CITY OF GRANTS PASS, OREGON, v. Gloria JOHNSON, et al

GORSUCH, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and THOMAS, ALITO, KAVANAUGH, and BARRETT, JJ., joined. THOMAS, J., filed a concurring opinion. SOTOMAYOR, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which KAGAN and JACKSON, JJ., joined.

Opinion

Justice GORSUCH delivered the opinion of the Court.

*2207 Many cities across the American West face a homelessness crisis. The causes are varied and complex, the appropriate public *2208 policy responses perhaps no less so. Like many local governments, the city of Grants Pass, Oregon, has pursued a multifaceted approach. Recently, it adopted various policies aimed at “protecting the rights, dignity[,] and private property of the homeless.” App. 152. It appointed a “homeless community liaison” officer charged with ensuring the homeless receive information about “assistance programs and other resources” available to them through the city and its local shelter. Id., at 152–153; Brief for Grants Pass Gospel Rescue Mission as Amicus Curiae 2–3. And it adopted certain restrictions against encampments on public property. App. 155–156. The Ninth Circuit, however, held that the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause barred that last measure. With support from States and cities across the country, Grants Pass urged this Court to review the Ninth Circuit's decision. We take up that task now.

I A

Some suggest that homelessness may be the “defining public health and safety crisis in the western United States” today. 72 F.4th 868, 934 (CA9 2023) (Smith, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). According to the federal government, homelessness in this country has reached its highest levels since the government began reporting data on the subject in 2007. Dept. of Housing and Urban Development, Office of Community Planning & Development, T. de Sousa et al., The 2023 Annual Homeless Assessment Report (AHAR) to Congress 2–3 (2023). California alone is home to around half of those in this Nation living without shelter on a given night. Id., at 30. And each of the five States with the highest rates of unsheltered homelessness in the country—California, Oregon, Hawaii, Arizona, and Nevada—lies in the American West. Id., at 17.

Those experiencing homelessness may be as diverse as the Nation itself—they are young and old and belong to all races and creeds. People become homeless for a variety of reasons, too, many beyond their control. Some have been affected by economic conditions, rising housing costs, or natural disasters. Id., at 37; see Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 2–3. Some have been forced from their homes to escape domestic violence and other forms of exploitation. Ibid. And still others struggle with drug addiction and mental illness. By one estimate, perhaps 78 percent of the unsheltered suffer from mental-health issues, while 75 percent struggle with substance abuse. See J. Rountree, N. Hess, & A. Lyke, Health Conditions Among Unsheltered Adults in the U. S., Calif. Policy Lab, Policy Brief 5 (2019).

Those living without shelter often live together. L. Dunton et al., Dept. of Housing and Urban Development, Office of Policy Development & Research, Exploring Homelessness Among People Living in Encampments and Associated Cost 1 (2020) (2020 HUD Report). As the number of homeless individuals has grown, the number of homeless encampments across the country has increased as well, “in numbers not seen in almost a century.” Ibid. The unsheltered may coalesce in these encampments for a range of reasons. Some value the “freedom” encampment living provides compared with submitting to the rules shelters impose. Dept. of Housing and Urban Development, Office of Policy Development and Research, R. Cohen, W. Yetvin, & J. Khadduri, Understanding Encampments of People Experiencing Homelessness and Community Responses 5 (2019). Others report that encampments offer a “sense of community.” Id., at 7. And still others may seek them out for *2209 “dependable access to illegal drugs.” Ibid. In brief, the reasons why someone will go without shelter on a given night vary widely by the person and by the day. See ibid.

As the number and size of these encampments have grown, so have the challenges they can pose for the homeless and others. We are told, for example, that the “exponential increase in ... encampments in recent years has resulted in an increase in crimes both against the homeless and by the homeless.” Brief for California State Sheriffs’ Associations et al. as Amici Curiae 21 (California Sheriffs Brief). California's Governor reports that encampment inhabitants face heightened risks of “sexual assault” and “subjugation to sex work.” Brief for California Governor G. Newsom as Amicus Curiae 11 (California Governor Brief). And by one estimate, more than 40 percent of the shootings in Seattle in early 2022 were linked to homeless encampments. Brief for Washington State Association of Sheriffs and Police Chiefs as Amicus Curiae on Pet. for Cert. 10 (Washington Sheriffs Brief).

Other challenges have arisen as well. Some city officials indicate that encampments facilitate the distribution of drugs like heroin and fentanyl, which have claimed the lives of so many Americans in recent years. Brief for Office of the San Diego County District Attorney as Amicus Curiae 17–19. Without running water or proper sanitation facilities, too, diseases can sometimes spread in encampments and beyond them. Various States say that they have seen typhus, shigella, trench fever, and other diseases reemerge on their city streets. California Governor Brief 12; Brief for Idaho et al. as Amici Curiae 7 (States Brief). . . . 

Communities of all sizes are grappling with how best to address challenges like these. As they have throughout the Nation's history, charitable organizations “serve as the backbone of the emergency shelter system in this country,” accounting for roughly 40 percent of the country's shelter beds for single adults on a given night. See National Alliance To End Homelessness, Faith-Based Organizations: Fundamental Partners in Ending Homelessness 1 (2017). Many private organizations, city officials, and States have worked, as well, to increase the availability of affordable housing in order to provide more permanent shelter for those in need. See Brief for Local Government Legal Center et al. as Amici Curiae 4, 32 (Cities Brief). But many, too, have come to the conclusion that, as they put it, “[j]ust building more shelter beds and public housing options is almost certainly not the answer by itself.” Id., at 11.

As many cities see it, even as they have expanded shelter capacity and other public services, their unsheltered populations have continued to grow. Id., at 9–11. The city of Seattle, for example, reports that *2210 roughly 60 percent of its offers of shelter have been rejected in a recent year. See id., at 28, and n. 26. Officials in Portland, Oregon, indicate that, between April 2022 and January 2024, over 70 percent of their approximately 3,500 offers of shelter beds to homeless individuals were declined. Brief for League of Oregon Cities et al. as Amici Curiae 5 (Oregon Cities Brief). Other cities tell us that “the vast majority of their homeless populations are not actively seeking shelter and refuse all services.” Brief for Thirteen California Cities as Amici Curiae 3. Surveys cited by the Department of Justice suggest that only “25–41 percent” of “homeless encampment residents” “willingly” accept offers of shelter beds. See Dept. of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, S. Chamard, Homeless Encampments 36 (2010).

