Mr. Justice Douglas

delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case involves eight defendants who were convicted in a Florida municipal court of violating a Jacksonville, Florida, vagrancy ordinance.1 Their convictions *157were affirmed by the Florida Circuit Court in a consolidated appeal, and their petition for certiorari was denied by the District Court of Appeal on the authority of Johnson v. State, 202 So. 2d 852.2 The case is *158here on a petition for certiorari, which we granted. 403 U. S. 917. For reasons which will appear, we reverse.

At issue are five consolidated cases. Margaret Papa-christou, Betty Calloway, Eugene Eddie Melton, and Leonard Johnson were all arrested early on a Sunday morning, and charged with vagrancy — “prowling by auto.”

Jimmy Lee Smith and Milton Henry were charged with vagrancy — ‘ 'vagabonds. ’ ’

Henry Edward Heath and a eodefendant were arrested for vagrancy — “loitering” and “common thief.”

Thomas Owen Campbell was charged with vagrancy— “common thief.”

Hugh Brown was charged with vagrancy — “disorderly loitering on street” and “disorderly conduct — resisting arrest with violence.”

The facts are stipulated. Papachristou and Calloway are white females. Melton and Johnson are black males. Papachristou was enrolled in a job-training program sponsored by the State Employment Service at Florida Junior College in Jacksonville. Calloway was a typing and shorthand teacher at a state mental institution located near Jacksonville. She was the owner of the automobile in which the four defendants were arrested. Melton was a Vietnam war veteran who had been released from the Navy after nine months in a veterans’ hospital. On the date of his arrest he was a part-time computer helper while attending college as a full-time student in Jacksonville. Johnson was a tow-motor operator in a grocery chain warehouse and was a lifelong resident of Jacksonville.

At the time of their arrest the four of them were riding *159in Calloway’s car on the main thoroughfare in Jacksonville. They had left a restaurant owned by Johnson’s uncle where they had eaten and were on their way to a nightclub. The arresting officers denied that the racial mixture in the car played any part in the decision to make the arrest. The arrest, they said, was made because the defendants had stopped near a used-car lot which had been broken into several times. There was, however, no evidence of any breaking and entering on the night in question.

Of these four charged with “prowling by auto” none had been previously arrested except Papachristou who had once been convicted of a municipal offense.

Jimmy Lee Smith and Milton Henry (who is not a petitioner) were arrested between 9 and 10 a. m. on a weekday in downtown Jacksonville, while waiting for a friend who was to lend them a car so they could apply for a job at a produce company. Smith was a part-time produce worker and part-time organizer for a Negro political group. He had a common-law wife and three children supported by him and his wife. He had been arrested several times but convicted only once. Smith’s companion, Henry, was an 18-year-old high school student with no previous record of arrest.

This morning it was cold, and Smith had no jacket, so they went briefly into a dry cleaning shop to wait, but left when requested to do so. They thereafter walked back and forth two or three times over a two-block stretch looking for their friend. The store owners, who apparently were wary of Smith and his companion, summoned two police officers who searched the men and found neither had a weapon. But they were arrested because the officers said they had no identification and because the officers did not believe their story.

Heath and a codefendant were arrested for “loitering” and for “common thief.” Both were residents of Jacksonville, Heath having lived there all his life and being *160employed at an automobile body shop. Heath had previously been arrested but his codefendant had no arrest record. Heath and his companion were arrested when they drove up to a residence shared by Heath’s girl friend and some other girls. Some police officers were already there in the process of arresting another man. When Heath and his companion started backing out of the driveway, the officers signaled to them to stop and asked them to get out of the car, which they did. Thereupon they and the automobile were searched. Although no contraband or incriminating evidence was found, they were both arrested, Heath being charged with being a “common thief” because he was reputed to be a thief. The codefendant was charged with “loitering” because he was standing in the driveway, an act which the officers admitted was done only at their command.

Campbell was arrested as he reached his home very early one morning and was charged with “common thief.” He was stopped by officers because he was traveling at a high rate of speed, yet no speeding charge was placed against him.

Brown was arrested when he was observed leaving a downtown Jacksonville hotel by a police officer seated in a cruiser. The police testified he was reputed to be a thief, narcotics pusher, and generally opprobrious character. The officer called Brown over to the car, intending at that time to arrest him unless he had a good explanation for being on the street. Brown walked over to the police cruiser, as commanded, and the officer began to search him, apparently preparatory to placing him in the car. In the process of the search he came on two small packets which were later found to contain heroin. When the officer touched the pocket where the packets were, Brown began to resist. He was charged with “disorderly loitering on street” and “dis*161orderly conduct — resisting arrest with violence.” While he was also charged with a narcotics violation, that charge was nolled.

Jacksonville’s ordinance and Florida’s statute were “derived from early English law,” Johnson v. State, 202 So. 2d, at 854, and employ “archaic language” in their definitions of vagrants. Id., at 855. The history is an oftentold tale. The breakup of feudal estates in England led to labor shortages which in turn resulted in the Statutes of Laborers,3 designed to stabilize the labor force by prohibiting increases in wages and prohibiting the movement of workers from their home areas in search of improved conditions. Later vagrancy laws became criminal aspects of the poor laws. The series of laws passed in England on the subject became increasingly severe.4 *162But “the theory of the Elizabethan poor laws no longer fits the facts,” Edwards v. California, 314 U. S. 160, 174. The conditions which spawned these laws may be gone, but the archaic classifications remain.

This ordinance is void for vagueness, both in the sense that it “fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute,” United States v. Harriss, 347 U. S. 612, 617, and because it encourages arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88; Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U. S. 242.

Living under a rule of law entails various suppositions, one of which is that “[all persons] are entitled to be informed as to what the State commands or forbids.” Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U. S. 451, 453.

Lametta is one of a well-recognized group of cases insisting that the law give fair notice of the offending conduct. See Connolly v. General Construction Co., 269 U. S. 385, 391; Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274 U. S. 445; United States v. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U. S. 81. In the field of regulatory statutes governing business activities, where the acts limited are in a narrow category, greater leeway is allowed. Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U. S. 337; United States v. National Dairy Products Corp., 372 U. S. 29; United States v. Petrillo, 332 U. S. 1.

The poor among us, the minorities, the average householder are not in business and not alerted to the regula*163tory schemes of vagrancy laws; and we assume they would have no understanding of their meaning and impact if they read them. Nor are they protected from being caught in the vagrancy net- by the necessity of having a specific intent to commit an unlawful act. See Screws v. United States, 325 U. S. 91; Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, supra.

The Jacksonville ordinance makes criminal activities which by modern standards are normally innocent. “Nightwalking” is one. Florida construes the ordinance not to make criminal one night’s wandering, Johnson v. State, 202 So. 2d, at 855, only the “habitual” wanderer or, as the ordinance describes it, “common night walkers.” We know, however, from experience that sleepless people often walk at night, perhaps hopeful that sleep-inducing relaxation will result.

Luis Munoz-Marin, former Governor of Puerto Rico, commented once that “loafing” was a national virtue in his Commonwealth and that it should be encouraged. It is, however, a crime in Jacksonville.

“[Pjersons able to work but habitually living upon the earnings of their wives or minor children” — like habitually living “without visible means of support” — might implicate unemployed pillars of the community who have married rich wives.

“[P]ersons able to work but habitually living upon the earnings of their wives or minor children” may also embrace unemployed people out of the labor market, by reason of a recession 5 or disemployed by reason of technological or so-called structural displacements.

*164Persons “wandering or strolling” from place to place have been extolled by Walt Whitman and Yachel Lindsay.6 The qualification “without any lawful purpose or object” may be a trap for innocent acts. Persons “neglecting all lawful business and habitually spending their time by frequenting . . . places where alcoholic beverages are sold or served” would literally embrace many members of golf clubs and city clubs.

Walkers and strollers and wanderers may be going to or coming from a burglary. Loafers or loiterers may be “casing” a place for a holdup. Letting one’s wife support him is an intra-family matter, and normally of no concern to the police. Yet it may, of course, be the setting for numerous crimes.

The difficulty is that these activities are historically part of the amenities of life as we have known them. They are not mentioned in the Constitution or in the Bill of Rights. These unwritten amenities have been in part responsible for giving our people the feeling of independence and self-confidence, the feeling of creativity. These amenities have dignified the right of dissent and have honored the right to be nonconformists and the right to defy submissiveness. They have encouraged lives of high spirits rather than hushed, suffocating silence.

They are embedded in Walt Whitman’s writings, especially in his “Song of the Open Road.” They are reflected, too, in the spirit of Vachel Lindsay’s “I Want to Go Wandering,” and by Henry D. Thoreau.7

*165This aspect of the vagrancy ordinance before us is suggested by what this Court said in 1876 about a broad criminal statute enacted by Congress: “It would certainly be dangerous if the legislature could set a net large enough to catch all possible offenders, and leave it to the courts to step inside and say who could be rightfully detained, and who should be set at large.” United States v. Reese, 92 U. S. 214, 221.

While that was a federal case, the due process implications are equally applicable to the States and to this vagrancy ordinance. Here the net cast is large, not to give the courts the power to pick and choose but to increase the arsenal of the police. In Winters v. New York, 333 U. S. 507, the Court struck down a New York statute that made criminal the distribution of a magazine made up principally of items of criminal deeds of bloodshed or lust so massed as to become vehicles for inciting violent and depraved crimes against the person. The infirmity the Court found was vagueness — the absence of “ascertainable standards of guilt” (id., at 515) in the *166sensitive First Amendment area.8 Mr. Justice Frankfurter dissented. But concerned as he, and many others,9 had been over the vagrancy laws, he added:

“Only a word needs to be said regarding Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U. S. 451. The case involved a New Jersey statute of the type that seek to control ‘vagrancy.’ These statutes are in a class by themselves, in view of the familiar abuses to which they are put. . . . Definiteness is designedly avoided so as to allow the net to be cast at large, to enable men to be caught who are vaguely undesirable in the eyes of police and prosecution, although not chargeable with any particular offense. In short, these ‘vagrancy statutes’ and laws against ‘gangs’ are not fenced in by the text of the statute or by the subject matter so as to give notice of conduct to be avoided.” Id., at 540.

Where the list of crimes is so all-inclusive and generalized 10 as the one in this ordinance, those convicted *167may be punished for no more than vindicating affronts to police authority:

“The common ground which brings such a motley assortment of human troubles before the magistrates in vagrancy-type proceedings is the procedural laxity which permits 'conviction’ for almost any kind of conduct and the existence of the House of Correction as an easy and convenient dumping-ground for prob*168lems that appear to have no other immediate solution.” Foote, Vagrancy-Type Law and Its Administration, 104 U. Pa. L. Rev. 603, 631.11

Another aspect of the ordinance’s vagueness appears when we focus, not on the lack of notice given a potential offender, but on the effect of the unfettered discretion it places in the hands of the Jacksonville police. Caleb Foote, an early student of this subject, has called the vagrancy-type law as offering “punishment by analogy.” Id., at 609. Such crimes, though long common in Russia,12 are not compatible with our constitutional *169system. We allow our police to make arrests only on “probable cause,” 13 a Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment standard applicable to the States14 as well as to the Federal Government. Arresting a person on suspicion, like arresting a person for investigation, is foreign to our system, even when the arrest is for past criminality. Future criminality, however, is the common justification for the presence of vagrancy statutes. See Foote, supra, at 625. Florida has, indeed, construed her vagrancy statute “as necessary regulations,” inter alia, “to deter vagabondage and prevent crimes.” Johnson v. State, 202 So. 2d 852; Smith v. State, 239 So. 2d 250, 251.

A direction by a legislature to the police to arrest all “suspicious” persons15 would not pass constitutional muster. A vagrancy prosecution may be merely the cloak for a conviction which could not be obtained on the real but undisclosed grounds for the arrest. People *170v. Moss, 309 N. Y. 429, 131 N. E. 2d 717. But as Chief Justice Hewart said in Frederick Dean, 18 Crim. App. 133, 134 (1924):

“It would be in the highest degree unfortunate if in any part of the country those who are responsible for setting in motion the criminal law should entertain, connive at or coquette with the idea that in a case where there is not enough evidence to charge the prisoner with an attempt to commit a crime, the prosecution may, nevertheless, on such insufficient evidence, succeed in obtaining and upholding a conviction under the Vagrancy Act, 1824.”

Those generally implicated by the imprecise terms of the ordinance — poor people, nonconformists, dissenters, idlers — may be required to comport themselves according to the lifestyle deemed appropriate by the Jacksonville police and the courts. Where, as here, there are no standards governing the exercise of the discretion granted by the ordinance, the scheme permits and encourages an arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of the law. It furnishes a convenient tool for “harsh and discriminatory enforcement by local prosecuting officials, against particular groups deemed to merit their displeasure.” Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88, 97-98. It results in a regime in which the poor and the unpopular are permitted to “stand on a public sidewalk . . . only at the whim of any police officer.” Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 382 U. S. 87, 90. Under this ordinance,

“[I]f some carefree type of fellow is satisfied to work just so much, and no more, as will pay for one square meal, some wine, and a flophouse daily, but a court thinks this kind of living subhuman, the fellow can be forced to raise his sights or go to jail as a vagrant.” Amsterdam, Federal Constitutional Restrictions on the Punishment of Crimes of Status, *171Crimes of General Obnoxiousness, Crimes of Displeasing Police Officers, and the Like, 3 Crim. L. Bull. 205, 226 (1967).

A presumption that people who might walk or loaf or loiter or stroll or frequent houses where liquor is sold, or who are supported by their wives or who look suspicious to the police are to become future criminals is too precarious for a rule of law. The implicit presumption in these generalized vagrancy standards — that crime is being nipped in the bud — is too extravagant to deserve extended treatment. Of course, vagrancy statutes are useful to the police. Of course, they are nets making easy the roundup of so-called undesirables. But the rule of law implies equality and justice in its application. Vagrancy laws of the Jacksonville type teach that the scales of justice are so tipped that even-handed administration of the law is not possible. The rule of law, evenly applied to minorities as well as majorities, to the poor as well as the rich, is the great mucilage that holds society together. •

The Jacksonville ordinance cannot be squared with our constitutional standards and is plainly unconstitutional.

Reversed.

Mr. Justice Powell and Mr. Justice Rehnquist took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

Justice O’Connor

delivered the opinion of the Court.

This appeal presents a facial challenge to a criminal statute that requires persons who loiter or wander on the streets to provide a “credible and reliable” identification and to account for their presence when requested by a peace officer under circumstances that would justify a stop under the standards of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968).1 We conclude that the statute as it has been construed is unconstitutionally vague within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by failing to clarify what is contemplated *354 by the requirement that a suspect provide a "credible and reliable" identification. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court below.

I

Appellee Edward Lawson was detained or arrested on approximately 15 occasions between March 1975 and January 1977 pursuant to Cal. Penal Code Ann. § 647(e) (West 1970). 2 Lawson was prosecuted only twice, and was convicted once. The second charge was dismissed.

Lawson then brought a civil action in the District Court for the Southern District of California seeking a declaratory judgment that § 647(e) is unconstitutional, a mandatory injunction to restrain enforcement of the statute, and compensatory and punitive damages against the various officers who detained him. The District Court found that § 647(e) was overbroad because "a person who is stopped on less than probable cause cannot be punished for failing to identify himself." App. to Juris. Statement A-78. The District Court enjoined enforcement of the statute, but held that Lawson could not recover damages because the officers involved acted in the good-faith belief that each detention or arrest was lawful.

Appellant H. A. Porazzo, Deputy Chief Commander of the California Highway Patrol, appealed the District Court decision to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Lawson *355cross-appealed, arguing that he was entitled to a jury trial on the issue of damages against the officers. The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court determination as to the unconstitutionality of § 647(e). 658 F. 2d 1362 (1981). The appellate court determined that the statute was unconstitutional in that it violates the Fourth Amendment’s proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures, it contains a vague enforcement standard that is susceptible to arbitrary enforcement, and it fails to give fair and adequate notice of the type of conduct prohibited. Finally, the Court of Appeals reversed the District Court as to its holding that Lawson was not entitled to a jury trial to determine the good faith of the officers in his damages action against them, and remanded the case to the District Court for trial.

The officers appealed to this Court from that portion of the judgment of the Court of Appeals which declared § 647(e) unconstitutional and which enjoined its enforcement. We noted probable jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1254(2). 455 U. S. 999 (1982).

II

In the courts below, Lawson mounted an attack on the facial validity of § 647(e).3 “In evaluating a facial challenge to a state law, a federal court must, of course, consider any limiting construction that a state court or enforcement agency has proffered.” Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U. S. 489, 494, n. 5 (1982). As construed by the California Court of Appeal,4 § 647(e) requires that an in*356dividual provide “credible and reliable” identification when requested by a police officer who has reasonable suspicion of criminal activity sufficient to justify a Terry detention.5 People v. Solomon, 83 Cal. App. 3d 429, 108 Cal. Rptr. 867 *357(1973). “Credible and reliable” identification is defined by the State Court of Appeal as identification “carrying reasonable assurance that the identification is authentic and providing means for later getting in touch with the person who has identified himself.” Id., at 438, 108 Cal. Rptr., at 873. In addition, a suspect may be required to “account for his presence ... to the extent that it assists in producing credible and reliable identification . . . .” Id., at 438, 108 Cal. Rptr., at 872. Under the terms of the statute, failure of the individual to provide “credible and reliable” identification permits the arrest.6

III

Our Constitution is designed to maximize individual freedoms within a framework of ordered liberty. Statutory limitations on those freedoms are examined for substantive authority and content as well as for definiteness or certainty of expression. See generally M. Bassiouni, Substantive Criminal Law 53 (1978).

As generally stated, the void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., supra; Smith v. Goguen, 415 U. S. 566 (1974); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U. S. 104 (1972); Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U. S. 156 (1972); Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U. S. 385 (1926). Although the doctrine focuses *358both on actual notice to citizens and arbitrary enforcement, we have recognized recently that the more important aspect of the vagueness doctrine “is not actual notice, but the other principal element of the doctrine — the requirement that a legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement.” Smith, 415 U. S., at 574. Where the legislature fails to provide such minimal guidelines, a criminal statute may permit “a standardless sweep [that] allows policemen, prosecutors, and juries to pursue their personal predilections.” 7d., at 575.7

Section 647(e), as presently drafted and as construed by the state courts, contains no standard for determining what a suspect has to do in order to satisfy the requirement to provide a “credible and reliable” identification. As such, the statute vests virtually complete discretion in the hands of the police to determine whether the suspect has satisfied the statute and must be permitted to go on his way in the absence of probable cause to arrest. An individual, whom police may think is suspicious but do not have probable cause to believe has committed a crime, is entitled to continue to walk the public streets “only at the whim of any police officer” who happens to stop that individual under § 647(e). Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 382 U. S. 87, 90 (1965). Our concern here is based upon the “potential for arbitrarily suppressing First Amendment liberties . . . .” Id., at 91. In addition, § 647(e) implicates consideration of the constitutional right to freedom of movement. See Kent v. Dulles, 357 U. S. 116, 126 (1958); Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U. S. 500, 505-506 (1964).8

*359Section 647(e) is not simply a “stop-and-identify” statute. Rather, the statute requires that the individual provide a “credible and reliable” identification that carries a “reasonable assurance” of its authenticity, and that provides “means for later getting in touch with the person who has identified himself.” Solomon, 33 Cal. App. 3d, at 438, 108 Cal. Rptr., at 872-873. In addition, the suspect may also have to account for his presence “to the extent it assists in producing *360credible and reliable identification.” Id., at 438, 108 Cal. Rptr., at 872.

At oral argument, the appellants confirmed that a suspect violates § 647(e) unless “the officer [is] satisfied that the identification is reliable.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 6. In giving examples of how suspects would satisfy the requirement, appellants explained that a jogger, who was not carrying identification, could, depending on the particular officer, be required to answer a series of questions concerning the route that he followed to arrive at the place where the officers detained him,9 or .could satisfy the identification requirement simply by reciting his name and address. See id., at 6-10.

It is clear that the full discretion accorded to the police to determine whether the suspect has provided a “credible and reliable” identification necessarily “entrusts] lawmaking ‘to the moment-to-moment judgment of the policeman on his beat.’” Smith, supra, at 575 (quoting Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U. S. 111, 120 (1969) (Black, J., concurring)). Section 647(e) “furnishes a convenient tool for ‘harsh and discriminatory enforcement by local prosecuting officials, against particular groups deemed to merit their displeasure/” Papachristou, 405 U. S., at 170 (quoting Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88, 97-98 (1940)), and “confers on police a virtually unrestrained power to arrest and charge persons with a violation.” Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U. S. 130, 135 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring in result). In providing that a detention under § 647(e) may occur only where there is the level of suspicion sufficient to justify a Terry stop, the State ensures the existence of “neutral limitations on the conduct of individual officers.” Brown v. Texas, 443 *361U. S., at 51. Although the initial detention is justified, the State fails to establish standards by which the officers may determine whether the suspect has complied with the subsequent identification requirement.

Appellants stress the need for strengthened law enforcement tools to combat the epidemic of crime that plagues our Nation. The concern of our citizens with curbing criminal activity is certainly a matter requiring the attention of all branches of government. As weighty as this concern is, however, it cannot justify legislation that would otherwise fail to meet constitutional standards for definiteness and clarity. See Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U. S. 451 (1939). Section 647(e), as presently construed, requires that “suspicious” persons satisfy some undefined identification requirement, or face criminal punishment. Although due process does not require “impossible standards” of clarity, see United States v. Petrillo, 332 U. S. 1, 7-8 (1947), this is not a case where further precision in the statutory language is either impossible or impractical.

IV

We conclude § 647(e) is unconstitutionally vague on its face because it encourages arbitrary enforcement by failing to describe with sufficient particularity what a suspect must do in order to satisfy the statute.10 Accordingly, the judgment of *362 the Court of Appeals is affirmed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Justice Brennan,

concurring.

I join the Court’s opinion; it demonstrates convincingly that the California statute at issue in this case, Cal. Penal Code Ann. § 647(e) (West 1970), as interpreted by California courts, is unconstitutionally vague. Even if the defect identified by the Court were cured, however, I would hold that this statute violates the Fourth Amendment.1 Merely to facilitate the general law enforcement objectives of investigating and preventing unspecified crimes, States may not authorize the arrest and criminal prosecution of an individual for failing to produce identification or further information on demand by a police officer.

*363It has long been settled that the Fourth Amendment prohibits the seizure and detention or search of an individual’s person unless there is probable cause to believe that he has committed a crime, except under certain conditions strictly-defined by the legitimate requirements of law enforcement and by the limited extent of the resulting intrusion on individual liberty and privacy. See Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U. S. 721, 726-727 (1969). The scope of that exception to the probable-cause requirement for seizures of the person has been defined by a series of cases, beginning with Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968), holding that a police officer with reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, based on articulable facts, may detail! a suspect briefly for purposes of limited questioning and, in so doing, may conduct a brief “frisk” of the suspect to protect himself from concealed weapons. See, e. g., United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S. 873, 880-884 (1975); Adams v. Williams, 407 U. S. 143, 145-146 (1972). Where probable cause is lacking, we have expressly declined to allow significantly more intrusive detentions or searches on the Terry rationale, despite the assertion of compelling law enforcement interests. “For all but those narrowly defined intrusions, the requisite ‘balancing’ has been performed in centuries of precedent and is embodied in the principle that seizures are ‘reasonable’ only if supported by probable cause.” Dunaway v. New York, 442 U. S. 200, 214 (1979).2

*364 Terry and the cases following it give full recognition to law enforcement officers’ need for an “intermediate” response, short of arrest, to suspicious circumstances; the power to effect a brief detention for the purpose of questioning is a powerful tool for the investigation and prevention of crimes. Any person may, of course, direct a question to another person in passing. The Terry doctrine permits police officers to do far more: If they have the requisite reasonable suspicion, they may use a number of devices with substantial coercive impact on the person to whom they direct their attention, including an official “show of authority,” the use of physical force to restrain him, and a search of the person for weapons. Terry v. Ohio, supra, at 19, n. 16; see Florida v. Royer, 460 U. S. 491, 498-499 (1983) (opinion of White, J.); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U. S. 544, 554 (1980) (opinion of Stewart, J.). During such an encounter, few people will ever feel free not to cooperate fully with the police by answering their questions. Cf. 3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 9.2, pp. 53-55 (1978). Our case reports are replete with examples of suspects’ cooperation during Terry encounters, even when the suspects have a great deal to lose by cooperating. See, e. g., Sibron v. New York, 392 U. S. 40, 45 (1968); Florida v. Royer, supra, at 493-495.

The price of that effectiveness, however, is intrusion on individual interests protected by the Fourth Amendment. We have held that the intrusiveness of even these brief stops for purposes of questioning is sufficient to render them “seizures” under the Fourth Amendment. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S., at 16. For precisely that reason, the scope of seizures of the person on less than probable cause that Terry *365permits is strictly circumscribed to limit the degree of intrusion they cause. Terry encounters must be brief; the suspect must not be moved or asked to move more than a short distance; physical searches are permitted only to the extent necessary to protect the police officers involved during the encounter; and, most importantly, the suspect must be free to leave after a short time and to decline to answer the questions put to him.

“[T]he person may be briefly detained against his will while pertinent questions are directed to him. Of course, the person stopped is not obliged to answer, answers may not be compelled, and refusal to answer furnishes no basis for an arrest, although it may alert the officer to the need for continued observation.” Id., at 34 (White, J., concurring).

Failure to observe these limitations converts a Terry encounter into the sort of detention that can be justified only by probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U. S., at 501 (opinion of White, J.); id., at 509-511 (Brennan, J., concurring in result); Dunaway v. New York, supra, at 216.

The power to arrest — or otherwise to prolong a seizure until a suspect had responded to the satisfaction of the police officers — would undoubtedly elicit cooperation from a high percentage of even those very few individuals not sufficiently coerced by a show of authority, brief physical detention, and a frisk. We have never claimed that expansion of the power of police officers to act on reasonable suspicion alone, or even less, would further no law enforcement interests. See, e. g., Brown v. Texas, 443 U. S. 47, 52 (1979). But the balance struck by the Fourth Amendment between the public interest in effective law enforcement and the equally public interest in safeguarding individual freedom and privacy from arbitrary governmental interference forbids such expansion. See Dunaway v. New York, supra; United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S., at 878. Detention beyond the limits *366of Terry without probable cause would improve the effectiveness of legitimate police investigations by only a small margin, but it would expose individual members of the public to exponential increases in both the intrusiveness of the encounter and the risk that police officers would abuse their discretion for improper ends. Furthermore, regular expansion of Terry encounters into more intrusive detentions, without a clear connection to any specific underlying crimes, is likely to exacerbate ongoing tensions, where they exist, between the police and the public. See Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders 157-168 (1968).

In sum, under the Fourth Amendment, police officers with reasonable suspicion that an individual has committed or is about to commit a crime may detain that individual, using some force if necessary, for the purpose of asking investigative questions.3 They may ask their questions in a way calculated to obtain an answer. But they may not compel an answer, and they must allow the person to leave after a reasonably brief period of time unless the information they have acquired during the encounter has given them probable cause sufficient to justify an arrest.4

California cannot abridge this constitutional rule by making it a crime to refuse to answer police questions during a *367 Terry encounter, any more than it could abridge the protections of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments by making it a crime to refuse to answer police questions once a suspect has been taken into custody. To begin, the statute at issue in this case could not be constitutional unless the intrusions on Fourth Amendment rights it occasions were necessary to advance some specific, legitimate state interest not already taken into account by the constitutional analysis described above. Yet appellants do not claim that § 647(e) advances any interest other than general facilitation of police investigation and preservation of public order — factors addressed at length in Terry, Davis, and Dunaway. Nor do appellants show that the power to arrest and to impose a criminal sanction, in addition to the power to detain and to pose questions under the aegis of state authority, is so necessary in pursuit of the State’s legitimate interests as to justify the substantial additional intrusion on individuals’ rights. Compare Brief for Appellants 18-19 (asserting that § 647(e) is justified by state interest in “detecting and preventing crime” and “protecting the citizenry from criminal acts”), and People v. Solomon, 33 Cal. App. 3d 429, 436-437, 108 Cal. Rptr. 867, 872 (1973) (§ 647(e) justified by “the public need involved,” i. e., “protection of society against crime”), with United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra, at 884 (federal interest in immigration control permits stops at the border itself without reasonable suspicion), and California v. Byers, 402 U. S. 424, 456-458 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in judgment) (state interest in regulating automobiles justifies making it a crime to refuse to stop after an automobile accident and report it). Thus, because the State’s interests extend only so far as to justify the limited searches and seizures defined by Terry, the balance of interests described in that case and its progeny must control.

Second, it goes without saying that arrest and the threat of a criminal sanction have a substantial impact on interests protected by the Fourth Amendment, far more severe than *368we have ever permitted on less than probable cause. Furthermore, the likelihood that innocent persons accosted by law enforcement officers under authority of § 647(e) will have no realistic means to protect their rights compounds the severity of the intrusions on individual liberty that this statute will occasion. The arrests it authorizes make a mockery of the right enforced in Brown v. Texas, 443 U. S. 47 (1979), in which we held squarely that a State may not make it a crime to refuse to provide identification on demand in the absence of reasonable suspicion.5 If § 647(e) remains in force, the validity of such arrests will be open to challenge only after the fact, in individual prosecutions for failure to produce identification. Such case-by-case scrutiny cannot vindicate the Fourth Amendment rights of persons like appellee, many of whom will not even be prosecuted after they are arrested, see ante, at 354. A pedestrian approached by police officers has no way of knowing whether the officers have “reasonable suspicion” — without which they may not demand identification even under § 647(e), ante, at 356, and n. 5 — because that condition depends solely on the objective facts known to the officers and evaluated in light of their experience, see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S., at 30; United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S., at 884-885. The pedestrian will know that to assert his rights may subject him to arrest and all that goes with it: new acquaintances among jailers, lawyers, prisoners, and bail bondsmen, firsthand knowledge of local jail conditions, a “search incident to arrest,” and the expense of defending against a possible prosecution.6 The only response to be *369expected is compliance with the officers’ requests, whether or not they are based on reasonable suspicion, and without regard to the possibility of later vindication in court. Mere reasonable suspicion does not justify subjecting the innocent to such a dilemma.7

By defining as a crime the failure to respond to requests for personal information during a Terry encounter, and by permitting arrests upon commission of that crime, California attempts in this statute to compel what may not be compelled under the Constitution. Even if § 647(e) were not unconstitutionally vague, the Fourth Amendment would prohibit its enforcement.

Justice White,

with whom Justice Rehnquist joins, dissenting.

The usual rule is that the alleged vagueness of a criminal statute must be judged in light of the conduct that is charged to be violative of the statute. See, e. g., United States v. Mazurie, 419 U. S. 544, 550 (1975); United States v. Powell, 423 U. S. 87, 92-93 (1975). If the actor is given sufficient notice that his conduct is within the proscription of the statute, his conviction is not vulnerable on vagueness grounds, even if as applied to other conduct, the law would be unconstitutionally vague. None of our cases “suggests that one who has received fair warning of the criminality of his own conduct from the statute in question is nonetheless entitled to *370attack it because the language would not give similar fair warning with respect to other conduct which might be within its broad and literal ambit. One to whose conduct a statute clearly applies may not successfully challenge it for vagueness.” Parker v. Levy, 417 U. S. 733, 756 (1974). The correlative rule is that a criminal statute is not unconstitutionally vague on its face unless it is “impermissibly vague in all of its applications.” Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U. S. 489, 497 (1982).

These general rules are equally applicable to cases where First Amendment or other “fundamental” interests are involved. The Court has held that in such circumstances “more precision in drafting .may be required because of the vagueness doctrine in the case of regulation of expression,” Parker v. Levy, supra, at 756; a “greater degree of specificity” is demanded than in other contexts. Smith v. Goguen, 415 U. S. 566, 573 (1974). But the difference in such cases “relates to how strict a test of vagueness shall be applied in judging a particular criminal statute.” Parker v. Levy, 417 U. S., at 756. It does not permit the challenger of the statute to confuse vagueness and overbreadth by attacking the enactment as being vague as applied to conduct other than his own. See ibid. Of course, if his own actions are themselves protected by the First Amendment or other constitutional provision, or if the statute does not fairly warn that it is proscribed, he may not be convicted. But it would be unavailing for him to claim that although he knew his own conduct was unprotected and was plainly enough forbidden by the statute, others may be in doubt as to whether their acts are banned by the law.

The upshot of our cases, therefore, is that whether or not a statute purports to regulate constitutionally protected conduct, it should not be held unconstitutionally vague on its face unless it is vague in all of its possible applications. If any fool would know that a particular category of conduct would be within the reach of the statute, if there is an unmistakable core that a reasonable person would know is forbidden by the *371law, the enactment is not unconstitutional on its face and should not be vulnerable to a facial attack in a declaratory-judgment action such as is involved in this case. Under our cases, this would be true, even though as applied to other conduct the provision would fail to give the constitutionally required notice of illegality.

