thus “avoid [ing] or substantially modify [ing] the federal constitutional challenge to the statute.” Id., at 148. The question before us — in light of what we have said in the prior cases — is whether § 12S, as authoritatively interpreted by the Supreme Judicial Court, provides for parental notice and consent in a manner that does not unduly burden the right to seek an abortion. See id., at 147.

Appellees and intervenors contend that even as interpreted by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts § 12S does unduly burden this right. They suggest, for example, that the mere requirement of parental notice constitutes such a burden. As stated in Part II above, however, parental notice and consent are qualifications that typically may be imposed by the State on a minor’s right to make important decisions. As immature minors often lack the ability to make fully informed choices that take account of both immediate and long-range consequences, a State reasonably may determine that parental consultation often is desirable and in the best interest of the minor.19 It may further determine, as a general proposition, that such consultation is particularly desirable with respect to the abortion decision — one that for some people raises profound moral and religious concerns.20 As Mr. Justice Stewart wrote in concurrence in Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, supra, at 91:

“There can be little doubt that the State furthers a constitutionally permissible end by encouraging an unmar*641ried pregnant minor to seek the help and advice of her parents in making the very important decision whether or not to bear a child. That is a grave decision, and a girl of tender years, under emotional stress, may be ill-equipped to make it without mature advice and emotional support. It seems unlikely that she will obtain adequate counsel and support from the attending physician at an abortion clinic, where abortions for pregnant minors frequently take place.” (Footnote omitted.)21

*642But we are concerned here with a constitutional right to seek an abortion. The abortion decision differs in important ways from other decisions that may be made during minority. The need to preserve the constitutional right and the unique nature of the abortion decision, especially when made by a minor, require a State to act with particular sensitivity when it legislates to foster parental involvement in this matter.

A

The pregnant minor’s options are much different from those facing a minor in other situations, such as deciding whether to marry. A minor not permitted to marry before the age of majority is required simply to postpone her decision. She and her intended spouse may preserve the opportunity for later marriage should they continue to desire it. A pregnant adolescent, however, cannot preserve for long the possibilty of aborting, which effectively expires in a matter of weeks from the onset of pregnancy.

Moreover, the potentially severe detriment facing a pregnant woman, see Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S., at 153, is not mitigated by her minority. Indeed, considering her probable education, employment skills, financial resources, and emotional maturity, unwanted motherhood may be exceptionally burdensome for a minor. In addition, the fact of having a child brings with it adult legal responsibility, for parenthood, like attainment of the age of majority, is one of the traditional criteria for the termination of the legal disabilities of minority. In sum, there are few situations in which denying a minor the right to make an important decision will have consequences so grave and indelible.

Yet, an abortion may not be the best choice for the minor. The circumstances in which this issue arises will vary widely. In a given case, alternatives to abortion, such as marriage to the father of the child, arranging for its adoption, or assuming the responsibilities of motherhood with the assured support of *643family, may be feasible and relevant to the minor’s best interests. Nonetheless, the abortion decision is one that simply cannot be postponed, or it will be made by default with far-reaching consequences.

For these reasons, as we held in Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U. S., at 74, “the State may not impose a blanket provision . . . requiring the consent of a parent or person in loco parentis as a condition for abortion of an unmarried minor during the first 12 weeks of her pregnancy.” Although, as stated in Part II, supra, such deference to parents may be permissible with respect to other choices facing a minor, the unique nature and consequences of the abortion decision make it inappropriate “to give a third party an absolute, and possibly arbitrary, veto over the decision of the physician and his patient to terminate the patient’s pregnancy, regardless of the reason for withholding the consent.” 428 U. S., at 74. We therefore conclude that if the State decides to require a pregnant minor to obtain one or both parents’ consent to an abortion, it also must provide an alternative procedure22 whereby authorization for the abortion can be obtained.

A pregnant minor is entitled in such a proceeding to show either: (1) that she is mature enough and well enough informed to make her abortion decision, in consultation with her physician, independently of her parents’ wishes;23 or *644(2) that even if she is not able to make this decision independently, the desired abortion would be in her best interests. The proceeding in which this showing is made must assure that a resolution of the issue, and any appeals that may follow, will be completed with anonymity and sufficient expedition to provide an effective opportunity for an abortion to be obtained. In sum, the procedure must ensure that the provision requiring parental consent does not in fact amount to the “absolute; and possibly arbitrary, veto” that was found impermissible in Danforth. Ibid.

B

It is against these requirements that § 12S must be tested. We observe initially that as authoritatively construed by the highest court of the State, the statute satisfies some of the concerns that require special treatment of a minor’s abortion decision. It provides that if parental consent is refused, authorization may be “obtained by order of a judge of the superior court for good cause shown, after such hearing as he deems necessary.” A superior court judge presiding over a § 12S proceeding “must disregard all parental objections, and other considerations, which are not based exclusively on what would serve the minor’s best interests.” 24 Attorney General, *645371 Mass., at 748, 360 N. E. 2d, at 293. The Supreme Judicial Court also stated: “Prompt resolution of a [§ 12S] proceeding may be expected. . . . The proceeding need not be brought in the minor’s name and steps may be taken, by impoundment or otherwise, to preserve confidentiality as to the minor and her parents. . . . ['W] e believe that an early hearing and decision on appeal from a judgment of a Superior Court judge may also be achieved.” Id., at 757-758, 360 N. E. 2d, at 298. The court added that if these expectations were not met, either the superior court, in the exercise of its rulemaking power, or the Supreme Judicial Court would be willing to eliminate any undue burdens by rule or order. Ibid. 25

Despite these safeguards, which avoid much of what was objectionable in the statute successfully challenged in Dan-jorth, § 12S falls short of constitutional standards in certain respects. We now consider these.

*646(1)

Among the questions certified to the Supreme Judicial Court was whether § 12S permits any minors — mature or immature — to obtain judicial consent to an abortion without any parental consultation whatsoever. See n. 9, supra. The state court answered that, in general, it does not. “[T]he consent required by [§ 12S must] be obtained for every non-emergency abortion where the mother is less than eighteen years of age and unmarried.” Attorney General, supra, at 750, 360 N. E. 2d, at 294. The text of § 12S itself states an exception to this rule, making consent unnecessary from any parent who has “died or has deserted his or her family.” 26 The Supreme Judicial Court construed the statute as containing an additional exception: Consent need not be obtained “where no parent (or statutory substitute) is available.” 371 Mass., at 750, 360 N. E. 2d, at 294. The court also ruled that an available parent must be given notice of any judicial proceedings brought by a minor to obtain consent for an abortion.27 Id., at 755-756, 360 N. E. 2d, at 297.

*647We think that, construed in this manner, § 12S would impose an undue burden upon the exercise by minors of the right to seek an abortion. As the District Court recognized, “there are parents who would obstruct, and perhaps altogether prevent, the minor’s right to go to court.” Baird III, 450 F. Supp., at 1001. There is no reason to believe that this would be so in the majority of cases where consent is withheld. But many parents hold strong views on the subject of abortion, and young pregnant minors, especially those living at home, are particularly vulnerable to their parents’ efforts to obstruct both an abortion and their access to court. It would be unrealistic, therefore, to assume that the mere existence of a legal right to seek relief in superior court provides an effective avenue of relief for some of those who need it the most.

We conclude, therefore, that under state regulation such as that undertaken by Massachusetts, every minor must have the opportunity — if she so desires — to go directly to a court without first consulting or notifying her parents. If she satisfies the court that she is mature and well enough informed to make intelligently the abortion decision on her own, the court must authorize her to act without parental consultation or consent. If she fails to satisfy the court that she is competent to make this decision independently, she must be permitted to show that an abortion nevertheless would be in her *648best interests. If the court is persuaded that it is, the court must authorize the abortion. If, however, the court is not persuaded by the minor that she is mature or that the abortion would be in her best interests, it may decline to sanction the operation.

There is, however, an important state interest in encouraging a family rather than a judicial resolution of a minor’s abortion decision. Also, as we have observed above, parents naturally take an interest in the welfare of their children— an interest that is particularly strong where a normal family relationship exists and where the child is living with one or both parents. These factors properly may be taken into account by a court called upon to determine whether an abortion in fact is in a minor’s best interests. If, all things considered, the court determines that an abortion is in the minor’s best interests, she is entitled to court authorization without any parental involvement. On the other hand, the court may deny the abortion request of an immature minor in the absence of parental consultation if it concludes that her best interests would be served thereby, or the court may in such a case defer decision until there is parental consultation in which the court may participate. But this is the full extent to which parental involvement may be required.28 For the reasons stated above, the constitutional right to seek an abortion may not be unduly burdened by state-imposed conditions upon initial access to court.

(2)

.Section 12S requires that both parents consent to a minor’s abortion. The District Court found it to be “custom” tO' perform other medical and surgical procedures on minors with the consent of only one parent, and it concluded that “nothing about abortions . . . requires the minor’s interest to be treated *649differently.” Baird I, 393 F. Supp., at 852. See Baird III, supra, at 1004 n. 9.

We are not persuaded that, as a general rule, the requirement of obtaining both parents’ consent unconstitutionally burdens a minor’s right to seek an abortion. The abortion decision has implications far broader than those associated with most other kinds of medical treatment. At least when the parents are together and the pregnant minor is living at home, both the father and mother have an interest — one normally supportive — in helping to determine the course that is in the best interests of a daughter. Consent and involvement by parents in important decisions by minors long have been recognized as protective of their immaturity. In the case of the abortion decision, for reasons we have stated, the focus of the parents’ inquiry should be the best interests of their daughter. As every pregnant minor is entitled in the first instance to go directly to the court for a judicial determination without prior parental notice, consultation, or consent, the general rule with respect to parental consent does not unduly burden the constitutional right. Moreover, where the pregnant minor goes to her parents and consent is denied, she still must have recourse to a prompt judicial determination of her maturity or best interests.29

(3)

Another of the questions certified by the District Court to the Supreme Judicial Court was the following: “If the superior court finds that the minor is capable [of making], and has, in fact, made and adhered to, an informed and reasonable decision to have an abortion, may the court refuse its consent based on a finding that a parent’s, or its own, contrary deci*650sion is a better one?” Attorney General, 371 Mass., at 747 n. 5, 360 N. E. 2d, at 293 n. 6. To this the state court answered:

“[W]e do not view the judge's role as limited to a determination that the minor is capable of making, and has made, an informed and reasonable decision to have an abortion. Certainly the judge must make a determination of those circumstances, but, if the statutory role of the judge to determine the best interests of the minor is to be carried out, he must make a finding on the basis of all relevant views presented to him. We suspect that the judge will give great weight to the minor’s determination, if informed and reasonable, but in circumstances where he determines that the best interests of the minor will not be served by an abortion, the judge’s determination should prevail, assuming that his conclusion is supported by the evidence and adequate findings of fact.” Id., at 748, 360 N. E. 2d, at 293.

The Supreme Judicial Court’s statement reflects the general rule that a State may require a minor to wait until the age of majority before being permitted to exercise legal rights independently. See n. 23, supra. But we are concerned here with the exercise of a constitutional right of unique character. See supra, at 642-643. As stated above, if the minor satisfies a court that she has attained sufficient maturity to make a fully informed decision, she then is entitled to make her abortion decision independently. We therefore agree with the District Court that § 12S cannot constitutionally permit judicial disregard of the abortion decision of a minor who has been determined to be mature and fully competent to assess the implications of the choice she has made.30

*651IV

Although it satisfies constitutional standards in large part, § 12S falls short of them in two respects: First, it permits judicial authorization for an abortion to be withheld from a minor who is found by the superior court to be mature and fully competent to make this decision independently. Second, it requires parental consultation or notification in every instance, without affording the pregnant minor an opportunity to receive an independent judicial determination that she is mature enough to consent or that an abortion would be in her best interests.31 Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the District Court insofar as it invalidates this statute and enjoins its enforcement.32

Affirmed.

Mr. Justice Rehnquist,

concurring.

I join the opinion of Mr. Justice Powell and the judgment of the Court. At such time as this Court is willing to *652reconsider its earlier decision in Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U. S. 52 (1976), in which I joined the opinion of Mr. Justice White, dissenting in part, I shall be more than willing to participate in that task. But unless and until that time comes, literally thousands of judges cannot be left with nothing more than the guidance offered by a truly fragmented holding of this Court.

Mr. Justice Stevens,

with whom Mr. Justice Brennan, Mr. Justice Marshall, and Mr. Justice Blackmun join, concurring in the judgment.

In Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113, the Court held that a woman’s right to decide whether to terminate a pregnancy is *653entitled to constitutional protection. In Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U. S. 52, 72-75, the Court held that a pregnant minor’s right to make the abortion decision may not be conditioned on the consent of one parent. I am persuaded that these decisions require affirmance of the District Court’s holding that the Massachusetts statute is unconstitutional.

The Massachusetts statute is, on its face, simple and straightforward. It provides that every woman under 18 who has not married must secure the consent of both her parents before receiving an abortion. “If one or both of the mother’s parents refuse such consent, consent may be obtained by order of a judge of the superior court for good cause shown.” Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 112, § 12S (West Supp. 1979).

Whatever confusion or uncertainty might have existed as to how this statute was to operate, see Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U. S. 132, has been eliminated by the authoritative construction of its provisions by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court. See Baird v. Attorney General, 371 Mass. 741, 360 N. E. 2d 288 (1977). The statute was construed to require that every minor who wishes an abortion must first seek the consent of both parents, unless a parent is not available or unless the need for the abortion constitutes “ ‘an emergency requiring immediate action.’ ” Id., at 750, 360 N. E. 2d, at 294. Both parents, so long as they are available., must also receive notice of judicial proceedings brought under the statute by the minor. In those proceedings, the task of the judge is to determine whether the best interests of the minor will be served by an abortion. The decision is his to make, even if he finds “that the minor is capable of making, and has made, an informed and reasonable decision to have an abortion.” Id., at 748, 360 N. E. 2d, at 293. Thus, no minor in Massachusetts, no matter how mature and capable of informed decisionmaking, may receive an abortion without the consent *654of either both her parents or a superior court judge. In every instance, the minor’s decision to secure an abortion is subject to an absolute third-party veto.1

In Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, supra, this Court invalidated statutory provisions requiring the consent of the husband of a married woman and of one parent of a pregnant minor to an abortion. As to the spousal consent, the Court concluded that “we cannot hold that the State has the constitutional authority to give the spouse unilaterally the ability to prohibit the wife from terminating her pregnancy, when the State itself lacks that right.” 428 U. S., at 70. And as to the parental consent, the Court held that “[j]ust as with the requirement of consent from the spouse, so here, the State does not have the constitutional authority to give a third party an absolute, and possibly arbitrary, veto over the decision of the physician and his patient to terminate the patient’s pregnancy, regardless of the reason for withholding the consent.” Id., at 74. These holdings, I think, equally apply to the Massachusetts statute. The differences between the two statutes are few. Unlike the Missouri statute, Massachusetts requires the consent of both of the woman’s parents. It does, of course, provide an alternative in the form of a suit initiated by the woman in superior court. But in that proceeding, the judge is afforded an absolute veto over the minor’s decisions, based on his judgment of her best interests. In Massachusetts, then, as in Missouri, the State has imposed an “absolute limitation on the minor’s right to obtain an abortion,” id., at 90 (Stewart, J., concurring), applicable to every pregnant minor in the State who has not married.

*655The provision of an absolute veto to a judge — or, potentially, to an appointed administrator 2 — is to me particularly troubling. The constitutional right to make the abortion decision affords protection to both of the privacy interests recognized in this Court’s cases: “One is the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters, and another is the interest in independence in making certain kinds of important decisions.” Whalen v. Roe, 429 U. S. 589, 599-600 (footnotes omitted). It is inherent in the right to make the abortion decision that the right may be exercised without public scrutiny and in defiance of the contrary opinion of the sovereign or other third parties. In Massachusetts, however, every minor who cannot secure the consent of both her parents — which under Danforth cannot be an absolute prerequisite to an abortion — is required to secure the consent of the sovereign. As a practical matter, I would suppose that the need to commence judicial proceedings in order to obtain a legal abortion would impose a burden at least as great as, and probably greater than, that imposed on the minor child by the need to obtain the consent of a parent.3 Moreover, once this burden is met, the only standard provided for the judge’s decision is the best interest of the minor. That standard provides little real guidance to the judge, and his decision must necessarily reflect personal and societal values and mores whose enforcement upon the minor — particularly when contrary to her own informed and reasonable decision — is fundamentally at odds *656with privacy interests underlying the constitutional protection afforded to her decision.

In short, it seems ¿5* me that this litigation is governed by Danforth; to the extent this statute differs from that in Dan-forth, it is potentially even more restrictive of the constitutional right to decide whether or not to terminate a pregnancy. Because the statute has been once authoritatively construed by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, and because it is clear that the statute as written and construed is not constitutional, I agree with Mr. Justice Powell that the District Court's judgment should be affirmed. Because his opinion goes further, however, and addresses the constitutionality of an abortion statute that Massachusetts has not enacted, I decline to join his opinion.4

Mr. Justice White,

dissenting.

I was in dissent in Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U. S. 52, 94-95 (1976), on the issue of the validity of requiring the consent of a parent when an unmarried woman under 18 years of age seeks an abortion. I continue to have the views I expressed there and also agree with much of what Mr. Justice Stevens said in dissent in that *657case. Id., at 101-105. I would not, therefore, strike down this Massachusetts law.

But even if a parental consent requirement of the kind involved in Danforth must be deemed invalid, that does not condemn the Massachusetts law, which, when the parents .object, authorizes a judge to permit an abortion if he concludes that an abortion is in the best interests of the child. Going beyond Danforth, the Court now holds it unconstitutional for a State to require that in all cases parents receive notice that their daughter seeks an abortion and, if they object to the abortion, an opportunity to participate in a hearing that will determine whether it is in the “best interests” of the child to undergo the surgery. Until now, I would have thought inconceivable a holding that the United States Constitution forbids even notice to parents when their minor child who seeks surgery objects to such notice and is able to convince a judge that the parents should be denied participation in the decision.

With all due respect, I dissent.

Mr. Justice Blackmun

delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case is a logical and anticipated corollary to Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113 (1973), and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U. S. 179 (1973), for it raises issues secondary to those that were then before the Court. Indeed, some of the questions now presented were forecast and reserved in Roe and Doe. 410 U. S., at 165 n. 67.

I

After the decisions in Roe and Doe, this Court remanded for reconsideration a pending Missouri federal case in which the State's then-existing abortion legisla*56tion, Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 559.100, 542.380, and 563.300 (1969), was under constitutional challenge. Rodgers v. Danforth, 410 U. S. 949 (1973). A three-judge federal court for the Western District of Missouri, in an unreported decision, thereafter declared the challenged Missouri statutes unconstitutional and granted injunctive relief. On appeal here, that judgment was summarily affirmed. Danforth v. Rodgers, 414 U. S. 1035 (1973).

In June 1974, somewhat more than a year after Roe and Doe had been decided, Missouri’s 77th General Assembly, in its Second Regular Session, enacted House Committee Substitute for House Bill No. 1211 (hereinafter Act). The legislation was approved by the Governor on June 14, 1974, and became effective immediately by reason of an emergency clause contained in § A of the statute. The Act is set forth in full as the Appendix to this opinion. It imposes a structure for the control and regulation of abortions in Missouri during all stages of pregnancy.

II

Three days after the Act became effective, the present litigation was instituted in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri. The plaintiffs are Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri, a not-for-profit Missouri corporation which maintains a facility in Columbia, Mo., for the performance of abortions; David Hall, M. D.; and Michael Freiman, M. D. Doctor Hall is a resident of Columbia, is licensed as a physician in Missouri, is chairman of the Department and Professor of Obstetrics and Gynecology at the University of Missouri Medical School at Columbia, and supervises abortions at the Planned Parenthood facility.. He was described by the three-judge court in the 1973 case as one of four plaintiffs who were “eminent, Missouri-licensed obstetricians and gynecologists.” Jurisdictional *57Statement, App. A7, in Danforth v. Rodgers, No. 73-426, O. T. 1973. Doctor Freiman is a resident of St. Louis, is licensed as a physician in Missouri, is an instructor of Clinical Obstetrics and Gynecology at Washington University Medical School, and performs abortions at two St. Louis hospitals and at a clinic in that city.

The named defendants are the Attorney General of Missouri and the Circuit Attorney of the city of St. Louis “in his representative capacity” and “as the representative of the class of all similar Prosecuting Attorneys of the various counties of the State of Missouri.” Complaint 10.

The plaintiffs brought the action on their own behalf and, purportedly, “on behalf of the entire class consisting of duly licensed physicians and surgeons presently performing or desiring to perform the termination of pregnancies and on behalf of the entire class consisting of their patients desiring the termination of pregnancy, all within the State of Missouri.” Id., at 9. Plaintiffs sought declaratory relief and also sought to enjoin enforcement of the Act on the ground, among others, that certain of its provisions deprived them and their patients of various constitutional rights: “the right to privacy in the physician-patient relationship”; the physicians’ “right to practice medicine according to the highest standards of medical practice”; the female patients’ right to determine whether to bear children; the patients’ “right to life due to the inherent risk involved in childbirth” or in medical procedures alternative to abortion; the physicians’ “right to give and plaintiffs’ patients’ right to receive safe and adequate medical advice and treatment, pertaining to the decision of whether to carry a given pregnancy to term and the method of termination” ; the patients’ right under the Eighth Amendment to be free from cruel and unusual punishment “by forcing *58and coercing them to bear each pregnancy they conceive” ; and, by being placed “in the position of decision making beset with . . . inherent possibilities of bias and conflict of interest,” the physician’s right to due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Id., at 10-11.

The particular provisions of the Act that remained under specific challenge at the end of trial were § 2 (2), defining the term “viability”; § 3 (2), requiring from the woman, prior to submitting to abortion during the first 12 weeks of pregnancy, a certification in writing that she consents to the procedure and “that her consent is informed and freely given and is not the result of coercion”; § 3 (3), requiring, for the same period, “the written consent of the woman’s spouse, unless the abortion is certified by a licensed physician to be necessary in order to preserve the life of the mother”; § 3 (4), requiring, for the same period, “the written consent of one parent or person in loco parentis of the woman if the woman is unmarried and under the age of eighteen years, unless the abortion is certified by a licensed physician as necessary in order to preserve the life of the mother”; § 6 (1), requiring the physician to exercise professional care “to preserve the life and health of the fetus” and, failing such, deeming him guilty of manslaughter and making him liable in an action for damages; § 7, declaring an infant, who survives “an attempted abortion which was not performed to save the life or health of the' mother,” to be “an abandoned ward of the state under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court,” and depriving the mother, and also the father if he consented to the abortion, of parental rights; § 9, the legislative finding that the method of abortion known as saline amniocentesis “is deleterious to maternal health,” and prohibiting that method after the first 12 weeks of pregnancy; and §§10 *59and 11, imposing reporting and maintenance of record requirements for health facilities and for physicians who perform abortions.

The case was presented to a three-judge District Court convened pursuant to the provisions of 28 U. S. C. §§ 2281 and 2284. 392 F. Supp. 1362 (1975). The court ruled that the two physician-plaintiffs had standing inasmuch as §6(1) provides that the physician who fails to exercise the prescribed standard of professional care due the fetus in the abortion procedure shall be guilty of manslaughter, and § 14 provides that any person who performs or aids in the performance of an abortion contrary to the provisions of the Act shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. 392 F. Supp., at 1366-1367. Due to this “obvious standing” of the two physicians, id., at 1367, the court deemed it unnecessary to determine whether Planned Parenthood also had standing.

On the issues as to the constitutionality of the several challenged sections of the Act, the District Court, largely by a divided vote, ruled that all except the first sentence of § 6 (1) withstood the attack. That sentence was held to be constitutionally impermissible because it imposed upon the physician the duty to exercise at all stages of pregnancy “that degree of professional skill, care and diligence to preserve the life and health of the fetus” that “would be required ... to preserve the life and health of any fetus intended to be born.” Inasmuch as this failed to exclude the stage of pregnancy prior to viability, the provision was “unconstitutionally over-broad.” 392 F. Supp., at 1371.

One judge concurred in part and dissented in part. Id., at 1374. He agreed with the majority as to the constitutionality of §§2(2), 3(2), 10, and 11, respectively relating to the definition of “viability,” the woman's prior written consent, maintenance of records, *60and retention of records. He also agreed with the majority that §6(1) was unconstitutionally overbroad. He dissented from the majority opinion upholding the constitutionality of §§ 3 (3), 3 (4), 7, and 9, relating, respectively, to spousal consent, parental consent, the termination of parental rights, and the proscription of saline amniocentesis.

In No. 74AL151, the plaintiffs appeal from that part of the District Court's judgment upholding sections of the Act as constitutional and denying injunctive relief against their application and enforcement. In No. 74-1419, the defendant Attorney General cross-appeals from that part of the judgment holding § 6 (1) unconstitutional and enjoining enforcement thereof. We granted the plaintiffs' application for stay of enforcement of the Act pending appeal. 420 U. S. 918 (1975). Probable jurisdiction of both appeals thereafter was noted. 423 U. S. 819 (1975).

For convenience, we shall usually refer to the plaintiffs as “appellants'' and to both named defendants as “appellees.”

Ill

In Roe v. Wade the Court concluded that the “right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment’s concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is, or, as the District Court determined, in the Ninth Amendment’s reservation of rights to the people, is broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.” 410 U. S., at 153. It emphatically rejected, however, the proffered argument “that the woman's right is absolute and that she is entitled to terminate her pregnancy at whatever time, in whatever way, and for whatever reason she alone chooses.” Ibid. Instead, *61this right “must be considered against important state interests in regulation.” Id., at 154.

The Court went on to say that the “pregnant woman cannot be isolated in her privacy,” for she “carries an embryo and, later, a fetus.” Id., at 159. It was therefore “reasonable and appropriate for a State to decide that at some point in time another interest, that of health of the mother or that of potential human life, becomes significantly involved. The woman’s privacy is no longer sole and any right of privacy she possesses must be measured accordingly.” Ibid. The Court stressed the measure of the State’s interest in “the light of present medical knowledge.” Id., at 163. It concluded that the permissibility of state regulation was to be viewed in three stages: “For the stage prior to approximately the end of the first trimester, the abortion decision and its effectuation must be left to the medical judgment of the pregnant woman’s attending physician,” without interference from the State. Id., at 164. The participation by the attending physician in the abortion decision, and his responsibility in that decision, thus, were emphasized. After the first stage, as so described, the State may, if it chooses, reasonably regulate the abortion procedure to preserve and protect maternal health. Ibid. Finally, for the stage subsequent to viability, a point purposefully left flexible for professional determination, and dependent upon developing medical skill and technical ability,1 the State may regulate an abortion to protect the life of the fetus and even may proscribe abortion except where it is necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the mother. Id., at 163-165.

*62IV

With the exception specified in n. 2, infra, we agree with the District Court that the physician-appellants clearly have standing. This was established in Doe v. Bolton, 410 U. S., at 188. Like the Georgia statutes challenged in that case, “[t]he physician is the one against whom [the Missouri Act] directly operate [s] in the event he procures an abortion that does not meet the statutory exceptions and conditions. The physician-appellants, therefore, assert a sufficiently direct threat of personal detriment. They should not be required to await and undergo a criminal prosecution as the sole means of seeking relief.” 2 Ibid.

Our primary task, then, is to consider each of the *63challenged provisions of the new Missouri abortion statute in the particular light of the opinions and decisions in Roe and in Doe. To this we now turn, with the assistance of helpful briefs from both sides and from some of the amici.

A

The definition of viability. Section 2 (2) of the Act defines “viability” as “that stage of fetal development when the life of the unborn child may be continued indefinitely outside the womb by natural or artificial life-supportive systems.” Appellants claim that this definition violates and conflicts with the discussion of viability in our opinion in Roe. 410 U. S., at 160, 163. In particular, appellants object to the failure of the definition to contain any reference to a gestational time period, to its failure to incorporate and reflect the three stages of pregnancy, to the presence of the word “indefinitely,” and to the extra burden of regulation imposed. It is suggested that the definition expands the Court's definition of viability, as expressed in Roe, and amounts to a legislative determination of what is properly a matter for medical judgment. It is said that the “mere possibility of momentary survival is not the medical standard of viability.” Brief for Appellants 67.

In Roe, we used the term “viable,” properly we thought, to signify the point at which the fetus is “potentially able to live outside the mother's womb, albeit with artificial aid,” and presumably capable of “meaningful life outside the mother’s womb,” 410 U. S., at 160, 163. We noted that this point “is usually placed” at about seven months or 28 weeks, but may occur earlier. Id., at 160.

We agree with the District Court and conclude that the definition of viability in the Act does not conflict with what was said and held in Roe. In fact, we believe that *64§ 2 (2), even when read in conjunction with § 5 (proscribing an abortion “not necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother . . . unless the attending physician first certifies with reasonable medical certainty that the fetus is not viable”); the constitutionality of which is not explicitly challenged here, reflects an attempt on the part of the Missouri General Assembly to comply with our observations and discussion in Roe relating to viability. Appellant Hall, in his deposition, had no particular difficulty with the statutory definition.3 As noted above, we recognized in Roe that viability was a matter of medical judgment, skill, and technical ability, and we preserved the flexibility of the term. Section 2 (2) does the same. Indeed, one might argue, as the appellees do, that the presence of the statute’s words “continued indefinitely” favor, rather than disfavor, the appellants, for, arguably, the point when life can be “continued indefinitely outside the womb” may well occur later in pregnancy than the point where the fetus is “potentially able to live outside the mother’s womb.” Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S., at 160.

In any event, we agree with the District Court that it is not the proper function of the legislature or the courts to place viability, which essentially is a medical concept, at a specific point in the gestation period. The time when viability is achieved may vary with each pregnancy, and the determination of whether a particular fetus is viable is, and must be, a matter for the judgment of the responsible attending physician. The definition of viability in § 2 (2) merely reflects this fact. The appellees do not contend otherwise, for they insist *65that the determination of viability rests with the physician in the exercise of his professional judgment.4

We thus do not accept appellants’ contention that a specified number of weeks in pregnancy must be fixed by statute as the point of viability. See Wolfe v. Schroering, 388 F. Supp. 631, 637 (WD Ky. 1974); Hodgson v. Anderson, 378 F. Supp. 1008, 1016 (Minn. 1974), dismissed for want of jurisdiction sub nom. Spannaus v. Hodgson, 420 U. S. 903 (1976).5

We conclude that the definition in § 2 (2) of the Act does not circumvent the limitations on state regulation outlined in Roe. We therefore hold that the Act’s definition of “viability” comports with Roe and withstands the constitutional attack made upon it in this litigation.

B

The woman’s consent. Under § 3 (2) of the Act, a woman, prior to submitting to an abortion during the first 12 weeks of pregnancy, must certify in writing her consent to the procedure and “that her consent is informed and freely given and is not the result of coercion.” Appellants argue that this requirement is violative of *66 Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S., at 164-65, by imposing an extra layer and burden of regulation on the abortion decision. See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U. S., at 195-200. Appellants also claim that the provision is overbroad and vague.

The District Court’s majority relied on the propositions that the decision to terminate a pregnancy, of course, “is often a stressful one,” and that the consent requirement of § 3 (2) “insures that the pregnant woman retains control over the discretions of her consulting physician.” 392 F. Supp., at 1368, 1369. The majority also felt that the consent requirement “does not single out the abortion procedure, but merely includes it within the category of medical operations for which consent is required.” 6 Id., at 1369. The third judge joined the majority in upholding § 3 (2), but added that the written consent requirement was “not burdensome or chilling” and manifested “a legitimate interest of the state that this important decision has in fact been made by the person constitutionally empowered to do so.” 392 F. Supp., at 1374. He went on to observe that the requirement “in no way interposes the state or third parties in the decision-making process.” Id., at 1375.

We do not disagree with the result reached by the District Court as to §3 (2). It is true that Doe and Roe clearly establish that the State may not restrict the decision of the patient and her physician regarding abortion during the first stage of pregnancy. Despite the fact that apparently no other Missouri statute, with the exceptions referred to in n. 6, supra, requires a *67patient’s prior written consent to a surgical procedure,7 the imposition by § 3 (2) of such a requirement for termination of pregnancy even during the first stage, in our view, is not in itself an unconstitutional requirement. The decision to abort, indeed, is an important, and often a stressful one, and it is desirable and imperative that it be made with full knowledge of its nature and consequences. The woman is the one primarily concerned, and her awareness of the decision and its significance may be assured, constitutionally, by the State to the extent of requiring her prior written consent.

We could not say that a requirement imposed by the State that a prior written consent for any surgery would be unconstitutional. As a consequence, we see no constitutional defect in requiring it only for some types of surgery as, for example, an intracardiac procedure, or where the surgical risk is elevated above a specified mortality level, or, for that matter, for abortions.8

C

The spouse’s consent. Section 3 (3) requires the prior written consent of the spouse of the woman seeking an abortion during the first 12 weeks of pregnancy, unless *68“the abortion is certified by a licensed physician to be necessary in order to preserve the life of the mother.” 9

The appellees defend § 3 (3) on the ground that it was enacted in the light of the General Assembly’s “perception of marriage as an institution,” Brief for Appellee Danforth 34, and that any major change in family status is a decision to be made jointly by the marriage partners. Reference is made to an abortion’s possible effect on the woman’s childbearing potential. It is said that marriage always has entailed some legislatively imposed limitations: Reference is made to adultery and bigamy as criminal offenses; to Missouri’s general requirement, Mo. Rev. Stat. §453.030.3 (1969), that for an adoption of a child born in wedlock the consent of both parents is necessary; to similar joint-consent requirements imposed by a number of States with respect to artificial insemination and the legitimacy of children so conceived; to the laws of two States requiring spousal consent for voluntary sterilization; and to the long-established requirement of spousal consent for the effective disposition of an interest in real property. It is argued that “[r]ec-ognizing that the consent of both parties is generally necessary ... to begin a family, the legislature has determined that a change in the family structure set in motion by mutual consent should be terminated only by mutual consent,” Brief for Appellee Danforth 38, and that what the legislature did was to exercise its inherent policy-making power “for what was believed to be in the best interests of all the people of Missouri.” Id., at 40.

The appellants, on the other hand, contend that §3(3) obviously is designed to afford the husband the right unilaterally to prevent or veto an abortion, whether or *69not he is the father of the fetus, and that this not only violates Roe and Doe but is also in conflict with other decided cases. See, e. g., Poe v. Gerstein, 517 F. 2d 787, 794-796 (CA5 1975), appeal docketed, No. 75-713; Wolfe v. Schroering, 388 F. Supp., at 636-637; Doe v. Rampton, 366 F. Supp. 189, 193 (Utah 1973). They also refer to the situation where the husband's consent cannot be obtained because he cannot be located. And they assert that § 3 (3) is vague and overbroad.

In Roe and Doe we specifically reserved decision on the question whether a requirement for consent by the father of the fetus, by the spouse, or by the parents, or a parent, of an unmarried minor, may be constitutionally imposed. 410 U. S., at 165 n. 67. We now hold that the State may not constitutionally require the consent of the spouse, as is specified under § 3 (3) of the Missouri Act, as a condition for abortion during the first 12 weeks of pregnancy. We thus agree with the dissenting judge in the present case, and with the courts whose decisions are cited above, that the State cannot “delegate to a spouse a veto power which the state itself is absolutely and totally prohibited from exercising during the first trimester of pregnancy.” 392 F. Supp., at 1375. Clearly, since the State cannot regulate or proscribe abortion during the first stage, when the physician and his patient make that decision, the State cannot delegate authority to any particular person, even the spouse, to prevent abortion during that same period.

We are not unaware of the deep and proper concern and interest that a devoted and protective husband has in his wife’s pregnancy and in the growth and development of the fetus she is carrying. Neither has this Court failed to appreciate the importance of the marital relationship in our society. See, e. g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479, 486 (1965); Maynard v. Hill, 125 U. S. *70190, 211 (1888).10 Moreover, we recognize that the decision whether to undergo or to forgo an abortion may have profound effects on the future of any marriage, effects that are both physical and mental, and possibly deleterious. Notwithstanding these factors, we cannot hold that the State has the constitutional authority to give the spouse unilaterally the ability to prohibit the wife from terminating her pregnancy, when the State itself lacks that right. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U. S. 438, 453 (1972).11

*71It seems manifest that, ideally, the decision to terminate a pregnancy should be one concurred in by both the wife and her husband. No marriage may be viewed as harmonious or successful if the marriage partners are fundamentally divided on so important and vital an issue. But it is difficult to believe that the goal of fostering mutuality and trust in a marriage, and of strengthening the marital relationship and the marriage institution, will be achieved by giving the husband a veto power exercisable for any reason whatsoever or for no reason at all. Even if the State had the ability to delegate to the husband a power it itself could not exercise, it is not at all likely that such action would further, as the District Court majority phrased it, the “interest of the state, in protecting the mutuality of decisions vital to the marriage relationship.” 392 F. Supp., at 1370.

We recognize, of course, that when a woman, with the approval of her physician but without the approval of her husband, decides to terminate her pregnancy, it could be said that she is acting unilaterally. The obvious fact is that when the wife and the husband disagree on this decision, the view of only one of the two marriage partners can prevail. Inasmuch as it is the woman who physically bears the child and who is the more directly and immediately affected by the pregnancy, as between the two, the balance weighs in her favor. Cf. Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S., at 153.

We conclude that § 3 (3) of the Missouri Act is inconsistent with the standards enunciated in Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S., at 164-165, and is unconstitutional. It is therefore unnecessary for us to consider the appellants' *72additional challenges to § 3 (3) based on vagueness and overbreadth.

D

Parental Consent. Section 3 (4) requires, with respect to the first 12 weeks of pregnancy, where the woman is unmarried and under the age of 18 years, the written consent of a parent or person in loco parentis unless, again, “the abortion is certified by a licensed physician as necessary in order to preserve the life of the mother.” It is to be observed that only one parent need consent.

The appellees defend the statute in several ways. They point out that the law properly may subject minors to more stringent limitations than are permissible with respect to adults, and they cite, among other cases, Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158 (1944), and McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U. S. 528 (1971). Missouri law, it is said, “is replete with provisions reflecting the interest of the state in assuring the welfare of minors,” citing statutes relating to a guardian ad litem for a court proceeding, to the care of delinquent and neglected children, to child labor, and to compulsory education. Brief for Appellee Danforth 42. Certain decisions are considered by the State to be outside the scope of a minor’s ability to act in his own best interest or in the interest of the public, citing statutes proscribing the sale of firearms and deadly weapons to minors without parental consent, and other statutes relating to minors’ exposure to certain types of literature, the purchase by pawnbrokers of property from minors, and the sale of cigarettes and alcoholic beverages to minors. It is pointed out that the record contains testimony to the effect that children of tender years (even ages 10 and 11) have sought abortions. Thus, a State’s permitting a child to obtain an abortion without the counsel of an adult “who has responsi*73bility or concern for the child would constitute an irresponsible abdication of the State’s duty to protect the welfare of minors.” Id., at 44. Parental discretion, too, has been protected from unwarranted or unreasonable interference from the State, citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390 (1923); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 (1925); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205 (1972). Finally, it is said that § 3 (4) imposes no additional burden on the physician because even prior to the passage of the Act the physician would require parental consent before performing an abortion on a minor.

The appellants, in their turn, emphasize that no other Missouri statute specifically requires the additional consent of a minor’s parent for medical or surgical treatment, and that in Missouri a minor legally may consent to medical services for pregnancy (excluding abortion), venereal disease, and drug abuse. Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 431.061-431.063 (Supp. 1975). The result of § 3 (4), it is said, “is the ultimate supremacy of the parents’ desires over those of the minor child, the pregnant patient.” Brief for Appellants 93. It is noted that in Missouri a woman under the age of 18 who marries with parental consent does not require parental consent to abort, and yet her contemporary who has chosen not to marry must obtain parental approval.

The District Court majority recognized that, in contrast to § 3 (3), the State’s interest in protecting the mutuality of a marriage relationship is not present with respect to § 3 (4). It found “a compelling basis,” however, in the State’s interest “in safeguarding the authority of the family relationship.” 392 F. Supp., at 1370. The dissenting judge observed that one could not seriously argue that a minor must submit to an abortion if her parents insist, and he could not see “why she would not be entitled to the same right of self-determination now *74explicitly accorded to adult women, provided she is sufficiently mature to understand the procedure and to make an intelligent assessment of her circumstances with the advice of her physician.” Id., at 1376.

Of course, much of what has been said above, with respect to §3(3), applies with equal force to §3(4). Other courts that have considered the parental-consent issue in the light of Roe and Doe, have concluded that a statute like § 3 (4) does not withstand constitutional scrutiny. See, e. g., Poe v. Gerstein, 517 F. 2d, at 792; Wolfe v. Schroering, 388 F. Supp., at 636-637; Doe v. Rampton, 366 F. Supp., at 193, 199; State v. Koome, 84 Wash. 2d 901, 530 P. 2d 260 (1975).

We agree with appellants and with the courts whose decisions have just been cited that the State may not impose a blanket provision, such as § 3 (4), requiring the consent of a parent or person in loco parentis as a condition for abortion of an unmarried minor during the first 12 weeks of her pregnancy. Just as with the requirement of consent from the spouse, so here, the State does not have the constitutional authority to give a third party an absolute, and possibly arbitrary, veto over the decision of the physician and his patient to terminate the patient’s pregnancy, regardless of the reason for withholding the consent.

Constitutional rights do not mature and come into being magically only when one attains the state-defined age of majority. Minors, as well as adults, are protected by the Constitution and possess constitutional rights. See, e. g., Breed v. Jones, 421 U. S. 519 (1975); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U. S. 565 (1975); Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U. S. 503 (1969); In re Gault, 387 U. S. 1 (1967). The Court indeed, however, long has recognized that the State has somewhat broader authority to regulate the activities of children than of adults. *75 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S., at 170; Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U. S. 629 (1968). It remains, then, to examine whether there is any significant state interest in conditioning an abortion on the consent of a parent or person in loco parentis that is not present in the case of an adult.

One suggested interest is the safeguarding of the family unit and of parental authority. 392 F. Supp., at 1370. It is difficult, however, to conclude that providing a parent with absolute power to overrule a determination, made by the physician and his minor patient, to terminate the patient's pregnancy will serve to strengthen the family unit. Neither is it likely that such veto power will enhance parental authority or control where the minor and the nonconsenting parent are so fundamentally in conflict and the very existence of the pregnancy already has fractured the family structure. Any independent interest the parent may have in the termination of the minor daughter’s pregnancy is no more weighty than the right of privacy of the competent minor mature enough to have become pregnant.

We emphasize that our holding that § 3 (4) is invalid does not suggest that every minor, regardless of age or maturity, may give effective consent for termination of her pregnancy. See Bellotti v. Baird, post, p. 132. The fault with § 3 (4) is that it imposes a special-consent provision, exercisable by a person other than the woman and her physician, as a prerequisite to a minor’s termination of her pregnancy and does so without a sufficient justification for the restriction. It violates the strictures of Roe and Doe.

E

Saline amniocentesis. Section 9 of the statute prohibits the use of saline amniocentesis, as a method or technique of abortion, after the first 12 weeks of preg*76nancy. It describes the method as one whereby the amniotic fluid is withdrawn and “a saline or other fluid” is inserted into the amniotic sac. The statute imposes this proscription on the ground that the technique “is deleterious to maternal health,” and places it in the form of a legislative finding. Appellants challenge this provision on the ground that it operates to preclude virtually all abortions after the first trimester. This is so, it is claimed, because a substantial percentage, in the neighborhood of 70% according to the testimony, of all abortions performed in the United States after the first trimester are effected through the procedure of saline amniocentesis. Appellants stress the fact that the alternative methods of hysterotomy and hysterectomy are significantly more dangerous and critical for the woman than the saline technique; they also point out that the mortality rate for normal childbirth exceeds that where saline amniocentesis is employed. Finally, appellants note that the perhaps safer alternative of prostaglandin instillation, suggested and strongly relied upon by the appellees, at least at the time of the trial, is not yet widely used in this country.

We held in Roe that after the first stage, “the State, in promoting its interest in the health of the mother, may, if it chooses, regulate the abortion procedure in ways that are reasonably related to maternal health.” 410 U. S., at 164. The question with respect to § 9 therefore is whether the flat prohibition of saline amniocentesis is a restriction which “reasonably relates to the preservation and protection of maternal health.” Id., at 163. The appellees urge that what the Missouri General Assembly has done here is consistent with that guideline and is buttressed by substantial supporting medical evidence in the record to which this Court should defer.

*77The District Court's majority determined, on the basis of the evidence before it, that the maternal mortality rate in childbirth does, indeed, exceed the mortality rate where saline amniocentesis is used. Therefore, the majority acknowledged, § 9 could be upheld only if there were safe alternative methods of inducing abortion after the first 12 weeks. 392 F. Supp., at 1373. Referring to such methods as hysterotomy, hysterectomy, “mechanical means of inducing abortion,” and prostaglandin injection, the majority said that at least the latter two techniques were safer than saline. Consequently, the majority concluded, the restriction in § 9 could be upheld as reasonably related to maternal health.