The reasons why the unsheltered sometimes reject offers of assistance may themselves be many and complex. Some may reject shelter because accepting it would take them further from family and local ties. See Brief for 57 Social Scientists as Amici Curiae 20. Some may decline offers of assistance because of concerns for their safety or the rules some shelters impose regarding curfews, drug use, or religious practices. Id., at 22; see Cities Brief 29. Other factors may also be at play. But whatever the causes, local governments say, this dynamic significantly complicates their efforts to address the challenges of homelessness. See id., at 11.

Rather than focus on a single policy to meet the challenges associated with homelessness, many States and cities have pursued a range of policies and programs. See 2020 HUD Report 14–20. Beyond expanding shelter and affordable housing opportunities, some have reinvested in mental-health and substance-abuse treatment programs. See Brief for California State Association of Counties et al. as Amici Curiae 20, 25; see also 2020 HUD Report 23. Some have trained their employees in outreach tactics designed to improve relations between governments and the homeless they serve. Ibid. And still others have chosen to pair these efforts with the enforcement of laws that restrict camping in public places, like parks, streets, and sidewalks. Cities Brief 11.

Laws like those are commonplace. By one count, “a majority of cities have laws restricting camping in public spaces,” and nearly forty percent “have one or more laws prohibiting camping citywide.” See Brief for Western Regional Advocacy Project as Amicus Curiae 7, n. 15 (emphasis deleted). 

Different governments may use these laws in different ways and to varying degrees. See Cities Brief 11. But many broadly agree that “policymakers need access to the full panoply of tools in the policy toolbox” to “tackle the complicated issues of housing and homelessness.” California Governor Brief 16; accord, Cities Brief 11; Oregon Cities Brief 17.

B

Five years ago, the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit took one of those tools off the table. In Martin v. Boise, 920 F.3d 584 (2019), that court considered a public-camping ordinance in Boise, Idaho, that made it a misdemeanor to use “streets, sidewalks, parks, or public places” for “camping.” Id., at 603 (internal quotation marks omitted). According to the Ninth Circuit, the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause barred Boise from enforcing its public-camping ordinance against homeless individuals who lacked “access to alternative shelter.” Id., at 615. That “access” was lacking, the court said, whenever “ ‘there is a greater number of homeless individuals in a jurisdiction than the number of available beds in shelters.’ ” Id., at 617 (alterations omitted). According to the Ninth Circuit, nearly three quarters of Boise's shelter beds were not “practically available” because the city's charitable shelters had a “religious atmosphere.” Id., at 609–610, 618. Boise was thus enjoined from enforcing its camping laws against the plaintiffs. Ibid.

. . .

After Martin, similar suits proliferated against Western cities within the Ninth Circuit. As Judge Smith put it, “[i]f one picks up a map of the western United States and points to a city that appears on it, there is a good chance that city has already faced” a judicial injunction based on Martin or the threat of one “in the few short years since [the Ninth Circuit] initiated its Martin experiment.” 72 F.4th, at 940; see, e.g., Boyd v. San Rafael, 2023 WL 7283885, *1–*2 (ND Cal., Nov. 2, 2023); Fund for Empowerment v. Phoenix, 646 F.Supp.3d 1117, 1132 (D Ariz. 2022); Warren v. Chico, 2021 WL 2894648, *3 (ED Cal., July 8, 2021).

. . . 

C

The case before us arises from a Martin injunction issued against the city of Grants Pass. Located on the banks of the Rogue River in southwestern Oregon, the city is home to roughly 38,000 people. Among them are an estimated 600 individuals who experience homelessness on a given day. 72 F.4th, at 874; App. to Pet. for Cert. 167a–168a; 212a–213a.

Like many American cities, Grants Pass has laws restricting camping in public spaces. Three are relevant here. The first prohibits sleeping “on public sidewalks, streets, or alleyways.” Grants Pass Municipal Code § 5.61.020(A) (2023); App. to Pet. for Cert. 221a. The second prohibits “[c]amping” on public property. § 5.61.030; App. to Pet. for Cert. 222a (boldface deleted). Camping is defined as “set[ting] up ... or remain[ing] in or at a campsite,” and a “[c]ampsite” is defined as “any place where bedding, sleeping bag[s], or other material used for bedding purposes, or any stove or fire is placed ... for the purpose of maintaining a temporary place to live.” §§ 5.61.010(A)–(B); App. to Pet. for Cert. 221a. The third prohibits “[c]amping” and “[o]vernight parking” in the city's parks. §§ 6.46.090(A)–(B); 72 F.4th, at 876. Penalties for violating these ordinances escalate stepwise. An initial violation may trigger a fine. §§ 1.36.010(I)–(J). Those who receive multiple citations may be subject to an order barring them from city parks for 30 days. § 6.46.350; App. to Pet. for Cert. 174a. And, in turn, violations of those orders can constitute criminal trespass, punishable by a maximum of 30 days in prison and a $1,250 fine. Ore. Rev. Stat. §§ 164.245, 161.615(3), 161.635(1)(c) (2023).

. . . [S]hortly after the panel decision in Martin, two homeless individuals, Gloria Johnson and John Logan, filed suit challenging the city's public-camping laws. App. 37, Third Amended Complaint ¶¶6–7. They claimed, among other things, that the city's ordinances violated the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. Id., at 51, ¶66. And they *2214 sought to pursue their claim on behalf of a class encompassing “all involuntarily homeless people living in Grants Pass.” Id., at 48, ¶52.²

The district court certified the class action and enjoined the city from enforcing its public-camping laws against the homeless. . . . [T]he court found, everyone without shelter in Grants Pass was “involuntarily homeless” because the city's total homeless population outnumbered its “ ‘practically available’ ” shelter beds. App. to Pet. for Cert. 179a, 216a. In fact, the court ruled, none of the beds at Grants Pass's charity-run shelter qualified as “available.” They did not, the court said, both because that shelter offers something closer to transitional housing than “temporary emergency shelter,” and because the shelter has rules requiring residents to abstain from smoking and attend religious services. Id., at 179a–180a. The Eighth Amendment, the district court thus concluded, prohibited Grants Pass from enforcing its laws against homeless individuals in the city. Id., at 182a–183a.

. . .

