Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge J. SKELLY WRIGHT.

J. SKELLY WRIGHT, Circuit Judge:

Appellants, who were tried jointly for armed robbery of a post office, challenge .their convictions on several evidentiary and procedural grounds. Because we agree that the trial court improperly instructed the jury regarding the use of prior inconsistent statements, we reverse the convictions and remand for a new trial. We do not reach any of the other issues raised by appellants.

*20I. BACKGROUND

On March 5, 1980 two men robbed the Brookland Station Post Office in Washington, D. C. The pair had approached the last employee leaving the office and forced him at gunpoint to let them into the post office and open the safes. The men took about $550 in cash, a money order writing machine, a validating plate, and 97 money orders.

On June 3, 1980 appellants John T. Livingston and David Coyle were indicted on two counts: armed robbery of a post office 1 and possession of stolen United States money orders.2 At trial the Government introduced several witnesses to testify about the events on the day of the robbery and about property stolen from the post office. Several witnesses also testified about the cashing and attempted cashing of a number of stolen money orders in Philadelphia and Trenton. These two lines of evidence were linked by testimony of three women, acquaintances of Livingston and Coyle, who accompanied them on a trip to Philadelphia and Trenton one week after the robbery. The defense presented no evidence. The jury returned verdicts of guilty as to both appellants on the armed robbery count.3 Appellants were sentenced to 25 years’ incarceration, and they subsequently brought this appeal.

II. USE OF PRIOR INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS

Prior to trial each of the women accompanying appellants to Philadelphia and Trenton was questioned by, and gave at least one sworn statement to, postal inspectors. In particular, the statement of Yvonne Hester indicated that the appellants had discussed and joked about several aspects of the robbery.4 At trial Ms. Hester appeared as a Government witness. When she denied or failed to recall conversations mentioned in the statement to the postal inspector, the prosecutor read damaging excerpts from it.5 On cross-examination Ms. Hester stated that when she signed the statement she did not know what she was signing and that she did not remember the conversations mentioned in the statement.6

In his instructions to the jury the trial judge noted the confrontation with prior statements.7 He then gave guidance as to how the prior inconsistent statements could ■be used. The pertinent instruction, based in part on language in Rule 801(d)(1)(A) of the Federal Rules of Evidence,8 read as follows:

However, if the prior statement was given by the witness while under oath, subject to the penalty of perjury, at a prior trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or in a deposition, and if you find that such prior statement under oath is inconsistent with *21the present statement in court, you may accept either the prior statement or the present testimony in court as reflecting the truth of any matter contained therein.[9]

Defense counsel objected to this instruction,10 and appellants contend that the trial court erred in giving it. They argue that Hester’s prior statements did not meet the requirements of Rule 801(d)(1)(A) and that they therefore should never have been considered as substantive evidence.

A. Prior Statements as Substantive Evidence

Under the Federal Rules a prior inconsistent statement by a witness is not hearsay if “given under oath subject to the penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or in a deposition * * Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(1)(A) (emphasis added). Here, a postal inspector went to Ms. Hester’s residence, asked her questions, took notes, wrote a statement based on her responses, asked her to read a typewritten copy and to make any necessary changes, and then obtained her signature swearing to the accuracy of the statement.11 We do not think that these circumstances satisfy the Rule’s requirement of “a trial, hearing, or other proceeding.” 12

In order to assure authenticity and reliability, “the Rule seems to contemplate situations in which an official verbatim record is routinely kept, whether stenographically or by electronic means, under legal authority.” 4 D. Louisell & C. Mueller, Federal Evidence § 419 at 171 (1980). The Rule’s requirements were designed “to limit substantive use of prior inconsistent statements to those situations in which there is likely to be overwhelming proof that the witness did in fact make the prior inconsistent statement.” Blakey, Substantive Use of Prior Inconsistent Statements Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 64 Ky.L.J. 3, 10 (1975) (emphasis added).13 In this case no official verbatim record was routinely kept by postal inspectors. The formalities used “provide less assurance that a statement was in fact made and sworn to than the formalities which surround a firsthand appearance at an on-the-record proceeding.” 4 D. Louisell & C. Mueller, supra, § 419 at 172 (discussing the formalities surrounding affidavits).

Courts of Appeals have generally found that statements made to investigating officials fail to qualify as made at a proceeding under Rule 801(d)(1)(A). United States v. Ragghianti, 560 F.2d 1376, 1381 (9th Cir. 1977) (prior statement obtained by Federal Bureau of Investigation in the course of a criminal investigation not admissible for substantive purposes); Martin v. United States, 528 F.2d 1157, 1161 (4th Cir. 1975) (statement before two investigating officers was not made at a proceeding and therefore does not qualify as substantive evidence); United States v. Tavares, 512 F.2d 872, 875 *22(9th Cir. 1975)' (statements to FBI agent and sheriff’s department officer not admissible for substantive purposes). These cases provide the clearest analogy to the present case; they suggest that Hester’s statement was hearsay inadmissible to prove the truth of matters contained within it.

The one exception to the line of cases in this area is United States v. Castro-Ayon, 537 F.2d 1055. (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 983, 97 S.Ct. 501, 50 L.Ed.2d 594 (1976). There the court found that statements made to a federal agent during an interrogation at a Border Patrol station fell within the Rule’s requirements. However, the court noted that

the immigration proceeding before Agent Pearce bears many similarities to a grand-jury proceeding: both are investigatory, ex parte, inquisitive, sworn, basically prosecutorial, held before an officer other than the arresting officer, recorded, and held in circumstances of some legal formality. Indeed, this immigration proceeding provides more legal rights for the witnesses than does a grand jury: the right to remain totally silent, the right to counsel, and the right to have the interrogator inform the witness of these rights.

Id. at 1058 (footnote omitted).

Hester’s statement to the postal inspector lacks many of the circumstantial guarantees of reliability identified in Castro-Ayon. The questioning was not held before an independent officer; no recordings were made; the interrogation occurred at Hester’s home; and no rights were afforded to her. Indeed, the circumstances fall far short of those in a grand jury proceeding, the paradigmatic “other proceeding” under the Rule. See id. at 1057 & n.3.

Accordingly, Hester’s statement should have been admitted only for the purpose of impeaching her credibility. It should not have been treated as having any potential substantive or independent testimonial value.14 While some commentators doubt that juries can distinguish between the use of prior statements for impeachment as opposed to substantive purposes,15 the distinction remains an important one if the Rules as drafted are to retain their vitality.

B. Reversible Error

The prior inconsistent statements were important to the Government’s case and might well have influenced the jury’s verdict. The Government itself recognized that Hester’s statement “was clearly probative of the identity of the robbers.” Appellee’s brief at 22. Hester’s statement to the postal inspector included a comment allegedly made by one defendant about the division of the proceeds from the robbery16 and a detailed exchange between both appellants about several aspects of the robbery.17 These statements provided the most direct evidence linking the defendants to the thefts and the stolen money orders. Not only were they read into the record on direct examination, but the prosecutor also read the statements twice in his closing argument and then summarized them at the end of his argument.18 The repeated emphasis on Hester’s prior statement surely must have made an impression on the jurors. Moreover, the prosecutor’s reliance on the statement suggests its importance to the Government’s entire case. .

*23Under these circumstances we can hardly say that the judge’s error in allowing the prior statement to be considered for its substantive value “did not influence the jury, or had but very slight effect * * *.” Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 764, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 1247, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946) (discussing harmless error standard). Thus the error in this case was sufficiently grave to warrant reversal.

III. CONCLUSION

The convictions are therefore reversed and the cases are remanded for a new trial.

So ordered.

WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge.

After a foot chase during which an officer said he saw Darnell Boyce throw a gun into a yard, officers recovered the gun from the area and also found ammunition for the gun in Boyce’s pocket. A jury convicted Boyce of being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition. He maintains that he could lawfully possess a handgun on the premise that his civil rights had been restored. In light of our precedent, we disagree and conclude that a letter to Boyce restoring his civil rights did not do so for all his prior felonies. Boyce also challenges the admission at trial of statements of Sarah Portis, the mother of four of his children, made during a 911 call, including that Boyce had a gun. We find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s admission of the statements under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule because they were made while under the stress of a domestic battery and related to it. We affirm the district court’s judgment.

I. BACKGROUND

Sarah Portis called 911' at around 7:45 p.m. on March 27, 2010, asking that police come to her residence because her child’s father had just hit her and was “going crazy for no reason.” The 911 operator asked, “Any weapons involved?” to which Portis responded, “Yes.” The operator asked what kind, and Portis said, “A gun.” The operator said, “He has a gun?”, then “Hello?”, and Portis responded, “I, I think so. ‘Cause he just, he just.” After the operator said, “Come on,” Portis responded, “Yes!” twice. The operator again inquired, “Did you see one?” and Portis replied, “Yes!” The operator then cautioned Portis that if she wasn’t telling the truth, she could be taken to jail. Portis responded, “I’m positive.” After giving a description of what Boyce was wearing, the operator asked where he was at the moment. Portis responded that she “just ran upstairs to [her] neighbor’s house” and didn’t know whether Boyce had left her house yet.

Within minutes, Officers Robert Cummings and Eugene Solomon responded to the 911 call. After determining Boyce was no longer in the apartment, they interviewed Portis for about five to ten minutes. Officer Solomon described Portis as “appearing] emotional as if she just had an argument, perhaps a fight, someone who was just running.” The officers then went to their car to complete a case report for domestic battery. While they were sitting in their squad car, the officers saw that Boyce had returned to the outside of Portis’s residence and was calling out her name. Officer Solomon asked Boyce to come over, but Boyce ran away instead, *794and Officer Cummings ran after him. During the chase, Officer Cummings saw Boyce reach toward the midsection of his body, retrieve a nickel-plated1 handgun, and toss it over a garage into a yard. The officer caught up with Boyce soon afterward and detained him. Officers found a silver .357 Magnum handgun in the area where Officer Cummings saw Boyce throw a gun. Officers also found three .357 bullets in Boyce’s right front pants pocket after they arrested him.

Boyce was charged with one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm and one count of being a felon in possession of ammunition, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and § 924(e)(1). While he was in jail awaiting trial, Boyce sent Portis a letter requesting that she recant her statement that he had a gun. He even provided the language he wanted her to use in a letter he wanted her to write to him:

It seems like my whole life is going down since I called the police and I lied on you. I didn’t know that those police was going to actually put a gun on you. Like I said before, I am so sorry for calling them and lying about you had a gun and hit me, but you just misunderstand how I felt when I saw you and the other girl hugging and kissing.... So the only way I thought of paying you back was to call the police and get you locked up once again. I’m so sorry.

Boyce and Portis also spoke by telephone while he was in jail, and Boyce said “our story” to which they would stick was that Portis made the whole thing up because she was mad he had been talking to another woman.

Portis did not testify at trial, but the government played a recording of her 911 call for the jury. In arguing that Boyce possessed a firearm on March 27, 2010, the government pointed to Officer Cummings’s testimony that he saw Portis throw a gun, other officers’ testimony recounting the recovery of the gun in the area and ammunition matching the gun in Boyce’s pocket, and Portis’s statement on the 911 call that Boyce had -a gun. A jury found Boyce guilty on both charged counts. The district court concluded that Boyce had three prior violent felonies or serious drug offenses that mandated a minimum term of fifteen years’ imprisonment under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). The court sentenced him to 210 months’ imprisonment, two and a half years over the mandatory minimum sentence. Boyce appeals.

II. ANALYSIS

A. No Restoration of Civil Rights

Before we consider the admission of Portis’s statements in the 911 call, we address Boyce’s argument that the indictment against him should have been dismissed. Boyce contends that the district court should have granted his motion to dismiss the indictment for lack of a qualifying predicate felony conviction. We review that decision de novo, and we review the district court’s factual findings for clear error. United States v. Greve, 490 F.3d 566, 570 (7th Cir.2007).

Boyce was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). A prior felony is not a predicate offense for a § 922(g)(1) violation if the defendant “has been pardoned or has had civil rights restored” unless the “restoration of civil rights expressly provides” that the person may not possess firearms. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20). Boyce maintains his civil rights had been restored regarding his prior felony convictions before he possessed the gun and ammunition in this case, and, therefore, that he did not have a *795predicate felony for purposes of § 922(g)(1).

Boyce was convicted of five state felonies in 1991 and received concurrent prison terms. He was released from prison in 1993 and placed on supervised release. While on supervised release, he was arrested and convicted of unlawful use of a weapon (“UUW”). Because of that conviction, his supervised release on the prior 1991 convictions was revoked, and he returned to prison. The district court found that his sentence on the parole revocation ended on December 23, 1995. Boyce remained in prison, however, because he still had more time to serve on the UUW charge. Boyce completed his prison term on the UUW charge on February 6, 1996 and began a one-year period of supervised release on that charge. He completed that term on February 6, 1997. He then received a form letter informing him of the restoration of his right to vote and to hold state office. Specifically, the letter stated:

We are pleased to inform you of the restoration of your right to vote and to hold offices created under the constitution of the state of Illinois. You also have the right to restoration of licenses granted to you under the authority of the State of Illinois if such license was revoked solely as a result of your conviction, unless the licensing authority determined that such restoration would not be in the public interest.