We feel that the majority, in reaching its conclusion, failed to appreciate and to consider several significant facts. First, it did not recognize the prevalence, as the record conclusively demonstrates, of the use of saline amniocentesis as an accepted medical procedure in this country; the procedure, as noted above, is employed in a substantial majority (the testimony from both sides ranges from 68% to 80%) of all post-first-trimester abortions. Second, it failed to recognize that at the time of trial, there were severe limitations on the availability of the prostaglandin technique, which, although promising, was used only on an experimental basis until less than two years before. See Wolfe v. Schroering, 388 F. Supp., at 637, where it was said that at that time (1974), there were “no physicians in Kentucky competent in the technique of prostaglandin amnio infusion.” And appellees offered no evidence that prostaglandin abortions were available in Missouri.12 Third, the statute’s *78reference to the insertion of “a saline or other fluid” appears to include within its proscription the intra-amni-otic injection of prostaglandin itself and other methods that may be developed in the future and that may prove highly effective and completely safe. Finally, the majority did not consider the anomaly inherent in § 9 when it proscribes the use of saline but does not prohibit techniques that are many times more likely to result in maternal death. See 392 F. Supp., at 1378 n. 8 (dissenting opinion).

These unappreciated or overlooked factors place the State’s decision to bar use of the saline method in a completely different light. The State, through § 9, would prohibit the use of a method which the record shows is the one most commonly used nationally by physicians after the first trimester and which is safer, with respect to maternal mortality, than even continuation of the pregnancy until normal childbirth. More*79over, as a practical matter, it forces a woman and her physician to terminate her pregnancy by methods more dangerous to her health than the method outlawed.

As so viewed, particularly in the light of the present unavailability- — as demonstrated by the record — of the prostaglandin technique, the outright legislative proscription of saline fails as a reasonable regulation for the protection of maternal health. It comes into focus, instead, as an unreasonable or arbitrary regulation designed to inhibit, and having the effect of inhibiting, the vast majority of abortions after the first 12 weeks. As such, it does not withstand constitutional challenge. See Wolfe v. Schroering, 388 F. Supp., at 637.

F

Recordkeeping. Sections 10 and 11 of the Act impose recordkeeping requirements for health facilities and physicians concerned with abortions irrespective of the pregnancy stage. Under § 10, each such facility and physician is to be supplied with forms “the purpose and function of which shall be the preservation of maternal health and life by adding to the sum of medical knowledge through the compilation of relevant maternal health and life data and to monitor all abortions performed to assure that they are done only under and in accordance with the provisions of the law.” The statute states that the information on the forms “shall be confidential and shall be used only for statistical purposes.” The “records, however, may be inspected and health data acquired by local, state, or national public health officers.” Under § 11 the records are to be kept for seven years in the permanent files of the health facility where the abortion was performed.

Appellants object to these reporting and recordkeeping provisions on the ground that they, too, impose an extra *80layer and burden of regulation, and that they apply throughout all stages of pregnancy. All the judges of the District Court panel, however, viewed these provisions as statistical requirements “essential to the advancement of medical knowledge,” and as nothing that would “restrict either the abortion decision itself or the exercise of medical judgment in performing an abortion.” 392 F. Supp., at 1374.

One may concede that there are important and perhaps conflicting interests affected by recordkeeping requirements. On the one hand, maintenance of records indeed may be helpful in developing information pertinent to the preservation of maternal health. On the other hand, as we stated in Roe, during the first stage of pregnancy the State may impose no restrictions or regulations governing the medical judgment of the pregnant woman’s attending physician with respect to the termination of her pregnancy. 410 U. S., at 163, 164. Furthermore, it is readily apparent that one reason for the recordkeeping requirement, namely, to assure that all abortions in Missouri are performed in accordance with the Act, fades somewhat into insignificance in view of our holding above as to spousal and parental consent requirements.

Recordkeeping and reporting requirements that are reasonably directed to the preservation of maternal health and that properly respect a patient’s confidentiality and privacy are permissible. This surely is so for the period after the first stage of pregnancy, for then the State may enact substantive as well as recordkeeping regulations that are reasonable means of protecting maternal health. As to the first stage, one may argue forcefully, as the appellants do, that the State should not be able to impose any recordkeeping requirements that significantly differ from those imposed with respect to other, *81and comparable, medical or surgical procedures. We conclude, however, that the provisions of §§10 and 11, while perhaps approaching impermissible limits, are not constitutionally offensive in themselves. Recordkeeping of this kind, if not abused or overdone, can be useful to the State's interest in protecting the health of its female citizens, and may be a resource that is relevant to decisions involving medical experience and judgment.13 The added requirements for confidentiality, with the sole exception for public health officers, and for retention for seven years, a period not unreasonable in length, assist and persuade us in our determination of the constitutional limits. As so regarded, we see no legally significant impact or consequence on the abortion decision or on the physician-patient relationship. We naturally assume, furthermore, that these record-keeping and record-maintaining provisions will be interpreted and enforced by Missouri’s Division of Health in the light of our decision with respect to the Act’s other provisions, and that, of course, they will not be utilized in such a way as to accomplish, through the sheer burden of recordkeeping detail, what we have held to be an otherwise unconstitutional restriction. Obviously, the State may not require execution of spousal and parental consent forms that have been invalidated today.

G

Standard of care. Appellee Danforth in No. 74-1419 appeals from the unanimous decision of the District *82Court that § 6 (1) of the Act is unconstitutional. That section provides:

“No person who performs or induces an abortion shall fail to exercise that degree of professional skill, care and diligence to preserve the life and health of the fetus which such person would be required to exercise in order to preserve the life and health of any fetus intended to be born and not aborted. Any physician or person assisting in the abortion who shall fail to take such measures to encourage or to sustain the life of the child, and the death of the child results, shall be deemed guilty of manslaughter ... . Further, such physician or other person shall be liable in an action for damages.”

The District Court held that the first sentence was unconstitutionally overbroad because it failed to exclude from its reach the stage of pregnancy prior to viability. 392 F. Supp., at 1371.

The Attorney General argues that the District Court's interpretation is erroneous and unnecessary. He claims that the first sentence of § 6 (1) establishes only the general standard of care that applies to the person who performs the abortion, and that the second sentence describes the circumstances when that standard of care applies, namely, when a live child results from the procedure. Thus, the first sentence, it is said, despite its reference to the fetus, has no application until a live birth results.

The appellants, of course, agree with the District Court. They take the position that §6(1) imposes its standard of care upon the person performing the abortion even though the procedure takes place before viability. They argue that the statute on its face effectively precludes abortion and was meant to do just that.

*83We see nothing that requires federal-court abstention on this issue. Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U. S. 433, 437-439 (1971); Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U. S. 51, 54-55 (1973). And, like the three judges of the District Court, we are unable to accept the appellee’s sophisticated interpretation of the statute. Section 6(1) requires the physician to exercise the prescribed skill, care, and diligence to preserve the life and health of the fetus. It does not specify that such care need be taken only after the stage of viability has been reached. As the provision now reads, it impermissibly requires the physician to preserve the life and health of the fetus, whatever the stage of pregnancy. The fact that the second sentence of §6(1) refers to a criminal penalty where the physician fails “to take such measures to encourage or to sustain the life of the child, and the death of the child results” (emphasis supplied), simply does not modify the duty imposed by the previous sentence or limit that duty to pregnancies that have reached the stage of viability.

The appellees finally argue that if the first sentence of §6(1) does not survive constitutional attack, the second sentence does, and, under the Act’s severability provision, § B, is severable from the first. The District Court’s ruling of unconstitutionality, 392 F. Supp., at 1371, made specific reference to the first sentence, but its conclusion of law and its judgment invalidated all of § 6 (1). Id., at 1374; Jurisdictional Statement A-34 in No. 74-1419. Appellee Danforth’s motion to alter or amend the judgment, so far as the second sentence of §6(1) was concerned, was denied by the District Court. Id., at A-39.

We conclude, as did the District Court, that § 6 (1) must stand or fall as a unit. Its provisions are inextricably bound together. And a physician’s or other person’s criminal failure to protect a liveborn infant surely *84will be subject to prosecution in Missouri under the State’s criminal statutes.

The judgment of the District Court is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

APPENDIX TO OPINION OF THE COURT

H. C. S. HOUSE BILL NO. 1211

AN ACT relating to abortion with penalty provisions and emergency clause.

Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of Missouri, as follows:

Section 1. It is the intention of the general assembly of the state of Missouri to reasonably regulate abortion in conformance with the decisions of the supreme court of the United States.

Section 2. Unless the language or context clearly indicates a different meaning is intended, the following words or phrases for the purpose of this act shall be given the meaning ascribed to them:

(1) “Abortion,” the intentional destruction of the life of an embryo or fetus in his or her mother’s womb or the intentional termination of the pregnancy of a mother with an intention other than to increase the probability of a live birth or to remove a dead or dying unborn child ;

(2) “Viability,” that stage of fetal development when the life of the unborn child may be continued indefinitely outside the womb by natural or artificial life-supportive systems;

(3) “Physician,” any person licensed to practice medi*85cine in this state by the state board of registration of the healing arts.

Section 3. No abortion shall be performed prior to the end of the first twelve weeks of pregnancy except:

(1) By a duly licensed, consenting physician in the exercise of his best clinical medical judgment.

(2) After the woman, prior to submitting to the abortion, certifies in writing her consent to the abortion and that her consent is informed and freely given and is not the result of coercion.

(3) With the written consent of the woman’s spouse, unless the abortion is certified by a licensed physician to be necessary in order to preserve the life of the mother.

(4) With the written consent of one parent or person in loco parentis of the woman if the woman is unmarried and under the age of eighteen years, unless the abortion is certified by a licensed physician as necessary in order to preserve the life of the mother.

Section 4. No abortion performed subsequent to the first twelve weeks of pregnancy shall be performed except where the provisions of section 3 of this act are satisfied and in a hospital.

Section 5. No abortion not necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother shall be performed unless the attending physician first certifies with reasonable medical certainty that the fetus is not viable.

Section 6. (1) No person who performs or induces an abortion shall fail to exercise that degree of professional skill, care and diligence to preserve the life and health of the fetus which such person would be required to exercise in order to preserve the life and health of any fetus intended to be born and not aborted. Any physician or person assisting in the abortion who *86shall fail to take such measures to encourage or to sustain the life of the child, and the death of the child results, shall be deemed guilty of manslaughter and upon conviction shall be punished as provided in Section 559.-140, RSMo. Further, such physician or other person shall be liable in an action for damages as provided in Section 537.080, RSMo.

(2) Whoever, with intent to do so, shall take the life of a premature infant aborted alive, shall be guilty of murder of the second degree.

(3) No person shall use any fetus or premature infant aborted alive for any type of scientific, research, laboratory or other kind of experimentation either prior to or subsequent to any abortion procedure except as necessary to protect or preserve the life and health of such premature infant aborted alive.

Section 7. In every case where a live born infant results from an attempted abortion which was not performed to save the life or health of the mother, such infant shall be an abandoned ward of the state under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court wherein the abortion occurred, and the mother and father, if he consented to the abortion, of such infant, shall have no parental rights or obligations whatsoever relating to such infant, as if the parental rights had been terminated pursuant to section 211.411, RSMo. The attending physician shall forthwith notify said juvenile court of the existence of such live born infant.

Section 8. Any woman seeking an abortion in the state of Missouri shall be verbally informed of the provisions of section 7 of this act by the attending physician and the woman shall certify in writing that she has been so informed.

Section 9. The general assembly finds that the method or technique of abortion known as saline amnio*87centesis whereby the amniotic fluid is withdrawn and a saline or other fluid is inserted into the amniotic sac for the purpose of killing the fetus and artificially inducing labor is deleterious to maternal health and is hereby prohibited after the first twelve weeks of pregnancy.

Section 10. 1. Every health facility and physician shall be supplied with forms promulgated by the division of health, the purpose and function of which shall be the preservation of maternal health and life by adding to the sum of medical knowledge through the compilation of relevant maternal health and life data and to monitor all abortions performed to assure that they are done only under and in accordance with the provisions of the law.

2. The forms shall be provided by the state division of health.

3. All information obtained by physician, hospital, clinic or other health facility from a patient for the purpose of preparing reports to the division of health under this section or reports received by the division of health shall be confidential and shall be used only for statistical purposes. Such records, however, may be inspected and health data acquired by local, state, or national public health officers.

Section 11. All medical records and other documents required to be kept shall be maintained in the permanent files of the health facility in which the abortion was performed for a period of seven years.

Section 12. Any practitioner of medicine, surgery, or nursing, or other health personnel who shall willfully and knowingly do or assist any action made unlawful by this act shall be subject to having his license, application for license, or authority to practice his profession as a physician, surgeon, or nurse in the state of Missouri *88rejected or revoked by the appropriate state licensing board.

Section 13. Any physician or other person who fails to maintain the confidentiality of any records or reports required under this act is guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction, shall be punished as provided by law.

Section 14. Any person who contrary to the provisions of this act knowingly performs or aids in the performance of any abortion or knowingly fails to perform any action required by this act shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction, shall be punished as provided by law.

Section 15. Any person who is not a licensed physician as defined in section 2 of this act who performs or attempts to perform an abortion on another as defined in subdivision (1) of section 2 of this act, is guilty of a felony, and upon conviction, shall be imprisoned by the department of corrections for a term of not less than two years nor more than seventeen years.

Section 16. Nothing in this act shall be construed to exempt any person, firm, or corporation from civil liability for medical malpractice for negligent acts or certification under this act.

Section A. Because of the necessity for immediate state action to regulate abortions to protect the lives and health of citizens of this state, this act is deemed necessary for the immediate preservation of the public health, welfare, peace and safety, and is hereby declared to be an emergency act within the meaning of the constitution, and this act shall be in full force and effect upon its passage and approval.

Section B. If any provision of this Act or the application thereof to any person or circumstance shall be *89held invalid, such invalidity does not affect the provisions or application of this Act which can be given effect without the invalid provisions or applications, and to this end the provisions of this Act are declared to be severable.

Approved June 14, 1974.

Effective June 14, 1974.

Mr. Justice Stewart,

with whom Mr. Justice Powell joins,

concurring.

While joining the Court’s opinion, I write separately to indicate my understanding of some of the constitutional issues raised by this litigation.

With respect to the definition of viability in § 2 (2) of the Act, it seems to me that the critical consideration is that the statutory definition has almost no operative significance. The State has merely required physicians performing abortions to certify that the fetus to be aborted is not viable. While the physician may be punished for failing to issue a certification, he may not be punished for erroneously concluding that the fetus is not viable. There is thus little chance that a physician’s professional decision to perform an abortion will be “chilled.”

I agree with the Court that the patient-consent provision in § 3 (2) is constitutional. While § 3 (2) obviously regulates the abortion decision during all stages of pregnancy, including the first trimester, I do not believe it conflicts with the statement in Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113, 163, that “for the period of pregnancy prior to [approximately the end of the first trimester] the attending physician, in consultation with his patient, is free to determine, without regulation by the State, that, in his medical judgment, the patient’s pregnancy should be terminated. If that decision is reached, the judgment *90may be effectuated by an abortion free of interference by the State.” That statement was made in the context of invalidating a state law aimed at thwarting a woman’s decision to have an abortion. It was not intended to preclude the State from enacting a provision aimed at ensuring that the abortion decision is made in a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary fashion.

As to the provision of the law that requires a husband’s consent to an abortion, § 3 (3), the primary issue that it raises is whether the State may constitutionally recognize and give effect to a right on his part to participate in the decision to abort a jointly conceived child. This seems to me a rather more difficult problem than the Court acknowledges. Previous decisions have recognized that a man’s right to father children and enjoy the association of his offspring is a constitutionally protected freedom. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U. S. 645; Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U. S. 535. But the. Court has recognized as well that the Constitution protects “a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.” Roe v. Wade, supra, at 153 (emphasis added). In assessing the constitutional validity of § 3 (3) we are called upon to choose between these competing rights. I agree with the Court that since “it is the woman who physically bears the child and who is the more directly and immediately affected by the pregnancy . . . the balance weighs in her favor.” Ante, at 71.

With respect to the state law’s requirement of parental consent, § 3 (4), I think it clear that its primary constitutional deficiency lies in its imposition of an absolute limitation on the minor’s right to obtain an abortion. The Court’s opinion today in Bellotti v. Baird, post, at 147-148, suggests that a materially different constitutional issue would be presented under a provision requiring parental consent or consultation in most cases *91but providing for prompt (i) judicial resolution of any disagreement between the parent and the minor, or (ii) judicial determination that the minor is mature enough to give an informed consent without parental concurrence or that abortion in any event is in the minor’s best interest. Such a provision would not impose parental approval as an absolute condition upon the minor’s right but would assure in most instances consultation between the parent and child.1

There can be little doubt that the State furthers a constitutionally permissible end by encouraging an unmarried pregnant minor to seek the help and advice of her parents in making the very important decision whether or not to bear a child. That is a grave decision, and a girl of tender years, under emotional stress, may be ill-equipped to make it without mature advice and emotional support. It seems unlikely that she will obtain adequate counsel and support from the attending physician at an abortion clinic, where abortions for pregnant minors frequently take place.2

*92As to the constitutional validity of § 9 of the Act, prohibiting the use of the saline amniocentesis procedure, I agree fully with the views expressed by Me. Justice Stevens.

Me. Justice White,

with whom The Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Rehnquist join,

concurring in part and dissenting in part.

In Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113 (1973), this Court recognized a right to an abortion free from state prohibition. The task of policing this limitation on state police power is and will be a difficult and continuing venture in substantive due process. However, even accepting Roe v. Wade, there is nothing in the opinion in that case and nothing articulated in the Court’s opinion in this case which justifies the invalidation of four provisions of House Committee Substitute for House Bill No. 1211 (hereafter Act) enacted by the Missouri 77th General Assembly in 1974 in response to Roe v. Wade. Accordingly, I dissent, in part.

I

Roe v. Wade, supra, at 163, holds that until a fetus becomes viable, the interest of the State in the life or potential life it represents is outweighed by the interest of the mother in choosing “whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.” 410 U. S., at 153. Section 3 (3) of the Act provides that a married woman may not obtain an abortion without her husband’s consent. The Court strikes down this statute in one sentence. It says that “since the State cannot . . . proscribe abortion . . . the State cannot delegate authority to any particular person, *93even the spouse, to prevent abortion . . . .” Ante, at 69. But the State is not — under § 3 (3) — delegating to the husband the power to vindicate the State’s interest in the future life of the fetus. It is instead recognizing that the husband has an interest of his own in the life of the fetus which should not be extinguished by the unilateral decision of the wife.1 It by no means follows, from the fact that the mother’s interest in deciding “whether or not to terminate her pregnancy” outweighs the State’s interest in the potential life of the fetus, that the husband’s interest is also outweighed and may not be protected by the State. A father’s interest in having a child — perhaps his only child — may be unmatched by any other interest in his life. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U. S. 645, 651 (1972), and cases there cited. It is truly surprising that the majority finds in the United States Constitution, as it must in order to justify the result it reaches, a rule that the State must assign a greater value to a mother’s decision to cut off a potential human life by abortion than to a father’s decision to let it mature into a live child. Such a rule cannot be found there, nor can it be found in Roe v. Wade, supra. These are matters which a State should be able to decide free from the suffocating power of the federal judge, purporting to act in the name of the Constitution.

*94In describing the nature of a mother's interest in ter-mininating a pregnancy, the Court in Roe v. Wade mentioned only the post-birth burdens of rearing a child, 410 U. S., at 153, and rejected a rule based on her interest in controlling her own body during pregnancy. Id., at 154. Missouri has a law which prevents a woman from putting a child up for adoption over her husband's objection, Mo. Rev. Stat. § 453.030 (1969). This law represents a judgment by the State that the mother’s interest in avoiding the burdens of child rearing do not outweigh or snuff out the father’s interest in participating in bringing up his own child. That law is plainly valid, but no more so than § 3 (3) of the Act now before us, resting as it does on precisely the same judgment.

II

Section 3 (4) requires that an unmarried woman under 18 years of age obtain the consent of a parent or a person in loco parentis as a condition to an abortion. Once again the Court strikes the provision down in a sentence. It states: “Just as with the requirement of consent from the spouse, so here, the State does not have the constitutional authority to give a third party an absolute, and possibly arbitrary, veto over the decision of the physician and his patient to terminate the patient's pregnancy . .. .” Ante, at 74. The Court rejects the notions that the State has an interest in strengthening the family unit, or that the parent has an “independent interest” in the abortion decision, sufficient to justify § 3 (4) and apparently concludes that the provision is therefore unconstitutional. But the purpose of the parental-consent requirement is not merely to vindicate any interest of the parent or of the State. The purpose of the requirement is to vindicate the very right created in Roe v. Wade, supra—the right of the pregnant woman to decide *95“whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.” 410 U. S., at 153 (emphasis added). The abortion decision is unquestionably important and has irrevocable consequences whichever way it is made. Missouri is entitled to protect the minor unmarried woman from making the decision in a way which is not in her own best interests, and it seeks to achieve this goal by requiring parental consultation and consent. This is the traditional way by which States have sought to protect children from their own immature and improvident decisions;2 and there is absolutely no reason expressed by the majority why the State may not utilize that method here.

Ill

Section 9 of the Act prohibits abortion by the method known as saline amniocentesis — a method used at the time the Act was passed for 70% of abortions performed after the first trimester. Legislative history reveals that the Missouri Legislature viewed saline amniocentesis as far less safe a method of abortion than the so-called pros-taglandin method. The court below took evidence on the question and summarized it as follows:

“The record of trial discloses that use of the saline method exposes a woman to the danger of severe complications, regardless of the skill of the physician or the precaution taken. Saline may cause one or *96more of the following conditions: Disseminated in-travascular coagulation or 'consumptive coagulap-athy’ (disruption of the blood clotting mechanism [Dr. Warren, Tr. 57-58; Dr. Klaus, Tr. 269-270; Dr. Anderson, Tr. 307; Defts’ Exs. H & M]), which may result in severe bleeding and possibly death (Dr. Warren, Tr. 58); hypernatremia (increase in blood sodium level), which may lead to convulsions and death (Dr. Klaus, Tr. 268); and water intoxication (accumulated water in the body tissue which may occur when oxytoxin is used in conjunction with the injection of saline), resulting in damage to the central nervous system or death (Dr. Warren, Tr. 76; Dr. Klaus, Tr. 270-271; Dr. Anderson, Tr. 310; Defts’ Ex. L). There is also evidence that saline amniocentesis causes massive tissue destruction to the inside of the uterus (Dr. Anderson, Tr. 308).” 392 F. Supp. 1362, 1372-1373 (1975).

The District Court also cited considerable evidence establishing that the prostaglandin method is safer. In fact, the Chief of Obstetrics at Yale University, Dr. Anderson, suggested that "physicians should be liable for malpractice if they chose saline over prostaglandin after having been given all the facts on both methods.” Id., at 1373. The Court nevertheless reverses the decision of the District Court sustaining § 9 against constitutional challenge. It does so apparently because saline amniocentesis was widely used before the Act was passed; because the prostaglandin method was seldom used and was not generally available; and because other abortion techniques more dangerous than saline amniocentesis were not banned. At bottom the majority’s holding — as well as the concurrence — rests on its factual finding that the prostaglandin method is unavailable to the women of *97Missouri. It therefore concludes that the ban on the saline method is “an unreasonable or arbitrary regulation designed to inhibit, and having the effect of inhibiting, the vast majority of abortions after the first 12 weeks/' ante, at 79. This factual finding was not made either by the majority or by the dissenting judge below. Appellants have not argued that the record below supports such a finding. In fact the record below does not support such a finding. There is no evidence in the record that women in Missouri will be unable to obtain abortions by the prostaglandin method. What evidence there is in the record on this question supports the contrary conclusion.3 The record discloses that the prostaglandin method of abortion was the country's second most common method of abortion during the second trimester, Tr. 42, 89-90; that although the prostaglandin method had previously been available only on an experimental basis, it was, at the time of trial available in “small hospitals all over the country,'' id., at 342; that in another year or so the prostaglandin method would become — even in the absence of legislation on the subject— the most prevalent method. Anderson deposition, at 69. Moreover, one doctor quite sensibly testified that if the saline method were banned, hospitals would quickly switch to the prostaglandin method.

The majority relies on the testimony of one doctor that — as already noted — prostaglandin had been available on an experimental basis only until January 1, 1974; and that its manufacturer, the Upjohn Co., restricted its sales to large medical centers for the following six months, after which sales were to be unrestricted. Tr. *9833A-335. In what manner this evidence supports the proposition that prostaglandin is unavailable to the women of Missouri escapes me. The statute involved in this litigation was passed on June 14, 1974; evidence was taken in July 1974; the District Court's decree sustaining the ban on the saline method which this Court overturns was entered in January 1975; and this Court declares the statute unconstitutional in July 1976. There is simply no evidence in the record that prosta-glandin was or is unavailable at any time relevant to this case. Without such evidence and without any factual finding by the court below this Court cannot properly strike down a statute passed by one of the States. Of course, there is no burden on a State to establish the constitutionality of one of its laws. Absent proof of a fact essential to its unconstitutionality, the statute remains in effect.

The only other basis for its factual finding which the majority offers is a citation to another case — Wolfe v. Schroering, 388 F. Supp. 631, 637 (WD Ky. 1974)—in which a different court concluded that the record in its case showed the prostaglandin method to be unavailable in another State — Kentucky—at another time — two years ago. This case must be decided on its own record. I am not yet prepared to accept the notion that normal rules of law, procedure, and constitutional adjudication suddenly become irrelevant solely because a case touches on the subject of abortion. The majority’s finding of fact that women in Missouri will be unable to obtain abortions after the first trimester if the saline method is banned is wholly unjustifiable.

In any event, the point of § 9 is to change the practice under which most abortions were performed under the saline amniocentesis method and to make the safer pros-taglandin method generally available. It promises to *99achieve that result, if it remains operative, and the evidence discloses that the result is a desirable one or at least that the legislature could have so viewed it. That should end our inquiry, unless we purport to be not only the country's continuous constitutional convention but also its ex officio medical board with powers to approve or disapprove medical and operative practices and standards throughout the United States.

IV

Section 6 (1) of the Act provides:

“No person who performs or induces an abortion shall fail to exercise that degree of professional skill, care and diligence to preserve the life and health of the fetus which such person would be required to exercise in order to preserve the life and health of any fetus intended to be born and not aborted. Any physician or person assisting in the abortion who shall fail to take such measures to encourage or to sustain the life of the child, and the death of the child results, shall be deemed guilty of manslaughter .... Further, such physician or other person shall be liable in an action for damages.”

If this section is read in any way other than through a microscope, it is plainly intended to require that, where a “fetus [may have] the capability of meaningful life outside the mother’s womb,” Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S., at 163, the abortion be handled in a way which is designed to preserve that life notwithstanding the mother’s desire to terminate it. Indeed, even looked at through a microscope the statute seems to go no further. It requires a physician to exercise “that degree of professional skill... to preserve the . . . fetus,” which he would be required to exercise if the mother wanted a live child. Plainly, *100if the pregnancy is to be terminated at a time when there is no chance of life outside the womb, a physician would not be required to exercise any care or skill to preserve the life of the fetus during abortion no matter what the mother's desires. The statute would appear then to operate only in the gray area after the fetus might be viable but while the physician is still able to certify “with reasonable medical certainty that the fetus is not viable.” See § 5 of the Act which flatly prohibits abortions absent such a certification. Since the State has a compelling interest, sufficient to outweigh the mother’s desire to kill the fetus, when the “fetus . . . has the capability of meaningful life outside the mother’s womb,” Roe v. Wade, supra, at 163, the statute is constitutional.

Incredibly, the Court reads the statute instead to require “the physician to preserve the life and health of the fetus, whatever the stage of pregnancy,” ante, at 83, thereby attributing to the Missouri Legislature the strange intention of passing a statute with absolutely no chance of surviving constitutional challenge under Roe v. Wade, supra.

The Court compounds its error by also striking down as unseverable the wholly unobjectionable requirement in the second sentence of § 6 (1) that where an abortion produces a live child, steps must be taken to sustain its life. It explains its result in two sentences:

“We conclude, as did the District Court, that §6(1) must stand or fall as a unit. Its provisions are inextricably bound together.” Ante, at 83.

The question whether a constitutional provision of state law is severable from an unconstitutional provision is entirely a question of the intent of the state legislature. There is not the slightest reason to suppose that the Missouri Legislature would not require proper care *101for live babies just because it cannot require physicians performing abortions to take care to preserve the life of fetuses. The Attorney General of Missouri has argued here that the only intent of § 6 (1) was to require physicians to support a live baby which resulted from an abortion.

At worst, §6(1) is ambiguous on both points and the District Court should be directed to abstain until a construction may be had from the state courts. Under no circumstances should §6(1) be declared unconstitutional at this point.4

V

I join the judgment and opinion of the Court insofar as it upholds the other portions of the Act against constitutional challenge.

Mr. Justice Stevens,

concurring in part and dissenting in part.

With the exception of Parts IY-D and IY-E, I join the Court’s opinion.

In Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113, the Court held that a woman’s right to decide whether to abort a pregnancy is entitled to constitutional protection. That decision, which is now part of our law, answers the question discussed in Part IV-E of the Court’s opinion, but merely poses the question decided in Part IV-D.

If two abortion procedures had been equally accessible to Missouri women, in my judgment the United States Constitution would not prevent the state legis*102lature from outlawing the one it found to be less safe even though its conclusion might not reflect a unanimous consensus of informed medical opinion. However, the record indicates that when the Missouri statute was enacted, a prohibition of the saline amniocentesis procedure was almost tantamount to a prohibition of any abortion in the State after the first 12 weeks of pregnancy. Such a prohibition is inconsistent with the essential holding of Roe v. Wade and therefore cannot stand.

In my opinion, however, the parental-consent requirement is consistent with the holding in Roe. The State's interest in the welfare of its young citizens justifies a variety of protective measures. Because he may not foresee the consequences of his decision, a minor may not make an enforceable bargain. He may not lawfully work or travel where he pleases, or even attend exhibitions of constitutionally protected adult motion pictures. Persons below a certain age may not marry without parental consent. Indeed, such consent is essential even when the young woman is already pregnant. The State's interest in protecting a young person from harm justifies the imposition of restraints on his or her freedom even though comparable restraints on adults would be constitutionally impermissible. Therefore, the holding in Roe v. Wade that the abortion decision is entitled to constitutional protection merely emphasizes the importance of the decision; it does not lead to the conclusion that the state legislature has no power to enact legislation for the purpose of protecting a young pregnant woman from the consequences of an incorrect decision.

The abortion decision is, of course, more important than the decision to attend or to avoid an adult motion picture, or the decision to work long hours in a *103factory. It is not necessarily any more important than the decision to run away from home or the decision to marry. But even if it is the most important kind of a decision a young person may ever make, that assumption merely enhances the quality of the State's interest in maximizing the probability that the decision be made correctly and with full understanding of the consequences of either alternative.

The Court recognizes that the State may insist that the decision not be made without the benefit of medical advice. But since the most significant consequences of the decision are not medical in character, it would seem to me that the State may, with equal legitimacy, insist that the decision be made only after other appropriate counsel has been had as well. Whatever choice a pregnant young woman makes — to marry, to abort, to bear her child out of wedlock — the consequences of her decision may have a profound impact on her entire future life. A legislative determination that such a choice will be made more wisely in most cases if the advice and moral support of a parent play a part in the decisionmaking process is surely not irrational. Moreover, it is perfectly clear that the parental-consent requirement will necessarily involve a parent in the decisional process.

If there is no parental-consent requirement, many minors will submit to the abortion procedure without ever informing their parents. An assumption that the parental reaction will be hostile, disparaging, or violent no doubt persuades many children simply to bypass parental counsel which would in fact be loving, supportive, and, indeed, for some indispensable. It is unrealistic, in my judgment, to assume that every parent-child relationship is either (a) so perfect that communication and accord will take place routinely or *104(b) so imperfect that the absence of communication reflects the child’s correct prediction that the parent will exercise his or her veto arbitrarily to further a selfish interest rather than the child’s interest. A state legislature may conclude that most parents will be primarily interested in the welfare of their children, and further, that the imposition of a parental-consent requirement is an appropriate method of giving the parents an opportunity to foster that welfare by helping a pregnant distressed child to make and to implement a correct decision.

The State’s interest is not dependent on an estimate of the impact the parental-consent requirement may have on the total number of abortions that may take place. I assume that parents will sometimes prevent abortions which might better be performed; other parents may advise abortions that should not be performed. Similarly, even doctors are not omniscient; specialists in performing abortions may incorrectly conclude that the immediate advantages of the procedure outweigh the disadvantages which a parent could evaluate in better perspective. In each individual case factors much more profound than a mere medical judgment may weigh heavily in the scales. The overriding consideration is that the right to make the choice be exercised as wisely as possible.

The Court assumes that parental consent is an appropriate requirement if the minor is not capable of understanding the procedure and of appreciating its consequences and those of available alternatives. This assumption is, of course, correct and consistent with the predicate which underlies all state legislation seeking to protect minors from the consequences of decisions they are not yet prepared to make. In all such situations chronological age has been the basis for imposition of a restraint on the minor’s freedom of choice even though *105it is perfectly obvious that such a yardstick is imprecise and perhaps even unjust in particular cases. The Court seems to assume that the capacity to conceive a child and the judgment of the physician are the only constitutionally permissible yardsticks for determining whether a young woman can independently make the abortion decision. I doubt the accuracy of the Court’s empirical judgment. Even if it were correct, however, as a matter of constitutional law I think a State has power to conclude otherwise and to select a chronological age as its standard.

In short, the State’s interest in the welfare of its young citizens is sufficient, in my judgment, to support the parental-consent requirement.

Mr. Justice Stewart

delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case presents statutory and constitutional questions concerning the public funding of abortions under Title XIX of the Social Security Act, commonly known as the “Medicaid” Act, and recent .annual Appropriations Acts containing *301the so-called “Hyde Amendment.” The statutory question is whether Title XIX requires a State that participates in the Medicaid program to fund the cost of medically necessary abortions for which federal reimbursement is unavailable under the Hyde Amendment. The constitutional question, which arises only if Title XIX imposes no such requirement, is whether the Hyde Amendment, by denying public funding for certain medically necessary abortions, contravenes the liberty or equal protection guarantees of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, or either of the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment.

I

The Medicaid program was created in 1965, when Congress added Title XIX to the Social Security Act, 79 Stat. 343, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1396 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. II), for the purpose of providing federal financial assistance to States that choose to reimburse certain costs of medical treatment for needy persons. Although participation in the Medicaid program is entirely optional, once a State elects to participate, it must comply with the requirements of Title XIX.

One such requirement is that a participating State agree to provide financial assistance to the “categorically needy”1 with respect to five general areas of medical treatment: (1) inpatient hospital services, (2) outpatient hospital services, (3) other laboratory and X-ray services, (4) skilled nursing *302facilities services, periodic screening and diagnosis of children, and family planning services, and (5) services of physicians. 42 U. S. C. §§ 1396a (a)(13)(B), 1396d (a)(l)-(5). Although a participating State need not “provide funding for all medical treatment falling within the five general categories, [Title XIX] does require that [a] state Medicaid pla[n] establish ‘reasonable standards ... for determining . .. the extent of medical assistance under the plan which . . . are consistent with the objectives of [Title XIX].’ 42 U. S. C. § 1396a (a) (17).” Beal v. Doe, 432 U. S. 438, 441.

Since September 1976, Congress has prohibited — either by an amendment to the annual appropriations bill for the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare2 or by a joint resolution — the use of any federal funds to reimburse the cost of abortions under the Medicaid program except under certain specified circumstances. This funding restriction is commonly known as the “Hyde Amendment,” after its original congressional sponsor, Representative Hyde. The current version of the Hyde Amendment, applicable for fiscal year 1980, provides:

“[N]one of the funds provided by this joint-resolution shall be used to perform abortions except where the life of the mother would be endangered if the fetus were carried to term; or except for such medical procedures necessary for the victims of rape or incest when such . rape or incest has been reported promptly to a law enforcement agency or public health service.” Pub. L. '96-123, § 109, 93 Stat. 926.

See also Pub. L. 96-86, § 118, 93 Stat. 662. This version of the Hyde Amendment is broader than that applicable for fiscal year 1977, which did not include the “rape or incest” *303exception, Pub. L. 94-439, § 209, 90 Stat. 1434, but narrower than that applicable for most of fiscal year 1978,3 and all of fiscal year 1979, which had an additional exception for “instances where severe and long-lasting physical health damage to the mother would result if the pregnancy were carried to term when so determined by two physicians,” Pub. L. 95-205, § 101, 91 Stat. 1460; Pub. L. 95-480, § 210, 92 Stat. 1586.4

On September 30, 1976, the day on which Congress enacted the initial version of the Hyde Amendment, these consolidated cases were filed in the District Court for the Eastern District of New York. The plaintiffs — Cora McRae, a New York Medicaid recipient then in the first trimester of a pregnancy that she wished to terminate, the New York City Health and Hospitals Corp., a public benefit corporation that operates 16 hospitals, 12 of which provide abortion services, and others — sought to enjoin the enforcement of the funding restriction on abortions. They alleged that the Hyde Amendment violated the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments of the Constitution insofar as it limited the funding of abortions to those necessary to save the life of the mother, while permitting the funding of costs associated with childbirth. Although the sole named defendant was the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, the District Court permitted Senators James L. Buckley and Jesse A. Helms and Representative Henry J. Hyde to intervene as defendants.5

*304After a hearing, the District Court entered a preliminary injunction prohibiting the Secretary from enforcing the Hyde Amendment and requiring him to continue to provide federal reimbursement for abortions under the standards applicable before the funding restriction had been enacted. McRae v. Mathews, 421 F. Supp. 533. Although stating that it had not expressly held that the funding restriction was unconstitutional, since the preliminary injunction was not its final judgment, the District Court noted that such a holding was “implicit” in its decision granting the injunction. The District Court also certified the McRae case as a class action on behalf of all pregnant or potentially pregnant women in the State of New York eligible for Medicaid and who decide to have an abortion within the first 24 weeks of pregnancy, and of all authorized providers of abortion services to such women. Id., at 543.

The Secretary then brought an appeal to this Court. After deciding Beal v. Doe, 432 U. S 438, and Maher v. Roe, 432 U. S. 464, we vacated the injunction of the District Court and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of those decisions. Califano v. McRae, 433 U. S. 916.

On remand, the District Court permitted the intervention of several additional plaintiffs, including (1) four individual Medicaid recipients who wished to have abortions that allegedly were medically necessary but did not qualify for federal funds under the versions of the Hyde Amendment applicable in fiscal years 1977 and 1978, (2) several physicians who perform abortions for Medicaid recipients, (3) the Women’s Division of the Board of Global Ministries of the United Methodist Church (Women’s Division), and (4) two individual officers of the Women’s Division.

An amended complaint was then filed, challenging the various versions of the Hyde Amendment on several grounds.. At the outset, the plaintiffs asserted that the District Court need not address the constitutionality of the Hyde Amend*305ment because, in their view, a participating State remains obligated under Title XIX to fund all medically necessary abortions, even if federal reimbursement is unavailable. With regard to the constitutionality of the Hyde Amendment, the plaintiffs asserted, among other things, that the funding restrictions violate the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.

After a lengthy trial, which inquired into the medical reasons for abortions and the diverse religious views on the subject,6 the District Court filed an opinion and entered a judgment invalidating all versions of the Hyde Amendment on constitutional grounds.7 The District Court rejected the plaintiffs’ statutory argument, concluding that even though Title XIX would otherwise have required a participating State to fund medically necessary abortions, the Hyde Amendment had substantively amended Title XIX to relieve a State of that funding obligation. Turning then to the constitutional issues, the District Court concluded that the Hyde Amendment, though valid under the Establishment Clause,8 violates the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause and the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. With regard to the Fifth Amendment, the District Court noted that when an abortion is "medically necessary to safeguard the pregnant woman’s health, . . . the disentitlement to [M]edieaid assistance impinges directly on the woman’s right to decide, in consultation with her physician and in reliance on his judgment, to terminate *306her pregnancy in order to preserve her health.” 9 McRae v. Califano, 491 F. Supp. 630, 737. The court concluded that the Hyde Amendment violates the equal protection guarantee because, in its view, the decision of Congress to fund medically necessary services generally but only certain medically necessary abortions serves no legitimate governmental interest. As to the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, the court held that insofar as a woman’s decision to seek a medically necessary abortion may be a product of her religious beliefs under certain Protestant and Jewish tenets, the funding restrictions of the Hyde Amendment violate that constitutional guarantee as well.

Accordingly, the District Court ordered the Secretary to “[c]ease to give effect” to the various versions of the Hyde Amendment insofar as they forbid payments for medically necessary abortions. It further directed the Secretary to “[cjontinue to authorize the expenditure of federal matching funds [for such abortions].” App. 87. In addition, the court recertified the McRae case as a nationwide class action on behalf of all pregnant and potentially pregnant women eligible for Medicaid who wish to have medically necessary abortions, and of all authorized providers of abortions for such women:10

The Secretary then applied to this Court for a stay of the judgment pending direct appeal of the District Court’s decision. We denied the stay, but noted probable jurisdiction of this appeal. 444 U. S. 1069.

II

It is well settled that if a case may be decided on either statutory or constitutional grounds, this Court, for sound *307jurisprudential reasons, will inquire first into the statutory question. This practice reflects the deeply rooted doctrine “that we ought not to pass on questions of constitutionality . . . unless such adjudication is unavoidable.” Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U. S. 101, 105. Accordingly, we turn first to the question whether Title XIX requires a State that participates in the Medicaid program to continue to fund those medically necessary abortions for which federal reimbursement is unavailable under the Hyde Amendment. If a participating State is under such an obligation, the constitutionality of the Hyde Amendment need not be drawn into question in the present case, for the availability of medically necessary abortions under Medicaid would continue, with the participating State shouldering the total cost of funding such abortions.

The appellees assert that a participating State has an independent funding obligation under Title XIX because (1) the Hyde Amendment is, by its own terms, only a limitation on federal reimbursement for certain medically necessary abortions, and (2) Title XIX does not permit a participating State to exclude from its Medicaid plan any medically necessary service solely on the basis of diagnosis or condition, even if federal reimbursement is unavailable for that service.11 It is thus the appellees’ view that the effect of the Hyde Amendment is to withhold federal reimbursement for certain medically necessary abortions, but not to relieve a participating *308State of its duty under Title XIX to provide for such abortions in its Medicaid plan.

The District Court rejected this argument. It concluded that, although Title XIX would otherwise have required a participating State to include medically necessary abortions in its Medicaid program, the Hyde Amendment substantively amended Title XIX so as to relieve a State of that obligation. This construction of the Hyde Amendment was said to find support in the decisions of two Courts of Appeals, Preterm, Inc. v. Dukakis, 591 F. 2d 121 (CA1 1979), and Zbaraz v. Quern, 596 F. 2d 196 (CA7 1979), and to be consistent with the understanding of the effect of the Hyde Amendment by the Department of Health,. Education, and Welfare in the administration of the Medicaid program.

We agree with the District Court, but for somewhat different reasons. The Medicaid program created by Title XIX is a cooperative endeavor in which the Federal Government provides financial assistance to participating States to aid them in furnishing health care to needy persons. Under this system of “cooperative federalism,” King v. Smith, 392 U. S. 309, 316, if a State agrees to establish a Medicaid plan that satisfies the requirements of Title XIX, which include several mandatory categories of health services, the Federal Government agrees to pay a specified percentage of “the total amount expended ... as medical assistance under the State plan. . . .” 42 U. S. C. § 1396b (a)(1). The cornerstone of Medicaid is financial contribution by both the Federal Government and the participating State. Nothing in Title XIX as originally enacted, or in its legislative history, suggests that Congress intended to require a participating State to assume the full costs of providing any health services in its Medicaid plan. Quite the contrary, the purpose of Congress in enacting Title XIX was to provide federal financial assistance for all legitimate state expenditures under an approved Medicaid plan. See S. Rep. No. 404, 89th Cong., 1st *309Sess., pt. 1, pp. 83-85 (1965); H. R. Rep. No. 213, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 72-74 (1965).