Of course, the overbreadth doctrine permits facial challenge of a law that reaches a substantial amount of conduct protected by the First Amendment; and, as I have indicated, I also agree that in First Amendment cases the vagueness analysis may be more demanding. But to imply, as the majority does, ante, at 358-359, n. 8, that the overbreadth doctrine requires facial invalidation of a statute which is not vague as applied to a defendant’s conduct but which is vague as applied to other acts is to confound vagueness and over-breadth, contrary to Parker v. Levy, supra.

If there is a range of conduct that is clearly within the reach of the statute, law enforcement personnel, as well as putative arrestees, are clearly on notice that arrests for such conduct are authorized by the law. There would be nothing arbitrary or discretionary about such arrests. If the officer arrests for an act that both he and the lawbreaker know is clearly barred by the statute, it seems to me an untenable exercise of judicial review to invalidate a state conviction because in some other circumstance the officer may arbitrarily misapply the statute. That the law might not give sufficient guidance to arresting officers with respect to other conduct should be dealt'with in those situations. See, e. g., Hoffman Estates, supra, at 504. It is no basis for fashioning a further brand of “overbreadth” and invalidating the statute on its face, thus forbidding its application to identifiable conduct that is within the State’s power to sanction.

I would agree with the majority in this case if it made at least some sense to conclude that the requirement to provide “credible and reliable identification” after a valid stop on reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct is “impermissibly vague in all of its applications.” Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, *372 supra, at 495.* But the statute is not vulnerable on this ground; and the majority, it seems to me, fails to demonstrate that it is. Suppose, for example, an officer requests identification information from a suspect during a valid Terry stop and the suspect answers: “Who I am is just none of your business.” Surely the suspect would know from the statute that a refusal to provide any information at all would constitute a violation. It would be absurd to suggest that in such a situation only the unfettered discretion of a police officer, who has legally stopped a person on reasonable suspicion, would serve to determine whether a violation of the statute has occurred.

“It is self-evident that there is a whole range of conduct that anyone with at least a semblance of common sense would know is [a failure to provide credible and reliable identification] and that would be covered by the statute .... In these instances, there would be ample notice to the actor and no room for undue discretion by enforcement officers. There may be a variety of other conduct that might or might not be claimed [to have failed to meet the statute’s requirements] by the State, but unpredictability in those situations does not change the certainty in others.” Smith v. Goguen, 415 U. S., at 584 (White, J., concurring in judgment).

See id., at 590 (Blackmun, J., joined by Burger, C. J., agreeing with White, J., on the vagueness issue). Thus, even if, as the majority cryptically asserts, the statute here *373implicates First Amendment interests, it is not vague on its face, however more strictly the vagueness doctrine should be applied. The judgment below should therefore not be affirmed but reversed and appellee Lawson remitted to challenging the statute as it has been or will be applied to him.

The majority finds that the statute “contains no standard for determining what a suspect has to do in order to satisfy the requirement to provide a ‘credible and reliable’ identification.” Ante, at 358. At the same time, the majority concedes that “credible and reliable” has been defined by the state court to mean identification that carries reasonable assurance that the identification is authentic and that provides means for later getting in touch with the person. The narrowing construction given this statute by the state court cannot be likened to the “standardless” statutes involved in the cases cited by the majority. For example, Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U. S. 156 (1972), involved a statute that made it a crime to be a “vagrant.” The statute provided:

“‘Rogues and vagabonds, or dissolute persons who go about begging, common gamblers, . . . common drunkards, common night walkers, . . . lewd, wanton and lascivious persons, . . . common railers and brawlers, persons wandering or strolling around from place to place without any lawful purpose or object, habitual loafers, . . . shall be deemed vagrants.’” Id., at 156-157, n. 1.

In Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U. S. 130, 132 (1974), the statute at issue made it a crime “ ‘for any person wantonly to curse or revile or to use obscene or opprobrious language toward or with reference to any member of the city police while in the actual performance of his duty.’ ” The present statute, as construed by the state courts, does not fall in the same category.

The statutes in Lewis v. City of New Orleans and Smith v. Goguen, supra, as well as other cases cited by the majority clearly involved threatened infringements of First Amend*374ment freedoms. A stricter test of vagueness was therefore warranted. Here, the majority makes a vague reference to potential suppression of First Amendment liberties, but the precise nature of the liberties threatened is never mentioned. Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 382 U. S. 87 (1965), is cited, but that case dealt with an ordinance making it a crime to “ ‘stand or loiter upon any street or sidewalk . . . after having been requested by any police officer to move on,’” id., at 90, and the First Amendment concerns implicated by the statute were adequately explained by the Court’s reference to Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U. S. 444 (1938), and Schneider v. State, 308 U. S. 147 (1939), which dealt with the First Amendment right to distribute leaflets on city streets and sidewalks. There are no such concerns in the present case.

Of course, if the statute on its face violates the Fourth or Fifth Amendment — and I express no views about that question — the Court would be justified in striking it down. But the majority apparently cannot bring itself to take this course. It resorts instead to the vagueness doctrine to invalidate a statute that is clear in many of its applications but which is somehow distasteful to the majority. As here construed and applied, the doctrine serves as an open-ended authority to oversee the States’ legislative choices in the criminal law area and in this case leaves the State in a quandary as to how to draft a statute that will pass constitutional muster.

I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

Taylor, Chief Justice.

Defendants were convicted of the charge of trespass after notice in violation of Section 16-388, Code of Laws of South Carolina, 1952, as amended, and appeal. By agreement of counsel, all bail bonds were continued in effect pending disposition of this appeal.

On August 9, 1960, in response to a call, law enforcement officers were dispatched to the S. H. Kress Store in Greenville, South Carolina, a member of a large chain of stores operated throughout the United States and described as a junior department store. Upon arrival they found the ten defendants and four others who were under sixteen years of age, all Negroes, seated at the lunch counter. There is testimony to the effect that because of the local custom to serve white persons only at the lunch counter the manager of the store announced that the lunch counter was closed, the lights were extinguished, and all persons were requested to leave. The white persons present left, but all Negroes refused to leave; and those above the age of sixteen were thereupon charged with trespass after notice as provided in the aforementioned section of the Code, which provides:

“Any person:

“(1) Who without legal cause or good excuse enters into the dwelling house, place of business or on the premises of another person, after having been warned, within six months preceding, not to do so or

“(2) Who, having entered into the dwelling house, place of business or on the premises of another person without having been warned within six months not to do so, and fails and refuses, without good cause or excuse, to leave immediately upon being ordered or requested to do so by the person in possession, or his agent or representative,

“Shall, on conviction, be fined not more than one hundred dollars, or be imprisoned for not more than thirty days.”

*302Defendants contend, first, error in refusing to dismiss the warrant upon the ground that the charge contained therein was too indefinite and uncertain as to apprise the defendants as to what they were actually being charged with.

Defendants were arrested in the act of committing the offense charged, they refused the manager’s request to leave after the lunch counter had been closed and the lights extinguished, and there could have been no question in defendants’ minds as to what they were- charged with. Further, there was at that time no claim of lack of sufficient information, and upon trial there was no motion to require the prosecution to make the charge more definite and certain. Defendants rely upon State v. Randolph et al., 239 S. C. 79, 121 S. E. (2d) 349, where this Court held that it was error to refuse defendants’ motion to make the charge more definite and certain in a warrant charging breach of the peace. It was pointed out in that case that breach of the peace embraces a variety of conduct and defendants were entitled to be given such information as would enable them to understand the nature of the offense. This is not true in instant case where the charges were definite, clear and unambiguous; further, no motion was made to require the prosecution to make the charge more definite and certain. There is no merit in this contention.

Defendants next contend that their arrest and conviction was in furtherance of a custom of racial segregation in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.

Defendants entered the place of business of the S. H. Kress Store and seated themselves at the lunch counter, they contend, for the purpose of being served, although four of them had no money and there is no testimony that such service was to be paid for by others.

The testimony reveals that the lunch counter was closed because it was the custom of the S. H. Kress Store in Greenville, South Carolina, to serve whites only and after *303all persons had left or been removed the lunch counter was reopened for business. The statute with no reference to segregation of the races applies to “Any person: * * * Who * * * fails and refuses, without good cause or excuse, to leave immediately upon being ordered or requested to do so by the person in possession, or his agent or representative, * * The act makes no reference to race or color and is clearly for the purpose of protecting the rights of the owners or those in control of private property. Irrespective of the reason for closing the counter, the evidence is conclusive that defendants were arrested because they chose to remain upon the premises after being requested to leave by the manager.

Defendants do not attack the statute as being unconstitutional but contend that their constitutional rights were abridged in its application in that they were invitees and had been refused service because of their race. The cases cited do not support this contention while there are a number of cases holding to the contrary. See Hall v. Commonwealth, 188 Va. 72, 49 S. E. (2d) 369; 335 U. S. 875, 69 S. Ct. 240, 93 L. Ed. 418; Henderson v. Trailway Bus Company, D. C. Va., 194 F. Supp. 423; State v. Clyburn, 247 N. C. 455, 101 S. E. (2d) 295; State v. Avent, 253 N. C. 580, 118 S. E. (2d) 47; Williams v. Howard Johnson’s Restaurant, 4 Cir., 268 F. 845; Slack v. Atlantic White Tower System, Inc., D. C. Md., 181 F. Supp. 124; 4 Cir., 284 F. (2d) 746; Griffin v. Collins, D. C. Md., 187 F. Supp. 149; Wilmington Parking Authority v. Burton, Del., 157 A. (2d) 894; Randolph v. Commonwealth, 202 Va. 661, 119 S. E. (2d) 817. The Fourteenth Amendment erects no shield against merely private conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful, Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U. S. 1, 68 S. Ct. 836, 92 L. Ed. 1161, 3 A. L. R. (2d) 441; and the operator of a privately owned business may accept some customers and reject others on purely personal grounds in the absence of a statute to the contrary, Alpaugh v. Wolverton, 184 Va. 943, 36 S. E. (2d) 906. In the absence of a statute forbidding discrimination based on race or *304color, the operator of a privately owned place of business has the right to select the clientele he will serve irrespective of color, State v. Avent, 253 N. C. 580, 118 S. E. (2d) 47. Although the general public has an implied license to enter any retail store the proprietor or his agent is at liberty to revoke this license at any time and to eject such individual if he refuses to leave when requested to do so, Annotation 9 A. L. R. 379; Annotation 33 A. L. R. 421; Brookside-Pratt Mining Co. v. Booth, 211 Ala. 268, 100 So. 240, 33 A. L. R. 417; and may lawfuly forbid any and all persons, regardless of reason, race or religion, to enter or remain upon any part of his premises which are not devoted to public use, Henderson v. Trailway Bus Company, 194 F. Supp. 423, 426.

The lunch counter was closed, the lights extinguished, and all persons requested to quit the premises. Defendants refused and their constitutional rights were not violated when they were arrested for trespass.

Upon cross examination of Capt. G. O. Bramlette of the Greenville City Police Department, it was brought out that the City of Greenville has an ordinance making it unlawful for any person owning, managing, or controlling any hotel, restaurant, cafe, etc., to furnish meals to white persons and colored persons except under certain conditions; and Defendants contend that they were prosecuted under this ordinance; however, the warrant does not so charge and there is nothing in the record to substantiate this contention. The ordinance was made a part of the record upon request of defendants’ counsel but defendants were not charged with having violated any of its provisions. The question of the validity of this ordinance was not before the trial Court and therefore not before this Court on appeal.

Defendants further contention that the prosecution failed to establish the corpus delicti is disposed of by what has already been said.

*305We are of the opinion that the judgment and sentences appealed from should be affirmed; and it is so ordered. Affirmed.

Oxner, Legge, Moss and Lewis, JJ., concur.

CYR, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiffs Yvonne Alexis (“Alexis”), and family members, challenge a summary judgment order rejecting various federal civil rights claims and related state-law claims stemming from the treatment accorded Alexis at a restaurant owned and operated by defendant-appellee McDonald’s Restaurants of Massachusetts, Inc. We affirm, in part, and remand other claims for further proceedings.

I

BACKGROUND1

At approximately 10:00 p.m. on July 20, ■ 1990, in Framingham, Massachusetts, Alexis and her family, who are African Americans, entered a McDonald’s restaurant, proceeded to the service counter, placed their order, and paid in advance. When the food was placed before them at the service counter, it became apparent that Alfredo Paseacio, whose native tongue is Spanish, had mistaken their order. During the ensuing exchange between Alexis and Paseacio, defendant-appellee Donna Domina, the “swing manager,” intervened in behalf of Paseacio, which prompted Alexis to say: “[Y]ou take care of the people in front of you. He’s taking care of me, and we’re sorting this out.” Domina nonetheless persisted for several more minutes.

Ultimately, Domina said to Alexis, “I don’t have to listen to you.” Alexis replied, “[Yjou’re damn right you don’t have to listen to me. I was not speaking to you. I was speaking to him.” Domina then instructed Paseacio: “Just put their stuff in a bag and get them out of here.” Turning to Alexis, Domina retorted: “You’re not eating here. If you [do] we’re going to call the cops.” Alexis responded: “Well you do what you have to do because we plan to eat here.” Notwithstanding Domina’s instructions, Pas-eacio placed the food order on a service tray, without bagging it. The entire incident at the service counter had lasted approximately ten minutes.

After the Alexis family went into the dining area, Sherry Topham, a managerial employee, summoned defendant Michael Lepo-rati into the restaurant. Leporati, a uniformed off-duty police sergeant, had been patrolling on foot outside the restaurant by prearrangement with the Town of Framing-ham, but had witnessed no part of the earlier exchange among Alexis, Paseacio and Domi-na.

Upon entering the restaurant, Leporati was informed by Domina that Alexis had been yelling, creating a “scene” and an “unwarranted disturbance” over a mistaken food order, and directing abusive remarks at Pas-eacio.2 Domina informed Leporati that Alexis had argued loudly with her and another employee; that she “just wasn’t stopping”; and that Alexis was still in the dining area though Domina had “asked her to leave.” Finally, Domina told Leporati, “I would like her to leave.”

Without further inquiry into the “disturbance” allegedly caused by Alexis, Leporati proceeded to the dining area where Alexis and her family were seated, and informed the entire Alexis family that the manager wanted them to leave and that they would have to go. Alexis immediately asked why, denied causing any disturbance, and claimed a right to finish eating in the restaurant. When she urged Leporati to ask other restaurant cus*346tomers whether there had been any disturbance, Leporati simply reiterated that the family would have to leave, then returned to the service counter.3

At the service counter, Leporati relayed his conversation with Alexis and informed Domina that the Alexis family had refused to leave. In Leporati’s presence, Domina discussed the matter with Sherry Topham, who recalled having had a “problem” with Alexis on a prior occasion.4 At that point, Domina stated, “Well, if that’s the case, then maybe we should have her leave.” With that, Sergeant Leporati returned to the Alexis family and advised Alexis that she would be arrested unless she left before his backup arrived. Cf. supra note 3. Alexis reiterated that she believed she had the right to finish eating. Leporati left the dining area to call for backup.

Approximately ten minutes later, Officer William Fuer arrived and Alexis was told by Leporati that she was being placed under arrest. Then, without asking or directing Alexis to get up from the table, Leporati suddenly and violently grabbed and pulled her bodily from the booth and across the table, handcuffed her hands tightly behind her back, and, with the help of Officer Fuer, dragged her from the booth, bruising her legs in the process. Insisting that she was “not resisting arrest,” Alexis asked the officers to allow her to walk out. Instead, they hoisted her by her elbows and carried her from the restaurant to the police car, where Leporati pushed her into the car with the instruction, “Get your ass in there.”

As she was being removed from the restaurant, Alexis and her husband repeatedly asked the officers why she was being treated in this manner. When Mr. Alexis said, “We have rights,” Leporati responded, “You people have no rights. You better shut up your [expletive] mouth before I arrest you too.”

Alexis eventually was charged with criminal trespass, a misdemeanor under Mass. Gen.Laws Ann. eh. 266, § 120 (West 1994). Following her acquittal by a jury, Alexis and her family filed the present action in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, asserting civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, & 1985(3), as well as state law claims for use of excessive force, intentional infliction of emotional distress, assault, battery, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and abuse of process. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants on all federal claims and on the excessive force claim against Leporati under Mass.Gen.Laws Ann. ch. 12, § 111. Finally, the court granted summary judgment for all defendants on the remaining state law claims, without stating its grounds. Plaintiffs appealed.

II

DISCUSSION

A grant of summary judgment is reviewed de novo under the same criteria incumbent upon the district court; it cannot stand on appeal unless the record discloses no trialworthy issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Guzman-Rivera v. Rivera-Cruz, 29 F.3d 3, 4 (1st Cir.1994).

A. Section 1981

Section 1981 proscribes intentional discrimination based on race. General Bldg. Contractors Ass’n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 391, 102 S.Ct. 3141, 3150, 73 L.Ed.2d 835 (1982); Dartmouth Review v. Dartmouth College, 889 F.2d 13, 17 (1st Cir.1989). The district court found no competent evidence of intentional race-based discrimination. Alexis presses her section 1981 claims against Domina and McDonald’s on the theory that her race-based exclusion from the dining area violated her right to make and enforce contracts. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a).5 As to de*347fendant Leporati, she alleges that her race-based arrest deprived her of the right to “full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens,” id. § 1981(a), and to “like punishment, pains, penalties ... of every kind, and to no other.” Id. (emphasis added).

1. Domina and McDonald’s

The district court initially excluded, as incompetent, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e) (affidavits may be considered at summary judgment only if facts attested to are based on admissible evidence); Fed.R.Evid. 701, portions of the deposition testimony of six witnesses— the five Alexis family members and Karen Stauffer, an eyewitness to the events — each of whom opined, in effect, that had Alexis been “a rich white woman,” she would not have been treated in the same manner. The court found that the proffered testimony was “not supported by sufficient factual under-girding” to permit a reasonable inference that either Domina or McDonald’s discriminated against Alexis on the basis of her race. The court nonetheless allowed Alexis further time to submit supplemental affidavits setting forth more particular grounds for the conclusory deposition testimony relating to racial animus. Alexis failed to do so.

Opinion testimony from lay witnesses is admissible only if it is “rationally based on the perception of the witness and ... helpful to a clear understanding of the witness’ testimony or the determination of the fact in issue.” Fed.R.Evid. 701; see Swajian v. General Motors Corp., 916 F.2d 31, 36 (1st Cir.1990). Rulings on the admissibility of lay opinion testimony are reviewed only for “manifest abuse of discretion.” United States v. Jackman, 48 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir.1995) (citing Keller v. United States, 38 F.3d 16, 31 (1st Cir.1994)). The exclusionary ruling was well within the district court’s broad discretion.

The six deponents based their inferences of racial animus on their personal observations that Domina reacted'“angrily” toward Alexis and with “a negative tone in her voice,” was “unfriendly,” “uncooperative,” “high strung,” “impolite,” “impatient,” and had “no reason” to eject Alexis. Although these observations may be entirely compatible with a race-based animus, there simply is no foundation for an inference that Domina harbored a racial animus toward Alexis or anyone else, absent some probative evidence that Domina’s petulance stemmed from something other than a race-neutral reaction to the stressful encounter plainly evidenced in the summary judgment record, including Alexis’s persistence (however justified). As the depositions disclosed no evidentiary foundation for an inference of racial animus, the conclusory lay opinions were properly excluded. See Fed.R.Evid. 701(a); Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); Willco Kuwait (Trading) S.A.K v. deSavary, 843 F.2d 618, 624 (1st Cir.1988) (lay opinion testimony, which does little more than tell the jury what result to reach, should not be admitted); see also Connell v. Bank of Boston, 924 F.2d 1169, 1177-78 (1st Cir.) (lay opinion—that employer was “ ‘determined to eliminate ... senior employees’ ” — pointed to no specific facts sufficient to buttress such a “broad assertion”) (ADEA claim), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1218, 111 S.Ct. 2828, 115 L.Ed.2d 997 (1991); cf. Gross v. Burggraf Constr. Co., 53 F.3d 1531, 1544 (10th Cir.1995) (determining inadmissible the lay opinion of co-worker that sexual harassment defendant had “‘a problem with women who were not between the ages of 19 and 25 and who weighed more than 115 pounds’ ”); Coca-Cola Co. v. Overland, Inc., 692 F.2d 1250, 1254-55 (9th Cir.1982) (upholding exclusion of lay opinion, testimony by bar and restaurant employees that customers used term “Coke” in generic sense).

As Alexis points to no competent evidence that Domina and McDonald’s intentionally discriminated against her on account of her race, the district court correctly ruled that this section 1981 claim was not trialworthy. See Dartmouth Review, 889 F.2d at 18 *348(‘“Disputes generally arise out of mutual misunderstanding, misinterpretation and overreaction, and without more, such disputes do not give rise to an inference of discrimination.’ ”) (quoting Johnson v. Legal Servs. of Ark., Inc., 813 F.2d 893, 896 (8th Cir.1987)). Accordingly, the summary judgment entered in favor of Domina and McDonald’s must be affirmed.

2. Leporati

All courts of appeals which have considered the question have held that a misuse of governmental power motivated by racial animus comes squarely within the “equal benefit” and “like punishment” clauses of section 1981(a). See Mahone v. Waddle, 564 F.2d 1018, 1027-30 (3d Cir.1977) (false arrest), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 904, 98 S.Ct. 3122, 57 L.Ed.2d 1147 (1978); see also Evans v. McKay, 869 F.2d 1341, 1344-45 (9th Cir.1989) (reversing dismissal of section 1981 claim alleging that police officers and others instigated “racially-motivated arrest-boycott conspiracy”); Coleman v. Franklin Parish Sch. Bd., 702 F.2d 74, 76-77 (5th Cir.1983) (remanding for factfinding on section 1981 claim that school officials denied black pupil equal benefit of laws and proceedings relating to corporal punishment). We have been presented with no basis in law or reason for departing from this solid line of authority.

During the arrest, Sergeant Leporati stated to Mr. Alexis: “You people have no rights, You better shut up your ... mouth before I arrest you too.” Alexis insists that this statement betrayed a racial animus. Leporati responds that the statement — “You people have no rights” — is too general to support , the section 1981(a) claim. Given its context, we cannot agree.

A rational factfinder who credited this statement, as we must at summary judgment, see supra note 1, reasonably could infer that Leporati harbored a racial animus adequate to support a section 1981 claim, especially since the record reflects that the only relevant behavior or physical characteristic — both apparent to Leporati and shared by the Alexis family — was their black skin. Indeed, a rational factfinder would be hard-pressed to glean a more plausible inference, particularly since Leporati has tendered no alternative interpretation supported by the present record.6 Viewed in context, therefore, the Leporati statement, tarring the entire family with the same brush — absent a scintilla of evidence that any member, with the possible exception of Alexis, had said or done anything remotely wrong or disorderly — cannot reasonably be presumed so innocent as to preclude a discriminatory animus.

Accordingly, we hold that the evidence adduced at summary judgment, viewed in context, was sufficient to support a reasonable inference that Leporati not only gratuitously employed excessive force in arresting Alexis but that his actions were motivated by a racial animus violative of the “equal benefit” and “like punishment” clauses of section 1981(a). Thus, Alexis raised a trial-worthy issue under section 1981 as to whether Leporati deprived her of “the full and equal benefit” of the law accorded white persons and the right to “like punishment ... [and] no other.” 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a).7

*349B. Section 1985(3)

Alexis alleged that Leporati and Domina “directly and explicitly conspired to deprive [her] of the equal protection, equal privileges and equal rights guaranteed to her under the Constitution and the laws of the United States” in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). A trialworthy section 1985(3) conspiracy claim requires competent evidence that “‘some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus’” motivated the alleged conspirators. Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, -, 113 S.Ct. 753, 758, 122 L.Ed.2d 34 (1993) (quoting Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102, 91 S.Ct. 1790, 1798, 29 L.Ed.2d 338 (1971)). Alexis predicated her section 1985(3) conspiracy claim on Sergeant Leporati’s statement: ‘You people have no rights.” Although this evidence, viewed in context, is sufficient to enable a reasonable inference that Leporati harbored the requisite racial animus, see swpra Section II.A.2, there is no evidence which would support such an inference as to Domina.

C. Section 1983

The gravamen of these federal claims is that Sergeant Leporati, acting under color of Massachusetts law, deprived Alexis of her Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizure of her person in effecting her misdemeanor arrest with excessive force, without a warrant and without probable cause. She also claims that Domina deprived her of procedural due process by summoning Leporati into the restaurant and directing her removal under color of state law. Finally, she alleges that Leporati determined to arrest her, and effected her arrest, in a discriminatory maimer, based on her race and in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

1. Arrest Without Probable Cause

a. Leporati

The Fourth Amendment guaranty against unreasonable seizures of the person requires that arrests be based on probable cause. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91, 85 S.Ct. 223, 225-26, 13 L.Ed.2d 142 (1964); Santiago v. Fenton, 891 F.2d 373, 383 (1st Cir.1989). The “probable cause” analysis entails “ ‘an objective assessment of the officer’s actions in light of the facts and circumstances confronting him at the time’ and not [an assessment of] the officer’s state of mind at the time the challenged action was taken.” Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 470-71, 105 S.Ct. 2778, 2783, 86 L.Ed.2d 370 (1985) (quoting Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 136, 98 S.Ct. 1717, 1723, 56 L.Ed.2d 168 (1978)). Probable cause will be found if “the facts and circumstances within [the officer’s] knowledge and of which [he] had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent [person] in believing that the [defendant] had committed or was committing an offense.” Rivera v. Murphy, 979 F.2d 259, 263 (1st Cir.1992).

i. Revocation of Invitation

Although appellants argue that the district court erred in finding probable cause for Alexis’s arrest, we perceive no error. As previously noted, Alexis was arrested for criminal trespass, a misdemeanor under the applicable Massachusetts statute:

Whoever, without right enters or remains in or upon the ... buildings ... of another, after having been forbidden so to do by the person who has lawful control of said premises ... shall be punished by a fine of not more than one hundred dollars or by imprisonment for not more than thirty *350days or both such fine and imprison-ment_ A person who is found committing such trespass may be arrested by a ... police officer and kept in custody in a convenient place, not more than twenty-four hours, Sunday excepted, until a complaint can be made against him for the offence, and he be taken upon a warrant issued upon such complaint.

Mass.Gen.Laws Ann. ch. 266, § 120 (emphasis added). Thus, under chapter 266, section 120, a person who remains, without right, on the property of another commits a continuing misdemeanor for which she may be subjected to a warrantless arrest by a police officer provided there is probable cause. Id.

The undisputed facts demonstrate that Do-mina expressly directed Alexis to leave the restaurant, but that Alexis nevertheless refused to leave until she and her family had finished eating. Appellants cite no authority for their implicit suggestion that Massachusetts recognizes an exception to the seemingly absolute right of a private business owner to withdraw, without cause, its implied license to enter a business establishment. Cf. State v. Tauvar, 461 A.2d 1065, 1067 (Me.1983) (Maine trespass statute permits revocation of implied invitation only where business owner “has some justification for requesting removal”); Model Penal Code § 221.2(3)(b) (affirmative defense to criminal trespass requires evidence that “premises ... open to members of the public and [defendant] complied with all lawful conditions imposed on access to or remaining in the premises”). Moreover, we have combed Massachusetts law for such an exception, to no avail.

It has been held, of course, and we do not question, that a Massachusetts business property owner may not violate the constitutional or statutory rights of its business licensees under the shield of the Massachusetts trespass statute. See Hurley v. Hinckley, 304 F.Supp. 704, 710 (D.Mass.1969) (“The words “without right’ in the context of the historical concept of trespass can only mean: □without any legal right; without any right, permission or license recognized by law as permitting an entry into the area described in the statute.[’] ... The concept [of] legal right in the context of today’s constitutional developments includes any right of the plaintiffs, individually or collectively, found in the Constitution of the United States....”), aff'd mem., 396 U.S. 277, 90 S.Ct. 608, 24 L.Ed.2d 469 (1970); Smith v. Suburban Restaurants, Inc., 374 Mass. 528, 373 N.E.2d 215, 218 (1978) (noting in libel case that “[a] place of public accommodation, as members of the community might know, has an obligation to treat each member of the public equally, except for good cause”) (dicta) (citations omitted); Commonwealth v. Lapon, 28 Mass. App.Ct. 681, 554 N.E.2d 1225, 1227 (1990) (the term “without right” encompasses constitutional rights).

Nevertheless, the Massachusetts trespass statute does not limit the power of a Massachusetts business owner summarily to revoke a business licensee’s right to enter or remain upon business premises held open to the general public. See Stager v. G.E. Lothrop Theatres Co., 291 Mass. 464, 197 N.E. 86, 87 (1935) (finding that, “[generally speaking,” a theater owner has an absolute right to revoke theater-goer’s license to enter or remain on the premises); cf. Baseball Publishing Co. v. Bruton, 302 Mass. 54, 18 N.E.2d 362, 363 (1938) (“[I]t is of the essence of a license [to enter private property] that it is revocable at the will of the possessor of the land.... The revocation of a license may constitute a breach of contract, and give rise to an action for damages. But it is none the less effective to- deprive the licensee of all justification for entering or remaining upon the land.”); Commonwealth v. Hood, 389 Mass. 581, 452 N.E.2d 188, 194 (1983) (stating that Massachusetts trespass statute “ ‘protects] the rights of those in lawful control of property to forbid entrance by those whom they are unwilling to receive, and to exclude them if, having entered, those in control see fit to command them to leave’ ”) (quoting Commonwealth v. Richardson, 313 Mass. 632, 48 N.E.2d 678, 682 (1943)); see also State v. Bowman, 124 Idaho 936, 866 P.2d 193, 202 (Ct.App.1993) (in case involving business invitees who purchased movie theater tickets, holding that Idaho trespass statute “does not require that the owner[s] of private property have any reason for asking *351trespassers to get off their land”); Impastato v. Heilman Enters., Inc., 147 A.D.2d 788, 537 N.Y.S.2d 659, 661 (1989) (same). Absent some invidious ulterior purpose, therefore, once proper notice has been given by the owner, and the business licensee nonetheless remains on the property, the Massachusetts trespass statute permits arrest of the uncooperative trespasser. See Hood, 452 N.E.2d at 194.

Although the Massachusetts trespass statute does not enable business owners to exclude business licensees on discriminatory grounds, Hurley, 304 F.Supp. at 710, Alexis proffered no competent evidence that Domina or McDonald’s, as distinguished from Leporati, sought to exclude her on the basis of her race. See supra Section II.A.1. Thus, on the record evidence, Domina acted within her lawful authority — as “the person [having] lawful control of said premises,” Mass.Gen.Laws Ann. ch. 266, § 120 — in revoking Alexis’s implied license to utilize McDonald’s dining facilities.

ii. Probable Cause

Probable cause exists if “the facts and circumstances within [a police officer’s] knowledge and of which [the officer] had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a [person] of reasonable caution” to believe that a crime has been committed or is being committed. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162, 45 S.Ct. 280, 288, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925); United States v. Drake, 673 F.2d 15, 17 (1st Cir.1982). Leporati effected this arrest based on the eyewitness report from Domina that Alexis had created an “unwarranted disturbance” and refused to leave the premises, and on the representation by Sherry Topham that there had been an unspecified “problem” with Alexis in the past. An objectively reasonable police officer so informed by the person in charge of the business premises, see swpra note 2, fairly could conclude that the implied license extended to Alexis had been revoked and that there was probable cause to believe that her continued presence constituted a criminal trespass. See Mass. Gen.Laws Ann. ch. 266, § 120 (“A person ... found committing such trespass may be arrested by a ... police officer_”); see also United States v. Figueroa, 818 F.2d 1020, 1023 (1st Cir.1987) (“The constitutionality of a warrantless arrest ‘depends ... upon whether, at the moment the arrest was made, the officers had probable cause to make it— whether at that moment the facts and circumstances within their knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent [person] in believing that the [defendant] had committed or was committing an offense.’ ”) (quoting Beck, 379 U.S. at 91, 85 S.Ct. at 225). Accordingly, we discern no error in the district court ruling that appellants failed to establish a trialworthy dispute on the issue of probable cause to arrest.

b. Domina

A section 1983 claim does not lie absent state action. Casa Marie, Inc. v. Superior Court of P.R., 988 F.2d 252, 258 (1st Cir.1993); 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (providing remedy for deprivations “under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage” of any state or territory). There are two components to the “state action” requirement. First, the deprivation must be shown to have been caused by the exercise of some right or privilege created by the state, or by a rule of conduct imposed by the state, or by a person for whom the state is responsible. Casa Marie, 988 F.2d at 258. Second, the party charged with the deprivation must be a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor. Id. Where a private individual is a defendant in a section 1983 action, there must be a showing that the private party and the state actor jointly deprived plaintiff of her civil rights. Wagenmann v. Adams, 829 F.2d 196, 209 (1st Cir.1987); Casa Marie, 988 F.2d at 258-59; see also Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27-28, 101 S.Ct. 183, 186-187, 66 L.Ed.2d 185 (1980) (“Private persons, jointly engaged with state officials in the challenged action, are acting ‘under color’ of law for purposes of § 1983 actions.”).