This form letter that Boyce received was the same form letter we have already held constitutes a restoration of civil rights for purposes of § 921(a)(20). See Buchmeier v. United States, 581 F.3d 561 (7th Cir.2009) (en banc).

That does not end the analysis, however, as the pertinent question is whether the letter restored Boyce’s civil rights on all his previous felonies or just on the UUW felony. Unfortunately for Boyce, we have considered and rejected the argument that the letter restored civil rights on all his previous felonies. We said in United States v. Burnett, 641 F.3d 894 (7th Cir.2011), that a letter telling a former prisoner that his civil rights have been restored applies conviction-by-conviction. Id. at 896. We concluded in that case that where a defendant finished his sentence for a parole revocation in 1994 but remained in prison on a murder conviction until 1999, the form letter he received after his release in 1999 — the same form letter Boyce received — only restored his civil rights on the murder conviction. Id. Burnett reached that conclusion despite recognizing that “[i]t may well be that Illinois refrained from sending Burnett letters in 1994 about his [other] convictions because the ongoing custody for the murder conviction meant he could not vote or hold public office.” Id. at 897. Boyce does not ask us to overturn Burnett. He points out that the defendant in Burnett spent more time in prison for the new offense after the end of his parole revocation sentence than Boyce, but we do not find that distinction material here.

Burnett did suggest that a person who received a restoration letter after serving multiple concurrent sentences that expired on the same day might have his civil rights restored on all convictions. Id. at 896. In light of that, Boyce argues that the district court erred when it relied on an affidavit from the Chief Records Officer for the Illinois Department of Corrections that calculated Boyce’s discharge revocation date as December 23, 1995. He contends that his sentence for his five 1991 convictions may have ended as early as mid-September 1995 or as late as “well beyond December 23, 1995.” But he offers no evidence that his parole revocation and UUW sentences terminated on the same *796date, and it is his burden to “produce evidence showing that his civil rights have been restored.” United States v. Foster, 652 F.3d 776, 791-92 (7th Cir.2011). We find no clear error in the district court’s determination that his sentences did not terminate on the same date, and, following Burnett, we affirm the denial of Boyce’s motion to dismiss the indictment.

B. 911 Call Properly Admitted

We next turn to Boyce’s argument that the government should not have been allowed to introduce Portis’s 911 call at trial. Portis did not testify at trial. The jury still heard her voice, though, as the government played the audio recording of her 911 call during the trial. (The jury received a transcript of the call as well.) The district court admitted Portis’s 911 call on the basis that it was a present sense impression under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(1) and an excited utterance under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(2). Boyce maintains that the call does not fall within either of these hearsay exceptions. We review the district court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Joy, 192 F.3d 761, 766 (7th Cir.1999).

Rule 803(1), the present sense impression exception, provides that “[a] statement describing or explaining an event or condition, made while or immediately after the declarant perceived it” is not excluded by the rule against hearsay. Rule 803(2) sets forth the exception for an “excited utterance,” defined by the rule as “[a] statement relating to a startling event or condition, made while the declarant was under the stress of the excitement that it caused.”

The theory underlying the present sense impression exception “is that substantial contemporaneity of event and statement negate the likelihood of deliberate or conscious misrepresentation.” Fed.R.Evid. 803 advisory committee’s note. Along similar lines, the idea behind the excited utterance exception is that “circumstances may produce a condition of excitement which temporarily stills the capacity of reflection and produces utterances free of conscious fabrication.” Id. In other words, the statement must have been a spontaneous reaction to the startling event and not the result of reflective thought. 2 McCormick on Evidence § 272 (7th ed.2013).

But that is not to say the spontaneity exceptions in the Federal Rules of Evidence necessarily rest on a sound foundation. We have said before regarding the reasoning behind the present sense impression that “[a]s with much of the folk psychology of evidence, it is difficult to take this rationale entirely seriously, since people are entirely capable of spontaneous lies in emotional circumstances.” See Lust v. Sealy, 383 F.3d 580, 588 (7th Cir.2004) (noting studies showing that less than one second is needed to fabricate a lie) (citing Douglas D. McFarland, Present Sense Impressions Cannot Live in the Past, 28 Fla. St. U.L.Rev. 907, 916 (2001)). As for the excited utterance exception, “The entire basis for the exception may ... be questioned. While psychologists would probably concede that excitement minimizes the reflective self-interest influencing the de-clarant’s statements, they have questioned whether this might be outweighed by the distorting effect of shock and excitement upon the declarant’s observation and judgement.” 2 McCormick on Evidence § 272 (7th ed.2013).

Nonetheless, we have recognized that despite these issues, the exceptions are well-established. See Ferrier v. Duckworth, 902 F.2d 545, 547-48 (7th Cir.1990); see also White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 356 n. 8, 112 S.Ct. 736, 116 L.Ed.2d 848 (1992) (describing excited utterance as a “firmly *797rooted” exception to the general prohibition against hearsay). Boyce, while pointing to some of this criticism, does not ask us to find the exceptions utterly invalid, and so we proceed to consider his arguments that the exceptions do not apply in the circumstances of his case.

To take the Rule 803(1) present sense impression exception first, we have said that to be admissible under this rule, “(1) the statement must describe an event or condition without calculated narration; (2) the speaker must have personally perceived the event or condition described; and (3) the statement must have been made while the speaker was perceiving the event or condition, or immediately thereafter.” United States v. Ruiz, 249 F.3d 643, 646 (7th Cir.2001). Here, Portis was personally present during the domestic battery she recounted during the 911 call. The questions here are whether Portis’s statements were made without calculated narration and whether her 911 call was sufficiently contemporaneous to constitute a present sense impression.

To take the timing issue first, while Portis did not call 911 as Boyce was hitting her, nor would that have been feasible or wise to do, the Advisory Committee’s Note to Federal Rule of Evidence 803 “recognizes that in many, if not most, instances precise contemporaneity is not possible and hence a slight lapse is allowable.” See also, e.g., Ruiz, 249 F.3d at 647 (upholding admission of statements made “shortly after” observations). Portis’s statements to the 911 operator that Boyce had “just” hit her and that she had “just” run upstairs to her neighbor’s house indicate that she called 911 nearly immediately after her observations. That timing is consistent with other circuits’ interpretation of the present sense impression exception. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 577 F.3d 660, 669 (6th Cir.2009) (admitting 911 call where caller reported seeing defendant with a gun as present sense impression and excited utterance in § 922(g)(1) case and stating it did not matter whether statements were made thirty seconds or five minutes after witnessing event); United States v. Shoup, 476 F.3d 38, 42 (1st Cir.2007) (finding that statements in 911 call made about one to two minutes after leaving dangerous situation and going into apartment constituted present sense impression and excited utterance).

A statement must also be made without calculated narration to qualify under the present sense impression exception, United States v. Woods, 301 F.3d 556, 562 (7th Cir.2002), and Boyce points out that Portis did not mention a gun until questioned by the dispatcher as to whether Boyce had any weapons. One can still make statements without calculated narration even if made in responses to questions. Cf. United States v. Thomas, 453 F.3d 838, 844 (7th Cir.2006) (admitting 911 call, including responses to operator questions, as present sense impression).1 Here, notably, when the operator asked what kind of weapon, Portis told the operator “a gun.” The operator did not ask whether Boyce had a gun; it was Portis who first brought up the gun’s presence.

But answering questions rather than giving a spontaneous narration could increase the chances that the statements *798were made with calculated narration, and, as we discussed, Portis ran to another residence between the battery and her 911 call. We need not definitively decide whether these concerns mean Portis’s statements fail to qualify under the present sense impression exception because even if they did, they would still be admissible as an excited utterance. The excited utterance exception “allows for a broader scope of subject matter coverage” than the present sense impression. United States v. Moore, 791 F.2d 566, 572 (7th Cir.1986). This is because the Federal Rules of Evidence provide that an excited utterance includes a statement “relating to” a startling event, Fed.R.Evid. 803(2), while the present sense impression exception is limited to “describing or explaining” the event, Fed.R.Evid. 803(1); see also Moore, 791 F.2d at 572.

For the excited utterance exception to apply, we have said that the proponent must demonstrate that: “(1) a startling event occurred; (2) the declarant makes the statement under the stress of the excitement caused by the startling event; and (3) the declarant’s statement relates to the startling event.” Joy, 192 F.3d at 767. The statement “need not be contemporaneous with the startling event to be admissible under rule 803(2) ... [rjather, the utterance must be contemporaneous with the excitement engendered by the startling event.” Id. at 765 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. Wesela, 223 F.3d 656, 663 (7th Cir.2000) (stating timing of statement important but not controlling and that what matters is whether statement made “contemporaneously with the excitement resulting from the event, not necessarily with the event itself’) (citations omitted).

Here, the startling event of a domestic battery occurred. Portis called 911 and reported that Boyce had just hit her and was “going crazy for no reason” and that he had a gun. Next, Portis made her 911 call while under the stress of the excitement caused by the domestic battery. She made the call right after the battery, telling the operator that she had “just” run upstairs to her neighbor’s house. Officer Solomon’s testimony that Portis appeared emotional, as though she had just been in an argument or fight, further supports the district court’s conclusion that Portis made the call while under the stress or excitement of the startling event.

Boyce principally takes issue with the district’s court finding that her statements related to the startling event. In particular, he argues that the gun Portis described in the call was not related to the domestic battery she was reporting. Instead, he says, her reference to a gun in the call referred to a separate, earlier time when Boyce possessed a gun.

We do not find an abuse of discretion in the district court’s determination that Boyce’s statement in the call that she had seen Boyce with a gun was related to the domestic battery. During her call to 911 requesting help from the police, Portis told the operator that Boyce had a gun and responded “Yes!” several times when the operator asked if she had seen it. Upon further questioning she replied that she was “positive.” When the dispatcher asked Portis whether any weapons were involved, the dispatcher was trying to obtain information regarding the battery and the level of danger posed by her assailant. Amd Portis said a weapon, in particular a gun, was involved. In doing so, Portis provided the dispatcher with information about her assailant and the danger she experienced just minutes before the call. This description of the threat posed by the man who battered her relates to the incident which produced her agitated state.

*799In addition to stating in the 911 call, and then confirming multiple times, that Boyce had a gun, Boyce stated in response to the government’s motion in limine that Portis told the responding officers Boyce had physically assaulted her and that she had witnessed him take a gun from a bedroom dresser before leaving the apartment. Boyce points out that although the probation officer interviewed Portis while preparing the Presentence Report, there is nothing in it that suggests that Portis recounted seeing Boyce with a gun to the probation officer. The district court’s decision to allow the account Portis gave in the immediate aftermath of the event, before she had the time to consider the effect it might have on the father of her children (and Boyce’s communications to Portis suggest he was trying to influence her), is consistent with the rationale underlying the excited utterance exception. And while corroboration is not required for admissibility, see Ruiz, 249 F.3d at 647, here Portis’s statement that Boyce had a gun was corroborated by Officer Cummings’s testimony that he saw Boyce throw a gun and by the testimony of other officers who recovered the gun and found bullets matching the gun in Boyce’s pocket.

Even if Boyce is correct that his gun was not at arms’ length while he struck her, if a domestic battery victim in Portis’s circumstances knows her assailant has access to a gun nearby, the potential for more lethal force to be used against her would be a subject likely to be evoked in the description of her assault. See Moore, 791 F.2d at 572 (quoting 4 Weinstein Evidence ¶ 803(2)[01] at 803-95 (1985) in explaining excited utterances: “If the subject matter of the statement is such as would likely be evoked by the event, the statement should be admitted.”). Under the facts of this case, we find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decision to admit Portis’s statements during the 911 call as excited utterances under Rule 803(2).

C. Enhanced Sentencing Penalty Proper

Boyce also argues that his sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), was improper because a jury did not find the fact of his prior convictions beyond a reasonable doubt. As support, Boyce points to the Supreme Court’s decision earlier this year holding that any fact that increases the mandatory minimum sentence for a crime is an element and must be submitted to the jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt. Alleyne v. United States, — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 2151, 2158, 186 L.Ed.2d 314 (2013). Alleyne, however, did not change the rule announced in Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 118 S.Ct. 1219, 140 L.Ed.2d 350 (1998), that the fact of a prior conviction need not be alleged in the indictment or proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court explicitly stated in Alleyne that it was not revisiting its Almendarez-Torres decision because the parties had not raised it. 133 S.Ct. at 2160 n. 1. Until the Supreme Court tells us otherwise, we will continue to apply Almendarez-Torres, and so we decline to set aside Boyce’s sentence on this ground.

III. CONCLUSION

The judgment of the district court is Affirmed.

POSNER, Circuit Judge,

concurring.

I agree that the district court should be affirmed — and indeed I disagree with nothing in the court’s opinion. I write separately only to express concern with Federal Rules of Evidence 803(1) and (2), which figure in this case. That concern is *800expressed in a paragraph of the majority opinion; I seek merely to amplify it.

Portis’s conversation with the 911 operator was a major piece of evidence of the defendant’s guilt. What she said in the conversation, though recorded, was hearsay, because it was an out-of-court statement offered “to prove the truth of the matter asserted,” Fed.R.Evid. 801(c)(2)— namely that the defendant (Boyce) had a gun — rather than to rebut a charge of recent fabrication or of a recently formed improper motive, Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(1)(B), by showing that the person making the statement had said the same thing before the alleged fabrication or the formation of the improper motive. 30B Michael H. Graham, Federal Practice & Procedure § 7012, pp. 128-45 (interim ed.2011). But the government argued and the district court agreed that Portis’s recorded statement was admissible as a “present sense impression” and an “excited utterance.” No doubt it was both those things, but there is profound doubt whether either should be an exception to the rule against the admission of hearsay evidence.