Since the Congress that enacted Title XIX did not intend a participating State to assume a unilateral funding obligation for any health service in an approved Medicaid plan, it follows that Title XIX does not require a participating State to include in its plan any services for which a subsequent Congress has withheld federal funding.12 Title XIX was designed as a cooperative program of shared financial responsibility, not as a device for the Federal Government to compel a State to provide services that Congress itself is unwilling to fund. Thus, if Congress chooses to withdraw federal funding for a particular service, a State is not obliged to continue to pay for that service as a condition of continued federal financial support of other services. This is not to say that Congress may not now depart from the original design of Title XIX under which the Federal Government shares the financial responsibility for expenses incurred under an approved Medicaid plan. It is only to say that, absent an indication of contrary legislative intent by a subsequent Congress, Title XIX does not obligate a participating State to pay for those medical services for which federal reimbursement is unavailable.13

*310Thus, by the normal operation of Title XIX, even if a State were otherwise required to include medically necessary abortions in its Medicaid plan, the withdrawal of federal funding under the Hyde Amendment would operate to relieve the State of that obligation for those abortions for which federal reimbursement is unavailable.14 The legislative history of the Hyde Amendment contains no indication whatsoever that Congress intended to shift the entire cost of such services to the participating States. See Zbaraz v. Quern, supra, at 200 (“no one, whether supporting or opposing the Hyde Amendment, ever suggested that state, funding would be required”). Rather, the legislative history suggests that Congress has always assumed that a participating State would not be required to fund medically necessary abortions once federal funding was withdrawn pursuant to the Hyde Amendment.15 See Preterm, Inc. v. Dukakis, supra, at 130 (“[t]he universal assumption in debate was that if the Amendment passed there would be no requirement that states carry on the service”). Accord, Zbaraz v. Quern, supra, at 200; Hodgson v. Board of County Comm’rs, 614 F. 2d 601, 612-613 (CA8 *3111980); Roe v. Casey, 623 F. 2d 829, 834-837 (CA3 1980). Accordingly, we conclude that Title XIX does not require a participating State to pay for those medically necessary abortions for which federal reimbursement is unavailable under the Hyde Amendment.16

Ill

Having determined that Title XIX does not obligate a participating State to pay for those medically necessary abortions for which Congress has withheld federal, funding, we must consider the constitutional validity of the Hyde Amendment. The appellees assert that the funding restrictions of the Hyde Amendment violate several rights secured by the Constitution — (1) the right of a woman, implicit in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, to decide whether to terminate a pregnancy, (2) the prohibition under the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment against any “law respecting an establishment of religion,” and (3) the right to freedom of religion protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. The appellees also contend that, quite apart from substantive constitutional rights, the Hyde Amendment violates the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment.17

*312It is well settled that, quite apart from the guarantee of equal protection, if a law “impinges upon a fundamental right explicitly or implicitly secured by the Constitution [it] is presumptively unconstitutional.” Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U. S. 55, 76 (plurality opinion). Accordingly, before turning to the equal protection issue in this case, we examine whether the Hyde Amendment violates any substantive rights secured by the Constitution.

A

We address first the appellees’ argument that the Hyde Amendment, by restricting the availability of certain medically necessary abortions under Medicaid, impinges on the “liberty” protected by the Due Process Clause as recognized in Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113, and its progeny.

In the Wade case, this Court held unconstitutional a Texas statute making it a crime to procure or attempt an abortion except on medical advice for the purpose of saving the mother’s life. The constitutional underpinning of Wade was a recognition that the “liberty” protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment includes not only the freedoms explicitly mentioned in the Bill of Rights, but also a freedom of personal choice in certain matters of marriage and family life.18 This implicit constitutional liberty, the Court in Wade held, includes the freedom of a woman to decide whether to terminate a pregnancy.

*313But the Court in Wade also recognized that a State has legitimate interests during a pregnancy in both ensuring the health of the mother and protecting potential human life. These state interests, which were found to be “separate and distinct” and to “gro[w] in substantiality as the woman approaches term,” id., at 162-163, pose a conflict with a woman’s untrammeled freedom of choice. In resolving this conflict, the Court held that before the end of the first trimester of pregnancy, neither state interest is sufficiently substantial to justify any instrusion on the woman’s freedom of choice. In the second trimester, the state interest in maternal health was found to be sufficiently substantial to justify regulation reasonably related to that concern. And at viability, usually in the third trimester, the state interest in protecting the potential life of the fetus was found to justify a criminal prohibition against abortions, except where necessary for the preservation of the life or health of the mother. Thus, inasmuch as the Texas criminal statute allowed abortions only where necessary to save the life of the mother and without regard to the stage of the pregnancy, the Court held in Wade that the statute violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

In Maher v. Roe, 432 U. S. 464, the Court was presented with the question whether the scope of personal constitutional freedom recognized in Roe v. Wade included an entitlement to Medicaid payments for abortions that are hot medically necessary. At issue in Maher was a Connecticut welfare regulation under which Medicaid recipients received payments for medical services incident to childbirth, but not for medical services incident to nontherapeutic abortions. The District Court held that the regulation violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because the unequal subsidization of childbirth and abortion impinged on the “fundamental right to abortion” recognized in Wade and its progeny.

*314It was the view of this Court that “the District Court misconceived the nature and scope of the fundamental right recognized in Roe.” 432 U. S., at 471. The doctrine of Roe v. Wade, the Court held in Maher, “protects the woman from unduly burdensome interference with her freedom to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy,” id., at 473-474, such as the severe criminal sanctions at issue in Roe v. Wade, supra, or the absolute requirement of spousal consent for an abortion challenged in Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U. S. 52.

But the constitutional freedom recognized in Wade and its progeny, the Maher Court explained, did not prevent Connecticut from making “a value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion, and . . . implement [ing] that judgment by the allocation of public funds.” 432 U. S., at 474. As the Court elaborated:

“The Connecticut regulation before us is different in kind from the laws invalidated in our previous abortion decisions. The Connecticut regulation places no obstacles — absolute or otherwise — in the pregnant woman’s path to an abortion. An indigent woman who desires an abortion suffers no disadvantage as a consequence of Connecticut’s decision to fund childbirth; she continues as before to be dependent on private sources for the service she desires. The State may have made childbirth a more attractive alternative, thereby influencing the woman’s decision, but it has imposed no restriction on access to abortions that was not already there. The indigency that may make it difiicult — and in some cases, perhaps, impossible — for some women to have abortions is neither created nor in any way affected by the Connecticut regulation.” Ibid.

The Court in Maher noted that its description of the doctrine recognized in Wade and its progeny signaled “no retreat” from those decisions. In explaining why the con*315stitutional principle recognized in Wade and later cases— protecting a woman's freédom of choice — did not translate into a constitutional obligation of Connecticut to subsidize abortions, the Court cited the “basic difference between direct state interference with a protected activity and state encouragement of an alternative activity consonant with legislative policy. Constitutional concerns are greatest when the State attempts to impose its will by force of law; the State’s power to encourage actions deemed to be in the public interest is necessarily far broader.” 432 U. S., at 475-476 (footnote omitted). Thus, even though the Connecticut regulation favored childbirth over abortion by means of subsidization of one and not the other, the Court in Maher concluded that the regulation did not impinge on the constitutional freedom recognized in Wade because it imposed no governmental restriction on access to abortions.

The Hyde Amendment, like the Connecticut welfare regulation at issue in Maher, places no governmental obstacle in the path of a woman who chooses to terminate her pregnancy, but rather, by means of unequal subsidization of abortion and other medical services, encourages alternative activity deemed in the public interest. The present case does differ factually from Maher insofar as that case involved a failure to fund nontherapeutic abortions, whereas the Hyde Amendment withholds funding of certain medically necessary abortions. Accordingly, the appellees argue that because the Hyde Amendment affects a significant interest not present or asserted in Maher — the interest of a woman in protecting her health during pregnancy — and because that interest lies at the core of the personal constitutional freedom recognized in Wade, the present case is constitutionally different from Maher. It is the appellees’ view that to the extent that the Hyde Amendment withholds funding for certain medically necessary abortions, it clearly impinges on the constitutional principle recognized in Wade.

*316It is evident that a woman’s interest in protecting her health was an important theme in Wade. In concluding that the freedom of a woman to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy falls within the personal liberty protected by the Due Process Clause, the Court in Wade emphasized the fact that the woman’s decision carries with it significant personal health implications — both physical and psychological. 410 U. S., at 153. In fact, although the Court in Wade recognized that the state interest in protecting potential life becomes sufficiently compelling in the period after fetal viability to justify an absolute criminal prohibition of nontherapeutic abortions, the Court held that even after fetal viability a State may not prohibit abortions “necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother.” Id., at 164. Because even the compelling interest of the State in protecting potential life after fetal viability was held to be insufficient to outweigh a woman’s decision to protect her life or health, it could be argued that the freedom of a woman to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy for health reasons does in fact lie at the core of the constitutional liberty identified in Wade.

But, regardless of whether the freedom of a woman to choose to terminate her pregnancy for health reasons lies at the core or the periphery of the due process liberty recognized in Wade, it simply does not follow that a woman’s freedom of choice carries with it a constitutional entitlement to the financial resources to avail herself of the full range of protected choices. The reason why was explained in Maher: although government may not place obstacles in the path of a woman’s exercise of her freedom of choice, it need not remove those not of its own creation. Indigency falls in the latter category. The financial constraints that restrict an indigent woman’s ability to enjoy the full range of constitutionally protected freedom of choice are the product not of governmental restrictions on access to abortions, but rather of her indigency. Although Congress has opted to subsidize *317medically necessary services generally, but not certain medically necessary abortions, the fact remains that the Hyde Amendment leaves an indigent woman with at least the same range of choice in deciding whether to obtain a medically necessary abortion as she would have had if Congress had chosen to subsidize no health care costs at all. We are thus not persuaded that the Hyde Amendment impinges on the constitutionally protected freedom of choice recognized in Wade. 19

Although the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause affords protection against unwarranted government interference with freedom of choice in the context of certain personal *318decisions, it does not confer an entitlement to such funds as may be necessary to realize all the advantages of that freedom. To hold otherwise would mark a drastic change in our understanding of the Constitution. It cannot be that because government may not prohibit the use of contraceptives, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479, or prevent parents from sending their child to a private school, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510, government, therefore, has an affirmative constitutional obligation to ensure that all persons have the financial resources to obtain contraceptives or send their children to private schools. To translate the limitation on governmental power implicit in the Due Process Clause into an affirmative funding obligation would require Congress to subsidize the medically necessary abortion of an indigent woman even if Congress had not enacted a Medicaid program to subsidize other medically necessary services. Nothing in the Due Process Clause supports such an extraordinary result.20 Whether freedom of choice that is constitutionally protected warrants federal subsidization is a question for Congress to answer, not a matter of constitutional entitlement. Accordingly, we conclude that the Hyde Amendment does not impinge on the due process liberty recognized in Wade. 21

B

The appellees also argue that the Hyde Amendment contravenes rights secured by the Religion Clauses of the First *319Amendment. It is the appellees’ view that the Hyde Amendment violates the Establishment Clause because it incorporates into law the doctrines of the Roman Catholic Church concerning the sinfulness of abortion and the time at which life commences. Moreover, insofar as a woman’s decision to seek a medically necessary abortion may be a product of her religious beliefs under certain Protestant and Jewish tenets, the appellees assert that the funding limitations of the Hyde Amendment impinge on the fréedom of religion guaranteed by the Free Exercise Clause.

1

It is well settled that “a legislative enactment does not contravene the Establishment Clause if it has a secular legislative purpose, if its principal or primary effect neither advances nor inhibits religion, and if it does not foster an excessive governmental entanglement with religion.” Committee for Public Education v. Regan, 444 U. S. 646, 653. Applying this standard, the District Court properly concluded that the Hyde Amendment does not run afoul of the Establishment Clause. Although neither a State nor the Federal Government can constitutionally “pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another,” Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1, 15, it does not follow that a statute violates the Establishment Clause because it “happens to coincide or harmonize with the tenets of some or all religions.” McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 442. That the Judaeo-Christian religions oppose stealing does not mean that a State or the Federal Government may not. consistent with the Establishment Clause, enact laws prohibiting larceny. Ibid. The Hyde Amendment, as the District Court noted, is as much a reflection of “traditionalist” values towards abortion, as it is an embodiment of the views of any particular religion. 491 F. Supp., at 741. See also Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S., at 138-141. In sum, we are convinced that the fact that the funding restrictions in the *320Hyde Amendment may coincide with the religious tenets of the Roman Catholic Church does not, without more, contravene the Establishment Clause.

2

We need not address the merits of the appellees’ arguments concerning the Free Exercise Clause, because the appellees lack standing to raise a free exercise challenge to the Hyde Amendment. The named appellees fall into three categories: (1) the indigent pregnant women who sued on behalf of other women similarly situated, (2) the two officers of the Women’s Division, and (3) the Women’s Division itself.22 The named appellees in the first category lack standing to challenge the Hyde Amendment on free exercise grounds because none alleged, much less proved, that she sought an abortion under compulsion of religious belief.23 See McGowan v. Maryland, supra, at 429. Although the named appellees in the second category did provide a detailed description of their religious beliefs, they failed to allege either that they are or expect to be pregnant or that they are eligible to receive Medicaid. These named appellees, therefore, lack the personal stake in the controversy needed to confer standing to raise such a challenge to the Hyde Amendment. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 498-499.

Finally, although the Women’s Division alleged that its *321membership includes “pregnant Medicaid eligible women who, as a matter of religious practice and in accordance with their conscientious beliefs, would choose but are precluded or discouraged from obtaining abortions reimbursed by Medicaid because of the Hyde Amendment,” the Women’s Division does not satisfy the standing requirements for an organization to assert the rights of its membership. One of those requirements is that “neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit.” Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Comm’n, 432 U. S. 333, 343. Since “it is necessary in a free exercise case for one to show the coercive effect of the enactment as it operates against him in the practice of his religion,” Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203, 223, the claim asserted here is one that ordinarily requires individual participation.24 In the present case, the Women’s Division concedes that “the permissibility, advisability and/or necessity of abortion according to circumstance is a matter about which there is diversity of view within . . . our membership, and is a determination which must be ultimately and absolutely entrusted to the conscience of the individual before God.” It is thus clear that the participation of individual members of the Women’s Division is essential to a proper understanding and resolution of their free exercise claims. Accordingly, we conclude that the Women’s Division, along with the other named appellees, lack standing to challenge the Hyde Amendment under the Free Exercise Clause.

C

It remains to be determined whether the Hyde Amendment violates the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment. This challenge is premised on the fact that, although *322federal reimbursement is available under Medicaid for medically necessary services generally, the Hyde Amendment does not permit federal reimbursement of all medically necessary abortions. The District Court held, and the appellees argue here, that this selective subsidization violates the constitutional guarantee of equal protection.

The guarantee of equal protection under the Fifth Amendment is not a source of substantive rights or liberties,25 but rather a right to be free from invidious discrimination in statutory classifications and other governmental activity. It is well settled that where a statutory classification does not itself impinge on a right or liberty protected by the Constitution, the validity of classification must be sustained unless “the classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of [any legitimate governmental] objective.” McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S., at 425. This presumption of constitutional validity, however, disappears if a statutory classification is predicated on criteria that are, in a constitutional sense, “suspect,” the principal example of which is a classification based on race, e. g., Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483.

1

For the reasons stated above, we have already concluded that the Hyde Amendment violates no constitutionally protected substantive rights. We now conclude as well that it is not predicated on a constitutionally suspect classification. In reaching this conclusion, we again draw guidance from the Court’s decision in Maher v. Roe. As to whether the Con*323necticut welfare regulation providing funds for childbirth but not for nontherapeutic abortions discriminated against a suspect class, the Court in Maher observed:

“An indigent woman desiring an abortion does not come within the limited category of disadvantaged classes so recognized by our cases. Nor does the fact that the impact of the regulation falls upon those who cannot pay lead to a different conclusion. In a sense, every denial of welfare to an indigent creates a wealth classification as compared to nonindigents who are able to pay for the desired goods or services. But this Court has never held that financial need alone identifies a suspect class for purposes of equal protection analysis.” 432 U. S., at 470-471, citing San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1, 29; Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471.

Thus, the Court in Maher found no basis for concluding that the Connecticut regulation was predicated .on a suspect classification.

It is our view that the present case is indistinguishable from Maher in this respect. Here, as in Maher, the principal impact of the Hyde Amendment falls on the indigent. But that fact does not itself render the funding restriction constitutionally invalid, for this Court has held repeatedly that poverty, standing alone, is not a suspect classification. See, e. g., James v. Valtierra, 402 U. S. 137. That Maher involved the refusal to fund nontherapeutic abortions, whereas the present case involves the refusal to fund medically necessary abortions, has no bearing on the factors that render a classification “suspect” within the meaning of the constitutional guarantee of equal protection.26

*3242

The remaining question then is whether the Hyde Amendment is rationally related to a legitimate governmental objective. It is the Government’s position that the Hyde Amendment bears a rational relationship to its legitimate interest in protecting the potential life of the fetus. We agree.

In Wade, the Court recognized that the State has an “important and legitimate interest in protecting the potentiality of human life.” 410 U. S., at 162. That interest was found to exist throughout a pregnancy, “grow[ing] in sub-stantiality as the woman approaches term.” Id., at 162-163. See also Beal v. Doe, 432 U. S., at 445-446. Moreover, in Maher, the Court held that Connecticut’s decision to fund the costs associated with childbirth but not those associated with nontherapeutic abortions was a rational means of advancing the legitimate state interest in protecting potential life by *325encouraging childbirth. 432 U. S., at 478-479. See also Poelker v. Doe, 432 U. S. 519, 520-521.

It follows that the Hyde Amendment, by encouraging childbirth except in the most urgent circumstances, is rationally related to the legitimate governmental objective of protecting potential life. By subsidizing the medical expenses of indigent women who carry their pregnancies to term while not subsidizing the comparable expenses of women who undergo abortions (except those whose lives are threatened),27 Congress has established incentives that make childbirth a more attractive alternative than abortion for persons eligible for Medicaid. These incentives bear a direct relationship to the legitimate congressional interest in protecting potential life. Nor is it irrational that Congress has authorized federal reimbursement for medically necessary services generally, but not for certain medically necessary abortions.28 Abortion is inherently different from other medical procedures, because no other procedure involves the purposeful termination of a potential life.

After conducting an extensive evidentiary hearing into issues surrounding the public funding of abortions, the District Court concluded that “[t]he interests of . . . the federal government ... in the fetus and in preserving it are not sufficient, weighed in the balance with the woman’s threatened health, to justify withdrawing medical assistance unless the *326woman consents ... to carry the fetus to term.” 491 F. Supp., at 737. In making an independent appraisal of the competing interests involved here, the District Court went beyond the judicial function. Such decisions are entrusted under the Constitution to Congress, not the courts. It is the role of the courts only to ensure that congressional decisions comport with the Constitution.

Where, as here, the Congress has neither invaded a substantive constitutional right or freedom, nor enacted legislation that purposefully operates to the detriment of a suspect class, the only requirement of equal protection is that congressional action be rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest. The Hyde Amendment satisfies that standard. It is not the mission of this Court or any other to decide whether the balance of competing interests reflected in the Hyde Amendment is wise social policy. If that were our mission, not every Justice who has subscribed to the judgment of the Court today could have done so. But we cannot, in the name of the Constitution, overturn duly enacted statutes simply “because they may be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a particular school of thought.” Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U. S. 483, 488, quoted in Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S., at 484. Rather, “when an issue involves policy choices as sensitive as those implicated [here] . . ., the appropriate forum for their resolution in a democracy is the legislature.” Maher v. Roe, supra, at 479.

IV

For the reasons stated in this opinion, we hold that a State that participates in the Medicaid program is not obligated under Title XIX to continue to fund those medically necessary abortions for which federal reimbursement is unavailable under the Hyde Amendment. We further hold that the funding restrictions of the Hyde Amendment violate neither the Fifth Amendment nor the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. It is also our view that the appellees *327lack standing to raise a challenge to the Hyde Amendment under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. Accordingly, the judgment of the District Court is reversed, and the case is remanded to that court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Mr. Justice White,

concurring.

I join the Court’s opinion and judgment with these additional remarks.

Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113 (1973), held that prior to viability of the fetus, the governmental interest in potential life was insufficient to justify overriding the due process right of a pregnant woman to terminate her pregnancy by abortion. In the last trimester, however, the State’s interest in fetal life was deemed sufficiently strong to warrant a ban on abortions, but only if continuing the pregnancy did not threaten the life or health of the mother. In the latter event, the State was required to respect the choice of the mother to terminate the pregnancy and protect her health.

Drawing upon Roe v. Wade and the cases that followed it, Mr. Justice Stevens’ dissent extrapolates the general proposition that the governmental interest in potential life may in no event be pursued at the expense of the mother’s health. It then notes that under the Hyde Amendment, Medicaid refuses to fund abortions where carrying to term threatens maternal health but finances other medically indicated procedures, including childbirth. The dissent submits that the Hyde Amendment therefore fails the first requirement imposed by the Fifth Amendment and recognized by the Court’s opinion today — that the challenged official action must serve a legitimate governmental goal, ante, at 324.

The argument has a certain internal logic, but it is not legally sound. The constitutional right recognized in Roe v. Wade was the right to choose to undergo an abortion without coercive interference by the government. As the Court *328points out, Roe v. Wade did not purport to adjudicate a right to have abortions funded by the government, but only to be free from unreasonable official interference with private choice. At an appropriate stage in a pregnancy, for example, abortions could be prohibited to implement the governmental interest in potential life, but in no case to the damage of the health of the mother, whose choice to suffer an abortion rather than risk her health the government was forced to respect.

Roe v. Wade thus dealt with the circumstances in which the governmental interest in potential life would justify official interference with the abortion choices of pregnant women. There is no such calculus involved here. The Government does not seek to interfere with or to impose any coercive restraint on the choice of any woman to have an abortion. The woman’s choice remains unfettered, the Government is not attempting to use its interest in life to justify a coercive restraint, and hence in disbursing its Medicaid funds it is free to implement rationally what Roe v. Wade recognized to be its legitimate interest in a potential life by covering the medical costs of childbirth but denying funds for abortions. Neither Roe v. Wade nor any of the cases decided in its wake invalidates this legislative preference. We decided as much in Maher v. Roe, 432 U. S. 464 (1977), when we rejected the claims that refusing funds for non-therapeutic abortions while defraying the medical costs of childbirth, although not an outright prohibition, nevertheless infringed the fundamental right to choose to terminate a pregnancy by abortion and also violated the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment. I would not abandon Maher and extend Roe v. Wade to forbid the legislative policy expressed in the Hyde Amendment.

Nor can Maher be successfully distinguished on the ground that it involved only nontherapeutic abortions that the Government was free to place outside the ambit of its Medicaid program. That is not the ground on which Maher pro*329ceeded. Maher held that the government need not fund elective abortions because withholding funds rationally furthered the State’s legitimate interest in normal childbirth. We sustained this policy even though under Roe v. Wade, the government’s interest in fetal life is an 'inadequate justification for coercive interference with the pregnant woman’s right to choose an abortion, whether or not such a procedure is medically indicated. We have already held, therefore, that the interest balancing involved in Roe v. Wade is not controlling in resolving the present constitutional issue. Accordingly, I am satisfied that the straightforward analysis followed in Mr. Justice Stewart’s opinion for the Court is sound.

Mr. Justice Brennan,

with whom Mr. Justice Marshall and Mr. Justice Blackmun join, dissenting.*

I agree entirely with my Brother Stevens that the State’s interest in protecting the potential life of the fetus cannot justify the exclusion of financially and medically needy women from the benefits to which they would otherwise be entitled solely because the treatment that a doctor has concluded is medically necessary involves an abortion. See post, at 351-352. I write separately to express my continuing disagreement 1 with the Court’s mischaracterization of the nature of the fundamental right recognized in Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113 (1973), and its misconception of the manner in which that right is infringed by federal and state legislation withdrawing all funding for medically necessary abortions.

Roe v. Wade held that the constitutional right to personal privacy encompasses a woman’s decision whether or not to *330terminate her pregnancy. Roe and its progeny2 established that the pregnant woman has a right to be free from state interference with her choice to have an abortion — a right which, at least prior to the end of the first trimester, absolutely prohibits any governmental regulation of that highly personal decision.3 The proposition for which these cases stand thus is not that the State is under an affirmative obligation to ensure access to abortions for all who may desire them; it is that the State must refrain from wielding its enormous power and influence in a manner that might burden the pregnant woman’s freedom to choose whether to have an abortion. The Hyde Amendment’s denial of public funds for medically necessary abortions plainly intrudes upon this constitutionally protected decision, for both by design and in effect it serves to coerce indigent pregnant women to bear children that they would otherwise elect not to have.4

*331When viewed in the context of the Medicaid program to which it is appended, it is obvious that the Hyde Amendment is nothing less than an attempt by Congress to circumvent the dictates of the Constitution and achieve indirectly what Roe v. Wade said it could not do directly.5 Under Title XIX of the Social Security Act, the Federal Government reimburses participating States for virtually all medically necessary services it provides to the categorically needy. The sole limitation of any significance is the Hyde Amendment’s prohibition against the use of any federal funds to pay for the *332costs of abortions (except where the life of the mother would be endangered if the fetus were carried to term). As my Brother Stevens persuasively demonstrates, exclusion of medically necessary abortions from Medicaid coverage cannot be justified as a cost-saving device. Rather, the Hyde Amendment is a transparent attempt by the Legislative Branch to impose the political majority’s judgment of the morally acceptable and socially desirable preference on a sensitive and intimate decision that the Constitution entrusts to the individual. Worse yet, the Hyde Amendment does not foist that majoritarian viewpoint with equal measure upon everyone in our Nation, rich and poor alike; rather, it imposes that viewpoint only upon that segment of our society which, because of its position of political powerlessness, is least able to defend its privacy rights from the encroachments of state-mandated morality. The instant legislation thus calls for more exacting judicial review than in most other cases. “When elected leaders cower before public pressure, this Court, more than ever, must not shirk its duty to enforce the Constitution for the benefit of the poor and powerless.” Beal v. Doe, 432 U. S. 438, 462 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Though it may not be this Court’s mission “to decide whether the balance of competing interests reflected in the Hyde Amendment is wise social policy,” ante, at 326, it most assuredly is our responsibility to vindicate the pregnant woman’s constitutional right to decide whether to bear children free from governmental intrusion.

Moreover, it is clear that the Hyde Amendment not only was designed to inhibit, but does in fact inhibit the woman’s freedom to choose abortion over childbirth. “Pregnancy is unquestionably a condition requiring medical services. . , . Treatment for the condition may involve medical procedures for its termination, or medical procedures to bring the pregnancy to term, resulting in a live birth. ‘[A]bortion and childbirth, when stripped of the sensitive moral arguments surrounding the abortion controversy, are simply two alter*333native medical methods of dealing with pregnancy. . . .’” Beal v. Doe, supra, at 449 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Roe v. Norton, 408 F. Supp. 660, 663, n. 3 (Conn. 1975)). In every pregnancy, one of these two courses of treatment is medically necessary, and the poverty-stricken woman depends on the Medicaid Act to pay for the expenses associated with that procedure. But under the Hyde Amendment, the Government will fund only those procedures incidental to childbirth. By thus injecting coercive financial incentives favoring childbirth into a decision that is constitutionally guaranteed to be free from governmental intrusion, the Hyde Amendment deprives the indigent woman of her freedom to choose abortion over maternity, thereby impinging on the due process liberty right recognized in Roe v. Wade.

The Court’s contrary conclusion is premised on its belief that “[t]he financial constraints that restrict an indigent woman’s ability to enjoy the full range of constitutionally protected freedom of choice are the product not of governmental restrictions on access to abortions, but rather of her indigency.” Ante, at 316. Accurate as this statement may be, it reveals only half the picture. For w.hat the Court fails to appreciate is that it is not simply the woman’s indigency that interferes with her freedom of choice, but the combination of her own poverty and the Government’s unequal subsidization of abortion and childbirth.

A poor woman in the early stages of pregnancy confronts two alternatives: she may elect either to carry the fetus to term or to have an abortion. In the abstract, of course, this choice is hers alone, and the Court rightly observes that the Hyde Amendment “places no governmental obstacle in the path of a woman who chooses to terminate her pregnancy.” Ante, at 315. But the reality of the situation is that the Hyde Amendment has effectively removed this choice from the indigent woman’s hands. By funding all of the expenses associated with childbirth and none of the expenses incurred in terminating pregnancy, the Government literally makes an *334offer that the indigent woman cannot afford to refuse. It matters not that in this instance the Government has used the carrot rather than the stick. What is critical is the realization that as a practical matter, many poverty-stricken women will choose to carry their pregnancy to term simply because the Government provides funds for the associated medical services, even though these same women would have chosen to have an abortion if the Government had also paid for that option, or indeed if the Government had stayed out of the picture altogether and had defrayed the costs of neither procedure.

The fundamental flaw in the Court’s due process analysis, then, is its failure to acknowledge that the discriminatory distribution of the benefits of governmental largesse can discourage the exercise of fundamental liberties just as effectively as can an outright denial of those rights through criminal and regulatory sanctions. Implicit in the Court’s reasoning is the notion that as long as the Government is not obligated to provide its citizens with certain benefits or privileges, it may condition the grant of such benefits on the recipient’s relinquishment of his constitutional rights.

It would belabor the obvious to expound at any great length on the illegitimacy of a state policy that interferes with the exercise of fundamental rights through the selective bestowal of governmental favors. It suffices to note that we have heretofore never hesitated to invalidate any scheme of granting or withholding financial benefits that incidentally or intentionally burdens one manner of exercising a constitutionally protected choice. To take but one example of many, Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398 (1963), involved a South Carolina unemployment insurance statute that required recipients to accept suitable employment when offered, even if the grounds for refusal stemmed from religious convictions. Even though the recipients possessed no entitlement to compensation, the Court held that the State could not cancel the *335benefits of a Seventh-Day Adventist who had refused a job requiring her to work on Saturdays. The Court’s explanation is particularly instructive for the present case:

“Here not only is it apparent that appellant’s declared ineligibility for benefits derives solely from the practice of her religion, but the pressure upon her to forego that practice is unmistakable. The ruling forces her to choose between following the precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of her religion in order to accept work, on the other hand. Governmental imposition of such a choice puts the same kind of burden upon the free exercise of religion as would a fine imposed against appellant for her Saturday worship.

“Nor may the South Carolina court’s construction of the statute be saved from constitutional infirmity on the ground that unemployment compensation benefits are not appellant’s ‘right’ but merely a ‘privilege.’ It is too late in the day to doubt that the liberties of religion and expression may be infringed by the denial of or placing of conditions upon a benefit or privilege. . . . [T]o condition the availability of benefits upon this appellant’s willingness to violate a cardinal principle of her religious faith effectively penalizes the free exercise of her constitutional liberties.” Id., at 404-406.

See also Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm’n, 271 U. S. 583 (1926); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U. S. 513 (1958); Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U. S. 11 (1966); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254 (1970); U. S. Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U. S. 528 (1973); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U. S. 546 (1975). Cf. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 (1969); Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U. S. 250 (1974).

The Medicaid program cannot be distinguished from these other statutory schemes that unconstitutionally burdened *336fundamental rights.6 Here, as in Skerbert, the government withholds financial benefits in a manner that discourages the exercise of a due process liberty: The indigent woman who chooses to assert her constitutional right to have an abortion can do so only on pain of sacrificing health-care benefits to which she would otherwise be entitled. Over 50 years ago, Mr. Justice Sutherland, writing for the Court in Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm’n, supra, at 593-594, made the following observation, which is as true now as it was then:

“It would be a palpable incongruity to strike down an act of state legislation which, by words of express divestment, seeks to strip the citizen of rights guaranteed by the federal Constitution, but to uphold an act by *337which the same result is accomplished under the guise of a surrender of a right in exchange for a valuable privilege which the state threatens otherwise to withhold. It is not necessary to challenge the proposition that, as a general rule, the state, having power to deny a privilege altogether, may grant it upon such conditions as it sees fit to impose. But the power of the state in that respect is not unlimited; and one of the limitations is that it may not impose conditions which require the relinquishment of constitutional rights. If the state may Compel the surrender of one constitutional right as a condition of its favor, it may, in like manner, compel a surrender of all. It is inconceivable that guaranties embedded in the Constitution of the United States may thus be manipulated out of existence.”

I respectfully dissent.

Me. Justice Maeshall,

dissenting.*

Three years ago, in Maher v. Roe, 432 U. S. 464 (1977), the Court upheld a state program that excluded nonthera-peutic abortions from a welfare program that generally subsidized the medical expenses incidental to pregnancy and childbirth. At that time, I expressed my fear “that the Court’s decisions will be an- invitation to public officials, already under extraordinary pressure from well-financed and carefully orchestrated lobbying campaigns, to approve more such restrictions” on governmental funding for abortion. Id., at 462 (dissenting both in Maher v. Roe, supra, and in Beal v. Doe, 432 U. S. 438 (1977), and Poelker v. Doe, 432 U. S. 519 (1977)).

*338That fear has proved justified. Under the Hyde Amendment, federal funding is denied for abortions that are medically necessary and that are necessary to avert severe and permanent damage to the health of the mother. The Court’s opinion studiously avoids recognizing the undeniable fact that for women eligible for Medicaid — poor women — denial of a Medicaid-funded abortion is equivalent to denial of legal abortion altogether. By definition, these women do not have the money to pay for an abortion themselves. If abortion is medically necessary and a funded abortion is unavailable, they must resort to back-alley butchers, attempt to induce an abortion themselves by crude and dangerous methods, or suffer the serious medical consequences of attempting to carry the fetus to term. Because legal abortion is not a realistic option for such women, the predictable result of the Hyde Amendment will be a significant increase in the number of poor women who will die or suffer significant health damage because of an inability to procure necessary medical services.

The legislation before us is the product of an effort to deny to the poor the constitutional right recognized in Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113 (1973), even though the cost may be serious and long-lasting health damage. As my Brother Stevens has demonstrated, see post, p. 349 (dissenting opinion), the premise underlying the Hyde Amendment was repudiated in Roe v. Wade, where the Court made clear that the state interest in protecting fetal life cannot justify jeopardizing the life or health of the mother. The denial of Medicaid benefits to individuals who meet all the statutory criteria for eligibility, solely because the treatment that is medically necessary involves the exercise of the fundamental right to chose abortion, is a form of discrimination repugnant to the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Constitution. The Court’s decision today marks a retreat from Roe v. Wade and represents a cruel blow to the most powerless members of our society. I dissent.

*339I

In its present form, the Hyde Amendment restricts federal funding for abortion to cases in which “the life of the mother would be endangered if the fetus were carried to term” and “for such medical procedures necessary for the victims of rape or incest when such rape or incest has been reported promptly to a law enforcement agency or public health service.” See ante, at 302. Federal funding is thus unavailable even when severe and long-lasting health damage to the mother is a virtual certainty. Nor are federal funds available when severe health damage, or even death, will result to the fetus if it is carried to term.

The record developed below reveals that the standards set forth in the Hyde Amendment exclude the majority of cases in which the medical profession would recommend abortion as medically necessary. Indeed, in States that have adopted a standard more restrictive than the “medically necessary” test of the Medicaid Act, the number of funded abortions has decreased by over 98%. App. 289.

The impact of the Hyde Amendment on indigent women falls into four major categories. First, the Hyde Amendment prohibits federal funding for abortions that are necessary in order to protect the health and sometimes the life of the mother. Numerous conditions — such as cancer, rheumatic fever, diabetes, malnutrition, phlebitis, sickle cell anemia, and heart disease — substantially increase the risks associated with pregnancy or are themselves aggravated by pregnancy. Such conditions may make an abortion medically necessary in the judgment of a physician, but cannot be funded under the Hyde Amendment. Further, the health risks of undergoing an abortion increase dramatically as pregnancy becomes more advanced. By the time a pregnancy has progressed to the point where a physician is able to certify that it endangers the life of the mother, it is in many cases too late to prevent her death because abortion is no *340longer safe. There are also instances in which a woman’s life will not be immediately threatened by carrying the pregnancy to term, but aggravation of another medical condition will significantly shorten her life expectancy. These cases as well are not fundable under the Hyde Amendment.

Second, federal funding is denied in cases in which severe mental disturbances will be created by unwanted pregnancies. The result of such psychological disturbances may be suicide, attempts at self-abortion, or child abuse. The Hyde Amendment makes no provision for funding in such cases.

Third, the Hyde Amendment denies funding for the majority of women whose pregnancies have been caused by rape or incest. The prerequisite of a report within 60 days serves to exclude those who are afraid of recounting what has happened or are in fear of unsympathetic treatment by the authorities. Such a requirement is, of course, especially burdensome for the indigent, who may be least likely to be aware that a rapid report to the 'authorities is indispensable in order for them to be able to obtain an abortion.

Finally, federal funding is unavailable in cases in which it is known that the fetus itself will be unable to survive. In a number of situations it is possible to determine in advance that.the fetus will suffer an early death if carried to term. The Hyde Amendment, purportedly designed to safeguard “the legitimate governmental objective of protecting potential life,” ante, at 325, excludes federal funding in such cases.

An optimistic estimate indicates that as many as 100 excess deaths may occur each year as a result of the Hyde Amendment.1 The record contains no estimate of the health damage that may occur to poor women, but it shows that it will be considerable.2

*341II

The Court resolves the equal protection issue in this case through a relentlessly formalistic catechism. Adhering to its “two-tiered” approach to equal protection, the Court first decides that so-called strict scrutiny is not required because the Hyde Amendment does not violate the Due Process Clause and is not predicated on a constitutionally suspect classification. Therefore, “the validity of classification must be sustained unless ‘the classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of [any legitimate governmental] objective.’” Ante, at 322 (bracketed material in original), quoting McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 425 (1961). Observing that previous cases have recognized “the legitimate governmental objective of protecting potential life,” ante, at 325, the Court concludes that the Hyde Amendment “estab-lishe[s] incentives that make childbirth a more attractive alternative than abortion for persons eligible for Medicaid,” ibid., and is therefore rationally related to that governmental interest.

I continue to believe that the rigid “two-tiered” approach is inappropriate and that the Constitution requires a more exacting standard of review than mere rationality in cases such as this one. Further, in my judgment the Hyde Amendment cannot pass constitutional muster even under the rational-basis standard of review.

A

This case is perhaps the most dramatic illustration to date of the deficiencies in the Court’s obsolete “two-tiered” approach to the Equal Protection Clause. See San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1, 98-110 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U. S. 307, 318-321 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Maher v. Roe, 432 U. S., at 457-458 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Vance v. Bradley, 440 U. S. 93, *342113-115 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting).3 With all deference, I am unable to understand how the Court can afford the same level of scrutiny to the legislation involved here — whose cruel impact falls exclusively on indigent pregnant women— that it has given to legislation distinguishing opticians from opthalmologists, or to other legislation that makes distinctions between economic interests more than able to protect themselves in the political process. See ante, at 326, citing Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U. S. 483 (1955). Heightened scrutiny of legislative classifications has always been designed to protect groups "saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process.” San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, supra, at 28.4 And while it is now clear that traditional "strict scrutiny” is unavailable to protect the poor against classifications that disfavor them, Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471 (1970), I do not believe that legislation that imposes a crushing burden on indigent women can be treated with the same deference given to legislation distinguishing among business interests.

*343B

The Hyde Amendment, of course, distinguishes between medically necessary abortions and other medically necessary expenses.5 As I explained in Maher v. Roe, supra, such classifications must be assessed by weighing “ 'the importance of the governmental benefits denied, the character of the class, and the asserted state interests,’ ” id., at 458, quoting Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, supra, at 322. Under that approach, the Hyde Amendment is clearly invalid.6

As in Maher, the governmental benefits at issue here are “of absolutely vital importance in the lives of the recipients.” Maher v. Roe, supra, at 458 (Marshall, J., dissenting). An indigent woman denied governmental funding for a medically necessary abortion is confronted with two grotesque choices. First, she may seek to obtain “an illegal abortion that poses a serious threat to her health and even her life.” 432 U. S., at 458. Alternatively, she may attempt to bear the child, a course that may both significantly threaten her health and eliminate any chance she might have had “to control the direction of her own life,” id., at 459.

The class burdened by the Hyde Amendment consists of indigent women, a substantial proportion of whom are members of minority races. As I observed in Maher, non white women obtain abortions at nearly double the rate of whites, ibid. In my view, the fact that the burden of the Hyde Amendment falls exclusively on financially destitute women *344suggests “a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.” United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U. S. 144, 153, n. 4 (1938). For this reason, I continue to believe that “a showing that state action has a devastating impact on the lives of minority racial groups must be relevant” for purposes of equal protection analysis. Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U. S. 535, 575-576 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting).

As I explained in Maher, the asserted state interest in protecting potential life is insufficient to “outweigh the deprivation or serious discouragement of a vital constitutional right of especial importance to poor and minority women.” 432 U. S., at 461. In Maher, the Court found a permissible state interest in encouraging normal childbirth. Id., at 477-479. The governmental interest in the present ease is substantially weaker than in Maher, for under the Hyde Amendment funding is refused even in cases in which normal childbirth will not result: one can scarcely speak of “normal childbirth” in cases where the fetus will die shortly after birth, or in which the mother's life will be shortened or her health otherwise gravely impaired by the birth. Nevertheless, the Hyde Amendment denies funding even in such cases. In these circumstances, I am unable to see how even a minimally rational legislature could conclude that the interest in fetal life outweighs the brutal effect of the Hyde Amendment on indigent women. Moreover, both the legislation in Maher and the Hyde Amendment were designed to deprive poor and minority women of the constitutional right to choose abortion. That purpose is not constitutionally permitted under Roe v. Wade.

C

Although I would abandon the strict-scrutiny/rational-basis dichotomy in equal protection analysis, it is by no *345means necessary to reject that traditional approach to conclude, as I do, that the Hyde Amendment is a denial of equal protection. My Brother Brennan has demonstrated that the Amendment is unconstitutional because it impermissibly infringes upon the individual’s constitútional right to decide whether to terminate a pregnancy. See ante, at 332-334 (dissenting opinion). And as my Brother Stevens demonstrates, see post, at 350-352 (dissenting opinion), the Government’s interest in protecting fetal life is not a legitimate one when it is in conflict with “the preservation of the life or health of the mother,” Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S., at 165, and when the Government’s effort to make serious health damage to the mother “a more attractive alternative than abortion,” ante, at 325, does not rationally promote the governmental interest in encouraging normal childbirth.

The Court treats this case as though it were controlled by Maher. To the contrary, this case is the mirror image of Maher. The result in Maher turned on the fact that the legislation there under consideration discouraged only non-therapeutic, or medically unnecessary, abortions. In the Court’s view, denial of Medicaid funding for nontherapeutic abortions was not a denial of equal protection because Medicaid funds were available only for medically necessary procedures. Thus the plaintiffs were seeking benefits which were not available to others similarly situated. I continue to believe that Maher was wrongly decided. But it is apparent that while the plaintiffs in Maher were seeking a benefit not available to others similarly situated, appellees are protesting their exclusion from a. benefit that is available to all others similarly situated. This, it need hardly be said, is a crucial difference for equal protection purposes.

Under Title XIX and the Hyde Amendment, funding is available for essentially all necessary medical treatment for the poor. Appellees have met the statutory requirements for eligibility, but they are excluded because the treatment that is medically necessary involves the exercise of a funda*346mental right, the right to choose an abortion. In short, these appellees have been deprived of a governmental benefit for which they are otherwise eligible, solely because they have attempted to exercise a constitutional right. The interest asserted by the Government, the protection of fetal life, has been declared constitutionally subordinate to appellees’ interest in preserving their lives and health by obtaining medically necessary treatment. Roe v. Wade, supra. And finally, the purpose of the legislation was to discourage the exercise of the fundamental right. In such circumstances the Hyde Amendment must be invalidated because it does not meet even the rational-basis standard of review.

Ill

The consequences of today’s opinion — consequences to which the Court seems oblivious — are not difficult to predict. Pregnant women denied the funding necessary to procure abortions will be restricted to two alternatives. First, they can carry the fetus to term — even though that route may result in severe injury or death to the mother, the fetus, or both. If that course appears intolerable, they can resort to self-induced abortions or attempt to obtain illegal abortions— not because bearing a child would be inconvenient, but because it is necessary in order to protect their health.7 The result will not be to protect what the Court describes as “the legitimate governmental objective of protecting potential life,” ante, at 325, but to ensure the destruction of both fetal and maternal life. “There is another world ‘out there,’ the existence of which the Court . . . either chooses to ignore or fears *347to recognize.” Beal v. Doe, 432 U. S., at 463 (Blackmtjn, J., dissenting). In my view, it is only by blinding itself to that other world that the Court can reach the result it announces today.

Ultimately, the result reached today may be traced to the Court’s unwillingness to apply the constraints of the Constitution to decisions involving the expenditure of governmental funds. In today’s decision, as in Maher v. Roe, the Court suggests that a withholding of funding imposes no real obstacle to a woman deciding whether to exercise her constitutionally protected procreative choice, even though the Government is prepared to fund all other medically necessary expenses, including the expenses of childbirth. The Court perceives this result as simply a distinction between a “limitation on governmental power” and “an affirmative funding obligation.” Ante, at 318. For a poor person attempting to exercise her “right” to freedom of choice, the difference is imperceptible. As my Brother Brennan has shown, see ante, at 332-334 (dissenting opinion), the differential distribution of incentives — which the Court concedes is present here, see ante, at 325 — can have precisely the same effect as an outright prohibition. It is no more sufficient an answer here than it was in Roe v. Wade to say that “ 'the appropriate forum’ ” for the resolution of sensitive policy choices is the legislature. See ante, at 326, quoting Maher v. Roe, at 479.

More than 35 years ago, Mr. Justice Jackson observed that the “task of translating the majestic generalities of the Bill of Rights . . . into concrete restraints on officials dealing with the problems of the twentieth century, is one to disturb self-confidence.” West Virginia State Bd. of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 639 (1943). These constitutional principles, he observed for the Court, “grew in soil which also produced a philosophy that the individual [’s] . . . liberty was attainable through mere absence of governmental restraints.” Ibid. Those principles must be “transplant [ed] ... to a soil in which the laissez-faire concept or principle of non*348interference has withered at least as to economic affairs, and social advancements are increasingly sought through closer integration of society and through expanded and strengthened governmental controls.” Id., at 640.

In this case, the Federal Government has taken upon itself the burden of financing practically all medically necessary expenditures. One category of medically necessary expenditure has been singled out for exclusion, and the sole basis for the exclusion is a premise repudiated for purposes of constitutional law in Roe v. Wade. The consequence is a devastating impact on the lives and health of poor women. I do not believe that a Constitution committed to the equal protection of the laws can tolerate this result. I dissent.