Grants Pass filed a petition for certiorari. A large number of States, cities, and counties from across the Ninth Circuit and the country joined Grants Pass in urging the Court to grant review to assess the Martin experiment. . .

 II A

The Constitution and its Amendments impose a number of limits on what governments in this country may declare to be criminal behavior and how they may go about enforcing their criminal laws. Familiarly, the First Amendment prohibits governments from using their criminal laws to abridge the rights to speak, worship, assemble, petition, and exercise the freedom of the press. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prevents governments from adopting laws that invidiously discriminate between persons. . .

But if many other constitutional provisions address what a government may criminalize and how it may go about securing a conviction, the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against “cruel and unusual punishments” focuses on what happens next. That Clause “has always been considered, and properly so, to be directed at the method or kind of punishment” a government may “impos[e] for the violation of criminal statutes.” Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 531–532, 88 S.Ct. 2145, 20 L.Ed.2d 1254 (1968) (plurality opinion).

We have previously discussed the Clause's origins and meaning. In the 18th century, English law still “formally tolerated” certain barbaric punishments like “disemboweling, quartering, public dissection, and burning alive,” even though those practices had by then “fallen into disuse.” Bucklew v. Precythe, 587 U.S. 119, 130, 139 S.Ct. 1112, 203 L.Ed.2d 521 (2019) (citing 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws *2216 of England 370 (1769) (Blackstone)). The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause was adopted to ensure that the new Nation would never resort to any of those punishments or others like them. Punishments like those were “cruel” because they were calculated to “ ‘superad[d]’ ” “ ‘terror, pain, or disgrace.’ ” 587 U.S., at 130, 139 S.Ct. 1112 (quoting 4 Blackstone 370). And they were “unusual” because, by the time of the Amendment's adoption, they had “long fallen out of use.” 587 U.S., at 130, 139 S.Ct. 1112. . . .

All that would seem to make the Eighth Amendment a poor foundation on which to rest the kind of decree the plaintiffs seek in this case and the Ninth Circuit has endorsed since Martin. The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause focuses on the question what “method or kind of punishment” a government may impose after a criminal conviction, not on the question whether a government may criminalize particular behavior in the first place or how it may go about securing a conviction for that offense. Powell, 392 U.S., at 531–532, 88 S.Ct. 2145. To the extent the Constitution speaks to those other matters, it does so, as we have seen, in other provisions.

Nor, focusing on the criminal punishments Grant Pass imposes, can we say they qualify as cruel and unusual. Recall that, under the city's ordinances, an initial offense may trigger a civil fine. Repeat offenses may trigger an order temporarily barring an individual from camping in a public park. Only those who later violate an order like that may face a criminal punishment of up to 30 days in jail and a larger fine. See Part I–C, supra. None of the city's sanctions qualifies as cruel because none is designed to “superad[d]” “terror, pain, or disgrace.” Bucklew, 587 U.S., at 130, 139 S.Ct. 1112 (internal quotation marks omitted). . . .

B

Instead, the plaintiffs and the dissent pursue an entirely different theory. . . .  [E]choing the Ninth Circuit in Martin, they insist one notable exception exists.

In Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 82 S.Ct. 1417, 8 L.Ed.2d 758 (1962), the plaintiffs and the dissent observe, this Court addressed a challenge to a criminal conviction under a California statute providing that “ ‘[n]o person shall ... be addicted to the use of narcotics.’ ” Ibid., n. 1. In response to that challenge, the Court invoked the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause to hold that California could not enforce its law making “the ‘status’ of narcotic addiction a criminal offense.” Id., at 666, 82 S.Ct. 1417. The Court recognized that “imprisonment for ninety days is not, in the abstract, a punishment which is either cruel or unusual.” Id., at 667, 82 S.Ct. 1417. But, the Court reasoned, when punishing “ ‘status,’ ” “[e]ven one day in prison would be ... cruel and unusual.” Id., at 666–667, 82 S.Ct. 1417.

. . . [T]he Court read[] the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause to impose a limit not just on what punishments may follow a criminal conviction but what a State may criminalize to begin with. It was a view unprecedented in the history of the Court before 1962. In dissent, Justice White lamented that the majority had embraced an “application of ‘cruel and unusual punishment’ so novel that” it could not possibly be “ascribe[d] to the Framers of the Constitution.” 370 U.S., at 689, 82 S.Ct. 1417. Nor, in the 62 years since Robinson, has this Court once invoked it as authority to decline the enforcement of any criminal law, leaving the Eighth Amendment instead to perform its traditional function of addressing the punishments that follow a criminal conviction.

Still, no one has asked us to reconsider Robinson. Nor do we see any need to do so today. Whatever its persuasive force as an interpretation of the Eighth Amendment, it cannot sustain the Ninth Circuit's course since Martin. In Robinson, the Court expressly recognized the “broad power” States enjoy over the substance of their criminal laws, stressing that they may criminalize knowing or intentional drug use even by those suffering from addiction. 370 U.S., at 664, 666, 82 S.Ct. 1417. The Court held only that a State may not criminalize the “ ‘status’ ” of being an addict. Id., at 666, 82 S.Ct. 1417. In criminalizing a mere status, Robinson stressed, California had taken a historically anomalous approach toward criminal liability. One, in fact, this Court has not encountered since Robinson itself.

Public camping ordinances like those before us are nothing like the law at issue in Robinson. Rather than criminalize mere status, Grants Pass forbids actions like “occupy[ing] a campsite” on public property “for the purpose of maintaining a temporary place to live.” Grants Pass Municipal Code §§ 5.61.030, 5.61.010; App. to Pet. for Cert. 221a–222a. Under the city's laws, it makes no difference whether the charged defendant is homeless, a backpacker on vacation passing through town, or a student who abandons his dorm room to camp out in protest on the lawn of a municipal building. See Part I–C, supra; Blake v. Grants Pass, No. 1:18–cv–01823 (D Ore.), ECF Doc. 63–4, pp. 2, 16; Tr. of Oral Arg. 159. In that respect, the city's laws parallel those found in countless jurisdictions across the country. See Part I–A, supra. And because laws like these do not criminalize mere status, Robinson is not implicated.⁵

 C

If Robinson does not control this case, the plaintiffs and the dissent argue, we should extend it so that it does. Perhaps a person does not violate ordinances like Grants Pass's simply by being homeless but only by engaging in certain acts (actus rei) with certain mental states (mentes reae). Still, the plaintiffs and the dissent insist, laws like these seek to regulate actions that are in some sense “involuntary,” for some homeless persons cannot help but do what the law forbids. See Brief for Respondents 24–25, 29, 32; post, at 2236 - 2237 (opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J.). And, the plaintiffs and the dissent continue, we should extend Robinson to prohibit the enforcement of laws that operate this way—laws that don't proscribe status as such but that proscribe acts, even acts undertaken with some required mental state, the defendant cannot help but undertake. Post, at 2236 - 2237. To rule otherwise, the argument goes, would “ ‘effectively’ ” allow cities to punish a person because of his status. Post, at 2241. The Ninth Circuit pursued just this line of thinking below and in Martin.