There was no evidence of joint discriminatory action between Leporati and Domina — whether by plan, prearrangement, conspiracy, custom, or policy — which would enable a rational factfinder to conclude that *352Alexis’s arrest resulted from concerted action tantamount to substituting the judgment of a private party for that of the police or allowing the private party to exercise state power. Compare Wagenmann, 829 F.2d at 209-11 (close relationship between private citizen and deputy police chief, together with evidence that private actor and police collectively determined to arrest plaintiff, raised inference that private actor was more than “mere complainant” and that a “meeting of the minds” occurred between police and private defendant sufficient to warrant finding that defendant was state actor) with Carey v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 823 F.2d 1402, 1404 (10th Cir.1987) (airline employee, who complained of striking airline pilot’s presence in airport terminal and refusal to leave, found not to be state actor where police officer summoned to airport terminal asked pilot to leave and, upon pilot’s refusal, called for three additional officers who escorted pilot to airport security station where he was arrested); see also Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1605-06, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970) (holding that white schoolteacher, in company of six black youths denied service at lunch counter, would be entitled to relief under section 1983 upon proof that lunch counter employee and policeman had reached an understanding to deny service to teacher because she was a white person in company of blacks). As there is no evidence in the summary judgment record from which it could fairly be inferred that Domina and Leporati had any understanding, tacit or explicit, to deprive Alexis of any right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, we conclude that the district court correctly granted summary judgment for Domina on this section 1983 claim.8

2. Excessive Force

Alexis asserts an “excessive force” claim under the Fourth Amendment, which guarantees citizens the right “to be secure in their persons ... against unreasonable ... seizures.” See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 1871, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989) (“Where [an] excessive force claim arises in the context of an arrest or investigatory stop of a free citizen, it is most properly characterized as one invoking the protections of the Fourth Amend-ment_”). In the Fourth Amendment setting, a viable excessive force claim must demonstrate that the police defendant’s actions were not objectively reasonable, viewed in light of the facts and circumstances confronting him and without regard to his underlying intent or motivation. Id. at 397, 109 S.Ct. at 1872 (“An officer’s evil intentions will not make a Fourth Amendment violation out of an objectively reasonable use of force; nor will an officer’s good intentions make an objectively unreasonable use of force constitutional.”) (citations omitted).9

As the Supreme Court has counseled, our inquiry must be undertaken from the perspective of “a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Id. at 396, 109 S.Ct. at 1872 (citations omitted). Though the reasonableness test under the Fourth Amendment “ ‘is not capable of precise definition or mechanical application,’ ” id. (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 1884, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979)), “‘[n]ot every push or shove’ ” will reach the level required for an actionable “excessive force” claim. Id. (citation omitted); Gaudreault v. Salem, 923 F.2d 203, 205 (1st Cir.1990) (“[P]olice officers making arrests are often forced to make split-second decisions about the amount of force needed to effect an arrest while operating under tense, dangerous and rapidly-changing circumstances.”), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 956, 111 S.Ct 2266, 114 L.Ed.2d 718 (1991). Accordingly, Graham prescribes three criteria for evaluating the objective reasonableness of the force used: (1) “the severity of the crime at issue;” (2) “whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others;” and (3) *353“whether [the suspect] is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396, 109 S.Ct. at 1872; see also Gaudreault, 923 F.2d at 205.

All three Graham factors, viewed in the context of “the totality of the circumstances,” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396, 109 S.Ct. at 1872; see also supra p. 346, weigh heavily in favor of Alexis. First, the crime for which she was arrested — criminal trespass — is a misdemeanor. See Mass.Gen.Laws Ann. ch. 266, § 120 (maximum term 30 days). Second, there is no suggestion that Alexis posed a threat to the peace or safety of anyone, including Sergeant Leporati and Officer Fuer. Third, taking her evidence at face value, Alexis neither threatened nor attempted to evade or resist arrest. Nor did any Alexis family member pose a threat to the officers or anyone else. Yet, without even having been requested or directed to get up from the table — and though all the surrounding circumstances, individually and in combination, plainly counseled minimal force in effecting any arrest — Alexis was abruptly pulled from the booth, and across the table, with sufficient force to bruise her legs, then handcuffed with her hands behind her back and dragged and carried to a police cruiser and pushed inside.

Viewed in context and accepted as true, we are not persuaded that the record evidence compelled the conclusion that the force with which Leporati effected the sudden, unannounced, violent seizure and removal of Alexis’s person was objectively reasonable, especially since there is no evidence or suggestion that she posed a risk of flight, attempted to resist or evade arrest, or threatened the peace, property or safety of anyone.10 See Palmer v. Sanderson, 9 F.3d 1433, 1436 (9th Cir.1993) (finding trialworthy “excessive force” claim where deputy sheriff arrested, tightly handcuffed, and bruised sixty-seven-year-old man with impaired mobility who attempted to return to his car to sit down while answering officer’s questions); see also Rowland v. Perry, 41 F.3d 167, 171-74 (4th Cir.1994) (finding trialworthy “excessive force” claim where police officer injured arrestee’s leg (“wrenching the knee until it cracked”) after arrestee picked up five dollar bill dropped by its owner); cf. Lester v. Chicago, 830 F.2d 706, 714 (7th Cir.1987) (pre-Graham case) (holding that plaintiff stated trialworthy Fourth Amendment “excessive force” claim when, during course of arrest for disturbing peace, plaintiff was kneed in the back, threatened with being struck, dragged down a hallway, and handcuffed tightly, causing bruises on her wrists); Patzner v. Burkett, 779 F.2d 1363, 1371 (8th Cir.1985) (pre-Graham case) (finding trial-worthy “excessive force” claim where uncooperative double amputee — arrested at home after allegedly driving under the influence — was pulled from wheelchair to floor, then dragged through home after promising to cooperate).11 Accordingly, the “excessive force” claim must be remanded for further proceedings.12

3. Equal Protection

Alexis claims that Leporati discriminated against her on the basis of her race, both in deciding to enforce the criminal trespass statute by effecting her immediate arrest, and by employing unreasonable force. Even assuming probable cause to arrest, she argues that Leporati would not have effected an immediate seizure of her person for so *354minor an infraction, nor used such excessive force, were it not for the color of her skin.

In order to avoid summary judgment on her Equal Protection Clause claim, Alexis had to tender competent evidence that a state actor intentionally discriminated against her because she belonged to a protected class. Johnson v. Morel, 876 F.2d 477, 479 (5th Cir.1989) (citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 247-48, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 2051-52, 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976)), overruled on other grounds, Harper v. Harris County, 21 F.3d 597, 600 (5th Cir.1994). This she did. See supra Section II.A.2. A rational factfinder, who credited Alexis’s evidence of racial animus and excessive force, could conclude that Leporati resolved, on the basis of her race, to enforce the criminal trespass statute by effecting an immediate seizure of her person. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74, 6 S.Ct. 1064, 1073, 30 L.Ed. 220 (1886) (“[I]f [the law] is applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal discriminations between persons in similar circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition of the constitution.”); Johnson, 876 F.2d at 479 (plaintiff stated viable Equal Protection Clause claim, where officer humiliated and harassed plaintiff prior to and during lawful arrest on basis of plaintiffs race); United States v. Scopo, 19 F.3d 777, 786 (2d Cir.) (“Though the Fourth Amendment permits a pretext arrest, if otherwise supported by probable cause, the Equal Protection Clause still imposes restraint on impermissibly class-based discriminations.”) (Newman, C.J., concurring), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 207, 130 L.Ed.2d 136 (1994); Inada v. Sullivan, 523 F.2d 485, 489 (7th Cir.1975) (finding right of action under Equal Protection Clause where police officer, motivated by animus toward plaintiffs ancestry, threatened him with deportation); Tanner v. Heise, 879 F.2d 572, 580 n. 5 (9th Cir.1989) (where plaintiff alleged “equal protection” violation, police officers’ “mere compliance” with state law would not shield them from liability under § 1983, provided plaintiff could prove that officers’ motivation for arrest was to harass plaintiff because of his religious beliefs). Furthermore, a rational factfinder could conclude that, in electing to use excessive force to effect the violent seizure of Alexis’s person and her forcible removal from the restaurant, Leporati was motivated by a discriminatory animus. See Smith v. Fontana, 818 F.2d 1411, 1420 (9th Cir.) (finding actionable claim where it was alleged that decedent had been subdued through use of excessive force because he was black), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 935, 108 S.Ct. 311, 98 L.Ed.2d 269 (1987). We therefore hold, based on the present record, that the Equal Protection Clause claims under section 1983 are trialworthy.13

D. State Law Claims

Since only one state law claim was addressed on the merits below, see supra note 12, and federal claims remain pending, the state law claims against Leporati must be remanded as well. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction where all claims over which court has original jurisdiction have been dismissed). The dismissal of the state-law claims against the remaining defendants is affirmed.

Ill

CONCLUSION

The district court judgment dismissing the section 1983 claim against Leporati for arresting Alexis without probable cause in violation of the Fourth Amendment is affirmed. The judgments entered in favor of Domina and McDonald’s on the section 1981 claim; Domina and Leporati on the section 1985(3) claim; and Domina on the section 1983 procedural due process claim are affirmed. The district court judgment entered in favor of Leporati on the section 1981, excessive force, and Equal Protection Clause claims is vacated, and these claims are remanded for fur*355ther proceedings consistent with this opinion, along with all pendent state law claims against Leporati, see 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.

SO ORDERED.

BOWNES, Senior Circuit Judge,

concurring, in part, and dissenting, in part.

I concur in all of the court’s holdings except the one dismissing the section 1983 claim against Domina. The evidence taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs is sufficient, I believe, for a reasonable fact-finder to conclude that there was a conspiracy between Domina and Leporati to discriminate against the plaintiff, Yvonne Alexis, because of the color of her skin.

I.

The facts from which such a conspiracy could rationally be inferred are as follows. A dispute over an incorrect food order occurred at the McDonald’s service counter between plaintiff Yvonne Alexis, an African American woman, Donna Domina, the “swing manager,” and the counterperson, Alfredo Pascado. After the dispute was over, Sherry Topham, a McDonald’s managerial employee, went outside the restaurant for police assistance. She returned with Officer Leporati, a uniformed off-duty police officer assigned to McDonald’s pursuant to an agreement between McDonald’s and the Town of Framingham. Leporati conferred with both Topham and Domina, who identified Yvonne Alexis as “that black woman.” Domina told Leporati that she wanted Alexis out of the restaurant. Domina made this request even though she was aware Yvonne Alexis and her family had already taken seats preparatory to eating the food they had purchased.

Officer Leporati neither asked Topham and Domina why he should make Alexis leave the restaurant nor made inquiries of anybody else as to the behavior of the Alexis family. Based solely on his initial discussion with Domina and Topham, Leporati proceeded to the dining room table where the Alexis family sat quietly eating their food. He told Yvonne Alexis that she and her entire family had to leave the premises. Yvonne Alexis stated that they would not leave until they finished eating. Upon hearing this, Officer Leporati left the dining area and conferred again with Topham and Domina. He told them that Alexis refused to leave.

During this second discussion, Topham said she had a problem with this woman on a prior occasion. Domina then said, “Well, if that’s the case, then maybe we should have her leave.” Neither Domina nor Officer Le-porati requested information about the alleged prior problem with Alexis. Significantly, Officer Leporati again failed to inquire as to why he was being told to remove Alexis from the restaurant. Instead, he said that “it wouldn’t be pretty” but he would make Yvonne Alexis leave if Domina wanted him to. Domina then told him that she wanted Yvonne Alexis out of the restaurant.

Officer Leporati returned to the Alexis table and notified Yvonne Alexis that she would be arrested unless she left within the ten minutes it would take his backup cruiser to arrive. Neither Yvonne nor any member of her family left. When the cruiser arrived, Officer Leporati physically pulled Yvonne Alexis out of her seat and over the table at which she and her family had been eating, bruising her in the process. Yvonne Alexis was then handcuffed, pushed into the cruiser, and taken to jail.

Both Yvonne Alexis and her husband protested the violent treatment she received from Officer Leporati during her removal from the restaurant. At one juncture, Mr. Alexis exclaimed, ‘We have rights,” to which Officer Leporati retorted, ‘You people have no rights. You better shut up your [expletive] mouth before I arrest you too.” Officer Leporati made these comments while still inside the restaurant.

II.

The majority opinion’s cursory treatment of Alexis’ section 1983 claims overlooks several factual bases for finding that there was a conspiracy within section 1983’s “under color of law” requirement between Domina and Leporati. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 928, 102 S.Ct. 2744, 2749, 73 *356L.Ed.2d 482 (1982) (“ ‘under color of law has consistently been treated as the same thing as the ‘state action’ required under the Fourteenth Amendment”). Evidence submitted at trial, when viewed in the “light most favorable to the nonmoving party” and with “all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor,” Colonial Courts Apartment Co. v. Proc. Assocs., 57 F.3d 119, 122 (1st Cir.1995), supports the view that Alexis’ arrest resulted from concerted action between Domina and Leporati.

Section 1983 conspiracies are “commonly defined as ‘a combination of two or more persons acting in concert to commit an unlawful act, or to commit a lawful act by unlawful means, the principal element of which is an agreement between the parties to inflict a wrong against or injury upon another’_” Earle v. Benoit, 850 F.2d 836, 844 (1st Cir.1988) (quoting Hampton v. Hanrahan, 600 F.2d 600, 620-21 (7th Cir.1979), rev’d in part on other grounds, 446 U.S. 754, 100 S.Ct. 1987, 64 L.Ed.2d 670 (1980)). Under this definition, section 1983 liability attaches to private actors deemed “willful par-ticipantes] in [a] joint action with a State or its agents.” Lugar, 457 U.S. at 941, 102 S.Ct. at 2756; Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27, 101 S.Ct. 183, 186, 66 L.Ed.2d 185 (1980); Casa Marie, Inc. v. Superior Court of Puerto Rico, 988 F.2d 252, 259 (1st Cir.1993). And joint action may be proved by circumstantial evidence of a prearranged conspiracy. See Wagenmann v. Adams, 829 F.2d 196, 211 (1st Cir.1987); see also Moore v. Marketplace Restaurant, Inc., 754 F.2d 1336, 1352 (7th Cir.1985).

I do not contend that joint action existed in this case because Leporati worked the McDonald’s detail or that Domina’s supervisor, Sherry Topham, requested his assistance. This court has clearly stated that “merely initiating a good faith request for police protection would not attach liability for the subsequent unconstitutional conduct of arresting officers.” Wagenmann, 829 F.2d at 210; see also Lusby v. T.G. & Y. Stores, Inc., 749 F.2d 1423, 1433 (10th Cir.1984), vacated on other grounds sub nom. City of Lawton v. Lusby, 474 U.S. 805, 106 S.Ct. 40, 88 L.Ed.2d 33 (1985), aff'd by 796 F.2d 1307 (10th Cir.1986) (a store that employs an off-duty police officer is not vicariously liable under section 1983 for such officer’s deprivation of customer’s civil rights). But, I am persuaded by the fact that Domina and Leporati conferred on two separate occasions before Alexis’ brutal arrest. The record establishes that Domina, not Leporati, made the decision to expel Alexis from McDonald’s premises, and that she made that decision with the knowledge that some harm could befall Alexis (Alexis’ removal “would not be pretty”). And it is clear that Domina knew that Leporati would do as she requested.

Viewed in context, the events precipitating Yvonne Alexis’ claims against Domina cast a long shadow of doubt on the majority’s conclusion that there was “no evidence” to suggest Alexis’ claims against Domina should have survived summary judgment. The facts — that Leporati consulted with Domina on two occasions; that Leporati based his decision to arrest Alexis on Domina’s order; and that it could be found that both Leporati and Domina took Yvonne Alexis’ race into account — certainly suggest something more than independent, race neutral, police action. A factfinder could reasonably infer that Do-mina and Leporati were acting in concert with one another according to an informal plan whereby Leporati would eject anyone fi-om the restaurant identified by Domina as a problem without independently investigating the situation.

Evidence of such substituted judgment arrangements provides a basis for extending section 1983 liability to private actors. See Cruz v. Donnelly, 727 F.2d 79, 81 (3d Cir.1984) (holding evidence of a pre-arranged plan to arrest suspected shoplifters without independently investigating the presence of probable cause was needed to confer section 1983 liability); Lusby, 749 F.2d at 1432-33. While it generally does not suffice to show that a police officer fulfilled a private actor’s request to arrest someone, courts will impose liability where it is evident the police officer would not have acted without the private actor’s order. Cruz, 727 F.2d at 81. A failure to investigate, though not dispositive, has been deemed sufficiently demonstrative *357of conspiratorial conduct. See Lusby, 749 F.2d at 1432.

Despite the majority’s attempts to do so, this case cannot be squared with the holding in Carey v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 823 F.2d 1402 (10th Cir.1987). In that ease the Tenth Circuit found that there was no substituted judgment where a police officer was called into an airport to arrest a striking airline pilot. The police officer in Carey, however, was more of an independent actor than the facts show Officer Leporati was in this case. That officer actually conducted a separate inquiry into the facts before arresting the pilot. 823 F.2d at 1403. Officer Leporati failed to investigate at all, choosing to act solely at Domina’s behest. Additionally, it is worth noting that the use of excessive force and obvious racial overtones that marked Officer Leporati’s actions in this case were not present in Carey.

The current ease more closely patterns Wagenmann v. Adams, 829 F.2d 196 (1st Cir.1987), a case the majority attempts to distinguish. In that case the private actor enjoyed a close relationship with local police officers and enlisted them in carrying out a plan to eject a potential agitator from his son’s wedding ceremony. We held that a section 1983 conspiracy existed, concluding that the defendant in that case was essentially using the law enforcement officials involved to achieve his own, unconstitutional ends. 829 F.2d at 211.

A sound evidentiary basis exists for concluding Domina and Leporati adhered to a substituted judgment policy not unlike the one deemed constitutionally violative in Wag-enmann. First, the record reveals Domina, not Leporati, as the impetus for the decision to eject Yvonne Alexis. Second, Domina and Leporati, as individuals who worked at McDonald’s, could be found to have had a shared understanding to deprive Yvonne Alexis of her rights. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1605-06, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970). Leporati worked the McDonald’s detail on numerous occasions and must have had a working knowledge of company policy and decision making procedures for removals. Finally, the conversations Domina and Leporati held regarding Alexis were sufficient in duration and number to cement a conspiracy. These factors convince me that the independent police actions which persuaded the Tenth Circuit that no private liability existed in Carey are not present in this case.

I am not dissuaded by the absence of conclusive evidence that an express plan to discriminate existed between Domina and Leporati. The Supreme Court has found a section 1983 violation where there was no formal plan to discriminate. In Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970), the Court held that a policeman’s presence in a segregated lunch counter might be enough to infer a conspiracy between the police officer and the establishment, where the plaintiff had both been refused service and arrested. In a notable decision the Seventh Circuit found a conspiracy where the state agents with whom the private actor conspired were not actively involved in the deprivation of rights. See Soldal v. County of Cook, 942 F.2d 1073 (7th Cir.1991), rev’d on other grounds by 506 U.S. 56, 113 S.Ct. 538, 121 L.Ed.2d 450 (1992) (finding that private owner and deputy sheriffs conspired to “get rid of a pesky tenant” when sheriffs passively watched an unlawful eviction). It was not necessary that there be evidence of an express plan between Domina and Leporati to implicate section 1983.

There was sufficient evidence from which a factfinder could conclude that Domina and Officer Leporati conspired together to deprive Yvonne Alexis of her due process right not to be arrested without probable cause and that such deprivation was based on the color of Alexis’ skin.

For the reasons discussed above, I would reverse the judgment of the district court on the section 1983 claims brought against Donna Domina.

OPINION & ORDER

SHIRA A. SCHEINDLIN, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION.......................................................483

II. LEGAL STANDARD FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION..................486

III. APPLICABLE LAW.....................................................487

A. Sources of Liability...................................................487

B. The Fourth Amendment, Stops, and Reasonable Suspicion.................488

C. Criminal Trespass under New York State Law...........................490

D. DeBour............................................................491

IV. FINDINGS OF FACT....................................................492

A. Evidence of an Unconstitutional Practice or Custom of the NYPD..........492

1. Findings of Fact Regarding Testimony of ADA Rucker and Decline to Prosecute Forms.............................................492

2. Findings of Fact Regarding Plaintiffs’ Stops .........................496

a. Charles Bradley’s Stop........................................497

b. Abdullah Turner’s Stops.......................................499

c. J.G.’s Stop...................................................503

d. Jerome Grant’s Stop ..........................................504

e. Roshea Johnson’s Stop ........................................505

f. Letitia Ledan’s Stops..........................................506

g. Fernando Moronta’s Stop......................................507

h. Kieron Johnson’s Stop.........................................508

i. Jovan Jefferson’s Stop.........................................509

3. Expert Testimony Regarding UF-250 Forms ........................510

B. Steps Taken by the NYPD in 2012......................................517

1. NYPD Recognition of a Problem in TAP.............................517

2. Interim Orders 22 and 23 of 2012...................................518

3. Absence of Steps Meaningfully Addressing Outdoor TAP Stops.........520

V. DISCUSSION...........................................................522

A. Standing............................................................522

B. Preliminary Injunctive Relief..........................................523

*4831. Clear or Substantial Likelihood of Success on the Merits...............523

a. Deliberate Indifference........................................523

i. ADA Rucker’s Testimony................................524

ii. Plaintiffs’ Stops ........................................524

in. Decline to Prosecute Forms..............................526

iv. Dr. Fagan’s Analysis....................................527

v. Notice to Defendants....................................531

vi. Legal Analysis.........................................532

b. Failure to Rebut Deliberate Indifference Claim Based on Steps Taken by NYPD in 2012 ..................................... 533

2. Irreparable Harm ................................................539

3. Balance of Equities....................... 539

4. Public Interest...................................................541

C. Appropriate Scope of Injunctive Relief..................................541

1. Immediate Relief.................................................542

2. Proposed Additional Relief.........................................543

a. Policies and Procedures........................................544

b. Supervision..................................................544

c. Training.....................................................544

d. Attorneys’ Fees...............................................545

VI. CONCLUSION..........................................................545

APPENDIX A..................................................................545

APPENDIX B..................................................................550

I. INTRODUCTION

This case, filed in 2012, is one of three cases currently before this Court challenging aspects of the New York City Police Department’s “stop and frisk” practices.1 Of the three cases, this case is the most narrow. It deals only with stops made by the police on suspicion of trespass outside of certain privately-owned buildings in the Bronx. But the legal issues raised by this ease have roots that stretch back decades.

In 1964, New York adopted the first version of its stop and frisk law, which has since been amended several times. The essence of the law is that a police officer may stop a person in a public place when he reasonably suspects that such person is committing, has committed, or is about to commit a crime, and the officer may demand of him his name, his address, and an explanation of his conduct. Upon stopping a person, if the police officer reasonably suspects that he is in danger of physical injury, he may search the person for a deadly weapon.2

*484This law and the policing practices associated with it have raised a host of difficult questions, including: (1) what is reasonable suspicion; (2) what constitutes a stop; (3) what is a public place; (4) when is a stopped person free to walk away from the police; and (5) when does an officer have grounds to reasonably suspect that he is danger of physical injury. None of these questions are easily answered.

In 1968, the United States Supreme Court heard a challenge to New York’s stop and frisk statute in the context of two criminal convictions, and made some important points that bear repeating today.3 First, the Court held that although states may develop their own laws on stop and frisk, they may not “authorize police conduct which trenches upon Fourth Amendment rights, regardless of the labels which it attaches to such conduct.”4 The Court stated, in no uncertain terms, that the question is not whether a particular search was authorized by state law but “ ‘whether the search was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.’ ”5 Second, the Court held that it would not judge the constitutionality of the New York statute on its face, but rather as applied to the particular facts of the two cases it was reviewing.6 Third, the Court stressed that a police officer must have reasonable grounds before he seizes a person. In that regard the Court stated: “The police officer is not entitled to seize and search every person whom he sees on the street or of whom he makes inquiries.”7

In confronting the issues addressed in this Opinion, I am keenly aware that this Court does not stand in the shoes of the Police Department and is in no way qualified or empowered to engage in policy determinations. The sole role of the Court is to interpret and apply the law — in this case the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution as interpreted by the Supreme Court of the United States and the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit — to the specific facts before it. I have endeavored faithfully to carry out that limited role. My object here is only to clarify what the law permits — and does not permit — an officer to do when initiating and conducting a stop or stop and frisk of people in the public areas outside of certain privately owned buildings in the Bronx.

Plaintiffs, all of whom are African-American or Latino residents of New York,8 argue that the Police Department has a widespread practice of making unlawful stops on suspicion of trespass outside buildings in the Bronx that are enrolled in the Trespass Affidavit Program (“TAP”), which was formerly known in the Bronx as Operation Clean Halls.9 This program allows “police officers to patrol *485inside and around thousands of private residential apartment buildings throughout New York City.”10 Plaintiffs argue that the NYPD’s trespass stops outside TAP buildings are often made without reasonable suspicion, and thus violate the Fourth Amendment.11 Plaintiffs stated that such stops have caused them to feel “violated,” 12 “disrespected,”13 “angry,”14 and “defenseless.”15 As the Supreme Court noted in Terry v. Ohio, even limited stops and searches represent “an annoying, frightening, and perhaps humiliating experience,” 16 and thus must be based on reasonable suspicion.

On September 24, 2012, plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction, seeking an order requiring the NYPD to create and implement new policies, training programs, and monitoring and supervisory procedures that specifically address the problem of unconstitutional trespass stops outside TAP buildings.17 The preliminary injunction hearing took place between October 15 and November 7, 2012.18 This Opinion addresses plaintiffs’ motion.

I begin by summarizing the relevant legal standards, then state my findings of fact and conclusions of law. Based on all the evidence presented at the hearing, I conclude that plaintiffs have shown a clear likelihood of proving that defendants have displayed deliberate indifference toward a widespread practice of unconstitutional trespass stops by the NYPD outside TAP buildings in the Bronx. This conclusion is based on five categories of evidence, briefly summarized here and fully explored below: (1) the testimony of Bronx Assistant District Attorney Jeannette Rucker (“ADA Rucker”), who concluded that the NYPD frequently made trespass stops outside TAP buildings in the Bronx for no reason other than that the officer had seen someone enter and exit or exit the building; (2) a sample of “decline to prosecute” forms prepared by the Bronx District Attorneys’ Office, which revealed the alarming frequency of unlawful trespass stops in the vicinity of TAP buildings in the Bronx; (3) the testimony of eight plaintiffs and a non-party witness, who described remarkably similar encounters with the police when stopped in the vicinity of TAP buildings in the Bronx; (4) the analysis by Dr. Jeffrey Fagan, plaintiffs’ expert, of an NYPD database of recorded stops, which provided further evidence of the frequency of apparently unlawful trespass stops outside TAP buildings in the Bronx; and (5) NYPD training materials that continue to misstate the minimal constitutional standards for making stops.

*486In sum, while it may be difficult to say where, precisely, to draw the line between constitutional and unconstitutional police encounters, such a line exists, and the NYPD has systematically crossed it when making trespass stops outside TAP buildings in the Bronx. For those of us who do not fear being stopped as we approach or leave our own homes or those of our friends and families, it is difficult to believe that residents of one of our boroughs live under such a threat.19 In light of the evidence presented at the hearing, however, I am compelled to conclude that this is the case.

As a result, plaintiffs are entitled to a preliminary injunction. However, with one exception, I am not yet ordering relief pending a further hearing on the appropriate scope of such relief.

II. LEGAL STANDARD FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

“‘A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right.’ ”20 In general, to obtain a preliminary injunction, the moving party must establish: (1) “that [it] is likely to succeed on the merits,” (2) “that [it] is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief,” (3) “that the balance of equities tips in [its] favor,” and (4) “that an injunction is in the public interest.”21 The Second Circuit has held that the moving party may be entitled to a preliminary injunction even if the party is unable to establish a likelihood of success on the merits, provided that the party demonstrates “ ‘a serious question going to the merits to make them a fair ground for trial, with a balance of hardships tipping decidedly in the plaintiffs favor.’ ”22 In addition, when the moving party seeks a “mandatory” injunction, that is, an injunction that commands action rather than merely prohibiting it, the standard is higher: “[W]here ‘the injunction sought will alter rather than maintain the status quo,’ the movant must show [a] ‘clear’ or ‘substantial’ likelihood of success.”23

Because plaintiffs seek mandatory injunctive relief including the drafting and *487distribution of new policies, the development and implementation of new training programs, and the implementation of new monitoring and supervision procedures,24 they must establish a clear or substantial likelihood that they will succeed at trial.

III. APPLICABLE LAW

A. Sources of Liability

Plaintiffs bring a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of their Fourth Amendment rights by the City of New York and several of its employees.25 As the Supreme Court established in Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services, 26 in order to have recourse against a municipality or other local government under section 1983, plaintiffs “must prove that ‘action pursuant to official municipal policy’ caused the alleged constitutional injury.”27 In general, “[o]fficial municipal policy includes the decisions of a government’s lawmakers, the acts of its policymaking officials, and practices so persistent and widespread as to practically have the force of law.”28

One way to establish an official policy is through a showing of “deliberate indifference” by high-level officials. “ ‘[Wjhere a policymaking official exhibits deliberate indifference to constitutional deprivations caused by subordinates, such that the official’s inaction constitutes a deliberate choice, that acquiescence may be properly thought of as a city policy or custom that is actionable under § 1983.’ ”29 “Deliberate indifference” requires “ ‘proof that a municipal actor disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his action.’ ”30

Recognizing that “deliberate indifference” is “a stringent standard of fault,” the Second Circuit requires “that the policymaker’s inaction was the result of ‘conscious choice’ and not ‘mere negli*488gence.’ ”31 The Second Circuit has held that municipal liability can be established “by demonstrating that the actions of subordinate officers are sufficiently widespread to constitute the constructive acquiescence of senior policymakers.”32

A municipality may incur Monell liability based on deliberate indifference through its training practices. Although “[a] municipality’s culpability for a deprivation of rights is at its most tenuous where a claim turns on a failure to train,”33 the Supreme Court has held that “[w]hen city policymakers are on actual or constructive notice that a particular omission in their training program causes city employees to violate citizens’ constitutional rights, the city may be deemed deliberately indifferent if the policymakers choose to retain that program.”34 “[Deliberate indifference may be inferred where ‘the need for more or better supervision to protect against constitutional violations was obvious,’ but the policymaker ‘fail[ed] to make meaningful efforts to address the risk of harm to plaintiffs[.]’ ”35

B. The Fourth Amendment, Stops, and Reasonable Suspicion

The Fourth Amendment, made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment,36 states: “The right of the *489people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause.37 As interpreted by the courts, the Fourth Amendment prohibits arrest without probable cause, but allows the police to “ ‘stop and briefly detain a person for investigative purposes if the officer has a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity “may be afoot,” even if the officer lacks probable cause.’ ”38 “This form of investigative detention is now known as a Terry stop.”39

“While ‘reasonable suspicion’ is a less demanding standard than probable cause and requires a showing considerably less than preponderance of the evidence, the Fourth Amendment requires at least a minimal level of objective justification for making the stop.”40 “ ‘The officer [making a Terry stop] ... must be able to articulate something more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch.’ ”41 “Reasonable suspicion is an objective standard; hence, the subjective intentions or motives of the officer making the stop are irrelevant.”42

It is sometimes the case that a police officer may observe “a series of acts, each of them perhaps innocent in itself, but which taken together warrant[] further investigation.”43 “An individual’s presence in an area of expected criminal activity, standing alone, is not enough to support a reasonable, particularized suspicion that the person is committing a crime.”44 However, “the fact that the stop occurred in a ‘high crime area’ [may be] among the relevant contextual considerations in a Terry analysis.”45

Courts reviewing stops for reasonable suspicion “must look at ‘the totality of the circumstances’ of each case to see whether the detaining officer has a ‘particularized and objective basis’ for suspecting legal wrongdoing.”46 “[T]he proper inquiry is not whether each fact considered in isolation denotes unlawful behavior, but *490whether all the facts taken together support a reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing.” 47

The test for whether a Terry stop has taken place outdoors is whether “a reasonable person would feel free ‘to disregard the police and go about his business.’ ”48 “ ‘[W]henever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has ‘seized’ that person.’ ”49 “[P]olice questioning, by itself, is unlikely to result in a Fourth Amendment violation ... [u]nless the circumstances of the encounter are so intimidating as to demonstrate that a reasonable person would have believed he was not free to leave if he had not responded.”50 The Second Circuit has held that “[a] seizure occurs when (1) a person obeys a police officer’s order to stop or (2) a person that does not submit to an officer’s show of authority is physically restrained.”51 Both Terry stops and arrests constitute “seizures” under the Fourth Amendment.