Mr. Justice Blackmun,

dissenting.*

I join the dissent of Mr. Justice Brennan and agree wholeheartedly with his and Mr. Justice Stevens' respective observations and descriptions of what the Court is doing in this latest round of “abortion cases.” I need add only that I find what I said in dissent in Beal v. Doe, 432 U. S. 438, 462 (1977), and its two companion cases, Maher v. Roe, 432 U. S. 464 (1977), and Poelker v. Doe, 432 U. S. 519 (1977), continues for me to be equally pertinent and equally applicable in these Hyde Amendment cases. There is “condescension” in the Court’s holding that “she may go elsewhere for her abortion”; this is “disingenuous and alarming”; the Government “punitively impresses upon a needy minority its own concepts of the socially desirable, the publicly acceptable, and the morally sound”; the “financial argument, of course, is specious”; there truly is “another world ‘out there,’ the existence of which the Court, I suspect, either chooses to ignore *349or fears to recognize”; the “cancer of poverty will continue to grow”; and “the lot of the poorest among us,” once again, and still, is not to be bettered.

Mr. Justice Stevens,

dissenting.*

“The federal sovereign, like the States, must govern impartially. The concept of equal justice under law is served by the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of due process, as well as by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U. S. 88, 100. When the sovereign provides a special benefit or a special protection for a class of persons, it must define the membership in the class by neutral criteria; it may not make special exceptions for reasons that are constitutionally insufficient.

These cases involve the pool of benefits that Congress created by enacting Title XIX of the Social Security Act in 1965. Individuals who satisfy two neutral statutory criteria — financial need and medical need — are entitled to equal access to that pool. The question is whether certain persons who satisfy those criteria may be denied access to benefits solely because they must exercise the constitutional right to have an abortion in order to obtain the medical care they need. Our prior cases plainly dictate the answer to that question.

A fundamentally different question was decided in Maher v. Roe, 432 U. S. 464. Unlike these plaintiffs, the plaintiffs in Maher did not satisfy the neutral criterion of medical need; they sought a subsidy for nontherapeutic abortions— medical procedures which by definition they did not need. In rejecting that claim, the Court held that their constitutional right to choose that procedure did not impose a duty on *350the State to subsidize the exercise of that right. Nor did the fact that the State had undertaken to pay for the necessary medical care associated with childbirth require the State also to pay for abortions that were not necessary; for only necessary medical procedures satisfied the neutral statutory criteria. Nontherapeutic abortions were simply outside the ambit of the medical benefits program. Thus, in Maher, the plaintiffs’ desire to exercise a constitutional right gave rise to neither special access nor special exclusion from the pool of benefits created by Title XIX.

These cases involve a special exclusion of women who, by definition, are confronted with a choice between two serious harms: serious health damage to themselves on the one hand and abortion on the other. The competing interests are the interest in maternal health and the interest in protecting potential human life. It is now part of our law that the pregnant woman’s decision as to which of these conflicting interests shall prevail is entitled to constitutional protection.1

In Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113, and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U. S. 179, the Court recognized that the States have a legitimate and protectible interest in potential human life. 410 U. S., at 162. But the Court explicitly held that prior to fetal viability that interest may not justify any governmental burden on the woman’s choice to have an abortion2 nor even any *351regulation of abortion except in furtherance of the State’s interest in the woman’s health. In effect, the Court held that a woman’s freedom to elect to have an abortion prior to viability has absolute constitutional protection, subject only to valid health regulations. Indeed, in Roe v. Wade the Court held that even after fetal viability, a State may “regulate, and even proscribe, abortion except where it is necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the mother.” Id., at 165 (emphasis added). We have a duty to respect that holding. The Court simply shirks that duty in this case.

If a woman has a constitutional right to place a higher value on avoiding either, serious harm to her own health or perhaps an abnormal childbirth3 than on protecting potential life, the exercise of that right cannot provide the basis for the denial of a benefit to which she would otherwise be entitled. The Court’s sterile equal protection analysis evades this critical though simple point. The Court focuses exclusively on the “legitimate interest in protecting the potential life of the fetus.” Ante, at 324. It concludes that since the Hyde Amendments further that interest, the exclusion they create is rational and therefore constitutional. But it is mis*352leading to speak of the Government’s legitimate interest in the fetus without reference to the context in which that interest was held to be legitimate. For Roe v. Wade squarely-held that the States may not protect that interest when a conflict with the interest in a pregnant woman’s health exists. It is thus perfectly clear that neither the Federal Government nor the States may exclude a woman from medical benefits to which she would otherwise be entitled solely to further an interest in potential life when a physician, “in appropriate medical judgment,” certifies that an abortion is necessary “for the preservation of the life or health of the mother.” Roe v. Wade, supra, at 165. The Court totally fails to explain why this reasoning is not dispositive here.4

*353It cannot be denied that the harm inflicted upon women in the excluded class is grievous.5 As the Court’s comparison of the differing forms of the Hyde Amendment that have *354been enacted since 1976 demonstrates, the Court expressly approves the exclusion of benefits in “instances where severe and long-lasting physical health damage to the mother” is the predictable consequence of carrying the pregnancy to term. Indeed, as the Solicitor General acknowledged with commendable candor, the logic of the Court’s position would justify a holding that it would be constitutional to deny funding to a medically and financially needy person even if abortion were the only lifesaving medical procedure available.6 Because a denial of benefits for medically necessary abortions inevitably causes serious harm to the excluded women, it is tantamount to severe punishment.7 In my judgment, that denial cannot be justified unless government may, in effect, punish women who want abortions. But as the Court unequivocally held in Roe v. Wade, this the government may not do.

*355Nor can it be argued that the exclusion of this type of medically necessary treatment of the indigent can be justified on fiscal grounds. There are some especially costly forms of treatment that may reasonably be excluded from the program in order to preserve the assets in the pool and extend its benefits to the maximum number of needy persons. Fiscal considerations may compel certain difficult choices in order to improve the protection afforded to the entire benefited class.8 But, ironically, the exclusion of medically necessary abortions harms the entire class as well as its specific victims. For the records in both McRae and Zbaraz demonstrate that the cost of an abortion is only a small fraction of the costs associated with childbirth.9 Thus, the decision to tolerate harm to indi*356gent persons who need an abortion in order to avoid “serious and long-lasting health damage” is one that is financed by-draining money out of the pool that is used to fund all other necessary medical procedures. Unlike most invidious classifications, this discrimination harms not only its direct victims but also the remainder of the class of needy persons that the pool was designed to benefit.

In Maher the Court stated:

“The Constitution imposes no obligation on the States to pay the pregnancy-related medical expenses of indigent women, or indeed to pay any of the medical expenses of indigents. But when a State decides to alleviate some of the hardships of poverty by providing medical care, the manner in which it dispenses benefits is subject to constitutional limitations.” 432 U. S., at 469-470 (footnote omitted).

Having decided to alleviate some of the hardships of poverty by providing necessary medical care, the government must use neutral criteria in distributing benefits. It may not deny benefits to a financially and medically needy person simply because he is a Republican, a Catholic, or an Oriental— or because he has spoken against a program the government has a legitimate interest in furthering. In sum, it may not create exceptions for the sole purpose of furthering a governmental interest that is constitutionally subordinate to the individual interest that the entire program was designed to protect. The Hyde Amendments not only exclude financially and medically needy persons from the pool of benefits for a constitutionally insufficient reason; they also require the expenditure of millions and millions of dollars in order to thwart the exercise of a constitutional right, thereby effectively inflicting serious and long-lasting harm on impoverished women who want and need abortions for valid medical reasons. In my judgment, these Amendments constitute an unjustifiable, *357and indeed blatant, violation of the sovereign’s duty to govern impartially.10

I respectfully dissent.

*843Justice O’Connor, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Sou-ter

announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II, III, V-A, *844V-C, and VI, an opinion with respect to Part V-E,

in which Justice Stevens joins, and an opinion with respect to Parts IV, V-B, and V-D.

I

Liberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt. Yet 19 years after our holding that the Constitution protects a woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy in its early stages, Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113 (1973), that definition of liberty is still questioned. Joining the respondents as amicus curiae, the United States, as it has done in five other cases in the last decade, again asks us to overrule Roe. See Brief for Respondents 104-117; Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 8.

At issue in these cases are five provisions of the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act of 1982, as amended in 1988 and 1989. 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§3203-3220 (1990). Relevant portions of the Act are set forth in the Appendix. Infra, at 902. The Act requires that a woman seeking an abortion give her informed consent prior to the abortion procedure, and specifies that she be provided with certain information at least 24 hours before the abortion is performed. § 3205. For a minor to obtain an abortion, the Act requires the informed consent of one of her parents, but provides for a judicial bypass option if the minor does not wish to or cannot obtain a parent’s consent. § 3206. Another provision of the Act requires that, unless certain exceptions apply, a married woman seeking an abortion must sign a statement indicating that she has notified her husband of her intended abortion. §3209. The Act exempts compliance with these three requirements in the event of a “medical emergency,” which is defined in §3203 of the Act. See §§3203, 3205(a), 3206(a), 3209(c). In addition to the above provisions regulating the performance of abortions, the Act imposes certain reporting requirements on facilities that provide abortion services. §§ 3207(b), 3214(a), 3214(f).

*845Before any of these provisions took effect, the petitioners, who are five abortion clinics and one physician representing himself as well as a class of physicians who provide abortion services, brought this suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. Each provision was challenged as unconstitutional on its face. The District Court entered a preliminary injunction against the enforcement of the regulations, and, after a 3-day bench trial, held all the provisions at issue here unconstitutional, entering a permanent injunction against Pennsylvania’s enforcement of them. 744 F. Supp. 1323 (ED Pa. 1990). The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part, upholding all of the regulations except for the husband notification requirement. 947 F. 2d 682 (1991). We granted certiorari. 502 U. S. 1056 (1992).

The Court of Appeals found it necessary to follow an elaborate course of reasoning even to identify the first premise to use to determine whether the statute enacted by Pennsylvania meets constitutional standards. See 947 F. 2d, at 687-698. And at oral argument in this Court, the attorney for the parties challenging the statute took the position that none of the enactments can be upheld without overruling Roe v. Wade. Tr. of Oral Arg. 5-6. We disagree with that analysis; but we acknowledge that our decisions after Roe cast doubt upon the meaning and reach of its holding. Further, The Chief Justice admits that he would overrule the central holding of Roe and adopt the rational relationship test as the sole criterion of constitutionality. See post, at 944, 966. State and federal courts as well as legislatures throughout the Union must have guidance as they seek to address this subject in conformance with the Constitution. Given these premises, we find it imperative to review once more the principles that define the rights of the woman and the legitimate authority of the State respecting the termination of pregnancies by abortion procedures.

After considering the fundamental constitutional questions resolved by Roe, principles of institutional integrity, *846and the rule of stare decisis, we are led to conclude this: the essential holding of Roe v. Wade should be retained and once again reaffirmed.

It must be stated at the outset and with clarity that Roe’s essential holding, the holding we reaffirm, has three parts. First is a recognition of the right of the woman to choose to have an abortion before viability and to obtain it without undue interference from the State. Before viability, the State’s interests are not strong enough to support a prohibition of abortion or the imposition of a substantial obstacle to the woman’s effective right to elect the procedure. Second is a confirmation of the State’s power to restrict abortions after fetal viability, if the law contains exceptions for pregnancies which endanger the woman’s life or health. And third is the principle that the State has legitimate interests from the outset of the pregnancy in protecting the health of the woman and the life of the fetus that may become a child. These principles do not contradict one another; and we adhere to each.

II

Constitutional protection of the woman’s decision to terminate her pregnancy derives from the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. It declares that no State shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” The controlling word in the cases before us is “liberty.” Although a literal reading of the Clause might suggest that it governs only the procedures by which a State may deprive persons of liberty, for at least 105 years, since Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623, 660-661 (1887), the Clause has been understood to contain a substantive component as well, one “barring certain government actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them.” Daniels v. Williams, 474 U. S. 327, 331 (1986). As Justice Brandéis (joined by Justice Holmes) observed, “[djespite arguments to the contrary which had seemed to me persuasive, it is settled that the due process clause of the Fourteenth *847Amendment applies to matters of substantive law as well as to matters of procedure. Thus all fundamental rights comprised within the term liberty are protected by the Federal Constitution from invasion by the States.” Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357, 373 (1927) (concurring opinion). “[TJhe guaranties of due process, though having their roots in Magna Carta’s ‘per legem ter rae’ and considered as procedural safeguards ‘against executive usurpation and tyranny/ have in this country ‘become bulwarks also against arbitrary legislation.’ ” Poe v. Ullman, 367 U. S. 497, 541 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting from dismissal on jurisdictional grounds) (quoting Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516, 532 (1884)).

The most familiar of the substantive liberties protected by the Fourteenth Amendment are those recognized by the Bill of Rights. We have held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates most of the Bill of Rights against the States. See, e. g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145, 147-148 (1968). It is tempting, as a means of curbing the discretion of federal judges, to suppose that liberty encompasses no more than those rights already guaranteed to the individual against federal interference by the express provisions of the first eight Amendments to the Constitution. See Adamson v. California, 332 U. S. 46, 68-92 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting). But of course this Court has never accepted that view.

It is also tempting, for the same reason, to suppose that the Due Process Clause protects only those practices, defined at the most specific level, that were protected against government interference by other rules of law when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U. S. 110, 127-128, n. 6 (1989) (opinion of Scalia, J.). But such a view would be inconsistent with our law. It is a promise of the Constitution that there is a realm of personal liberty which the government may not enter. We have vindicated this principle before. Marriage is mentioned nowhere in the Bill of Rights and interracial marriage was file-*848gal in most States in the 19th century, but the Court was no doubt correct in finding it to be an aspect of liberty protected against state interference by the substantive component of the Due Process Clause in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S. 1, 12 (1967) (relying, in an opinion for eight Justices, on the Due Process Clause). Similar examples may be found in Turner v. Safley, 482 U. S. 78, 94-99 (1987); in Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U. S. 678, 684-686 (1977); in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479, 481-482 (1965), as well as in the separate opinions of a majority of the Members of the Court in that case, id., at 486-488 (Goldberg, J., joined by Warren, C. J., and Brennan, J., concurring) (expressly relying on due process), id., at 500-502 (Harlan, J., concurring in judgment) (same), id., at 502-507 (White, J., concurring in judgment) (same); in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510, 534-535 (1925); and in Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390, 399-403 (1923).

Neither the Bill of Rights nor the specific practices of States at the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment marks the outer limits of the substantive sphere of liberty which the Fourteenth Amendment protects. See U. S. Const., Arndt. 9. As the second Justice Harlan recognized:

“[T]he full scope of the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause cannot be found in or limited by the precise terms of the specific guarantees elsewhere provided in the Constitution. This ‘liberty’ is not a series of isolated points pricked out in terms of the taking of property; the freedom of speech, press, and religion; the right to keep and bear arms; the freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures; and so on. It is a rational continuum which, broadly speaking, includes a freedom from all substantial arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints, . . . and which also recognizes, what a reasonable and sensitive judgment must, that certain interests require particularly careful scrutiny of the state needs asserted to justify their abridgment.” Poe v. *849 UUman, supra, at 543 (opinion dissenting from dismissal on jurisdictional grounds).

Justice Harlan wrote these words in addressing an issue the full Court did not reach in Poe v. Ullman, but the Court adopted his position four Terms later in Griswold v. Connecticut, supra. In Griswold, we held that the Constitution does not permit a State to forbid a married couple to use contraceptives. That same freedom was later guaranteed, under the Equal Protection Clause, for unmarried couples. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U. S. 438 (1972). Constitutional protection was extended to the sale and distribution of contraceptives in Carey v. Population Services International, supra. It is settled now, as it was when the Court heard arguments in Roe v. Wade, that the Constitution places limits on a State’s right to interfere with a person’s most basic decisions about family and parenthood, see Carey v. Population Services International, supra; Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U. S. 494 (1977); Eisenstadt v. Baird, supra; Loving v. Virginia, supra; Griswold v. Connecticut, supra; Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U. S. 535 (1942); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, supra; Meyer v. Nebraska, supra, as well as bodily integrity, see, e. g., Washington v. Harper, 494 U. S. 210, 221-222 (1990); Winston v. Lee, 470 U. S. 753 (1985); Rochin v. California, 342 U. S. 165 (1952).

The inescapable fact is that adjudication of substantive due process claims may call upon the Court in interpreting the Constitution to exercise that same capacity which by tradition courts always have exercised: reasoned judgment. Its boundaries are not susceptible of expression as a simple rule. That does not mean we are free to invalidate state policy choices with which we disagree; yet neither does it permit us to shrink from the duties of our office. As Justice Harlan observed:

“Due process has not been reduced to any formula; its content cannot be determined by reference to any code. *850The best that can be said is that through the course of this Court’s decisions it has represented the balance which our Nation, built upon postulates of respect for the liberty of the individual, has struck between that liberty and the demands of organized society. If the supplying of content to this Constitutional concept has of necessity been a rational process, it certainly has not been one where judges have felt free to roam where unguided speculation might take them. The balance of which I speak is the balance struck by this country, having regard to what history teaches are the traditions from which it developed as well as the traditions from which it broke. That tradition is a living thing. A decision of this Court which radically departs from it eould not long survive, while a decision which builds on what has survived is likely to be sound. No formula could serve as a substitute, in this area, for judgment and restraint.” Poe v. Ullman, 367 U. S., at 542 (opinion dissenting from dismissal on jurisdictional grounds).

See also Rochin v. California, supra, at 171-172 (Frankfurter, J., writing for the Court) (“To believe that this judicial exercise of judgment could be avoided by freezing ‘due process of law’ at some fixed stage of time or thought is to suggest that the most important aspect of constitutional adjudication is a function for inanimate machines and not for judges”).

Men and women of good conscience can disagree, and we suppose some always shall disagree, about the profound moral and spiritual implications of terminating a pregnancy, even in its earliest stage. Some of us as individuals find abortion offensive to our most basic principles of morality, but that cannot control our decision. Our obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate our own moral code. The underlying constitutional issue is whether the State can resolve these philosophic questions in such a definitive way that a woman lacks all choice in the matter, except perhaps *851in those rare circumstances in which the pregnancy is itself a danger to her own life or health, or is the result of rape or incest.

It is conventional constitutional doctrine that where reasonable people disagree the government can adopt one position or the other. See, e. g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U. S. 726 (1963); Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U. S. 483 (1955). That theorem, however, assumes a state of affairs in which the choice does not intrude upon a protected liberty. Thus, while some people might disagree about whether or not the flag should be saluted, or disagree about the proposition that it may not be defiled, we have ruled that a State may not compel or enforce one view or the other. See West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624 (1943); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U. S. 397 (1989).

Our law affords constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education. Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U. S., at 685. Our cases recognize “the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.” Eisenstadt v. Baird, supra, at 453 (emphasis in original). Our precedents “have respected the private realm of family life which the state cannot enter.” Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158, 166 (1944). These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State.

*852These considerations begin our analysis of the woman’s interest in terminating her pregnancy but cannot end it, for this reason: though the abortion decision may originate within the zone of conscience and belief, it is more than a philosophic exercise. Abortion is a unique act. It is an act fraught with consequences for others: for the woman who must live with the implications of her decision; for the persons who perform and assist in the procedure; for the spouse, family, and society which must confront the knowledge that these procedures exist, procedures some deem nothing short of an act of violence against innocent human life; and, depending on one’s beliefs, for the life or potential life that is aborted. Though abortion is conduct, it does not follow that the State is entitled to proscribe it in all instances. That is because the liberty of the woman is at stake in a sense unique to the human condition and so unique to the law. The mother who carries a child to full term is subject to anxieties, to physical constraints, to pain that only she must bear. That these sacrifices have from the beginning of the human race been endured by woman with a pride that ennobles her in the eyes of others and gives to the infant a bond of love cannot alone be grounds for the State to insist she make the sacrifice. Her suffering is too intimate and personal for the State to insist, without more, upon its own vision of the woman’s role, however dominant that vision -has been in the course of our history and our culture. The destiny of the woman must be shaped to a large extent on her own conception of her spiritual imperatives and her place in society.

It should be recognized, moreover, that in some critical respects the abortion decision is of the same character as the decision to use contraception, to which Griswold v. Connecticut, Eisenstadt v. Baird, and Carey v. Population Services International afford constitutional protection. We have no doubt as to the correctness of those decisions. They support *853the reasoning in Roe relating to the woman’s liberty because they involve personal decisions concerning not only the meaning of procreation but also human responsibility and respect for it. As with abortion, reasonable people will have differences of opinion about these matters. One view is based on such reverence for the wonder of creation that any pregnancy ought to be welcomed and carried to full term no matter how difficult it will be to provide for the child and ensure its well-being. Another is that the inability to provide for the nurture and care of the infant is a cruelty to the child and an anguish to thé parent. These are intimate views with infinite variations, and their deep, personal character underlay our decisions in Griswold, Eisenstadt, and Carey. The same concerns are present when the woman confronts the reality that, perhaps despite her attempts to avoid it, she has become pregnant.

It was this dimension of personal liberty that Roe sought to protect, and its holding invoked the reasoning and the tradition of the precedents we have discussed, granting protection to substantive liberties of the person. Roe was, of course, an extension of those cases and, as the decision itself indicated, the separate States could act in some degree to further their own legitimate interests in protecting prenatal life. The extent to which the legislatures of the States might aet to outweigh the interests of the woman in choosing to terminate her pregnancy was a subject of debate both in Roe itself and in decisions following it.

While we appreciate the weight of the arguments made on behalf of the State in the cases before us, arguments which in their ultimate formulation conclude that Roe should be overruled, the reservations any of us may have in reaffirming the central holding of Roe are outweighed by the explication of individual liberty we have given combined with the force of stare decisis. We turn now to that doctrine.

*854hH I — I

A

The obligation to follow precedent begins with necessity, and a contrary necessity marks its outer limit. With Cardozo, we recognize that no judicial system could do society's work if it eyed each issue afresh in every case that raised it. See B. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 149 (1921). Indeed, the very concept of the rule of law underlying our own Constitution requires such continuity over time that a respect for precedent is, by definition, indispensable. See Powell, Stare Decisis and Judicial Restraint, 1991 Journal of Supreme Court History 13,16. At the other extreme, a different necessity would make itself felt if a prior judicial ruling should come to be seen so clearly as error that its enforcement was for that very reason doomed.

Even when the decision to overrule a prior case is not, as in the rare, latter instance, virtually foreordained, it is common wisdom that the rule of stare decisis is not an “inexorable command,” and certainly it is not such in every constitutional case, see Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U. S. 393, 405-411 (1932) (Brandéis, J., dissenting). See also Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U. S. 808, 842 (1991) (Souter, J., joined by Kennedy, J., concurring); Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U. S. 203, 212 (1984). Rather, when this Court reexamines a prior holding, its judgment is customarily informed by a series of prudential and pragmatic considerations designed to test the consistency of overruling a prior decision with the ideal of the rule of law, and to gauge the respective costs of reaffirming and overruling a prior case. Thus, for example, we may ask whether the rule has proven to be intolerable simply in defying practical workability, Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U. S. 111, 116 (1965); whether the rule is subject to a kind of reliance that would lend a special hardship to the consequences of overruling and add inequity to the cost of repudiation, e. g., United States v. Title Ins. & Trust *855Co., 265 U. S. 472, 486 (1924); whether related principles of law have so far developed as to have left the old rule no more than a remnant of abandoned doctrine, see Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U. S. 164, 173-174 (1989); or whether facts have so changed, or come to be seen so differently, as to have robbed the old rule of significant application or justification, e.g., Burnet, supra, at 412 (Brandéis, J., dissenting).

So in this case we may enquire whether Roe’s central rule has been found unworkable; whether the rule’s limitation on state power could be removed without serious inequity to those who have relied upon it or significant damage to the stability of the society governed by it; whether the law’s growth in the intervening years has left Roe’s central rule a doctrinal anachronism discounted by society; and whether Roe’s premises of fact have so far changed in the ensuing two decades as to render its central holding somehow irrelevant or unjustifiable in dealing with the issue it addressed.

1

Although Roe has engendered opposition, it has in no sense proven “unworkable,” see Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U. S. 528, 546 (1985), representing as it does a simple limitation beyond which a state law is unenforceable. While Roe has, of course, required judicial assessment of state laws affecting the exercise of the choice guaranteed against government infringement, and although the need for such review will remain as a consequence of today’s decision, the required determinations fall within judicial competence.

2

The inquiry into reliance counts the cost of a rule’s repudiation as it would fall on those who have relied reasonably on the rule’s continued application. Since the classic case for weighing reliance heavily in favor of following the earlier rule occurs in the commercial context, see Payne v. Tennes *856 see, supra,, at 828, where advance planning of great precision is most obviously a necessity, it is no cause for surprise that some would find no reliance worthy of consideration in support of Roe.

While neither respondents nor their amici in so many words deny that the abortion right invites some reliance prior to its actual exercise, one can readily imagine an argument stressing the dissimilarity of this case to one involving property or contract. Abortion is customarily chosen as an unplanned response to the consequence of unplanned activity or to the failure of conventional birth control, and except on the assumption that no intercourse would have occurred but for Roe’s holding, such behavior may appear to justify no reliance claim. Even if reliance could be claimed on that unrealistic assumption, the argument might run, any reliance interest would be de minimis. This argument would be premised on the hypothesis that reproductive planning could take virtually immediate account of any sudden restoration of state authority to ban abortions.

To eliminate the issue of relianee that easily, however, one would need to limit cognizable reliance to specific instances of sexual activity. But to do this would be simply to refuse to face the fact that for two decades of economic and social developments, people have organized intimate relationships and made choices that define their views of themselves and their places in society, in relianee on the availability of abortion in the event that contraception should fail. The ability of women to participate equally in the economic and social life of the Nation has been facilitated by their ability to control their reproductive lives. See, e. g., R. Petehesky, Abortion and Woman’s Choice 109, 138, n. 7 (rev. ed. 1990). The Constitution serves human values, and while the effect of reliance on Roe cannot be exactly measured, neither can the certain cost of overruling Roe for people who have ordered their thinking and living around that case be dismissed.

*8573

No evolution of legal principle has left Roe’s doctrinal footings weaker than they were in 1973. No development of constitutional law since the ease was decided has implicitly or explicitly left Roe behind as a mere survivor of obsolete constitutional thinking.

It will be recognized, of course, that Roe stands at an intersection of two lines of decisions, but in whichever doctrinal category one reads the case, the result for present purposes will be the same. The Roe Court itself placed its holding in the succession of cases most prominently exemplified by Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479 (1965). See Roe, 410 U. S., at 152-153. When it is so seen, Roe is clearly in no jeopardy, since subsequent constitutional developments have neither disturbed, nor do they threaten to diminish, the scope of recognized protection accorded to the liberty relating to intimate relationships, the family, and decisions about whether or not to beget or bear a child. See, e. g., Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U. S. 678 (1977); Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U. S. 494 (1977).

Roe, however, may be seen not only as an exemplar of Griswold liberty but as a rule (whether or not mistaken) of personal autonomy and bodily integrity, with doctrinal affinity to cases recognizing limits on governmental power to mandate medical treatment or to bar its rejection. If so, our cases since Roe accord with Roe’s view that a State’s interest in the protection of life falls short of justifying any plenary override of individual liberty claims. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U. S. 261, 278 (1990); cf., e. g., Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U. S. 127, 135 (1992); Washington v. Harper, 494 U. S. 210 (1990); see also, e. g., Rochin v. California, 342 U. S. 165 (1952); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U. S. 11, 24-30 (1905).

Finally, one could classify Roe as sui generis. If the case is so viewed, then there clearly has been no erosion of its central determination. The original holding resting on the *858concurrence of seven Members of the Court in 1973 was expressly affirmed by a majority of six in 1983, see Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U. S. 416 (Akron I), and by a majority of five in 1986, see Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U. S. 747, expressing adherence to the constitutional ruling despite legislative efforts in some States to test its limits. More recently, in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U. S. 490 (1989), although two of the present authors questioned the trimester framework in a way consistent with our judgment today, see id., at 518 (Rehnquist, C. J., joined by White and Kennedy, JJ.); id., at 529 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment), a majority of the Court either decided to reaffirm or declined to address the constitutional validity of the central holding of Roe. See Webster, 492 U. S., at 521 (Rehnquist, C. J., joined by White and Kennedy, JJ.); id., at 525-526 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); id., at 537, 553 (Blackmun, J., joined by Brennan and Marshall, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id., at 561-563 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

Nor will courts building upon Roe be likely to hand down erroneous decisions as a consequence. Even on the assumption that the central holding of Roe was in error, that error would go only to the strength of the state interest in fetal protection, not to the recognition afforded by the Constitution to the woman’s liberty. The latter aspect of the decision fits comfortably within the framework of the Court’s prior decisions, including Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U. S. 535 (1942); Griswold, supra; Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S. 1 (1967); and Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U. S. 438 (1972), the holdings of which are “not a series of isolated points,” but mark a “rational continuum.” Poe v. Ullman, 367 U. S., at 543 (Harlan, J, dissenting). As we described in *859 Carey v. Population Services International, supra, the liberty which encompasses those decisions

“includes ‘the interest in independence in making certain kinds of important decisions/ While the outer limits of this aspect of [protected liberty] have not been marked by the Court, it is clear that among the decisions that an individual may make without unjustified government interference are personal decisions ‘relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child rearing and education/ ” 431 U. S., at 684-685 (citations omitted).

The soundness of this prong of the Roe analysis is apparent from a consideration of the alternative. If indeed the woman’s interest in deciding whether to bear and beget a child had not been recognized as in Roe, the State might as readily restrict a woman’s right to choose to carry a pregnancy to term as to terminate it, to further asserted state interests in population control, or eugenics, for example. Yet Roe has been sensibly relied upon to counter any such suggestions. E. g., Arnold v. Board of Education of Escambia County, Ala., 880 F. 2d 305, 311 (CA11 1989) (relying upon Roe and concluding that government officials violate the Constitution by coercing a minor to have an abortion); Avery v. County of Burke, 660 F. 2d 111, 115 (CA4 1981) (county agency inducing teenage girl to undergo unwanted sterilization on the basis of misrepresentation that she had sickle cell trait); see also In re Quinlan, 70 N. J. 10, 355 A. 2d 647 (relying on Roe in finding a right to terminate medical treatment), cert, denied sub nom. Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U. S. 922 (1976)). In any event, because Roe’s scope is confined by the fact of its concern with postconeeption potential life, a concern otherwise likely to be implicated only by some forms of contraception protected independently under Griswold and later cases, any error in Roe is unlikely to have serious ramifications in fixture cases.

*8604

We have seen how time has overtaken some of Roe’s factual assumptions: advances in maternal health care allow for abortions safe to the mother later in pregnancy than was true in 1973, see Akron I, supra, at 429, n. 11, and advances in neonatal care have advanced viability to a point somewhat earlier. Compare Roe, 410 U. S., at 160, with Webster, supra, at 515-616 (opinion of Rehnquist, C. J.); see Akron I, 462 U. S., at 457, and n. 5 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). But these facts go only to the scheme of time limits on the realization of competing interests, and the divergences from the factual premises of 1973 have no bearing on the validity of Roe’s central holding, that viability marks the earliest point at which the State’s interest in fetal life is constitutionally adequate to justify a legislative ban on nontherapeutic abortions. The soundness or unsoundness of that constitutional judgment in no sense turns on whether viability occurs at approximately 28 weeks, as was usual at the time of Roe, at 23 to 24 weeks, as it sometimes does today, or at some moment even slightly earlier in pregnancy, as it may if fetal respiratory capacity can somehow be enhanced in the future. Whenever it may occur, the attainment of viability may continue to serve as the critical fact, just as it has done since Roe was decided; which is to say that no change in Roe’s factual underpinning has left its central holding obsolete, and none supports an argument for overruling it.

5

The sum of the precedential enquiry to this point Shows Roe’s underpinnings unweakened in any way affecting its central holding. While it has engendered disapproval, it has not been unworkable. An entire generation has come of age free to assume Roe’s concept of liberty in defining the capacity of women to act in society, and to make reproductive decisions; no erosion of principle going to liberty or personal autonomy has left Roe’s central holding a doctrinal remnant; *861 Roe portends no developments at odds with other precedent for the analysis of personal liberty; and no changes of fact have rendered viability more or less appropriate as the point at which the balance of interests tips. Within the bounds of normal stare decisis analysis, then, and subject to the considerations on which it customarily turns, the stronger argument is for affirming Roe’s central holding, with whatever degree of personal reluctance any of us may have, not for overruling it.

B

In a less significant case, stare decisis analysis could, and would, stop at the point we have reached. But the sustained and widespread debate Roe has provoked calls for some comparison between that case and others of comparable dimension that have responded to national controversies and taken on the impress of the controversies addressed. Only two such decisional lines from the past century present themselves for examination, and in each instance the result reached by the Court accorded with the principles we apply today.

The first example is that line of cases identified with Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45 (1905), which imposed substantive limitations on legislation limiting economic autonomy in favor of health and welfare regulation, adopting, in Justice Holmes’s view, the theory of laissez-faire. Id., at 75 (dissenting opinion). The Lochner decisions were exemplified by Adkins v. Children’s Hospital of District of Columbia, 261 U. S. 525 (1923), in which this Court held it to be an infringement of constitutionally protected liberty of contract to require the employers of adult women to satisfy minimum wage standards. Fourteen years later, West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U. S. 379 (1937), signaled the demise of Lochner by overruling Adkins. In the meantime, the Depression had come and, with it, the lesson that seemed unmistakable to most people by 1937, that the interpretation of contractual freedom protected in Adkins rested on funda*862mentally false factual assumptions about the capacity of a relatively unregulated market to satisfy minimal levels of human welfare. See West Coast Hotel Co., supra, at 399. As Justice Jackson wrote of the constitutional crisis of 1937 shortly before he came on the bench: “The older world of laissez faire was recognized everywhere outside the Court to be dead.” The Struggle for Judicial Supremacy 85 (1941). The facts upon which the earlier case had premised a constitutional resolution of social controversy had proven to be untrue, and history’s demonstration of their untruth not only justified but required the new choice of constitutional principle that West Coast Hotel announced. Of course, it was true that the Court lost something by its misperception, or its lack of prescience, and the Court-packing crisis only magnified the loss; but the clear demonstration that the facts of economic life were different from those previously assumed warranted the repudiation of the old law.

The second comparison that 20th century history invites is with the cases employing the separate-but-equal rule for applying the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection guarantee. They began with Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537 (1896), holding that legislatively mandated racial segregation in public transportation works no denial of equal protection, rejecting the argument that racial separation enforced by the legal machinery of American society treats the black race as inferior. The Plessy Court considered “the underlying fallacy of the plaintiff’s argument to consist in the assumption that the enforced separation of the two races stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority. If this be so, it is not by reason of anything found in the act, but solely because the colored race chooses to put that construction upon it.” Id., at 551. Whether, as a matter of historical fact, the Justices in the Plessy majority believed this or not, see id., at 557, 562 (Harlan, J., dissenting), this understanding of the implication of segregation was the stated justification for the Court’s opinion. But this understanding of *863the facts and the rule it was stated to justify were repudiated in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483 (1954) (Brown I). As one commentator observed, the question before the Court in Brown was “whether discrimination inheres in that segregation which is imposed by law in the twentieth century in certain specific states in the American Union. And that question has meaning and can find an answer only on the ground of history and of common knowledge about the facts of life in the times and places aforesaid.” Black, The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 Yale L. J. 421, 427 (1960).

The Court in Brown addressed these facts of life by observing that whatever may have been the understanding in Plessy’s time of the power of segregation to stigmatize those who were segregated with a “badge of inferiority,” it was clear by . 1954 that legally sanctioned segregation had just such an effect, to the point that racially separate public educational facilities were deemed inherently unequal. 347 U. S., at 494-495. Society’s understanding of the facts upon which a constitutional ruling was sought in 1954 was thus fundamentally different from the basis claimed for the decision in 1896. While we think Plessy was wrong the day it was decided, see Plessy, supra, at 552-564 (Harlan, J., dissenting), we must also recognize that the Plessy Court’s explanation for its decision was so clearly at odds with the facts apparent to the Court in 1954 that the decision to reexamine Plessy was on this ground alone not only justified but required.

West Coast Hotel and Brown each rested on facts, or an understanding of facts, changed from those which furnished the claimed justifications for the earlier constitutional resolutions. Each case was comprehensible as the Court’s response to facts that the country could understand, or had come to understand already, but which the Court of an earlier day, as its own declarations disclosed, had not been able to perceive. As the decisions were thus comprehensible *864they were also defensible, not merely as the victories of one doctrinal school over another by dint of numbers (victories though they were), but as applications of constitutional principle to facts as they had not been seen by the Court before. In constitutional adjudication as elsewhere in life, changed circumstances may impose new obligations, and the thoughtful part of the Nation could accept each decision to overrule a prior ease as a response to the Court’s constitutional duty.

Because the cases before us present no such occasion it could be seen as no such response. Because neither the factual underpinnings of Roe’s central holding nor our understanding of it has changed (and because no other indication of weakened precedent has been shown), the Court could not pretend to be reexamining the prior law with any justification beyond a present doctrinal disposition to come out differently from the Court of 1973. To overrule prior law for no other reason than that would run counter to the view repeated in our eases, that a decision to overrule should rest on some special reason over and above the belief that a prior ease was wrongly decided. See, e. g., Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U. S. 600, 636 (1974) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (“A basic change in the law upon a ground no firmer than a change in our membership invites the popular misconception that this institution is little different from the two political branches of the Government. No misconception could do more lasting injury to this Court and to the system of law which it is our abiding mission to serve”); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643, 677 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).

C

The examination of the conditions justifying the repudiation of Adkins by West Coast Hotel and Plessy by Brown is enough to suggest the terrible price that would have been paid if the Court had not overruled as it did. In the present cases, however, as our analysis to this point makes clear, the terrible price would be paid for overruling. Our analysis *865would not be complete, however, without explaining why-overruling Roe’s central holding would not only reach an unjustifiable result under principles of stare decisis, but would seriously weaken the Court’s capacity to exercise the judicial power and to function as the Supreme Court of a Nation dedicated to the rule of law. To understand why this would be so it is necessary to understand the source of this Court’s authority, the conditions necessary for its preservation, and its relationship to the country’s understanding of itself as a constitutional Republic.

The root of American governmental power is revealed most clearly in the instance of the power conferred by the Constitution upon the-Judiciary of the United States and specifically upon this Court. As Americans of each succeeding generation are rightly told, the Court cannot buy support for its decisions by spending money and, except to a minor degree, it cannot independently coerce obedience to its decrees. The Court’s power lies, rather, in its legitimacy, a product of substance and perception that shows itself in the people’s acceptance of the Judiciary as fit to determine what the Nation’s law means and to declare what it demands.

The underlying substance of this legitimacy is of course the warrant for the Court’s decisions in the Constitution and the lesser sources of legal principle on which the Court draws. That substance is expressed in the Court’s opinions, and our contemporary understanding is such that a decision without principled justification would be no judicial act at all. But even when justification is furnished by apposite legal principle, something more is required. Because not every conscientious claim of principled justification will be accepted as such, the justification claimed must be beyond dispute. The Court must take care to speak and act in ways that allow people to accept its decisions on the terms the Court claims for them, as grounded truly in principle, not as compromises with social and political pressures having, as such, no bearing on the principled choices that the Court is *866obliged to make. Thus, the Court’s legitimacy depends on making legally principled decisions under circumstances in which their principled character is sufficiently plausible to be accepted by the Nation.

The need for principled action to be perceived as such is implicated to some degree whenever this, or any other appellate court, overrules a prior case. This is not to say, of course, that this Court cannot give a perfectly satisfactory explanation in most cases. People understand that some of the Constitution’s language is hard to fathom and that the Court’s Justices are sometimes able to perceive significant facts or to understand principles of law that* eluded their predecessors and that justify departures from existing decisions. However upsetting it may be to those most directly affected when one judicially derived rule replaces another, the country can accept some correction of error without necessarily questioning the legitimacy of the Court.

In two circumstances, however, the Court would almost certainly fail to receive the benefit of the doubt in overruling prior cases. There is, first, a point beyond which frequent overruling would overtax the country’s belief in the Court’s good faith. Despite the variety of reasons that may inform and justify a decision to overrule, we cannot forget that such a decision is usually perceived (and perceived correctly) as, at the least, a statement that a prior decision was wrong. There is a limit to the amount of error that can plausibly be imputed to prior Courts. If that limit should be exceeded, disturbance of prior rulings would be taken as evidence that justifiable reexamination of principle had given way to drives for particular results in the short term. The legitimacy of the Court would fade with the frequency of its vacillation.

That first circumstance can be described as hypothetical; the second is to the point here and now. Where, in the performance of its judicial duties, the Court decides a ease in such a way as to resolve the sort of intensely divisive controversy reflected in Roe and those rare, comparable cases, its *867decision has a dimension that the resolution of the normal case does not carry. It is the dimension present whenever the Court’s interpretation of the Constitution calls the contending sides of a national controversy to end their national division by accepting a common mandate rooted in the Constitution.

The Court is not asked to do this very often, having thus addressed the Nation only twice in our lifetime, in the decisions of Brown and Roe. But when the Court does act in this way, its decision requires an equally rare precedential force to counter the inevitable efforts to overturn it and to thwart its implementation. Some of those efforts may be mere unprincipled emotional reactions; others may proceed from principles worthy of profound respect. But whatever the premises of opposition may be, only the most convincing justification under accepted standards of precedent could suffice to demonstrate that a later decision overruling the first was anything but a surrender to political pressure, and an unjustified repudiation of the principle on which the Court staked its authority in the first instance. So to overrule under fire in the absence of the most compelling reason to reexamine a watershed decision would subvert the Court’s legitimacy beyond any serious question. Cf. Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U. S. 294, 300 (1955) (Broten II) (“[I]t should go without saying that the vitality of th[e] constitutional principles [announced in Brown I,] cannot be allowed to yield simply because of disagreement with them”).

The country’s loss of confidence in the Judiciary would be underscored by an equally certain and equally reasonable condemnation for another failing in overruling unnecessarily and under pressure. Some cost will be paid by anyone who approves or implements a constitutional decision where it is unpopular, or who refuses to work to undermine the decision or to force its reversal. The price may be criticism or ostracism, or it may be violence. An extra price will be paid by those who themselves disapprove of the decision’s results *868when viewed outside of constitutional terms, but who nevertheless struggle to accept it, because they respect the rule of law. To all those who will be so tested by following, the Court implicitly undertakes to remain steadfast, lest in the end a price be paid for nothing. The promise of constancy, once given, binds its maker for as long as the power to stand by the decision survives and the understanding of the issue has not changed so fundamentally as to render the commitment obsolete. From the obligation of this promise this Court cannot and should not assume any exemption when duty requires it to decide a case in conformance with the Constitution. A willing breach of it would be nothing, less than a breach of faith, and no Court that broke its faith with the people could sensibly expect credit for principle in the decision by which it did that.

It is true that diminished legitimacy may be restored, but only slowly. Unlike the political branches, a Court thus weakened could not seek to regain its position with a new mandate from the voters, and even if the Court could somehow go to the polls, the loss of its principled character could not be retrieved by the casting of so many votes. Like the character of an individual, the legitimacy of the Court must be earned over time. So, indeed, must be the character of a Nation of people who aspire to live according to the rule of law. Their belief in themselves as such a people is not readily separable from their understanding of the Court invested with the authority to decide their constitutional cases and speak before all others for their constitutional ideals. If the Court’s legitimacy should be undermined, then, so would the country be in its very ability to see itself through its constitutional ideals. The Court’s concern with legitimacy is not for the sake of the Court, but for the sake of the Nation to which it is responsible.

The Court’s duty in the present cases is clear. In 1973, it confronted the already-divisive issue of governmental power *869to limit personal choice to undergo abortion, for which it provided a new resolution based on the due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Whether or not a new social consensus is developing on that issue, its divisiveness is no less today than in 1973, and pressure to overrule the decision, like pressure to retain it, has grown only more intense. A decision to overrule Roe’s essential holding under the existing circumstances would address error, if error there was, at the cost of both profound and unnecessary damage to the Court’s legitimacy, and to the Nation’s commitment to the rule of law. It is therefore imperative to adhere to the essence of Roe’s original decision, and we do so today.

IV

From what we have said so far it follows that it is a constitutional liberty of the woman to have some freedom to terminate her pregnancy. We conclude that the basic decision in Roe was based on a constitutional analysis which we cannot now repudiate. The woman’s liberty is not so unlimited, however, that from the outset the State cannot show its concern for the life of the unborn, and at a later point in fetal development the State’s interest in life has sufficient force so that the right of the woman to terminate the pregnancy can be restricted.

That brings us, of course, to the point where much criticism has been directed at Roe, a criticism that always inheres when the Court draws a specific rule from what in the Constitution is but a general standard. We conclude, however, that the urgent claims of the woman to retain the ultimate control over her destiny and her body, claims implicit in the meaning of liberty, require us to perform that function. Liberty must not be extinguished for want of a line that is clear. And it falls to us to give some real substance to the woman’s liberty to determine whether to carry her pregnancy to full term.