The problem is, this Court has already rejected that view. In Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 88 S.Ct. 2145, 20 L.Ed.2d 1254 (1968), the Court confronted a defendant who had been convicted under a Texas statute making it a crime to “ ‘get drunk or be found in a state of intoxication in any public place.’ ” Id., at 517, 88 S.Ct. 2145 (plurality opinion). Like the plaintiffs here, Mr. Powell argued that his drunkenness was an “ ‘involuntary’ ” byproduct of his status as an alcoholic. Id., at 533, 88 S.Ct. 2145. Yes, the statute required proof of an act (becoming drunk or intoxicated and then proceeding into public), and perhaps some associated mental state (for presumably the defendant knew he was drinking and maybe even knew he made his way to a public place). Still, Mr. Powell contended, Texas's law effectively criminalized his status as an alcoholic because he could not help but doing as he did. Ibid.  Justice Fortas embraced that view, but only in dissent: He would have extended Robinson to cover conduct that flows from any “condition [the defendant] is powerless to change.” 392 U.S., at 567, 88 S.Ct. 2145 (Fortas, J., dissenting).

The Court did not agree. Writing for a plurality, Justice Marshall observed that Robinson had authorized “a very small” intrusion by courts “into the substantive criminal law” “under the aegis of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment[s] Clause.” 392 U.S., at 533, 88 S.Ct. 2145. That small intrusion, Justice Marshall said, prevents States only from enforcing laws that criminalize “a mere status.” Id., at 532, 88 S.Ct. 2145. It does nothing to curtail a State's authority to secure a conviction when “the accused has committed some act ... society has an interest in preventing.” Id., at 533, 88 S.Ct. 2145. . . .

*2220 This case is no different from Powell. Just as there, the plaintiffs here seek to expand Robinson’s “small” intrusion “into the substantive criminal law.” Just as there, the plaintiffs here seek to extend its rule beyond laws addressing “mere status” to laws addressing actions that, even if undertaken with the requisite mens rea, might “in some sense” qualify as “ ‘involuntary.’ ” And just as Powell could find nothing in the Eighth Amendment permitting that course, neither can we. As we have seen, Robinson already sits uneasily with the Amendment's terms, original meaning, and our precedents. Its holding is restricted to laws that criminalize “mere status.” Nothing in the decision called into question the “broad power” of States to regulate acts undertaken with some mens rea. And, just as in Powell, we discern nothing in the Eighth Amendment that might provide us with lawful authority to extend Robinson beyond its narrow holding. . . .

D

Not only did Powell decline to extend Robinson to “involuntary” acts, it stressed *2221 the dangers that would likely attend any attempt to do so. Were the Court to pursue that path in the name of the Eighth Amendment, Justice Marshall warned, “it is difficult to see any limiting principle that would serve to prevent this Court from becoming ... the ultimate arbiter of the standards of criminal responsibility, in diverse areas of the criminal law, throughout the country.” Powell, 392 U.S., at 533, 88 S.Ct. 2145. After all, nothing in the Amendment's text or history exists to “confine” or guide our review. Id., at 534, 88 S.Ct. 2145. Unaided by those sources, we would be left “to write into the Constitution” our own “formulas,” many of which would likely prove unworkable in practice. Id., at 537, 88 S.Ct. 2145. Along the way, we would interfere with “essential considerations of federalism” that reserve to the States primary responsibility for drafting their own criminal laws. Id., at 535, 88 S.Ct. 2145.

. . . Martin exemplifies much of what can go wrong when courts try to resolve matters like those unmoored from any secure guidance in the Constitution.

Start with this problem. Under Martin, cities must allow public camping by those who are “involuntarily” homeless. 72 F.4th, at 877 (citing Martin, 920 F.3d, at 617, n. 8). But how are city officials and law enforcement officers to know what it means to be “involuntarily” homeless, or whether any particular person meets that standard? *2222 Posing the questions may be easy; answering them is not. Is it enough that a homeless person has turned down an offer of shelter? Or does it matter why? Cities routinely confront individuals who decline offers of shelter for any number of reasons, ranging from safety concerns to individual preferences. See Part I–A, supra. How are cities and their law enforcement officers on the ground to know which of these reasons are sufficiently weighty to qualify a person as “involuntarily” homeless?

If there are answers to those questions, they cannot be found in the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. . . .

. . . Consider an example. The city of Chico, California, thought it was complying with Martin when it constructed an outdoor shelter facility at its municipal airport to accommodate its homeless population. Warren v. Chico, 2021 WL 2894648, *3 (ED Cal., July 8, 2021). That shelter, we are told, included “protective fencing, large water totes, handwashing stations, portable toilets, [and] a large canopy for shade.” Brief for City of Chico as Amicus Curiae on Pet. for Cert. 16. Still, a district court enjoined the city from enforcing its public-camping ordinance. Why? Because, in that court's view, “appropriate” shelter requires “ ‘indoo[r],’ ” not outdoor, spaces. Warren, 2021 WL 2894648, *3 (quoting Martin, 920 F.3d, at 617). One federal court in Los Angeles ruled, during the COVID pandemic, that “adequate” shelter must also include nursing staff, testing for communicable diseases, and on-site security, among other things. See LA Alliance for Hum. Rights v. Los Angeles, 2020 WL 2512811, *4 (CD Cal., May 15, 2020). By imbuing the availability of shelter with constitutional significance in this way, many cities tell us, Martin and its progeny have “paralyzed” communities and prevented them from implementing even policies designed to help the homeless while remaining sensitive to the limits of their resources and the needs of other citizens. Cities Cert. Brief 4 (boldface and capitalization deleted). . .