C. Criminal Trespass under New York State Law52

Criminal trespass is defined under section 140 of the New York Penal Law. As the Appellate Division, First Department, of the Supreme Court of New York recently stated in a case concerning alleged trespass in a Clean Halls building:

A person is guilty of criminal trespass in the second degree when, in pertinent part, he “knowingly enters or remains unlawfully in a dwelling” (Penal Law § 140.15[1]). A person “enters or remains unlawfully” in or upon premises “when he is not licensed or privileged to do so” (Penal Law § 140.00[5]). “In general, a person is ‘licensed or privileged’ to enter private premises when he has obtained the consent of the owner or another whose relationship to the premises gives him authority to issue such consent” (People v. Graves, 76 N.Y.2d 16, 20, 556 N.Y.S.2d 16, 555 N.E.2d 268 ... [1990]). The prosecution bears the burden of proving the absence of such license or privilege (People v. Brown, 25 N.Y.2d 874, 377, 306 N.Y.S.2d 449, 254 N.E.2d 755 ... [1969] ).53

The trespass law also states:

A person who, regardless of his intent, enters or remains in or upon premises *491which are at the time open to the public does so with license and privilege unless he defies a lawful order not to enter or remain, personally communicated to him by the owner of such premises or other authorized person. A license or privilege to enter or remain in a building which is only partly open to the public is not a license or privilege to enter or remain in that part of the building which is not open to the public.54

D. De Bour

In People v. De Bour, the New York Court of Appeals established a four-level test for determining the legality of encounters between police officers and civilians under New York state law. The more intrusive the encounter, the more justification required:

• Level 1: Approach to Request Information: “If a police officer seeks simply to request information from an individual, that request must be supported by an objective, credible reason, not necessarily indicative of criminality.” 55

• Level 2: The Common-Law Right of Inquiry: “Once the officer asks more pointed questions that would lead the person approached reasonably to believe that he or she is suspected of some wrongdoing and is the focus of the officer’s investigation, the officer is [engaged in] a common-law inquiry that must be supported by a founded suspicion that criminality is afoot.”56

• Level 3: Forcible Stop: “Where a police officer has reasonable suspicion that a particular person was involved in a felony or misdemeanor, the officer is authorized to forcibly, stop and detain that person.”57 A Level 3 stop is legally equivalent to a Terry stop, and New York state court opinions generally refer to Level 3 De Bour stops and Terry stops interchangeably.58

• Level 4: Arrest: “Finally, where the officer has probable cause to believe that a person has committed a crime, an arrest is authorized.”59

At least in the context of police encounters inside TAP and NYCHA buildings, New York courts have often identified requests for name and purpose in the building as Level 1 questions.60 Mere presence in a drug-prone NYCHA building with a history of trespassing has been identified *492as an objective, credible reason justifying Level 1 questioning.61 Level 1 questioning of someone exiting a TAP building, on the other hand, appears to require more than a history of drug activity in the building.62

IV. FINDINGS OF FACT

A. Evidence of an Unconstitutional Practice or Custom of the NYPD

At the hearing, plaintiffs offered three categories of evidence in support of their contention that the NYPD has a practice of making unconstitutional trespass stops outside Clean Halls buildings in the Bronx. First, plaintiffs offered the testimony of ADA Rucker regarding her concerns about trespass stops and arrests at Clean Halls buildings, corroborated by “decline to prosecute” forms from the Bronx District Attorney’s office. Second, plaintiffs offered testimony regarding their personal experiences of having been stopped outside Clean Halls buildings.63 Third, plaintiffs offered the expert testimony of Dr. Jeffrey Fagan regarding the number and nature of trespass stops outside Clean Halls buildings.

I address each of these categories of evidence in turn.

1. Findings of Fact Regarding Testimony of ADA Rucker and Decline to Prosecute Forms

Since 2007, ADA Rucker has been chief of the complaint and arraignments bureau at the Bronx DA. In this position, she oversees the arrest to arraignment process, ensuring “that we evaluate all cases that are coming through and making sure we are doing the right thing.” ADA Ruck-er testified that around 2007 she started to become concerned about cases in which people were being stopped and then arrested based solely on their having entered or exited a Clean Halls building. Especially in 2009, judges began dismissing these cases frequently, sometimes saying that the police had no right to approach the arrested person in the first place.64

ADA Rucker also started to receive a steady stream of complaints about trespass arrests from the defense bar, the Legal Aid Society, and the Bronx Defenders.65 At first, she ignored the complaints. *493But in 2010, her staff began telling her that judges were not only dismissing trespass cases, but were finding evidence that the defendant lived in the building where the trespass was said to have occurred.66

Finally, in 2011, ADA Rucker investigated the law governing trespass stops based on entry to and exit from a Clean Halls building, and she determined that the office’s position on the prerequisites for a legal stop had been wrong.67 She sent memos to a number of commanders and other police officials clarifying that, contrary to previous statements, observing someone exiting a Clean Halls building is not by itself a sufficient justification for a stop.68 ADA Rucker testified that she sent the memos in her official capacity, and that the memos expressed the views of the Bronx DA’s office.69

I find ADA Rucker’s testimony credible. It is no small matter when an ADA publicly suggests that the NYPD has been engaged in a recurring pattern of unlawful stops. Such testimony is entitled to significant weight. A prosecutor has professional and institutional incentives to be skeptical of allegations that the police are making stops and arrests without a legal basis. That ADA Rucker overcame her skepticism says a great deal about the severity of the problem she came to recognize. I also note that the NYPD itself found ADA Rucker sufficiently trustworthy to allow her to train police officers regarding procedures in the complaint room.70

Yet defendants argue that ADA Ruck-er’s impression that a problem existed regarding unlawful trespass stops at Clean Halls buildings was unfounded, and in fact rested only on the two specific cases she discussed in detail at the hearing.71 Defendants’ argument is without merit. ADA Rucker made clear that over the years she learned of “many” cases involving unlawful trespass stops at Clean Halls buildings,72 that “the judges kept dismissing” them,73 that “[a]t least five” judges had dismissed Clean Halls trespass cases *494based on lack of probable cause,74 and that her concerns were also based on complaints from other ADAs, phone calls from the arraignment parts, and ADAs coming to her after leaving court, or when sent to her by their supervisors.75 ADA Rucker explicitly stated on cross-examination that her concerns were not based only on the anonymous letter and the indoor stop highlighted by defendants.76

To the extent that ADA Rucker’s concerns were based partly on statements made by non-parties who did not testify at the hearing and whose statements do not fall under any hearsay exception, I give no weight to the truth of those statements. I do not accept, however, the insinuation that ADA Rucker invented the problem of unlawful Clean Halls trespass stops in order to lessen the Bronx DA’s caseload,77 or that she imagined the dismissed trespass cases under pressure from the Bronx Defenders.78 ADA Rucker’s concerns are independently corroborated by numerous “decline to prosecute” affidavit forms. As ADA Rucker explained, the Bronx DA’s office produces these affidavits after a police officer or witness is interviewed and the office declines to prosecute the case.79

The decline to prosecute forms are an important source of information and I have reviewed each of them. Plaintiffs entered into evidence twenty-six forms generated by the Bronx DA’s office in support of its decision not to prosecute cases involving arrests for trespass outside TAP buildings in the Bronx over three sample months in 2011.80 Without giving weight to the truth of any hearsay statements attributed to arrestees in the decline to prosecute forms, the forms persuasively show that ADA Rucker was not alone in the Bronx DA’s office in perceiving a recurring problem involving legally unjustified trespass stops and arrests outside Clean Halls buildings.81 Defendants concede that the *495forms are, at minimum, admissible “for the limited purpose of establishing that officers’ observations of entries/exits were the bases for the underlying stops,” though defendants question whether the forms can support this finding in the absence of testimony from the assigned ADA and further paperwork.82 Defendants were free to elicit such testimony and introduce such paperwork. They did not.83 I decline to draw inferences in defendants’ favor based on the speculative possibility that further testimony would have revealed persuasive legal justifications for the stops described in the forms.

In an Appendix to this Opinion, I have collected excerpts from the twenty-six narratives of stops and arrests that appear in the decline to prosecute forms.84 One of the shorter and less redacted narratives reads: Based solely on a review of these forms, none of the stops leading to the arrests described in the forms were based on a reasonable suspicion of trespass. All were based merely on exit or entry and exit from a Clean Halls building.86 Thus, over the course of three months in 2011, there were at least twenty-six arrests for trespass outside Clean Halls buildings in the Bronx that resulted from stops lacking reasonable suspicion. As will be discussed in greater detail below, these arrests independently suggest a widespread practice of unlawful stops.87

On January 5, 2011 the defendants were observed exiting a [CJlean [Hjalls building. The defendants stated they were there to visit a tenant in the building. After being arrested[,] a tenant from the building did corroborate the defendant[s’] statements and the tenant stated that both defendants were in the building as his guests.

Therefore, the People are declining to prosecute this case at this time [redacted].85

In sum, ADA Rucker’s testimony and the supporting exhibits, including the decline to prosecute forms, contained more than enough evidence to support the conclusion that there is a clear and substantial likelihood that plaintiffs will be able to prove at trial that NYPD officers in the Bronx repeatedly stopped and questioned people on suspicion of trespass simply because they were observed exiting or entering and exiting a Clean Halls building. ADA Rucker’s testimony and the supporting exhibits show that a nexus existed between the Clean Halls program and the kinds of unlawful trespass stops described by plaintiffs and quantified by Dr. Fagan, as discussed in the sections below. That is, the stops of people exiting or entering and exiting Clean Halls buildings took place because the buildings were enrolled in Operation Clean Halls.

*4962. Findings of Fact Regarding Plaintiffs’ Stops

Plaintiffs offered testimony at the preliminary injunction hearing regarding their experiences in having been stopped on suspicion of trespass outside Clean Halls buildings in the Bronx. Sometimes plaintiffs’ accounts were corroborated by other plaintiffs and witnesses. In a few cases, the parties were able to identify officers who took part in the stops, and these officers testified. In other cases, neither plaintiffs nor defendants were able to identify the officers.

Defendants argue that plaintiffs failed to provide sufficient information to identify the John Doe officers in the case, and that as a result this Court should not credit plaintiffs’ testimony.88 Defendants go so far as to suggest that the stops about which plaintiffs testified “may not have occurred at all.”89 Based on the testimony described below, I reject this contention. Perhaps the strongest sign of the credibility of plaintiffs’ testimony is the striking similarities among plaintiffs’ stops. A person approaches or exits a Clean Halls building in the Bronx; the police suddenly materialize, stop the person, demand identification, and question the person about where he or she is coming from and what he or she is doing; attempts at explanation are met with hostility; especially if the person is a young black man, he is frisked, which often involves an invasive search of his pockets; in some cases the officers then detain the person in a police van in order to carry out an extended interrogation about the person’s knowledge of drugs and weapons; and in some cases the stop escalates into an arrest for trespass, with all of the indignities, inconveniences, and serious risks that follow from an arrest even when the charges are quickly dropped.

Nevertheless, while I found plaintiffs’ testimony credible, it would obviously have been valuable to hear from the unnamed officers involved in plaintiffs’ stops. The officers were never identified. I find that this was due in part to the lack of specificity in some of plaintiffs’ memories of their encounters. At the same time, I also find that defendants made inadequate efforts to identify officers based on the information plaintiffs did provide.

Defendants claim that Sgt. Robert Mu-sick of the NYPD’s Special Litigation Support Unit “conducted an exhaustive search to determine the officers involved in the purported incidents presented by plaintiffs at the hearing.”90 Sgt. Musick’s reference to his “limited attempts” to identify the officers is closer to the mark.91 A large part of Sgt. Musick’s investigation involved searches of the electronic UF-250 database, which contained only the addresses and birthdates — not the names — of individuals stopped after July 2010 when the stop did not result in a summons or arrest.92 Sgt. Musick conceded that he is “definitely *497not an expert” at using the database.93 For example, he was only able to narrow down the potential list of officers who might have stopped Jerome Grant in the summer of 2011 (discussed below) to a list of three hundred. Yet this list included officers of all ethnicities, while Grant had testified that one of the two officers was Asian. On cross-examination, Sgt. Musick explained that he had not searched for Asian officers within the list of three hundred because Grant’s description of the other officer did not specify an ethnicity.94 This makes no more sense than refusing to search a drawer for a pair of striped socks because one cannot remember which color shoes they match: there was no reason to make the search for the Asian officer contingent on obtaining more information about his partner. In the end, Sgt. Musick was unable to locate a single UF-250 for any of the eleven stops to which plaintiffs testified.95

Because I find it extremely implausible that any plaintiff simply invented the stop or stops to which he or she testified, because defendants failed to make a sufficiently persuasive effort to identify the officers involved, and because the officers who did testify failed to undermine any plaintiff’s credibility, I decline to draw speculative inferences in defendants’ favor regarding the reasons that unidentified officers might have provided for their stops,

a. Charles Bradley’s Stop

On May 3, 2011, after finishing his work for the day as a security guard, Charles Bradley, a black fifty-one year old resident of the Bronx, took the subway to visit his fiancee, Lisa Michelle Rappa, as they had arranged the evening before.96 Rappa lived in the Bronx at 1527 Taylor Avenue.97 Bradley formerly lived with Rappa and had keys to her apartment, but following a disagreement Bradley had returned his keys.98 1527 Taylor Avenue is a Clean Halls building.99

When Bradley arrived at Rappa’s apartment building, a young man who lived on the first floor and knew of Bradley’s and Rappa’s relationship let Bradley into the building. Bradley then walked up the stairs to Rappa’s apartment on the fifth floor and knocked. Because Rappa is deaf in one ear, Bradley waited a minute or two. When there was still no response, he returned downstairs and left the building. Outside, he looked up toward Rappa’s window.100

While Bradley was standing on the sidewalk, an unmarked green police van approached and an officer in the passenger seat — later identified as Officer Miguel Santiago — gestured for Bradley to come over.101 After Bradley approached the van, the officer got out and asked, ‘What are you doing here?”102 Bradley explained he was there to see Rappa, and that he worked as a security guard. Bradley testified that the officer responded to his attempts to explain his presence by suggesting Bradley was acting “like a *498fucking animal,”103 searched Bradley’s pockets,104 then told Bradley to place his hands behind his back. Once Bradley was handcuffed, the officer placed him in the van, where there were two other officers. While the van drove away, the officers began to question Bradley: “When was the last time you saw a gun? When was the last time you got high? When was the last time you bought some drugs?”105

After twenty or thirty minutes in the van, the officers stopped at the station house. Bradley was taken into a room, stripped, and told to wait.106 He was searched in “inappropriate areas.”107 For the next two hours, he waited in a cell with other people who had been arrested. He was then fingerprinted and given a desk appearance ticket and a date to appear in court to answer the criminal charge of trespassing. Later, Bradley’s defense attorney provided the Bronx DA’s office with a notarized letter from Rappa stating that Bradley had been visiting her.108 “[A]t that point in time,” Bradley testified, “paperwork was submitted to me stating that the People of New York declined to prosecute.” 109

Officer Santiago also testified at the hearing, explaining that he worked two tours on May 3, 2011, the first from 4 a.m. to 12:35 p.m. and the second from 1 p.m. to 9:30 p.m. Bradley’s arrest took place around 5:20 p.m., after Officer Santiago had been patrolling with his partner, Officer Landro Perez, for a few hours without incident.110 Officer Santiago emphasized that 1527 Taylor Avenue is in “a drug prone location” with “a lot of robberies, a lot of shootings” in the area.111 It is a “high crime neighborhood.”112

Officer Santiago’s account of Bradley’s arrest differed from Bradley’s in several respects. Officer Santiago claimed that before stopping Bradley, he had observed Bradley at the end of a hallway inside the building “suspiciously walking back and forth” for two or three minutes and “disap*499pearing.” 113 Officer Santiago claimed that he was able to see Bradley’s suspicious behavior even though he was inside a police van parked across the street, twenty to thirty feet from the front door, separated from Bradley not only by the street but by the windows of the front door, a vestibule, the windows of an inner door, and the hallway.114

Officer Santiago testified that he approached Bradley after Bradley exited the building and said: “Excuse me, sir, could you come over here?” 115 In response to Officer Santiago’s questioning, Bradley could not tell him the name of his girlfriend or her apartment number, and could not produce any identification.116 After he arrested Bradley for criminal trespass, they drove five or ten minutes to the precinct.117 There was only one other officer in the van.118 Officer Santiago did not ask Bradley any questions along the way, and Bradley was not strip-searched upon arrival at the station.119

The paperwork Officer Santiago completed with regard to Bradley’s stop and arrest contained numerous, self-serving errors.120 In direct contradiction to his testimony at the hearing, Officer Santiago made the following statements on the arrest fact sheet: first, that he observed Bradley in the building for seven minutes; second, that he stopped Bradley inside the building; third, that he went to the apartment Bradley said he was visiting; and fourth, that the apartment was occupied.121 By all accounts, each of these statements was false. Officer Santiago’s credibility was further called into question by the fact that in 2002 or 2003 he lied within the scope of his police work by creating two improper summonses to help a friend.122 Finally, Officer Santiago failed to complete the UF-250 form he was required to fill out for Bradley’s stop.123

I find Bradley’s account credible. Bradley entered a Clean Halls building based on an invitation from a tenant, walked upstairs to the tenant’s residence, found the tenant not home, then returned outside and waited on the sidewalk while considering what to do. In response to Officer Santiago’s questions, Bradley offered reasonable and unsuspicious answers. Bradley’s conduct provided no further basis for a stop.

b. Abdullah Turner’s Stops

On the evening of March 26, 2011, Abdullah Turner, a black twenty-four year old, had plans to go to an engagement *500party in the Bronx with his close Mend Anginette Trinidad.124 Both Turner and Trinidad testified at the hearing that Trinidad was carrying a sweater in a plastic bag.125 When the two had nearly arrived at the party, Trinidad told Turner she had to return the sweater to someone in the next building, 2020 Davidson Avenue, which is a Clean Halls building.126

While Trinidad went inside, Turner remained outside and called another close Mend, Felisha Black, on his cell phone. During the call, he paced in a circle on the sidewalk, trying to stay warm.127 It was “freezing cold” that night, but Turner was wearing only a cardigan sweater and t-shirt with no coat or hat.128

After Turner had been pacing and talking on the phone for about five minutes, someone “snatched the phone out of my hand.”129 When Turner turned, he saw three police officers: one who was Hispanic and a little stocky; one who was Indian, tall and slim; and a third officer that Turner did not “get a good look at.”130 One of the officers, Rieron Ramdeen, testified that he was only with one other officer, Michael Pomerantz.131 Officer Ramdeen’s testimony on this point was not credible, as Officer Pomerantz’s own memobook stated that he was patrolling on the night of March 26 with Officer Ramdeen and Premativo Montanez, a Hispanic officer.132

Turner testified that the Hispanic officer who took his phone began questioning him about what he was doing and whether he lived at 2020 Davidson. Turner explained that his Mend was returning a sweater and they were on their way to a party in the next building. The officer asked for identification, and Turner gave him his driver’s license. After the officer saw that Turner did not live on the block, he asked again what Turner was doing at 2020 Davidson, and Turner explained again.133 Then the officer asked: “So you don’t know anybody who lives in this building?” 134 When Turner said no, the officer asked him to stand against the wall.135

*501While Turner stood against the wall, the Hispanic officer entered 2020 Davidson with Turner’s driver’s license and cell phone still in his possession. Officer Ramdeen, now alone with Turner, continued asking Turner the same questions as before. Eventually, Trinidad emerged from the building, no longer carrying the plastic bag, and Turner pointed to her as proof of what he had been saying. Trinidad confirmed Turner’s story while the other officers returned. The Hispanic officer asked for Trinidad’s ID, and Trinidad gave it to him.136 Then the officer asked her if she had “anything on her that she shouldn’t have,” and in response, Trinidad said she had “a little pocketknife that her husband gave her for protection and a bag of marijuana.” 137

After confiscating these items, the Hispanic officer approached Turner and pointed to a sign on 2020 Davidson and asked him if he knew what the sign meant. Turner said he did not. The sign stated that 2020 Davidson was enrolled in Operation Clean Halls. The officer told Turner that he was trespassing and was going to jail. Turner asked how he could be trespassing if he was outside. The officer repeated that Turner was going to jail and placed him in handcuffs.138

After being driven to the precinct in a paddy wagon, Turner spent several hours waiting, was fingerprinted, and then was transferred to central booking, where he spent several more hours. It was not until the next day that a judge released Turner. He was then obligated to return to court eight to ten times before the charges were dismissed.139 Turner testified that the events on March 26 made him feel “defenseless.” 140 Trinidad’s testimony at the hearing supported Turner’s account of the stop.141

Officer Ramdeen testified to a different version of events. He testified that he and Officer Pomerantz were driving past 2020 Davidson when he saw Turner in the lobby. Officer Pomerantz stopped the car and Officer Ramdeen watched as Turner paced aimlessly in the lobby for two to three minutes, occasionally looking up the stairs. Aware that 2020 Davidson was a Clean Halls building, Officer Ramdeen approached Turner, who then exited the lobby. In response to Officer Ramdeen’s brief questioning, Turner volunteered that his friend was engaged in a drug deal.142 “I asked him what he was doing in the building and, in sum and substance, he responded with, I am not going to lie, Officer, I just came with my friend. She went upstairs to buy weed.”143 Officer Ramdeen did not record this alleged confession in his arrest report.144

*502Officer Ramdeen then arrested Turner for trespassing, basing “the charges on the fact that he had no lawful reason to be in the building and that he knowingly was there to buy marijuana.”145 Officer Ramdeen could not recall having arrested Trinidad. He conceded that neither he nor Officer Pomerantz took any steps to investigate or arrest the drug dealer who, according to their version of events, was operating that night a few stories above them at 2020 Davidson.146

I find Turner’s testimony to be credible. Turner stopped briefly at 2020 Davidson so that Trinidad could allegedly return a sweater. While Trinidad went inside, Turner talked on his cell phone outside for a few minutes. Officers Ramdeen, Pomerantz, and likely Montanez saw him standing outside the building in the cold, stopped him, and questioned him. Turner’s responses to the officers’ questions were reasonable and unsuspicious. Turner provided no other grounds for suspicion. I did not find credible Officer Ramdeen’s testimony concerning Turner’s spontaneous confession. Turner persuasively denied that he made the confession,147 and the officers took no steps to investigate or stop the drug dealer who (according to Officer Ramdeen’s testimony) was operating several floors above them. I also did not find credible Officer Ramdeen’s testimony concerning his observation of Turner’s suspicious pacing inside the building before the officers approached. Based on the totality of the evidence presented at the hearing, I do not believe that Turner entered the building.148

Finally, Turner credibly testified to having been stopped on another night during December 2011 or January 2012 outside of his own building, 2249 Morris Avenue, which is also a Clean Halls building in the Bronx. As Turner was exiting the building, a police car pulled up. Turner’s thirteen-year-old brother, a friend, and the friend’s nephew were talking at the front of the courtyard. When Turner began to step out of the courtyard, a female officer got out of the car and asked whether they all lived in the building, and they all responded yes. Then the officer asked for Turner’s identification, and he gave it to her.149 Finally, the officer “told us that we can’t stand in front of our building, so when they come back we would need to be gone.”150 Turner testified that he did not feel free to leave while the officer talked to him: “[S]he had my ID, and I don’t know anyone ... who ever just walked away from a cop in the middle of a conversa*503tion.” 151 In this encounter as well, I find that Turner’s behavior provided no grounds for suspicion of trespass or any other crime.

As to whether Turner’s second stop was based on the suspicion of trespass, the evidence is less clear.152 Nevertheless, because I found Turner’s testimony credible, because the officer’s questions concerned the right of Turner and the others to be on Clean Halls property, because there is no indication that the officers suspected Turner of any other crime, and because the parties were unable to locate a UF-250 or any other documentation showing otherwise, I find it more likely than not that Turner’s second stop was based on the suspicion of trespass.

c. J.G.’s Stop

J.G. is the son of plaintiff Jaenean Ligón and the brother of J.A.G. and Jerome Grant. The family lives in a Clean Halls building in the Bronx.153

J.G., who is black and seventeen years old, testified that the first time he remembered being stopped around his apartment building was on an evening in August 2011. He had gone to a nearby store to buy ketchup for dinner. On his way back, he saw two plainclothes officers with badges in front of his building and three uniformed officers across the street. When J.G. reached his building, the officers stopped him and began asking him questions, such as where he was coming from, where he was headed, and what he had in his bag. After J.G. answered that he had ketchup in the bag, one of the officers asked him to raise his hands, then asked him what he had in his pockets. The officer started to frisk him, first shaking J.G.’s pockets, then putting a hand in J.G.’s left pocket,154 then patting J.G.’s arms down. After the search, the officer asked for J.G.’s ID and took his name down on a notepad. Then the other officer looked in J.G.’s bag and inspected the ketchup. The officers asked for J.G.’s apartment number and rang the bell. Finally, after Ligón had come downstairs and confirmed that J.G. was her son, the officers handed her the ketchup and let them go.155

Ligon’s testimony supported J.G.’s account. Ligón testified that she sent J.G. to the store for ketchup one evening when she was cooking chicken and french fries. A few minutes after he left, she heard her bell ring.156 Jerome Grant answered the *504bell and an unfamiliar voice said: “[C]an you please come down and identify your son.”157 Hearing these words, Ligón thought J.G. was dead or hurt. She ran downstairs and collapsed on the steps when she saw J.G. standing, uninjured, beside the officers. The plainclothes officer who was standing with J.G. approached Ligón, laughing, and handed her the ketchup.158

I find J.G.’s and Ligon’s testimony credible. J.G. provided no grounds for suspicion of trespass — or indeed of any other crime — as he approached his building. He also provided no grounds for suspicion in his responses to the officers’ questions. J.G. provided no further basis for a stop, much less a frisk. Because the officers did not ask J.G. whether he lived in the building, it is unclear whether J.G.’s stop was based on the suspicion of trespass. Nevertheless, because J.G. was only stopped as he approached a Clean Halls building, because the officers’ questions indicate no suspicion of any other crime other than trespass, and because the parties have been unable to locate a UF-250 indicating otherwise, it remains more likely than not that J.G. was stopped on suspicion of trespass — if his stop was indeed based on a particularized suspicion of any crime at all.

d. Jerome Grant’s Stop

Jerome Grant, J.G.’s older brother and Ligon’s son, testified that his grandmother, Betty Ligón, lives at 274 Bonner Place in the Bronx.159 274 Bonner Place is a Clean Halls building.160

Grant, who is black and nineteen years old, testified that the first time the police stopped him at his grandmother’s building was in July 2011. He had been playing basketball with his little brother J.A.G., his cousin, and a friend. In the evening, the group needed to pick up a key from Grant’s grandmother’s house, so they began walking toward it and sent J.A.G. to run ahead. J.A.G. went inside the building without leaving the door open, so the others knocked loudly on the door.161 Grant’s cousin was “a little upset” by being locked out.162

Two uniformed male police officers, one white and one Asian, approached with flashlights and asked if Grant, his cousin, and his friend lived in the building, and if they were trespassing. Grant explained that they were visiting their grandmother’s apartment to get a key, and Grant’s cousin asked if they were doing anything wrong.163 The Asian officer responded, “I’m the one that’s talking here.”164 When Grant’s cousin said that he just wanted to know if there was a problem, the Asian officer told him to “hush up” and there would not be any problems.165 Then the officers made Grant, his cousin, and his friend stand with their backs against a wall and take out their IDs.166 When only Grant had an ID, the Asian officer told Grant’s cousin and friend: “I could take you in because you don’t have ID.”167 The Asian *505officer then wrote down Grant’s cousin’s and friend’s names and birthdates in a notepad while the white officer did the same for Grant.168

Then the Asian officer returned Grant’s ID and told the group to turn around and place their hands against the wall. The Asian officer asked Grant’s cousin whether he had any drugs or blades in his pockets, then grabbed his shoulders and patted him down to the ankles, stopping to remove all the contents from his pockets.169 The white officer frisked Grant’s friend and Grant. Finally, the Asian officer told the group to put their backs against the wall again, warned them to carry their IDs with them, and explained that the officers had wanted to make sure the group was not trespassing. J.A.G. came outside shortly after the officers left. Grant testified that he did not feel free to leave until the officers told him to go home.170

I find Grant’s testimony largely credible, though it conflicted in certain minor details with his deposition testimony.171 Defendants argue that the officers approached based on the group knocking on the door, rather than on the suspicion of trespass.172 But I accept Grant’s testimony that the John Doe defendant Asian officer mentioned trespassing as the basis for the stop.173

e. Roshea Johnson’s Stop

Roshea Johnson is the brother o f plaintiff Letitia Ledan.174 From 2001 through 2010, Johnson lived at River Park Towers, a complex of buildings in the Bronx. Sometimes he lived with Ledan, and at other times with a friend. River Park Towers is enrolled in Operation Clean Halls.175

On the morning of Father’s Day 2010, Johnson, who is black and was then thirty-four years old, went to Ledan’s apartment to change into clothes he had left there. To enter River Park Towers, it is not necessary to pass through security or a closed gate, or to have a key. Johnson walked into Ledan’s building and took the elevator to her floor. When he knocked at Ledan’s door, there was no answer. He went back to the elevator and returned to the ground floor, planning to call Ledan on the payphone in front of a supermarket in the complex.176

As Johnson crossed the street to the payphone, a black van pulled up with police officers inside. One officer asked him where he was coming from.177 Johnson told the officer he was coming from his sister’s house but she was not home.178 *506Then the officer “mentioned something about trespassing.”179 Johnson tried to tell the officer that he could prove he was not trespassing, and that he had a letter in his pocket with his name and his sister’s address on it. The officer responded by handcuffing Johnson and placing him in the back of the van.180

The officers then drove the van to another part of the complex and questioned Johnson.181 One of the officers asked Johnson “where was the drugs or the guns at.”182 Johnson said he “didn’t know where the drugs or the gun was.”183 The officers continued asking similar questions for a few minutes, then pulled out of the complex.184 During the drive, the officers “said you could make it easy on yourself if you tell us where the guns and the drug was, but I didn’t know where no guns or drugs was.”185 Finally, after about fifteen or twenty minutes, the officers pulled over at a location about a mile from River Park Towers, opened the door, and told Johnson to get out of the van.186 “When I got out of the van, he said maybe you don’t know nothing, and took the handcuffs off me and let me go.”187 Looking back, Johnson said that the encounter made him feel “angry and kind of helpless.”188

I find Johnson’s testimony credible. Johnson provided no grounds for suspicion of trespass as he entered and exited Ledan’s building. He also provided no grounds for suspicion in his interactions with the officers. Nor did Johnson’s conduct provide any other basis for a stop.

f. Letitia Ledan’s Stops

Letitia Ledan, Roshea Johnson’s sister, testified that she has lived at River Park Towers for the past eleven years. She chairs the maintenance and elevator committee in the tenants’ association. As noted above, River Park Towers is enrolled in Operation Clean Halls.189

Ledan, who is black, testified that she has been stopped six times in or around her building. Twice the stops occurred outdoors. The first took place at some time in 2009, although she could not provide a more precise date. Two white male officers stopped her in front of a supermarket in the River Park Towers complex as she was about to leave the complex. They asked her whether she lived there and whether she had an ID, then took her ID, looked at it, handed it back to her, and said to have a nice day. During the roughly three-minute encounter, she did not feel free to leave because the officers were standing in front of her and had her ID.190

Ledan’s second outdoor stop occurred in the summer of 2011. Ledan was returning home from work in the afternoon and saw four uniformed police officers standing with her husband and two of her friends in front of her building. While one of the officers patted down one of Ledan’s friends, another was patting down Ledan’s *507husband and removing items from his pockets. As Ledan approached her building, she asked what was going on.191 Then an officer approached her, and she asked, “[W]hy are you stopping us?”192 The officer told her to be quiet and asked whether she lived at the building, then asked for her ID, which she gave to him.193 After returning her ID and finishing the search of her husband and friends, the officers “just started walking away.”194 As in 2009, Ledan did not feel free to leave during the encounter because the officer blocked the entrance to her building and had her ID.195

I find Ledan’s testimony as to both encounters credible. Plaintiffs have failed to establish, however, that Ledan’s encounters constituted Terry stops. Despite Ledan’s subjective feeling that she was not free to leave in the first encounter, Ledan’s limited testimony tended to show that the officers approached and asked her questions politely and not in an aggressive, coercive, or threatening manner. “[Ejven when officers have no basis for suspecting a particular individual, they may generally ask questions of that individual; [and] ask to examine the individual’s identification ... as long as the police do not convey a message that compliance with their requests is required.”196 Ledan’s testimony did not provide adequate evidence that the police conveyed a message that compliance with their requests was required, and thus that she was not free to terminate the encounter.