One reason that hearsay normally is inadmissible (though the bar to it is riddled with exceptions) is that it often is no better than rumor or gossip, and another, which is closely related, is that it can’t be tested by cross-examination of its author. But in this case either party could have called Portis to testify, and her testimony would not have been hearsay. Neither party called her — the government, doubtless because Portis recanted her story that Boyce had had a gun after he wrote her several letters from prison asking her to lie for him and giving her detailed instructions on what story she should make up; Boyce, because her testimony would have been likely to reinforce the evidence of the letters that he had attempted to suborn perjury, and also because his sexual relationship with Portis began when she was only 15. Boyce’s counsel said “the concern is that if Ms. Portis were to testify, she does look somewhat young and so the jury could infer ... that this relationship could have started when she was underage.”

To get her recorded statement admitted into evidence, the government invoked two exceptions to the hearsay rule. One, stated in Rule 803(1) and captioned “present sense impression,” allows into evidence “a statement describing or explaining an event or condition, made while or immediately after the declarant perceived it.” The other — the “excited utterance” exception of Rule 803(2) — allows into evidence “a statement relating to a startling event or condition, made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement that it caused.”

The rationale for the exception for a “present sense impression” is that if the event described and the statement describing it are near to each other in time, this “negate[s] the likelihood of deliberate or conscious misrepresentation.” Advisory Committee Notes to 1972 Proposed Rules. I don’t get it, especially when “immediacy” is interpreted to encompass periods as long as 23 minutes, as in United States v. Blakey, 607 F.2d 779, 785-86 (7th Cir.1979), 16 minutes in United States v. Mejia-Velez, 855 F.Supp. 607, 614 (E.D.N.Y.1994), and 10 minutes in State v. Odom, 316 N.C. 306, 341 S.E.2d 332, 335-36 (1986). Even real immediacy is not a guarantor of truthfulness. It’s not true that people can’t make up a lie in a short period of time. Most lies in fact are spontaneous. See, e.g., Monica T. Whitty et al., “Not All Lies Are Spontaneous: An Examination of Deception Across Different Modes of Communication,” 63 J. Am. Society of Information Sci. & Technology 208, 208-09, 214 (2012), where we read that “as with previous research, we found that *801planned lies were rarer than spontaneous lies.” Id. at 214. Suppose I run into an acquaintance on the street and he has a new dog with him — a little yappy thing— and he asks me, “Isn’t he beautiful”? I answer yes, though I’m a cat person and consider his dog hideous.

I am not alone in deriding the “present sense impression” exception to the hearsay rule. To the majority opinion’s quotation from Lust v. Sealy, Inc., 388 F.3d 580, 588 (7th Cir.2004) — “as with much of the folk psychology of evidence, it is difficult to take this rationale [that immediacy negates the likelihood of fabrication] entirely seriously, since people are entirely capable of spontaneous lies in emotional circumstances” — I would add the further statement that “ ‘old and new studies agree that less than one second is required to fabricate a lie.’ ” Id., quoting Douglas D. McFarland, “Present Sense Impressions Cannot Live in the Past,” 28 Fla. State U.L.Rev. 907, 916 (2001); see also Jeffrey Bellin, “Facebook, Twitter, and the Uncertain Future of Present Sense Impressions,” 160 U. Pa. L. Rev. 331, 362-66 (2012); I. Daniel Stewart, Jr., “Perception, Memory, and Hearsay: A Criticism of Present Law and the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence,” 1970 Utah L.Rev. 1, 27-29. Wigmore made the point emphatically 110 years ago. 3 John Henry Wig-more, A Treatise on the System of Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 1757, p. 2268 (1904) (“to admit hearsay testimony simply because it was uttered at the time something else was going on is to introduce an arbitrary and unreasoned test, and to remove all limits of principle”).

It is time the law awakened from its dogmatic slumber. The “present sense impression” exception never had any grounding in psychology. It entered American law in the nineteenth century, see Jon R. Waltz, “The Present Sense Impression Exception to the Rule Against Hearsay: Origins and Attributes,” 66 Iowa L.Rev. 869, 871 (1981), long before there was a field of cognitive psychology; it has neither a theoretical nor an empirical basis; and it’s not even common sense — it’s not even good folk psychology.

The Advisory Committee Notes provide an even less convincing justification for the second hearsay exception at issue in this case, the “excited utterance” rule. The proffered justification is “simply that circumstances may produce a condition of excitement which temporarily stills the capacity of reflection and produces utterances free of conscious fabrication.” The two words I’ve italicized drain the attempted justification of any content. And even if a person is so excited by something that he loses the capacity for reflection (which doubtless does happen), how can there be any confidence that his unreflective utterance, provoked by excitement, is reliable? “One need not be a psychologist to distrust an observation made under emotional stress; everybody accepts such statements with mental reservation.” Robert M. Hutchins & Donald Slesinger, “Some Observations on the Law of Evidence: Spontaneous Exclamations,” 28 Colum. L.Rev. 432, 437 (1928). (This is more evidence that these exceptions to the hearsay rule don’t even have support in folk psychology.)

As pointed out in the passage that the majority opinion quotes from the McCormick treatise, “The entire basis for the [excited utterance] exception may ... be questioned. While psychologists would probably concede that excitement minimizes the possibility of reflective self-interest influencing the declarant’s statements, they have questioned whether this might be outweighed by the distorting effect of shock and excitement upon the declarant’s observation and judgement.” 2 McCor*802mick on Evidence § 272, p. 366 (7th ed.2013).

The Advisory Committee Notes go on to say that while the excited utterance exception has been criticized, “it finds support in cases without number.” I find that less than reassuring. Like the exception for present sense impressions, the exception for excited utterances rests on no firmer ground than judicial habit, in turn reflecting judicial incuriosity and reluctance to reconsider ancient dogmas.

I don’t want to leave the impression that in questioning the present sense and excited utterance exceptions to the hearsay rule I want to reduce the amount of hearsay evidence admissible in federal trials. What I would like to see is Rule 807 (“Residual Exception”) swallow much of Rules 801 through 806 and thus many of the exclusions from evidence, exceptions to the exclusions, and notes of the Advisory Committee. The “hearsay rule” is too complex, as well as being archaic. Trials would go better with a simpler rule, the core of which would be the proposition (essentially a simplification of Rule 807) that hearsay evidence should be admissible when it is reliable, when the jury can understand its strengths and limitations, and when it will materially enhance the likelihood of a correct outcome.

OPINION

COWEN, Circuit Judge.

Defendant Artega Green was convicted by a jury of one count of distribution of more than 50 grams of cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841. The District Court sentenced him to a term of imprisonment of 151 months. Green timely appeals from both his conviction and sentence. For the reasons set forth below, we will vacate the judgment of conviction and remand for a new trial.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Green’s current conviction is premised upon a single controlled narcotics transaction which occurred on May 14, 2002. However, Green had apparently been a target of Drug Enforcement Agency (“DEA”) investigative efforts since 2000, and was the subject of a number of other attempted controlled buys from 2000 to 2002. But the May 2002 transaction was the only one for which he was charged. DEA Special Agent David Hughes and Task Force Officer Lawrence Collins were the case agents; both were supervised by DEA Special Agent Eric Miller. The DEA’s confidential informant (“Cl”), Michael Brown, participated in the buy.

With regard to the May 2002 transaction, the Government’s evidence against Green, as presented during its case-in-chief, consisted of: the testimonies of Special Agents (1) Hughes, and (2) Miller, (3) an audio recording in which the Cl called a cell phone number “associated with” Green and ordered 3 ounces of cocaine base, and (4) a video1 in which the Cl allegedly engaged in a drug transaction with Green. The video was of relatively low quality, and only briefly depicted the profile of the alleged perpetrator; thus, key to the defense’s case was to cast doubt as to whether Green was in fact the person depicted. Similarly, the audio recording consisted merely of a two-second phone call in which the recipient of the call (Green, allegedly) said ‘What’s up dog, what’s the deal?” and agreed to the buy. The only evidence introduced by the Government in its casein-chief directly connecting Green to both the audio and video was the testimony of the agents. Hughes testified he recognized Green’s voice on the audio recording, Miller stated he recognized Green on the video and that he observed Green arrive at the location of the controlled buy and enter the premises with the Cl (where the video surveillance took place). However, the Cl involved in the transaction, Brown, testified for the defense at trial that the individual on the video was not Green.

II. DISCUSSION

The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have ap*154pellate jurisdiction to review the judgment and resulting sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).

On appeal, Green raises a number of issues: whether (1) the District Court erred by admitting Brown’s prior written statement under the “present sense impression” hearsay exception; (2) the Government violated its Brady v. Maryland disclosure obligations; (3) the prosecutor engaged in misconduct in her summation by referring to Green’s reactions after viewing of the video of the controlled buy; whether the District Court erred (4) in allowing the jury to review transcripts of audio tape identifying Green by name; (5) in attributing additional drug quantities to Green at sentencing; and (6) in determining that the drug involved was crack cocaine. Because we conclude that the error as to the admission of the Cl’s statement warrants a new trial, we do not reach the remaining issues.2

A. Admission of Michael Brown’s Statement

The crux of the Government’s case was proving the identity of the individual captured on its audio and video evidence. It sought to do this exclusively through the testimonies of Agents Hughes and Miller. In a rather dramatic turn of events, however, Michael Brown, the Cl involved in the controlled transaction, testified as the sole defense witness. According to Brown, Green never got out of the car on the day of the buy, and the person depicted on the video selling the drugs was an individual known as “Tex.” Brown also stated that the DEA agents had used him before in other controlled buys, always with the goal *155of catching Green on tape selling drugs; but they were never successful, and were upset at Brown because of this. He was extensively cross-examined by the Assistant United States Attorney (“AUSA”), who was allowed to elicit from Brown, without defense objection, that he had previously purchased drugs from Green on several occasions.

After Brown was excused from the witness stand, the prosecution called Special Agent Miller as a rebuttal witness. Through Miller, and over Green’s vigorous objection, the Government was permitted to introduce as substantive evidence a statement that Brown purportedly made some 50 minutes following the controlled buy in question, after he was brought back to DEA offices and debriefed by the case agents. In it, Brown attested that it was Green who sold him the drugs. The statement was signed by Brown, and was witnessed and signed by the agents as well. Although the defense argued that the statement should not have been admitted under Federal Rule of Evidence 613(b) because Brown had not been given the opportunity to explain or deny it on the stand, the District Court admitted the statement, pursuant to the prosecution’s argument, as a present-sense impression under Rule 803(1). No limiting instruction was given.

We generally review a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence for abuse of discretion. United States v. Sokolow, 91 F.3d 396, 402 (3d Cir.1996). But where the evidentiary determination is premised upon an interpretation of the federal rules, our review is plenary. Id. Here, we conclude the District Court’s evidentiary ruling was in error.

Federal Rule of Evidence 803(1) renders admissible as a present-sense impression “[a] statement describing or explaining an event or condition made while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition, or immediately thereafter.” A hearsay statement may be admitted under this exception if it explains or describes an event personally witnessed by the declar-ant, and if the declaration is made essentially contemporaneous to witnessing the event. United States v. Mitchell, 145 F.3d 572, 576 (3d Cir.1998); 5 Jack B. Wein-stein and Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein’s FedeRal Evidence § 803.03[1] (2d ed.1997). In this case, there is no dispute that Brown was personally present at the narcotics transaction and that his statement purports to recount the details of that transaction. The only question before us is whether the statement is sufficiently contemporaneous to qualify as a present-sense impression.

The fundamental premise behind this hearsay exception “is that substantial contemporaneity of event and statement minimizes unreliability due to [the declar-ant’s] defective recollection or conscious fabrication.” United States v. Manfre, 368 F.3d 832, 840 (8th Cir.2004) (quoting United States v. Blakey, 607 F.2d 779, 785 (7th Cir.1979)); 5 Weinstein’s Federal Evi-denoe § 803.03[1]; see Miller v. Keating, 754 F.2d 507, 512 (3d Cir.1985) (lack of time to deliberately manipulate truth of account is key). “The idea of immediacy lies at the heart of the exception,” thus, the time requirement underlying the exception “is strict because it is the factor that assures trustworthiness.” 4 Christopher B. Mueller and Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidenoe § 8:67, 559, 562 (3d ed.2007); see also Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 298-99, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973) (hearsay exceptions are premised on the idea that the particular circumstances surrounding the making of certain utterances guarantee their reliability). Put differently, the temporality re*156quirement must be rigorous because the passage of time — or the lack thereof — is the effective proxy for the reliability of the substance of the declaration; hence the greater the passage of time, the less truth-worthy the statement is presumed to be, and the more the scales should tip toward inadmissibility. Manfre, 368 F.3d at 840 (“The opportunity for strategic modification undercuts the reliability that spontaneity insures.”). Nevertheless, some brief temporal lapse is permissible so as to accommodate “the human realities that the condition or event may happen so fast that the words do not quite keep pace.” 4 Federal EvidenCe § 8:67, at 562; Fed. R.Evid. 803(1) Adv. Comm. Notes (1975) (“[w]ith respect to the time element, [803(1) ] recognizes that in many, if not most, instances precise contemporaneity is not possible and hence a slight lapse is allowable”).