*870We conclude the line should be drawn at viability, so that before that time the woman has a right to choose to terminate her pregnancy. We adhere to this principle for two reasons. First, as we have said, is the doctrine of stare deci-sis. Any judicial act of line-drawing may seem somewhat arbitrary, but Roe was a reasoned statement, elaborated with great care. We have twice reaffirmed it in the face of great opposition. See Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U. S., at 759; Akron I, 462 U. S., at 419-420. Although we must overrule those parts of Thornburgh and Akron I which, in our view, are inconsistent with iBoe’s statement that the State has a legitimate interest in promoting the life or potential life of the unborn, see infra, at 882-883, the central premise of those cases represents an unbroken commitment by this Court to the essential holding of Roe. It is that premise which we reaffirm today.

The second reason is that the concept of viability, as we noted in Roe, is the time at which there is a realistic possibility of maintaining and nourishing a life outside the womb, so that the independent existence of the second life can in reason and all fairness be the object of state protection that now overrides the rights of the woman. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S., at 163. Consistent with other constitutional norms, legislatures may draw lines which appear arbitrary without the necessity of offering a justification. But courts may not. We must justify the lines we draw And there is no line other than viability which is more workable. To be sure, as we have said, there may be some medical developments that affect the precise point of viability, see supra, at 860, but this is an imprecision within tolerable limits given that the medical community and all those who must apply its discoveries will continue to explore the matter. The viability line also has, as a practical matter, an element of fairness. In some broad sense it might be said that a woman who fails to act before viability has consented to the State’s intervention on behalf of the developing child.

*871The woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy before viability is the most central principle of Roe v. Wade. It is a rule of law and a component of liberty we cannot renounce.

On the other side of the equation is the interest of the State in the protection of potential life. The Roe Court recognized the State’s “important and legitimate interest in protecting the potentiality of human life.” Roe, supra, at 162. The weight to be given this state interest, not the strength of the woman’s interest, was the difficult question faced in Roe. We do not need to say whether each of us, had we been Members of the Court when the valuation of the state interest came before it as an original matter, would have concluded, as the Roe Court did, that its weight is insufficient to justify a ban on abortions prior to viability even when it is subject to certain exceptions. The matter is not before us in the first instance, and coming as it does after nearly 20 years of litigation in Roe’s wake we are satisfied that the immediate question is not the soundness of Roe’s resolution of the issue, but the precedential force that must be accorded to its holding. And we have concluded that the essential holding of Roe should be reaffirmed.

Yet it must be remembered that Roe v. Wade speaks with clarity in establishing not only the woman’s liberty but also the State’s “important and legitimate interest in potential life.” Roe, supra, at 163. That portion of the decision in Roe has been given too little acknowledgment and implementation by the Court in its subsequent cases. Those eases decided that any regulation touching upon the abortion decision must survive strict scrutiny, to be sustained only if drawn in narrow terms to further a compelling state interest. See, e. g., Akron I, supra, at 427. Not all of the cases decided under that formulation can be reconciled with the holding in Roe itself that the State has legitimate interests in the health of the woman and in protecting the potential life within her. In resolving this tension, we choose to rely upon Roe, as against the later cases.

*872 Roe established a trimester framework to govern abortion regulations. Under this elaborate but rigid construct, almost no regulation at all is permitted during the first trimester of pregnancy; regulations designed to protect the woman’s health, but not to further the State’s interest in potential life, are permitted during the second trimester; and during the third trimester, when the fetus is viable, prohibitions are permitted provided the life or health of the mother is not at stake. Roe, supra, at 163-166. Most of our cases since Roe have involved the application of rules derived from the trimester framework. See, e. g., Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, supra; Akron I, supra.

The trimester framework no doubt was erected to ensure that the woman’s right to choose not become so subordinate to the State’s interest in promoting fetal life that her choice exists in theory but not in fact. We do not agree, however, that the trimester approach is necessary to accomplish this objective. A framework of this rigidity was unnecessary and in its later interpretation sometimes contradicted the State’s permissible exercise of its powers.

Though the woman has a right to choose to terminate or continue her pregnancy before viability, it does not at all follow that the State is prohibited from taking steps to ensure that this choice is thoughtful and informed. Even in the earliest stages of pregnancy, the State may enact rules and regulations designed to encourage her to know that there are philosophic and social arguments of great weight that can be brought to bear in favor of continuing the pregnancy to full term and'that there are procedures and institutions to allow adoption of unwanted children as well as a certain degree of state assistance if the mother chooses to raise the child herself. “ ‘[T]he Constitution does not forbid a State or city, pursuant to democratic processes, from expressing a preference for normal childbirth.’” Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U. S., at 511 (opinion of *873the Court) (quoting Poelker v. Doe, 432 U. S. 519, 521 (1977)). It follows that States are free to enact laws to provide a reasonable framework for a woman to make a decision that has such profound and lasting meaning. This, too, we find consistent with Roe’s central premises, and indeed the inevitable consequence of our holding that the State has an interest in protecting the life of the unborn. .

We reject the trimester framework, which we do not consider to be part of the essential holding of Roe. See Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U. S., at 518 (opinion of Rehnquist, C. J.); id., at 529 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (describing the trimester framework as “problematic”). Measures aimed at ensuring that a woman’s choice contemplates the consequences for the ' fetus do not necessarily interfere with the right recognized in Roe, although those measures have been found to be inconsistent with the rigid trimester framework announced in that case. A logical reading of the central holding in Roe itself, and a necessary reconciliation of the liberty of the woman and the interest of the State in promoting prenatal life, require, in our view, that we abandon the trimester framework as a rigid prohibition on all previability regulation aimed at the protection of fetal life. The trimester framework suffers from these basic flaws: in its formulation it misconceives the nature of the pregnant woman’s interest; and in practice it undervalues the State’s interest in potential life, as recognized in Roe.

As our jurisprudence relating to all liberties save perhaps abortion has recognized, not every law which makes a right more difficult to exercise is, ipso facto, an infringement of that right. An example clarifies the point. We have held that not every ballot access limitation amounts to an infringement of the right to vote. Rather, the States are granted substantial flexibility in establishing the framework within which voters choose the candidates for whom' they *874wish to vote. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U. S. 780, 788 (1983); Norman v. Reed, 502 U. S. 279 (1992).

The abortion right is similar. Numerous forms of state regulation might have the incidental effect of increasing the cost or decreasing the availability of medical care, whether for abortion or any other medical procedure. The fact that a law which serves a valid purpose, one not designed to strike at the right itself, has the incidental effect of making it more difficult or more expensive to procure an abortion cannot be enough to invalidate it. Only where state regulation imposes an undue burden on a woman’s ability to make this decision does the power of the State reach into the heart of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause. See Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U. S. 417, 458-459 (1990) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment in part); Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 497 U. S. 502, 519-520 (1990) (Akron II) (opinion of Kennedy, J.); Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, supra, at 530 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U. S., at 828 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); Simopoulos v. Virginia, 462 U. S. 506, 520 (1983) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); Planned Parenthood Assn. of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 462 U. S. 476, 505 (1983) (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part); Akron I, 462 U. S., at 464 (O’Connor, J., joined by White and Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting); Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U. S. 132, 147 (1976) (Bellotti I).

For the most part, the Court’s early abortion cases adhered to this view. In Maher v. Roe, 432 U. S. 464, 473-474 (1977), the Court explained: “Roe did not declare an unqualified ‘constitutional right to an abortion,’ as the District Court seemed to think. Rather, the right protects the woman from unduly burdensome interference with her freedom to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy.” See *875also Doe v. Bolton, 410 U. S. 179, 198 (1973) (“[T]he interposition of the hospital abortion committee is unduly restrictive of the patient’s rights”); Bellotti I, supra, at 147 (State may not “impose undue burdens upon a minor capable of giving an informed consent”); Harris v. McRae, 448 U. S. 297, 314 (1980) (citing Maker, supra). Cf. Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U. S., at 688 (“[T]he same test must be applied to state regulations that burden an individual’s right to decide to prevent conception or terminate pregnancy by substantially limiting access to the means of effectuating that decision as is applied to state statutes that prohibit the decision entirely”).

These considerations of the nature of the abortion right illustrate that it is an overstatement to describe it as a right to decide whether to have an abortion “without interference from the State.” Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U. S. 52, 61 (1976). All abortion regulations interfere to some degree with a woman’s ability to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy. It is, as a consequence, not surprising that despite the protestations contained in the original Roe opinion to the effect that the Court was not recognizing an absolute right, 410 U. S., at 154-155, the Court’s experience applying the trimester framework has led to the striking down of some abortion regulations which in no real sense deprived women of the ultimate decision. Those decisions went too far because the right recognized by Roe is a right “to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.” Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U. S., at 453. Not all governmental intrusion is of necessity unwarranted; and that brings us to the other basic flaw in the trimester framework: even in ftoe’s terms, in practice it undervalues the State’s interest in the potential life within the woman.

Roe v. Wade was express in its recognition of the State’s “important and legitimate interests] in preserving and pro-*876teeting the health of the pregnant woman [and] in protecting the potentiality of human life.” 410 U. S., at 162. The trimester framework, however, does not fulfill Roe’s own promise that the State has an interest in protecting fetal life or potential life. Roe began the contradiction by using the trimester framework to forbid any regulation of abortion designed to advance that interest before viability. Id., at 163. Before viability, Roe and subsequent cases treat all governmental attempts to influence a woman’s decision on behalf of the potential life within her as unwarranted. This treatment is, in our judgment, incompatible with the recognition that there is a substantial state interest in potential life throughout pregnancy. Cf. Webster, 492 U. S., at 519 (opinion of Rehnquist, C. J.); Akron I, supra, at 461 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).

The very notion that the State has a substantial interest in potential life leads to the conclusion that not all regulations must be deemed unwarranted. Not all burdens on the right to decide whether to terminate a pregnancy will be undue. In our view, the undue burden standard is the appropriate means of reconciling the State’s interest with the' woman’s constitutionally protected liberty.

The concept of an undue burden has been utilized by the Court as well as individual Members of the Court, including two of us, in ways that could be considered inconsistent. See, e. g., Hodgson v. Minnesota, supra, at 459-461 (O’CONNOR, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); Akron II, supra, at 519-520 (opinion of Kennedy, J.); Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, supra, at 828-829 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); Akron I, supra, at 461-466 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); Harris v. McRae, supra, at 314; Maher v. Roe, supra, at 473; Beal v. Doe, 432 U. S. 438, 446 (1977); Bellotti I, supra, at 147. Because we set forth a standard of general application to which we intend to adhere, it is important to clarify what is meant by an undue burden.

*877A finding of an undue burden is a shorthand for the conclusion that a state regulation has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus. A statute with this purpose is invalid because the means chosen by the State to further the interest in potential life must be calculated to inform the woman’s free choice, not hinder it. And a statute which, while furthering the interest in potential life or some other valid state interest, has the effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman’s choice cannot be considered a permissible means of sérving its legitimate ends. To the extent that the opinions of the Court or of individual Justices use the undue burden standard in a manner that is inconsistent with this analysis, we set out what in our view should be the controlling standard. Cf. McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U. S. 467, 489 (1991) (attempting “to define the doctrine of abuse of the writ with more precision” after acknowledging tension among earlier cases). In our considered judgment, an undue burden is an unconstitutional burden. See Akron II, 497 U. S., at 519-520 (opinion of Kennedy, J.). Understood another way, we answer the question, left open in previous opinions discussing the undue burden formulation, whether a law designed to further the State’s interest in fetal life which imposes an undue burden on the woman’s decision before fetal viability could be constitutional. See, e. g., Akron I, 462 U. S., at 462-463 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). The answer is no.

Some guiding principles should emerge. What is at stake is the woman’s right to make the ultimate decision, not a right to be insulated from all others in doing so. Regulations which do no more than create a structural mechanism by which the State, or the parent or guardian of a minor, may express profound respect for the life of the unborn are permitted, if they are not a substantial obstacle to the woman’s exereise of the right to choose. See infra, at 899-900 (addressing Pennsylvania’s parental consent requirement). *878Unless it has that effect on her right of choice, a state measure designed to persuade her to choose childbirth over abortion will be upheld if reasonably related to that goal.' Regulations designed to foster the health of a woman seeking an abortion are valid if they do not constitute an undue burden.

Even when jurists reason from shared premises, some disagreement is inevitable. Compare Hodgson, 497 U. S., at 482-497 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part), with id., at 458-460 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment in part). That is to be expected in the application of any legal standard which must accommodate life’s complexity. We do not expect it to be otherwise with respect to the undue burden standard. We give this summary:

(a) To protect the central right recognized by Roe v. Wade while at the same time accommodating the State’s profound interest in potential life, we will employ the undue burden analysis as explained in this opinion. An undue burden exists, and therefore a provision of law is invalid, if its purpose or effect is to place a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains viability.

(b) We reject the rigid trimester framework of Roe v. Wade. To promote the State’s profound interest in potential life, throughout pregnancy the State may take measures to ensure that the woman’s choice is informed, and measures designed to advance this interest will not be invalidated as long as their purpose is to persuade the woman to choose childbirth over abortion. These measures must not be an undue burden on the right.

(c) As with any medical procedure, the State may enact regulations to further the health or safety of a woman seeking an abortion. Unnecessary health regulations that have the purpose or effect of presenting a substantial obstacle to a woman seeking an abortion impose an undue burden on the right.

*879(d) Our adoption of the undue burden analysis does not disturb the central holding of Roe v. Wade, and we reaffirm that holding. Regardless of whether exceptions are made for particular circumstances, a State may not prohibit any woman from making the ultimate decision to terminate her pregnancy before viability.

(e) We also reaffirm Roe’s holding that “subsequent to viability, the State in promoting its interest in the potentiality of human life may, if it chooses, regulate, and even proscribe, abortion except where it is necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the mother.” Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S., at 164-165.

These principles control our assessment of the Pennsylvania statute, and we now turn to the issue of the validity of its challenged provisions.

V

The Court of Appeals applied what it believed to be the undue burden standard and upheld each' of the provisions except for the husband notification requirement. We agree generally with this conclusion, but refine the undue burden analysis in accordance with the principles articulated above. We now consider the separate statutory sections at issue.

A

Because it is central to the operation of various other requirements, we begin with the statute’s definition of medical emergency. Under the statute, a medical emergency is

“[t]hat condition which, on the basis of the physician’s good faith clinical judgment, so complicates the medical condition of a pregnant woman as to necessitate the immediate abortion of her pregnancy to avert her death or for which a delay will create serious risk of substantial and irreversible impairment of a major bodily function.” 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. §3208 (1990).

*880Petitioners argue that the definition is too narrow, contending that it forecloses the possibility of an immediate abortion despite some significant health risks. If the contention were correct, we would be required to invalidate the restrictive operation of the provision, for the essential holding of Roe forbids a State to interfere with a woman’s choice to undergo an abortion procedure if continuing her pregnancy would constitute a threat to her health. 410 U. S., at 164. See also Harris v. McRae, 448 U. S., at 316.

The District Court found that there were three serious conditions which would not be covered by the statute: pre-eclampsia, inevitable abortion, and premature ruptured membrane. 744 F. Supp., at 1378. Yet, as the Court of Appeals observed, 947 F. 2d, at 700-701, it is undisputed that under some circumstances each of these conditions could lead to an illness with substantial and irreversible consequences. While the definition could be interpreted in an unconstitutional manner, the Court of Appeals construed the phrase “serious risk” to include those circumstances. Id., at 701. It stated: “[W]e read the medical emergency exception as intended by the Pennsylvania legislature to assure that compliance with its abortion regulations would not in any way pose a significant threat to the life or health of a woman.” Ibid. As we said in Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U. S. 491, 499-500 (1985): “Normally, ... we defer to the construction of a state statute given it by the lower federal courts.” Indeed, we have said that we will defer to lower court interpretations of state law unless they amount to “plain” error. Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U. S. 109, 118 (1943). This “ ‘reflects] our belief that district courts and courts of appeals are better schooled in and more able to interpret the laws of their respective States.’” Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U. S. 474, 482 (1988) (citation omitted). We adhere to that course today, and conclude that, as construed by the Court of Appeals, the medical emergency definition imposes no undue burden on a woman’s abortion right.

*881B

We next consider the informed consent requirement. 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. §3205 (1990). Except in a medical emergency, the statute requires that at least 24 hours before performing an abortion a physician inform the woman of the nature of the procedure, the health risks of the abortion and of childbirth, and the “probable gestational age of the unborn child.” The physician or a qualified nonphysician must inform the woman of the availability of printed materials published by the State describing the fetus and providing information about medical assistance for childbirth, information about child support from the father, and a list of agencies which provide adoption and other services as alternatives. to abortion. An abortion may not be performed unless the woman certifies in writing that she has been informed of the availability of these printed materials and has been provided them if she chooses to view them.

Our prior decisions establish that as with any medical procedure, the State may require a woman to give her written informed consent to an abortion. See Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U. S., at 67. In this respect, the statute is unexceptional. Petitioners challenge the statute’s definition of informed consent because it includes the provision of specific information by the doctor and the mandatory 24-hour waiting period. The conclusions reached by a majority of the Justices in the separate opinions filed today and the undue burden standard adopted in this opinion require us to overrule in part some of the Court’s past decisions, decisions driven by the trimester framework’s prohibition of all previability regulations designed to further the State’s interest in fetal life.

In Akron I, 462 U. S. 416 (1983), we invalidated an ordinance which required that a woman seeking an abortion be provided by her physieian with specific information “designed. to influence the woman’s informed choice between abortion or childbirth.” Id., at 444. As we later described *882the Akron I holding in Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U. S., at 762, there were two purported flaws in the Akron ordinance: the information was designed to dissuade the woman from having an abortion and the ordinance imposed “a rigid requirement that a specific body of information be given in all cases, irrespective of the particular needs of the patient. . . .” Ibid.

To the extent Akron I and Thornburgh find a constitutional violation when the government requires, as it does here, the giving of truthful, nonmisleading information about the nature of the procedure, the attendant health risks and those of childbirth, and the “probable gestational age” of the fetus, those eases go too far, are inconsistent with Roe’s acknowledgment of an important interest in potential life, and are overruled. This is clear even on the very terms of Akron I and Thornburgh. Those decisions, along with Dan-forth, recognize a substantial government interest justifying a requirement that a woman be apprised of the health risks of abortion and childbirth. E. g., Danforth, supra, at 66-67. It cannot be questioned that psychological well-being is a facet of health. Nor can it be doubted that most women considering an abortion would deem the impact on the fetus relevant, if not dispositive, to the decision. In attempting to ensure that a woman apprehend the full consequences of her decision, the State furthers the legitimate purpose of reducing the risk that a woman may elect an abortion, only to discover later, with devastating psychological consequences, that her decision was not fully informed. If the information the State requires to be made available to the woman is truthful and not misleading, the requirement may be permissible.

We also see no reason why the State may not require doctors to inform a woman seeking an abortion of the availability of materials relating to the consequences to the fetus, even when those consequences have no direct relation to her health. An example illustrates the point. We would think *883it constitutional for the State to require that in order for there to he informed consent to a kidney transplant operation the recipient must be supplied with information about risks to the donor as well as risks to himself or herself. A requirement that the physician make available information similar to that mandated by the statute here was described in Thornburgh as “an outright attempt to wedge the Commonwealth’s message discouraging abortion into the privacy of the informed-consent dialogue between the woman and her physician.” 476 U. S., at 762. We conclude, however, that informed choice need not be defined in such narrow terms that all considerations of the effect on the fetus are made irrelevant. As we have made clear, we depart from the holdings of Akron I and Thornburgh to the extent that we permit a State to further its legitimate goal of protecting the life of the unborn by enacting legislation aimed at ensuring a decision that is mature and informed, even when in so doing the State expresses a preference for childbirth over abortion. In short, requiring that the woman be informed of the availability of information relating to fetal development and the assistance available should she decide to carry the pregnancy to full term is a reasonable measure to ensure an informed choice, one which might cause the woman to choose childbirth over abortion. This requirement cannot be considered a substantial obstacle to obtaining an abortion, and, it follows, there is no undue burden.

Our prior cases also suggest that the “straitjacket,” Thornburgh, supra, at 762 (quoting Danforth, supra, at 67, n. 8), of particular information which must be given in each ease interferes with a constitutional right of privacy between a pregnant woman and her physician. As a preliminary matter, it is worth noting that the statute now before us does not require a physician to comply with the informed consent provisions “if he or she can demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence, that he or she reasonably believed that furnishing the information would have resulted in a severely *884adverse effect on the physical or mental health of the patient/’ 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3205 (1990). In this respect, the statute does not prevent the physician from exercising his or her medical judgment.

Whatever constitutional status the doctor-patient relation may have as a general matter, in the present context it is derivative of the woman’s position. The doctor-patient relation does not underlie or override the two more general rights under which the abortion right is justified: the right to make family decisions and the right to physical autonomy. On its own, the doctor-patient relation here is entitled to the same solicitude it receives in other contexts. Thus, a requirement that a doctor give a woman certain information as part of obtaining her consent to an abortion is, for constitutional purposes, no different from a requirement that a doctor give certain specific'information about any medical procedure.

All that is left of petitioners’ argument is an asserted First Amendment right of a physician not to provide information about the risks of abortion, and childbirth, in a manner mandated by the State. To be sure, the physician’s First Amendment rights not to speak are implicated, see Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U. S. 705 (1977), but only as part of the practice of medicine, subject to reasonable licensing and regulation by the State, cf. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U. S. 589, 603 (1977). We see no constitutional infirmity in the requirement that the physician provide the information mandated by the State here.

The Pennsylvania statute also requires us to reconsider the holding in Akron I that the State may not require that a physician, as opposed to a qualified assistant, provide information relevant to a woman’s informed consent. 462 U. S., at 448. Since there is no evidence on this record that requiring a doctor to give the information as provided by the statute would amount in practical terms to a substantial obstacle to a woman seeking an abortion, we conclude that it is not *885an undue burden. Our eases reflect the fact that the Constitution gives the States broad latitude to decide that particular functions may be performed only by licensed professionals, even if an objective assessment might suggest that those same tasks could be performed by others. See Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U. S. 483 (1955). Thus, we uphold the provision as a reasonable means to ensure that the woman’s consent is informed.

Our analysis of Pennsylvania’s 24-hour waiting period between the provision of the information deemed necessary to informed consent and the performance of an abortion under the undue burden standard requires us to reconsider the premise behind the decision in Akron I invalidating a parallel requirement. In Akron I we said: “Nor are we convinced that the State’s legitimate concern that the woman’s decision be informed is reasonably served by requiring a 24-hour delay as a matter of course.” 462 U. S., at 450. We consider that conclusion to be wrong. The idea that important decisions will be more informed and deliberate if they follow some period of reflection does not strike us as unreasonable, particularly where the statute directs that important information become part of the background of the decision. The statute, as construed by the Court of Appeals, permits avoidance of the waiting period in the event of a medical emergency and the record evidence shows that in the vast majority of cases, a 24-hour delay does not create any appreciable health risk. In theory, at least, the waiting period is a reasonable measure to implement the State’s interest in protecting the life of the unborn, a measure that does not amount to an undue burden.

Whether the mandatory 24-hour waiting period is nonetheless invalid because in practice it is a substantial obstacle to a woman’s choice to terminate her pregnancy is a closer question. The findings of fact by the District Court indicate that because of the distances many women must travel to reach an abortion provider, the practical effect will often be *886a delay of much more than a day because the waiting period requires that a woman seeking an abortion make at least two visits to the doctor. The District Court also found that in many instances this will increase the exposure of women seeking abortions to “the harassment and hostility of antiabortion protestors demonstrating outside a clinic.” 744 F. Supp., at 1351. As a result, the District Court found that for those women who have the fewest financial resources, those who must travel long distances, and those who have difficulty explaining their whereabouts to husbands, employers, or others, the 24-hour waiting period will be “particularly burdensome.” Id., at 1352.

These findings are troubling in some respects, but they do not demonstrate that the waiting period constitutes an undue burden. We do not doubt that, as the District Court held, the waiting period has the effect of “increasing the cost and risk of delay of abortions,” id., at 1378, but the District Court did not conclude that the increased costs and potential delays amount to substantial obstacles. Rather, applying the trimester framework’s strict prohibition of all regulation designed to promote the State’s interest in potential life before viability, see id., at 1374, the District Court concluded that the waiting period does not further the state “interest in maternal health” and “infringes the physician’s discretion to exercise sound medical judgment,” id., at 1378. Yet, as we have stated, under the undue burden standard a State is permitted to enact persuasive measures which favor childbirth over abortion, even if those measures do not further a health interest. And while the waiting period does limit a physician’s discretion, that is not, standing alone, a reason to invalidate it. In light of the construction given the statute’s definition of medical emergency by the Court of Appeals, and the District Court’s findings, we cannot say that the waiting period imposes a real health risk.

We also disagree with the District Court’s conclusion that the “particularly burdensome” effects of the waiting period *887on some women require its invalidation. A particular burden is not of necessity a substantial obstacle. Whether a burden falls on a particular group is a distinct inquiry from whether it is a substantial obstacle even as to the women in that group. And the District Court did not conclude that the waiting period is such an obstacle even for the women who are most burdened by it. Hence, on the record before us, and in the context of this facial challenge, we are not convinced that the 24-hour waiting period constitutes an undue burden.

We are left with the argument that the various aspects of the informed consent requirement are unconstitutional because they place barriers in the way of abortion on demand. Even the broadest reading of Roe, however, has not suggested that there is a constitutional right to abortion on demand. See, e. g., Doe v. Bolton, 410 U. S., at 189. Rather, the right protected by Roe is a right to decide to terminate a pregnancy free of undue interference by the State. Because the informed consent requirement facilitates the wise exercise of that right, it cannot be classified as an interference with the right Roe protects. The informed consent requirement is not an undue burden on that right.

C

Section 8209 of Pennsylvania’s abortion law provides, except in eases of medical emergency, that no physician shall perform an abortion on a married woman without receiving a signed statement from the woman that she has notified her spouse that she is about to undergo an abortion. The woman has the option of providing an alternative signed statement certifying that her husband is not the man who impregnated her; that her husband could not be located; that the pregnancy is the result of spousal sexual assault which she has reported; or that the woman believes that notifying her husband will cause him or someone else to inflict bodily injury upon her. A physician who performs an abortion on *888a married woman without receiving the appropriate signed statement will have his or her license revoked, and is liable to the husband for damages.

The District Court heard the testimony of numerous expert witnesses, and made detailed findings of fact regarding the effect of this statute. These included:

“273. The vast majority of women consult their husbands prior to deciding to terminate their pregnancy....

“279. The ‘bodily injury’ exception could not be invoked by a married woman whose husband, if notified, would, in her reasonable belief, threaten to (a) publicize her intent to have an abortion to family, friends or acquaintances; (b) retaliate against her in future child custody or divorce proceedings; (e) inflict psychological intimidation or emotional harm upon her, her children or other persons; (d) inflict bodily harm on other persons such as children, family members or other loved ones; or (e) use his control over finances to deprive of necessary monies for herself or her children....

“281. Studies reveal that family violence occurs in two million families in the United States.. This figure, however, is a conservative one that substantially understates (because battering is usually not reported until it reaches life-threatening proportions) the actual number of families affected by domestic violence. In fact, researchers estimate that one of every two women will be battered at some time in their life....

“282. A wife may not elect to notify her husband of her intention to have an abortion for a variety of reasons, including the husband’s illness, concern about her own health, the imminent failure of the marriage, or the husband’s absolute opposition to the abortion. ...

“283. The required filing of the spousal consent form would require plaintiff-clinics to change their counseling *889procedures and force women to reveal their most intimate decision-making on pain of criminal sanctions. The confidentiality of these revelations could not be guaranteed, since the woman’s records are not immune from subpoena....

“284. Women of all class levels, educational backgrounds, and racial, ethnic and religious groups are battered....

“285. Wife-battering or abuse can take on many physical and psychological forms. The nature and scope of the battering can cover a broad range of actions and be gruesome and torturous....

“286. Married women, victims of battering, have been killed in Pennsylvania and throughout the United States....

“287. Battering can often involve a substantial amount of sexual abuse, including marital rape and sexual mutilation....

“288. In a domestic abuse situation, it is common for the battering husband to also abuse the children in an attempt to coerce the wife....

“289. Mere notification of pregnancy is frequently a flashpoint for battering and violence within the family. The number of battering incidents is high during the pregnancy and often the worst abuse can be associated with pregnancy. . . . The battering husband may deny parentage and use the pregnancy as an excuse for abuse....

“290. Secrecy typically shrouds abusive families. Family members are instructed not to tell anyone, especially police or doctors, about the abuse and violence. Battering husbands often threaten their wives or her children with further abuse if she tells an outsider of the violence and tells her that nobody will believe her. A battered woman, therefore, is highly unlikely to disclose *890the violence against her for fear of retaliation by the abuser....

“291. Even when confronted directly by medical personnel or other helping professionals, battered women often will not admit to the battering because they have not admitted to themselves that they are battered.. . .

“294. A woman in a shelter or a safe house unknown to her husband is not ‘reasonably likely’ to have bodily harm inflicted upon her by her batterer, however her attempt to notify her husband pursuant to section 3209 could accidentally disclose her whereabouts to her husband. Her fear of future ramifications would be realistic under, the circumstances.

“295. Marital rape is rarely discussed with others or reported to law enforcement authorities, and of those reported only few are prosecuted....

“296. It is common for battered women to have sexual intercourse with their husbands to avoid being battered. While this type of coercive sexual activity would be spousal sexual assault as defined by the Act, many women may not consider it to be so and others would fear disbelief....

“297. The marital rape exception to section 3209 cannot be claimed by women who are victims of coercive sexual behavior other than penetration. The 90-day reporting requirement of the spousal sexual assault statute, 18 Pa. Con. Stat. Ann. § 3218(c), further narrows the class of sexually abused wives who can claim the exception, since many of these women may be psychologically unable to discuss or report the rape for several years after the incident. . ..

“298. Because of the nature of the battering relationship, battered women are unlikely to avail themselves of the exceptions to section 3209 of the Act, regardless of *891whether the section applies to them.” 744 F. Supp., at 1360-1362 (footnote omitted).

These findings are supported by studies of domestic violence. The American Medical Association (AMA) has published a summary of the recent research in this field, which indicates that in an average 12-month period in this country, approximately two million women are the victims of severe assaults by their male partners. In a 1985 survey, women reported that nearly one of every eight husbands had assaulted their wives during the past year. The AMA views these figures as “marked underestimates,” because the nature of these incidents discourages women from reporting them, and because surveys typically exclude the very poor, those who do not speak English well, and women who are homeless or in institutions or hospitals when the survey is conducted. According to the AMA, “[researchers on family violence agree that the true incidence of partner violence is probably double the above estimates; or four million severely assaulted women per year. Studies on prevalence suggest that from one-fifth to one-third of all women will be physically assaulted by a partner or ex-partner during their lifetime.” AMA Council on Scientific Affairs, Violence Against Women 7 (1991) (emphasis in original). Thus on an average day in the United States, nearly 11,000 women are severely assaulted by their male partners. Many of these incidents involve sexual assault. Id., at 3-4; Shields & Hanneke, Battered Wives’ Reactions to Marital Rape, in The Dark Side of Families: Current Family Violence Research 131, 144 (D. Finkelhor, R. Gelles, G. Hataling, & M. Straus eds. 1983). In families where wifebeating takes. place, moreover, child abuse is often present as well. Violence Against Women, supra, at 12.

Other studies fill in the rest of this troubling picture. Physical violence is only the most visible form of abuse. Psychological abuse, particularly forced social and economic isolation of women, is also eommon. L. Walker, The Bat*892tered Woman Syndrome 27-28 (1984). Many victims of domestic violence remain with their abusers, perhaps because they perceive no superior alternative. Herbert, Silver, & Ellard, Coping with an Abusive Relationship: I. How and Why do Women Stay?, 53 J. Marriage & the Family 311 (1991). Many abused women who find temporary refuge in shelters return to their husbands, in large part because they have no other source of income. Aguirre, Why Do They Return? Abused Wives in Shelters, 30 J. Nat. Assn, of Social Workers 350, 352 (1985). Returning to one’s abuser can be dangerous. Recent Federal Bureau of Investigation statistics disclose that 8.8 percent of all homicide victims in the United States are killed by their spouses. Mercy & Saltz-man, Fatal Violence Among Spouses in the United States, 1976-85, 79 Am. J. Public Health 595 (1989). Thirty percent of female homicide victims are killed by their male partners. Domestic Violence: Terrorism in the Home, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Children, Family, Drugs and Alcoholism of the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 3 (1990).

The limited research that has been conducted with respect to notifying one’s husband about an abortion, although involving samples too small to be representative, also supports the District Court’s findings of fact. The vast majority of women notify their male partners of their decision to obtain an abortion. In many cases in which married women do not notify their husbands, the pregnancy is the result of an extramarital affair. Where the husband is the father, the primary reason women do not notify their husbands is that the husband and wife are experiencing marital difficulties, often accompanied by incidents of violence. Ryan & Plutzer, When Married Women Have Abortions: Spousal Notification and Marital Interaction, 51 J. Marriage & the Family 41, 44 (1989).

This information and the District Court’s findings reinforce what common sense would suggest. In well-*893functioning marriages, spouses discuss important intimate decisions such as whether to bear a child. But there are millions of women in this country who are the victims of regular physical and psychological abuse at the hands of their husbands. Should these women become pregnant, they may have very good reasons for not wishing to inform their husbands of their decision to obtain an abortion. Many may have justifiable fears of physical abuse, but may be no less fearful of the consequences of reporting prior abuse to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Many may have a reasonable fear that notifying their husbands will provoke further instances of child abuse; these women are not exempt from § 3209’s notification requirement. Many may fear devastating forms of psychological abuse from their husbands, including verbal harassment, threats of future violence, the destruction of possessions, physical confinement to the home, the withdrawal of financial support, or the disclosure of the abortion to family and friends. These methods of psychological abuse may act as even more of a deterrent to notification than the possibility of physical violence, but women who are the victims of the abuse are not exempt from § 8209’s notifi-. cation requirement. And many women who are pregnant as a result of sexual assaults by their husbands will be unable to avail themselves of the exception for spousal sexual assault, § 3209(b)(3), because the exception requires that the woman have notified law enforcement authorities within 90 days of the assault, and her husband will be notified of her report once an investigation begins, § 3128(c). If anything in this field is certain, it is that victims of spousal sexual assault are extremely reluctant to report the abuse to the government; hence, a great many spousal rape victims will not be exempt from the notification requirement imposed by §3209.

The spousal notification requirement is thus likely to prevent a significant number of women from obtaining an abortion. It does not merely make abortions a little more difficult or expensive to obtain; for. many women, it will impose *894a substantial obstacle. We must not blind ourselves to the fact that the significant number of women who fear for their safety and the safety of their children are likely to be deterred from procuring an abortion as surely as if the Commonwealth had outlawed abortion in all cases.

Respondents attempt to avoid the conclusion that § 3209 is invalid by pointing out that it imposes almost no burden at all for the vast majority of women seeking abortions. They begin by noting that only about 20 percent of the women who obtain abortions are married. They then note that of these women about 95 percent notify their husbands of their own volition. Thus, respondents argue, the effects of § 3209 are felt by only one percent of the women who obtain abortions. Respondents argue that since some of these women will be able to notify their husbands without adverse consequences or will qualify for one of the exceptions, the statute affects fewer than one percent of women seeking abortions. For this reason, it is asserted, the statute cannot be invalid on its face. See Brief for Respondents 83-86. We disagree with respondents’ basic method of analysis.

The analysis does not end with the one percent of women upon whom the statute operates; it begins there. Legislation is measured for consistency with the Constitution by its impact on those whose conduct it affects. For example, we would not say that a law which requires a newspaper to print a candidate’s reply to an unfavorable editorial is valid on its face because most newspapers would adopt the policy even absent the law. See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U. S. 241 (1974). The proper focus of constitutional inquiry is the group for whom the law is a restriction, not the group for whom the law is irrelevant.

Respondents’ argument itself gives implicit recognition to this principle, at one of its critical points. Respondents speak of the one percent of women seeking abortions who are married and would choose not to notify their husbands of their plans. By selecting as the controlling class women *895who wish to obtain abortions, rather than all women or all pregnant women, respondents in effect concede that §3209 must be judged by reference to those for whom it is an actual rather than an irrelevant restriction. Of course, as we have said, §3209’s real target is narrower even than the class of women seeking abortions identified by the State: it is married women seeking abortions who do not wish to notify their husbands of their intentions and who do not qualify for one of the statutory exceptions to the notice requirement. The unfortunate yet persisting conditions we document above will mean that in a large fraction of the cases in which §3209 is relevant, it will operate as a substantial obstacle to a woman’s choice to undergo an abortion. It is an undue burden, and therefore invalid.

This conclusion is in no way inconsistent with our decisions upholding parental notification or consent requirements. See, e. g., Akron II, 497 U. S., at 510-519; Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U. S. 622 (1979) (Bellotti II); Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U. S., at 74. Those enactments, and our judgment that they are constitutional, are based on the quite reasonable assumption that minors will benefit from consultation with their parents and that children will often not realize that their parents have their best interests at heart. We cannot adopt a parallel assumption about adult women.

We recognize that a husband has a “deep and proper concern and interest ... in his wife’s pregnancy and in the growth and development of the fetus she is' carrying.” Dan-forth, supra, at 69. With regard to the children he has fathered and raised, the Court has recognized his “cognizable and substantial” interest in their custody. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U. S. 645, 651-652 (1972); see also Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U. S. 246 (1978); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U. S. 380 (1979); Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U. S. 248 (1983). If these cases concerned a State’s ability to require the mother to notify the father before taking some action with respect to a living *896child raised by both, therefore, it would be reasonable to conclude as a general matter that the father’s interest in the welfare of the child and the mother’s interest are equal.

Before birth, however, the issue takes on a very different cast. It is an inescapable biological fact that state regulation with respect to the child a woman is carrying will have a far greater impact on the mother’s liberty than on the father’s. The effect of state regulation on a woman’s protected liberty is doubly deserving of scrutiny in such a case, as the State has touched not only upon the private sphere of the family but upon the very bodily integrity of the pregnant woman. Cf. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U. S., at 281. The Court has held that “when the wife and the husband disagree on this decision, the view of only one of the two marriage partners can prevail. Inasmuch as it is the woman who physically bears the child and who is the more directly and immediately affected by the pregnancy, as between the two, the balance weighs in her favor.” Danforth, supra, at 71. This conclusion rests upon the basic nature of marriage and the nature of our Constitution: “[T]he marital couple is not an independent entity with a mind and heart of its own, but an association of two individuals each with a separate intellectual and emotional makeup. If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.” Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U. S., at 453 (emphasis in original). The Constitution protects individuals, men and women alike, from unjustified state interference, even when that interference is enacted into law for the benefit of their spouses.

There was a time, not so long ago, when a different understanding of the family and of the Constitution prevailed. In Bradwell v. State, 16 Wall. 130 (1873), three Members of this *897Court reaffirmed the common-law principle that “a woman had no legal existence separate from her husband, who was regarded as her head and representative in the social state; and, notwithstanding some recent modifications of this civil status, many of the special rules of law flowing from and dependent upon this cardinal principle still exist in foil force in most States.” Id., at 141 (Bradley, X, joined by Swayne and Field, JX, concurring in judgment). Only one generation has passed since this Court observed that “woman is still regarded as the center of home and family life,” with attendant “special responsibilities” that precluded full and independent legal status under the Constitution. Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U. S. 57, 62 (1961). These views, of course, are no longer consistent with our understanding of the family, the individual, or the Constitution.

In keeping with our rejection of the common-law understanding of a woman’s role within the family, the Court held in Danforth that the Constitution does not permit a State to require a married woman to obtain her husband’s consent before undergoing an abortion. 428 U. S., at 69. The principles that guided the Court in Danforth should be our guides today. For the great many women who are victims of abuse inflicted by their husbands, or whose children are the victims of such abuse, a spousal notice requirement enables the husband to wield an effective veto over his wife’s decision. Whether the prospect of notification itself deters such women from seeking abortions, or whether the husband, through physical force or psychological pressure or economic coercion, prevents his wife from obtaining an abortion until it is too late, the notice requirement will often be tantamount to the veto found unconstitutional in Danforth. The women most affected by this.law — those who most reasonably fear the consequences of notifying their husbands that they are pregnant — are in the gravest danger.

*898The husband’s interest in the life of the child his wife is carrying does not permit the State to empower him with this troubling degree of authority over his wife. The contrary view leads to consequences reminiscent of the common law. A husband has no enforceable right to require a wife to advise him before she exercises her personal choices. If a husband’s interest in the potential life of the child outweighs a wife’s liberty, the State could require a married woman to notify her husband before she uses a postfertilization contraceptive. Perhaps next in line would be a statute requiring pregnant married women to notify their husbands before engaging in conduct causing risks to the fetus. After all, if the husband’s interest in the fetus’ safety is a sufficient predicate for state regulation, the State could reasonably conclude that pregnant wives should notify their husbands before drinking alcohol or smoking. Perhaps married women should notify their husbands before using contraceptives or before undergoing any type of surgery that may have complications affecting the husband’s interest in his wife’s reproductive organs. And if a husband’s interest justifies notice in any of these cases, one might reasonably argue that it justifies exactly what the Danforth Court held it did not justify — a requirement of the husband’s consent as well. A State may not give to a man the kind of dominion over his wife that parents exercise over their children.

Section 3209 embodies a view of marriage consonant with the common-law status of married women but repugnant to our present understanding of marriage and of the nature of the rights secured by the Constitution. Women do not lose their constitutionally protected liberty when they marry. The Constitution protects all individuals, male or female, married or unmarried, from the abuse of governmental power, even where that power is employed for the supposed benefit of a member of the individual’s family. These considerations confirm our conclusion that § 3209 is invalid.

*899D

We next consider the parental consent provision. Except in a medical emergency, an unemancipated young woman under 18 may not obtain an abortion unless she and one of her parents (or guardian) provides informed consent as defined above. If neither a parent nor a guardian provides consent, a court may authorize the performance of an abortion upon a determination that the young woman is mature and capable of giving informed consent and has in fact given her informed consent, or that an abortion would be in her best interests.

We have been over most of this ground before. Our cases establish, and we reaffirm today, that a State may require a minor seeking an abortion to obtain the consent of a parent or guardian, provided that there is an adequate judicial bypass procedure. See, e. g., Akron II, 497 U. S., at 510-519; Hodgson, 497 U. S., at 461 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment in part); id., at 497-501 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part); Akron I, 462 U. S., at 440; Bellotti II, 443 U. S., at 643-644 (plurality opinion). Under these precedents, in our view, the one-parent consent requirement and judicial bypass procedure are constitutional.

The only argument made by petitioners respecting this provision and to which our prior decisions do not speak is the contention that the parental consent requirement is invalid because it requires informed parental consent. For the most part, petitioners’ argument is a reprise of their argument with respect to the informed consent requirement in general, and we reject it for the reasons given above. Indeed, some of the provisions regarding informed consent have particular force with respect to minors: the waiting period, for example, may provide the parent or parents of a pregnant young woman the opportunity to consult with her in private, and to discuss the consequences of her decision in *900the context of the values and moral or religious principles of their family. See Hodgson, supra, at 448-449 (opinion of Stevens, J.).

E

Under the recordkeeping and reporting requirements of the statute, every facility which performs abortions is required to file a report stating its name and address as well as the name and address of any related entity, such as a controlling or subsidiary organization. In the case of state-funded institutions, the information becomes public.

For each abortion performed, a report must be filed identifying: the physician (and the second physician where required); the facility; the referring physician or agency; the woman’s age; the number of prior pregnancies and prior abortions she has had;'gestational age; the type of abortion procedure; the date of the abortion; whether there were any pre-existing medical conditions which would complicate pregnancy; medical complications with the abortion; where applicable, the basis for the determination that the abortion was medically necessary; the weight of the aborted fetus; and whether the woman was married, and if so, whether notice was provided or the basis for the failure to give notice. Every abortion facility must also file quarterly reports showing the number of abortions performed broken down by trimester. See 18 Pa. Cons. Stat, §§ 3207, 8214 (1990). In all events, the identity of each woman who has had an abortion remains confidential.

In Danforth, 428 U. S., at 80, we held that recordkeeping and reporting provisions “that are reasonably directed to the preservation of maternal health and that properly respect a patient’s confidentiality and privacy are permissible.” We think that under this standard, all the provisions at issue here, except that relating to spousal notice, are constitutional. Although they do not relate to the State’s interest in informing the woman’s choice, they do relate to health. The collection of information with respect to actual patients *901is a vital element of medical research, and so it cannot be said that the requirements serve no purpose other than to make abortions more difficult. Nor do we find that the requirements impose a substantial obstacle to a woman’s choice. At most they might increase the cost of some abortions by a slight amount. While at some point increased cost could become a substantial obstacle, there is no such showing on the record before us.

Subsection (12) of the reporting provision requires the re-, porting of, among other things, a married woman’s “reason for failure to provide notice” to her husband. § 3214(a)(12). This provision in effeet requires women, as a condition of obtaining an abortion, to provide the Commonwealth with the precise information we have already recognized that many women have pressing reasons not to reveal. Like the spousal notice requirement itself, this provision places an undue burden on a woman’s choice, and must be invalidated for that reason.