Similarly, Ledan’s testimony concerning her second encounter with the police suggested that it was consensual. Without delving into the intricacies of Fourth Amendment case law concerning consensual stops,197 the Supreme Court has made clear that “[l]aw enforcement officers do not violate the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition of unreasonable seizures merely by approaching individuals on the street or in other public places and putting questions to them if they are willing to listen.”198 Ledan testified that in her second encounter, she approached the police, initiated the encounter, and questioned the police before being questioned by them. Based on this testimony, I find that Ledan’s second encounter was most likely consensual,

g. Fernando Moronta’s Stop

Fernando Moronta, who is Latino, was thirty-six years old at the time of the *508hearing. He lives in a Clean Halls building in the Bronx. One day after work in the winter of 2008, Moronta went with his brother, Eladio Vasquez, to his brother’s apartment building at 1453 Walton Avenue in the Bronx, which is also a Clean Halls building.199

When Moronta left the building at around 10:30 p.m., a police van pulled up and half a dozen uniformed officers exited and began questioning Moronta about where he was going and what he was doing in the building. After Moronta explained that he had been at his brother’s apartment, one of the officers asked if he had anything sharp in his pockets and then patted him down and searched his pockets.200 Then the officer asked if they could go upstairs to confirm Moronta’s story, and Moronta gave his permission. A white officer asked for Moronta’s ID.201 On the way up in the elevator, a black officer told Moronta that he “better be telling the truth,” because if Moronta’s brother did not live in the building, Moronta would be arrested for trespassing.202

At the door, Moronta’s brother identified Moronta, and after the white officer compared the name given to the name on Moronta’s ID, “he looked at me and smirked and gave my ID back.” 203 On the way down the elevator, the officers explained that they had stopped Moronta because “the neighborhood is bad, got drugs and stuff like that.” 204 Moronta stated that he did not feel free to leave until he left his brother’s building.205

I find Moronta’s testimony credible. Moronta provided no grounds for suspicion as he exited his brother’s building, or in his responses to the officers’ questions. Moronta’s conduct provided no other basis for a stop.

h. Kieron Johnson’s Stop

Kieron Johnson, who is black, was twenty-one years old at the time of the hearing. He lives in a Clean Halls building in the Bronx and testified to having been stopped in or near Clean Halls buildings seven or eight times, and to having seen others stopped about ten times. His best friend, plaintiff Jovan Jefferson, lives across the street at 1546 Selwyn Avenue, another Clean Halls building.206

On a warm day in 2010, around noon, Jefferson invited Johnson over to play basketball. Johnson went to Jefferson’s building and waited outside, about six steps away from the door.207 After about two minutes, two uniformed officers “pulled up in a car and ... jumped out and *509ran out and around me.” 208 One asked whether Johnson had been in the building. After he replied that he had not, one of the officers asked for his ID while the other patted down his front pockets and reached into his back pockets, where he kept his wallet.209 The officer looked through his wallet, then the other officer returned his ID and told him he was free to go. Until then, Johnson did not feel free to leave.210

I find Johnson’s testimony credible, despite his inability to offer a more precise date for the stop. Defendants argue that Johnson’s stop was not for trespass, because he testified that at the time of the stop, he believed the officers were truancy officers.211 But defendants offer no persuasive evidence that the officers were, in fact, truancy officers.212 Even if the officers were truancy officers, defendants fail to show how this fact would undermine plaintiffs’ claim that Johnson was stopped on suspicion of trespass.213 Presumably truancy officers are no less able to make trespass stops than any other kind of officer. Moreover, Johnson’s testimony that the officers asked him whether he had been inside the building suggests a trespass stop.214 Based on Johnson’s testimony, I find that he provided no grounds for suspicion of trespass as he waited outside Jefferson’s building, in his responses to the officers’ questions, or in any other manner,

i. Jovan Jefferson’s Stop

Jovan Jefferson, who is black, was twenty years old at the time of the hearing. As noted above, he lives in a Clean Halls building in the Bronx. Jefferson testified that he had been stopped outside Clean Halls buildings about seven to eight times, and inside Clean Halls buildings about three to four times. Jefferson’s friend Brandon Muriel lives at 1515 Selwyn Avenue, another Clean Halls building in the Bronx.215

Jefferson testified that his most recent stop outside a Clean Halls building occurred between April and June 2012. He and Muriel had been watching SportsCenter in Muriel’s apartment when Muriel left for work. It was shortly after noon as the two of them stepped out of Muriel’s building.216 A passing police van stopped and three officers got out, including two that Jefferson recognized as officers named “Marquez” and “Rodriguez.”217 Jefferson testified that these officers had previously stopped him inside his building, and had arrested Kieron Johnson for trespass inside Jefferson’s building at a time when *510Jefferson was with him. The officers had also arrested another friend of Jefferson’s for trespass.218 I find it more likely than not that Rodriguez participated in the stop that Jefferson described.

Rodriguez asked Jefferson and Muriel where they were coming from and why they were in the building. The officers also asked Muriel for his ID. Then Jefferson’s mother drove by with his aunt.219 After his mother got out and approached the officers, Rodriguez stated that Jefferson was “free to go and that he was just talking to me.” 220 Jefferson testified that he did not feel free to leave before his mother approached.221

I find Jefferson’s testimony largely credible, despite his failure during his deposition to remember the stop to which he testified at the hearing.222 Given the number of times Jefferson has apparently been stopped, it is understandable that he might forget one and then remember it later, just as it would be understandable if a police officer were unable to remember a relatively brief, unrecorded stop. I find that neither Jefferson nor Muriel provided grounds for suspicion of trespass as they exited Muriel’s building, as they responded to the officers’ questions, or in any other manner.

3. Expert Testimony Regarding UF-250 Forms

Plaintiffs’ expert witness, Dr. Jeffrey Fagan, is a criminologist with expertise in statistics.223 Dr. Fagan performed a statistical analysis of data contained on certain UF-250 forms completed by NYPD officers in the Bronx in 2011.224 As noted above, officers are required to complete a UF-250 form after each stop.225 The front and back of the form contain various checkboxes and fields in which officers indicate the nature of the stop and the circumstances that led to the stop.226

Dr. Fagan ultimately concluded that the NYPD recorded 1,663 stops outside a Clean Halls building in the Bronx in 2011 based only on a suspicion of trespass, and without observing any indoor behavior.227 Of these stops, Dr. Fagan concluded that 1,044 lacked any justification on the front or back of the UF-250 form that would have constituted reasonable suspicion of trespass.228 In other words, Dr. Fagan concluded that sixty-three percent of the *511recorded trespass stops outside Clean Halls buildings in the Bronx in 2011 where no indoor behavior was observed were not based on any articulated reasonable suspicion.229

Defendants offer a number of arguments against Dr. Fagan’s conclusions. First, they argue that it is impossible to conclude whether reasonable suspicion existed for a stop based on a UF-250 alone because “it is a conclusory form that does not capture all details, nuances and circumstances that may lead to a stop.”230 Defendants argue that Dr. Fagan had an obligation to incorporate into his analysis other sources of information, such as “911 calls or SPRINT Reports, memobooks, arrest and complaint reports, Trespass Crimes Fact Sheets, Owner’s Affidavits and/or criminal court complaints.”'231 Defendants also criticize Dr. Fagan for having no expertise regarding police training on street stops and reasonable suspicion, and for having conducted no interviews with police personnel.232

If defendants believe that such research would have shown that reasonable suspicion existed for some or all of Dr. Fagan’s 1,044 unlawful stops, defendants were free to conduct such research themselves and introduce evidence rebutting Dr. Fagan’s conclusions regarding specific UF-250 forms. Defendants did not.233 In general, as I stated when evaluating Dr. Fagan’s methods in Floyd, the contents of UF-250s are admissible and probative.234 As *512defendants themselves emphasize, officers are required to record all the reasons justifying a stop,235 and the UF-250 provides spaces for officers to record any reason.236 To the extent that plaintiffs used the UF-250 database primarily to estimate the magnitude of the problem at issue in this case, plaintiffs were under no legal obligation to supplement “the extremely rich and informative material” 237 contained in the UF-250 database with other paperwork or testimony.

In any case, even if there are reasons to believe that Dr. Fagan’s exclusive reliance on UF-250s led to inaccuracies, the inaccuracies generally favored defendants, not plaintiffs. UF-250s present a one-sided picture of a stop: they are completed not by neutral third parties, or with the cooperation of the stopped person, but by officers who have obvious incentives to justify the stops they have made.238 More significantly, evidence from the hearing suggested that many stops take place for which no UF-250 form is ever generated. Sgt. Mu-sick failed to identify a single UF-250 form for any of the eleven stops to which plaintiffs testified,239 and in both of the stops where officers were clearly identified, the officers admitted that they had failed to complete a UF-250 for the stop.240 Plaintiffs also introduced two reports by the Civilian Complaint Review Board (“CCRB”) stating that there is a systemic problem with officers failing to complete UF-250 forms after stops.241

In light of the above, I reject defendants’ contention that the sole reliance on UF-250 forms as a statistical tool provides a categorically inadequate basis for determining the rough magnitude of unlawful stops in this case. I also find that failures to fill out UF-250 forms likely led to a significant undercounting of both lawful and unlawful stops in Dr. Fagan’s analysis.

Second, defendants attack Dr. Fagan’s analysis based on his failure to take account of a field on the UF-250 labeled “Period of Observation Prior To Stop.”242 Defendants correctly note that the location field that Dr. Fagan matched to Clean Halls addresses indicates not the location of the suspected trespass but the location *513of the stop.243 According to defendants’ theory, Dr. Fagan’s analysis overcounted the number of outdoor stops based on suspicion of trespass in Clean Halls buildings because officers may have stopped someone near a Clean Halls building on suspicion of trespass in a nearby building.244 As defendants conceded in their opening argument, however, the possibility of a discrepancy between the location of the suspected trespass and the location of the stop “cuts both ways.” 245 Just as Dr. Fagan’s analysis might erroneously include stops that were in fact based on suspicion of trespass in a building near a Clean Halls building, so might his analysis erroneously exclude stops that were based on suspicion of trespass in a Clean Halls building but took place elsewhere.246 I am not persuaded that one effect would be larger than the other.

On the other hand, there is some validity to defendants’ argument that Dr. Fagan’s method might have failed to exclude stops based wholly or in part on observations of indoor behavior, despite Dr. Fagan’s attempt to exclude these stops.247 Dr. Fagan assumed that whenever an officer checked “Outside” rather than “Inside” on a UF-250 and gave no indication elsewhere on the form of having observed indoor behavior,248 the officer’s suspicion was not based at all on an observation of indoor behavior.249 But it is easy to imagine an officer observing behavior inside a Clean Halls building, making a stop outside, checking the “Outside” box as a result of the stop location, describing the location of the outdoor stop in greater detail in the “Type of Location” field, and failing to indicate elsewhere on the form that all or part of the observed behavior took place inside.

Nonetheless, defendants have failed to show why it was necessary for Dr. Fagan to exclude all stops involving the observation of indoor behavior in the first place. An outdoor stop based on the observation of unsuspicious indoor behavior may be just as unconstitutional, and just as potentially relevant to establishing a pattern of unlawful trespass stops outside Clean Halls buildings,250 as a stop based solely on the observation of unsuspicious outdoor behavior near a TAP building, or a person *514exiting a TAP building. Perhaps Dr. Fagan attempted to exclude all stops involving the observation of indoor behavior because these stops as a group tend to have a greater likelihood of being based on reasonable suspicion, especially if the officer observed the person indoors for a long period of time. If so, the exclusion was a gesture of methodological conservatism,251 and the apparent unfeasibility of perfectly executing the exclusion should not be held against plaintiffs. While Dr. Fagan’s methods may have failed to exclude some stops that were preceded by an observation of indoor behavior, this failure, by itself, is unlikely to have any significant impact on the validity of Dr. Fagan’s conclusions.252

Third, defendants criticize Dr. Fagan for having departed from methods he used to analyze UF-250 forms in Davis and Floyd 253 I decline to evaluate Dr. Fagan’s simple methods in the instant case through the circuitous route proposed by defendants of analyzing Dr. Fagan’s far more complicated methods in the other two cases, determining whether those methods were valid, comparing those methods to Dr. Fagan’s methods in the instant case, analyzing whether Dr. Fagan’s methods in the instant case are consistent with the methods in the other two cases, and then, if any inconsistency arises, rejecting Dr. Fagan’s methods in the instant case on that basis. Instead, I will simply evaluate the validity of Dr. Fagan’s methods in the instant case on their own terms.

Furthermore, it would be entirely understandable if the application of the method from Floyd to the instant case resulted in a lower count of unlawful stops than the method Dr. Fagan used here. The explanation for such a discrepancy is apparent. Dr. Fagan used more conservative assumptions throughout Floyd than in the instant case, and with valid reason.254 The universe of stops that Floyd analyzes for unconstitutionality is vastly larger than the universe analyzed for unconstitutionality as part of the instant motion — 2.8 million stops versus 1,663.255 As a result, the plaintiffs in Floyd have less of a need for precision than plaintiffs in the instant case. That does not mean that plaintiffs’ precision in the instant case is spurious. Dr. Fagan’s credibility should hardly be questioned in the instant case simply because, for whatever strategic or pragmatic reasons, he chose cautious but more manageable methods in another case that might result in a large number of unlawful stops being coded as lawful. Once again, the relevant question in evaluating Dr. Fagan’s methods in the instant case is whether the methods are valid here, not whether they are identical to the methods used in a *515different case based on a different universe of stops.256

Fourth, defendants persuasively note that Dr. Fagan’s analysis, standing alone, does not provide a convincing methodology for establishing a causal nexus between the Clean Halls program and the stops that Dr. Fagan analyzed.257 As Dr. Smith, stated in his report:

Professor Fagan’s methodology, by its very nature, cannot distinguish between whatever impact Clean Halls may have had on the pattern of Terry stops in the Bronx [and] the impact other factors ... might have had on that same pattern .... [I]t would be invalid to conclude that Professor Fagan has demonstrated that the Clean Halls program itself, and its implementation, caused the outcomes Professor Fagan observes and the Plaintiffs challenge.258

In essence, Dr. Fagan selected a set of stops from the UF-250 database based on several selection criteria — the stops had to be in the Bronx, on suspicion of trespass only, at the location of a Clean Halls address, outside, and so on 259 — and then determined how many of the stops in the set were unjustified. This approach cannot show whether stops in the set were more likely to be unjustified than stops in the UF-250 database in general, or stops in some other relevant set. Much less can this approach show that belonging to the set causes an increased likelihood that a stop will be unjustified. Just as Dr. Fagan analyzed the number and percentage of trespass stops outside Clean Halls buildings that were unjustified, one could analyze the quantity of unjustified trespass stops outside any arbitrary category of building — such as green buildings, or buildings with odd-numbered addresses. If, hypothetically, the police were making a large number of unjustified stops throughout New York City, the analysis would show that a large number of stops outside odd-numbered buildings were unjustified. It would obviously be inappropriate to infer from this that the police had a customary practice of making unlawful stops outside odd-numbered buildings, or to grant a preliminary injunction requiring the police to conduct specific training regarding stops outside odd-numbered buildings.260

*516Thus, defendants are correct that Dr. Fagan’s analysis, standing alone, cannot establish a causal nexus between Clean Halls buildings and unlawful trespass stops. But plaintiffs have already established a clear likelihood of proving such a nexus based on other evidence. ADA Rucker credibly testified to the police repeatedly making unjustified trespass stops and arrests outside Clean Halls buildings because they were Clean Halls buildings.261 One plaintiff testified that an officer explained an unlawful trespass stop based on the fact that it took place outside a Clean Halls building.262 As discussed below, an officer in the NYPD’s Legal Bureau learned through focus groups with sergeants and lieutenants that they believed it was legal to approach and question, if not stop, anyone in a TAP building even without a reason for doing so.263 Finally, on 417 of the UF-250s in Dr. Fagan’s original universe of 1,857 trespass stops outside Clean Halls buildings, officers handwrote phrases or words to the effect of “Clean Halls” or “Trespass Affidavit.” 264 The purpose of a UF-250 is to record the circumstances that led to an officer’s stop.265 The frequency with which officers took the time to note “Clean Halls” on a form, even though there is no specific field or checkbox and no reason for doing so,266 suggests that many officers thought a building’s enrollment in Clean Halls contributed to the justification for the stop.

Fifth, defendants challenge the methods and assumptions Dr. Fagan followed in processing the information contained on UF-250 forms into conclusions regarding the number of unlawful stops.267 Not surprisingly, defendants argue that many of the forms Dr. Fagan identified as lacking an articulation of reasonable suspicion in fact contained such an articulation. Because these arguments involve mixed questions of fact and law that depend on a fine-grained analysis of what constitutes reasonable suspicion, I will address them in my conclusions of law below.268 In any case, the facts regarding how Dr. Fagan counted the number of unlawful stops are not in material dispute.

Based on the testimony of plaintiffs and others, the decline to prosecute forms, and the statistical analysis performed by Dr. Fagan and discussed in greater detail below, I find that plaintiffs have shown a clear likelihood of laying a sufficient factual foundation to prove that defendants have engaged in a widespread practice of making unlawful trespass stops outside TAP buildings in the Bronx.

*517B. Steps Taken by the NYPD in 2012

TAP began in the early 1990s in Manhattan.269 Despite the program’s name, TAP was originally focused not on trespass but on narcotics sales taking place in the common areas of private buildings, such as lobbies, stairwells, and rooftops.270 An officer who testified regarding the origins of TAP stated that “[t]he more that we cracked down on drug sales on the street, the more that you saw drug dealers move indoors.”271 Before TAP, officers had to deal informally with landlords to get permission to enter private buildings in search of drug sales.272 TAP provided a formal process for building owners to permit officers to conduct “vertical patrols” inside the buildings.273

Defendants were unable to produce a single written policy or procedure governing any aspect of TAP between the program’s origins in the early 1990s and the issuance of two orders in 2012, discussed below.274 Nor did defendants produce evidence that the NYPD conducted any training or created any training materials specific to TAP before 2012.275 Nor did the NYPD have an accurate and complete count of buildings enrolled in TAP prior to a survey conducted in the summer of 2012.276

1. NYPD Recognition of a Problem in TAP

The improvements to TAP in 2012 had their roots in earlier years. Inspector Kerry Sweet, the executive officer of the NYPD Legal Bureau, testified that by early 2010, he had become involved in a group that was examining vertical patrols and trespass issues in NYCHA buildings.277 Inspector Sweet received approval to ex*518amine these issues in the TAP program as well.278 In the summer of 2010 through 2011, Inspector Sweet conducted focus groups with sergeants and lieutenants involved with TAP, and then with prosecutors and various NYPD officials.279 Inspector Sweet learned that “there really wasn’t a lot of direction about the administration of the program.” 280 During his deposition, Inspector Sweet testified that he also learned of “some confusion” regarding TAP stops:

[O]fficers believe their role might have been as doorman [or] custodian, rather than a strict application of De Bout. And once again, understanding that they needed that articulate reason to approach somebody and that if you were a doorman, you could approach everybody, but that is not the case.... [I]n TAP buildings, you have to have a reason to approach people.

I wasn’t getting the sense necessarily that they were stopping people in their tracks, but they may have been asking everybody coming into a building, what are you doing here, what is your reason for being here. And that obviously isn’t what we want them to do nor is it probably the right thing to do under the De Bour standard.281

Inspector Sweet testified that Katherine Lemire, special counsel to Police Commissioner Raymond Kelly, attended meetings with Inspector Sweet where this problem was discussed.282

2. Interim Orders 22 and 23 of 2012

After completing the focus groups in 2010 and 2011, Inspector Sweet helped to draft two new regulations to govern the TAP program: Interim Orders (“IOs”) 22 and 23, both published in May 2012.283 IO 23 of 2012 addresses various administrative issues relating to TAP, including procedures for enrolling buildings in the program.284 IO 22 of 2012 lays out procedures for the conduct of vertical patrols inside TAP buildings, with an emphasis on trespass arrests.285 It provides explicit guidance regarding when stops are lawful based on the suspicion of trespass in a TAP building. The second page of the Order begins with an italicized warning:

A uniformed member of the service may approach and question persons if they [sic] have an objective credible reason to do so. However, a uniformed member may not stop (temporarily detain) a suspected trespasser unless the uniformed member reasonably suspects that the person is in the building without authorization,286

*519The next page, in a separate section, repeats the first sentence of this note, and then continues, again in italics:

When reasonable suspicion exists, a STOP, QUESTION AND FRISK REPORT WORKSHEET shall be prepared as per P.G. 212-11, “Stop and Frisk.” Some factors which may contribute to “reasonable suspicion” that a person is trespassing, in addition to those factors set forth in P.G. 212-11, “Stop and Frisk, ” are contradictory assertions made to justify presence in the building and/or assertions lacking credibility made to justify presence in the building.287

The section continues by stating that a trespass arrest requires probable cause, and that refusal to answer questions is insufficient to establish probable cause.288

As plaintiffs correctly note, however, 10 22 of 2012 makes no reference to stops outside TAP buildings.289 It does not explicitly state that stops outside TAP buildings require reasonable suspicion, and that merely exiting a TAP building is insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion, even in a high crime area.290

At the hearing, defendants offered evidence of numerous steps that have been taken to support the implementation of IOs 22 and 23 of 2012.291 After any trespass arrest, officers must now complete a “Trespass Crimes-Fact Sheet” documenting the facts that established probable cause.292 The Chief of Patrol distributed IOs 22 and 23 to 2012 to all commanding officers with a brief synopsis,293 pursuant to a two-page plan to promote knowledge of criminal trespass offenses among uniformed servicemembers.294 Legal Bureau and other personnel offered instruction on IOs 22 and 23 of 2012 to training sergeants and special operations lieutenants,295 who were then expected to pass along the information to “the rank and file” at training sessions during roll call.296 Legal Bureau and other personnel provided separate instruction to borough and precinct commanders.297 Some of the training involved the use of a newly prepared video on “Stop, Question, and Frisk,” 298 and an up*520dated version of the Chief of Patrol Field Training Guide.299

Many of these steps are peripheral to the concerns of this case. The video and the Training Guide, for example, deal with stop and frisk in general, and make no specific reference to trespass stops outside TAP buildings.300 In addition, as discussed below, some of the training materials contain inaccurate or misleading information that could exacerbate rather than resolve the problem of unconstitutional stops.301

3. Absence of Steps Meaningfully Addressing Outdoor TAP Stops

During the hearing, defendants emphasized the training that officers receive throughout their careers regarding the laws governing stop and frisk in geneml. 302 This training has recently been supplemented by a refresher course on stop and frisk at the Rodman’s Neck training center in the Bronx.303 More than three thousand officers have attended the training course since its development in 2012.304

The root problem that led to unlawful trespass stops outside TAP buildings in the Bronx, however, based on ADA Ruck-er’s testimony and the other evidence introduced at the hearing, is that officers perceived trespass stops in the proximity of TAP buildings as exceptions to the general rules governing stop and frisk. Improving the training surrounding stop and frisk in general may do nothing to dispel the notion that there is an exception for stops outside TAP buildings.

IO 22 of 2012 makes clear that presence inside a TAP building is not a sufficient basis for a stop, and that stops made during vertical patrols of TAP buildings must be based on reasonable suspicion. But IO 22 of 2012 and the training introduced in support of it present themselves as guides to conducting vertical patrols inside a TAP building, not guides for making trespass stops and arrests outside TAP buildings. The difference may seem insignificant when viewed in the abstract. In theory, officers should be able to infer from the rules in IO 22 of 2012 how to perform lawful trespass stops outside TAP buildings.

In practice, however, the evidence at the hearing suggests that NYPD officers are trained to carry out their duties according to a set of standard operating procedures. The NYPD’s training reduces the unpredictable, confusing challenges that arise on patrol to a manageable set of standard situations and orderly procedures for ad*521dressing them.305 If a recurring, problematic situation is not included in the training, officers may categorize it in the wrong way and employ inappropriate responses— such as stopping someone simply because he exited a TAP building. The evidence at the hearing, as summarized in the previous section, strongly supports the conclusion that many officers took such actions before 2012.306 Yet none of the steps taken by the NYPD in 2012 were directly and meaningfully focused on uprooting the misconceptions regarding trespass stops outside TAP buildings that resulted in the constitutional violations in this case.

In fact, based on the evidence at the hearing, the only piece of instruction that has been provided to officers on a systematic basis and that specifically targets the problem of outdoor trespass stops at TAP buildings is a single bullet point included in a PowerPoint presentation offered by the Legal Bureau as part of the Rodman’s Neck training.307 The bullet point, which takes up one third of a page of a forty-five-page presentation, states:

Observation of an individual exiting a NYCHA/TAP Building, without more, is not an objective, credible reason to approach that individual.308

As common sense would suggest, and evidence at the hearing confirmed, attendees at the Rodman’s Neck training do not always absorb the lesson contained in this bullet point, or even recall having seen it. One officer who had recently attended the refresher course at Rodman’s Neck testified that he did not remember any discussion of TAP,309 and both he and another officer testified that they could not remember any training involving outdoor stops on suspicion of trespass.310

In light of the above, and in the absence of reliable statistics regarding stops in 2012, I find that defendants failed to introduce persuasive evidence regarding whether the improvements undertaken by the *522NYPD in 2012 have affected the magnitude of unlawful trespass stops outside TAP buildings in the Bronx.311

V. DISCUSSION

A. Standing

As a preliminary matter, defendants argue that plaintiffs lack standing to seek injunctive relief.312 I addressed this issue extensively in Floyd, and again in Davis, and the same analysis applies here.313 First, “[concrete injury is a prerequisite to standing and a ‘plaintiff seeking injunctive or declaratory relief cannot rely on past injury to satisfy the injury requirement but must show a likelihood that he or she will be injured in the future.’ ”314 Second, “ ‘[t]he possibility of recurring injury ceases to be speculative when actual repeated incidents are documented.’ ”315 Third, “ ‘the presence of one party with standing is sufficient to satisfy Article Ill’s case-or-controversy requirement.’ ”316

Abdullah Turner testified to two specific unlawful trespass stops outside TAP buildings in the Bronx, and J.G. and Jovan Jefferson both referred to having been stopped multiple times outside TAP buildings.317 The evidence suggests that both of Turner’s stops were on suspicion of trespass.318 Furthermore, Turner has lived since 2008 in a TAP building,319 where, based on the evidence presented at the hearing, he will likely be the target of future unlawful stops — if such stops continue to take place as they have in the past.320 This is sufficient to confer standing on plaintiffs.321

*523B. Preliminary Injunctive Relief

Plaintiffs seek a variety of injunctive remedies that would require the NYPD to act in ways that depart from the status quo, including the development and implementation of new formal policies, new training procedures, and burdensome new supervisory and monitoring procedures.322 Because the preliminary injunctive relief sought by plaintiffs is thus mandatory rather than prohibitory, plaintiffs must show (1) that they are clearly or substantially likely to prove at trial that defendants are engaged in an ongoing custom of making trespass stops outside TAP buildings in the Bronx in the absence of reasonable suspicion, in violation of the Fourth Amendment; (2) that plaintiffs are likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of injunctive relief; (3) that the balance of equities tips in plaintiffs’ favor; and (4) that an injunction is in the public interest.323

The following sections address each of these factors in turn.

1. Clear or Substantial Likelihood of Success on the Merits

Because plaintiffs do not assert that defendants have an explicit or formally approved policy of making trespass stops without reasonable suspicion outside TAP buildings in the Bronx, plaintiffs must show a clear or substantial likelihood of proving at trial that defendants have a custom or usage of making such stops. Specifically, plaintiffs argue that defendants “have a pattern and practice” of making unlawful trespass stops outside TAP buildings, and that “the City of New York has been deliberately indifferent” to this practice “by failing to supervise and train.”324

My analysis of plaintiffs’ claim proceeds in two steps. First, I analyze plaintiffs’ deliberate indifference claim and conclude that plaintiffs have shown a clear likelihood of establishing that defendants’ longstanding failure to train officers regarding the legal standards for trespass stops outside TAP buildings in the Bronx, despite actual or constructive notice that this omission was causing city employees to violate individuals’ constitutional rights, has risen to the level of deliberate indifference. Whether plaintiffs’ deliberate indifference claim is analyzed in terms of the general standard in Connick, the three-part Walker standard, or the constructive acquiescence standard, plaintiffs have shown a clear likelihood of success on their Monell claim. Second, I analyze whether defendants have rebutted plaintiffs’ evidence of deliberate indifference based on the steps taken by the NYPD in 2012. I conclude that these steps have not meaningfully addressed the specific problem of unconstitutional trespass stops outside TAP buildings in the Bronx.

a. Deliberate Indifference

Applying the law of Terry stops to my findings of fact, above, plaintiffs offered *524more than enough evidence at the hearing to support the conclusion that they have shown a clear likelihood of proving at trial that the NYPD has a practice of making unlawful trespass stops outside of TAP buildings in the Bronx:

i. ADA Rucker’s Testimony

As described above, ADA Rucker credibly testified that NYPD officers have treated proximity to a TAP building as a factor contributing to reasonable suspicion, and have frequently made trespass stops outside TAP buildings for no reason other than that the officer had seen someone enter and exit or exit the building.325 These stops were made because the building was enrolled in TAP, and they were not based on any reasonable suspicion of trespass.326 ADA Rucker’s testimony is corroborated by the accounts of stops and arrests in the twenty-six decline to prosecute forms, as well as by the hundreds of UF-250s on which officers wrote “Clean Halls” as a justification for a stop.327 As discussed below, Dr. Fagan’s analysis of UF-250s provides further corroboration of ADA Rucker’s testimony.328

ii. Plaintiffs’ Stops

The conclusion that the NYPD has repeatedly made trespass stops outside TAP buildings without reasonable suspicion is further supported by the credible and mutually corroborating testimony of named plaintiffs regarding the circumstances leading to their encounters with police.329 First, with the exception of Ledan’s two police encounters, each of plaintiffs’ encounters with the police constituted Terry stops requiring reasonable suspicion. As Ledan’s first encounter illustrates, it is possible for an officer to approach a person outside a TAP building and ask the person her name, where she is coming from, whether she lives in the building, and if not, whether she knows anyone in the building, all the while acting in such a way that a reasonable person would feel free to terminate the encounter and go about her business. But the other plaintiffs’ testimony showed that many trespass-related encounters outside TAP buildings involve aggressive, coercive, and threatening police behavior that would not leave a reasonable person feeling free to terminate the encounter.

Bradley was stopped when an officer in a van gestured for him to come over, he came over, and the officer asked “What are you doing here?” 330 Turner was stopped when three officers approached and one “snatched the phone out of [his] hand,”331 abruptly and aggressively ending his call and taking control of his property, without any request for permission to do so. The stop continued as the officer asked Turner what he was doing and whether he lived in the building beside which he was standing.332 Turner was stopped a second time when a police car pulled up in front of him as he and others were exiting a Clean Halls building, an officer got out, questioned the group, and requested Turner’s identification.333 J.G. was stopped when five officers approached him outside his building, stopped him, and asked him where he was coming from, where he was headed, and what he had in his bag. He was surely stopped when the *525officers made him raise his hands, frisked him, and searched inside his pockets and his grocery bag.334 Jerome Grant was stopped when two officers approached with flashlights, questioned him and his friends to determine whether they were trespassing, and in response to questions from those who were stopped, replied with strong words such as “I’m the one that’s talking here,” 335 and “hush up.” 336 Roshea Johnson was stopped when a black van pulled up in front of him with police officers inside and one of them began questioning him about trespassing.337 He was certainly stopped — and arrested — a moment later when he was placed in handcuffs in the back of the van.338

No reasonable person would have felt free to leave in these plaintiffs’ circumstances once an officer or officers approached, caused the plaintiff to stop through a command, gesture, accusatory introduction, or by taking possession of the person’s property, and then began asking questions that were clearly intended to elicit incriminating responses regarding trespassing.

Any doubt that these plaintiffs were free to leave after the commencement of intrusive investigatory questioning is resolved by looking to the instances in the decline to prosecute forms when suspects attempted to terminate their encounters. In one encounter, “the defendant attempted to walk away[,] at which time [the officer] grabbed the defendant[’]s arms.” 339 After a struggle, the defendant was arrested.340 In another encounter, “[t]he arresting officer stopped defendant and defendant clenched his fists on his sides and spread his feet apart and ... stated ... YOU’RE NOT GOING TO TOUCH ME. YOU’RE NOT GOING TO TOUCH ME. YOU’RE NOT PUTTING YOUR HANDS ON ME.”341 The arresting officer then handcuffed the defendant and placed him in a patrol vehicle.342 Similarly, when various defendants simply refused to answer an officer’s questions, it became clear that they were not free to terminate the encounter in this way either.343 In one encounter, the arresting officer “approached the defendant and asked her where she was coming [from], what was she doing in the building[,] and what apartment number was she visiting. Defendant responded in sum and substance: I WAS VISITING A FRIEND. I AM NOT TELLING YOU THE APARTMENT NUMBER OR THE NAME.” 344 The defendant was then arrested for trespass,345 The responses of the police officers as summarized in the decline to prosecute forms do not tell a surprising story. Indeed, they are what a reasonable person would have expected under the circum*526stances. When a person considers walking away from an officer who has stopped her and begun asking accusatory questions, it is objectively reasonable for the stopped person to believe that the officer will attempt to prevent her from doing so. Persons who are stopped by the police in circumstances like those described by the plaintiffs (other than Ledan) reasonably conclude that they are not free to terminate the encounter. As a result, such stops are Terry stops under the Fourth Amendment, and De Bour Level 3 stops under New York state law, and require that the officer have a “reasonable suspicion” that criminal activity may be afoot.