While it is true, as the Government notes, that courts have not adopted any bright-line rule as to when a lapse of time becomes too lengthy to preclude Rule 803(l)’s application, see Blakey, 607 F.2d at 785 (no per se rule exists), we are nevertheless unaware of any legal authority for the proposition that 50 minutes after the fact3 may appropriately be considered “immediately thereafter.” On the contrary, given the clear language of the rule and its underlying rationale, courts consistently require substantial contemporaneity. See, e.g., United States v. Shoup, 476 F.3d 38, 42 (1st Cir.2007) (911 phone call made “only one or two minutes ... immediately following” event admissible); United States v. Danford, 435 F.3d 682, 687 (7th Cir.2006) (statement made “less than 60 seconds” after witnessing robbery qualified as present-sense impression); United States v. Jackson, 124 F.3d 607, 618 (4th Cir.1997) (statement by witness to police upon their arrival at scene that defendant was threatening to kill her family was admissible as “description of ongoing events”); Blakey, 607 F.2d at 779, 785-86 (not error to admit statement made at most 23 minutes after event4); cf. Manfre, 368 F.3d at 840 (statement made after “an intervening walk or drive” following event not admissible; “The present-sense-impression exception ... is rightfully limited to statements made while a declarant perceives an event or immediately thereafter, and we decline to expand it to cover a declarant’s relatively recent memories.”); Hilyer v. Howat Concrete Co., Inc., 578 F.2d 422, 426 n. 7 (D.C.Cir.1978) (excluding statement made between 15 and 45 minutes following event). Indeed, we have previously expressed skepticism that a statement made some 40 minutes after the fact could be properly admitted as a present-sense impression. Mitchell, 145 F.3d at 577 (where robbery occurred between 9:00am and 9:15am and notes were found in getaway car a mile from the crime scene *157at approximately 10:00am, intervening lapse was “probably too long for applicability of the present-sense impression[,] ... which requires the statement to be made virtually contemporaneously with the event being perceived”); see also Miller, 754 F.2d at 512 (concluding it was “not necessarily an abuse of discretion” to admit statement made “several minutes” after the fact as excited utterance, but noting “courts have recognized that the length of time separating the event from the statement [for admission as an excited utterance] may be considerably longer than for statements qualifying under the present sense impression exception of Rule 803(1)”) (emphasis added).

Here, we need not decide the precise temporal limits of application of the present-sense impression exception, nor whether a statement made 50 minutes after the fact could ever be properly admitted under Rule 803(1). This is so since Brown’s statement in this case is problematic not only because of the lengthy passage of time, but also because the statement was only made after he had been questioned by DEA agents about the details of the transaction the statement purports to describe. This undisputed sequence of events affirmatively indicates that Brown made his statement after he was expressly asked to reflect upon the events in question, and thereby fatally disqualifies the declaration for admission as a present-sense impression. See, e.g., 4 Federal Evidenoe § 8:67, at 564 (statements made after “significant delays — those measured in minutes or hours, especially if the speaker has made other statements in the interim— bar resort to [Rule] 803(1)”) (emphasis added); United States v. Narciso, 446 F.Supp. 252, 287-88 (E.D.Mich.1977) (note written two hours after event and in response to questions not present-sense impression because declarant “not only had time to reflect on what had transpired [but] was intentionally encouraged to reflect on those events before answering”). Admitting Brown’s statement under these circumstances would directly undermine the fundamental premise behind the present-sense impression exception — that contemporaneity ensures reliability because there is no time for deliberate fabrication. E.g., 4 FedeRal Evidenoe § 8:67, at 564 (“time for reflection [] lessen[s] or removes[s] the assurance of trustworthiness”); 5 Weinstein’s Federal Evidenoe § 803.03[1] (substantial contemporaneity required as to allow “little or no time for calculated misstatement”). In short, the weight of the authorities makes plain that Brown’s statement — made 50 minutes after perceiving the transaction, after he was searched and driven to DEA offices, and after he was debriefed by law enforcement — was not properly admitted as a present-sense impression.

Nor does Special Agent Miller’s testimony corroborating the substance of Brown’s description of the transaction otherwise render the statement admissible under Rule 803(1). We have indicated that courts may, in certain cases, require substantiation or other indicia of trustworthiness in addition to contemporaneity before admitting the declaration as a present-sense impression. See In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238, 303 (3d Cir.1983), rev’d on other grounds, 475 U.S. 574, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (declining to admit statements “solely on the basis of contemporaneity” because there was otherwise “reason to be skeptical” of their substance). However, we are aware of no authority that a statement which does not independently satisfy a hearsay exception’s prerequisites may nevertheless be admitted based solely upon corroboration of its contents. Such a proposition would obviously render much *158of the actual text of the hearsay rules completely superfluous.5

Our conclusion that the admission of Brown’s prior statement was error warrants reversal unless the error was harmless. Lippay v. Christos, 996 F.2d 1490, 1500 (3d Cir.1993). To determine harmlessness, we must decide whether it was highly probable that the evidentiary error substantially influenced the jury’s verdict. Gov’t of Virgin Islands v. Toto, 529 F.2d 278, 283 (3d Cir.1976). Here, notwithstanding the Government’s conelu-sory assertions to the contrary, the evidence against Green, outside of Brown’s statement, was not overwhelming. While Special Agent Miller testified he recognized Green as the individual briefly (and partially) depicted on the videotape, the informant himself — the only person who was actually physically present for the transaction — testified to the contrary. Given this conflicting testimony, the import of Brown’s prior statement in which he contradicts his trial testimony is self-evident, and the resulting prejudice to Green is plain. Even after taking into account Green’s reactions to watching the videotape and his subsequent inculpatory statement under interrogation, see supra n. 2, we cannot help but harbor a “grave doubt” that the erroneous admission of the written statement here substantially influenced the jury’s verdict. Toto, 529 F.2d at 283 (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946)); see Lippay, 996 F.2d at 1500 (new trial warranted where evidence pertaining to key issue in case was improperly admitted). Accordingly, we must vacate the conviction and remand for a new trial.

III. CONCLUSION

The District Court erred in admitting the written statement of the confidential informant as a present-sense impression. Because this error was not harmless, we will vacate Green’s conviction and remand the matter for a new trial.

OPINION BY

MUNDY, J.:

Appellant, Joshua Anthony Belknap, appeals from the October 25, 2013 judgment of sentence imposing no punishment, after he was found guilty in a bench trial of one count of possession of drug paraphernalia.1 After careful review, we affirm.

The trial court summarized the relevant facts of this case as follows.

On the evening of November 22, 2012, at approximately 9:51 P.M., the Brook-haven Police Department was dispatched to Brookhaven Swim Club. Officer Robert Barth was the first to arrive on the scene. Upon arrival, Officer Barth observed a large crowd of people across the street in a gravel parking lot. As he got closer he saw that the group was surrounding an individual, later identified as [Appellant], who was lying face down on the ground.

Officer Barth asked everyone to clear the area and asked for information *9about [] [Appellant]. He checked [Appellant’s] vitals and discovered that while he was unresponsive, he had a rapid pulse and was breathing. Officer Barth was told by two individuals on the scene that they believed [Appellant] had overdosed on heroin.

Officer Barth administered sternum rub to the [Appellant’s] chest, which he explained as a hard rub on the sternum of the chest and an unconscious subject, if they’re not totally out, will come to when you administer the rub. Immediately after administering the rub, [Appellant] opened his eyes for a few seconds and then went back out. Officer Barth then searched [Appellant’s] pockets for identification purposes. A needle with an orange cap was recovered from his right pocket. Officer Barth testified that he did not smell any alcohol emanating from [Appellant’s] person and did not locate alcohol within the general area where [Appellant] was found. Similarly, Officer Barth did not locate any controlled substances in the general area where [Appellant] was found.

Trial Court Opinion, 3/14/14, at 1-2 (citations to notes of testimony and internal quotation marks omitted).

Appellant was subsequently arrested, and on April 17, 2013, was charged with one count of possession of drug paraphernalia. Appellant waived his right to a jury and proceeded to a bench trial on October 16, 2013. At trial, the Commonwealth presented evidence from Officer Barth, who testified that, upon arriving at the scene and attempting to revive an unconscious Appellant, two of his friends indicated that Appellant had overdosed on heroin. N.T., 10/16/13, at 20-21, 25. Appellant’s counsel objected to said testimony on the grounds it constituted hearsay, but the trial court overruled this objection. Id. at 21, 26. In reaching this conclusion, the trial court concluded that Officer Barth’s testimony was admissible under the medical treatment exception to the hearsay rule, pursuant to Pa.R.E. 803(4). See id. at 23-24.

At the conclusion of the Commonwealth’s case-in-chief, Appellant made a motion for a directed verdict, and the trial court took the matter under advisement. Id. at 51-52, 61-64. Following argument on the matter, the trial court denied Appellant’s motion on October 21, 2013. Thereafter, on October 25, 2013, the trial court found Appellant guilty of one count of possession of drug paraphernalia, but declined to impose a sentence of confinement. See Trial Court Verdict Slip, 10/25/13; N.T., 10/25/13, at 6, 9. At the time of sentencing, Appellant was on parole in another matter, and was directed by the trial court to comply with the general rules governing probation and parole. N.T., 10/25/13, at 7; Trial Court Order, 10/25/13. Appellant did not file any post-sentence motions. On November 21, 2013, Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal.2

On appeal, Appellant raises the following issue for our review.

I[.] Whether the trial court erred in allowing the hearsay testimony of Officer Robert Barth regarding out-of-court statements made by unidentified individuals who stated to him that [Appellant] may have overdosed in their car and that [Appellant] had an addiction .to heroin[?]

Appellant’s Brief at 7.

In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence, our standard of review is one of deference. Questions concerning the admissibility of evidence are “within the sound discretion of *10the trial court ... [and] we will not reverse a trial court’s decision concerning admissibility of evidence absent an abuse of the trial court’s discretion.” Commonwealth v. Brown, 617 Pa. 107, 52 A.3d 1139, 1197 (2012) (citation omitted). “An abuse of discretion is not merely an error of judgment, but is rather the overriding or misapplication of the law, or the exercise of judgment that is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of bias, prejudice, ill-will or partiality, as shown by the evidence of record.” Commonwealth v. Mendez, 74 A.3d 256, 260 (Pa.Super.2013) (citation omitted), appeal denied, - Pa. -, 87 A.3d 319 (2013). “[I]f in reaching a conclusion the trial court over-rides [sic] or misapplies the law, discretion is then abused and it is the duty of the appellate court to correct the error.” Commonwealth v. Weakley, 972 A.2d 1182, 1188 (Pa.Super.2009) (citation omitted), appeal denied, 604 Pa. 696, 986 A.2d 150 (2009).

“Hearsay means a statement that ... the declarant does not make while testifying at the current trial or hearing; and ... a party offers in evidence- to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement.” Pa.R.E. 801(c). “Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by [the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence], by other rules prescribed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, or by statute.” Pa.R.E. 802. However, an out-of-court statement is not hearsay when it is introduced for the purpose of establishing the fact that the statement itself was made, rather than for the truth of that statement. Cf. Pa.R.E. 801(c). This is true whether or not the declarant is available. Id.

This Court has long recognized that to insure a party the guarantees of trustworthiness resulting from a declarant’s presence in court, a proponent of hearsay evidence must point to a reliable hearsay exception before such testimony will be admitted. Thus, the burden of production is on the proponent of the hearsay statement to convince the court of its admissibility under one of the exceptions.

Commonwealth v. Smith, 545 Pa. 487, 681 A.2d 1288, 1290 (1996) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

In the instant matter, the trial court permitted Officer Barth to testify as to hearsay statements that were made to him by Appellant’s friends as he attempted to resuscitate Appellant. Officer Barth testified, over Appellant’s objections, as follows.

Q. [Commonwealth:] Okay. And you said that you had asked what happened. At some point in trying to determine what course of action to take with [Appellant] did you receive any information as to what had happened?

A. [Officer Barth:] Yes. There was (sic) two subjects there that identified themselves as [Appellant’s] friends. They notified me that he went unconscious in their vehicle and they believed he overdosed.

[Appellant’s Counsel]: Objection, Your Honor. That is the hearsay statement.

Q. [Commonwealth:] Did you get an indication of what he overdosed on?

A. [Officer Barth:] They also said that [Appellant] was — had an addiction to heroin that he was fighting on and off for years.

[Appellant’s Counsel]: Objection, Your Honor, that is also speculative. We don’t know how they know unless he’s carrying the drugs or presently ...

N.T., 10/16/13, at 20-21, 25.

Appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in concluding that Officer Barth’s testimony was admissible under the medical treatment exception to *11the hearsay rule. Appellant’s Brief 11,15-18. Appellant maintains that the trial court’s reliance on Rule 808(4) is misplaced, as the medical treatment exception is limited to out-of-court statements made to physicians and nurses, and the statements in question “had little impact on the course of action he took when he arrived on location.” Id. at 16. Appellant further argues that this testimony “was inherently unreliable[,]” and the trial court abused its discretion in allowing it to be admitted into evidence. Id. at 10, 18-19. For the following reasons, we disagree.