VI

Our Constitution is a covenant running from the first generation of Americans to us and then to future generations. It is a coherent succession. Each generation must learn anew that the Constitution’s written terms embody ideas and aspirations that must survive more ages than one. We accept our responsibility not to retreat from interpreting the full meaning of the covenant in light of all of our precedents. We invoke it once again to define the freedom guaranteed by the Constitution’s own promise, the promise of liberty.

* * *

The judgment in No. 91-902 is affirmed. The judgment in No. 91-744 is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion, including consideration of the question of severability.

It is so ordered.

*902APPENDIX TO OPINION OF O’CONNOR, KENNEDY, AND SOUTER, JJ.

Selected Provisions of the 1988 and 1989 Amendments to the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act of 1982

18 PA. CONS. STAT. (1990).

Ҥ3203. Definitions.

“ ‘Medical emergency.’ That condition which, on the basis of the physician’s good faith clinical judgment, so complicates the medical condition of a pregnant woman as to necessitate the immediate abortion of her pregnancy to avert her death or for which a delay will create serious risk of substantial and irreversible impairment of major bodily function.”

Ҥ3205. Informed consent.

“(a) General rule. — No abortion shall be performed or induced except with the voluntary and informed consent of the woman upon whom the abortion is to be performed or induced. Except in the case of a medical emergency, consent to an abortion is voluntary and informed if and only if:

“(1) At least 24 hours prior to the abortion, the physician who is to perform the abortion or the referring physician has orally informed the woman of:

“(i) The nature of the proposed procedure or treatment and of those risks and alternatives to the procedure or treatment that a reasonable patient would consider material to the decision of whether or not to undergo the abortion.

“(ii) The probable gestational age of the unborn child at the time the abortion is to be performed.

“(iii) The medical risks associated with carrying her child to term.

“(2) At least 24 hours prior to the abortion, the physician who is to perform the abortion or the referring physician, or a qualified physician assistant, health care practitioner, technician or social worker to whom the re*903sponsibility has been delegated by either physician, has informed the pregnant woman that:

“(i) The department publishes printed materials which describe the unborn child and list agencies which offer alternatives to abortion and that she has a right to review the printed materials and that a copy will be provided to her free of charge if she chooses to review it.

“(ii) Medical assistance benefits may be available for prenatal care, childbirth and neonatal care, and that more detailed information on the availability of such assistance is contained in the printed materials published by the department.

“(iii) The father of the unborn child is liable to assist in the support of her child, even in instances where he has offered to pay for the abortion. In the case of rape, this information may be omitted.

“(3) A copy of the printed materials has been provided to the woman if she chooses to view these materials.

“(4) The pregnant woman certifies in writing, prior to the abortion, that the information required to be provided under paragraphs (1), (2) and (3) has been provided.

“(b) Emergency. — Where a medical emergency compels the performance of an abortion, the physician shall inform the woman, prior to the abortion if possible, of the medical indications supporting his judgment that an abortion is necessary to avert her death or to avert substantial and irreversible impairment of major bodily function.

“(e) Penalty. — Any physician who violates the provisions of this section is guilty of ‘unprofessional conduct’ and his license for the practice of medicine and surgery shall be subject to suspension or revocation in accordance with procedures provided under the act of October 5,1978 (P. L. 1109, No. 261), known as the Osteopathic Medical Practice Act, the *904act of December 20, 1985 (P. L. 457, No. 112), known as the Medical Practice Act of 1985, or their successor acts. Any physician who performs or induces an abortion without first obtaining the certification required by subsection (a)(4) or with knowledge or reason to know that the informed consent of the woman has not been obtained shall for the first offense be guilty of a summary offense and for each subsequent offense be guilty of a misdemeanor of the third degree. No physician shall be guilty of violating this section for failure to furnish the information required by subsection (a) if he or she can demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he or she reasonably believed that furnishing the information would have resulted in a severely adverse effect on the physical or mental health of the patient.

“(d) Limitation on civil liability. — Any physician who complies with the provisions of this section may not be held civilly liable to his patient for failure to obtain informed consent to the abortion within the meaning of that term as defined by the act of October 15, 1975 (P. L. 390, No. Ill), known as the Health Care Services Malpractice Act.”

Ҥ 3206. Parental consent.

“(a) General rule. — Except in the case of a medical emergency or except as provided in this section, if a pregnant woman is less than 18 years of age and not emancipated, or if she has been adjudged an incompetent under 20 Pa. C. S. §5511 (relating to petition and hearing; examination by court-appointed physician), a physician shall not perform an abortion upon her unless, in the case of a woman who is less than 18 years of age, he first obtains the informed consent both of the pregnant woman and of one of her parents; or, in the case of a woman who is incompetent, he first obtains the informed consent of her guardian. In deciding whether to grant such consent, a pregnant woman’s parent or guardian shall consider only their child’s or ward’s best interests. In the case of a pregnancy that is the result of incest, where *905the father is a party to the incestuous act, the pregnant woman need only obtain the consent of her mother.

“(b) Unavailability of parent or guardian. — If both parents have died or are otherwise unavailable to the physician within a reasonable time and in a reasonable manner, consent of the pregnant woman’s guardian or guardians shall be sufficient. If the pregnant woman’s parents are divorced, consent of the parent having custody shall be sufficient. If neither any parent nor a legal guardian is available to the physician within a reasonable time and in a reasonable manner, consent of any adult person standing in loco parentis shall be sufficient.

“(c) Petition to the court for consent. — If both of the parents or guardians of the pregnant woman refuse to consent to the performance of an abortion or if she elects not to seek the consent of either of her parents or of her guardian, the court of common pleas of the judicial district in which the applicant resides or in which the abortion is sought shall, upon petition or motion, after an appropriate hearing, authorize a physician to perform the abortion if the court determines that the pregnant woman is mature and capable of giving informed consent to the proposed abortion, and has, in fact, given such consent.

“(d) Court order. — If the court determines that the pregnant woman is not mature and capable of giving informed consent or if the pregnant woman does not claim to be mature and capable of giving informed consent, the court shall determine whether the performance of an abortion upon her would be in her best interests. If the court determines that the performance of an abortion would be in the best interests of the woman, it shall authorize a physician to perform the abortion.

“(e) Representation in proceedings. — The pregnant woman may participate in proceedings in the court on her own behalf and the court may appoint a guardian ad litem to assist her. The court shall, however, advise her that she has *906a right to court appointed counsel, and shall provide her with such counsel unless she wishes to appear with private counsel or has knowingly and intelligently waived representation by counsel.”

Ҥ3207. Abortion facilities.

“(b) Reports. — Within 30 days after the effective date of this chapter, every facility at which abortions are performed shall file, and update immediately upon any change, a report with the department, containing the following information:

“(1) Name and address of the facility.

“(2) Name and address of any parent, subsidiary or affiliated organizations, corporations or associations.

“(3) Name and address of any parent, subsidiary or affiliated organizations, corporations or associations having contemporaneous commonality of ownership, beneficial interest, directorship or offieership with any other facility.

The information contained in those reports which are filed pursuant to this subsection by facilities which receive State-appropriated funds during the 12-ealendar-month period immediately preceding a request to inspect or copy such reports shall be deemed public information. Reports filed by facilities which do not receive State-appropriated funds shall only be available to law enforcement officials, the State Board of Medicine and the State Board of Osteopathic Medicine for use in the performance of their official duties. Any facility failing to comply with the provisions of this subsection shall be assessed by the department a fine of $500 for each day it is in violation hereof.”

Ҥ 3208. Printed information.

“(a) General rule. — The department shall cause to be published in English, Spanish and Vietnamese, within 60 days after this chapter becomes law, and shall update on an annual basis, the following easily comprehensible printed materials:

*907“(1) Geographically indexed materials designed to inform the woman of public and private agencies and services available to assist a woman through pregnancy, upon childbirth and while the child is dependent, including adoption agencies, which shall include a comprehensive list of the agencies available, a description of the services they offer and a description of the manner, including telephone numbers, in which they might be contacted, or, at the option of the department, printed materials including a toll-free 24-hour a day telephone number which may be called to obtain, orally, such a list and description of agencies in the locality of the caller' and of the services they offer. The materials shall provide information on the availability of medical assistance benefits for prenatal care, childbirth and neonatal care, and state that it is unlawful for any individual to coerce a woman to undergo abortion, that any physician who performs an abortion upon a woman without obtaining her informed consent or without according her a private medical consultation may be liable to her for damages in a civil action at law, that the father of a child is liable to assist in the support of that child, even in instances where the father has offered to pay for an abortion and that the law permits adoptive parents to pay costs of prenatal care, childbirth and neonatal care.

“(2) Materials designed to inform the woman of the probable anatomical and physiological characteristics of the unborn child at two-week gestational increments from fertilization to full term, including pictures representing the development of unborn children at two-week gestational increments, and any relevant information on the possibility of the unborn child’s survival; provided that any such pictures or drawings must contain the dimensions of the fetus and must be realistic and appropriate for the woman’s stage of pregnancy. The materials shall be objective, non-judgmental and designed *908to convey only accurate scientific information about the unborn child at the various gestational ages.' The material shall also contain objective information describing the methods of abortion procedures commonly employed, the medical risks commonly associated with each such procedure, the possible detrimental psychological effects of abortion and the medical risks commonly associated with each such procedure and the medical risks commonly associated with carrying a child to term.

“(b) Format. — The materials shall be printed in a typeface large enough to be clearly legible.

“(e) Free distribution. — The materials required under this section shall be available at no cost from the department upon request and in appropriate number to any person, facility or hospital.”

Ҥ3209. Spousal notice.

“(a) Spousal notice required. — In order to further the Commonwealth’s interest in promoting the integrity of the marital relationship and to protect a spouse’s interests in having children within marriage and in protecting the prenatal life of that spouse’s child, no physician shall perform an abortion on a married woman, except as provided in subsections (b) and (c), unless he or she has received a signed statement, which need not be notarized, from the woman upon whom the abortion is to be performed, that she has notified her spouse that she is about to undergo an abortion. The statement shall bear a notice that any false statement made therein is punishable by law.

“(b) Exceptions. — The statement certifying that the notice required by subsection (a) has been given need not be furnished where the woman provides the physician a signed statement certifying at least one of the following:

“(1) Her spouse is not the father of the child.

“(2) Her spouse, after diligent effort, could not be located.

*909“(3) The pregnancy is a result of spousal sexual assault as described in section 3128 (relating to spousal sexual assault), which has been reported to a law enforcement agency having the requisite jurisdiction.

“(4) The woman has reason to believe that the furnishing of notice to her spouse is likely to result in the infliction of bodily injury upon her by her spouse or by another individual.

Such statement need not be notarized, but shall bear a notice that any false statements made therein are punishable by law.

“(c) Medical emergency. — The requirements of subsection (a) shall not apply in case of a medical emergency.

“(d) Forms. — The department shall cause to be published, forms which may be utilized for purposes of providing the signed statements required by subsections (a) and (b). The department shall distribute an adequate supply of such forms to all abortion facilities in this Commonwealth.

“(e) Penalty; civil action. — Any'physician who violates the provisions of this section is guilty of 'unprofessional conduct,’ and his -or her license for the practice of medicine and surgery shall be subject to suspension or revocation in accordance with procedures provided under the act of October 5, 1978 (P. L. 1109, No. 261), known as the Osteopathic Medical Practice Act, the act of December 20, 1985 (P. L. 457, No. 112), known as the Medical Practice Act of 1985, or their successor acts. In addition, any physician who knowingly violates the provisions of this section shall be civilly liable to the spouse who is the father of the aborted child for any damages caused thereby and for punitive damages in the amount of $5,000, and the court shall award a prevailing plaintiff a reasonable attorney fee as part of costs.”

Ҥ3214. Reporting.

“(a) General rule. — For the purpose of promotion of maternal health and life by adding to the sum of medical and *910public health knowledge through the compilation of relevant data, and to promote the Commonwealth’s interest in protection of the unborn child, a report of each abortion performed shall be made to the department on forms prescribed by it. The report forms shall not identify the individual patient by name and shall include the following information:

“(1) Identification of the physician who performed the abortion, the concurring physician as required by section 3211(c)(2) (relating to abortion on unborn child of 24 or more weeks gestational age), the second physician as required by section 3211(c)(5) and the facility where the abortion was performed and of the referring physician, agency or service, if any.

“(2) The county and state in which the woman resides.

“(3) The woman’s age.

“(4) The number of prior pregnancies and prior abortions of the woman.

“(5) The gestational age of the unborn child at the time of the abortion.

“(6) The type of procedure performed or prescribed and the date of the abortion.

“(7) Pre-existing medical conditions of the woman which would complicate pregnancy, if any, and if known, any medical complication which resulted from the abortion itself.

“(8) The basis for the medical judgment of the physician who performed the abortion that the abortion was necessary to prevent either the death of the pregnant woman or the substantial and irreversible impairment of a major bodily function of the woman, where an abortion has been performed pursuant to section 3211(b)(1).

“(9) The weight of the aborted child for any abortion performed pursuant to section 3211(b)(1).

“(10) Basis for any medical judgment that a medical emergency existed which excused the physician from compliance with any provision of this chapter.

*911“(11) The information required to be reported under section 3210(a) (relating to determination of gestational age).

“(12) Whether the abortion was performed upon a married woman and, if so, whether notice to her spouse was given. If no notice to her spouse was given, the report shall also indicate the reason for failure to provide notice.

“(f) Report by facility. — Every facility in which an abortion is performed within this Commonwealth during any quarter year shall file with the department a report showing the total number of abortions performed within the hospital or other facility during that quarter year. This report shall also show the total abortions performed in each trimester of pregnancy. Any report shall be available for public inspection and copying only if the facility receives State-appropriated funds within the 12-calendar-month period immediately preceding the filing of the report. These reports shall be submitted on a form prescribed by the department which will enable, a facility to indicate whether or not it is receiving State-appropriated funds. If the facility indicates on the form that it is not receiving State-appropriated funds, the department shall regard its report as confidential unless it receives other evidence which causes it to conclude that the facility receives State-appropriated funds.”

Justice Stevens,

concurring in part and dissenting in part.

The portions of the Court’s opinion that I have joined are more important than those with which I disagree. I shall therefore first comment on significant areas of agreement, and then explain the limited character of my disagreement.

*912f-H

The Court is unquestionably correct in concluding that the doctrine of stare decisis has controlling significance in a case of this kind, notwithstanding an individual Justice’s concerns about the merits.1 The central holding of Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113 (1973), has been a “part of our law” for almost two decades. Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U. S. 52, 101 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). It was a natural sequel to the protection of individual liberty established in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479 (1965). See also Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U. S. 678, 687, 702 (1977) (White, J., concurring in part and concurring in result). The societal costs of overruling Roe at this late date would be enormous. Roe is an integral part of a correct understanding of both the concept of liberty and the basic equality of men and women.

Stare decisis also provides a sufficient basis for my agreement with the joint opinion’s reaffirmation of Roe’s post-viability analysis. Specifically, I accept the proposition that “[i]f the State is interested in protecting fetal life after viability, it may go so far as to proscribe abortion during that period, except when it is necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother.” 410 U. S., at 163-164; see ante, at 879.

I also accept what is implicit in the Court’s analysis, namely, a reaffirmation of Roe’s explanation oí-why the State’s obligation to protect the life or health of the mother *913must take precedence over any duty to the unborn. The Court in Roe carefully considered, and rejected, the State’s argument “that the fetus is a ‘person’ within the language and meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.” 410 U. S., at 156. After analyzing the usage of “person” in the Constitution, the Court concluded that that word “has application only postnatally.” Id., at 157. Commenting on the contingent property interests of the unborn that are generally represented by guardians ad litem, the Court noted: “Perfection of the interests involved, again, has generally been contingent upon live birth. In short, the unborn have never been recognized in the law as persons in the whole sense.” Id., at 162. Accordingly, an abortion is not “the termination of life entitled to Fourteenth Amendment protection.” Id., at 159. From this holding, there was no dissent, see id., at 173; indeed, no Member of the Court has ever questioned this fundamental proposition. Thus, as a matter of federal constitutional law, a developing organism that is not yet a “person” does not have what is sometimes described as a “right to life.”2 This has been and, by the Court’s holding today, *914remains a fundamental premise of our constitutional law governing reproductive autonomy.

II

My disagreement with the joint opinion begins with its understanding of the trimester framework established in Roe. Contrary to the suggestion of the joint opinion, ante, at 876, it is not a “contradiction” to recognize that the State may have a legitimate interest in potential human life and, at the same time, to conclude that that interest does not justify the regulation of abortion before viability (although other interests, such as maternal health, may). The fact that the State’s interest is legitimate does not tell us when, if ever, that interest outweighs the pregnant woman’s interest in personal liberty. It is appropriate, therefore, to consider more carefully the nature of the interests at stake.

First, it is clear that, in order to be legitimate, the State’s interest must be secular; consistent with the First Amendment the State may not promote a theological or sectarian interest. See Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U. S. 747, 778 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring); see generally Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U. S. 490, 563-572 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Moreover, as discussed above, the state interest in potential human life is not an interest in loco parentis, for the fetus is not a person.

Identifying the State’s interests — which the States rarely articulate with any precision — makes clear that the interest in protecting potential life is not grounded in the Constitution. It is, instead, an indirect interest supported by both humanitarian and pragmatic concerns. Many of our citizens believe that any abortion reflects an unacceptable disrespect for potential human life and that the performance of more *915than a million abortions each year is intolerable; many find third-trimester abortions performed when the fetus is approaching personhood particularly offensive. The State has a legitimate interest in minimizing such offense. The State may also have a broader interest in expanding the population,3 believing society would benefit from the services of additional productive citizens — or that the potential human lives might include the occasional Mozart or Curie. These are the kinds of concerns that comprise the State’s interest in potential human life.

In counterpoise is the woman’s constitutional interest in liberty. One aspect of this liberty is a right to bodily integrity, a right to control one’s person. See, e. g., Rochin v. California, 342 U. S. 165 (1952); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U. S. 535 (1942). This right is neutral on the question of abortion: The Constitution would be equally offended by an absolute requirement that all women undergo abortions as by an absolute prohibition on abortions. “Our whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of giving government the power to control men’s minds.” Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U. S. 557, 565 (1969). The same holds true for the power to control women’s bodies.

The woman’s constitutional liberty interest also involves her freedom to decide matters of the highest privacy and the most personal nature. Cf. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U. S. 589, *916598-600 (1977). A woman considering abortion faces “a difficult choice having serious and personal consequences of major importance to her own future — perhaps to the salvation of her own immortal soul.” Thornburgh, 476 U. S., at 781. The authority to make such traumatic and yet empowering decisions is an element of basic human dignity. As the joint opinion so eloquently demonstrates, a woman’s decision to terminate her pregnancy is nothing less than a matter of conscience.

Weighing the State’s interest in potential life and the woman’s liberty interest, I agree with the joint opinion that the State may “ ‘ “expres[s] a preference for normal childbirth,”’” that the State may take steps to ensure that a woman’s choice “is thoughtful and informed,” and that “States are free to enact laws to provide a reasonable framework for a woman to make a decision that has such profound and lasting meaning.” Ante, at 872-873. Serious questions arise, however, when a State attempts to “persuade the woman to choose childbirth over abortion.” Ante, at 878. Decisional autonomy must limit the State’s power to inject into a woman’s most personal deliberations its own views of what is best. The State may promote its preferences by funding childbirth, by creating and maintaining alternatives to abortion, and by espousing the virtues of family; but it must respect the individual’s freedom to make such judgments.

This theme runs throughout our decisions concerning reproductive freedom. In general, Roe’s requirement that restrictions on abortions before viability be justified by the State’s interest in maternal health has prevented States from interjecting regulations designed to influence a woman’s decision. Thus, we have upheld regulations of abortion that are not efforts to sway or direct a woman’s choice, but rather are efforts to enhance the deliberative quality of that decision or are neutral regulations on the health aspects of her decision. We have, for example, upheld regulations re*917quiring written informed consent, see Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U. S. 52 (1976); limited rec-ordkeeping and reporting, see ibid.; and pathology reports, see Planned Parenthood Assn. of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 462 U. S. 476 (1983); as well as various licensing and qualification provisions, see, e. g., Roe, 410 U. S., at 150; Simopoulos v. Virginia, 462 U. S. 506 (1983). Conversely, we have consistently rejected state efforts to prejudice a woman’s choice, either by limiting the information available to her, see Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U. S. 809 (1975), or by “requiring] the delivery of information designed ‘to influence the woman’s informed choice between abortion or childbirth.’ ” Thornburgh, 476 U. S., at 760; see also Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U. S. 416, 442-449 (1983).

In my opinion, the principles established in this long line of eases and the wisdom reflected in Justice Powell’s opinion for the Court in Akron (and followed by the Court just six years ago in Thornburgh) should govern our decision today. Under these principles, Pa. Cons. Stat. § § 3205(a)(2)(i) — (iii) (1990) of the Pennsylvania statute are unconstitutional. Those sections require a physician or counselor to provide the woman with a range of materials clearly designed to persuade her to choose not to undergo the abortion. While the Commonwealth is free, pursuant to § 3208 of the Pennsylvania law, to produce and disseminate such material, the Commonwealth may not inject such information into the woman’s deliberations just as she is weighing such an important ehoice.

Under this same analysis, §§ 3205(a)(l)(i) and (iii) of the Pennsylvania statute are constitutional. Those sections, which require the physician to inform a woman of the nature and risks of the abortion procedure and the medical risks of carrying to term, are neutral requirements comparable to those imposed in other medical procedures. Those sections indicate no effort by the Commonwealth to influence the *918woman’s choice in any way. If anything, such requirements enhance, rather than skew, the woman’s decisionmaking.

I — I HH

The 24-hour waiting period required by §§ 3205(a)(l)-(2) of the Pennsylvania statute raises even more serious concerns. Such a requirement arguably furthers the Commonwealth’s interests in two ways, neither of which is constitutionally permissible.

First, it may be argued that the 24-hour delay is justified by the mere fact that it is likely to reduce the number of abortions, thus furthering the Commonwealth’s interest in potential life. But such an argument would justify any form of coercion that placed an obstacle in the woman’s path. The Commonwealth cannot further its interests by simply wearing down the ability of the pregnant woman to exercise her constitutional right.

Second, it can more reasonably be argued that the 24-hour delay furthers the Commonwealth’s interest in ensuring that the woman’s decision is informed and thoughtful. But there is no evidence that the mandated delay benefits women or that it is necessary to enable the physician to convey any relevant information to the patient. The mandatory delay thus appears to rest on outmoded and unacceptable assumptions about the decisionmaking capacity of women. While there are well-established and consistently maintained reasons for the Commonwealth to view with skepticism the ability of minors to make decisions, see Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U. S. 417, 449 (1990),4 none of those reasons applies to an *919adult woman’s decisionmaking ability. Just as we have left behind the belief that a woman must consult her husband before undertaking serious matters, see ante, at 895-898, so we must reject the notion that a woman is less capable of deciding matters of gravity. Cf. Reed v. Reed, 404 U. S. 71 (1971).

In the alternative, the delay requirement may be premised on the belief that the decision to terminate a pregnancy is presumptively wrong. This premise is illegitimate. Those who disagree vehemently about the legality and morality of abortion agree about one thing: The decision to terminate a pregnancy is profound and difficult. No person undertakes such a decision lightly — and States may not presume that a woman has failed to reflect adequately merely because her conclusion differs from the State’s preference. A woman who has, in the privacy of her thoughts and conscience, weighed the options and made her decision cannot be forced to reconsider all, simply because the State believes she has come to the wrong conclusion.5

*920Part of the constitutional liberty to choose is the equal dignity to which each of us is entitled. A woman who decides to terminate her pregnancy is entitled to the same respect as a woman who decides to carry the fetus to term. The mandatory waiting period denies women that equal respect.

IV

In my opinion, a correct application of the “undue burden” standard leads to the same conclusion concerning the constitutionality of these requirements. A state-imposed burden on the exercise of a constitutional right is measured both by its effects and by its character: A burden may be “undue” either because the burden is too severe or because it lacks a legitimate, rational justification.6

The 24-hour delay requirement fails both parts of this test. The findings of the District Court establish the severity of *921the burden that the 24-hour delay imposes on many pregnant women. Yet even in those cases in which the delay is not especially onerous, it is, in my opinion, “undue” because there is no evidence that such a delay serves a useful and legitimate purpose. As indicated above, there is no legitimate reason to require a woman who has agonized over her decision to leave the clinic or hospital and return again another day. While a general requirement that a physician notify her patients about the risks of a proposed medical procedure is appropriate, a rigid requirement that all patients wait 24 hours or (what is true in practice) much longer to evaluate the significance of information that is either common knowledge or irrelevant is an irrational and, therefore, “undue” burden.

The counseling provisions are similarly infirm. Whenever government commands private citizens to speak or to listen, careful review of the justification for that command is particularly appropriate. In these eases, the Pennsylvania statute directs that counselors provide women seeking abortions with information concerning alternatives to abortion, the availability of medical assistance benefits, and the possibility of child-support payments. §§ 3205(a)(2)(i) — (iii). The statute requires that this information be given to all women seeking abortions, including those for whom such information is clearly useless, such as those who are married, those who have undergone the procedure in the past and are fully aware of the options, and those who are fully convinced that abortion is their only reasonable option. Moreover, the statute requires physicians to inform all of their patients of “[t]he probable gestational age of the unborn child.” §3205(a)(l)(ii). This information is of little decisional value in most cases, because 90% of all abortions are performed during the first trimester7 when fetal age has less relevance than when the fetus nears viability. Nor can the informa*922tion required by the statute be justified as relevant to any “philosophic” or “social” argument, ante, at 872, either favoring or disfavoring the abortion decision in a particular ease. In light of all of these facts, I conclude that the information requirements in §3205(a)(l)(ii) and §§ 3205(a)(2)(i)-(iii) do not serve a useful purpose and thus constitute an unnecessary— and therefore undue — burden on the woman’s constitutional liberty to decide to terminate her pregnancy.

Accordingly, while I disagree with Parts IV, V-B, and V-D of the joint opinion,8 I join the remainder of the Court’s opinion.

Justice Blackmun,

concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part.

I join Parts I, II, III, V-A, V-C, and VI of the joint opinion of Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, ante.

Three years ago, in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U. S. 490 (1989), four Members of this Court appeared poised to “cas[t] into darkness the hopes and visions of every woman in this country” who had come to believe that the Constitution guaranteed her the right to reproductive choice. Id., at 557 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See id., at 499 (plurality opinion of Rehnquist, C. J., joined by White and Kennedy, JJ.); id., at 532 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). All that remained between the promise of Roe and the darkness of the plurality was a single, flickering flame. Decisions since Webster gave little reason to hope that this flame would cast much light. See, e. g., Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 497 U. S. 502, 524 (1990) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). But now, just when so many expected the darkness to fall, the flame has grown bright.

*923I do not underestimate the significance of today’s joint opinion. Yet I remain steadfast in my belief that the right to reproductive choice is entitled to the full protection afforded by this Court before Webster. And I fear for the darkness as four Justices anxiously await the single vote necessary to extinguish the light.

I — i

Make no mistake, the joint opinion of Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter is an act of personal courage and constitutional principle. In contrast to previous decisions in which Justices O’Connor and Kennedy postponed reconsideration of Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113 (1973), the authors of the joint opinion today join Justice Stevens and me in concluding that “the essential holding of Roe v. Wade should be retained and once again reaffirmed.” Ante, at 846. In brief, five Members of this Court today recognize that “the Constitution protects a woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy in its early stages.” Ante, at 844.

A fervent view of individual liberty and the force of stare decisis have led the Court to this conclusion. Ante, at 853. Today a majority reaffirms that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment establishes “a realm of personal liberty which the government may not enter,” ante, at 847— a realm whose outer limits cannot be determined by interpretations of the Constitution that focus only on the specific practices of States at the time the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted. See ante, at 848-849. Included within this realm of liberty is “The right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.’ ” Ante, at 851, quoting Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U. S. 438, 453 (1972) (emphasis in original). “These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the *924liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.” Ante, at 851 (emphasis added). Finally, the Court today recognizes that in the case of abortion, “the liberty of the woman is at stake in a sense unique to the human condition and so unique to the law. The mother who carries a child to full term is subject to anxieties, to physical constraints, to pain that only she must bear.” Ante, at 852.

The Court’s reaffirmation of Roe’s central holding is also based on the force of stare decisis. “[N]o erosion of principle going to liberty or personal autonomy has left Roe’s central holding a doctrinal remnant; Roe portends no developments at odds with other precedent for the analysis of personal liberty; and no changes of fact have rendered viability more or less appropriate as the point at which the balance of interests tips.” Ante, at 860-861. Indeed, the Court acknowledges that Roe’s limitation on state power could not be removed “without serious inequity to those who have relied upon it or significant damage to the stability of the society governed by it.” Ante, at 855. In the 19 years since Roe was decided, that case has shaped more than reproductive planning — “[a]n entire generation has come of age free to assume Roe’s concept of liberty in defining the capacity of women to act in society, and to make reproductive decisions.” Ante, at 860. The Court understands that, having “call[ed] the contending sides ... to end their national division by accepting a common mandate rooted in the Constitution,” ante, at 867, a decision to overrule Roe “would seriously weaken the Court’s capacity to exercise the judicial power and to function as the Supreme Court of a Nation dedicated to the rule of law.” Ante, at 865. What has happened today should serve as a model for future Justices and a warning to all who have tried to turn this Court into yet another political branch.

In striking down the Pennsylvania statute’s spousal notification requirement, the Court has established a framework *925for evaluating abortion regulations that responds to the social context of women facing issues of reproductive choice.1 In determining the burden imposed by the challenged regulation, the Court inquires whether the regulation’s “purpose or effect is to plaee a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains viability.” Ante, at 878 (emphasis added). The Court reaffirms: “The proper focus of constitutional inquiry is the group for whom the law is a restriction, not the group for whom the law is irrelevant.” Ante, at 894. Looking at this group, the Court inquires, based on expert testimony, empirical studies, and common sense, whether “in a large fraction of the cases in which [the restriction] is relevant, it will operate as a substantial obstacle to a woman’s choice to undergo an abortion.” Ante, at 895. “A statute with this purpose is invalid because the means chosen by the State to further the interest in potential life must be calculated to inform the woman’s free choice, not hinder it.” Ante, at 877. And in applying its test, the Court remains sensitive to the unique role of women in the decisionmaking process. Whatever may have been the practice when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, the Court observes, “[w]omen do not lose their constitutionally protected liberty when they marry. The Constitution protects all individuals, male or female, married or unmarried, from the abuse of governmental power, even where that power is employed for the supposed benefit of a member of the individual’s, family.” Ante, at 898.2

*926Lastly, while I believe that the joint opinion errs in failing to invalidate the other regulations, I am pleased that the joint opinion has not ruled out the possibility that these regulations may be shown to impose an unconstitutional burden. The joint opinion makes clear that its specific holdings are based on the insufficiency of the record before it. See, e. g., ante, at 885-886. I am confident that in the future evidence will be produced to show that “in a large fraction of the cases in which [these regulations are] relevant, [they] will operate as a substantial obstacle to a woman’s choice to undergo an abortion.” Ante, at 895.

II

Today, no less than yesterday, the Constitution and decisions of this Court require that a State’s abortion restrictions be subjected to the strictest judicial scrutiny. Our precedents and the joint opinion’s principles require us to subject all non-de-minimis abortion regulations to strict scrutiny. Under this standard, the Pennsylvania statute’s provisions requiring content-based counseling, a 24-hour delay, informed parental consent, and reporting of abortion-related information must be invalidated.

A

The Court today reaffirms the long recognized rights of privacy and bodily integrity. As early as 1891, the Court held, “[n]o right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded by the common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others ... .” Union Pacific R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U. S. 250, 251 (1891). Throughout this century, this Court also has held that the fundamental right of privacy protects citizens against governmental in-*927trusión in such intimate family matters as procreation, child-rearing, marriage, and contraceptive choice. See ante, at 847-849. These eases embody the principle that personal decisions that profoundly affeet bodily integrity, identity, and destiny should be largely beyond the reach of government. Eisenstadt, 405 U. S., at 453. In Roe v. Wade, this Court correctly applied these principles to a woman’s right to choose abortion.

State restrictions on abortion violate a woman’s right of privacy in two ways. First, compelled continuation of a pregnancy infringes upon a woman’s right to bodily integrity by imposing substantial physical intrusions and significant risks of physical harm. During pregnancy, women experience dramatic physical changes and a wide range of health consequences. Labor and delivery pose additional health risks and physical demands. In short, restrictive abortion laws force women to endure physical invasions far more substantial than those this Court has held to violate the constitutional principle of bodily integrity in other contexts. See, e. g., Winston v. Lee, 470 U. S. 753 (1985) (invalidating surgical removal of bullet from murder suspect); Rochin v. California, 342 U. S. 165 (1952) (invalidating stomach pumping).3

Further, when the State restricts a woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy, it deprives a woman of the right to make her own decision about reproduction and family planning — critical life choices that this Court long has deemed central to the right to privacy. The decision to terminate or continue a pregnancy has no less an impact on a woman’s life than decisions about contraception or marriage. 410 U. S., *928at 153. Because motherhood has a dramatic impact on a woman’s educational prospects, employment opportunities, and self-determination, restrictive abortion laws deprive her of basic control over her life.- For these reasons, “the decision whether or not to beget or bear a child” lies at “the very heart of this cluster of constitutionally protected choices.” Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U. S. 678, 685 (1977).

A State’s restrictions on a woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy also implicate constitutional guarantees of gender equality. State restrictions on abortion compel women to continue pregnancies they otherwise might terminate. By restricting the right to terminate pregnancies, the State conscripts women’s bodies into its service, forcing women to continue their pregnancies, suffer the pains of childbirth, and in most instances, provide years of maternal care. The State does not compensate women for their services; instead, it assumes that they owe this duty as a matter of course. This assumption — that women can simply be forced to accept the “natural” status and incidents of motherhood — appears to rest upon a conception of women’s role that -has triggered the protection of the Equal Protection Clause. See, e.g., Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U. S. 718, 724-726 (1982); Craig v. Boren, 429 U. S. 190, 198-199 (1976).4 The joint opinion recognizes that these assumptions about women’s place in society “are no longer consistent with our *929understanding of the family, the individual, or the Constitution.” Ante, at 897.

B

The Court has held that limitations on the right of privacy are permissible only if they survive “strict” constitutional scrutiny — that is, only if the governmental entity imposing the restriction can demonstrate that the limitation is both necessary and narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479, 485 (1965). We have applied this principle specifically in the context of abortion regulations. Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S., at 155.5

Roe implemented these principles through a framework that was designed “to ensure that the woman’s right to choose not become so subordinate to the State’s interest in promoting fetal life that her choice exists in theory but not in fact,” ante, at 872. Roe identified two relevant state interests: “an interest in preserving and protecting the health of the pregnant woman” and an interest in “protecting the potentiality of human life.” 410 U. S., at 162. With respect to the State’s interest in the health of the mother, “the ‘compelling’ point ... is at approximately the end of the first trimester,” because it is at that point that the mortality rate in abortion approaches that in childbirth. Id., at 163. With respect to the State’s interest in potential life, “the ‘compelling’ point is at viability,” because it is at that point that the *930fetus “presumably has the capability of meaningful life outside the mother’s womb.” Ibid. In order to fulfill the requirement of narrow tailoring, “the State is obligated to make a reasonable effort to limit the effect of its regulations to the period in the trimester during which its health interest will be furthered.” Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U. S. 416, 434 (1983).

In my view, application of this analytical framework is no less warranted than when it was approved by seven Members of this Court in Roe. Strict scrutiny of state limitations on reproductive choice still offers the most secure protection of the woman’s right to make her own reproductive decisions, free from state coercion. No majority of this Court has ever agreed upon an alternative approach. The factual premises of the trimester framework have not been undermined, see Webster, 492 U. S., at 553 (Blackmun, J., dissenting), and the Roe framework is far more administra-ble, and far less manipulate, than the “undue burden” standard adopted by the joint opinion.

Nonetheless, three criticisms of the trimester framework continue to be uttered. First, the trimester framework is attacked because its key elements do not appear in the text of the Constitution. My response to this attack remains the same as it was in Webster:

“Were this a true concern, we would have to abandon most of our constitutional jurisprudence. [Tjhe ‘critical elements’ of countless constitutional doctrines nowhere appear in the Constitution’s text.... The Constitution makes no mention, for example, of the First Amendment’s ‘actual malice’ standard for proving certain libels, see New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254 (1964). ... Similarly, the Constitution makes no mention of the rational-basis test, or the specific verbal formulations of intermediate and strict scrutiny by which this Court evaluates claims under the Equal Protection Clause. The reason is simple. Like the Roe framework, these *931tests or standards are not, and do not purport to be, rights protected by the Constitution. Rather, they are judge-made methods for evaluating and measuring the strength and scope of constitutional rights or for balancing the constitutional rights of individuals against the competing interests of government.” Id., at 548.

The second criticism is that the framework more closely resembles a regulatory code than a body of constitutional doctrine. Again, my answer remains the same as in Webster:

“[I]f this were a true and genuine concern, we would have to abandon vast areas of our constitutional jurisprudence. . . . Are [the distinctions entailed in the trimester framework] any finer, or more ‘regulatory,’ than the distinctions we have often drawn in our First Amendment jurisprudence, where, for example, we have held that a ‘release time’ program permitting public-school students to leave school grounds during school hours to receive religious instruction does not violate the Establishment Clause, even though a release-time program permitting religious instruction on school grounds does violate the Clause? Compare Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U. S. 306 (1952), with Illinois ex rel. Mc-Collum v. Board of Education of School Dist. No. 71, Champaign County, 333 U. S. 203 (1948)... . Similarly, in a Sixth Amendment case, the Court held that although an overnight ban on attorney-client communication violated the constitutionally guaranteed right to counsel, Geders v. United States, 425 U. S. 80 (1976), that right was not violated when a trial judge separated a defendant from his lawyer during a 15-minute recess after the defendant’s direct testimony. Perry v. Leeke, 488 U. S. 272 (1989).

“That numerous constitutional doctrines result in narrow differentiations between similar circumstances does *932not mean that this Court has abandoned adjudication in favor of regulation.” Id., at 549-550.

The final, and more genuine, criticism of the trimester framework is that it fails to find the State’s interest in potential human life compelling throughout pregnancy. No Member of this Court — nor for that matter, the Solicitor General, see Tr. of Oral Arg. 42 — has ever questioned our holding in Roe that an abortion is not “the termination of life entitled to Fourteenth Amendment protection.” 410 U. S., at 159. Accordingly, a State’s interest in protecting fetal life is not grounded in the Constitution. Nor, consistent with our Establishment Clause, can it be a theological or sectarian interest. See Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U. S. 747, 778 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring). It is, instead, a legitimate interest grounded in humanitarian or pragmatic concerns. See ante, at 914-915 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

But while a State has “legitimate interests from the outset of the pregnancy in protecting the health of the worn an and the life of the fetus that may become a child,” ante, at 846, legitimate interests are not enough. To overcome the burden of strict scrutiny, the interests must be compelling. The question then is how best to accommodate the State’s interest in potential human life with the constitutional liberties of pregnant women. Again, I stand by the views I expressed in Webster:

“I remain convinced, as six other Members of this Court 16 years ago were convinced, that the Roe framework, and the viability standard in particular, fairly, sensibly, and effectively functions to safeguard the constitutional liberties of pregnant women while recognizing and accommodating the State’s interest in potential human life. The viability line reflects the biological facts and truths of fetal development; it marks that threshold moment prior to which a fetus cannot survive separate from the *933woman and cannot reasonably and objectively be regarded as a subject of rights or interests distinct from, or paramount to, those of the pregnant woman. At the same time, the viability standard takes account of the undeniable fact that as the fetus evolves into its postnatal form, and as it loses its dependence on the uterine environment, the State’s interest in the fetus’ potential human life, and in fostering a regard for human life in general, becomes compelling. As a practical matter, because viability follows ‘quickening’ — the point at which. a woman feels movement in her womb — and because viability occurs no earlier than 23 weeks gestational age, it establishes an easily applicable standard for regulating abortion while providing a pregnant woman ample time to exercise her fundamental right with her responsible physician to terminate her pregnancy.” 492 U. S., at 553-554.6

Roe’s trimester framework does not ignore the State’s interest in prenatal life. Like Justice Stevens, ante, at 916,

I agree that the State may take steps to ensure that a woman’s choice “is thoughtful and informed,” ante, at 872, and that “States are free to enact laws to provide a reasonable framework for a woman to make a decision that has such profound and lasting meaning.” Ante, at 873. But

“[sjerious questions- arise ... when a State attempts to persuade the woman to choose childbirth over abortion. Ante, at 878. Decisional autonomy must limit the State’s power to inject into a woman’s most personal deliberations its own views of what is best. The State may promote its preferences by funding childbirth, by creating and maintaining alternatives to abortion, and by espousing the virtues of family; but it must respect *934the individual’s freedom to make such judgments.” Ante, at 916 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (internal quotation marks omitted).

As the joint opinion recognizes, “the means chosen by the State to further the interest in potential life must be calculated to inform the woman’s free choice, not hinder it.” Ante, at 877.

In sum, .Roe’s requirement of strict scrutiny as implemented through a trimester framework should not be disturbed. No other approach has gained a majority, and no other is more protective of the woman’s fundamental right. Lastly, no other approach properly accommodates the woman’s constitutional right with the State’s legitimate interests.

C

Application of the strict scrutiny standard results in the invalidation of all the challenged provisions. Indeed, as this Court has invalidated virtually identical provisions in prior cases, stare decisis requires that we again strike them down.

This Court has upheld informed- and written-consent requirements only where the State has demonstrated that they genuinely further important health-related state concerns. See Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U. S. 52, 65-67 (1976). A State may not, under the guise of securing informed consent, “require the delivery of information ‘designed to influence the woman’s informed choice between abortion or childbirth.’ ” Thornburgh, 476 U. S., at 760, quoting Akron, 462 U. S., at 443-444. Rigid requirements that a specific body of information be imparted to a woman in all cases, regardless of the needs of the patient, improperly intrude upon the discretion of the pregnant woman’s physician and thereby impose an “‘undesired and uncomfortable straitjacket.’ ” Thornburgh, 476 U. S., at 762, quoting Danforth, 428 U. S., at 67, n. 8.

Measured against these principles, some aspects of the Pennsylvania informed-consent scheme are unconstitutional. *935While it is unobjectionable for the Commonwealth to require that the patient be informed of the nature of the procedure, the health risks of the abortion and of childbirth, and the probable gestational age of the unborn child, compare Pa. Cons. Stat. §§3205(a)(i)-(iii) (1990) with Akron, 462 U. S., at 446, n. 37, I remain unconvinced that there is a vital state need for insisting that the information be provided by a physician rather than a counselor. Id., at 448. The District Court found that the physician-only requirement necessarily would increase costs to the plaintiff clinics, costs that undoubtedly would be passed on to patients. And because trained women counselors are often more understanding than physicians, and generally havé more time to spend with patients, see App. 366-387, the physician-only disclosure requirement is not narrowly tailored to serve the Commonwealth’s interest in protecting maternal health.

Sections 3205(a)(2)(i)~(iii) of the Act further requires that the physician or a qualified nonphysieian inform the woman that printed materials are available from the Commonwealth that describe the fetus and provide information about medical assistance for childbirth, information about child support from the father, and a list of agencies offering adoption and other services as alternatives to abortion. Thornburgh invalidated biased patient-counseling requirements virtually identical to the one at issue here. What we said of those requirements fully applies in these cases:

“[T]he listing of agencies in the printed Pennsylvania form presents serious problems; it contains names of agencies that well may be out of step with the needs of the particular woman and thus places the physician in an awkward position and infringes upon his or her professional responsibilities. Forcing the physician or counselor to present the materials and the list to the woman makes him or her in effect an agent of the State in treating the woman and places his or her imprimatur upon both the materials and the list. All this is, or *936comes close to being, state medicine imposed upon the woman, not the professional medical guidance she seeks, and it officially structures — as it obviously was intended to do — the dialogue between the woman and her physician.

“The requirements . . . that the woman be advised that medical assistance benefits may be available, and that the father is responsible for financial assistance in the support of the child similarly are poorly disguised elements of discouragement for the abortion decision. Much of this ..., for many patients, would be irrelevant and inappropriate. For a patient with a life-threatening pregnancy, the ‘information’ in its very rendition may be cruel as well as destructive of the physician-patient relationship. As any experienced social worker or other counselor knows, theoretical financial responsibility often does not equate with fulfillment.... Under the guise of informed consent, the Act requires the dissemination of information that is not relevant to such consent, and, thus, it advances no legitimate state interest.” 476 U' S., at 762-763 (citation omitted).