Second, all but two of the eleven encounters to which plaintiffs testified appear to have been based on suspicion of trespass, but lacked the reasonable suspicion of trespass needed to support a Terry stop. The two exceptions are Jerome Grant’s stop and Letitia Ledan’s second encounter.346

iii. Decline to Prosecute Forms

There remains the question of how widespread the practice of unlawful stops was. Plaintiffs argue that the decline to prosecute forms independently support the finding of a widespread practice of unlawful stops outside of TAP buildings.347 Their rather complicated argument proceeds as follows: First, plaintiffs assume the City’s expert was correct in reporting that approximately thirteen percent of the trespass stops analyzed by Dr. Fagan resulted in arrest.348 From this, plaintiffs infer a rough, general rule that thirteen percent of trespass stops in the Bronx in 2011 resulted in arrest — or in other words, for every recorded trespass arrest, there were roughly 7.7 trespass stops.349 Second, in three randomly selected months in 2011, the Bronx DA’s office produced at least twenty-six decline to prosecute forms describing arrests that were apparently based only on a person entering or exiting a TAP building.350 Because entry or exit from a TAP building does not provide reasonable suspicion, there were at least twenty-six arrests in the three sample months that were preceded by stops that were not based on reasonable suspicion. Third, if the twenty-six decline to prosecute forms reflect only thirteen percent of the suspicionless trespass stops outside TAP buildings in the three sample months in 2011, and if the sample months were representative of the year, then eight hundred trespass stops took place outside *527TAP buildings in the Bronx in 2011 without reasonable suspicion.351

Assuming as I do that the decline to prosecute forms contain largely accurate descriptions of stops, plaintiffs’ reasoning is persuasive. If anything, plaintiffs undercount the number of suspicionless stops suggested by the decline to prosecute forms. Dr. Smith’s thirteen percent figure is the arrest rate for all the trespass stops outside TAP buildings in Dr. Fagan’s study, including both stops based on and stops lacking reasonable suspicion.352 Common sense would suggest, however, that the arrest rate for stops lacking reasonable suspicion — for example, stops based on nothing more than a person exiting a TAP building — should be significantly lower than the combined arrest rate for lawful and unlawful stops. The lower the arrest rate for unlawful stops, the higher the number of unlawful stops that would be required to generate twenty-six arrests based on such stops. If the arrest rate for unlawful stops were five percent, for example, the existence of twenty-six arrests in three months based on unlawful stops would imply a yearly total of more than two thousand (2,080) unlawful stops,

iv. Dr. Fagan’s Analysis

Dr. Fagan’s analysis of the UF-250 database provides further evidence that plaintiffs have a clear likelihood of being able to prove at trial that the NYPD’s practice of unlawful stops was widespread. In order to understand Dr. Fagan’s claim that 1,044 trespass stops within his set apparently lacked reasonable suspicion, it is necessary to understand the basic features of a UF-250 form.353 I have included a copy of a blank UF-250 form as Appendix B to this Opinion.

The UF-250 form has two sides.354 On Side 1 there is a section labeled “What Were Circumstances Which Led To Stop? (MUST CHECK AT LEAST ONE BOX).” Inside the section are several boxes that officers may check, such as “Fits Description” and “Actions Indicative of Acting As A Lookout.” There is also a checkbox for “Other Reasonable Suspicion Of Criminal Activity (Specify)” (the “Other” box) that officers can check and then supplement with a handwritten note. On the back of the form, Side 2, there is a section labeled “Additional Circumstances/Factors: (Check All That Apply).” Inside this section there are other checkboxes, such as “Report From Vietim/Witness” and “Evasive, False Or Inconsistent Response To Officer’s Questions.” As noted above, officers are required to record all the reasons justifying a stop.355

In an appendix to Dr. Fagan’s report, he lists the combinations of factors from UF-250 forms that he counted as indicative of a stop apparently lacking reasonable suspicion of trespass.356 The list descends from the most common combinations of factors *528to the least common.357 On all of the forms that Dr. Fagan identified as apparently lacking reasonable suspicion, the officer had checked at most one of the listed “circumstances” on Side l.358 In some cases the officer had also checked the “Other” box on Side 1 and handwritten a text string, which Dr. Fagan also analyzed.359

The most frequent combination of stop factors identified by Dr. Fagan as apparently inadequate were “Furtive Movements” (Side 1) and “Area Has High Incidence Of Reported Offense Of Type Under Investigation” (Side 2), referred to in Dr. Fagan’s shorthand as the “High Crime Area” box.360 On ninety-one forms, these two factors were the only recorded basis for the stop.361

Of the 1,044 trespass stops that Dr. Fagan identified as apparently unlawful, 503 were based on the ten most frequent combinations of stop factors.362 In each of these ten combinations, which offer a manageable illustration of Dr. Fagan’s assumptions, the officer filling out the form recorded only the following basis for the trespass stop. First, on Side 1, the officer offered one of the following three factors:

1) “Furtive Movements.”

2) “Other Reasonable Suspicion Of Criminal Activity (Specify)” (the “Other” box), and a text string referring to “Clean Halls,” “Trespass,” or both as the sole notation.363

3) The “Other” box and words indicating the suspect was observed exiting the building.364

Second, on Side 2, under “Additional Circumstances/Factors,” the officer either checked no box, or offered one of the following five justifications:

1) High Crime Area.

2) “Time Of Day, Day Of Week, Season Corresponding To Reports Of Criminal Activity” (the “Time of Day” box).

3) Both High Crime Area and Time of Day.

4) “Proximity To Crime Location” (the “Proximity to Scene” box).

5) “Changing Direction At Sight Of Officer/Flight” (the “Change Direction” box).

Standing alone, Dr. Fagan’s categorizations leave a great deal of room for skepticism. The Supreme Court has “recognized that nervous, evasive behavior is a pertinent factor in determining reasonable suspicion.” 365 It is possible to imagine *529scenarios in which an officer observing behavior that would probably give rise to reasonable suspicion might reasonably record that behavior by checking nothing more than “Furtive Movements.” For example, an officer might observe a person standing nervously outside a TAP building, pretending to walk away whenever others approach, then returning after they are gone, and finally entering the building without a key, nervously looking both ways before opening the door. I also note that in each of the twenty stops where the officer checked “Change Direction” on Side 2, the officer also checked “Furtive Movement” on Side l.366 If these forms were based on an officer seeing someone engage in the behavior described above, and then run away at the sight of the officer, the officer almost certainly had reasonable suspicion of trespass.367

On the other hand, there are good reasons to doubt that most, or even many, of the forms marked with the combinations listed above were in fact based on such suspicious behavior. First, many of the 503 forms in the top ten on Dr. Fagan’s list contain stop factor combinations providing no basis whatsoever for reasonable suspicion. 205 of these forms simply indicate that the person was stopped outside a Clean Halls building, or for criminal trespass, neither of which explains why the officer’s suspicion was reasonable; or that the person was observed exiting, which also contributes nothing to reasonable suspicion; and that the stop took place in a high crime area and/or at a suspicious time of day, neither of which can establish reasonable suspicion in the absence of some additional contributing factor.368 Thus, at a bare minimum, over two hundred of the five hundred stops at the top of Dr. Fagan’s list provide no basis for a finding of suspicious behavior.

Second, Dr. Fagan reported that in his original universe of stops, officers had checked the Other box on nearly forty percent of the UF-250 forms.369 Officers were clearly willing and able to describe suspicious behavior when they observed it.370 In fact, officers frequently took the time to write notes that do not contribute to reasonable suspicion.371 Given the evident eagerness of officers to check the Other box and write notes — even when they had no basis for doing so — it is doubtful that many officers observed the kind of *530highly suspicious behavior hypothesized above and then merely checked the Furtive Movements box.372

Third, as Dr. Fagan notes, when police officers are in an area where they are primed to look for signs that “crime is afoot,” they may be more likely to perceive a gesture as an indicator of criminality.373 Recent psychological research has provided evidence of such cognitive distortions.374 Thus the category of Furtive Movements may be inherently prone to overuse on UF-250s. Given the nature of their work on patrol, officers may have a systematic tendency to see and report furtive movements where none objectively exist.375

Dr. Fagan raised further doubts in Floyd regarding the general validity of assuming reasonable suspicion based on Furtive Movements.376 Dr. Fagan’s report in Floyd showed that “the arrest rates in stops where the high crime area or furtive movement boxes are checked off is actually below average.” 377 Officers may have a tendency to check these boxes when'they are unable to articulate any other basis for a stop — perhaps because the suspicion leading to the stop was, in fact, not reasonable.

Defendants attack the accuracy of Dr. Fagan’s categorization scheme in various ways.378 First, defendants criticize Dr. Fagan for neglecting to factor into his analysis a field on Side 1 of the UF-250 form labeled “Period Of Observation Prior To Stop.” 379 Though defendants’ reasoning is not explicit, I take it they assume that a long enough period of observation, combined with some of the stop factor combinations in Dr. Fagan’s list of unlawful stops, might justify removing a stop from the list.380 Second, defendants’ expert noted a few dozen text strings accompanying the Other box that Dr. Fagan included in his count of unlawful stops but that defendants argue could justify a Terry stop.381 *531For example, Dr. Fagan categorized “RAN INTO BLDG” as an instance of an observed entry into a TAP building, and thus not a basis for a stop.382 Third, defendants argue that Dr. Fagan’s list of unlawful stops should not have included the forty-one stops in which an officer marked Furtive Movement on Side 1 and a box on Side 2 labeled “Ongoing Investigations, e.g., Robbery Pattern” (the “Ongoing Investigations” box).383

Rather than addressing each of these claims individually, it is enough to note that even if the one hundred forty-three stops involving observation periods over two minutes, the thirty-six stops with contestable text strings, and the forty-one stops with both Furtive Movements and Ongoing Investigations marked were excluded from Dr. Fagan’s grand total of 1,044 unlawful stops, the total would still show that out of the 1,663 stops in Dr. Fagan’s revised set of trespass stops outside TAP buildings in the Bronx in 2011, over eight hundred (824) were unconstitutional. That is, even if defendants’ arguments on these points are accepted — and I am not convinced that they should be — Dr. Fagan’s report would still show that on hundreds of occasions in the Bronx in 2011, people were stopped without basis outside of TAP buildings, in violation of their rights under the U.S. Constitution, and required to answer questions from an officer with the power to arrest them if they answered incorrectly.

The essential fact, sufficiently established by Dr. Fagan’s analysis when viewed in combination with the other evidence discussed above, is that a very large number of constitutional violations took place outside TAP buildings in the Bronx in 2011. Whether the percentage of trespass stops that were unconstitutional was thirty or sixty, and whether one assumes that officers failed to fill out UF-250s ten, twenty, or fifty percent of the time, plaintiffs have succeeded in showing a clear likelihood that they will be able to prove that the City of New York and its agents displayed deliberate indifference toward the violation of the constitutional rights of hundreds and more likely thousands of individuals prior to 2012.

v. Notice to Defendants

By 2011 city policymakers were on actual notice of a practice of unconstitutional trespass stops by city employees outside TAP buildings in the Bronx384 As early as 1999, the NYPD Legal Bureau was aware that it was unlawful to stop someone simply for entering and exiting a TAP building.385 By July 2010, as Inspector Sweet testified, the NYPD was on actual notice that officers were unlawfully approaching people entering or inside TAP buildings to question them about their presence.386 The special counsel to Commissioner Kelly attended meetings where the problem was discussed.387 In February 2011, a number of NYPD officials received letters from ADA Rucker on behalf of the Bronx DA’s office clarifying the unconstitutionality of stopping people merely for entering or exiting a TAP building.388 Throughout this period, the NYPD received copies of decline to prosecute forms describing arrests in which officers apparently stopped people for no rea*532son other than their proximity to a TAP building.389

vi. Legal Analysis

Deliberate indifference is “a stringent standard of fault,” 390 especially when it is based on a failure to train.391 Nevertheless, “deliberate indifference may be inferred where ‘the need for more or better supervision to protect against constitutional violations was obvious,’ but the policymaker ‘failfed] to make meaningful efforts to address the risk of harm to plaintiffs[.]’ ”392

Based on the conclusions above, plaintiffs have shown a clear likelihood of proving deliberate indifference under any of the prevailing ways of framing that standard. Stated in terms of Connick’s general standard for failure-to-train claims, plaintiffs have shown a clear likelihood of proving that city policymakers were on actual notice by 2011, and constructive notice prior to then, that the failure to train NYPD officers regarding the legal standard for trespass stops outside TAP buildings in the Bronx was causing city employees to violate the constitutional rights of a large number of individuals.393 Stated in terms of the three-part Walker test for deliberate indifference through failure to train, plaintiffs have shown a clear likelihood of proving (1) city policymakers knew to a moral certainty that NYPD officers, who regularly patrol in and around TAP buildings in the Bronx, would confront the question of when it was legally permissible to stop people outside those buildings; (2) the decline to prosecute forms, ADA Ruck-er’s letters, and the hundreds of UF-250 forms that failed to articulate reasonable suspicion for trespass stops outside TAP buildings provided an extensive record of NYPD officers mishandling these stops; and (3) when NYPD officers made the wrong choice in these stops, the deprivation of constitutional rights frequently resulted.394 Thus, plaintiffs have shown a clear likelihood of proving that city policymakers should have known that their inadequate training and supervision regarding trespass stops outside TAP buildings in the Bronx was “ ‘so likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights,’ ” that their failure to train constituted deliberate indifference.395 Stated in terms of the constructive acquiescence standard, plaintiffs have shown a clear likelihood of proving that there was “a sufficiently widespread practice among police officers” of unlawful trespass stops outside TAP buildings “to support reasonably the conclusion that such abuse was the custom of the officers,” and that “supervisory personnel must have been aware of it but took no adequate corrective or preventive measures.”396

In fact, plaintiffs presented some evidence suggesting that the practice of making stops outside TAP buildings without regard for reasonable suspicion might have been “so persistent and widespread as to practically have the force of law.” 397 In addition to the sheer magnitude of apparently unlawful stops, ADA Rucker offered testimony suggesting that prior to her legal research into the standards governing stops outside TAP buildings, she had been *533explicitly advising officers that it was permissible to stop a person simply because he had exited a TAP building, so long as the officer had observed the person in the vestibule first.398 Even defendants seemed to recognize that the similarities among the stops described in this case support the conclusion that officers’ behaviors were the result of uniform training.399

b. Failure to Rebut Deliberate Indifference Claim Based on Steps Taken by NYPD in 2012

Defendants spent a great deal of time at the hearing introducing evidence concerning steps the NYPD took in 2012 to improve TAP and provide training regarding stop and frisk practices.400 Yet in spite of receiving actual notice of NYPD officers carrying out widespread constitutional violations outside TAP buildings, and in spite of already being engaged in changes to the TAP program and the training related to stop and frisk more generally, the NYPD has failed to take meaningful action to address the specific and narrow problem at issue in this case: the problem of unconstitutional trespass stops outside TAP buildings in the Bronx. To date, as noted *534above, the only piece of instruction that has been provided to officers on a systematic basis and that specifically targets the problem at issue in this case is a single bullet point in a single slide show during a single part of the Rodman’s Neck training.401 This has been the NYPD’s most meaningful specific response to the problem that caused Charles Bradley’s unlawful stop and arrest, Abdullah Turner’s unlawful stop and arrest, the unlawful stop of J.G. that led Jaenean Ligón to fear for her son’s life, Roshea Johnson’s stop and interrogation in an unmarked NYPD van, all the other indignities that the other plaintiffs were obliged to suffer, and the hundreds of other unlawful stops, recorded and unrecorded, whose precise details this Court will never know.

The Rodman’s Neck bullet point is plainly insufficient to rebut plaintiffs’ showing of a clear likelihood of success on the merits of their deliberate indifference claim. Nor did defendants provide reliable statistics regarding stops in 2012 that might have rebutted plaintiffs’ claim. Defendants have provided no evidence that the NYPD has ceased its practice of making unlawful trespass stops outside TAP buildings in the Bronx.

The evidence introduced by defendants of broader reforms to TAP and stop and frisk undertaken by the NYPD in 2012 also does not rebut plaintiffs’ case that city policymakers have displayed deliberate indifference to an ongoing practice of constitutional violations by city employees based on unlawful stops outside TAP buildings. To the contrary, many of the training materials introduced by defendants may serve to further entrench the problem of these unconstitutional stops. In some cases, defendants’ introduction of training materials not only failed to rebut plaintiffs’ case, but made plaintiffs’ case stronger.

Most strikingly, within the last year the NYPD has produced a video on stop and frisk that has now been shown in every precinct.402 Chief Shea testified that “it would be fair to say that every single member of a patrol borough has probably” seen the video by now.403 The video, whose script was also entered into evidence, begins by briefly summarizing the four levels of police encounters recognized by New York state courts. Then the video provides the following description of what constitutes a stop requiring reasonable suspicion, that is, a Terry stop:

Your authority to conduct a Stop Question and Frisk encounter is limited to public places within the City of New York.... A forcible stop can take many different forms. It can be constructive in nature, such as using verbal commands or blocking a subject’s path. Or it could be an actual stop, such as grabbing or holding the subject.

The courts will look to an officer’s actions in making this determination. They consider: if the officer’s gun was drawn; if the person was physically prevented from moving; the number and tone of verbal commands; the content of the commands; the number of officers present; and the location of the encounter.

Usually just verbal commands, such as STOP, POLICE!!!, will not constitute a seizure. However, a verbal command, plus other actions may be considered a seizure — other actions, such as: using *535physical force to subdue a suspect; physically blocking a suspect’s path; grabbing a suspect by the arm, shirt or coat; pointing a gun at a suspect; using an ASP or baton to contain a suspect; or placing a suspect against a wall or on the ground.404

This misstates the law. It is incorrect in its specific claim that if an officer yelled “STOP, POLICE!!!” and the person stopped, the result would not “[u]sually” constitute a Terry stop.405 Indeed, it is difficult to imagine many contexts in which an officer shouting this command, followed by the person stopping, would not constitute a Terry stop. As noted above, the test for a Terry stop is whether “a reasonable person would feel free ‘to disregard the police and go about his business.’ ”406 If the “reasonable person” of Fourth Amendment law would feel free to disregard an officer yelling “STOP, POLICE!!!” and go about his business, then this “reasonable person” bears little or no resemblance to the many reasonable people who have been or will be affected by the NYPD’s stop and frisk practices.

The video is also incorrect in its more general suggestion that an officer must deploy something resembling physical force or the threat of such force in order for an encounter to constitute a stop. It is true that Terry stops are sometimes referred to as “forcible stops.”407 But the test for a Terry stop, again, is not the use of force: it is whether a “reasonable person” would feel free “ ‘to disregard the police and go about his business.’ ”408 The Second Circuit has held, for example, that a stop took place where an officer twice ordered a person to “hold on a second,” and after the second order the person stopped 409 The Second Circuit also held that a stop occurred where an officer pointing a spotlight at a person said, “What, are you stupid? Come here. I want to talk to you,” and then told the person to show his hands.410 In Davis, the City of New York conceded, and I held, that a person was stopped when he encountered an officer in a stairway, the officer asked if he lived in the building, the officer asked for his ID, and then the officer asked him to step out of the stairwell and into the lobby.411 I also held in *536 Davis that a person was stopped “when she attempted to walk to the elevator, was told to ‘come back’ by [an officer], and stopped walking,” because the officer’s “order to ‘come back’ was an order to stop and [she] obeyed the order.”412

The Second Circuit held more than twenty years ago, in a case that remains good law, that the following factors are indicative of a “seizure,” which can mean either an arrest or a Terry stop:

the threatening presence of several officers; the display of a weapon; the physical touching of the person by the officer; language or tone indicating that compliance with the officer was compulsory; prolonged retention of a person’s personal effects, such as airplane tickets or identification; and a request by the officer to accompany him to the police station or a police room.413

Because the yelled command “STOP, POLICE!!!” contains both language and a tone indicating that compliance is compulsory, the NYPD’s video is incorrect to suggest that other actions would usually be required for an encounter to constitute a Terry stop. Indeed, some of the “other actions” described by the NYPD’s video— “using physical force to subdue a suspect; physically blocking a suspect’s path; grabbing a suspect by the arm, shirt or coat; pointing a gun at a suspect; using an ASP or baton to contain a suspect; or placing a suspect against a wall or on the ground” 414 —go significantly beyond the level of coercion suggested by the Second Circuit’s list of factors that define a Terry stop. While any evaluation of whether a Terry stop has taken place requires consideration of the totality of the circumstances, it is clear that the NYPD’s video conflicts with the Second Circuit’s guidance: there is a certain range of conduct that a viewer of the video would identify as insufficiently coercive to constitute a Terry stop, while a reader of the Second Circuit’s list would identify the same conduct as falling squarely within the parameters of a Terry stop.

By raising the Terry bar above where it was set by the Second Circuit, the NYPD trains its officers that they do not need reasonable suspicion to engage in conduct that the Second Circuit would identify as sufficiently coercive to qualify as a Terry stop. In other words, the NYPD’s video, which was produced in 2012, which has now been seen by nearly every officer in the patrol bureau, and which defendants continue to present as a sign of their lack of deliberate indifference,415 trains officers that it is acceptable to engage in conduct that amounts to a Terry stop without reasonable suspicion.

The Chief of Patrol Field Training Unit Program Guide, which is distributed to supervisors in Operation IMPACT,416 also reflects the tendency of NYPD training materials to exaggerate how intrusive a police encounter must be in order to constitute a Terry stop. The Guide states that with something less than reasonable suspicion,417 an officer may approach a person and engage in “pointed, invasive, and accusatory” questioning that is “intended *537to elicit an incriminating response,” and even “ask for permission” to search the person.418 While “[t]he Fourth Amendment does not proscribe all contact between the police and citizens,”419 it is difficult to imagine many circumstances in which a reasonable person being aggressively interrogated by the police regarding suspected criminal activity could feel free “ ‘to disregard the police and go about his business.’ ” 420 The more realistic outcome would be for the person to assume that if he refused to answer, walked away, gave the wrong answers, or made a false move, serious consequences would follow.421 As Abdullah Turner testified, “I don’t know anyone ... who ever just walked away from a cop in the middle of a conversation.” 422 Given the high stakes of any encounter in which an officer interrogates someone regarding his suspected criminal activity, it is fanciful to say that a reasonable person would as a rule feel free in the midst of such an interrogation to “ ‘terminate the encounter’ ” 423 at will.

A lesson on TAP that was added to the Guide in 2012 similarly reflects a model of policing in which the investigative questioning of suspects routinely precedes rather them follows reasonable suspicion:

A uniformed member of the service may not stop (temporarily detain) a suspected trespasser unless the uniformed member reasonably suspects that the person is in the building without authority.... Some factors which may contribute to “reasonable suspicion” that a person is trespassing ... are contradictory assertions made to justify presence in the building and/or assertions lacking credibility made to justify presence in the building.424

Instead of reasonable suspicion providing a basis for investigative questioning, the NYPD’s training materials suggest that the standard scenario is for investigative questioning to lead to reasonable suspicion. The NYPD Legal Bureau’s PowerPoint presentation at Rodman’s Neck similarly suggests that even when an officer *538lacks reasonable suspicion for a stop, the officer may not only approach and ask accusatory questions, but during the encounter may “place [his] hand on [his] holstered firearm” or “draw and conceal” his weapon, all without escalating the encounter to a Terry stop.425

What is most troubling about these materials is not the suggestion that investigative questioning might under certain circumstances lawfully precede reasonable suspicion, but that it should do so as a matter of course, routinely, as the rule rather than the exception. If the difference between a Terry stop and a less intrusive encounter hinges on indefinite factors such as the demeanor and positioning of the officers; and if it is safe to assume that officers routinely display their authority and power through aggressive behavior, as many of the officers did in their encounters with plaintiffs in the instant case; then a training program that invites officers to approach large numbers of people and question them without reasonable suspicion will inevitably result in frequent Terry stops that lack reasonable suspicion, effectively guaranteeing the commission of widespread constitutional violations. The evidence of numerous unlawful stops at the hearing strengthens the conclusion that the NYPD’s inaccurate training has taught officers the following lesson: stop and question first, develop reasonable suspicion later.426

The NYPD’s training failures may also help to explain why no UF-250s were located for any of the plaintiffs in the instant case. Based on training materials like those above, the officers who stopped plaintiffs may very well have perceived themselves as not engaged in Terry stops at all, but in something less intrusive. The NYPD Legal Bureau’s PowerPoint presentation at Rodman’s Neck continues to encourage this belief, and the constitutional violations that will naturally follow from it, by redefining the standards for stops and arrests. Thus, the final slide on arrests states: “If you are at probable cause, you have made an arrest.” 427 This is not correct. If you have arrested someone, you have made an arrest; whether or not you had probable cause only determines whether the arrest was constitutional. Similarly, the presentation states: “When an individual is stopped based upon Reasonable Suspicion a UF-250 must be prepared.” 428 10 22 of 2012 offers a similar message: “W hen reasonable suspicion exists, a STOP, QUESTION AND FRISK REPORT WORKSHEET shall be prepared .... ” Both of these statements are incorrect. Whether a stop constitutes a Terry stop and thus requires the completion of a UF-250 form does not depend on whether the stop is based on reasonable suspicion, but on whether a reasonable person would have felt free to terminate the encounter.429

In response to criticisms directed at the NYPD’s training materials, defendants have argued that the materials reflect New *539York state law, and in particular De Bout and its progeny.430 Defendants assert that “New York Law applies” in the instant case.431 But practices that violate the Fourth Amendment cannot be saved by proving that they comply with state law432 To the extent that De Bout suggests a police officer, without reasonable suspicion, may lawfully stop and question an individual in such a way that a reasonable person would not feel free to terminate the encounter, that suggestion would be incorrect.

2. Irreparable Harm

In addition to showing a clear likelihood of success on the merits, plaintiffs have the burden of showing that they are “likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief.” 433 Plaintiffs have moved for class certification in connection with their motion for a preliminary injunction. Plaintiffs’ putative class is “comprised of individuals who have been or are at risk of being subjected to the New York City Police Department’s practice of stopping individuals outside of buildings enrolled in Operation Clean Halls in the Bronx on suspicion of trespassing inside those buildings.” 434

While I have not yet ruled on plaintiffs’ motion, “[i]t is well established that ‘[cjertain circumstances give rise to the need for prompt injunctive relief for a named plaintiff or on behalf of a class’ and that the ‘court may conditionally certify the class or otherwise award a broad preliminary injunction, without a formal class ruling, under its general equity powers.’ ”435 Based on the conclusions in the preceding section, the putative class in this case is threatened with imminent violations of their constitutional rights in the absence of preliminary relief.436 The frequency of unconstitutional trespass stops outside Clean Halls buildings reflected in the decline to prosecute forms and Dr. Fagan’s report establishes that members of plaintiffs’ putative class will likely be subject to such stops between now and the completion of trial if this Court does not act. Because “[t]he violation of a constitutional right ... constitutes irreparable harm for the purpose of a preliminary injunction,” 437 plaintiffs have carried their burden of showing likely irreparable harm on behalf of the putative class.

3. Balance of Equities

In order to qualify for a preliminary injunction, plaintiffs must show “that the balance of equities tips in [their] favor.” 438 Given that a preliminary injunc*540tion is “‘an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right,’ ” 439 it would be inappropriate to award such an injunction if doing so would result in an arrangement less fair to the parties than the status quo, such as an arrangement in which the hardship imposed on one party outweighed the benefit to the other. “[T]he Court should ‘balancfe] ... the equities to reach an appropriate result protective of the interests of both parties.’ ”440

I do not take lightly the burden on defendants of altering NYPD policies and training procedures. It is partly out of concern for defendants’ hardships that I have rejected some of plaintiffs’ proposed remedies.441 Nevertheless, the burden on putative class members of continued unconstitutional stops goes far beyond administrative inconvenience. As I stated in Floyd:

The right to physical liberty has long been at the core of our nation’s commitment to respecting the autonomy and dignity of each person: “No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law.”442

Eliminating the threat that the kinds of stops described by plaintiffs might occur at any moment, without legal justification, in the vicinity of one’s home and the homes of one’s friends and family, is itself an important interest deserving of judicial protection.

Equally important are the potential consequences of an unlawful stop. The stakes of “field interrogation”443 by the police have dramatically risen since Terry was decided in 1968. The use of incarceration has increased, sentences have grown, the threat of lengthy incarceration has created new incentives to plead guilty, and the collateral consequences of a conviction — on employment, housing, access to government programs, and even the right to vote or serve on a jury — have become more common and more severe. If an unjustified stop happens to lead to an unjustified arrest for trespassing, as it did in Charles Bradley’s case, not every overburdened public defender will have the wherewithal to obtain a notarized letter from the defendant’s host explaining that the defendant was invited, as Bronx Defender Cara Suvall did on behalf of Bradley.444 When considering the relative hardships faced by the parties, it is important to consider the potentially dire and long-lasting consequences that can follow from unconstitutional stops.445

*541Weighing the equities in light of the totality of the circumstances, the administrative burdens that defendants will face in revising the NYPD’s policies and training materials are real, but are outweighed by plaintiffs’ interest in not being subjected to unconstitutional stops outside their homes and the homes of their family and friends.

4. Public Interest

Any preliminary injunction must be “in the public interest.”446 Courts have no special institutional competence in determining what the public interest is, and the parties presented little evidence at the hearing directly addressing this issue. Nevertheless, the public interests at issue in plaintiffs’ motion are familiar from a long line of cases concerning “the power of the police to ‘stop and frisk’ ... suspicious persons.”447 In these cases, there is a recurring conflict between liberty and dignity on the one hand, and safety on the other.448

Because any member of the public could conceivably find herself outside a TAP building in the Bronx, the public at large has a liberty and dignity interest in bringing an end to the practice of unconstitutional stops at issue in this case. Even if the constitutional violations described by plaintiffs were confined to the members of a discrete community, the public has a clear interest in protecting the constitutional rights of all its members. At the same time, enforcing constitutional restrictions on the NYPD’s ability to stop and potentially frisk people outside TAP buildings could conceivably inhibit the NYPD’s ability to provide security to the residents of those buildings and their communities.

In light of these considerations, and taking account of all the evidence presented at the hearing, I find that the public interest lies with the enforcement of the Constitution. It is “ ‘clear and plain’ ”449 that the public interest in liberty and dignity under the Fourth Amendment trumps whatever modicum of added safety might theoretically be gained from the NYPD making unconstitutional trespass stops outside TAP buildings in the Bronx. I am not ordering the abolition or even a reduction of TAP, which appears to be a valuable way of using the NYPD’s resources to enhance the security in voluntarily enrolled private buildings.450 My ruling today is directed squarely at a category of stops lacking reasonable suspicion. Precisely because these stops lack rational justification, they are presumably of less value to public safety than would be the stops of individuals who displayed objectively suspicious behavior.

C. Appropriate Scope of Injunctive Relief

Injunctive relief “ ‘should be narrowly tailored to fit specific legal viola*542tions.’”451 In addition, “great[] caution is appropriate where a federal court is asked to interfere by means of injunctive relief with a state’s executive functions, a sphere in which states typically are afforded latitude.” 452 Prudence counsels in favor of the exercise of restraint and caution when the important interests of policing and safety may conflict with the equally important interests of protecting the constitutional rights of all those who are or may be affected by police practices in New York City.453 Nevertheless, where the levers of municipal democracy have failed, leaving in place practices that violate constitutional rights, courts have a duty to intervene. As I stated in Floyd, safeguarding the liberties guaranteed under the Fourth Amendment “is quintessentially the role of the judicial branch.”454

In light of these considerations, as well as the findings of fact and conclusions of law detailed above, I impose the following preliminary relief:

1. Immediate Relief

The NYPD is ordered immediately to cease performing trespass stops outside TAP buildings in the Bronx without reasonable suspicion of trespass, in accordance with the law as set forth and clarified in this Opinion.455 To summarize: as the Fourth Amendment has been interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court and the Second Circuit, an encounter between a police officer and a civilian constitutes a Terry stop whenever a reasonable person would not feel free to “ ‘terminate the encounter.’ ”456 The stops in this case illustrate that the threat or use of force is not a necessary or even typical element of Terry stops. Encounters involving nothing more than commands or accusatory questioning can and routinely do rise to the level of Terry stops, provided that the *543commands and questioning would lead a reasonable person to conclude he was not free to terminate the encounter.

In order for an officer to have “reasonable suspicion” that an individual is engaged in criminal trespass, the officer must be able to articulate facts providing “a minimal level of objective justification for making the stop,”457 which means “something more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch.’ ”458 In particular, an individual observed exiting or entering and exiting a TAP building does not establish reasonable suspicion of trespass, even if the building is located in a high crime area, and regardless of the time of day. For the reasons described above, “furtive movement” is a problematic basis for a trespass stop, especially when it is offered as a stand-alone justification. If an officer is unable to articulate anything more specific than that a person displayed “furtive movement,” including anything about the person’s furtive movement that suggested trespass, then the statement that a person displayed “furtive movement” is nothing more than an unparticularized suspicion or hunch, and does not constitute reasonable suspicion.

2. Proposed Additional Relief

In addition to the immediate relief ordered above, I propose to enter the preliminary relief described under the following subheadings. I present this relief as a proposal for two reasons. First, the parties in Ligón had little opportunity to argue and present evidence at the preliminary injunction hearing concerning the appropriate scope of relief. Second, the preliminary relief I propose is similar though not identical to the relief sought by plaintiffs in the Floyd action, where I have already certified a city-wide class of plaintiffs alleging that they have or will be victims of unconstitutional stops. Floyd is scheduled for trial on March 11, 2013. As part of the proof in that case, plaintiffs intend to present evidence regarding the remedies they seek.