As noted, Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 808 enumerates various exceptions to the general inadmissibility of hearsay testimony, including the one at issue here. Rule 803(4) excludes from the hearsay rule statements made for the purposes of medical diagnosis and treatment (the “medical treatment exception”), and provides as follows.

Rule 803. Exceptions to the Rule Against Hearsay — Regardless of Whether the Declarant Is Available as a Witness

The following are not excluded by the rule against hearsay, regardless of whether the declarant is available as a witness:

(4) Statement Made for Medical Diagnosis or Treatment. A statement that:

(A) is made for — and is reasonably pertinent to — medical treatment or diagnosis in contemplation of treatment; and

(B) describes medical history, past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof, insofar as reasonably pertinent to treatment, or diagnosis in contemplation of treatment.

Comment: Pa.R.E. 803(4) differs from F.R.E. 803(4) in that it permits admission of statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis only if they are made in contemplation of treatment. Statements made to persons retained solely for the purpose of litigation are not admissible under this rule. The rationale for admitting statements for purposes of treatment is that the declarant has a very strong motivation to speak truthfully. This rationale is not applicable to statements made for purposes of litigation. Pa.R.E. 803(4) is consistent with Pennsylvania law. See [Smith, supra at 1288].

This rule is not limited to statements made to physicians. Statements to a nurse have been held to be admissible. See Smith, supra. Statements as to causation may be admissible, but statements as to fault or identification of the person inflicting harm have been held to be inadmissible. See Smith, supra.

Pa.R.E. 803(4) (citation formatting corrected; emphasis added).

“The medical treatment exception provides that testimony repeating out-of-court statements made for the purposes of receiving medical treatment are admissible as substantive evidence.” Commonwealth v. Fink, 791 A.2d 1235, 1246 (Pa.Super.2002) (citation omitted). This is true “regardless whether the declarant is available as a witness.” Commonwealth v. D.J.A., 800 A.2d 965, 975 (Pa.Super.2002), appeal denied, 579 Pa. 700, 857 A.2d 677 (2004), appeal denied, 598 Pa. 786, 959 A.2d 928 (2004). The following two requirements must be satisfied in order for a statement to qualify as a medical treatment exception: (1) the statement must be made for the purpose of receiving medical treatment; and (2) the statement must be necessary and proper for diagnosis and treatment. Id. at 976 (citation omitted).

*12Upon review, we discern no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in concluding that Appellant’s aforementioned hearsay claim was devoid of merit. The record reflects that Officer Barth testified pursuant to the medical treatment exception that, prior to his attempt to revive an unconscious Appellant, he inquired as to what had transpired and two of Appellant’s friends indicated that he had overdosed on heroin. N.T., 10/16/13, at 20-21, 25. First, these statements in question were clearly made for the sole purpose of obtaining “medical treatment or diagnosis” on behalf of Appellant. See Pa.R.E. 803(4)(A). The record reflects that Appellant was found lying face down and unconscious in the Brookhaven Swim Club Parking Lot, surrounded by a group of individuals, and Officer Barth, the first to respond to the scene, immediately inquired as to the possible cause of Appellant’s condition in order to determine how to proceed. N.T., 10/16/13, at 18-20.

Second, although Officer Barth testified on cross-examination that the information he received from Appellant’s friends “didn’t change the way [he] dealt with [Appellant,]” said statements described a possible cause of Appellant’s unconsciousness, which were “reasonably pertinent to [his] treatment[,]” of Appellant. See Pa. R.E. 803(4)(B); N.T., 10/16/13, at 26. The record reflects that at the time of this incident, Officer Barth was an 18-year veteran of the Brookhaven Police Department and was trained in the practice of resuscitating victims who may have suffered a drug overdose, like Appellant in the case sub judice, by performing a sternum rub. N.t., 10/16/13, at 17, 27-28.

Third, the statements of Appellant’s friends at the scene carried a strong assurance of reliability, in that they were evidently made in order to assist Officer Barth in the timely resuscitation of Appellant, who was unconscious and lying face down in a parking lot at the time of Officer Barth’s arrival. This Court has long recognized that statements proffered under Rule 803(4) are subject to a two-part reliability test. “First, the declarant must have a motive consistent with obtaining medical care. Second, the content of the statement must be such as is reasonably relied upon by medical personnel for treatment or diagnosis.” Smith, supra at 1291 (citation omitted).

Fourth, the admission of this aforementioned testimony did not deprive Appellant of a fair trial. The record reflects that the trial court, sitting as factfinder, explicitly disregarded the testimony concerning Appellant’s prior heroin use, and considered this testimony for the sole purpose of the medical treatment exception. See N.T., 10/16/13, pp. 43-44.

Lastly, we note that, contrary to Appellant’s contention, the medical treatment exception to the hearsay rule set forth in Rule 803(4) is not expressly limited to statements made to licensed medical professionals such as physicians or nurses. See Appellant’s Brief at 16, referencing Smith, supra.3 Nor has our own independent research yielded any case law in this *13Commonwealth indicating that this is the case. Rather, as noted, the official comment to Rule 803(4) states that “[t]his rule is not limited to statements made to physicians[,]” and statements as to causation, e.g. how the person sustained the injury, may be admissible. Pa.R.E. 803(4) Comment; see also Fink, supra (stating, “a statement comes within this exception when ... [it] relat[es] to the cause of the injury ... and ... as to how the person sustained the injuries ... [ ]”).

Instantly, Officer Barth, the first-responder at the scene in question, testified that when he arrived on the scene, he noticed a large group of people across the street in a parking lot. N.T., 10/16/13, at 19. Upon getting close, Officer Barth saw Appellant lying face down in the gravel. Id. The first thing Officer Barth did was ask the group to move out of his way and to tell him what happened. Id. As this was transpiring, Officer Barth approached Appellant, rolled him over and checked his vital signs, including his pulse and verified that he was breathing. Id. at 20. It was during these moments, when Officer Barth was actually trying to assess Appellant’s condition and provide first-response, emergency medical treatment that the de-clarants, two of Appellant’s friends, told Officer Barth that Appellant had gone unconscious in their vehicle and they believed he had overdosed. Id. at 21. Therefore, the certified record reveals the declarants made their statements to Officer Barth, a trained first responder, specifically in the context of his trying to assess Appellant’s then-present condition, symptoms, and the cause thereof. As a result, it logically follows, the statements in this case were made for the purpose of securing medical treatment, as he was providing first-response, emergency medical treatment. As a result, we conclude the statements were admissible under Rule 803(4). See Brown, supra.

Based on the foregoing, we discern no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in concluding Appellant’s hearsay claim is devoid of merit. Accordingly, the trial court’s October 25, 2013 judgment of sentence is affirmed.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

GEORGE CLIFTON EDWARDS, Jr., Circuit Judge.

In these two cases plaintiffs John Ed Clay and Curtis Bailey, each joined by his wife, brought actions for damages against defendants Johns-Manville Sales Corporation and Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., on the basis of products liability claims resulting from plaintiffs’ exposure to asbestos containing products manufactured by the defendants. The cases were tried in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee and ended in jury verdicts for the defendants.

Appellants urge that the District Judge committed reversible error in a variety of ways. In our judgment, three of these require our discussion.

Before turning to these issues, however, we must point out that Johns-Manville as previously recognized in a number of cases which we cite in the footnote below,1 has filed for reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1979,11 U.S.C. § 1101, et seq. Supp. Ill 1979, in the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York. This action brought into play the automatic stay provision set out in § 362(a)(1) of the Act, which reads:

§ 362. Automatic stay

(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a petition filed under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title operates as a stay, applicable to all entities, of—

(1) the commencement or continuation, including the issuance or employment of process, of a judicial, administrative, or other proceeding against the debtor that was or could have been commenced before the commencement of the ease under this title, or to recover a claim against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title; ....

The language of § 362(a)(1) quoted above states flatly that filing of a bankruptcy *1291petition ‘operates as a stay.’ Although no motion to stay has been filed by Johns-Man-ville in this court, we hereby order the appeal as to Johns-Manville to be stayed, pending further action by the parties or the Bankruptcy Court in the Southern District of New York, and we further instruct the clerk to place the file as it pertains to Johns-Manville in inactive status, pending the actions just referred to.

I.

Turning now to the other issues remaining in relation to defendant Raybestos-Manhattan, the first issue pertains to the judge’s instruction to the jury on the possible effect of a general 10-year statute of limitations, T.C.A. § 29-28-103, which became effective in the State of Tennessee on July 1, 1978. This statute was amended approximately one year later by the Tennessee legislature by the adoption of T.C.A. § 29-28-103(b) which provided that the 10-year statute of limitations was inapplicable “to any action resulting from exposure to asbestos.” The District Judge in these cases instructed the jury in effect that if the jury found that plaintiffs during the year the 10-year statute of limitations was in effect for all cases discovered or should have discovered that they were suffering from asbestosis, then the jury should find for the defendants.

Although it seems obvious to us that the legislature of Tennessee, in adopting the 10-year statute of limitations without any exemption of asbestos disease in the first instance, simply made a serious error which it has now sought to correct, appellees argue that the Tennessee Constitution and the Tennessee Supreme Court have mandated the interpretation which the District Judge gave to this jury. See Article I, Section 20 of the Tennessee Constitution, which provides: “That no retrospective law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts, shall be made.” See Ford Motors v. Moulton, 511 S.W.2d 690 (Tenn.1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 870, 95 S.Ct. 129, 42 L.Ed.2d 109 (1974), reaffirmed, 533 S.W.2d 295 (Tenn.1976).

This would obviously produce a harsh result from what appears clearly to have been a legislative mistake. Even so, the federal courts in the exercise of their diversity jurisdiction would be obligated to follow state law as that law has been construed by the state’s highest court, absent reason to believe from subsequent state court developments that such would no longer be the ruling of the Supreme Court of Tennessee.

Such reason has now been found in a recent case in this court which raised this identical issue from a similar ruling by the same District Judge. In Murphree v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 696 F.2d 459 (6th Cir.1982), with one of this court’s Tennessee judges writing for a unanimous panel, the court held on the principal legal issue presented in our instant case:

“The main question of law on appeal in this diversity case is whether Tennessee’s ten year statute of limitations based on sale, adopted July 1, 1978, as T.C.A. § 29-28-103 (action ‘must be brought within ten years from the date ... product . . . first purchased for use’) created for defendant a vested right barring plaintiff’s claim despite a July 1, 1979, statutory amendment excluding asbestos-related disease actions from this ten year ceiling.1 The Tennessee appellate courts have not spoken directly on this issue. We hold that Tennessee’s vested rights doctrine based on Tennessee Constitution Article I Section 20 does not bar the claim and that the 1979 amendment is applicable as a matter of law.

“Interpretation of Tennessee’s various statutes of limitations governing products liability actions has created troublesome problems for Tennessee courts in the past two decades. In 1969 the Tennessee Supreme Court in Jackson v. General Motors, 223 Tenn. 12, 441 S.W.2d 482 (1969), adopted a rule widely criticized by the bench and bar of the state. It held that Tennessee’s limitations statute in products cases begins to run on the date of purchase of the product and not on the date of injury or discovery. Thus, in some cases of latent disease and injury the limitation period expired before discovery by the victim. The legislature acted promptly to overrule the holding in Jackson by amending the statute. *1292In 1974 the Tennessee Supreme Court, with Justice William Fones dissenting, prevented the amendment from becoming effective. The Court held in Ford Motor Company v. Moulton, 511 S.W.2d 690 (Tenn.1974) that under Tennessee vested rights doctrine, based on Article I, Section 20 of the Tennessee Constitution, the statutory amendment running the limitation period from discovery could not be applied retroactively. Thus, the seller who sold his product outside the statutory period was held to have a vested right to defeat an action for injuries discovered and sued upon during the statutory period.

“In 1975, shortly after the decision in Moulton, a new Tennessee Supreme Court was elected. Of the members of the old Court, only Justice William Fones remained. He became the first Chief Justice of the new Court. The new Court, in an opinion by Justice Joe Henry (a beloved member of that Court until his recent untimely death), promptly overruled Jackson v. General Motors, supra, and held that the limitations statute runs from discovery, not sale. In McCroskey v. Bryant Air Conditioning Co., 524 S.W.2d 487 (Tenn.1975), Justice Henry held that ‘reason, logic and fundamental fairness’ demanded that the running of the statute begin upon discovery, for it is ludicrous to have a ‘law which charges a litigant with sleeping upon any right which he does not have’ just as one cannot ‘harvest a crop never planted, or burn down a house never built.’ 524 S.W.2d at 489. The McCroskey opinion announces very clearly that judicial policy in Tennessee does not favor doctrines that activate statutes of limitations before the plaintiff has knowledge of his injury.

“Although the Tennessee Supreme Court in McCroskey did not expressly overrule the vested rights doctrine as applied to statutes of limitations in Moulton, it is clear to us that the Moulton vested rights doctrine no longer has any vitality. Justice Henry’s McCroskey opinion quotes from that part of Justice Fones’ Moulton dissent that quotes in turn from an opinion of this Court by Judges Phillips, Edwards and Celebrezze. In McCroskey Justice Henry said:

Our own Chief Justice [Fones] dissented from the majority opinion in Ford Motor Company v. Moulton, supra. We quote from his dissent:

“The following principles are stated concisely in Hodge v. Service Machine Company, 438 F.2d 347 (6th Cir.1971).