“This type of compelled information is the antithesis of informed consent,” id., at 764, and goes far beyond merely describing the general subject matter relevant to the woman’s decision. “That the Commonwealth does not, and surely would not, compel similar disclosure of every possible peril of necessary surgery or of simple vaccination, reveals the anti-abortion character of the statute and its real purpose.” Ibid. 7

*937The 24-hour waiting period following the provision of the foregoing information is also clearly unconstitutional. The District Court found that the mandatory 24-hour delay could lead to delays in excess of 24 hours, thus increasing health risks, and that it would require two visits to the abortion provider, thereby increasing travel time, exposure to further harassment, and financial cost. Finally, the District Court found that the requirement would pose especially significant burdens on women living in rural areas and those women that have difficulty explaining their whereabouts. 744 F. Supp. 1328,1378-1379 (ED Pa. 1990). In Akron this Court invalidated a similarly arbitrary or inflexible waiting period because, as here, it fiirthered no legitimate state interest.8

As Justice Stevens insightfully concludes, the mandatory delay rests either on outmoded or unacceptable assumptions about the decisionmaking capacity of women or the belief that the decision to terminate the pregnancy is *938presumptively wrong. Ante, at 918-919. The requirement that women consider this obvious and slanted information for an additional 24 hours contained in these provisions will only influence the womán’s decision in improper ways. The vast majority of women will know this information — of the few that do not, it is less likely that their minds will be changed by this information than it will be either by the realization that the State opposes their choice or the need once again to endure abuse and harassment on return to the clinic.9

Except in the case of a medical emergency, § 3206 requires a physician to obtain the informed consent of a parent or guardian before performing an abortion on an unemanci-pated minor or an incompetent woman. Based on evidence in the record, the District Court concluded that, in order to fulfill the informed-consent requirement, generally accepted medical principles would require an in-person visit by the parent to the facility. 744 F. Supp., at 1382. Although the Court “has recognized that the State has somewhat broader authority to regulate the activities of children than of adults,” the State nevertheless must demonstrate that there is a “significant state interest in conditioning an abortion... that is not present in the case of an adult.” Danforth, 428 U. S., at 74-75 (emphasis added). The requirement of an in-person visit would carry with it the risk of a delay of several days or possibly weeks, even where the parent is willing to consent. While the State has an interest in encouraging parental involvement-in the minor’s abortion decision, §3206 is not narrowly drawn to serve that interest.10

*939Finally, the Pennsylvania statute requires every facility performing abortions to report its activities to the Commonwealth. Pennsylvania contends that this requirement is valid under Danforth, in which this Court held that record-keeping and reporting requirements that are reasonably directed to the preservation of maternal health and that properly respect a patient’s confidentiality are permissible. Id., at 79-81. The Commonwealth attempts to justify its required reports on the ground that the public has a right to know how its tax dollars are spent. A regulation designed to inform the public about public expenditures does not further the Commonwealth’s interest in protecting maternal health. Accordingly, such a regulation cannot justify a legally significant burden on a woman’s right to obtain an abortion.

The confidential reports concerning the identities and medical judgment of physicians involved in abortions at first glance may seem valid, given the Commonwealth’s interest in maternal health and enforcement of the Act. The District Court found, however, that, notwithstanding the confidentiality protections, many physicians, particularly those who have previously discontinued performing abortions because of harassment, would refuse to refer patients to abortion clinics if their names were to appear on these reports. 744 F. Supp., at 1392. The Commonwealth has failed to show that the name of the referring physician either adds to the pool of scientific knowledge concerning abortion or is reasonably related to the Commonwealth’s interest in maternal health. I therefore agree with the District Court’s conclusion that the confidential reporting requirements are uneon-*940stitutional insofar as they require the name of the referring physician and the basis for his or her medical judgment.

In sum, I would affirm the judgment in No. 91-902 and reverse the judgment in No. 91-744 and remand the eases for further proceedings.

Ill

At long last, The ChieF Justice and those who have joined him admit it. Gone are the contentions that the issue need not be (or has not been) considered. There, on the first page, for all to see, is what was expected: “We believe that Roe was wrongly decided, and that it can and should be overruled consistently with our traditional approach to stare de-cisis in constitutional cases.” Post, at 944. If there is much reason to applaud the advances made by the joint opinion today, there is far more to fear from The ChieF Justice’s opinion.

The ChieF Justice’s criticism of Roe follows from his stunted conception of individual liberty. While recognizing that the Due Process Clause protects more than simple physical liberty, he then goes on to construe this Court’s personal-liberty cases as establishing only a laundry list of particular rights, rather than a principled account of how these particular rights are grounded in a more general right of privacy. Post, at 951. This constricted view is reinforced by The Chief Justice’s exclusive reliance on tradition as a source of fundamental rights. He argues that the record in favor of a right to abortion is no stronger than the record in Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U. S. 110 (1989), where the plurality found no fundamental right to visitation privileges by an adulterous father, or in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U. S. 186 (1986), where the Court found no fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy, or in a ease involving the “ ‘firing [of] a gun . . . into another person’s body.’” Post, at 951-952. In The Chief Justice’s world, a woman considering whether to terminate a pregnancy is entitled to no more protection than adulterers, murderers, and so-called sexual *941deviates.11 Given The ChieF Justice’s exclusive reliance on tradition, people using contraceptives seem the next likely candidate for his list of outcasts.

Even more shocking than The Chief Justice’s cramped notion of individual liberty is his complete omission of any discussion of the effects that compelled childbirth and motherhood have on women’s lives. The only expression of concern with women’s health is purely instrumental — for The CHIEF Justice, only women’s 'psychological health is a concern, and only to the extent that he assumes that every woman who decides to have an abortion does so without serious consideration of the moral implications of her decision. Post, at 967-968. In short, The Chief Justice’s view of the State’s compelling interest in maternal health has less to do with health than it does with compelling women to be maternal.

Nor does. The Chief Justice give any serious consideration to the doctrine of stare decisis. For The Chief Justice, the facts, that gave rise to Roe are surprisingly simple: “women become pregnant, there is a point somewhere, depending on medical technology, where a fetus becomes viable, and women give birth to children.” Post, at 965. This characterization of the issue thus allows The Chief Justice quickly to discard the joint opinion’s reliance argument by asserting that “reproductive planning could take virtually immediate account of” a decision overruling Roe. Post, at 956 (internal quotation marks omitted).

The Chief Justice’s narrow conception of individual liberty and stare decisis leads him to propose the same standard of review proposed by the plurality in Webster. “States may regulate abortion procedures in ways rationally related to a legitimate state interest. Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc., 348 U. S. 483, 491 (1955); cf. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651-653 (1972).” Post, at 966. The *942CHIEF Justice then further weakens the test by providing an insurmountable requirement for facial challenges: Petitioners must “‘show that no set of circumstances exists under which the [provision] would be valid.’ ” Post, at 973, quoting Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 497 U. S., at 514. In short, in his view, petitioners must prove that the statute cannot constitutionally be applied to anyone. Finally, in applying his standard to the spousal-notification provision, The Chief Justice contends that the record lacks any “hard evidence” to support the joint opinion’s contention that a “large fraction” of women who prefer not to notify their husbands involve situations of battered women and unreported spousal assault. Post, at 974, n. 2. Yet throughout the explication of his standard, The Chief Justice never explains what hard evidence is, how large a fraction is required, or how a battered woman is supposed to pursue an as-applied challenge.

Under his standard, States can ban abortion if that ban is rationally related to a legitimate state interest — a standard which the United States calls “deferential, but not toothless.” Yet when' pressed at oral argument to describe the teeth, the best protection that the Solicitor General could offer to women was that a prohibition, enforced by criminal penalties, with no exception for the life of the mother, “could raise very serious questions.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 48. Perhaps, the Solicitor General offered, the failure to include an exemption for the life of the mother would be “arbitrary and capricious.” Id., at 49. If, as The Chief Justice contends, the undue burden test is made out of whole cloth, the so-called “arbitrary and capricious” limit is the Solicitor General’s “new clothes.”

Even if it is somehow “irrational” for a State to require a woman to risk her life for her child, what protection is offered for women who become pregnant through rape or incest? Is there anything arbitrary or capricious about a *943State’s prohibiting the sins of the father from being visited upon his offspring?12

But, we are reassured, there is always the protection of the democratic process. While there is much to be'praised about our democracy, our country since its founding has recognized that there are certain fundamental liberties that are not to be left to the whims of an election. A woman’s right to reproductive choice is one of those fundamental liberties. Accordingly, that liberty need not seek refuge at the ballot box.

IV

In one sense, the Court’s approach is worlds apart from that of The Chief Justice and Justíce Scalia. And yet, in another sense, the distance between the two approaches is short — the distance is but a single vote.

I am 83 years old. I cannot remain on this Court forever, and when I do step down, the confirmation process for my successor well may focus on the issue before us today. That, I regret, may be exactly where the choice between the two worlds will be made.

*944ChieF Justice Rehnquist,

with whom Justice White, Justice Scalia, and Justice Thomas join,

concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part.

The joint opinion, following its newly minted variation on stare decisis, retains the outer shell of Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113 (1973), but beats a wholesale retreat from the substance of that case. We believe that Roe was wrongly decided, and that it can and should be overruled consistently with our traditional approach to stare decisis in constitutional cases. We would adopt the approach of the plurality in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U. S. 490 (1989), and uphold the challenged provisions of the Pennsylvania statute in their entirety.

I

In ruling on this litigation below, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit first observed that “this appeal does not directly implicate Roe; this case involves the regulation of abortions rather than their outright prohibition.” 947 F. 2d 682, 687 (1991). Accordingly, the court directed its attention to the question of the standard of review for abortion regulations. In attempting to settle on the correct standard, however, the court confronted the confused state of this Court’s abortion jurisprudence. After considering the several opinions in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, supra, and Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U. S. 417 (1990), the Court of Appeals concluded that Justice O’Connor’s “undue burden” test was controlling, as that was the narrowest ground on which we had upheld recent abortion regulations. 947 F. 2d, at 693-697 (“When a fragmented court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds” (quoting Marks v. United States, 430 U. S. 188, 193 (1977) (internal quotation marks omitted))). Applying this standard, the Court of Appeals upheld all of the challenged regulations except the one *945requiring a woman to notify her spouse of an intended abortion.

In arguing that this Court should invalidate each of the provisions at issue, petitioners insist that we reaffirm our decision in Roe v. Wade, supra, in which we held unconstitutional a Texas statute making it a crime to procure an abortion except to save the life of the mother.1 We agree with the Court of Appeals that our decision in Roe is not directly implicated by the Pennsylvania statute, which does not prohibit, but simply regulates, abortion. But, as the Court of Appeals found, the state of our post-ftoe decisional law dealing with the regulation of abortion is confusing and uncertain, indicating that a reexamination of that line of eases is in order. Unfortunately for those who must apply this Court’s decisions, the reexamination undertaken today leaves the Court no less divided than beforehand. Although they reject the trimester framework that formed the underpinning of Roe, Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter adopt a revised undue burden standard to analyze the challenged regulations. We conclude, however, that such an outcome is an unjustified constitutional compromise, one which leaves the Court in a position to closely scrutinize all types of abortion regulations despite the fact that it lacks the power to do so under the Constitution.

In Roe, the Court opined that the State “does have an important and legitimate interest in preserving and protecting the health of the pregnant woman, . . . and that it has still another important and legitimate interest in protecting *946the potentiality of human life.” 410 U. S., at 162 (emphasis omitted). In the companion case of Doe v. Bolton, 410 U. S. 179 (1973), the Court referred to its conclusion in Roe “that a pregnant woman does not have an absolute constitutional right to an abortion on her demand.” 410 U. S., at 189. But while the language and holdings of these cases appeared to leave States free to regulate abortion procedures in a variety of ways, later decisions based on them have found considerably less latitude for such regulations than might have been expected.

For example, after Roe, many States have sought to protect their young citizens by requiring that a minor seeking an abortion involve her parents in the decision. Some States have simply required notification of the parents, while others have required a minor to obtain the consent of her parents. In a number of decisions, however, the Court has substantially limited the States in their ability to impose such requirements. With regard to parental notice requirements, we initially held that a State could require a minor to notify her parents before proceeding with an abortion. H. L. v. Matheson, 460 U. S. 398, 407-410 (1981). Recently, however, we indicated that a State’s ability to impose a notice requirement actually depends on whether it requires notice of one or both parents. We concluded that although the Constitution might allow a State to demand that notice be given to one parent prior to an abortion, it may not require that similar notice be given to two parents, unless the State incorporates a judicial bypass procedure in that two-parent requirement. Hodgson v. Minnesota, supra.

We have treated parental consent provisions even more harshly. Three years after Roe, we invalidated a Missouri regulation requiring that an unmarried woman under the age of 18 obtain the consent of one of her parents before proceeding with an abortion. We held that our abortion jurisprudence prohibited the State from imposing such a “blanket provision ... requiring the consent of a parent.” Planned Parenthood *947 of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U. S. 52, 74 (1976). In Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U. S. 622 (1979), the Court struck down a similar Massachusetts parental consent statute. A majority of the Court indicated, however, that a State could constitutionally require parental consent, if it alternatively allowed a pregnant minor to obtain an abortion without parental consent by showing either that she was mature enough to make her own decision, or that the abortion would be in her best interests. See id., at 643-644 (plurality opinion); id., at 656-657 (White, J., dissenting). In light of Bellotti, we have upheld one parental consent regulation which incorporated a judicial bypass option we viewed as sufficient, see Planned Parenthood Assn. of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 462 U. S. 476 (1983), but have invalidated another because of our belief that the judicial procedure did not satisfy the dictates of Bellotti, see Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U. S. 416, 439-442 (1983). We have never had occasion, as we have in the parental notice context, to further parse our parental consent jurisprudence into one-parent and two-parent components.

In Roe, the Court observed that certain States recognized the right of the father to participate in the abortion decision in certain circumstances. Because neither Roe nor Doe involved the assertion of any paternal right, the Court expressly stated that the case did not disturb the validity of regulations that protected such a right. Roe v. Wade, supra, at 165, n. 67. But three years later, in Danforth, the Court extended its abortion jurisprudence and held that a State could not require that.a woman obtain the consent of her spouse before proceeding with an abortion. Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U. S., at 69-71.

States have also regularly tried to ensure that a woman’s decision to have an abortion is an informed and well-considered one. In Danforth, we upheld a requirement that a woman sign a consent form prior to her abortion, and observed that “it is desirable and imperative that [the decision] *948be made with full knowledge of its nature and consequences.” Id., at 67. Since that case, however, we have twice invalidated state statutes designed to impart such knowledge to a woman seeking an abortion. In Akron, we held unconstitutional a regulation requiring a physician to inform a woman seeking an abortion of the status of her pregnancy, the development of her fetus, the date of possible viability, the complications that could result from an abortion, and the availability of agencies providing assistance and information with respect to adoption and childbirth. Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, supra, at 442-445. More recently, in Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U. S. 747 (1986), we struck down a more limited Pennsylvania regulation requiring that a woman be informed of the risks associated with the abortion procedure and the assistance available to her if she decided to proceed with her pregnancy, because we saw the compelled information as “the antithesis of informed consent.” Id., at 764. Even when a State has sought only to provide information that, in our view, was consistent with the Roe framework, we concluded that the State could not require that a physician furnish the information, but instead had to alternatively allow nonphysician counselors to provide it. Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U. S., at 448-449. In Akron as well, we went further and held that a State may not require a physician to wait 24 hours to perform an abortion after receiving the consent of a woman. Although the State sought to ensure that the' woman’s decision was carefully considered, the Court concluded that the Constitution forbade the State to impose any sort of delay. Id., at 449-451.

We have not allowed States much leeway to regulate even the actual abortion procedure. Although a State can require that second-trimester abortions be performed in outpatient clinics, see Simopoulos v. Virginia, 462 U. S. 506 (1983), we concluded in Akron and Ashcroft that a State could not *949require that such abortions be performed only in hospitals. See Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, supra, at 437-439; Planned Parenthood Assn. of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft, supra, at 481-482. Despite the fact that Roe expressly allowed regulation after the first trimester in furtherance of maternal health, “‘present medical knowledge,’” in our view, could not justify such a hospitalization requirement under the trimester framework. Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, supra, at 437 (quoting Roe v. Wade, supra, at 163). And in Danforth, the Court held that Missouri could not outlaw the saline amniocentesis method of abortion, concluding that the Missouri Legislature had “failed to appreciate and to consider several significant facts” in making its decision. 428 U. S., at 77.

Although Roe allowed state regulation after the point of viability to protect the potential life of the fetus, the Court subsequently rejected attempts to regulate in this manner. In Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U. S. 379 (1979), the Court struck down a statute that governed the determination of viability. Id., at 390-397. In the process, we made clear that the trimester framework incorporated only one definition of viability — ours—as we forbade States to decide that a certain objective indicator — “be it weeks of gestation or fetal weight or any other single factor” — should govern the definition of viability. Id., at 389. In that same case, we also invalidated a regulation requiring a physician to use the abortion technique offering the best chance for fetal survival when performing postviability abortions. See id., at 397-401; see also Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U. S., at 768-769 (invalidating a similar regulation). In Thornburgh, the Court struck down Pennsylvania’s requirement that a second physician be present at postviability abortions to help preserve the health of the unborn child, on the ground that it did not incorporate a sufficient medical emergency exception. Id., at 769-771. Regulations governing the treatment of aborted fetuses have *950met a similar fate. In Akron, we invalidated a provision requiring physicians performing abortions to “insure that the remains of the unborn child are disposed of in a humane and sanitary manner.” 462 U. S., at 451 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Dissents in these cases expressed the view that the Court was expanding upon Roe in imposing ever greater restrictions on the States. See Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U. S., at 783 (Burger, C. J., dissenting) (“The extent to which the Court has departed from the limitations expressed in Roe is readily apparent”); id., at 814 (White, J., dissenting) (“[T]he majority indiscriminately strikes down statutory provisions that in no way contravene the right recognized in Roe”). And, when confronted with state regulations of this type in past years, the Court has become increasingly more divided: The three most recent abortion cases have not commanded a Court opinion. See Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 497 U. S. 502 (1990); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U. S. 417 (1990); Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U. S. 490 (1989).

The task of the Court of Appeals in the present eases was obviously complicated by this confusion and uncertainty. Following Marks v. United States, 480 U. S. 188 (1977), • it concluded that in light of Webster and Hodgson, the strict scrutiny standard enunciated in Roe was no longer applicable, and that the “undue burden” standard adopted by Justice O’Connor was the governing principle. This state of confusion and disagreement warrants reexamination of the “fundamental right” accorded to a woman’s decision to abort a fetus in Roe, with its concomitant requirement that any state regulation of abortion survive “strict scrutiny.” See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U. S. 808, 827-828 (1991) (observing that reexamination of constitutional decisions is appropriate when those decisions have generated uncertainty and failed to provide clear guidance, because “correction through legis*951lative action is practically impossible” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U. S. 528, 546-547, 557 (1985).

We have held that a liberty interest protected under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment will be deemed fundamental if it is “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.” Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319, 325 (1937). Three years earlier, in Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U. S. 97 (1934), we referred to a “principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.” Id., at 105; see also Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U. S. 110, 122 (1989) (plurality opinion) (citing the language from Snyder). These expressions are admittedly not precise, but our decisions implementing this notion of “fonda-mental” rights do not afford any more elaborate basis on which to base such a classification.

In construing the phrase “liberty” incorporated in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, we have recognized that its meaning extends beyond freedom from physical restraint. In Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 (1925), we held that it included a parent’s right to send a child to private school; in Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390 (1923), we held that it included a right to teach a foreign language in a parochial school. Building on these cases, we have held that the term “liberty” includes a right to marry, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S. 1 (1967); a right to procreate, Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U. S. 535 (1942); and a right to use contraceptives, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479 (1965); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U. S. 438 (1972). But a reading of these opinions makes clear that they do not endorse any all-encompassing “right of privacy.”

In Roe v. Wade, the Court recognized a “guarantee of personal privacy” which “is broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.” 410 U S., at 152-153. We are now of the view that, in terming this right fundamental, the Court in Roe read the earlier *952opinions upon which it based its decision much too broadly. Unlike marriage, procreation, and contraception, abortion “involves the purposeful termination of a potential life.” Harris v. McRae, 448 U. S. 297, 325 (1980). The abortion decision must therefore “be recognized as sui generis, different in kind from the others that the Court has protected under the rubric of personal or family privacy and autonomy.” Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, supra, at 792 (White, J., dissenting). One cannot ignore the fact that a woman is not isolated in her pregnancy, and that the decision to abort necessarily involves the destruction of a fetus. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., supra, at 124, n. 4 (To look “at the act which is assertedly the subject of a liberty interest in isolation from its effect upon other people [is] like inquiring whether there is a liberty interest in firing a gun where the case at hand happens to involve its discharge into another person’s body”).

Nor do the historical traditions of the American people support the view that the right to terminate one’s pregnancy is “fundamental.” The common - law which we inherited from England made abortion after “quickening” an offense. At the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, statutory prohibitions or restrictions on abortion were commonplace; in 1868, at least 28 of the then-87 States and 8 Territories had statutes banning or limiting abortion. J. Mohr, Abortion in America 200 (1978). By the turn of the century virtually every State had a law prohibiting or restricting abortion on its books. By the middle of the present century, a liberalization trend had set in. But 21 of the restrictive abortion laws in effect in 1868 were still in effect in 1973 when Roe was decided, and an overwhelming majority of the States prohibited abortion unless necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother. Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S., at 139-140; id., at 176-177, n. 2 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). On this record, it can scarcely be said that any deeply rooted tradition of relatively unrestricted abortion in our his*953tory supported the classification of the right to abortion as “fundamental” under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

We think, therefore, both in view of this history and of our decided cases dealing with substantive liberty under the Due Process Clause, that the Court was mistaken in Roe when it classified a woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy as a “fundamental right” that could be abridged only in a manner which withstood “strict scrutiny.” In so concluding, we repeat the observation made in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U. S. 186 (1986):

“Nor are we inclined to take a more expansive view of our authority to discover new fundamental rights imbedded in the Due Process Clause. The Court is most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made constitutional law having little ■ or no cognizable roots in the language or design of the Constitution.” Id., at 194.

We believe that the sort of constitutionally imposed abortion code of the type illustrated by our decisions following Roe is inconsistent “with the notion of a Constitution cast in general terms, as ours is, and usually speaking in general principles, as ours does.” Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U. S., at 518 (plurality opinion). The Court in Roe reached too far when it analogized the right to abort a fetus to the rights involved in Pierce, Meyer, Loving, and Griswold, and thereby deemed the right to abortion fundamental.

II

The joint opinion of Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter cannot bring itself to say that Roe was correct as an original matter, but the authors are of the view that “the immediate question is not the soundness of Roe’s resolution of the issue, but the precedential force that must be aceorded to its holding.” Ante, at 871. Instead of claiming that Roe *954was correct as a matter of original constitutional interpretation, the opinion therefore contains an elaborate discussion of stare decisis. This discussion of the principle of stare decisis appears to be almost entirely dicta, because the joint opinion does not apply that principle in dealing with Roe. Roe decided that a woman had a fundamental right to an abortion. The joint opinion rejects that view. Roe decided that abortion regulations were to be subjected to “strict scrutiny” and could be justified only in the light of “compelling state interests.” The joint opinion rejects that view. Ante, at 872-873; see Roe v. Wade, supra, at 162-164. Roe analyzed abortion regulation under a rigid trimester framework, a framework which has guided this Court’s decisionmaking for 19 years. The joint opinion rejects that framework. Ante, at 873.

Stare decisis is defined in Black’s Law Dictionary as meaning “to abide by, or adhere to, decided cases.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1406 (6th ed. 1990). Whatever the “central holding” of Roe that is left after the joint opinion finishes dissecting it is surely not the result of that principle. While purporting to adhere to precedent, the joint opinion instead revises it. Roe continues to exist, but only in the way a storefront on a western movie set exists: a mere facade to give the illusion of reality. Decisions following Roe, such as Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U. S. 416 (1983), and Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U. S. 747 (1986), are frankly overruled in part under the “undue burden” standard expounded in the joint opinion. Ante, at 881-884.

In our view, authentic principles of stare decisis do not require that any portion of the reasoning in Roe be kept intact. “Stare decisis is not... a universal, inexorable command,” especially in eases involving the interpretation of the Federal Constitution. Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U. S. 393, 405 (1932) (Brandéis, J., dissenting). Erroneous decisions in such constitutional cases are uniquely durable, because correction through legislative action, save for *955constitutional amendment, is impossible. It is therefore our duty to reconsider constitutional interpretations that “depart] from a proper understanding” of the Constitution. Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U. S., at 557; see United States v. Scott, 437 U. S. 82, 101 (1978) (“ ‘[I]n cases involving the Federal Constitution, . . . [t]he Court bows to the lessons of experience and the force of better reasoning, recognizing that the process of trial and error, so fruitful in the physical sciences, is appropriate also in the judicial function’” (quoting Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., supra, at 406-408 (Brandeis, J., dissenting))); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U. S. 649, 665 (1944). Our constitutional watch does not cease merely because we have spoken before on an issue; when it becomes clear that a prior constitutional interpretation is unsound we are obliged to reexamine the question. See, e. g., West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 642 (1943); Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, 74-78 (1938).

The joint opinion discusses several stare decisis factors which, it asserts, point toward retaining a portion of Roe. Two of these factors are that the main “factual underpinning” of Roe has remained the same, and that its doctrinal foundation is no weaker now than it was in 1973. Ante, at 857-860. Of course, what might be called the basic facts which gave rise to Roe have remained the same — women become pregnant, there is a point somewhere, depending on medical technology, where a fetus becomes viable, and women give birth to children. But this is only to say that the same facts which gave rise to Roe will continue to give rise to similar cases. It is not a reason, in and of itself, why those cases must be decided in the same incorrect manner as was the first case to deal with the question. And surely there is no requirement, in considering whether to depart from stare decisis in a constitutional case, that a decision be more wrong now than it was at the time it was rendered. If that were true, the most outlandish constitutional decision could sur*956vive forever, based simply on the fact that it was no more outlandish later than it was when originally rendered.

Nor does the joint opinion faithfully follow this alleged requirement. The opinion frankly concludes that Roe and its progeny were wrong in failing to recognize that the State’s interests in maternal health and in the protection of unborn human life exist throughout pregnancy. Ante, at 871-873. But there is no indication that these components of Roe are any more incorrect at this juncture than they were at its inception.

The joint opinion also points to the reliance interests involved in this context in its effort to explain why precedent must be followed for precedent’s sake. Certainly it is true that where reliance is truly at issue, as in the case of judicial decisions that have formed the basis for private decisions, “[Considerations in favor of stare decisis are at their acme.” Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U. S., at 828. But, as the joint opinion apparently agrees, ante, at 855-856, any traditional notion of reliance is not applicable here. The Court today cuts back on the protection afforded by Roe, and no one claims that this action defeats any reliance interest in the disavowed trimester framework. Similarly, reliance interests would not be diminished were the Court to go further and acknowledge the full error of Roe, as “reproductive planning could take virtually immediate account. of” this action. Ante, at 856.

The joint opinion thus turns to what can only be described as an unconventional — and unconvincing — notion of reliance, a view based on the surmise that the availability of abortion since Roe has led to “two deeades of economic and social developments” that would be undercut if the error of Roe were recognized. Ante, at 856. The joint opinion’s assertion of this fact is undeveloped and totally conclusory. In fact, one cannot be sure to what economic and social developments the opinion is referring. Surely it is dubious to suggest that women have reached their “places in society” in *957reliance upon Roe, rather than as a result of their determination to obtain higher education and compete with men in the job market, and of society’s increasing recognition of their ability to fill positions that were previously thought to be reserved only for men. Ante, at 856.

In the end, having failed to put forth any evidence to prove any true reliance, the joint opinion’s argument is based solely on generalized assertions about the national psyche, on a belief that the people of this country have grown accustomed to the Roe decision over the last 19 years and have “ordered their thinking and living around” it. Ante, at 856, As an initial matter, one might inquire how the joint opinion can view the “central holding” of Roe as so deeply rooted in our constitutional culture, when it so casually uproots and disposes of that same decision’s trimester framework. Furthermore, at various points in the past, the same could have been said about this Court’s erroneous decisions that the Constitution allowed “separate but equal” treatment of minorities, see Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537 (1896), or that “liberty” under the Due Process Clause protected “freedom of contract,” see Adkins v. Children’s Hospital of District of Columbia, 261 U. S. 525 (1923); Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45 (1905). The “separate but equal” doctrine lasted 58 years after Plessy, and Lochner’s protection of contractual freedom lasted 32 years. However, the simple fact that a generation or more had grown used to these major decisions did not prevent the Court from correcting its errors in those cases, nor should it prevent us from correctly interpreting the Constitution here. See Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483 (1954) (rejecting the “separate but equal” doctrine); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U. S. 379 (1937) (overruling Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, supra, in upholding Washington’s minimum wage law).

Apparently realizing that conventional stare decisis principles do not support its position, the joint opinion advances a belief that retaining a portion of Roe is necessary to protect *958the “legitimacy” of this Court. Ante, at 861-869. Because the Court must take care to render decisions “grounded truly in principle,” and not simply as political and social compromises, ante, at 865, the joint opinion properly declares it to be this Court’s duty to ignore the public criticism and protest that may arise as a result of a decision. New would quarrel with this statement, although it may be doubted that Members of this Court, holding their tenure as they do during constitutional “good behavior,” are at all likely to be intimidated by such public protests.

But the joint opinion goes on to state that when the Court “resolve[s] the sort of intensely divisive controversy reflected in Roe and those rare, comparable cases,” its decision is exempt from reconsideration under established principles of stare decisis in constitutional eases. Ante, at 866. This is so, the joint opinion contends, because in those “intensely divisive” cases the Court has “eall[ed] the contending sides of a national controversy to end their national division by accepting a common mandate rooted in the Constitution,” and must therefore take special care not to be perceived as “surrendering] to political pressure” and continued opposition. Ante, at 866, 867. This is a truly novel principle, one which is contrary to both the Court’s historical practice and to the Court’s traditional willingness to tolerate criticism of its opinions. Under this principle, when the Court has ruled on a divisive issue, it is apparently prevented from overruling that decision for the sole reason that it was incorrect, unless opposition to the original decision has died away.

The first difficulty with this principle lies in its assumption that cases that are “intensely divisive” can be readily distinguished from those that are not. The question of whether a particular issue is “intensely divisive” enough to qualify for special protection is entirely subjective and dependent on the individual assumptions of the Members of this Court. In addition, because the Court’s duty is to ignore public opinion and criticism on issues that come before it, its Members are *959in perhaps the worst position to judge whether a decision divides the Nation deeply enough to justify such uncommon protection. Although many of the Court’s decisions divide the populace to a large degree, we have not previously on that account shied away from applying normal rules of stare decisis when urged to reconsider earlier decisions. Over the past 21 years, for example, the Court has overruled in whole or in part 34 of its previous constitutional decisions. See Payne v. Tennessee, supra, at 828-830, and n. 1 (listing eases).

The joint opinion picks out and discusses two prior Court rulings that it believes are of the “intensely divisive” variety, and concludes that they are of comparable dimension to Roe. Ante, at 861-864 (discussing Lochner v. New York, supra, and Plessy v. Ferguson, supra). It appears to us very odd indeed that the joint opinion chooses as benchmarks two cases in which the Court chose not to adhere to erroneous constitutional precedent, but instead enhanced its stature by acknowledging and correcting its error, apparently in violation of the joint opinion’s “legitimacy” principle. See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, supra; Brown v. Board of Education, supra. One might also wonder how it is that the joint opinion puts these, and not others, in the “intensely divisive” category, and how it assumes that these are the only two lines of cases of comparable dimension to Roe. There is no reason to think that either Plessy or Lochner produced the sort of public protest when they were decided that Roe did. There were undoubtedly large segments of the bench and bar who agreed with the dissenting views in those cases, but surely that cannot be what the Court means when it uses the term “intensely divisive,” or many other cases would have to be added to the list. In terms of public protest, however, Roe, so far as we know, was unique. But just as the Court should not respond to that sort of protest by retreating from the decision simply to allay the concerns of the protesters, it should likewise not respond by determining to adhere to the *960decision at all costs lest it seem to be retreating under fire. Public protests should not alter the normal application of stare decisis, lest perfectly lawful protest activity be penalized by the Court itself.

Taking the joint opinion on its own terms, we doubt that its distinction between Roe, on the one hand, and Plessy and Lochner, on the other, withstands analysis. The joint opinion acknowledges that the Court improved its stature by overruling Plessy in Brown on a deeply divisive issue. And our decision in West Coast Hotel, which overruled Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, supra, and Lochner, was rendered at a time when Congress was considering President Franklin Roosevelt’s proposal to “reorganize” this Court and enable him to name six additional Justices in the event that any Member of the Court over the age of 70 did not elect to retire. It is difficult to imagine a situation in which the Court would face more intense opposition to a prior ruling than it did at that time, and, under the general principle proclaimed in the joint opinion, the Court seemingly should have responded to this opposition by stubbornly refusing to reexamine the Lochner rationale, lest it lose legitimacy by appearing to “overrule under fire.” Ante, at 867.

The joint opinion agrees that the Court’s stature would have been seriously damaged if in Brown and West Coast Hotel it had dug in its heels and refused to apply normal principles of stare decisis to the earlier decisions. But the opinion contends that the Court was entitled to overrule Plessy and Lochner in those eases, despite the existence of opposition to the original decisions, only because both the Nation and the Court had learned new lessons in the interim. This is at best a feebly supported, post hoc rationalization for those decisions.

For example, the opinion asserts that the Court could justifiably overrule its decision in Lochner only because the Depression had convinced “most people” that constitutional protection of contractual freedom contributed to an economy *961that failed to protect the welfare of all. Ante, at 861. Surely the joint opinion does not mean to suggest that people saw this Court’s failure to uphold minimum wage statutes as the cause of the Great Depression! In any event, the Loch-ner Court did not base its rule upon the policy judgment that an unregulated market was fundamental to a stable economy; it simple believed, erroneously, that “liberty” under the Due Process Clause protected the “right to make a contract.” Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S., at 53. Nor is it the case that the people of this Nation only discovered the dangers of extreme laissez-faire economies because of the Depression. State laws regulating maximum hours and minimum wages were in existence well before that time. A Utah statute of that sort enacted in 1896 was involved in our decision in Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366 (1898), and other States followed suit shortly afterwards, see, e. g., Muller v. Oregon, 208 U. S. 412 (1908); Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U. S. 426 (1917). These statutes were indeed enacted because of a belief on the part of their sponsors that “freedom of contract” did not protect the welfare of workers, demonstrating that that belief manifested itself more than a generation before the Great Depression. Whether “most people” had come to share it in the hard times of the 1930’s is, insofar as anything the joint opinion advances, entirely speculative. The crucial failing at that time was not that workers were not paid a fair wage, but that there was no work available at any wage.

When the Court finally recognized its error in West Coast Hotel, it did not engage in the post hoc rationalization that the joint opinion attributes to it today; it did not state that Lochner had been based on an economic view that had fallen into disfavor, and that it therefore should be overruled. Chief Justice Hughes in his opinion for the Court simply recognized what Justice Holmes had previously recognized in his Lochner dissent, that “[t]he Constitution does not speak of freedom of contract.” West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U. S., at 391; Lochner v. New York, supra, at 75 (Holmes, *962J., dissenting) (“[A] constitution is not intended to embody a particular economic theory, whether of paternalism and the organic relation of the citizen to the State or of laissez faire”). Although the Court did acknowledge in the last paragraph of its opinion the state of affairs during the then-current Depression, the theme of the opinion is that the Court had been mistaken as a matter of constitutional law when it embraced “freedom of contract” 32 years previously.

The joint opinion also agrees that the Court acted properly in rejecting the doctrine of “separate but equal” in Brown. In fact, the opinion lauds Brown in comparing it to Roe. Ante, at 867. This is strange, in that under the opinion’s “legitimacy” principle the Court would seemingly have been forced to adhere to its erroneous decision in Plessy because of its “intensely divisive” character. To us, adherence to Roe today under the guise of “legitimacy” would seem to resemble more closely adherence to Plessy on the same ground. Fortunately, the Court did not choose that option in Brown, and instead frankly repudiated Plessy. The joint opinion concludes that such repudiation was justified only because of newly discovered evidence that segregation had the effect of treating one race as inferior to another. But it can hardly be argued that this was not urged upon those who decided Plessy, as Justice Harlan observed in his dissent that the law at issue “puts the brand of servitude and degradation upon a large class of our fellow-citizens, our equals before the law.” Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S., at 562. It is clear that the same arguments made before the Court in Brown were made in Plessy as well. The Court in Brown simply recognized, as Justice Harlan had recognized beforehand, that the Fourteenth Amendment does not permit racial segregation. The rule of Brown is not tied to popular opinion about the evils of segregation; it is a judgment that the Equal Protection Clause does not permit racial segregation, no matter whether the public might come to believe that it is beneficial. On that ground it stands, and on that ground *963alone the Court was justified in properly concluding that the Plessy' Court had erred.

There is also a suggestion in the joint opinion that the propriety of overruling a “divisive” decision depends in part on whether “iftost people” would now agree that it should be overruled. Either the demise of opposition or its progression to substantial popular agreement apparently is required to allow the Court to reconsider a divisive decision. How such agreement would be ascertained, short of a public opinion poll, the joint opinion does not say. But surely even the suggestion is totally at war with the idea of “legitimacy” in whose name it is invoked. The Judicial Branch derives its legitimacy, not from following public opinion, but from deciding by its best lights whether legislative enactments of the popular branches of Government comport with the Constitution. The doctrine of stare decisis is an adjunct of this duty, and should be no more subject to the vagaries of public opinion than is the basic judicial task.

There are other reasons why the joint opinion’s discussion of legitimacy is unconvincing as well. In assuming that the Court is perceived as “surrendering] to political pressure” when it overrules a controversial decision, ante, at 867, the joint opinion forgets that there are two sides to any controversy. The joint opinion asserts that, in order to protect its legitimacy, the Court must refrain from overruling a controversial decision lest it be viewed as favoring those who oppose the decision. But a decision to adhere to prior precedent is subject to the same criticism, for in such a case one can easily argue that the Court is responding to those who have demonstrated in favor of the original decision. The decision in Roe has engendered large demonstrations, including repeated marches on this Court and on Congress, both in opposition to and in support of that opinion. A decision either way on Roe can therefore be perceived as favoring one group or the other. But this perceived dilemma arises only if one assumes, as the joint opinion does, that the Court *964should make its decisions with a view toward speculative public perceptions. If one assumes instead, as the Court surely did in both Brown and West Coast Hotel, that the Court’s legitimacy is enhanced by faithful interpretation of the Constitution irrespective of public opposition, such self-engendered difficulties may be put to one side.

Roe is not this Court’s only decision to generate conflict. Our decisions in some recent capital eases, and in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U. S. 186 (1986), have also engendered demonstrations in opposition. The joint opinion’s message to such protesters appears to be that they must cease their activities in order to serve their cause, because their protests will only cement in place a decision which by normal standards of stare decisis should be reconsidered. Nearly a century ago, Justice David J. Brewer of this Court, in an article discussing criticism of its decisions, observed that “many criticisms may be, like their authors, devoid of good taste, but better all sorts of criticism than no criticism at all.” Justice Brewer on “The Nation’s Anchor,” 57 Albany L. J. 166, 169 (1898). This was good advice to the Court then, as it is today. Strong and often misguided criticism of a decision should not render the decision immune from reconsideration, lest a fetish for legitimacy penalize freedom of expression.

The end result of the joint opinion’s paeans of praise for legitimacy is the enunciation of a brand new standard for evaluating state regulation of a woman’s right to abortion— the “undue burden” standard. As indicated above, Roe v. Wade adopted a “fundamental right” standard under which state regulations could survive only if they met the requirement of “strict scrutiny.” While we disagree with that standard, it at least had a recognized basis in constitutional law at the time Roe was decided. The same cannot be said for the “undue burden” standard, which is created largely out of whole cloth by the authors of the joint opinion. It is a standard which even today does not command the support of a majority of this Gourt. And it will not, we believe, re-*965suit in the sort of “simple limitation,” easily applied, which the joint opinion anticipates. Ante, at 855. In sum, it is a standard which is not built to last.

In evaluating abortion regulations under that standard, judges will have to decide whether they place a “substantial obstacle” in the path of a woman seeking an abortion. • Ante, at 877. In that this standard is based even more on a judge’s subjective determinations than was the trimester framework, the standard will do nothing to prevent “judges from roaming at large in the constitutional field” guided only by their personal views. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S., at 502 (Harlan, J., concurring in judgment). Because the undue burden standard is plucked from nowhere, the question of what is a “substantial obstacle” to abortion will undoubtedly engender a variety of conflicting views. For example, in the very matter before us now, the authors of the joint opinion would uphold Pennsylvania’s 24-hour waiting period, concluding that a “particular burden” on some women is not a substantial obstacle. Ante, at 887. But the authors would at the same time strike down Pennsylvania’s spousal notice provision, after finding that in a “large fraction” of cases the provision will be a substantial obstacle. Ante, at 895. And, while the authors conclude that the informed consent provisions do not constitute an “undue burden,” Justice Stevens would hold that they do. Ante, at 920-922.

Furthermore, while striking down the spousal notice regulation, the joint opinion would uphold a parental consent restriction that certainly places very substantial obstacles in the path of a minor’s abortion choice. The joint opinion is forthright in admitting that it draws this distinction based on a policy judgment that parents will have the best interests of their children at heart, while the same is not necessarily true of husbands as to their wives. Ante, at 895. This may or may not be a correct judgment, but it is quintessentially a legislative one. The “undue burden” inquiry does not in any way supply the distinction between parental consent and *966spousal consent which the joint opinion adopts. Despite the efforts of the joint opinion, the undue burden standard presents nothing more workable than the trimester framework which it discards today. Under the guise of the Constitution, this Court will still impart its own preferences on the States in the form of a complex abortion code.

The sum of the joint opinion’s labors in the name of stare decisis and “legitimacy” is this: Roe v. Wade stands as a sort of judicial Potemkin Village, which may be pointed out to passers-by as a monument to the importance of adhering to precedent. But behind the facade, an entirely new method of analysis, without any roots in constitutional law, is imported to decide the constitutionality of state laws regulating abortion. Neither stare decisis nor “legitimacy” are truly served by such an effort.

We have stated above our belief that the Constitution does not subject state abortion regulations to heightened scrutiny. Accordingly, we think that the correct analysis is that set forth by the plurality opinion in Webster. A woman’s interest in having an abortion is a form of liberty protected by the Due Process Clause, but States may regulate abortion procedures in ways rationally related to a legitimate state interest. Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc., 348 U. S. 483, 491 (1955); cf. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U. S. 645, 651-653 (1972). With this rule in mind, we examine each of the challenged provisions.

Ill

'A

Section 3205 of the Act imposes certain requirements related to the informed consent of a woman seeking an abortion. 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. §3205 (1990). Section 3205(a)(1) requires that the referring or performing physician must inform a woman contemplating an abortion of (i) the nature of the procedure and the risks and alternatives that a reasonable patient would find material; (ii) the fetus’ probable ges*967tational age; and (iii) the medical risks involved in carrying her pregnancy to term. Section 3205(a)(2) requires a physician or a nonphysician counselor to inform the woman that (i) the state health department publishes free materials describing the fetus at different stages and listing abortion alternatives; (ii) medical assistance benefits may be available for prenatal, childbirth, and neonatal care; and (iii) the child’s father is liable for child support. The Act also imposes a 24-hour waiting period between the time that the woman receives the required information and the time that the physician is allowed to perform the abortion. See Appendix to opinion of O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ., ante, at 902-904.

This Court has held that it is certainly within the province of the States to require a woman’s voluntary and informed consent to an abortion. See Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U. S., at 760. Here, Pennsylvania seeks to further its legitimate interest in obtaining informed consent by ensuring that each woman “is aware not only of the reasons for having an abortion, but also of the risks associated with an abortion and the availability of assistance that might make the alternative of normal childbirth more attractive than it might otherwise appear.” Id., at 798-799 (White, J., dissenting).

We conclude that this provision of the statute is rationally related to the State’s interest in assuring that a woman’s consent to an abortion be a fully informed decision.

Section 3205(a)(1) requires a physician to disclose certain information about the abortion procedure and its risks and alternatives. This requirement is certainly no large burden, as the Court of Appeals found that “the record shows that the clinics, without exception, insist on providing this information to women before an abortion is performed.” 947 F. 2d, at 703. We are of the view that this information “elearly is related to maternal health and to the State’s legitimate purpose in requiring informed consent.” Akron v. *968 Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U. S., at 446. An accurate description of the gestational age of the fetus and of the risks involved in carrying a child to term helps to further both those interests and the State’s legitimate interest in unborn human life. See id., at 445-446, n. 37 (required disclosure of gestational age of the fetus “certainly is not objectionable”). Although petitioners contend that it is unreasonable for the State to require that a physician, as opposed to a nonphysician counselor, disclose this information, we agree with the Court of Appeals that a State “may rationally decide that physicians are better qualified than counselors to impart this information and answer questions about the medical aspects of the available alternatives.” 947 F. 2d, at 704.