Because of the rapidly approaching trial date in Floyd and the inefficiency of hearing separate arguments regarding the closely related remedies at issue in Ligón and Floyd, I am ordering the consolidation of the remedies hearing in the instant case with the remedies portion of the Floyd trial. Thus, the relief proposed under the subheadings below will not take effect until the parties in this case have had the opportunity to participate in a hearing at which they may present evidence or argument as to whether the proposed relief is insufficient or too burdensome or otherwise inappropriate, as well as regarding the appropriate timeline for relief. This remedy hearing will be held in conjunction with the Floyd trial, following the phase of the trial dealing with proof of liability.459 Plaintiffs’ counsel in Ligón and Floyd must coordinate their presentations with respect to appropriate remedies.460 Submissions by *544counsel in Ligón related solely to remedies must be filed no later than February 22, 2013, and may not exceed twenty-five pages per side.

a.Policies and Procedures

The NYPD is ordered to develop and adopt a formal written policy specifying the limited circumstances in which it is legally permissible to stop a person outside a TAP building on a suspicion of trespass. The policy must reflect the fact that trespass stops outside TAP buildings are governed not only by New York state law, but by the Fourth Amendment. Guidance in drafting this policy should be drawn from the legal discussion found in this Opinion.

A draft of the written policy governing trespass stops outside TAP buildings shall be provided to the Court (or a monitor appointed by the Court) for approval prior to distribution, with a copy to plaintiffs’ counsel.

b.Supervision

First, the City is ordered to take all necessary steps to ensure that UF-250s are completed for every trespass stop outside a TAP building in the Bronx. Again, a “stop” in the relevant sense is defined as any police encounter in which a reasonable person would not feel free to terminate the encounter.

Second, the City is ordered to implement a system of review modeled on the one ordered by Chief Hall in paragraph 3 of Exhibit E. Supervisory personnel in each Bronx precinct must review, on a quarterly basis, each UF-250 completed for a trespass stop outside a TAP building in the Bronx. To the extent that such review reveals nonconformity with the formal written policy described above, the City will take specific steps to retrain the officer. The results of these reviews and any retraining will be periodically reported to the relevant precinct commander, a designated member of the Bronx Borough Command, a designated member of the Chief of Patrol’s Office, and plaintiffs’ counsel. Copies of all reviewed UF-250s shall be provided to plaintiffs’ counsel,

c.Training

The City is ordered to revise the NYPD’s training materials and training programs to conform with the law as set forth in this Opinion. The instruction must be sufficient to uproot the longstanding misconceptions that have afflicted TAP in the Bronx. It must include, but need not be limited to, the following reforms: (1) The formal written policy governing trespass stops outside TAP buildings, described above, must be distributed to each Bronx NYPD member, and then redistributed two additional times at six-month intervals. (2) The stop and frisk refresher course at Rodman’s Neck must be altered to incorporate instruction specifically targeting the problem of unconstitutional trespass stops outside TAP buildings. Whether the instruction includes additional slides, role-playing, or exams, it must be sufficient to convey to all officers who attend the course that reasonable suspicion of trespass is required before making a trespass stop outside a TAP building. Training regarding these stops must also be provided to new recruits and to officers who have already attended the Rodman’s Neck refresher course and are not scheduled to do so again. (3) Chapter 16 of the Chief of Patrol Field Training Guide must be revised to reflect the formal written policy governing trespass stops outside TAP buildings described above. (4) SQF Training Video No. 5 must be revised to conform with the law as set forth in this Opinion. I recognize that this step, like some of the others above, will involve alterations to training materials used outside the Bronx and outside the context of TAP. *545But such steps are necessary to correct the longstanding misconceptions that led to the violations of plaintiffs’ constitutional rights described in this Opinion.

Drafts of the written or scripted training materials described above shall be provided to the Court (or a monitor appointed by the Court) for approval prior to use, with a copy to plaintiffs’ counsel.

d. Attorneys’ Fees

Reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs will be rewarded as appropriate, on application.

In closing, I stress that my conclusions in this Opinion are based on the limited evidence presented at the preliminary injunction hearing. It could be the case that the development and implementation of IOs 22 and 23 of 2012, as well as the changes to NYPD training in 2012, have resolved the problem of unconstitutional trespass stops outside TAP buddings in the Bronx. Because these changes were so recent, however, and so late in the two-decade history of TAP, they were insufficient to rebut plaintiffs’ evidence at the hearing of defendants’ deliberate indifference to a practice of unconstitutional stops. At any time that defendants develop persuasive evidence, supported by reliable statistics, that unconstitutional trespass stops are no longer taking place outside TAP buildings in the Bronx, defendants may move for the dissolution of this preliminary injunction and the proposed relief.

VI. CONCLUSION

For the reasons explained above, plaintiffs’ motion is granted, although the full extent of the relief has not yet been determined.461 No action is required by the Clerk of the Court, because plaintiffs’ motion has already been closed.

SO ORDERED.

APPENDIX A

Excerpts from Decline to Prosecute Affidavits:

1. The Arresting Officer observed the defendant exit the lobby of ... a Clean Halls Apartment Building, and asked defendant, why were you in the building? Defendant stated in sum and substance: VISITING A FRIEND. The Arresting Officer then observed defendant to have a white powdery substance on his nose ... however, the amount was too small to field test or recover.

The Arresting Officer arrested Defendant and charged him with violating New York State Penal Law section 140.15 (Criminal Trespass). However, the Arresting Officer failed to ask defendant [redacted] you know anyone in the building; if so, what is the person’s name and apartment number.

2. [T]he defendants were observed exiting a clean halls building. The defendants stated that they were there to visit a tenant. ... After being arrested a tenant from the building did corroborate the defendant’s statements and the tenant stated that both defendants were in the building as his guests.

3. The Arresting Officer ... observed defendant exiting the lobby of ... a Clean Halls Apartment Building. The Arresting Officer ... approached the defendant and asked the defendant do you live in the building and defendant stated in sum and substance: NO. The Arresting Officer further asked the defendant what apartment *546did you come from and defendant stated in sum and substance: I MET WITH [redacted] IN THE LOBBY. The Arresting Officer further asked defendant what apartment does [redacted] live in and defendant stated in sum and substance: I DON’T KNOW THE APARTMENT NUMBER. [Another officer then went inside the building and asked two people exiting if they knew anyone by the name of the defendant’s host. When they said no, the defendant was arrested for trespass.] 4. ... Arresting Officer observed defendant enter and exit a Clean Halls Building. Arresting Officer approached the defendant and asked her where she was coming [from], what was she doing in the building and what apartment number was she visiting. Defendant responded in sum and substance: I WAS VISITING A FRIEND. I AM NOT TELLING YOU THE APARTMENT NUMBER OR THE NAME. [The defendant was then arrested for trespass.]

5. Defendants entered ... a clean halls building, and exited. Defendant was stopped outside of the location. When the arresting officer questioned the defendant, defendant stated, in sum and substance, I’M JUST CHILLING. Defendant did not admit that he was in the location. [The defendant was then arrested for trespass.]

6. [A]rresting officer ... observed the defendant enter and exit the lobby of ... a Clean Halls Apartment Building, asked defendant does he live there and defendant did not respond. The arresting officer then asked the defendant if he knows anyone in the apartment and defendant did not respond. Arresting officer then asked defendant what was he doing in the building and defendant stated in sum and substance I WASN’T THERE TO BUY DRUGS. [The defendant was then arrested for trespass.]

7. Arresting Officer observed the defendant enter and exit the lobby of ... a Clean Halls Apartment building, and asked defendant do you live in the building, do you know anyone in the building, what are you doing in the building, to which defendant stated in sum and substance: NO, NO, I WAS INSIDE FOR A COUPLE OF MINUTES MAKING A PHONE CALL. [The defendant was then arrested for trespass.]

8. Arresting Officer ... observed both defendants exit the lobby of ... a Clean Halls Apartment Building and asked defendants what was their purpose inside of said building and defendant [redacted] stated in sum and substance: I WAS VISITING MY COUSIN [redacted] IN [redacted] but defendant [redacted] remained silent. [Another officer] entered the building to investigate further, however, the arresting officer was unable to articulate how [the other officer] disproved [the speaking defendant’s] claim. [Both defendants were arrested for trespass.]

9. Police Officer ... observed the defendant exiting the lobby of ... a Clean Halls Apartment Building and asked defendant whether he lived in the building and defendant stated in sum and substance: NO. [The officer] then asked the defendant, were you visiting anyone in the building, and defendant stated in sum and substance: YES. [The officer] then asked the defendant for the name of the person he was visiting and the apartment number and defendant stated in sum and substance: I DON’T KNOW. [The defendant was then arrested for trespass.]

10. Arresting Officer observed the defendant enter and exit the lobby of ... a Clean Halls Building, and radioed defendant’s description. Arresting Officer’s partner asked defendant why did you go into the building, do you know anyone in the building, to which defendant stated in *547sum and substance: I CAME OUT OF A FRIEND[’]S APARTMENT. I WAS INSIDE FOR ABOUT AN HOUR. [The defendant was then arrested for trespass.]

11. [T]he arresting officer observed the defendant enter into [a Clean Halls building] and exit after approximately five (5) minutes....

... The defendant was not observed in an area of the building that is not open to the public such as the hallways, lobby and stairwells. [The defendant was arrested for trespass.]

12. [A police officer] observed the defendant enter a Clean Halls Building and exit moments later.... [Wjhen the defendant exited the building, [the officer] asked the defendant if he lived in the building, to which the defendant stated in sum and substance, NO.... [The officer] did not ask the defendant if he was a guest of a tenant in the building.... [T]he defendant attempted to walk away at which time [the officer] grabbed the defendant[’]s arms, and the defendant pulled away. [A struggle ensued, and the defendant was then arrested in part for trespass.]

13. [T]he defendants entered a Clean Halls building, stayed there approximately five minutes, and then left. The arresting officer stopped the defendants and asked them where they were coming from. The defendants replied, in sum and substance, WE’RE COMING FROM ... WE’RE COMING FROM ..., and could not provide a name or apartment number. The officer placed both defendants under arrest and searched them.

14. The Arresting Officer observed the defendant exit the lobby of ... a Clean Halls Apartment Building, approached defendant and asked, Do you live in the building?, defendant stated in sum and substance: NO. The Arresting Officer then asked the defendant, Do you know anyone in the building?, defendant stated in sum and substance: YES, A FRIEND. The Arresting Officer then asked the defendant, What’s your friend’s name? What apartment does your friend live in?, defendant stated in sum and substance: I DON’T KNOW HIS NAME. HE’S IN [redacted]. The Arresting Officer went to [redacted] however, the apartment was unoccupied, and as a result, the Arresting Officer was unable to locate anyone who could verify defendant’s claim. [The defendant was then arrested for trespass.]

15. The Arresting Officer observed the defendant exit the lobby of ... a Clean Halls Apartment Building and [another officer] approached defendant on the sidewalk and asked defendant, Do you live in the building?, and defendant stated in sum and substance: NO. [The officer] asked defendant, What was your reason for being in the building?, and defendant stated in sum and substance: LOOKING FOR A GIRL. [The officer] then asked the defendant, What’s the name of the girl?, and defendant refused to provide an answer to the aforementioned question. [The defendant was then arrested for trespass.]

16. Arresting Officer observed the defendant enter and exit the lobby of ... a clean halls Building. [The defendant was then arrested for trespass.] However, arresting Officer could not obtain a clean halls affidavit.

17. [I]n front of ... a Clean Halls building, [the arresting officer] observed defendant and several unapprehended individuals exit the lobby.... [The officer] approached defendant and asked defendant if he knew anyone in above-mentioned location and defendant stated in sum and substance: NO. I’M JUST LOOKING FOR MY FRIEND [redacted], NO [redacted] DOESN’T LIVE HERE. [The defendant was then arrested for trespass.]

*54818. [Defendant was observed entering and exiting the lobby of [a Clean Halls building].

Arresting officer asked defendant what he was doing in the building and defendant stated in sum and substance I WAS IN THE BUILDING LOOKING FOR WORK. Arresting officer asked defendant what kind of work he was looking for and defendant stated in sum and substance I WAS LOOKING FOR MY FRIEND [redacted]. Arresting officer asked defendant where his friend lived and defendant stated in sum- and substance I DON’T KNOW WHERE HE LIVES. [The defendant was then arrested for trespass.]

19. Arresting officer observed defendant enter ... a clean halls building and observed defendant exit said building. Arresting officer approached and asked defendant, what were you doing in the building and defendant stated in sum and substance: I WAS THERE TO VISIT A FRIEND. I DON’T KNOW WHAT APARTMENT THEY LIVE IN. [The officer then searched the defendant, found crack-cocaine and a pipe, and arrested defendant in part for trespass.]

20. The arresting officer ... observed defendant exiting the lobby of ... a Clean Halls Apartment Building. The arresting officer stopped defendant and defendant clenched his fists on his sides and spread his feet apart and ... stated in sum and substance YOU’RE NOT GOING TO TOUCH ME. YOU’RE NOT GOING TO TOUCH ME. YOU’RE NOT PUTTING YOUR HANDS ON ME. [The arresting officer then handcuffed defendant and placed him in the patrol vehicle.]

21. [Defendant was observed entering the above location, a Clean Halls Apartment building, and was also observed exiting said location minutes later. Arresting police officer ... asked defendant if he lived in the building and defendant stated in sum and substance, I’M NOT THERE, I’M IN [redacted]. [The defendant was then arrested for trespass.]

22. Arresting Officer observed the defendant exit the lobby of ... a Clean Halls Apartment Building. Arresting officer approached defendant and asked him, do you live in the building, do you know anyone in the building, what apartment does your friend live [in], what is his name[,] to which defendant stated in sum and substance: ... NO I DON’T, YES I’M VISITING MY FRIEND ON THE [redacted] FLOOR, NO I’M NOT GOING TO GIVE YOU MY FRIEND’S NAME. [The officer then patted down the defendant and arrested him in part for trespass.]

23. Arresting officer observed defendant enter ... a clean halls building and observed defendant exit said building. Arresting officer approached and asked defendant, what were you doing in the building and do you know anyone in the building and defendant stated in sum and substance: NO, I DON’T KNOW ANYONE AND I WENT TO BUY DRUGS. [The defendant was then arrested in part for trespass.]

24. The Arresting Officer states that ... he observed defendant exiting ... a Clean Halls Apartment Building. The Arresting Officer approached defendant and asked defendant if he lives in the building and defendant stated in sum and substance: NO. The Arresting Officer further asked the defendant where are you coming from and defendant stated in sum and substance: I’M COMING FROM THE [redacted] FLOOR. The Arresting Officer asked the defendant what apartment are you coming from and defendant stated in sum and substance: I DON’T KNOW THE APARTMENT NUMBER BUT I’LL SHOW IT TO YOU. [The officer went with the defendant to the apartment. *549No one answered the door. The defendant was arrested for trespass.]

25. Arresting Officer observed the defendant enter and exit the lobby of ... a Clean Halls Building. Arresting Officer told defendant that he observed him enter said building along with separately apprehended [redacted] ... and separately apprehended stated in sum and substance WE WERE IN THE BUILDING. Arresting Officer then asked separately apprehended and defendant what apartment they were visiting, and neither defendant nor separately apprehended provided a response. [The defendant was then arrested for trespass.]

... [T]he Arresting Officer did not observe defendant to go beyond the public vestibule of said building, nor did defendant admit to being inside of said building, beyond the public vestibule.

26. The arresting officer states that ... inside of ... a Clean Halls Building, she observed defendant and separately apprehended [redacted] enter the lobby of said location and exit shortly thereafter. Arresting officer stopped defendant and asked him if he lived in the building and defendant stated in sum and substance I DON’T LIVE IN THE BUILDING. Arresting officer asked defendant what he was doing in the building and defendant stated in sum and substance I WAS WAITING FOR A FRIEND. Arresting officer asked defendant for the name of the person he was waiting for and defendant did not reply. Arresting officer asked defendant for his identification and defendant was unable to produce one at which time arresting officer attempted to handcuff defendant and defendant ran.

*550APPENDIX B

Blank UF-250 Form

KENNETH A. MARRA, United States District Judge

This cause is before the Court upon Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (DE 361); the United States's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (DE 408); Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2's Motion to Compel Answers (DE 348) and Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2's Motion for Finding Waiver of Work Product and Similar Protections by Government and for Production of Documents (DE 414). The Motions are fully briefed and ripe for review. The Court has carefully considered the Motions and is otherwise fully advised in the premises.

I. Background

The facts, as culled from affidavits, exhibits, depositions, answers to interrogatories and reasonably inferred, for the purpose of these motions, are as follows:

From between about 1999 and 2007, Jeffrey Epstein sexually abused more than 30 minor girls, including Petitioners Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2 (hereinafter, "Petitioners"), at his mansion in Palm Beach, Florida, and elsewhere in the United States and overseas. (Government Resp. to Petitioner's Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (hereinafter, "DE 407" at ¶ 1.) Because Epstein and his co-conspirators knowingly traveled in interstate and international commerce to sexually abuse Jane Doe 1, Jane Doe 2 and others, they committed violations of not only Florida law, but also federal law. (DE 407 at ¶ 2.) In addition to his own sexual abuse of the victims, Epstein directed other persons to abuse the girls sexually. (DE 407 at ¶ 3.) Epstein used paid employees to find and bring minor girls to him. Epstein worked in concert with others to obtain minors not only for his own sexual gratification, but also for the sexual gratification of others. (DE 407 at ¶ 8.)

In 2005, the Town of Palm Beach Police Department ("PBPD") received a complaint from the parents of a 14 year old girl about her sexual abuse by Jeffery Epstein. The PBPD ultimately identified approximately 20 girls between the ages of 14 and 17 who were sexually abused by *1205Epstein. (DE 407 at ¶ 4.) In 2006, at the request of the PBPD, the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") opened an investigation into allegations that Epstein and his personal assistants used the facilities of interstate commerce to induce girls between the ages of 14 and 17 to engage in illegal sexual activities. (DE 407 at ¶ 5.) The FBI ultimately determined that both Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2 were victims of sexual abuse by Epstein while they were minors. Jane Doe 1 provided information about her abuse and Jane Doe 2's abuse to the FBI on August 7, 2007. (DE 407 at ¶ 6.)

From January of 2007 through September of 2007, discussions took place between the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida ("the Office") and Jeffrey Epstein's attorneys. (DE 407 at ¶ 9.) On February 1, 2007, Epstein's defense team sent a 24-page letter to the Office going over what they intended to present during a meeting at the Office the same day. (DE 407 at ¶ 10.)

By March 15, 2007, the Office was sending letters to victims informing them of their rights pursuant to the Crime Victims' Rights Act ("CVRA"). (DE 407 at ¶ 11.) By May of 2007, the Office had drafted an 82-page prosecution memorandum and a 53-page indictment outlining numerous federal sexual offenses committed by Epstein. (DE 407 at ¶ 12.) On or about June 7, 2007, FBI agents had delivered to Jane Doe 1 a standard CVRA victim notification letter.1 The notification letter promised that the Justice Department would make its "best efforts" to protect Jane Doe 1's rights, including "the reasonable right to confer with the attorney for the United States in the case" and "to be reasonably heard at any public proceeding in the district court involving [a] ... plea." The notification further stated that, "[a]t this time, your case is under investigation." (DE 407 at ¶ 13.) Jane Doe 1 relied on those representations and believed that the Government would protect those rights and keep her informed about the progress of her case. (DE 407 at ¶ 14.)

On July 6, 2007, Epstein's lawyers sent a 23-page letter lodging numerous arguments to persuade the Office that no federal crimes had been committed by him. (DE 407 at ¶ 15.) By August 3, 2007, the Government had rejected Epstein's various arguments against federal charges and sent a letter to Epstein's counsel stating, "[w]e would reiterate that the agreement to Section 2255 [a civil restitution provision] liability applies to all of the minor girls identified during the federal investigation, not just the 12 that form the basis of an initial planned charging instrument." (DE 407 at ¶ 17.) On September 10, 2007, multiple drafts of a non-prosecution agreement ("NPA") had been exchanged between Epstein's counsel and the Office. (DE 407 at ¶ 18.)

On September 12, 2007, while attempting to create alternative charges against Epstein, the Office expressed concern *1206about "the effect of taking the position that Mr. Epstein's house is in the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States" because the Government had "no evidence of any assaults occurring either on Mr. Epstein's plane or offshore from his residence." (DE 407 at ¶ 19.) On September 13, 2007, the line prosecutor emailed Epstein's counsel indicating an effort to come up with a solution to the aforementioned concern and she stated that she had been "spending some quality time with Title 18 looking for misdemeanors." The line prosecutor further indicated, "I know that someone mentioned there being activity on an airplane. I just want to make sure that there is a factual basis for the plea that the agents can confirm." Epstein's counsel responded, "[a]lready thinking about the same statutes." (DE 407 at ¶ 20.)

On September 14, 2007, after having spoken on the telephone about the subject matter of the September 13 emails, Epstein's counsel and the line prosecutor exchanged emails including a proposed plea agreement for Epstein to plead guilty to assaulting one of his coconspirators. (DE 407 at ¶ 21.) On September 15, 2007, the line prosecutor sent an email to the Epstein defense team raising concerns about a resolution that would not involve one of Epstein's minor victims and stating:

I have gotten some negative reaction to the assault charge with [a co-conspirator] as the victim, since she is considered one of the main perpetrators of the offenses that we planned to charge in the indictment. Can you talk to Mr. Epstein about a young woman named [Jane Doe]? We have hearsay evidence that she traveled on Mr. Epstein's airplane when she was under 18, in around the 2000 or 2001 time frame.

(DE 407 at ¶ 22.)

On September 16, 2007, the line prosecutor corresponded with Epstein's counsel about having Epstein plead guilty to obstruction of justice for pressuring one of his co-conspirators not to turn over evidence or complying with a previously-served grand jury subpoena. (DE 407 at ¶ 23.) The Office also stated, "On an 'avoid the press' note, I believe that Mr. Epstein's airplane was in Miami on the day of the [co-conspirator] telephone call. If he was in Miami-Dade County at the time, then I can file the charge in the District Court in Miami, which will hopefully cut the press coverage significantly." They also discussed having Epstein plead guilty to a second charge of assaulting a different co-conspirator. (DE 407 at ¶ 24.)

On September 16, 2007, the line prosecutor wrote to Epstein's counsel indicating that the Office did not like the factual basis for the proposed charges as the Office was "not investigating Mr. Epstein [for] abusing his girlfriend." (DE 407 at ¶ 25.) The correspondence further stated:

Andy [i.e., AUSA Andrew Laurie] recommended that some of the timing issues be addressed only in the state agreement, so that it isn't obvious to the judge that we are trying to create federal jurisdiction for prison purposes.

I will include our standard language regarding resolving all criminal liability and I will mention 'co-conspirators,' but I would prefer not to highlight for the judge all of the other crimes and all of the other persons that we could charge. Also, we do not have the power to bind Immigration ... there is no plan to try to proceed on any immigration charges against either Ms. [co-conspirator] or Ms. [coconspirator]

(Ex. 7, DE 361-7.)

In the same email, the line prosecutor wrote to defense counsel about a meeting outside the U.S. Attorney's Office: "Maybe *1207we can set a time to meet. If you want to meet 'off campus' somewhere, that is fine." (DE 407 at ¶ 27.) On about September 16, 2007, Epstein's counsel provided a proposed NPA to the Government that extended immunity from federal prosecution not only to Epstein, but also to certain co-conspirators. (DE 407 at ¶ 28.)

On September 17, 2007, the line prosecutor wrote to defense counsel Jay Lefkowitz: "Please send [a document] to my home e-mail address - [redacted] and give me a call on my cell [redacted] so I can be ready for some discussions tomorrow." (DE 407 at ¶ 29.) On September 17, 2007, Lefkowitz responded: "[D]o you have another obstruction proffer I can review that you have drafted? Also, if we go that route, would you intend to make the deferred prosecution agreement public?" (DE 407 at ¶ 30.)

On September 18, 2007, the Office responded: "A non-prosecution agreement would not be made public or filed with the Court, but it would remain part of our case file. It probably would be subject to a FOIA request, but it is not something that we would distribute without compulsory process." (DE 407 at ¶ 31.) On September 20, 2007, the U.S. Attorney's Office wrote: "On the issue about 18 USC 2255, we seem to be miles apart. Your most recent version not only had me binding the girls to a trust fund administered by the state court, but also promising that they will give up their 2255 rights.... In the context of a non-prosecution agreement, the office may be more willing to be specific about not pursuing charges against others." (DE 407 at ¶ 32.)

On September 21, 2007, Palm Beach County State Attorney Barry Krischer wrote the line prosecutor about the proposed agreement and added: "Glad we could get this worked out for reasons I won't put in writing. After this is resolved I would love to buy you a cup at Starbucks and have a conversation." (DE 407 at ¶ 33.) On September 21, 2007, the line prosecutor emailed Epstein's counsel stating, "I think that the attached addresses the concerns about having an unlimited number of claimed victims, without me trying to bind girls whom I do not represent." (DE 407 at ¶ 34.) On September 23, 2007, the U.S. Attorney's Office sent an email to Lefkowitz stating: "It is factually accurate that the list we are going to give you are persons we have identified as victims. If we did not think they were victims, they would have no right to bring suit." (DE 407 at ¶ 35.)

On September 24, 2007, the line prosecutor sent an e-mail to a prospective representative for the Epstein victims, entitled "Conflict Check." The email confirmed the girls' status as victims, stating: "Please keep this confidential because these are minor victims. This is a preliminary list." Later on September 24, 2007, the line prosecutor sent an email to Lefkowitz stating: "I have compiled a list of 34 confirmed minors." (DE 407 at ¶ 36.) As correspondence continued on September 24, 2007, and the NPA was being executed, Lefkowitz sent an email to the line prosecutor stating: "Marie - Please do whatever you can to keep this [i.e., the NPA] from becoming public." (DE 407 at ¶ 37.)

On September 24, 2007, Epstein and the Office formally reached an agreement whereby the United States would defer federal prosecution in favor of prosecution by the State of Florida. Epstein and the Office accordingly entered into a NPA reflecting such an agreement. (DE 407 at ¶ 38.) The NPA provided that "the United States, in consultation with and subject to the good faith approval of Epstein's counsel, shall select an attorney representative for [the victims], who shall be paid for by Epstein." The NPA also provided that if *1208any of the victims elected to bring suit under 18 U.S.C. § 2255, they must agree to waive any other claim for damages. As part of the NPA, Epstein would not contest the jurisdiction of the United States District Court and waived his right to contest liability and damages. (NPA, DE 361-62.)

Among other provisions, the NPA expanded immunity to any "potential coconspirator" of Epstein's: "In consideration of Epstein's agreement to plead guilty and to provide compensation in the manner described above, if Epstein successfully fulfills all of the terms and conditions of this agreement, the United States also agrees that it will not institute any criminal charges against any potential co-conspirators of Epstein, including but not limited to Sarah Kellen, Adriana Ross, Lesley Groff, or Nadia Marcinkova." (DE 407 at ¶ 40.) The NPA also provided that: "The parties anticipate that this agreement will not be made part of any public record. If the United States receives a Freedom of Information Act request or any compulsory process commanding the disclosure of the agreement, it will provide notice to Epstein before making that disclosure." (DE 407 at ¶ 41.)

From the time the FBI began investigating Epstein until September 24, 2007-when the NPA was concluded-the Office never conferred with the victims about a NPA or told the victims that such an agreement was under consideration. (Marie Villafaña Decl. ¶ 7, DE 361-64; DE 407 at ¶ 43.) Many, if not all, other similarly-situated victims received standard CVRA victim notification letters substantively identical to those sent to Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2. (DE 407 at ¶ 44.) The Office did not consult or confer with any of the victims about the NPA before it was signed. (DE 407 at ¶¶ 45-46.)

Epstein's counsel was aware that the Office was deliberately keeping the NPA secret from the victims and, indeed, had sought assurances to that effect. (DE 407 at ¶ 48.) After the NPA was signed, Epstein's counsel and the Office began negotiations about whether the victims would be told about the NPA. (DE 407 at ¶ 49.) It was a deviation from the Government's standard practice to negotiate with defense counsel about the extent of crime victim notifications. (DE 407 at ¶ 50.)

On September 24, 2007, the Office sent an email to Lefkowitz:

Thank you, Jay. I have forwarded your message only to [United States Attorney] Alex [Acosta], Andy, and Roland. I don't anticipate it going any further than that. When I receive the originals, I will sign and return one copy to you. The other will be placed in the case file, which will be kept confidential since it also contains identifying information about the girls.

When we reach an agreement about the attorney representative for the girls, we can discuss what I can tell him and the girls about the agreement. I know that Andy promised Chief Reiter an update when a resolution was achieved.... Rolando is calling, but Rolando knows not to tell Chief Reiter about the money issue, just about what crimes Mr. Epstein is pleading guilty to and the amount of time that has been agreed to. Rolando also is telling Chief Reiter not to disclose the outcome to anyone.

(DE 407 at ¶ 52.)

On September 25, 2007, the line prosecutor sent an e-mail to Lefkowitz stating: "And can we have a conference call to discuss what I may disclose to ... the girls regarding the agreement." (DE 407 at ¶ 53.) Also on September 25, 2007, the line prosecutor sent an email to Lefkowitz which stated in part: "They [Ted Babbitt, *1209Stuart Grossman, Chris Searcy, [L]ake Lytal] are all very good personal injury lawyers, but I have concerns about whether there would be an inherent tension because they may feel that THEY might make more money (and get a lot more press coverage) if they proceed outside the Terms of the plea agreement. (Sorry - I just have a bias against plaintiffs' attorneys.) One nice thing about Bert is that he is in Miami where there has been almost no coverage of this case." (DE 407 at ¶ 54.)

On September 26, 2007, the line prosecutor sent an e-mail to Lefkowitz in which she stated: "Hi Jay - Can you give me a call at 561-[xxx-xxxx] this morning? I am meeting with the agents and want to give them their marching orders regarding what they can tell the girls." (DE 407 at ¶ 55.) On September 27, 2007, the attorney representative for the victims emailed the Office and asked whether he could get a copy of the indictment or plea agreement to find out "exactly what Epstein concedes to in the civil case." (Sept. 27, 2007 email, DE 362-2.) Upon inquiry from the Office, Lefkowitz responded by stating that the attorney representative "certainly [ ] should not get a copy of any indictment." (DE 407 at ¶ 57.) That same day, the line prosecutor informed Epstein's counsel of concerns raised by the attorney representative for the girls. Specifically, "[t]he concern is, if all 40 girls decide they want to sue, they don't want to be in a situation where Mr. Epstein says this is getting too expensive, we won't pay anymore attorneys' fees." (DE 407 at ¶ 58.)

Also on that same day, the line prosecutor sent an email to state prosecutors Lanna Belohlavek and Barry Krischer: "Can you let me know when Mr. Epstein is going to enter his guilty plea and what judge that will be in front of? I know the agents and I would really like to be there, 'incognito.' " (DE 407 at ¶ 59.)

On October 3, 2007, the Office sent a proposed letter that would have gone to a special master for selecting an attorney representative for the victims under the NPA's compensation procedure. The letter described the facts of the Epstein case as follows: "Mr. Epstein, through his assistants, would recruit underage females to travel to his home in Palm Beach to engage in lewd conduct in exchange for money. Based upon the investigation, the United States has identified 40 young women who can be characterized as victims pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2255. Some of those women went to Mr. Epstein's home only once, some went there as many as 100 times or more. Some of the women's conduct was limited to performing a topless or nude massage while Mr. Epstein masturbated himself. For other women, the conduct escalated to full sexual intercourse." (DE 407 at ¶ 60.)

On October 10, 2007, Lefkowitz sent a letter to U.S. Attorney Alex Acosta stating, in pertinent part: "Neither federal agents nor anyone from your Office should contact the identified individuals to inform them of the resolution of the case, including appointment of the attorney representative and the settlement process. Not only would that violate the confidentiality of the agreement, but Mr. Epstein also will have no control over what is communicated to the identified individuals at this most critical stage. We believe it is essential that we participate in crafting mutually acceptable communication to the identified individuals." The letter further proposed that the attorney representative for the victims be instructed that "[t]he details regarding the United States's investigation of this matter and its resolution with Mr. Epstein is confidential. You may not make public statements regarding this matter." (DE 407 at ¶ 61.)

*1210U.S. Attorney Acosta then met with Lefkowitz for breakfast and Lefkowitz followed up with a letter stating, "I also want to thank you for the commitment you made to me during our October 12 meeting in which you ... assured me that your Office would not ... contact any of the identified individuals, potential witnesses, or potential civil claimants and their respective counsel in this matter." (DE 407 at ¶ 63.)

On October 24, 2007, AUSA Jeff Sloman sent a letter to Jay Lefkowitz, proposing an addendum to the NPA clarifying the procedures for the third-party representative for the victims under the NPA's compensation provisions. (DE 407 at ¶ 64.) On October 25, 2007, AUSA Sloman sent a letter to Retired Judge Davis about selecting an attorney to represent the victims under the NPA's compensation procedure. (DE 407 at ¶ 65.)