‘A cause of action accrues when a suit may be maintained upon it. Black’s Law Dictionary 37 (4th ed. 1951). A suit may not be brought upon a cause of action until it exists, and a cause of action does not exist until all its elements coalesce. In civil actions for damages, two elements must coalesce before a cause of action can exist: (a) a breach of some legally recognized duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff; (b) which causes the plaintiff some legally cognizable damage.’

To hold that a products liability action, which is a recognized legal right, is barred by a statute of limitations before any injury is sustained, deprives a person of the opportunity of redress for an injury done him in his goods or person by due process of law, contrary to our Constitution. 511 S.W.2d at 697.”

524 S.W.2d at 490.

Regarding Moulton, the McCroskey Court stated that it did not need to reach the retroactivity — i.e. vested rights — question. However, the Court did make the following observation: ‘We, therefore, neither reaffirm nor reverse Ford Motor Co. v. Moulton, but we have quoted, with approval, from the dissent of our present Chief Justice.’

“We do not find that the Tennessee Supreme Court has had occasion to speak on the retroactivity question in products cases since McCroskey. Justice Henry’s language in that case quoting from Justice Fones’ reliance on our opinion in Hodge v. Service Machine Co., 438 F.2d 347 (6th Cir.1971), and our knowledge of the careful and progressive character of the Tennessee Supreme Court, make it clear to us that the old vested rights doctrine as applied to statutes of limitations in Moulton is no longer the law in Tennessee and will be overruled when the occasion arises.

*1293“Tennessee will no longer apply undeb Article I Section 20 of its Constitution d vested rights doctrine to defeat a statutory, amendment that runs a statute of limita-; tions from the time of discovery of the; injury. The Tennessee Supreme Court will no longer use the vested rights doctrine to;: prevent the Tennessee legislature from;, ameliorating the harshness of a rule that; bars a plaintiff’s claim before he discovers; it. ;

“Thus the plaintiffs claim here is not barred under Tennessee law. The statutory' amendment excepting asbestos-related dis-; ease causes .of action from the ten year" limitations statute based on sale does not: abridge any right protected under the Ten-; nessee. Constitution. This brings the Ten-r nessee law into line with federal law on; vested rights as applied to statutes of limi-,. tations under the Federal Constitution.! The United States Supreme Court has long!; since rejected old doctrines of substantive,! due process which said that a liberalizing:; change in a statute of limitations abridges1; vested rights. See Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 65 S.Ct. 1137, 89 L.Ed. 1628, reh. denied, 325 U.S. 896, 65 S.Ct. 1561, 89 L.Ed. 2006 (1945) (statutory:, amendment abolishing limitations defense did not deprive defendant of any right);: Campbell v. Holt, 115 U.S. 620, 6 S.Ct. 209, 29 L.Ed. 483 (1885) (statutes of limitations! go to matters of remedy rather than de-) struetion of fundamental rights). In Donaldson, supra, Justice Jackson stated for the; Court:

Statutes of limitation find their justifi-; cation in necessity and convenience rath-; er than in logic. They represent expedients, rather than principles. They are practical and pragmatic devices to spare the courts from litigation of stale claims,! and the citizens from being put to his ; defense after memories have faded, wit- i nesses have died or disappeared, and evi-; dence has been lost. Order of Railroad, Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 349 [64 S.Ct. 582, 586, 88 L.Ed. 788]. They are by definition arbi- ¡, trary, and their operation does not discriminate between the just and the unjust claim, or the voidable and unavoidable delay. They have come into the law not through the judicial process but through legislation. They represent a public policy about the privilege to litigate. Their shelter has never been regarded as what now is called a “fundamental” right or what used to be called a “natural” right of the individual. He may, of course, have the protection of the policy while it exists, but the history of pleas of limitation shows them to be good only by legislative grace and to be subject to a relatively large degree of legislative control.

Id. 325 U.S. at 314, 65 S.Ct. at 1142.

“Therefore, the District Court erred in allowing the statute of limitations issue to go to the jury under a charge that allowed the jury to base a verdict for defendant on the 10 year statutory ceiling on products liability cases. The 1979 statutory amendment excepting asbestosis cases applies to this case and is not made ineffective by the vested rights doctrine.

“1 The trial court made the issue of the application of the ten year statute a jury question, charging the jury as follows:

“Under Tennessee Products Liability Law, if a plaintiff discovered, or should have discovered, his injury between July 1st, 1978 and June 30th, 1979, then he may not recover damages if the product which allegedly caused his injury was first purchased for use or consumption more than ten years prior to the date on which his lawsuit was filed.

“It should be remembered that this ten year period of limitation applies only when the plaintiff discovered, or should have discovered, his injury during the year beginning July 1st, 1978 and ending June 30th, 1979.

“This lawsuit was filed on December 8th, 1979. Therefore, if you find that plaintiff discovered, or should have discovered, his injury between July 1st, 1978 and June 30th, 1979, then, you should not consider exposure of plaintiff’s decedent to defendant’s products which were purchased for use or consumption before December 7th, 1969.”

We are bound by this opinion and we find occasion to state that we agree with it. This issue, of course, requires vacation of the judgment below and remand for retrial.

II.

We turn now to the second issue which requires our consideration, namely whether *1294the District Judge erred in excluding a deposition taken from a witness, Dr. Kenneth Wallace Smith, in DeRocco v. Forty-eight Installation, Inc., No. 7880 (W.D.Pa.1974). At the time of the DeRocco proceeding, Dr. Smith was 63 years of age and had acquired his knowledge about asbestos disease in the employment of the Johns-Manville Corporation, the largest asbestos manufacturer in the field. Serving Johns-Manville during a good portion of his 22 years of employment as the only full-time physician in the organization, Dr. Smith’s deposition is peculiarly relevant to the extent of the knowledge possessed by manufacturers of the hazards of asbestos containing products during the years when appellants Clay and Bailey allege they were exposed to asbestos.

Dr. Smith had died before the trial of this case. The key question in relation to the admissibility of this evidence is posed by the language of Rule 804(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which reads:

Rule 804. Hearsay Exceptions; Declar-ant Unavailable

(a) Definition of unavailability. “Unavailability as a witness” includes situations in which the declarant—

(b) Hearsay exceptions. The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness:

(1) Former testimony. Testimony given as a witness at another hearing of the same or a different proceeding, or in a deposition taken in compliance with law in the course of the same or another proceeding, if the party against whom the testimony is now offered, or, in a civil action or proceeding, a predecessor in interest, had an opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination.

To ascertain the meaning of “predecessor in interest,” an examination of legislative history is necessary. As originally proposed by the Supreme Court, Rule 804(b)(1) would have admitted prior testimony of an unavailable witness if the party against whom it is offered or a person “with a motive and interest” similar to him had an opportunity to examine that witness. H.R.Rep. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 7051, 7088. The House of Representatives substituted the current “predecessor in interest” language. The House Committee on the Judiciary offered the following explanation for the alteration:

The Committee considered that it is generally unfair to impose upon the party against whom the hearsay evidence is being offered responsibility for the manner in which the witness was previously handled by another party. The sole exception to this, in the Committee’s view, is when a party’s predecessor in interest in a civil action or proceeding had an opportunity and similar motive to examine the witness. The Committee amended the Rule to reflect these policy determinations.

H.R.Rep. No. 650, U.S.Code Cong. & Admin. News 1974, p. 7088, supra.

Although the Senate accepted the change proposed by the House, the Senate Committee on the Judiciary made the following observation about the import of the House actions:

Former testimony. — Rule 804(b)(1) as submitted by the Court allowed prior testimony of an unavailable witness to be admissible if the party against whom it is offered or a person “with motive and interest similar” to his had an opportunity to examine the witness.

The House amended the rule to apply only to a party’s predecessor in interest. Although the committee recognizes considerable merit to the rule submitted by the Supreme Court, a position which has been advocated by many scholars and judges, we have concluded that the difference between the two versions is not great and we accept the House amendment.

S.Rep. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 7051, 7074.

We join the Third Circuit in agreeing with the Senate Committee that the *1295difference between the ultimate revision and the Rule, as originally proposed, is “not great.” Lloyd v. American Export Lines Inc., 580 F.2d 1179, 1185 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 969, 99 S.Ct. 461, 58 L.Ed.2d 428 (1978). Accordingly, we adopt the position taken by the Lloyd court which it expressed in the following language: "

While we do not endorse an extravagant interpretation of who or what constitutes a “predecessor in interest,” we prefer one that is realistically generous, over one that is formalistically grudging.;1 We believe that what has been described as “the practical and expedient view” ex-,' presses the congressional intention: “if it appears that in the former suit a party ! having a like motive to cross-examine about the same matters as the present! party would have, was accorded an adequate opportunity for such examination, the testimony may be received against; the present party.” Under these circumstances, the previous party having like; motive to develop the testimony about, the same material facts is, in the final , analysis, a predecessor in interest to the present party.

Id. at 1187. See also Rule v. International Association of Bridge, Structural Ornamental Iron Workers, Local 396, 568 F.2d 558, 569 (8th Cir.1977); Weinstein & Berger, Evidence § 804(b)(1) [04] at 804-67 (1969) (“[C]ases decided since the enactment of: Rule 804(b)(1) for the most part indicate a reluctance to interpret ‘predecessor in interest’ in its old, narrow, and substantive law) sense, of privity”). Contra In re IBM Peripheral EDP Devices Antitrust Litigation, 444 F.Supp. 110 (N.D.Cal.1978).

Our examination of the record sub-! mitted in this case satisfies us that defendants in the DeRocco case had a similar motive in confronting Dr. Smith’s testimony, both in terms of appropriate objections : and searching cross-examination, to that which Raybestos has in the current litigation. We therefore hold that the purposes ; of Rule 804(b)(1) will be fulfilled by the admission of Dr. Smith’s deposition on retrial.

III.

At trial appellants Clay and Bailey filed a motion seeking summary judgment against both original defendants, maintaining that they were entitled to a ruling that the defendants were estopped from raising the issue of whether they knew or reasonably should have known of the danger associated with use of their products containing asbestos. In this regard plaintiffs rely upon Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir.1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869, 95 S.Ct. 127, 42 L.Ed.2d 107 (1974).

While Johns-Manville, an original defendant in this case (now excluded because of its filing for bankruptcy) was a party to Borel, Raybestos, the only defendant with whom we deal in this opinion, was not. Collateral estoppel prevents a party from relitigating a question put in issue and conclusively determined against that party, where such party had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the first suit. It is clear that we do not have before us a proper claim for summary judgment on the basis of collateral estoppel on the part of plaintiffs against remaining defendant Raybestos.

In Parklane Hosiery v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 99 S.Ct. 645, 58 L.Ed.2d 552 (1979), Justice Stewart’s opinion for a nearly unanimous Court gave limited sanction to the offensive use of collateral estoppel. On retrial of this case, we commend to the District Judge’s attention the standards set forth in Sections A and B of the Parklane opinion and suggest that he allow plaintiffs opportunity to prove, if they can, that they are entitled to the use of the doctrine of offensive collateral estoppel. We also, however, recognize the broad discretion that the Supreme Court has vested in the District Judge in determining whether or not to make use of this doctrine. Recognizing the difficulty of applying the doctrine equitably, Justice Stewart concluded for the Court:

We have concluded that the preferable approach for dealing with these problems in the federal courts is not to preclude *1296the use of offensive collateral estoppel, but to grant trial courts broad discretion to determine when it should be applied. The general rule should be that in cases where a plaintiff could easily have joined in the earlier action or where, either for the reasons discussed above or for other reasons, the application of offensive es-toppel would be unfair to a defendant, a trial judge should not allow the use of offensive collateral estoppel.

439 U.S. at 331, 99 S.Ct. at 651-52.

The judgments entered below against plaintiffs are vacated and the cases are remanded for retrial against defendant Raybestos in accordance with this opinion.

JAMES R. EYLER, Judge.

Robert Angel Perez, Jr., appellant (hereinafter Perez or appellant), was convicted by a jury in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County of two counts of felony murder and related charges. Appellant challenges his convictions on several grounds, including an assertion that his statements should have been suppressed because they were involuntary. One of the factors relevant to voluntariness was a delay in presentment to a district court commissioner. In light of recent Court of Appeals decisions dealing with a delay in presentment, we shall vacate appellant’s convictions and remand to the circuit court for new pre-trial proceedings and a new trial. We shall also consider (1) the court’s refusal to instruct the jury, pursuant to Md. Rule 4-212, that the police are obligated to take persons accused of a crime to a district court commissioner “without unnecessary delay and in no event later than 24 hours after arrest,” and (2) the trial court’s exclusion of testimony with respect to statements made by one of the two victims, shortly before she died.

*6FACTS AND LEGAL PROCEEDINGS

The Murders

On September 15, 1999, veterinarian Nirwan Tharpar and his wife, Shashi Tharpar, were brutally murdered at their animal hospital in Bladensburg, Maryland. An equipment technician found Dr. Tharpar lying behind the reception counter. When police arrived, they discovered that Dr. Tharpar was dead from gunshot wounds. His throat was also slit. They also discovered Mrs. Tharpar on the floor nearby. Though she had been hit in the back of her head and shot at close range over both eyes and in her neck, she was still alive. She described a single assailant — a tall black male. She died shortly after arriving at the hospital.