III

Homelessness is complex. Its causes are many. So may be the public policy responses required to address it. At bottom, the question this case presents is whether the Eighth Amendment grants federal judges primary responsibility for assessing those causes and devising those responses. It does not. Almost 200 years ago, a visitor to this country remarked upon the “extreme skill with which the inhabitants of the United States succeed in proposing a common object to the exertions of a great many men, and in getting them voluntarily to pursue it.” 2 A. de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 129 (H. Reeve transl. 1961). If the multitude of amicus briefs before us proves one thing, it is that the American people are still at it. Through their voluntary associations and charities, their elected representatives and appointed officials, their police officers and mental health professionals, they display that same energy and skill today in their efforts to address the complexities of the homelessness challenge facing the most vulnerable among us.

Yes, people will disagree over which policy responses are best; they may experiment with one set of approaches only to find later another set works better; they may find certain responses more appropriate for some communities than others. But in our democracy, that is their right. Nor can a handful of federal judges begin to “match” the collective wisdom the American people possess in deciding “how best to handle” a pressing social question like homelessness. Robinson, 370 U.S., at 689, 82 S.Ct. 1417 (White, J., dissenting). The Constitution's Eighth Amendment serves many important functions, but it does not authorize federal judges to wrest those rights and responsibilities from the American people and in their place dictate this Nation's homelessness policy. The judgment below is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Justice THOMAS, concurring.

I join the Court's opinion in full because it correctly rejects the respondents’ claims under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. . . .

[T]he respondents have not established that their claims implicate the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause in the first place. The challenged ordinances are enforced through the imposition of civil fines and civil park exclusion orders, as well as through criminal trespass charges. But, “[a]t the time the Eighth Amendment was ratified, the word ‘punishment’ referred to the penalty imposed for the commission of a crime.” Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 38, 113 S.Ct. 2475, 125 L.Ed.2d 22 (1993) (THOMAS, J., dissenting); see ante, at 2215 – 2216. The respondents have yet to explain how the civil fines and park exclusion orders constitute a “penalty imposed for the commission of a crime.” Helling, 509 U.S., at 38, 113 S.Ct. 2475.

Justice SOTOMAYOR, with whom Justice KAGAN and Justice JACKSON join, dissenting.

Sleep is a biological necessity, not a crime. For some people, sleeping outside is their only option. The City of Grants Pass jails and fines those people for sleeping anywhere in public at any time, including in their cars, if they use as little as a blanket to keep warm or a rolled-up shirt as a pillow. For people with no access to shelter, that punishes them for being homeless. That is unconscionable and unconstitutional. Punishing people for their status is “cruel and unusual” under the Eighth Amendment. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 82 S.Ct. 1417, 8 L.Ed.2d 758 (1962).

Homelessness is a reality for too many Americans. On any given night, over half a million people across the country lack a fixed, regular, and adequate nighttime residence. Many do not have access to shelters and are left to sleep in cars, sidewalks, parks, and other public places. They experience homelessness due to complex and interconnected issues, including crippling debt and stagnant wages; domestic and sexual abuse; physical and psychiatric disabilities; and rising housing costs coupled with declining affordable housing options.

At the same time, States and cities face immense challenges in responding to homelessness. To address these challenges and provide for public health and safety, local governments need wide latitude, including to regulate when, where, and how homeless people sleep in public. The decision below did, in fact, leave cities free to punish “littering, public urination or defecation, obstruction of roadways, possession or distribution of illicit substances, harassment, or violence.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 200a. The only question for the Court today is whether the Constitution permits punishing homeless people with no access to shelter for sleeping in public with as little as a blanket to keep warm.

It is possible to acknowledge and balance the issues facing local governments, the humanity and dignity of homeless people, and our constitutional principles. Instead, the majority focuses almost exclusively on the needs of local governments and leaves the most vulnerable in our society with an impossible choice: Either stay awake or be arrested. The Constitution provides a baseline of rights for all Americans rich and poor, housed and unhoused. This Court must safeguard those rights even when, and perhaps especially when, doing so is uncomfortable or unpopular. Otherwise, “the words of the Constitution become little more than good advice.” Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 104, 78 S.Ct. 590, 2 L.Ed.2d 630 (1958) (plurality opinion).

I

The causes, consequences, and experiences of homelessness are complex and *2229 interconnected. The majority paints a picture of “cities across the American West” in “crisis” that are using criminalization as a last resort. Ante, at 2207. That narrative then animates the majority's reasoning. This account, however, fails to engage seriously with the precipitating causes of homelessness, the damaging effects of criminalization, and the myriad legitimate reasons people may lack or decline shelter.

A

Over 600,000 people experience homelessness in America on any given night, meaning that they lack “a fixed, regular, and adequate nighttime residence.” Dept. of Housing and Urban Development, T. de Sousa et al., The 2023 Annual Homeless Assessment Report to Congress 4 (2023 AHAR). These people experience homelessness in different ways. Although 6 in 10 are able to secure shelter beds, the remaining 4 in 10 are unsheltered, sleeping “in places not meant for human habitation,” such as sidewalks, abandoned buildings, bus or train stations, camping grounds, and parked vehicles. See id., at 2. “Some sleep alone in public places, without any physical structures (like tents or shacks) or connection to services. Others stay in encampments, which generally refer to groups of people living semipermanently in tents or other temporary structures in a public space.” Brief for California as Amicus Curiae 6 (California Brief) (citation omitted). This is in part because there has been a national “shortage of 188,000 shelter beds for individual adults.” Brief for Service Providers as Amici Curiae 8 (Service Providers Brief).

People become homeless for many reasons, including some beyond their control. “[S]tagnant wages and the lack of affordable housing” can mean some people are one unexpected medical bill away from being unable to pay rent. Brief for Public Health Professionals and Organizations as Amici Curiae 3. Every “$100 increase in median rental price” is “associated with about a 9 percent increase in the estimated homelessness rate.” GAO, A. Cackley, Homelessness: Better HUD Oversight of Data Collection Could Improve Estimates of Homeless Populations 30 (GAO–20–433, 2020). Individuals with disabilities, immigrants, and veterans face policies that increase housing instability. See California Brief 7. Natural disasters also play a role, including in Oregon, where increasing numbers of people “have lost housing because of climate events such as extreme wildfires across the state, floods in the coastal areas, [and] heavy snowstorms.” 2023 AHAR 52. Further, “mental and physical health challenges,” and family and domestic “violence and abuse” can be precipitating causes of homelessness. California Brief 7.