On about October 26 or 27, 2007, Special Agents E. Nesbitt Kuyrkendall and Jason Richards met in person with Jane Doe 1. They explained that Epstein would plead guilty to state charges, he would be required to register as a sex offender for life, and he had made certain concessions related to the payment of damages. (DE 407 at ¶ 70.) According to Jane Doe 1, the Agents did not explain that the NPA had already been signed. (Jane Doe 1 Decl. ¶ 5, DE 361-26.) Jane Doe 1's understanding was that the federal investigation would continue. (Jane Doe 1 Decl. ¶ 6.) In contrast, Special Agent Kuyrkendall stated that the meeting with Jane Doe 1 was to advise her of the main terms of the NPA.2 (Kuykendall Decl. ¶ 8, DE 403-18.) After the meeting, Special Agent Kuyrkendall became concerned about what would happen if Epstein breached the NPA, and thought that if the victims were aware of the NPA, the provision about monetary damages could be grounds for impeachment of the victims and herself. (Kuykendall Decl. ¶ 9.) According to Special Agent Kuyrkendall, the investigation of Epstein continued through 2008. (Kuykendall Decl. ¶ 11.)

In addition to Jane Doe 1, FBI agents only talked to two other victims out of the 34 identified victims about the "general terms" of the NPA, including the provision providing a federal civil remedy to the victims. (DE 407 at ¶ 76.) After these meetings with three victims, Epstein's defense team complained. (DE 407 at ¶ 77.)

On about November 27, 2007, AUSA Sloman sent an e-mail to Lefkowitz, (with a copy to U.S. Attorney Acosta) stating that the Office had a statutory obligation to notify the victims about Epstein's plea to state charges that was part of the NPA:

The United States has a statutory obligation (Justice for All Act of 2004) to notify the victims of the anticipated upcoming events and their rights associated with the agreement entered into by the United States and Mr. Epstein in a timely fashion. Tomorrow will make one full week since you were formally notified of the selection. I must insist that the vetting process come to an end. Therefore, unless you provide me with a good faith objection to Judge Davis's selection [as special master for selecting legal counsel for victims pursuing claims against Epstein] by COB tomorrow, November 28, 2007, I will authorize the notification of the victims. Should you give me the go-head on [victim representative] ... selection by COB tomorrow, I will simultaneously send you a draft of the letter. I intend to notify the victims *1211by letter after COB Thursday, November 29th.

(DE 407 at ¶ 79.)

On November 28, 2007, the Government sent an email to Lefkowitz attaching a letter dated November 29, 2007 (the apparent date upon which it was intended to be mailed) and explained that "I am writing to inform you that the federal investigation of Jeffrey Epstein has been completed, and Mr. Epstein and the U.S. Attorney's Office have reached an agreement containing the following terms." The proposed letter then spelled out a number of the provisions in the NPA, including that because Epstein's plea of guilty to state charges was "part of the resolution of the federal investigation," the victims were "entitled to be present and to make a statement under oath at the state sentencing." (DE 407 at ¶ 80.)

On November 29, 2007, Lefkowitz sent a letter to U.S. Attorney Acosta objecting to the proposed victim notification letter, stating that it is inappropriate for any letter to be sent to the victims before Epstein entered his plea or had been sentenced. Lefkowitz also told the Government that the victims should not be invited to the state sentencing, that they should not be encouraged to contact law enforcement officials, and that encouraging the attorney representative to do anything other than get paid by Epstein to settle the cases was to encourage an ethical conflict. (DE 407 at ¶ 82.)

On about November 30, 2007, U.S. Attorney Acosta sent a letter to one of Epstein's defense attorneys, Kenneth Starr, stating: "I am directing our prosecutors not to issue victim notification letters until this Friday at 5 p.m., to provide you with time to review these options with your client." The letter also explained that the line prosecutor had informed U.S. Attorney Acosta "that the victims were not told of the availability of Section 2255 relief during the investigation phase of this matter" despite the fact that the "[r]ule of law ... now requires this District to consider the victims' rights under this statute in negotiating this Agreement." (DE 407 at ¶ 83.) On December 5, 2007, Starr sent a letter to U.S. Attorney Acosta (with copy to AUSA Sloman) asking about issuance of victim notification letters and stating: "While we believe that it is wholly inappropriate for your Office to send this letter under any circumstances, it is certainly inappropriate to issue this letter without affording us the right to review it." (DE 407 at ¶ 85.)

On about December 6, 2007, AUSA Sloman sent a letter to Lefkowitz stating in part:

[E]ach of the listed individuals are persons whom the Office identified as victims. [T]he Office is prepared to indict Mr. Epstein based upon Mr. Epstein's 'interactions' with these individuals. This conclusion is based upon a thorough and proper investigation - one in which none of the victims was informed of any right to receive damages of any amount prior to the investigation of her claim.

[T]he Office can say, without hesitation, that the evidence demonstrates that each person on the list was a victim of Mr. Epstein's criminal behavior.

Finally, let me address your objections to the draft Victim Notification Letter. You write that you don't understand the basis for the Office's belief that it is appropriate to notify the victims. Pursuant to the 'Justice for All Act of 2004,' crime victims are entitled to: 'The right to reasonable, accurate, and timely notice of any public court proceeding ... involving the crime' and the 'right not to be excluded from any such public court proceeding....' 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(2) & (3). Section 3771 also commands that *1212'employees of the Department of Justice ... engaged in the detection, investigation, or prosecution of crime shall make their best efforts to see that crime victims are notified of, and accorded, the rights described in subsection (a).' 18 U.S.C. § 3771(c)(1)....

With respect to notification of the other information that we propose to disclose, the statute requires that we provide a victim with the earliest possible notice of: the status of the investigation, the filing of charges against a suspected offender, and the acceptance of a plea. 42 U.S.C. 10607(c)(3). Just as in 18 U.S.C. 3771, these sections are not limited to proceedings in a federal district court. Our Non-Prosecution Agreement resolves the federal investigation by allowing Mr. Epstein to plead to a state offense. The victims identified through the federal investigation should be appropriately informed, and our Non-Prosecution Agreement does not require the U.S. Attorney's Office to forego its legal obligations. [T]he Office believes that it has proof beyond a reasonable doubt that each listed individual was a victim of Mr. Epstein's criminal conduct while the victim was a minor. The law requires us to treat all victims "with fairness and with respect for the victim's dignity and privacy." 18 U.S.C. 3771(a)(8).

The letter included a footnote stating: "Unlike the State's investigation, the federal investigation shows criminal conduct by Mr. Epstein at least as early as 2001, so all of the victims were minors at the time of the offense." (DE 407 at ¶ 83.)

On December 7, 2007, defense attorney Lilly Ann Sanchez sent a letter to AUSA Sloman, requesting "that the Office hold off on sending any victim notification letters." No letters were sent in December of 2007. (DE 407 at ¶ 88.) On December 13, 2007, the line prosecutor sent a letter to Lefkowitz stating that "You raised objections to any victim notification, and no further notifications were done." (DE 407 at ¶ 89.) On December 19, 2007, U.S. Attorney Acosta sent a letter to Lilly Ann Sanchez stating, "I understand that the defense objects to the victims being given notice of time and place of Mr. Epstein's state court sentencing hearing. We intend to provide victims with notice of the federal resolution, as required by law. We will defer to the discretion of the State Attorney regarding whether he wishes to provide victims with notices of the state proceedings. (DE 407 at ¶ 90.)

In January of 2008, any requirement that Epstein carry out his obligations under the NPA was delayed while he sought higher level review within the Justice Department. (DE 407 at ¶ 92.) On January 10, 2008, Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2 were sent victim notification letters from the FBI advising them that "[t]his case is currently under investigation. This can be a lengthy process and we request your continued patience while we conduct a thorough investigation." (DE 407 at ¶ 93.) The January 10, 2008 notification letters did not disclose that the Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2 case in the Southern District of Florida was the subject of the NPA entered into by Epstein and the Office, or that there had been any potentially binding resolution. (DE 407 at ¶ 94.) Other victims received the same letters as sent to Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2. (DE 407 at ¶ 95.)

According to the declaration of Jane Doe 1, she believed that criminal prosecution of Epstein was important and she wanted to be consulted by prosecutors before any resolution. Based on the letters received, she believed the Government would contact her before reaching any final resolution. (Jane Doe 1 Decl. ¶ 9.) On January 31, 2008, Jane Doe 1 met with FBI Agents *1213and an AUSA from the U.S. Attorney's Office. She provided additional details of Epstein's sexual abuse of her. The AUSA did not disclose to Jane Doe 1 at this meeting that they had already negotiated a NPA with Epstein. (DE 407 at ¶ 97.) According to the declaration of Jane Doe 2, while she recognizes she did not initially help the investigation, she later tried to cooperate with the investigation but was never given an opportunity to cooperate with the investigation.3 (Jane Doe 2 Decl. ¶¶ 13-14, DE 361-27.)

On March 19, 2008, the line prosecutor sent a lengthy email to a prospective pro bono attorney for one of Epstein's victims who had been subpoenaed to appear at a deposition. The email listed the attorneys representing Epstein, the targets of the investigation, and recounted in detail the investigation that had been conducted to that point. The email did not reveal the fact that Epstein had signed the NPA in September 2007. (DE 407 at ¶ 98.)

On May 30, 2008, Jane Doe 5, who was recognized as an Epstein victim by the Office, received a letter from the FBI advising her that "[t]his case is currently under investigation. This can be a lengthy process and we request your continued patience while we conduct a thorough investigation." (DE 407 at ¶ 99.) The May 30, 2008 victim letter to Jane Doe 5 also acknowledged the victims' rights under the CVRA. (DE 407 at ¶ 100.)

In mid-June of 2008, Mr. Bradley Edwards, the attorney for Petitioners, contacted the line prosecutor to inform her that he represented Jane Doe 1 and, later, Jane Doe 2. Edwards asked to meet to provide information about the federal crimes committed by Epstein against these victims. The line prosecutor and Edwards discussed the possibility of federal charges being filed in the future. Edwards was led to believe federal charges could still be filed, with no mention whatsoever of the existence of the NPA or any other possible resolution to the case. (DE 407 at ¶ 101.)

At the end of the call, the line prosecutor asked Edwards to send any information that he wanted considered by the Office in determining whether to file federal charges. The line prosecutor did not inform Edwards about the NPA. (DE 407 at ¶ 102.) On June 19, 2008, Edwards sent an email to the line prosecutor requesting to meet and discuss plans. (DE 407 at ¶ 103.)

On June 23, 2008, the line prosecutor sent an email to Lefkowitz stating that the Deputy Attorney General had completed his review of the Epstein matter and "determined that federal prosecution of Mr. Epstein's case [wa]s appropriate. Accordingly, Mr. Epstein ha[d] until the close of business on Monday, June 30, 2008, to comply with the terms and conditions of the agreement between the United States and Mr. Epstein." (DE 407 at ¶ 105.)

On or about June 27, 2008, the Office called Edwards to provide notice to his clients regarding the entry of Epstein's guilty plea in state court. (DE 407 at ¶ 107.) According to Edwards, the line *1214prosecutor only told him that Epstein was pleading guilty to state solicitation of prostitution. He was not told that the state plea was related to the federal investigation or that the state plea would resolve the federal crimes. Edwards claims he was not told his clients could address the state court. (Edwards Decl. ¶¶ 17-18, DE 416-1.) In contrast, the line prosecutor claims she told Edwards that his clients could address the state court. (Villafaña Decl. ¶ 38, DE 403-19.)

On or before June 30, 2008, the Office prepared a draft victim notification to be sent to the victims. The notification was designed to inform the victims of the provisions of the deferral of federal prosecution in favor of state charges. The notification letter began by describing Epstein's guilty plea in the past tense: "On June 30, 2008, Jeffrey Epstein ... entered a plea of guilty to violations of Florida statutes forbidding the solicitation of minors to engage in prostitution and felony solicitation of prostitution." Later, a substantively identical letter was prepared for Epstein's and his counsel's review. (DE 407 at ¶ 110.)

On June 30, 2008, the Office sent an e-mail to Epstein's counsel: "The FBI has received several calls regarding the Non-Prosecution Agreement. I do not know whether the title of the document was disclosed when the Agreement was filed under seal, but the FBI and our office are declining comment if asked." (DE 407 at ¶ 111.) That same day, Epstein pled guilty to state law solicitation of prostitution charges. (DE 407 at ¶ 112.) Immediately following the June 30, 2008 hearing, the line prosecutor told one of the victims' attorneys that Epstein had "pled guilty today in state court." (DE 407 at ¶ 113.) Also after the plea, the line prosecutor emailed the assistant state attorney a copy of the NPA to be filed under seal. (July 1, 2008 email, DE 362-38.)

On June 30, 2008, based on what she had been told by the Government, Jane Doe 1 thought that the Office was still investigating and pursuing her case. She did not receive notice that Epstein's state guilty plea affected her rights in any way. If she had been told that the state plea had some connection to blocking the prosecution of her case, she would have attended and tried to object to the judge to prevent that plea from going forward. (Jane Doe 1 Decl. ¶ 13.) According to the line prosecutor, Edwards did not tell her that Jane Doe 1 wanted to meet with her before a resolution was reached. (Villafaña Decl. ¶ 37, DE 403-19.)

On July 3, 2008, as specifically directed by the Office, Edwards sent a letter to the Office communicating the wishes of Jane Doe 1, Jane Doe 2, and Jane Doe 5 that federal charges be filed against Epstein: "We urge the Attorney General and our United States Attorney to consider the fundamental import of the vigorous enforcement of our Federal laws. We urge you to move forward with the traditional indictments and criminal prosecution commensurate with the crimes Mr. Epstein has committed, and we further urge you to take the steps necessary to protect our children from this very dangerous sexual predator." (DE 407 at ¶ 118.)

On July 7, 2008, the line prosecutor corresponded with Epstein's counsel seeking his signed agreement concerning a notification letter to the victims before beginning the distribution of that letter. (DE 407 at ¶ 120.) That same day, Jane Doe 1 filed an emergency petition for enforcement of her rights under the CVRA. (DE 407 at ¶ 126.) On July 9, 2008, Edwards saw the first reference to the NPA when the Government filed its responsive pleading to Jane Doe's emergency petition. (Edwards Decl. ¶ 21.)

*1215On July 8, 2008, the line prosecutor sent a letter to Epstein's counsel stating that victims would be informed about the civil compensation provision of the NPA the next day:

In accordance with the terms of the Non-Prosecution Agreement, on June 30, 2008, the United States Attorney's Office provided you with a list of thirty-one individuals "whom it was prepared to name in an Indictment as victims of an enumerated offense by Mr. Epstein." ... In deference to your vacation, we allowed you a week to provide us with any objections or requested modifications of the list and/or the Notification language. Yesterday, I contacted you via telephone and e-mail, but received no response. Accordingly, the United States hereby notifies you that it will distribute the victim notifications tomorrow, July 9, 2008, to each of the thirty-two identified victims, either directly or via their counsel.

(DE 407 at ¶ 127.)

On July 9, 2008, Epstein's counsel sent a letter to the line prosecutor raising concerns about the notifications, and suggesting modifications to the notification letter. Epstein's counsel also objected to the victim notification letters containing certain information about the NPA. (DE 407 at ¶ 128.) The line prosecutor responded: "Without such an express Acknowledgment by Mr. Epstein that the notice contains the substance of that Agreement, I believe that the victims will have justification to petition for the entire agreement, which is contrary to the confidentiality clause that the parties have signed." (DE 407 at ¶ 129.) That same day, the U.S. Attorney's Office sent victim notification letters to Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 5, via their attorney, Edwards, and to other identified victims of Epstein. That notification contained a written explanation of some of the civil compensation provisions of the NPA. The notification did not provide the full terms of the NPA.

On July 10, 2008, Epstein's counsel continued to protest victim notification as evidenced by an email to the line prosecutor stating, "we respectfully request a reasonable opportunity to review and comment on a draft of the modified notification letter you intend to mail before you send it." (DE 407 at ¶ 131.)

On August 10, 2008, Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2 filed a motion seeking release of the NPA. (DE 407 at ¶ 136.) On August 14, 2008, the line prosecutor emailed Epstein's counsel stating that the court has "ordered us to make the Agreement available to the plaintiffs." (DE 407 at ¶ 141.)

On August 18, 2008, Lefkowitz wrote the line prosecutor that Epstein objected to disclosure of the terms of the NPA, but that Epstein would "cooperate with the government to reach an agreement as to substance of the notification to be sent to the government's list of individuals. Based on the Agreement, the information contained in the notification should be limited to (1) the language provided in the Agreement dealing with civil restitution (paragraphs 7-10) and (2) the contact information of the selected attorney representative. We object to the inclusion of additional information about the investigation of Mr. Epstein, the terms of the Agreement other than paragraphs 7-10 and the identity of other identified individuals." (DE 407 at ¶ 143.) On August 21, 2008, the Government sent a letter to Epstein's counsel stating that, "[c]opies of the victim notifications will continue to be provided to counsel for Mr. Epstein."

Jane Doe 2 was not informed of the contents of the NPA until August 28, 2008, when the line prosecutor provided a copy to Edwards. (DE 407 at ¶ 146.) On September 2, 2008, the line prosecutor sent an *1216email to Epstein's counsel stating, "I will start sending out the victim notifications today. In accordance with your request, I have changed the language regarding the victims' right to receive a copy of the Agreement." (DE 407 at ¶ 147.) On September 2 and 3, 2008, the Office sent to Jane Doe 1 and other identified victims amended notification letters, stating "the United States has agreed to defer federal prosecution in favor of this state plea and sentence." (Sept. 3, 2008 letter, DE 363-66; (DE 407 at ¶ 148.)

On September 16, 2008, attorney Jeffrey Herman, who represented several Epstein victims, wrote to the line prosecutor to object to the restitution procedures established in the NPA after learning that another attorney, established through the NPA, would be making unsolicited contacts to the victims. Mr. Herman explained that the notification letters were "misleading" because they referred generally to a waiver of "any other claim for damages," without informing them that this waiver might include a valuable punitive damages claim against an alleged billionaire. (DE 407 at ¶ 152.) On September 17, 2008, the line prosecutor sent an email to State Attorney Barry Krischer, explaining that the NPA "contain[ed] a confidentiality provision that require[ed] us to inform Mr. Epstein's counsel before making any disclosure." (DE 407 at ¶ 153.)

Around this same time period, Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2 filed actions in Palm Beach County, seeking money damages from Epstein from sexually abusing them. (Petitioners' Resp. to Gov't's Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (hereinafter "DE 415") at ¶¶ 8-9.) Eventually, they received monetary settlements of their lawsuits. (DE 415 at ¶ 12.)

In moving for summary judgment, the Petitioners make the following arguments in support of their contention that the Government violated their CVRA rights. The Government violated Petitioners' right to confer under the CVRA: (1) when the Government was negotiating and signing the NPA; (2) when the Government sent letters telling Petitioners to be patient while the Government completed its investigation and (3) when the Government did not tell the victims that the state plea would extinguish the federal case. Petitioners also claim the Government violated their right to be treated with fairness under the CVRA by concealing the negotiations of the NPA. Additionally, Petitioners contend the Government violated their rights to reasonable and accurate notice when it concealed that the NPA and the federal investigation were implicated in the state court proceeding.

In moving for and responding to summary judgment, the Government contends that there is no right to notice or conferral about a NPA; it was reasonable for the Government to send letters to victims while continuing to investigate the case because the Government could not assume that Epstein would plead guilty; and the line prosecutor contacted Petitioners' attorneys about the state court plea hearing. The Government also claims it did not violate the right to reasonable, accurate and timely notice because the CVRA does not create any right to notice of state court proceedings and, in any event, the Government gave notice. The Government asserts it did not treat the victims unfairly and used its best efforts to comply with the CVRA, including complying with the Attorney General's guidelines for victim assistance. Furthermore, the Government argues that Petitioners are equitably estopped from challenging the NPA because they relied upon the NPA in their state court civil actions against Epstein. Lastly, the Government contends that Petitioners are judicially estopped from challenging *1217the validity of the NPA because they have asserted mutually inconsistent positions; namely, that the NPA is invalid in federal court but was binding on Epstein in state court.

II. Summary Judgment Standard

The Court may grant summary judgment "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The stringent burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact lies with the moving party. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The Court should not grant summary judgment unless it is clear that a trial is unnecessary, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986), and any doubts in this regard should be resolved against the moving party. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970).

The movant "bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of [the record] which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. To discharge this burden, the movant must point out to the Court that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case. Id. at 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548.

After the movant has met its burden under Rule 56(a), the burden of production shifts and the nonmoving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). "A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by citing to particular parts of materials in the record ... or showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A) and (B).

Essentially, so long as the non-moving party has had an ample opportunity to conduct discovery, it must come forward with affirmative evidence to support its claim. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 257, 106 S.Ct. 2505. "A mere 'scintilla' of evidence supporting the opposing party's position will not suffice; there must be enough of a showing that the jury could reasonably find for that party." Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1577 (11th Cir. 1990). If the evidence advanced by the non-moving party "is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, then summary judgment may be granted." Anderson, 477 U.S. 242, 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

III. Discussion

The CVRA was designed to protect victims' rights and ensure their involvement in the criminal justice process. United States v. Moussaoui, 483 F.3d 220, 234 (4th Cir. 2007) ; Kenna v. U.S. Dist. Court, 435 F.3d 1011, 1016 (9th Cir. 2006) ("The [CVRA] was enacted to make crime victims full participants in the criminal justice system."). The statute enumerates the following ten rights:

(1) The right to be reasonably protected from the accused.

(2) The right to reasonable, accurate, and timely notice of any public court proceeding, or any parole proceeding, involving the crime or of any release or escape of the accused.

(3) The right not to be excluded from any such public court proceeding, unless *1218the court, after receiving clear and convincing evidence, determines that testimony by the victim would be materially altered if the victim heard other testimony at that proceeding.

(4) The right to be reasonably heard at any public proceeding in the district court involving release, plea, sentencing, or any parole proceeding.

(5) The reasonable right to confer with the attorney for the Government in the case.

(6) The right to full and timely restitution as provided in law.

(7) The right to proceedings free from unreasonable delay.

(8) The right to be treated with fairness and with respect for the victim's dignity and privacy.

(9) The right to be informed in a timely manner of any plea bargain or deferred prosecution agreement.

(10) The right to be informed of the rights under this section and the services described in section 503(c) of the Victims' Rights and Restitution Act of 1990 ( 42 U.S.C. 10607(c) ) and provided contact information for the Office of the Victims' Rights Ombudsman of the Department of Justice.

18 U.S.C. § 3771(a).

This Court previously held the following with respect to the CVRA: First, the rights under the CVRA attach before the Government brings formal charges against a defendant. Does v. United States, 817 F.Supp.2d 1337, 1341 (S.D. Fla. 2011). Second, the CVRA authorizes the rescission or "reopening" of a prosecutorial agreement, including a non-prosecution agreement, reached in violation of a prosecutor's conferral obligations under the statute. Doe v. United States, 950 F.Supp.2d 1262, 1267 (S.D. Fla. 2013). Third, section 3771(d)(5) of the CVRA authorizes the setting aside of pre-charge prosecutorial agreements, despite the fact that the particular statutory enforcement provision expressly refers to the reopening of a plea or sentence. Id. at 1267. Fourth, the "reasonable right to confer ... in the case" extends to the pre-charge state of criminal investigations and proceedings. Id. Fifth, the federal sex offense crimes involving minors allegedly committed by Epstein renders these Petitioners crime victims under the CVRA. Id. at 1269. Sixth, "questions pertaining to [the] equitable defense[s] are properly left for resolution after development of a full evidentiary record." Id. at 1269 n. 6.

Here, it is undisputed that the Government entered into a NPA with Epstein without conferring with Petitioners during its negotiation and signing. Instead, the Government sent letters to the victims requesting their "patience" with the investigation even after the Government entered into the NPA. At a bare minimum, the CVRA required the Government to inform Petitioners that it intended to enter into an agreement not to prosecute Epstein. Although the binding effect of the NPA was contingent upon Epstein pleading guilty to the state charges, that contingency was out of the control of the Government. The Government's hands were permanently tied if Epstein fulfilled his obligations under the NPA. Thus, Petitioners and the other victims should have been notified of the Government's intention to take that course of action before it bound itself under the NPA. Had the Petitioners been informed about the Government's intention to forego federal prosecution of Epstein in deference to him pleading guilty to state charges, Petitioners could have conferred with the attorney for the Government and provided input. In re Dean, 527 F.3d 391, 394 (5th Cir. 2008) (there are rights under *1219the CVRA including the "reasonable right to confer with the attorney for the Government"). Hence, the Government would have been able to "ascertain the victims' views on the possible details of the [non-prosecution agreement]." Id. Indeed, it is this type of communication between prosecutors and victims that was intended by the passage of the CVRA. See United States v. Heaton, 458 F.Supp.2d 1271 (D. Utah 2006) (government motion to dismiss charge of using facility of interstate commerce to entice minors to engage in unlawful sexual activity would not be granted until government consulted with victim); United States v. Ingrassia, No. CR-04-0455ADSJO, 2005 WL 2875220, at *17 n. 11 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2005) (Senate debate supports the view that the contemplated mechanism for victims to obtain information on which to base their input was conferral with the prosecutor concerning any critical stage or disposition of the case).

Particularly problematic was the Government's decision to conceal the existence of the NPA and mislead the victims to believe that federal prosecution was still a possibility.4 When the Government gives information to victims, it cannot be misleading. While the Government spent untold hours negotiating the terms and implications of the NPA with Epstein's attorneys, scant information was shared with victims. Instead, the victims were told to be "patient" while the investigation proceeded.

The Government, however, interprets the CVRA as only obligating the prosecutor to answer inquiries by a crime victim and does not impose a duty on the prosecutor to give notice about case developments, other than what is required in section 3771(a)(2). Such an interpretation is in direct contravention of the intent of the CVRA. See Ingrassia, 2005 WL 2875220, at *17 n.11 (Senate debate explaining the right to confer is "intended to be expansive" including the right of victim to confer "concerning any critical state of disposition of the case"). In any event, no meaningful conferral could take place as long as the Government chose to conceal the existence of the NPA from the victims.5

Nor does the Court agree with the Government that the 2015 amendment to the CVRA, section 3771(a)(9), which gave victims the "right to be informed in a timely manner of any plea bargain or deferred prosecution agreement" specifically excluded the right of victims to be informed of a non-prosecution agreement. Prior to this amendment, this Court held that the right to confer extended to the pre-charge state of criminal investigations and proceedings. Doe, 950 F.Supp.2d at 1267 ; see also 157 Cong. Rec. S7060-01, 157 Cong. Rec. S7060-01, S7060 (CVRA co-sponsor Senator Jon Kyl's 2011 letter to the Attorney General, explaining that "Congress intended the CVRA to broadly protect crime victims throughout the criminal justice *1220process-from the investigative phases to the final conclusion of a case.")

The 2015 amendment did not serve to repeal or restrict the obligations of the Government to confer with victims in the early stages of a case. Instead, the 2015 amendment clarified that certain events, such as plea agreements or deferred prosecution agreements, must be conveyed to the crime victim. Put another way, the 2015 amendment codified what the courts had been interpreting the CVRA to require, such as entitlement to notice of a plea bargain. See In re Dean, 527 F.3d at 394 ("the government should have fashioned a reasonable way to inform the victims of the likelihood of criminal charges and to ascertain the victims' views on the possible details of a plea bargain"); United States v. Okun, No. CRIM. 3:08CR132, 2009 WL 790042, at *2 (E.D. Va. Mar. 24, 2009) (the statutory language of the CVRA gives the victims' rights before the accepting of plea agreements).

To the extent the Government relies upon the "interpretive canon, expressio unius est exclusio alterius , 'expressing one item of [an] associated group or series excludes another left unmentioned' " the Court is not persuaded. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 80, 122 S.Ct. 2045, 153 L.Ed.2d 82 (2002) (quoting United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 65, 122 S.Ct. 1043, 152 L.Ed.2d 90 (2002) ). "The force of any negative implication ... depends on context." Marx v. General Revenue Corp., 568 U.S. 371, 381, 133 S.Ct. 1166, 185 L.Ed.2d 242 (2013). "[T]he expressio unius canon does not apply unless it is fair to suppose that Congress considered the unnamed possibility and meant to say no to it, and that the canon can be overcome by contrary indications that adopting a particular rule or statute was probably not meant to signal any exclusion." Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

The expansive context of the CVRA lends itself to only one interpretation; namely, that victims should be notified of significant events resulting in resolution of their case without a trial. See Kenna v. U.S. Dist. Court for C.D.Cal., 435 F.3d 1011, 1016 (9th Cir. 2006) ("[t]he statute was enacted to make crime victims full participants in the criminal justice system"); Heaton, 458 F.Supp.2d at 1273 (the right to confer is "not limited to particular proceedings" but is "expansive" and applies broadly to "any critical stage or disposition of the case"). Reading into the statute a negative implication that victims need not be informed of non-prosecution agreements, and only informed of the more common events of plea bargains or deferred prosecution agreements, would be inconsistent with the goal of the CVRA.6 In the context of plea agreements, the CVRA provides victims with rights prior to the acceptance of plea agreements. See In re Dean, 527 F.3d at 394 ; United States v. Okun, No. CRIM. 3:08CR132, 2009 WL 790042, at *2 (E.D. Va. Mar. 24, 2009). Furthermore, victims obtain rights under the CVRA even before prosecution. Okun, 2009 WL 790042, at *2 (citing In re Dean, 527 F.3d at 394 ). Based on this authority, the Court concludes that the CVRA must extend to conferral about non-prosecution agreements.

Next, the Government claims it did not violate the right to confer when, in *1221January of 2008, it sent letters to the victims counseling patience because, at that time, Epstein's attorneys were seeking review of the NPA at higher levels within the Department of Justice. As indicated previously, however, at this point, the Government had bound itself to the terms of the NPA unless Epstein failed to comply with its terms. It was a material omission for the Government to suggest to the victims that they have patience relative to an investigation about which it had already bound itself not to prosecute. While Epstein was within his rights to attempt to persuade higher authorities within the Department of Justice to overrule the prosecutorial decisions of the U. S. Attorney's Office in the Southern District of Florida, the CVRA was designed to give the victims the same opportunity to attempt to affect prosecutorial decisions before they became final. Instead, the Office engaged in lengthy negotiations with Epstein that included repeated assurances that the NPA would not be "made public or filed with the Court." (DE 407 at ¶ 31.)

Nor did the Justice Department guidelines create an exemption from the CRVA's statutory requirements. Although the Government points to guidelines that conflicted with the requirements of the CVRA (by restricting CVRA rights until after a formal indictment), the Court is not persuaded that the guidelines were the basis for the Government's decision to withhold information about the NPA from the victims. If that had been the case, the Government would not have sent the victim letters telling them that they had rights protected under the CVRA. Nor would they have told Epstein's attorneys that it had obligations to notify the victims. In any event, an agency's own " 'interpretation' of a statute cannot supersede the language chosen by Congress." Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 825, 100 S.Ct. 2486, 65 L.Ed.2d 532 (1980).

Next, the Court rejects the Government's contention that Jane Doe 2 is not protected by the CVRA because she made statements favorable to Epstein early in the investigation.7 There is no dispute that Epstein sexually abused Jane Doe 2 while she was a minor. Therefore, regardless of her comments to the prosecutor, she was a victim. See 18 U.S.C. § 3771(e) (the CVRA defines a victim as "a person directly and proximately harmed as a result of the commission of a Federal offense"); In re Stewart, 552 F.3d 1285, 1288 (11th Cir. 2008) ("to determine a crime victim, then, first, we identify the behavior constituting 'commission of a Federal offense.' Second, we identify the direct and proximate effects of that behavior on parties other than the United States. If the criminal behavior causes a party direct and proximate harmful effects, the party is a victim under the CVRA.").

The Court need not resolve the factual questions surrounding what and when the victims were told about the state court proceeding and whether a state court proceeding is covered by the CVRA. Under the facts of this case, once the Government failed to advise the victims about its intention to enter into the NPA, a violation of the CVRA occurred.

Nor does the Court need to consider the Government's estoppel arguments at this time. These arguments relate only to the remedy, and not the determination of whether there was a CVRA violation. Therefore, the Court will address this issue at the appropriate juncture.

*1222Lastly, the Court will address the Government's argument that its prosecutorial discretion permitted it to enter into the NPA. The Government correctly notes that the CVRA provides that "[n]othing in this chapter shall be construed to impair the prosecutorial discretion of the Attorney General or any officer under his direction." 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771(d)(6). The Court is not ruling that the decision not to prosecute was improper. The Court is simply ruling that, under the facts of this case, there was a violation of the victims rights under the CVRA.

IV. Conclusion

Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:

1) Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (DE 361) is GRANTED to the extent that Petitioners' right to conferral under the CVRA was violated.

2) The United States's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (DE 408) is DENIED.

3) Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2's Motion to Compel Answers (DE 348) is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

4) Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2's Motion for Finding Waiver of Work Product and Similar Protections by Government and for Production of Documents (DE 414) is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

5) The parties should confer and inform the Court within 15 days of the date of entry of this Order how they wish to proceed on determining the issue of what remedy, if any, should be applied in view of the violation.

DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at West Palm Beach, Palm Beach County, Florida, this 21^st day of February, 2019.