On August 7, 2000, Keith Mahar informed Prince George’s County Detective Joseph Hoffman that Perez and Thomas Gordon had admitted to killing the Tharpars while they robbed the hospital. The next day, on August 8, Hoffman applied for and obtained an arrest warrant for Perez, alleging that probable cause arose from

information [that] was received by Prince George’s County Police Detectives that a witness had knowledge of the persons responsible for these homicides. This witness was interviewed at which time he stated that [Perez] and co-defendant admitted that they had committed an armed robbery of an Animal Hospital in Bladensburg during which time both victims were killed.

Shortly after midnight on August 9, 2000, police officers arrested Perez and took him to the homicide unit of the Prince George’s County Criminal Investigation Division (“CID”), where he arrived at 12:31 a.m.

Perez’s Statements

The State’s case against Perez included statements that he made to Prince George’s County homicide detectives during the approximately 48 hours after he was arrested, but before he was presented to a district court commissioner. *7According to the evidence considered in a light most favorable to the State, here is what happened during that time.1

Perez was taken to an interrogation room in the homicide unit of CID.

At approximately 1:00 a.m. on August 9, Detective Hoffman and Detective Robert Turner entered the room. Hoffman reviewed Miranda2 rights with Perez. Perez indicated that he understood his rights and did not want an attorney, and he executed a waiver form.

For about forty minutes, Hoffman and Turner interviewed Perez “about his personal information, his associates, his friends, background stuff, school, family, jobs, and things of that' nature.” At some point, they talked “about a murder involving him and Thomas Gordon.” Perez denied any involvement in the murder.

The officers left Perez alone in the room for about 45 minutes while they conferred with other detectives about the status of the investigation. At 2:25 a.m., Hoffman and Turner reentered the room and interviewed Perez for another 80 minutes. At some point, although they had not yet talked to Gordon, the detectives told Perez that Gordon said Perez was the shooter in the incident. Perez continued to deny any involvement. The detectives gave Perez water and left him alone between 3:45 and 4:00 a.m., while they conferred with other detectives about progress in the investigation, including “what was going on in the interview.”

Turner resumed the interrogation from 4:40 until 5:50 a.m., with a bathroom break at Perez’s request. Prior to this point *8in time, Perez admitted knowing Gordon but denied any involvement in the murders, denied owning or firing a gun, and denied that he had ever seen Gordon with a gun.

During this interview, however, Perez admitted that he had seen Gordon fire a gun twice. Perez also admitted that he was under investigation for some breaking and enterings. But, he continued to deny any involvement in the murders.

Perez was again left alone in the interrogation room. At 7:25 a.m., Detective Nelson Rhone, a member of the CID, found Perez “asleep leaning over a tablet.]” He “had to shake him to wake him up.” Perez was not handcuffed at this time, or at any time, while in the room.

After waking Perez, Rhone introduced himself and gave Perez “a little time to get himself together[.]” He then went over some biographical information.

At 9:15 a.m., Rhone and Perez completed another Miranda advisement and waiver. Perez was given some water and a break for the bathroom.

Rhone then questioned Perez about the murders. Perez admitted knowing Gordon, that “they had done several different B and E’s in ... Bowie,” and that he knew Gordon had a gun, but he claimed he had never seen Gordon with it.

“Later on,” however, Perez described “one time” in which he and Gordon were “just driving” in Perez’s black Mustang. Gordon “said he needed some money, and they talked about stopping somebody on the side of the road, robbing him.” But they could not find anybody, and Gordon “pointed out a spot, and said ... let’s go into that one and rob that place.” Gordon told Perez to go inside. Perez “knew he was inside of a[n] animal hospital because the lobby had pictures of dogs and cats[.]” He stayed “two to three minutes,” and saw only one “white lady,” about 40 to 50 years old. Returning to the car, he “[t]old Thomas Gordon no police were near” and “[described ... what was inside.” After parking the car at another location, “[b]oth went in.” Perez “[s]aid he heard some shots and then ran out.” “[H]e didn’t stay ... more *9than a brief second” before “jumping in his car.” “All of a sudden Thomas Gordon comes running out[.]” They drove “straight to Bowie.” When Rhone “asked him to reduce his oral statement into writing, ... that’s what he did.”

At 12:07 p.m., Rhone provided Perez with a form to write down this statement. Perez wrote six lines, and then Rhone recorded written questions and answers. The statement was completed about 2:00 p.m. At about 2:20, “[sjomeone brought some [fast] food[.]”

Another break ensued. Detective Hoffman, who had gone home to sleep, returned to the station and learned about Perez’s statement. At 2:58 p.m., Hoffman reentered the interrogation room, again reviewed Miranda rights, and Perez executed a waiver. Perez then stated that he was present during the robbery and the shooting and that “he went inside to check the place out.” “He heard [Gordon] shoot three times[,]” then “lied the scene[.]” Gordon “followed a short time later.” Perez wrote a second statement, which was two pages, and then answered follow-up questions and signed written answers. He began the written statement at 3:31 p.m. and completed it at 5:01 p.m. Perez also “drew a map of how the animal hospital is laid out and the general area surrounding the animal hospital[,]” showing “[w]here they parked their car[.]”

At approximately 7:00 p.m., Detective Ismael Canales entered the room and advised Perez of his Miranda rights, in preparation for administering a voice stress analysis (lie detector) test that Hoffman asked him to perform. Perez signed a release form stating that he agreed to submit to the test. Canales left the room at 8:10 p.m.

Around midnight on August 10, Detective Hoffman returned to the interrogation room with another Miranda waiver and a second type of waiver form. Because Perez had been in custody for almost 24 hours, Hoffman had been advised by a senior investigator that it would be a good idea to ask Perez to waive what he described as his right to be presented to a district court commissioner within 24 hours after arrest. He *10brought a waiver statement that he had typed on his word processor.

When Hoffman came in, Perez had his head down on the table, apparently sleeping. At 12:08 a.m., Hoffman reviewed Miranda rights, and Perez executed a waiver. At 12:10, Hoffman advised Perez that since he had “been in the custody of the Prince George’s County Police for over 23 hours[,]” he had “a right to be presented before a District Court Commissioner within 24 hours[.]” He then asked Perez a series of seven questions, to which Perez responded that he voluntarily agreed to remain at the station for additional questioning; he had not been promised anything, threatened, or coerced into remaining or signing the waiver; he had been advised of his constitutional rights before being questioned; he had not been denied the use of the bathroom or telephone while in custody; and he had not asked for an attorney to be present.

Hoffman reported that Perez “was very cooperative, no problem staying past 24 hours.” Perez did not appear tired to Hoffman, who noted that “[h]e had time to sleep at different times.” Hoffman then left Perez to sleep.

Based on Perez’s statements, police brought Thomas Gordon from an Anne Arundel County detention facility to CID. Rhone explained that this took several hours and required a judge’s signature. Beginning at 11:30 p.m., Detective Bergstrom spoke with Gordon about the murders.

Rhone returned on the morning of August 10 to ask Perez again about his involvement in the murders, based on what the police had learned from Gordon and from Perez’s voice stress test. According to Rhone, another reason detectives wished to talk again with Perez was that “[t]he autopsy showed that it could not have been ... one person that committed this incident, because one weapon was a knife and one weapon was a gun.”

Perez received food in the interrogation room at about 7:15 a.m. At 12:05 p.m., Rhone again advised Perez of his Miranda rights. Perez signed another Miranda waiver and, at 12:10 p.m., another “commissioner’s waiver.” He began a *11third written statement at 3:07 p.m. because Rhone wanted “to clarify some information that I had gathered from between [the] first interview and now this next one.” The statement started as written questions and answers, and then Rhone discussed “the information that [he had] in reference to [how] it couldn’t have been just one person[.]”

They “started talking in more depth,” and Perez “initially den[ied] that he knew anything about a knife.” Perez continued to deny that he had any weapons. At that point, Rhone let Perez hear, via a two-way radio, what Gordon was telling another detective. Gordon said that Perez “was the one that had the knife.” “From that point on,” Perez admitted having a knife, but said that he gave it to Gordon and did not use any weapon. He also said that Gordon “ran out with a purse, giving him thirty dollars for his share of being involved in the incident.” At Rhone’s request “to explain the entire situation all over again[,]” Perez did so in writing. He completed the third statement at 4:00 p.m.

During the morning of August 11, Rhone took Perez to the commissioner’s office.

Perez was questioned intermittently in an interview room; he was never threatened; never promised anything inappropriate; and never denied food, water, bathroom, rest, or sleep. Perez appeared to be alert throughout the advisements, waivers, and interrogation. He spoke clearly and logically. He never asked for a lawyer. Perez’s interrogations were not audiotaped or videotaped because the Prince George’s County Police Department lacked the facilities.3

For ease of reference, the time line, derived from our review of transcripts and waiver forms, is as follows.

August 9:

12:31 a.m.

Appellant arrived at police station.

*121:03 a.m.

Appellant, after being advised of Miranda rights, signed a waiver.

9:15 a.m.

Appellant, after again being advised of Miranda rights, signed a waiver.

10:15 a.m.

Appellant gave an oral statement.

12:07-2:00 p.m.

Appellant gave first written statement.

3:01 p.m.

Appellant, after again being advised of Miranda rights, signed a waiver, and gave another oral statement. 3:31-5:01 p.m.

Appellant gave second written statement.

7:09 p.m.

Appellant, after again being advised of Miranda rights, signed a waiver. Appellant consented to a voice stress analysis test.

August 10:

12:08 a.m.

Appellant, after again being advised of Miranda rights, signed a waiver.

12:10 a.m.

Appellant, after being advised of right to prompt presentment, signed a waiver.

12:05 p.m.

Appellant, after again being advised of Miranda rights, signed a waiver.

12:10 p.m.

Appellant, after again being advised of right to prompt presentment, signed a waiver.

3:07-4:00 p.m.

Appellant gave a third written statement.4

*13August 11:

Appellant was taken to a commissioner in the morning.

Discovery And Motions

Trial was scheduled to begin April 17, 2001. At the end of a three day evidentiary hearing in early March, 2001, the circuit court denied Perez’s motions to suppress his statements. At that hearing, Perez’s counsel argued that Perez’s statements resulted from an illegal arrest, because of the absence of probable cause, and that the statements were involuntary. The involuntariness argument was based on traditional grounds, referenced the totality of circumstances, and emphasized Perez’s version of the facts. Delay in presentment was argued as a factor to consider. While unclear, we shall assume the argument was based on Maryland common law, as well as on the Federal and State Constitutions.

During discovery, defense counsel tried to obtain information regarding Mahar’s statements implicating Perez, and in particular, information as to how the police got to Mahar.

On March 29, after the suppression hearing, the State disclosed to defense counsel that before Mahar implicated Perez, Mahar himself had been implicated in the murders. In a written statement to Prince George’s County police, “Tony Fox” had stated that Mahar told him, while both were incarcerated, that Mahar “and a buddy” had committed these crimes.

Based on this information, defense counsel sought various forms of relief, including a new suppression hearing and a Franks5 hearing. The defense alleged that on August 5, 2000, when Mahar and Fox were both incarcerated at the Prince George’s County Detention Center, Mahar told Fox that while “he and a buddy” were robbing an animal hospital in Bladensburg, his “buddy” killed an Indian couple.

According to the defense, on August 7, Prince George’s County homicide detectives interrogated Fox at the police *14station. Fox relayed Mahar’s confession. The next day, detectives interviewed Mahar, who denied any involvement, instead claiming that he overheard Perez discussing the murders with Gordon and implicating both of them. Detective Hoffman then applied for and obtained arrest warrants for Perez and Gordon.

Defense counsel claimed that both statements by Fox and Mahar were coerced, and that Mahar’s confession to Fox exculpated Perez because, if there was only one other participant in the crime, and that person was black, then it was Mahar and Gordon (who fit Shashi Tharpar’s description of her assailant) who robbed and murdered the Tharpars.6

The court denied all the defense motions. Trial followed on April 17-20, 2001.

During trial, the court granted the State’s motion to exclude the testimony of Fox, as well as the testimony of four police and emergency medical witnesses who heard Shashi Tharpar describe her murderer as a tall black man who had been in the animal hospital earlier that day. As a result, defense counsel elected not to call Mahar, in the asserted belief that, without that predicate testimony, the logical value of Mahar’s confession was lost.

The jury convicted Perez of two counts of felony murder, two counts of robbery with a deadly weapon, two counts of using a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence, and conspiracy to commit robbery with a deadly weapon. He was sentenced to two terms of life without parole, two terms of twenty years, the first five to be served without parole, and a term of ten years.

Perez filed motions for discovery and a new trial, which were denied.7 This appeal followed.

*15The Issues

Perez advances ten reasons why we should vacate his convictions, which we have rephrased:

1. The trial court erred in finding that defense counsel committed a Batson violation and in seating the challenged juror.

2. Perez’s post-arrest statements to police should have been suppressed because they were the fruit of an illegal arrest under a warrant issued without probable cause.