People experiencing homelessness are young and old, live in families and as individuals, and belong to all races, cultures, and creeds. Given the complex web of causes, it is unsurprising that the burdens of homelessness fall disproportionately on the most vulnerable in our society. People already in precarious positions with mental and physical health, trauma, or abuse may have nowhere else to go if forced to leave their homes. Veterans, victims of domestic violence, teenagers, and people with disabilities are all at an increased risk of homelessness. For veterans, “those with a history of mental health conditions, including post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) ... are at greater risk of homelessness.” Brief for American Psychiatric Association et al. as Amici Curiae 6. For women, almost 60% of those experiencing homelessness report that fleeing domestic violence was the “immediate cause.” Brief for Advocates for Survivors of Gender-Based Violence as Amici Curiae 9. For young people, “family dysfunction and rejection, *2230 sexual abuse, juvenile legal system involvement, ‘aging out’ of the foster care system, and economic hardship” make them particularly vulnerable to homelessness. Brief for Juvenile Law Center et al. as Amici Curiae 2. For American Indians, “policies of removal and resettlement in tribal lands” have caused displacement, resulting in “a disproportionately high rate of housing insecurity and unsheltered homelessness.” Brief for StrongHearts Native Helpline et al. as Amici Curiae 10, 24. For people with disabilities, “[l]ess than 5% of housing in the United States is accessible for moderate mobility disabilities, and less than 1% is accessible for wheelchair use.” Brief for Disability Rights Education and Defense Fund et al. as Amici Curiae 2 (Disability Rights Brief).

B

States and cities responding to the homelessness crisis face the difficult task of addressing the underlying causes of homelessness while also providing for public health and safety. This includes, for example, dealing with the hazards posed by encampments, such as “a heightened risk of disease associated with living outside without bathrooms or wash basins,” “deadly fires” from efforts to “prepare food and create heat sources,” violent crime, and drug distribution and abuse. California Brief 12.

Local governments need flexibility in responding to homelessness with effective and thoughtful solutions. See infra, at 2237 – 2239. Almost all of these policy solutions are beyond the scope of this case. The only question here is whether the Constitution permits criminalizing sleeping outside when there is nowhere else to go. That question is increasingly relevant because many local governments have made criminalization a frontline response to homelessness. “[L]ocal measures to criminalize ‘acts of living’ ” by “prohibit[ing] sleeping, eating, sitting, or panhandling in public spaces” have recently proliferated. U. S. Interagency Council on Homelessness, Searching Out Solutions 1 (2012).

Criminalizing homelessness can cause a destabilizing cascade of harm. “Rather than helping people to regain housing, obtain employment, or access needed treatment and services, criminalization creates a costly revolving door that circulates individuals experiencing homelessness from the street to the criminal justice system and back.” Id., at 6. When a homeless person is arrested or separated from their property, for example, “items frequently destroyed include personal documents needed for accessing jobs, housing, and services such as IDs, driver's licenses, financial documents, birth certificates, and benefits cards; items required for work such as clothing and uniforms, bicycles, tools, and computers; and irreplaceable mementos.” Brief for 57 Social Scientists as Amici Curiae 17–18 (Social Scientists Brief). Consider Erin Spencer, a disabled Marine Corps veteran who stores items he uses to make a living, such as tools and bike parts, in a cart. He was arrested repeatedly for illegal lodging. Each time, his cart and belongings were gone once he returned to the sidewalk. “[T]he massive number of times the City or State has taken all I possess leaves me in a vacuous déjà vu.” Brief for National Coalition for Homeless Veterans et al. as Amici Curiae 28.

Incarceration and warrants from unpaid fines can also result in the loss of employment, benefits, and housing options. See Social Scientists Brief 13, 17 (incarceration and warrants can lead to “termination of federal health benefits such as Social Security, Medicare, or Medicaid,” the “loss of a shelter bed,” or disqualification from “public housing and Section 8 vouchers”). Finally, *2231 criminalization can lead homeless people to “avoid calling the police in the face of abuse or theft for fear of eviction from public space.” Id., at 27. Consider the tragic story of a homeless woman “who was raped almost immediately following a police move-along order that pushed her into an unfamiliar area in the dead of night.” Id., at 26. She described her hesitation in calling for help: “What's the point? If I called them, they would have made all of us move [again].” Ibid.

For people with nowhere else to go, fines and jail time do not deter behavior, reduce homelessness, or increase public safety. In one study, 91% of homeless people who were surveyed “reported remaining outdoors, most often just moving two to three blocks away” when they received a move-along order. Id., at 23. Police officers in these cities recognize as much: “ ‘Look we're not really solving anybody's problem. This is a big game of whack-a-mole.’ ” Id., at 24. Consider Jerry Lee, a Grants Pass resident who sleeps in a van. Over the course of three days, he was woken up and cited six times for “camping in the city limits” just because he was sleeping in the van. App. 99 (capitalization omitted). Lee left the van each time only to return later to sleep. Police reports eventually noted that he “continues to disregard the city ordinance and returns to the van to sleep as soon as police leave the area. Dayshift needs to check on the van this morning and ... follow up for tow.” Ibid. (same).

Shelter beds that are available in theory may be practically unavailable because of “restrictions based on gender, age, income, sexuality, religious practice, curfews that conflict with employment obligations, and time limits on stays.” Social Scientists Brief 22. Studies have shown, however, that the “vast majority of those who are unsheltered would move inside if safe and affordable options were available.” Service Providers Brief 8 (collecting studies). Consider CarrieLynn Hill. She cannot stay at Gospel Rescue Mission, the only entity in Grants Pass offering temporary beds, because “she would have to check her nebulizer in as medical equipment and, though she must use it at least once every four hours, would not be able to use it in her room.” Disability Rights Brief 18. Similarly, Debra Blake's “disabilities prevent her from working, which means she cannot comply with the Gospel Rescue Mission's requirement that its residents work 40-hour work weeks.” Ibid.