Section 3205(a)(2) compels the disclosure, by a physician or a counselor, of information concerning the availability of paternal child support and state-funded alternatives if the woman decides to proceed with her pregnancy. Here again, the Court of Appeals observed that “the record indicates that most clinics already require that a counselor consult in person with the woman about alternatives to abortion before the abortion is performed.” Id., at 704-705. And petitioners do not claim that the information required to be disclosed by statute is in any way false or inaccurate; indeed, the Court of Appeals found it to be “relevant, accurate, and noninflammatory.” Id., at 705. We conclude that this required presentation of “balanced information” is rationally related to the State’s legitimate interest in ensuring that the woman’s consent is truly informed, Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U. S., at 830 (O’Connor, J., dissenting), and in addition furthers the State’s interest in preserving unborn life. That the information might create some uncertainty and persuade some women to forgo abortions does not lead to the conclusion that the Constitution forbids the provision of such information. Indeed, it only demonstrates that this information might *969very well make a difference, and that it is therefore relevant to a woman’s informed choice. Cf. id., at 801 (White, J., dissenting) (“[T]he ostensible objective of Roe v. Wade is not maximizing the number of abortions, but maximizing choice”). We acknowledge that in Thornburgh this Court struck down informed consent requirements similar to the ones at issue here. See id., at 760-764. It is clear, however, that while the detailed framework of Roe led to the Court’s invalidation of those informational requirements, they “would have been sustained under any traditional standard of judicial review, ... or for any other surgical procedure except abortion.” Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U. S., at 517 (plurality opinion) (citing Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U. S., at 802 (White, J., dissenting); id., at 783 (Burger, C. J., dissenting)). In light of our rejection of Roe’s “fundamental right” approach to this subject, we do not regard Thornburgh as controlling.

For the same reason, we do not feel bound to follow this Court’s previous holding that a State’s 24-hour mandatory waiting period is unconstitutional. See Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., supra, at 449-451. Petitioners are correct that such a provision will result in delays for some women that might not otherwise exist, therefore placing a burden on their liberty. But the provision in no way prohibits abortions, and the informed consent and waiting period requirements do not apply in the ease of a medical emergency. See 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 3205(a), (b) (1990). We are of the view that, in providing time for reflection and reconsideration, the waiting period helps ensure that a woman’s decision to abort is a well-considered one, and reasonably furthers the State’s legitimate interest in maternal health and in the unborn life of the fetus. It “is surely a small cost to impose to ensure that the woman’s decision is well considered in light of its certain and irreparable conse-*970quenees on fetal life, and the possible effects on her own.” 462 U. S., at 474 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).

B

In addition to providing her own informed consent, before an unemaneipated woman under the age of 18 may obtain an abortion she must either furnish the consent of one of her parents, or must opt for the judicial procedure that allows her to bypass the consent requirement. Under the judicial bypass option, a minor can obtain an abortion if a state court finds that she is capable of giving her informed consent and has indeed given such consent, or determines that an abortion is in her best interests. Records of these court proceedings are kept confidential. The Act directs the state trial court to render a decision within three days of the woman’s application, and the entire procedure, including appeal to Pennsylvania Superior Court, is to last no longer than eight business days. The parental consent requirement does not apply in the case of a medical emergency. 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. §3206 (1990). See Appendix to opinion of O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ., ante, at 904-906.

This provision is entirely consistent with this Court’s previous decisions involving parental consent requirements. See Planned Parenthood Assn. of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 462 U. S. 476 (1983) (upholding parental consent requirement with a similar judicial bypass option); Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., supra, at 439-440 (approving of parental consent statutes that include a judicial bypass option allowing a pregnant minor to “demonstrate that she is sufficiently mature to make the abortion decision herself or that, despite her immaturity, an abortion would be in her best interests”); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U. S. 622 (1979).

We think it beyond dispute that a State “has a strong and legitimate interest in the welfare of its young citizens, whose immaturity, inexperience, and lack of judgment may some*971times impair their ability to exercise their rights wisely.” Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U. S., at 444 (opinion of Stevens, J.). A requirement of parental consent to abortion, like myriad other restrictions placed upon minors in other contexts, is reasonably designed to further this important and legitimate state interest. In our view, it is entirely “rational and fair for the State to conclude that, in most instances, the family will strive to give a lonely or even terrified minor advice that is both compassionate and mature.” Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 497 U. S., at 520 (opinion of Kennedy, J.); see also Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U. S., at 91 (Stewart, J., concurring) (“There can be little doubt that the State furthers a constitutionally permissible end by encouraging an unmarried pregnant minor to seek the help and advice of her parents in making the very important decision whether or not to bear a child”). We thus conclude that Pennsylvania’s parental consent requirement should be upheld.

C

Section 3209 of the Act contains the spousal notification provision. It requires that, before a physician may perform an abortion on a married woman, the woman must sign a statement indicating that she has notified her husband of her planned abortion. A woman is not required to notify her husband if (1) her husband is not the father, (2) her husband, after diligent effort, cannot be located, (3) the pregnancy is the result of a spousal sexual assault that has been reported to the authorities, or (4) the woman has reason to believe that notifying her husband is likely to result in the infliction of bodily injury upon her by him or by another individual. In addition, a woman is exempted from the notification requirement in the case of a medical emergency. 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. §3209 (1990). See Appendix to opinion of O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ., ante, at 908-909.

*972We first emphasize that Pennsylvania has not imposed a spousal consent requirement of the type the Court struck down in Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U. S., at 67-72. Missouri’s spousal consent provision was invalidated in that case because of the Court’s view that it unconstitutionally granted to the husband “a veto power exercisable for any reason whatsoever or for no reason at all.” Id., at 71. But the provision here involves a much less intrusive requirement of spousal notification, not consent. Such a law requiring only notice to the husband “does not give any third party the legal right to make the [woman’s] decision for her, or to prevent her from obtaining an abortion should she choose to have one performed.” Hodgson v. Minnesota, supra, at 496 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part); see H. L. v. Matheson, 450 U. S., at 411, n. 17. Danforth thus does not control our analysis. Petitioners contend that it should, however; they argue that the real effect of such a notice requirement is to give the power to husbands to veto a woman’s abortion choice. The District Court indeed found that the notification provision created a risk that some woman who would otherwise have an abortion will be prevented from having one. 947 F. 2d, at 712. For example, petitioners argue, many notified husbands will prevent abortions through physical force, psychological coercion, and other types of threats. But Pennsylvania has incorporated exceptions in the notice provision in an attempt to deal with these problems. For instance, a woman need not notify her husband if the pregnancy is the result of a reported sexual assault, or if she has reason to believe that she would suffer bodily injury as a result of the notification. 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3209(b) (1990). Furthermore, because this is a facial challenge to the Act, it is insufficient for petitioners to show that the notification provision “might operate unconstitutionally under some conceivable set of circumstances.” United States v. Salerno, 481 U. S. 739, 745 (1987). Thus, it is not enough for petition*973ers to show that, in some “worst ease” circumstances, the notice provision will operate as a grant of veto power to husbands. Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 497 U. S., at 514. Because they are making a facial challenge to the provision, they must “show that no set of circumstances exists under which the [provision] would be valid.” Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). This they have failed to do.2

*974The question before us is therefore whether the spousal notification requirement rationally furthers any legitimate state interests. We conclude that it does. First, a husband’s interests in procreation within marriage and in the potential life of his unborn child are certainly substantial ones. See Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U. S., at 69 (“We are not unaware of the deep and proper concern and interest that a devoted and protective husband has in his wife’s pregnancy and in the growth and development of the fetus she is carrying”); id., at 93 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U. S., at 541. The State itself has legitimate interests both in protecting these interests of the father and in protecting the potential life of the fetus, and the spousal notification requirement is reasonably related to advancing those state interests. By providing that a husband will usually know of his spouse’s intent to have an abortion, the provision makes it more likely that the husband will participate in deciding the fate of his unborn child, a possibility that might otherwise have been denied him. This participation might in some cases result in a decision to proceed with the pregnancy. As Judge Alito observed in his dissent below, “[t]he Pennsylvania legislature eould have rationally believed that some married women are initially inclined to obtain an abortion without their husbands’ knowledge because of perceived problems — such as economic constraints, future plans, or the husbands’ previously expressed *975opposition — that may be obviated by discussion prior to the abortion.” 947 F. 2d, at 726 (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part).

The State also has a legitimate interest in promoting “the integrity of the marital relationship.” 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3209(a) (1990). This Court has previously recognized “the importance of the marital relationship in our society.” Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, supra, at 69. In our view, the spousal notice requirement is a rational attempt by the State to improve truthful communication between spouses and encourage collaborative decisionmaking, and thereby fosters marital integrity. See Labine v. Vincent, 401 U. S. 532, 538 (1971) (“[T]he power to make rules to establish, protect, and strengthen family life” is committed to the state legislatures). Petitioners argue that the notification requirement does not further any such interest; they assert that the majority of wives already notify their husbands of their abortion decisions, and the remainder have excellent reasons for keeping their decisions a secret. In the first ease, they argue, the law is unnecessary, and in the second ease it will only serve to foster marital discord and threats of harm. Thus, petitioners see the law as a totally irrational means of furthering whatever legitimate interest the State might have. But, in our view, it is unrealistic to assume that every husband-wife relationship is either (1) so perfect that this type of truthful and important communication will take place as a matter of course, or (2) so imperfect that, upon notice, the husband will react selfishly, violently, or contrary to the best interests of his wife. See Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, supra, at 103-104 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (making a similar point in the context of a parental consent statute). The spousal notice provision will admittedly be unnecessary in some circumstances, and possibly harmful in others, but “the existence of particular cases in which a feature of a statute performs no function (or is even counterpro-*976duetive) ordinarily does not render the statute unconstitutional or even constitutionally suspect.” Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U. S., at 800 (White, J., dissenting). The Pennsylvania Legislature was in a position to weigh the likely benefits of the provision against its likely adverse effects, and presumably concluded, on balance, that the provision would be beneficial. Whether this was a wise decision or not, we cannot say that it was irrational. We therefore conclude that the spousal notice provision comports with the Constitution. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U. S., at 325-326 (“It is not the mission of this Court or any other to decide whether the balance of competing interests ... is wise social policy”).

D

The Act also imposes various reporting requirements. Section 3214(a) requires that abortion facilities file a report on each abortion performed. The reports do not include the identity of the women on whom abortions are performed, but they do contain a variety of information about the abortions. For example, each report must include the identities of the performing and referring physicians, the gestational age of the fetus at the time of abortion, and the basis for any medical judgment that a medical emergency existed. See 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 3214(a)(1), (5), (10) (1990). See Appendix to opinion of O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ., ante, at 909-911. The District Court found that these reports are kept completely confidential. 947 F. 2d, at 716. We further conclude that these reporting requirements rationally farther the State’s legitimate interests in advancing the state of medical knowledge concerning maternal health and prenatal life, in gathering statistical information with respect to patients, and in ensuring compliance with other provisions of the Act.

Section 3207 of the Act requires each abortion facility to file a report with its name and address, as well as the names *977and addresses of any parent, subsidiary, or affiliated organizations. 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3207(b) (1990). Section 3214(f) further requires each facility to file quarterly reports stating the total number of abortions performed, broken down by trimester. Both of these reports are available to the public only if the facility received state funds within the preceding 12 months. See Appendix to opinion of O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ., ante, at 906,911. Petitioners do not challenge the requirement that facilities provide this information. They contend, however, that the forced public disclosure of the information given by facilities receiving public funds serves no legitimate state interest. We disagree. Records relating to the expenditure of public funds are generally available to the public under Pennsylvania law. See Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 65, §§66.1, 66.2 (Purdon 1959 and Supp. 1991-1992). As the Court of Appeals observed, “[w]hen a state provides money to a private commercial enterprise, there is a legitimate public interest in informing taxpayers who the funds are benefiting and what services the funds are supporting.” 947 F. 2d, at 718. These reporting requirements rationally further this legitimate state interest.

E

Finally, petitioners challenge the medical emergency exception provided for by the Act. The existence of a medical emergency exempts compliance with the Act’s informed consent, parental consent, and spousal notice requirements. See 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 3205(a), 3206(a), 3209(c) (1990). The Act defines a "medical emergency” as

“[t]hat condition which, on the basis of the physician’s good faith clinical judgment, so complicates the medical condition of a pregnant woman as to necessitate the immediate abortion of her pregnancy to avert her death or for which a delay will create serious risk of substantial *978and irreversible impairment of major bodily function.” §3203.

Petitioners argued before the District Court that the statutory definition was inadequate because it did not cover three serious conditions that pregnant women can suffer— preeelampsia, inevitable abortion, and prematurely ruptured membrane. The District Court agreed with petitioners that the medical emergency exception was inadequate, but the Court of Appeals reversed this holding. In construing the medical emergency provision, the Court of Appeals first observed that all three conditions do indeed present the risk of serious injury .or death when an abortion is not performed, and noted that the medical profession’s uniformly prescribed treatment for each of the three conditions is an immediate abortion. See 947 F. 2d, at 700-701. Finding that “[t]he Pennsylvania legislature did not choose the wording of its medical emergency exception in a vacuum,” the court read the exception as intended “to assure that compliance with its abortion regulations would not in any way pose a significant threat to the life or health of a woman.” Id., at 701. It thus concluded that the exception encompassed each of the three dangerous conditions pointed to by petitioners.

We observe that Pennsylvania’s present definition of medical emergency is almost an exact copy of that State’s definition at the time of this Court’s ruling in Thornburgh, one which the Court made reference to with apparent approval. 476 U. S., at 771 (“It is clear that the Pennsylvania Legislature knows how to provide a medieal-emergency exception when it chooses to do so”).3 We find that the interpretation *979of the Court of Appeals in these eases is eminently reasonable, and that the provision thus should be upheld. When a woman is faced with any condition that poses a “significant threat to [her] life or health,” she is exempted from the Act’s consent and notice requirements and may proceed immediately with her abortion.

IV

For the reasons stated, we therefore would hold that each of the challenged provisions of the Pennsylvania statute is consistent with the Constitution. It bears emphasis that our conclusion in this regard does not carry with it any necessary approval of these regulations. Our task is, as always, to decide only whether the challenged provisions of a law comport with the United States Constitution. If, as we believe, these do, their wisdom as a matter of public policy is for the people of Pennsylvania to decide.

Justice Scalia,

with whom The ChieF Justice, Justice White, and Justice Thomas join,

concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part.

My views on this matter are unchanged from those I set forth in my separate opinions in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U. S. 490, 532 (1989) (opinion concurring in part and concurring in judgment), and Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 497 U. S. 502, 520 (1990) (Akron II) (concurring opinion). The States may, if they wish, permit abortion on demand, but the Constitution does not require them to do so. The permissibility of abortion, and the limitations upon it, are to be resolved like most important questions in our democracy: by citizens trying to persuade one another and then voting. As the Court acknowledges, “where reasonable people disagree the government can adopt one position or the other.”. Ante, at 851. The Court is correct in adding the qualification that this “assumes a state of affairs in which the choice does not intrude upon a protected liberty,” ibid. — but the crucial part of that quali*980fication is the penultimate word. A State’s choice between two positions on which reasonable people can disagree is constitutional even when (as is often the ease) it intrudes upon a “liberty” in the absolute sense. Laws against bigamy, for example — with which entire societies of reasonable people disagree — intrude upon men and women’s liberty to marry and live with one another. But bigamy happens not to be a liberty specially “protected” by the Constitution.

That is, quite simply, the issue in these eases: not whether the power of a woman to abort her unborn child is a “liberty” in the absolute sense; or even whether it is a liberty of great importance to many women. Of course it is both. The issue is whether it is a liberty protected by the Constitution of the United States. I am sure it is not. I reach that conclusion not because of anything so exalted as my views concerning the “concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.” Ibid. Rather, I reach it for the same reason I reach the conclusion that bigamy is not constitutionally protected — because of two simple facts: (1) the Constitution says absolutely nothing about it, and (2) the longstanding traditions of American society have permitted it to be legally proscribed.1 Akron II, supra, at 520 (Scalia, J., concurring).

*981The Court destroys the proposition, evidently meant to represent my position, that “liberty” includes “only those practices, defined at the most specific level, that were protected against government interference by other rules of law when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified,” ante, at 847 (citing Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U. S. 110, 127, n. 6 (1989) (opinion of Scalia, J.)). That is not, however, what Michael H. says; it merely observes that, in defining “liberty,” we may not disregard a specific, “relevant tradition protecting, or denying protection to, the asserted right,” ibid. But the Court does not wish to be fettered by any such limitations on its preferences. The Court’s statement that it is “tempting” to acknowledge the authoritativeness of tradition in order to “cur[b] the discretion of federal judges,” ante, at 847, is of course rhetoric rather than reality; no government official is “tempted” to place restraints upon his own freedom of action, which is why Lord Acton did not say “Power tends to purify.” The Court’s temptation is in the quite opposite and more natural direction — towards systematically eliminating checks upon its own power; and it succumbs.

Beyond that brief summary of the essence of my position, I will not swell the United States Reports with repetition of what I have said before; and applying the rational basis test, I would uphold the Pennsylvania statute in its entirety. I must, however, respond to a few of the more outrageous arguments in today’s opinion, which it is beyond human nature to leave unanswered. I shall discuss each of them under a quotation from the Court’s opinion to which they pertain.

“The inescapable fact is that adjudication of substantive due process claims may call upon the Court *982in interpreting the Constitution to exercise that same capacity which by tradition courts always have exercised: reasoned judgment.” Ante, at 849.

Assuming that the question before us is to be resolved at such a level of philosophical abstraction, in such isolation from the traditions of American society, as by simply applying “reasoned judgment,” I do not see how that could possibly have produced the answer the Court arrived at in Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113 (1973). Today’s opinion describes the methodology of Roe, quite accurately, as weighing against the woman’s interest the State’s “ 'important and legitimate interest in protecting the potentiality of human life.’” Ante, at 871 (quoting Roe, supra, at 162). But “reasoned judgment” does not begin by begging the question, as Roe and subsequent eases unquestionably did by assuming that what the State is protecting is the mere “potentiality of human life.” See, e. g., Roe, supra, at 162; Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U. S. 52, 61 (1976); Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U. S. 379, 386 (1979); Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U. S. 416, 428 (1983) (Akron I); Planned Parenthood Assn. of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 462 U. S. 476, 482 (1983). The whole argument of abortion opponents is that what the Court calls the fetus and what others call the unborn child is a human life. Thus, whatever answer Roe came up with after conducting its “balancing” is bound to be wrong, unless it is correct that the human fetus is in some critical sense merely potentially human. There is of course no way to determine that as a legal matter; it is in fact a value judgment. Some societies have considered newborn children not yet human, or the incompetent elderly no longer so.

The authors of the joint opinion, of course, do not squarely contend that Roe, v. Wade was a correct application of “reasoned judgment”; merely that it must be followed, because of stare decisis. Ante, at 853, 861, 871. But in their exhaustive discussion of all the factors that go into the determi*983nation of when stare decisis should be observed and when disregarded, they never mention “how wrong was the decision on its face?” Surely, if “[t]he Court’s power lies ... in its legitimacy, a product of substance and perception,” ante, at 865, the “substance” part of the equation demands that plain error be acknowledged and eliminated. Roe was plainly wrong — even on the Court’s methodology of “reasoned judgment,” and even more so (of course) if the proper criteria of text and tradition are applied.

The emptiness of the “reasoned judgment” that produced Roe is displayed in plain view by the fact that, after more than 19 years of effort by some of the brightest (and most determined) legal minds in the country, after more than 10 eases upholding abortion rights in this Court, and after dozens upon dozens of amicus briefs submitted in these and other eases, the best the Court can do to explain how it is that the word “liberty” must be thought to include the right to destroy human fetuses is to rattle off a collection of adjectives that simply decorate a value judgment and conceal a political choice. The right to abort, we are told, inheres in “liberty” because it is among “a person’s most basic decisions,” ante, at 849; it involves a “most intimate and personal choie[ej,” ante, at 851; it is “central to personal dignity and autonomy,” ibid.; it “originate^] within the zone of conscience and belief,” ante, at 852; it is “too intimate and personal” for state interference, ibid.; it reflects “intimate views” of a “deep, personal character,” ante, at 858; it involves “intimate relationships” and notions of “personal autonomy and bodily integrity,” ante, at 857; and it concerns a particularly “ ‘important decisio[n],’” ante, at 859 (citation omitted).2 But it is *984obvious to anyone applying “reasoned judgment” that the same adjectives can be applied to many forms of conduct that this Court (including one of the Justices in today’s majority, see Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U. S. 186 (1986)) has held are not entitled to constitutional protection — because, like abortion, they are forms of conduct that have long been criminalized in American society. Those adjectives might be applied, for example, to homosexual sodomy, polygamy, adult incest, and suicide, all of which are equally “intimate” and “deep[ly] personal” decisions involving “personal autonomy and bodily integrity,” and all of which can constitutionally be proscribed because it is our unquestionable constitutional tradition that they are proseribable. It is not reasoned judgment that supports the Court’s decision; only personal predilection. Justice Curtis’s warning is as timely today as it was 135 years ago:

“[W]hen a strict interpretation of the Constitution, according to the fixed rules which govern the interpretation of laws, is abandoned, and the theoretical opinions of individuals are allowed to control its meaning, we have no longer a Constitution; we are under the government of individual men, who for the time being have power to declare what the Constitution is, according to their own views of what it ought to mean.” Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393, 621 (1857) (dissenting opinion).

“Liberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt.” Ante, at 844.

One might have feared to encounter this august and sonorous phrase in an opinion defending the real Roe v. Wade, rather than the revised version fabricated today by the au*985thors of the joint opinion. The shortcomings of Roe did not include lack of clarity: Virtually all regulation of abortion before the third trimester was invalid. But to come across this phrase in the joint opinion — which calls upon federal district judges to apply an “undue burden” standard as doubtful in application as it is unprincipled in origin — is really more than one should have to bear.

The joint opinion frankly concedes that the amorphous concept of “undue burden” has been inconsistently applied by the Members of this Court in the few brief years since that “test” was first explicitly propounded by Justice O’Connor in her dissent in Akron I, 462 U. S. 416 (1983). See ante, at 876.3 Because the three Justices now wish to “set forth a standard of general application,” the joint opinion announces that “it is important to clarify what is meant by an undue burden.” Ibid. I certainly agree with that, but I do not agree that the joint'opinion succeeds in the announced endeavor. To the contrary, its efforts at clarifica*986tion make elear only that the standard is inherently manipulable and will prove hopelessly unworkable in practice.

The joint opinion explains that a state regulation imposes an “undue burden” if it “has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus.” Ante, at 877; see also ante, at 877-879. An obstacle is “substantial,” we are told, if it is “calculated^] [not] to inform the woman’s free choice, [but to] hinder it.” Ante, at 877.4 This latter statement cannot *987possibly mean what it says. Any regulation of abortion that is intended to advance what the joint opinion concedes is the State’s “substantial” interest in protecting unborn life will be “calculated [to] hinder” a decision to have an abortion. It thus seems more accurate to say that the joint opinion would uphold abortion regulations only if they do not unduly hinder the woman’s decision. That, of course, brings us right back to square one: Defining an “undue burden” as an “undue hindrance” (or a “substantial obstacle”) hardly “clarifies” the test. Consciously or not, the joint opinion’s verbal shell game will conceal raw judicial policy choices concerning what is “appropriate” abortion legislation.

The ultimately standardless nature of the “undue burden” inquiry is a reflection of the underlying fact that the concept has no principled or coherent legal basis. As The ChieF Justice points out, Roe’s strict-scrutiny standard “at least had a recognized basis in constitutional law at the time Roe was decided,” ante, at 964, while “[t]he same cannot be said for the ‘undue burden’ standard, which is created largely out of whole cloth by the authors of the joint opinion,” ibid. The joint opinion is flatly wrong in asserting that “our jurisprudence relating to all liberties save perhaps abortion has recognized” the permissibility of laws that do not impose an “undue burden.” Ante, at 873. It argues that the abortion right is similar to other rights in that a law “not designed to strike at the right itself, [but which] has the incidental effect of making it more difficult or more expensive to [exercise the right,]” is not invalid. Ante, at 874. I agree, indeed I have *988forcefully urged, that a law of general applicability which places only an incidental burden on a fundamental right does not infringe that right, see R. A. V. v. St. Paul, 505 U. S. 377, 389-390 (1992); Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U. S. 872, 878-882 (1990), but that principle does not establish the quite different (and quite dangerous) proposition that a law which directly regulates a fundamental right will not be found to violate the Constitution unless it imposes an “undue burden.” It is that, of course, which is at issue here: Pennsylvania has consciously and directly regulated conduct that our cases have held is constitutionally protected. The appropriate analogy, therefore, is that of a state law requiring purchasers of religious books to endure a 24-hour waiting period, or to pay a nominal additional tax of 10. The joint opinion cannot possibly be correct in suggesting that we would uphold such legislation on the ground that it does not impose a “substantial obstacle” to the exercise of First Amendment rights. The “undue burden” standard is not at all the generally applicable principle the joint opinion pretends it to be; rather, it is a unique concept created specially for these cases, to preserve some judicial foothold in this ill-gotten territory. In claiming otherwise, the three Justices show their willingness to place all constitutional rights at risk in an effort to preserve what they deem the “central holding in Roe.” Ante, at 873.

The rootless nature of the “undue burden”, standard, a phrase plucked out of context from our earlier abortion decisions, see n. 3, supra, is further reflected in the fact that the joint opinion finds it necessary expressly to repudiate the more narrow formulations used in Justice O’Connor’s earlier opinions. Ante, at 876-877. Those opinions stated that a statute imposes an “undue burden” if it imposes “absolute obstacles or severe limitations on the abortion decision,” Akron I, 462 U. S., at 464 (dissenting opinion) (emphasis added); see also Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U. S. 747, 828 (1986) (dissent*989ing opinion). Those strong adjectives are conspicuously missing from the joint opinion, whose authors have for some unexplained reason now determined that a burden is “undue” if it merely imposes a “substantial” obstacle to abortion decisions. See, e. g., ante, at 895, 901. Justice O’Connor has also abandoned (again without explanation) the view she expressed in Planned Parenthood Assn. of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 462 U. S. 476 (1983) (dissenting opinion), that a medical regulation which imposes an “undue burden” could nevertheless be upheld if it “reasonably relate[s] to the preservation and protection of maternal health,” id., at 505 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In today’s version, even health measures will be upheld only “if they do not constitute an undue burden,” ante, at 878 (emphasis added). Gone too is Justice O’Connor’s statement that “the State possesses compelling interests in the protection of potential human life . . . throughout pregnancy,” Akron I, supra, at 461 (dissenting opinion) (emphasis added); see also Ashcroft, supra, at 505 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part); Thornburgh, supra, at 828 (O’Con-nor, J., dissenting); instead, the State’s interest in unborn human life is stealthily downgraded to a merely “substantial” or “profound” interest, ante, at 876, 878. (That had to be done, of course, since designating the interest as “compelling” throughout pregnancy would have been, shall we say, a “substantial obstacle” to the joint opinion’s determined effort to reaffirm what it views as the “central holding” of Roe. See Akron I, 462 U. S., at 420, n. 1.) And “viability” is no longer the “arbitrary” dividing line previously decried by Justice O’Connor in Akron I, id., at 461; the Court now announces that “the attainment of viability may continue to serve as the critical fact,” ante, at 860.5 It is difficult to *990maintain the illusion that we are interpreting a Constitution rather than inventing one, when we amend its provisions so breezily.

Because the portion of the joint opinion adopting and describing the undue burden test provides no more useful guidance than the empty phrases discussed above, one must turn to the 23 pages applying that standard to the present facts for further guidance. In evaluating Pennsylvania’s abortion law, the joint opinion relies extensively on the factual findings of the District Court, and repeatedly qualifies its conclusions by noting that they are contingent upon the record developed in these cases. Thus, the joint opinion would uphold the 24-hour waiting period contained in the Pennsylvania statute’s informed consent provision, 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3205 (1990), because “the record evidence shows that in the vast majority of eases, a 24-hour delay does not create any appreciable health risk,” ante, at 885. The three Justices therefore conclude that “on the record before us,. .. we are not convinced that the 24-hour waiting period constitutes an undue burden.” Ante, at 887. The requirement that a doctor provide the information pertinent to informed consent would also be upheld because “there is no evidence on this record that [this requirement] would amount in practical terms to a substantial obstacle to a woman seeking- an abortion.” Ante, at 884. Similarly, the joint opinion would uphold the reporting requirements of the Act, §§3207, 3214, because “there is no . . . showing on the record before us” that these requirements constitute a “substantial obstacle” *991to abortion decisions. Ante, at 901. But at the same time the opinion pointedly observes that these reporting requirements may increase the costs of abortions and that “at some point [that fact] could become a substantial obstacle.” Ibid. Most significantly, the joint opinion’s conclusion that the spousal notice requirement of the Act, see § 3209, imposes an “undue burden” is based in large measure on the District Court’s “detailed findings of fact,” which the joint opinion sets out at great length, ante, at 888-891.

I do not, of course, have any objection to the notion that, in applying legal principles, one should rely only upon the facts that are contained in the record or that are properly subject to judicial notice.6 But what is remarkable about the joint opinion’s fact-intensive analysis is that it does not result in any measurable clarification of the “undue burden” standard. Rather, the approach of the joint opinion is, for the most part, simply to highlight certain facts in the record that apparently strike the three Justices as particularly significant in establishing (or refuting) the existence of an undue burden; after describing these facts, the opinion then simply announces that the provision either does or does not impose a “substantial obstacle” or an “undue burden.” See, e. g., ante, at 880, 884-885, 887, 893-894, 895, 901. We do not know whether the same conclusions could have been reached on a different record, or in what respects the record would have had to differ before an opposite conclusion would have been *992appropriate. The inherently standardless nature of this inquiry invites the district judge to give effect to his personal preferences about abortion. By finding and relying upon the right facts, he can invalidate, it would seem, almost any abortion restriction that strikes him as “undue” — subject, of course, to the possibility of being reversed by a court of appeals or Supreme Court that is as unconstrained in reviewing his decision as he was in making it.

To the extent I can discern any meaningful content in the “undue burden” standard as applied in the joint opinion, it appears' to be that a State may not regulate abortion in such a way as to reduce significantly its incidence. The joint opinion repeatedly emphasizes that an important factor in the “undue burden” analysis is whether the regulation “prevent[s] a significant number of women from obtaining an abortion,” ante, at 893; whether a “significant number of women . . . are likely to be deterred from procuring an abortion,” ante, at 894; and whether the regulation often “deters” women from seeking abortions, ante, at 897. We are not told, however, what forms of “deterrence” are impermissible or what degree of success in deterrence is too much to be tolerated. If, for example, a State required a woman to read a pamphlet describing, with illustrations, the facts of fetal development before she could obtain an abortion, the effect of such legislation might be to “deter” a “significant number of women” from procuring abortions, thereby seemingly allowing a district judge to invalidate it as an undue burden. Thus, despite flowery rhetoric about the State’s “substantial” and “profound” interest in “potential human life,” and criticism of Roe for undervaluing that interest, the joint opinion permits the State to pursue that interest only so long as it is not too successful. As Justice Blackmun recognizes (with evident hope), ante, at 926, the “undue burden” standard may ultimately require the invalidation of each provision upheld today if it can be shown, on a better record, that the State is too effectively “expressing] a pref-*993erenee for childbirth over abortion,” ante, at 883. Reason finds no refuge in this jurisprudence of confusion.

“While we appreciate the weight of the arguments . . . that Roe should be overruled, the reservations any of us may have in reaffirming the central holding of Roe are outweighed by the explication of individual liberty we have given combined with the force of stare decisis.” Ante, at 853.

The Court’s reliance upon stare decisis ean best be described as contrived. It insists upon the necessity of adhering not to all of Roe, but only to what it calls the “central holding.” It seems to me that stare decisis ought to be applied even to the doctrine of stare decisis, and I confess never to have heard of this new, keep-what-you-want-and-throwaway-the-rest version. I wonder whether, as applied to Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803), for example, the new version of stare decisis would be satisfied if we allowed courts to review the constitutionality of only those statutes that (like the one in Marbury) pertain to the jurisdiction of the courts.

I am certainly not in a good position to dispute that the Court has saved the “central holding” of Roe, since to do that effectively I would have to know what the Court has saved, which in turn would require me to understand (as I do not) what the “undue burden” test means. I must confess, however, that I have always thought, and I think a lot of other people have always thought, that the arbitrary trimester framework, which the Court today discards, was quite as central to Roe as the arbitrary viability test, which the Court today retains. It seems particularly ungrateful to carve the trimester framework out of the core of Roe, since its very rigidity (in sharp contrast to the utter indeterminability of the “undue burden” test) is probably the only reason the Court is able to say, in urging stare decisis, that Roe “has in no sense proven ‘unworkable/ ” ante, at 855. I suppose the *994Court is entitled to call a “central holding” whatever it wants to call a “central holding” — which is, come to think of it, perhaps one of the difficulties with this modified version of stare decisis. I thought I might note, however, that the following portions of Roe have not been saved:

• Under Roe, requiring that a woman seeking an abortion be provided truthful information about abortion before giving informed written consent is unconstitutional, if the information is designed to influence her choice. Thornburgh, 476 U. S., at 759-765; Akron I, 462 U. S., at 442-445. Under the joint opinion’s “undue burden” regime (as applied today, at least) such a requirement is constitutional. Ante, at 881-885.

• Under Roe, requiring that information be provided by a doctor, rather than by nonphysieian counselors, is unconstitutional. Akron I, supra, at 446-449. Under the “undue burden” regime (as applied today, at least) it is not. Ante, at 884-885.

• Under Roe, requiring a 24-hour waiting period between the time the woman gives her informed consent and the time of the abortion is unconstitutional. Akron I, supra, at 449-451. Under the “undue burden” regime (as applied today, at least) it is not. Ante, at 885-887.

• Under Roe, requiring detailed reports that include demographic data about each woman who seeks an abortion and various information about each abortion is unconstitutional. Thornburgh, supra, at 765-768. Under the “undue burden” regime (as applied today, at least) it generally is not. Ante, at 900-901.

“Where, in the performance of its judicial duties, the Court decides a case in such a way as to resolve the sort of intensely divisive controversy reflected in Roe ..., its decision has a dimension that the resolution of the normal case does not carry. It is the dimension present whenever the Court’s interpretation of the Constitution calls the contending sides of a *995national controversy to end their national division by accepting a common mandate rooted in the Constitution.” Ante, at 866-867.

The Court’s description of the place of Roe in the social history of the United States is unrecognizable. Not only did Roe not, as the Court suggests, resolve the deeply divisive issue of abortion; it did more than anything else to nourish it, by elevating it to the national level where it is infinitely more difficult to resolve. National politics were not plagued by abortion protests, national abortion lobbying, or abortion marches on Congress before Roe v. Wade was decided. Profound disagreement existed among our citizens over the issue — as it does over other issues, such as the death penalty — but that disagreement was being worked out at the state level. As with many other issues, the division of sentiment within each State was not as closely balanced as it was among the population of the Nation as a whole, meaning not only that more people would be satisfied with the results of state-by-state resolution, but also that those results would be more stable. Pr e-Roe, moreover, political compromise was possible.

Roe’s mandate for abortion on demand destroyed the compromises of the past, rendered compromise impossible for the future, and required the entire issue to be resolved'uniformly, at the national level. At the same time, Roe created a vast new class of abortion consumers and abortion proponents by eliminating the moral opprobrium that had attached to the act. (“If the Constitution guarantees abortion, how can it be bad?” — not an accurate line of thought, but a natural one.) Many favor all of those developments, and it is not for me to say that they are wrong. But to portray Roe as the statesmanlike “settlement” of a divisive issue, a jurisprudential Peace of Westphalia that is worth preserving, is nothing less than Orwellian. Roe fanned into life an issue that has inflamed our national polities in general, and has obscured with its smoke the selection of Justices to this Court *996in particular, ever since. And by keeping us in the abortion-umpiring business, it is the perpetuation of that disruption, rather than of any Pax Boeana, that the Court’s new majority decrees.

“[T]o overrule under fire . . . would subvert the Court’s legitimacy....

“... To all those who will be ... tested by following, the Court implicitly undertakes to remain steadfast .... The promise of constancy, once given, binds its maker for as long as the power to stand by the decision survives and ... the commitment [is not] obsolete....

“[The American people’s] belief in themselves as ... a people [who aspire to live according to the rule of law] is not readily separable from their understanding of the Court invested with the authority to decide their constitutional cases and speak before all others for their constitutional ideals. If the Court’s legitimacy should be undermined, then, so would the country be in its very ability to see itself through its constitutional ideals.” Ante, at 867-868.

The Imperial Judiciary lives. It is instructive to compare this Nietzschean vision of us uneleeted, life-tenured judges— leading a Yolk who will be “tested by following,” and whose very “belief in themselves” is mystically bound up in their “understanding” of a Court that “speak[s] before all others for their constitutional ideals” — with the somewhat more modest role envisioned for these lawyers by the Founders.

“The judiciary . . . has ... no direction either of the strength or of the wealth of the society, and can take no active resolution whatever. It may truly be said to have neither Force nor Will, but merely judgment....” The Federalist No. 78, pp. 393-394 (G. Wills ed. 1982).

Or, again, to compare this ecstasy of a Supreme Court in which there is, especially on controversial matters, no *997shadow of change or hint of alteration (“There is a limit to the amount of error that can plausibly be imputed to prior Courts,” ante, at 866), with the more democratic views of a more humble man:

“[Tjhe candid citizen must confess that if the policy of the Government upon vital questions affecting the whole people is to be irrevocably fixed by decisions of the Supreme Court,... the people will have ceased to be their own rulers, having to that extent practically resigned their Government into the hands of that eminent tribunal.” A. Lincoln, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4,1861), reprinted in Inaugural Addresses of the Presidents of the United States, S. Doc. No. 101-10, p. 139 (1989).

It is particularly difficult, in the circumstances of the present decision, to sit still for the Court’s lengthy lecture upon the virtues of “constancy,” ante, at 868, of “remaining] steadfast,” ibid., and adhering to “principle,” ante, passim. Among the five Justices who purportedly adhere to Roe, at most three agree upon the principle that constitutes adherence (the joint opinion’s “undue burden” standard) — and that principle is inconsistent with Roe. See 410 U. S., at 154-156.7 To make matters worse, two of the three, in order thus to remain steadfast, had to abandon previously stated positions. See n. 4, supra; see supra, at 988-990. . It is beyond me how the Court expects these accommodations to be accepted “as grounded truly in principle, not as compromises with social and political pressures having, as such, no bearing on the principled choices that the Court is obliged to make.” Ante, at 865-866. The only principle the Court “adheres” *998to, it seems to me, is the principle that the Court must be seen as standing by Roe. That is not a principle of law (which is what I thought the Court was talking about), but a principle of Realpolitik — and a wrong one at that.

I cannot agree with, indeed I am appalled by, the Court’s suggestion that the decision whether to stand by an erroneous constitutional decision must be strongly influenced— against overruling, no less — by the substantial and continuing public opposition the decision has generated. The Court’s judgment that any other course would “subvert the Court’s legitimacy” must be another consequence of reading the error-filled history book that described the deeply divided country brought together by Roe. In my history book, the Court was covered with dishonor and deprived of legitimacy by Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393 (1857), an erroneous (and widely opposed) opinion that it did not abandon, rather than by West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U. S. 379 (1937), which produced the famous “switch in time” from the Court’s erroneous (and widely opposed) constitutional opposition to the social measures of the New Deal. (Both Dred Scott and one line of the cases resisting the New Deal rested upon the concept of “substantive due process” that the Court praises and employs today. Indeed, Dred Scott was “very possibly the first application of substantive due process in the Supreme Court, the original precedent for Lochner v. New York and Roe v. Wade.” D. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court 271 (1985) (footnotes omitted).)

But whether it would “subvert the Court’s legitimacy” or not, the notion that we would decide a ease differently from the way we otherwise would have in order to show that we can stand firm against public disapproval is frightening. It is a bad enough idea, even in the head of someone like me, who believes that the text of the Constitution, and our traditions, say what they say and there is no fiddling with them. But when it is in the mind of a Court that believes the Con*999stitution has an evolving meaning, see ante, at 848; that the Ninth Amendment’s reference to “othe[r]” rights is not a disclaimer, but a charter for action, ibid.; and that the function of this Court is to “speak before all others for [the people’s] constitutional ideals” unrestrained by meaningful text or tradition — then the notion that the Court must adhere to a decision for as long as the decision faces “great opposition” and the Court is “under fire” acquires a character of almost ezarist arrogance. We are offended by these marchers who descend upon us, every year on the anniversary of Roe, to protest our saying that the Constitution requires what our society has never thought the Constitution requires. These people who refuse to be “tested by following” must be taught a lesson. We have no Cossacks, but at least we can stubbornly refuse to abandon an erroneous opinion that we might otherwise change — to show how little they intimidate us.

Of course, as The Chief Justice points out, we have been subjected to what the Court calls “‘political pressure’” by both sides of this issue. Ante, at 963. Maybe today’s decision not to overrule Roe will be seen as buckling to pressure from that direction. Instead of engaging in the hopeless task of predicting public perception — a job not for lawyers but for political campaign managers — the Justices should do what is legally right by asking two questions: (1) Was Roe correctly decided? (2) Has Roe succeeded in producing a settled body of law? If the answer to both questions is no, Roe should undoubtedly be overruled.

In truth, I am as distressed as the Court is — and expressed my distress several years ago, see Webster, 492 U. S., at 535 — about the “political pressure” directed to the Court: the marches, the mail, the protests aimed at inducing us to change our opinions. How upsetting it is, that so many of our citizens (good people, not lawless ones, on both sides of this abortion issue, and on various sides of other issues as well) think that we Justices should properly take into ac*1000count their views, as though we were engaged not in ascertaining an objective law but in determining some kind of social consensus. The Court would profit, I think, from giving less attention to the fact of this distressing phenomenon, and more attention to the cause of it. That cause permeates today’s opinion: a new mode of constitutional adjudication that relies not upon text and traditional practice to determine the law, but upon what the Court calls “reasoned judgment,” ante, at 849, which turns out to be nothing but philosophical predilection and moral intuition. All manner of “liberties,” the Court tells us, inhere in the Constitution and are enforceable by this Court — notjust those mentioned in the text or established in the traditions of our society. Ante, at 847-849. Why even the Ninth Amendment — which says only that “[t]he enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people” — is, despite our contrary understanding for almost 200 years, a literally boundless source of additional, unnamed, unhinted-at “rights,” definable and enforceable by us, through “reasoned judgment.” Ante, at 848-849.

What makes all this relevant to the bothersome application of “political pressure” against the Court are the twin facts that the American people love democracy and the American people are not fools. As long as this Court thought (and the people thought) that we Justices were doing essentially lawyers’ work up here — reading text and discerning our society’s traditional understanding of that text — the public pretty much left us alone. Texts and traditions are facts to study, not convictions to demonstrate about. But if in reality our process of constitutional adjudication consists primarily of making value judgments; if we can ignore a long and clear tradition clarifying an ambiguous text, as we did, for example, five days ago in declaring unconstitutional invocations and benedictions at public high school graduation ceremonies, Lee v. Weisman, 505 U. S. 577 (1992); if, as I say, our pronouncement of constitutional law rests primarily on value *1001judgments, then a free and intelligent people’s attitude towards us can be expected to be (ought to be) quite different. The people know that their value judgments are quite as good as those taught in any law school — maybe better. If, indeed, the “liberties” protected by the Constitution are, as the Court says, undefined and unbounded, then the people should demonstrate, to protest that we do not implement their values instead of ours. Not only that, but confirmation hearings for new Justices should deteriorate into question- and-answer sessions in which Senators go through a list of their constituents’ most favored and most disfavored alleged constitutional rights, and seek the nominee’s commitment to support or oppose them. Value judgments, after all, should be voted on, not dictated; and if our Constitution has somehow accidently committed them to the Supreme Court, at least we can have a sort of plebiscite each time a new nominee to that body is put forward. Justice Blackmun not only regards this prospect with equanimity, he solicits it. Ante, at 943.

* * *

There is a poignant aspect to today’s opinion. Its length, and what might be called its epic tone, suggest that its authors believe they are bringing to an end a troublesome era in the history of our Nation and of our Court. “It is the dimension” of authority, they say, to “eal[l] the contending sides of national controversy to end their national division by accepting a common mandate rooted in the Constitution.” Ante, at 867.

There comes vividly to mind a portrait by Emanuel Leutze that hangs in the Harvard Law School: Roger Brooke Taney, painted in 1859, the 82d year of his life, the 24th of his Chief Justiceship, the second after his opinion in Dred Scott. He is all in black, sitting in a shadowed red armchair, left hand resting upon a pad of paper in his lap, right hand hanging limply, almost lifelessly, beside the inner arm of the chair. He sits facing the viewer and staring straight out. There *1002seems to be on his face, and in his deep-set eyes, an expression of profound sadness and disillusionment. Perhaps he always looked that way, even when dwelling upon the happiest of thoughts. But those of us who know how the lustre of his great Chief Justiceship came to be eclipsed by Dred Scott cannot help believing that he had that ease — its already apparent consequences for the Court and its soon-to-be-played-out consequences for the Nation — burning on his mind. I expect that two years earlier he, too, had thought himself “eall[ing] the contending sides of national controversy to end their national division by accepting a common mandate rooted in the Constitution.”

It is no more realistic for us in this litigation, than it was for him in that, to think that an issue of the sort they both involved — an issue involving life and death, freedom and subjugation — can be “speedily and finally settled” by the Supreme Court, as President James Buchanan in his inaugural address said the issue of slavery in the territories would be. See Inaugural Addresses of the Presidents of the United States, S. Doc. No. 101-10, p. 126 (1989). Quite to the contrary, by foreclosing all democratic outlet for the deep passions this issue arouses, by banishing the issue from the political forum that gives all participants, even the losers, the satisfaction of a fair hearing and an honest fight, by continuing the imposition of a rigid national rule instead of allowing for regional differences, the Court merely prolongs and intensifies the anguish.

We should get out of this area, where we have no right to be, and where we do neither ourselves nor the country any good by remaining.