Before I move on, consider one last example of a Nashville man who experienced homelessness for nearly 20 years. When an outreach worker tried to help him secure housing, the worker had difficulty finding him for his appointments because he was frequently arrested for being homeless. He was arrested 198 times and had over 250 charged citations, all for petty offenses. The outreach worker made him a t-shirt that read “Please do not arrest me, my outreach worker is working on my housing.” Service Providers Brief 16. Once the worker was able to secure him stable housing, he “had no further encounters with the police, no citations, and no arrests.” Ibid.

These and countless other stories reflect the reality of criminalizing sleeping outside when people have no other choice.

II

Grants Pass, a city of 38,000 people in southern Oregon, adopted three ordinances (Ordinances) that effectively make it unlawful to sleep anywhere in public, including in your car, at any time, with as little as a blanket or a rolled-up shirt as a pillow. . . .

Respondents here, two longtime residents of Grants Pass who are homeless and sleep in their cars, sued on behalf of themselves and all other involuntarily homeless people in the City, seeking to enjoin enforcement of the Ordinances. The District Court eventually certified a class and granted summary judgment to respondents. “As was the case in Martin, Grants Pass has far more homeless people than ‘practically available’ shelter beds.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 179a. The City had “zero emergency shelter beds,” and even counting the beds at the Gospel Rescue Mission (GRM), which is “the only entity in Grants Pass that offers any sort of temporary program for some class members,” “GRM's 138 beds would not be nearly enough to accommodate the at least 602 homeless individuals in Grants Pass.” Id., at 179a–180a. Thus, “the only way for homeless people to legally sleep on public property within the City is if they lay on the ground with only the clothing on their backs and without their items near them.” Id., at 178a.

The District Court entered a narrow injunction. It concluded that Grants Pass could “implement time and place restrictions for when homeless individuals may use their belongings to keep warm and dry and when they must have their belonging[s] packed up.” Id., at 199a. The City could also “ban the use of tents in public parks,” as long as it did not “ban people from using any bedding type materials to keep warm and dry while they sleep.” Id., *2233 at 199a–200a. Further, Grants Pass could continue to “enforce laws that actually further public health and safety, such as laws restricting littering, public urination or defecation, obstruction of roadways, possession or distribution of illicit substances, harassment, or violence.” Id., at 200a. . . .

III

The Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of “cruel and unusual punishments.” Amdt. 8 (Punishments Clause). . . .

In Robinson v. California, this Court detailed one substantive limitation on criminal punishment. Lawrence Robinson was convicted under a California statute for “ ‘be[ing] addicted to the use of narcotics’ ” and faced a mandatory 90-day jail sentence. 370 U.S., at 660, 82 S.Ct. 1417. The California statute did not “punis[h] a person for the use of narcotics, for their purchase, sale or possession, or for antisocial or disorderly behavior resulting from their administration.” Id., at 666, 82 S.Ct. 1417. Instead, it made “the ‘status’ of narcotic addiction a criminal offense, for which the offender may be prosecuted ‘at any time before he reforms.’ ” Ibid.

The Court held that, because it criminalized the “ ‘status’ of narcotic addiction,” ibid., the California law “inflict[ed] a cruel and unusual punishment in violation” of the Punishments Clause, id., at 667, 82 S.Ct. 1417. Importantly, the Court did not limit that holding to the status of narcotic addiction alone. It began by reasoning that the criminalization of the “mentally ill, or a leper, or [those] afflicted with a venereal disease” “would doubtless be universally thought to be an infliction of cruel and unusual punishment.” Id., at 666, 82 S.Ct. 1417. It extended that same reasoning to the status of being an addict, because “narcotic addiction is an illness” “which may be contracted innocently or involuntarily.” Id., at 667, 82 S.Ct. 1417.

Unlike the majority, see ante, at 2215 – 2217, the Robinson Court did not rely on the harshness of the criminal penalty itself. It understood that “imprisonment for ninety days is not, in the abstract, a punishment which is either cruel or unusual.” 370 U.S., at 667, 82 S.Ct. 1417. Instead, it reasoned that, when imposed because of a *2234 person's status, “[e]ven one day in prison would be a cruel and unusual punishment.” Ibid.

. . .

IV

Grants Pass's Ordinances criminalize being homeless. The status of being homeless (lacking available shelter) is defined by the very behavior singled out for punishment (sleeping outside). The majority protests that the Ordinances “do not criminalize mere status.” Ante, at 2218. Saying so does not make it so. Every shred of evidence points the other way. The Ordinances’ purpose, text, and enforcement confirm that they target status, not conduct. For someone with no available shelter, the only way to comply with the Ordinances is to leave Grants Pass altogether. . . .

Put another way, the Ordinances single out for punishment the activities that define the status of being homeless. By most definitions, homeless individuals are those that lack “a fixed, regular, and adequate nighttime residence.” 42 U.S.C. § 11434a(2)(A); 24 C.F.R. §§ 582.5, 578.3 (2023). Permitting Grants Pass to criminalize sleeping outside with as little as a blanket permits Grants Pass to criminalize homelessness. . . . 

Take the respondents here, two longtime homeless residents of Grants Pass who sleep in their cars. The Ordinances define “campsite” to include “any vehicle.” § 5.61.010(B). For respondents, the Ordinances as applied do not criminalize any behavior or conduct related to encampments (such as fires or tents). Instead, the Ordinances target respondents’ status as people without any other form of shelter. Under the majority's logic, cities cannot criminalize the status of being homeless, but they can criminalize the conduct that defines that status. The Constitution cannot be evaded by such formalistic distinctions.

The Ordinances’ definition of “campsite” creates a situation where homeless people necessarily break the law just by existing.  . . .  Every human needs to sleep at some point. Even if homeless people with no available shelter options can exist for a few days in Grants Pass without sleeping, they eventually must leave or be criminally punished.

The majority resists this understanding, arguing that the Ordinances criminalize the conduct of being homeless in Grants Pass while sleeping with as little as a blanket. Therefore, the argument goes, “[r]ather than criminalize mere status, Grants Pass forbids actions.” . . . The best the majority can muster is the following tautology: The Ordinances criminalize conduct, not pure status, because they apply to conduct, not status.

The flaw in this conclusion is evident. The majority countenances the criminalization of status as long as the City tacks on an essential bodily function—blinking, sleeping, eating, or breathing. That is just another way to ban the person. By this logic, the majority would conclude that the ordinance deemed unconstitutional in Robinson criminalizing “being an addict” would be constitutional if it criminalized “being an addict and breathing.”  . . . 

The Ordinances are enforced exactly as intended: to criminalize the status of being *2237 homeless. City officials sought to use the Ordinances to drive homeless people out of town. See supra, at 2234 – 2235. The message to homeless residents is clear. As Debra Blake, a named plaintiff who passed away while this case was pending, see n. 1, supra, shared:

“I have been repeatedly told by Grants Pass police that I must ‘move along’ and that there is nowhere in Grants Pass that I can legally sit or rest. I have been repeatedly awakened by Grants Pass police while sleeping and told that I need to get up and move. I have been told by Grants Pass police that I should leave town.

Because I have no choice but to live outside and have no place else to go, I have gotten tickets, fines and have been criminally prosecuted for being homeless.” App. 180–181.

Debra Blake's heartbreaking message captures the cruelty of criminalizing someone for their status: “I am afraid at all times in Grants Pass that I could be arrested, ticketed and prosecuted for sleeping outside or for covering myself with a blanket to stay warm.” Id., at 182. So, at times, when she could, Blake “slept outside of the city.” Ibid. Blake, who was disabled, unemployed, and elderly, “owe[d] the City of Grants Pass more than $5000 in fines for crimes and violations related directly to [her] involuntary homelessness and the fact that there is no affordable housing or emergency shelters in Grants Pass where [she could] stay.” Ibid.

. . . 

The majority proclaims, with no citation, that “it makes no difference whether the charged defendant is homeless, a backpacker on vacation passing through town, or a student who abandons his dorm room to camp out in protest.” Ante, at 2218. That describes a fantasy. In reality, the deputy chief of police operations acknowledged that he was not aware of “any non-homeless person ever getting a ticket for illegal camping in Grants Pass.”  . . .

…(C)

The majority . . . spars with a strawman in its discussion of Powell v. Texas. The Court in Powell considered the distinction between status and conduct but *2240 could not agree on a controlling rationale. Four Justices concluded that Robinson covered any “condition [the defendant] is powerless to change,” 392 U.S., at 567, 88 S.Ct. 2145 (Fortas, J., dissenting), and four Justices rejected that view. Justice White, casting the decisive fifth vote, left the question open because the defendant had “made no showing that he was unable to stay off the streets on the night in question.” Id., at 554, 88 S.Ct. 2145 (opinion concurring in judgment). So, in his view, it was “unnecessary to pursue at this point the further definition of the circumstances or the state of intoxication which might bar conviction of a chronic alcoholic for being drunk in a public place.” Id., at 553, 88 S.Ct. 2145.

This case similarly called for a straightforward application of Robinson. . . .  The Powell Court considered a statute that criminalized voluntary conduct (getting drunk) that could be rendered involuntary by a status (alcoholism); here, the Ordinances criminalize conduct (sleeping outside) that defines a particular status (homelessness). So unlike the debate in Powell, this case does not turn on whether the criminalized actions are “ ‘involuntary’ or ‘occasioned by’ ” a particular status. Id., at 533, 88 S.Ct. 2145 (Marshall, J., dissenting). For all the reasons discussed above, see supra, at 2234 – 2238, these Ordinances criminalize status and are thus unconstitutional under any of the opinions in Powell.

D

. . . The majority cites various amicus briefs to amplify Grants Pass's belief that its homelessness crisis is intractable absent the ability to criminalize homelessness. In so doing, the majority chooses to see only *2241 what it wants. Many of those stakeholders support the narrow rule in Martin. See, e.g., Brief for City and County of San Francisco et al. as Amici Curiae 4 (“[U]nder the Eighth Amendment ... a local municipality may not prohibit sleeping—a biological necessity—in all public spaces at all times and under all conditions, if there is no alternative space available in the jurisdiction for unhoused people to sleep”); Brief for City of Los Angeles as Amicus Curiae 1 (“The City agrees with the broad premise underlying the Martin and Johnson decisions: when a person has no other place to sleep, sleeping at night in a public space should not be a crime leading to an arrest, criminal conviction, or jail”); California Brief 2–3 (“[T]he Constitution does not allow the government to punish people for the status of being homeless. Nor should it allow the government to effectively punish the status of being homeless by making it a crime in all events for someone with no other options to sleep outside on public property at night”).

Even the Federal Government, which restricts some sleeping activities on park lands, see ante, at 2210 – 2211, has for nearly three decades “taken the position that laws prohibiting sleeping in public at all times and in all places violate the Robinson principle as applied to individuals who have no access to shelter.” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 14. The same is true of States across the Nation. See Brief for Maryland et al. as Amici Curiae 3–4 (“Taking these policies [criminalizing homelessness] off the table does not interfere with our ability to address homelessness (including the effects of homelessness on surrounding communities) using other policy tools, nor does it amount to an undue intrusion on state sovereignty”).

Nothing in today's decision prevents these States, cities, and counties from declining to criminalize people for sleeping in public when they have no available shelter. Indeed, although the majority describes Martin as adopting an unworkable rule, the elected representatives in Oregon codified that very rule. See infra, at 2241 – 2242. The majority does these localities a disservice by ascribing to them a demand for unfettered freedom to punish that many do not seek.

VI

The Court wrongly concludes that the Eighth Amendment permits Ordinances that effectively criminalize being homeless. Grants Pass's Ordinances may still raise a host of other legal issues. Perhaps recognizing the untenable position it adopts, the majority stresses that “many substantive legal protections and provisions of the Constitution may have important roles to play when States and cities seek to enforce their laws against the homeless.” Ante, at 2224. That is true. Although I do not prejudge the merits of these other issues, I detail some here so that people experiencing homelessness and their advocates do not take the Court's decision today as closing the door on such claims.

* * * . . 

I remain hopeful that our society will come together “to address the complexities of the homelessness challenge facing the most vulnerable among us.” Ante, at 2226. That responsibility is shared by those vulnerable populations, the States and cities in which they reside, and each and every one of us. “It is only after we begin to see a street as our street, a public park as our park, a school as our school, that we can become engaged citizens, dedicating our time and resources for worthwhile causes.” M. Desmond, Evicted: Property and Profit in the American City 294 (2016).

This Court, too, has a role to play in faithfully enforcing the Constitution to prohibit punishing the very existence of those without shelter. I remain hopeful that someday in the near future, this Court will play its role in safeguarding constitutional liberties for the most vulnerable among us. Because the Court today abdicates that role, I respectfully dissent.