3. Perez’s post-arrest statements to police should have been suppressed because they were the involuntary product of two days of pre-charging detention, coercion, threats, promises, and denial of his right to counsel.

4. The trial court erred in denying defense counsel’s request for a jury instruction that, under Maryland law, a defendant must be taken to a judicial officer without unnecessary delay and in no event later than 24 hours after arrest.

5. The trial court erred in excluding exculpatory statements by Fox and by Mrs. Tharpar.

6. The trial court erred in failing to conduct a suppression hearing at which defense counsel could have examined newly discovered witnesses Fox and Mahar.

7. The State should have been ordered to disclose all statements made by Mahar, including any recantations.

8. The State should have been ordered to disclose the identity of any police officer who obtained information from Fox.

*169. The State should have been ordered to disclose files and documents regarding the information that Fox provided to police.

10. The trial court should have held a Franks hearing to determine whether the police intentionally misled the court in the application for Perez’s arrest warrant.

We shall reach only the delayed presentment issue arising in the third assignment of error. For guidance, we also exercise our discretion to address the jury instruction issue in the fourth assignment and the evidentiary issue in the fifth assignment.

DISCUSSION

I. Delayed Presentment Issue

A. The Need For Prompt Presentment

A confession, to be admissible, must be voluntary under (1) Maryland non-constitutional law; (2) the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 22 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights; and (3) elicited in conformance with Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Ball v. State, 347 Md. 156, 173-174 and 178-79, 699 A.2d 1170 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1082, 118 S.Ct. 866, 139 L.Ed.2d 763 (1998).

“The use of coerced confessions, whether true or false, is forbidden because the method used to extract them offends constitutional principles.” Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 485, 92 S.Ct. 619, 624, 30 L.Ed.2d 618 (1972). Given the inherently coercive nature of custodial interrogation, a custodial confession is presumed to be involuntary, unless the State shows beyond a reasonable doubt that the statement was voluntary. See Hof v. State, 337 Md. 581, 595, 655 A.2d 370 (1995). Under both the Federal Constitution and State common law, the totality of the circumstances must be considered to determine voluntariness. See Ball v. State, 347 Md. at 178-179, 699 A.2d 1170; Hof 337 Md. at 595-97, 655 A.2d 370. *17Under Maryland common law, a confession is inadmissible if made in reliance on improper promises or threats. See Winder v. State, 362 Md. 275, 309, 765 A.2d 97 (2001); Ball, 347 Md. at 178-179, 699 A.2d 1170; Hillard v. State, 286 Md. 145, 153, 406 A.2d 415 (1979).

Although there is no definitive list of circumstances relevant to voluntariness, the Court of Appeals has recognized that consideration should be given to a wide range of factors, including

where the interrogation was conducted; its length; who was present; how it was conducted; whether the defendant was given Miranda warnings; the mental and physical condition of the defendant; the age, background, experience, education, character, and intelligence of the defendant; when the defendant was taken before a court commissioner following arrest; and whether the defendant was physically mistreated, physically intimidated or psychologically pressured.

Hof, 337 Md. at 596-97, 655 A.2d 370 (citations omitted).

The time of presentment to a judicial officer is one of the circumstances. The prompt presentment rule, first adopted in 1971, currently appears in Md. Rule 4-212. Subsection (e), applicable here, provides that

[a] copy of the warrant and charging documents shall be served on the defendant promptly after the arrest. The defendant shall be taken before a judicial officer of the District Court without unnecessary delay and in no event later than 24 hours after arrest[.]

Prior to Johnson v. State, 282 Md. 314, 384 A.2d 709 (1978), the general criterion for admissibility of a confession was voluntariness. In Johnson, the Court of Appeals applied the 24 hour requirement as a per se rule of exclusion and held that statements obtained more than 24 hours after arrest would be suppressed. 282 Md. at 328-29, 384 A.2d 709. This decision was followed in McClain v. State, 288 Md. 456, 419 A.2d 369 (1980).

*18In 1981, the legislature repudiated the Johnson-McClain exclusionary rule, returning to the voluntariness standard. The statute currently appears at Md. Code (1974, 2002 Repl. Vol), § 10-912 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, and provides:

Failure to take defendant before judicial officer after arrest.

(a) Confession not rendered inadmissible. — A confession may not be excluded from evidence solely because the defendant was not taken before a judicial officer after arrest within any time period specified by Title 4 of the Maryland Rules.

(b) Effect of failure to comply strictly with Title b of the Maryland Rules. — Failure to strictly comply with the provisions of Title 4 of the Maryland Rules pertaining to taking a defendant before a judicial officer after arrest is only one factor, among others, to be considered by the court in deciding the voluntariness and admissibility of a confession.

As explained in Williams v. State, 375 Md. 404, 421-22, 825 A.2d 1078 (2003), “[the McClain decision] did produce a swift legislative response. At the strong urging of the law enforcement community, the legislature, in its next session, enacted 1981 Maryland Laws, chapter 577 (Maryland Code, section 10-912 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article).... There is no doubt that the statute was a delayed reaction to Johnson and an immediate reaction to McClain.” See also Woods v. State, 315 Md. 591, 614, 556 A.2d 236 (1989)(“Acts 1981, ch. 577 was the legislative reaction to our decision in Johnson v. State ...''); Young v. State, 68 Md.App. 121, 133, 510 A.2d 599 (1986) (“As of July 1,1981, Johnson lost much of its effect. On that date the Maryland legislature abrogated the per se exclusionary rule of Johnson....”).

The Maryland legislature made it clear that voluntariness is the test, determined by a consideration of all relevant factors. The legislature did not address the weight to be given any particular factor, presumably because, under a totality of the circumstances test, the hearing judge generally *19determines the weight of each factor, considered in the context of the whole. On appellate review of a voluntariness determination, an appellate court defers to first level factual findings but engages in a de novo review of the ultimate constitutional issue. See, e.g., Polk v. State, 378 Md. 1, 7-9, 835 A.2d 575 (2003); Wilkes v. State, 364 Md. 554, 569, 774 A.2d 420 (2001).

After the instant case was argued before a three judge panel of this Court, the Court of Appeals ruled, in a trilogy of cases, that, under certain circumstances, a delay in presentment should be given “very heavy weight” when considering the totality of circumstances. See Facon v. State, 375 Md. 435, 453-54, 825 A.2d 1096 (2003); Williams v. State, 375 Md. 404, 434, 825 A.2d 1078 (2003); Hiligh v. State, 375 Md. 456, 473-75, 825 A.2d 1108 (2003). As a result, we requested counsel to file supplementary briefs, addressing the effect of those decisions. We then heard oral argument, sitting en banc. Before considering Perez’s arguments, therefore, we briefly review those decisions.

Williams

In Williams v. State, 375 Md. 404, 825 A.2d 1078 (2003), the defendant was arrested at 4:10 a.m. on July 30, 2000, on suspicion of two armed robberies. He suffered a dog bite during the arrest, and was taken to the hospital for treatment. He was placed in an interview room at the police station at 9:25 a.m.

Williams had identified himself by his brother’s name, but police found a paycheck bearing his own name in his pocket. Detectives from the Prince George’s County robbery unit began preliminary questioning “to get some basic information about [this] suspect and even about his involvement in the two robberies.” 375 Md. at 423, 825 A.2d 1078. During that questioning, they learned Williams’ real identity and that arrest warrants charging him with three homicides had been issued nine days earlier. By 1:13 p.m., Williams had confessed to two robberies and written two statements confirming those confessions.

*20Homicide detectives transported Williams to an interview room. Over the next 28 hours, three different detectives intermittently interrogated Williams. Williams was left alone to sleep overnight. Before being taken to the commissioner for an initial appearance at 3:07 p.m. on August 1, 47 hours after his arrest, Williams gave several oral and written statements confessing to the three murders.

The Court of Appeals, recognizing that “[m]any factors can bear on the voluntariness of a confession[,]” specifically addressed how much weight a violation of the prompt presentment rule should have in assessing the voluntariness of a particular statement. 375 Md. at 423, 825 A.2d 1078. “[W]hile the statute makes a delay in presentment only one factor in determining voluntariness and admissibility, not all factors that may weigh on voluntariness are necessarily equal in import[.]” Id. at 416, 825 A.2d 1078. Discussing different factors bearing on voluntariness, the Court recognized three categories into which most of these can be grouped.

Confessions preceded or accompanied by threats, promises of advantage, or physical mistreatment are involuntary, “notwithstanding any other factors that may suggest voluntariness,” because “[t]hose kinds of factors are coercive as a matter of law.” 375 Md. at 429, 825 A.2d 1078. Unless the State can satisfy its “very heavy burden ... of proving that they did not induce the confession,” these factors render the statement involuntary. Id. This appears to be a statement of when, under Maryland common law, statements are inadmissible as a matter of law. See Winder, supra, 362 Md. at 275, 765 A.2d 97.

Other factors, including “the length of the interrogation, team or sequential questioning, [and] the age, education, experience, or physical or mental attributes of the defendant,” do not have such decisive weight. 375 Md. at 429-30, 825 A.2d 1078. Instead, these factors “assume significance, and may become decisive, only in the context of a particular case-based on the actual extent of their coercive effect.” Id. at 430, 825 A.2d 1078.

*21But, “[l]ying between these two kinds of factors is a third” category. 875 Md. at 430, 825 A.2d 1078. The Court described these as “factors that may not be coercive as a matter of law but that need to be given special weight whenever they exist.” Id. “[T]he deliberate and unnecessary violation of an accused’s right to prompt presentment” falls into this “heavy weight” category. Id.

The Court, stating that it was harmonizing Rule 4-212 and section 10-912, ruled that, under certain circumstances, a delay in presentment must be given “very heavy weight.” A delay must be given very heavy weight only when (1) the delay was unnecessary; (2) deliberate; and (3) it was designed for the “sole purpose” of obtaining a confession.8 375 Md. at 416, 825 A.2d 1078.

Williams’ felony murder conviction was vacated because the suppression court gave “no indication” that it gave such weight to the continued delay and the trial court “did not instruct the jury to do so.” Id. at 416, 434, 825 A.2d 1078. The Court also indicated that, based on the record before it, the delay in presentment should have been given very heavy weight.

Hiligh

In Hiligh v. State, 375 Md. 456, 825 A.2d 1108 (2003), filed the same day as Williams, the Court of Appeals held that post-conviction relief was warranted because Hiligh’s trial counsel did not ask the suppression court or the jury to consider the effect of a nearly 24 hour delay in presentment on the voluntariness of Hiligh’s robbery confession. Shortly after the robbery of a Marriott hotel, Hiligh was arrested on *22suspicion of that crime. He arrived at the Prince George’s County police station at 10:58 p.m. on March 20,1995. Everything necessary to charge him had been accomplished by 3:30 a.m. on March 21, when the charging documents were ready.

Instead of being questioned or taken to a commissioner, Hiligh was left overnight in an interview room. At 7:15 a.m., detectives briefly took Hiligh to the hospital for minor medical treatment. At 8:35 a.m., they returned him to the same room.

Interrogation began shortly after 9:00 a.m. At 1:23 p.m., Hiligh signed his first inculpatory statement. He was then given food. He proceeded to sign an inculpatory statement about the Marriott robbery at 1:55, and to other robberies at 2:51, 3:18, and 4:45 p.m.

Once the detective from Prince George’s County was finished interrogating Hiligh about robberies in that jurisdiction, Hiligh was questioned about other robberies outside the jurisdiction. Hiligh made more inculpatory statements during those interrogations.

Hiligh was separately tried for Howard County and Prince George’s County robberies. In his Howard County trial, Hiligh’s defense counsel unsuccessfully argued that the presentment delay justified exclusion of Hiligh’s confession, both at a suppression hearing and at trial. On direct appeal, a divided panel of this Court held that the delay was unnecessary and that the confession should have been suppressed.

In contrast, in the Prince George’s County trial, Hiligh’s trial counsel neither elicited nor pointed to evidence regarding the delay in presentment. On direct appeal, we held that he had failed to preserve any challenge arising from the delay.

Citing the outcome and rationale of the Howard County appeal, the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County granted Hiligh’s postconviction petition for a new trial. A divided panel of this Court reversed, finding that the failure to raise the presentment delay was not prejudicially ineffective assistance of counsel.

*23The Court of Appeals disagreed and affirmed the post-conviction court’s ruling. See 375 Md. at 475, 825 A.2d 1108. The Court explained:

Had counsel argued the coercive effect of the deliberate delay in presentment, the court would have been required to give that delay very heavy weight and examine whether the State had shouldered its heavy burden of proving that the confession was not induced by that coercion. On this record, especially in light of the conclusion reached by the Court of Special Appeals in the Howard County appeal, there is, indeed, a substantial possibility that the court, in ruling on the suppression motion, would have found the confession involuntary and ruled it inadmissible. Even if the judge had allowed the confession into evidence, he would, under Williams, have been required, on request, to instruct the jury on the heavy weight to be accorded any deliberate and unnecessary delay. Furthermore, had counsel argued that point to the jury, there is the same substantial possibility that the jury would have found the confession involuntary and, in accordance with the judge’s other instructions, disregarded it.

Id. at 474-75, 825 A.2d 1108.

Facón

In Facon v. State, 375 Md. 435, 825 A.2d 1096 (2003), the Court held that a delay of more than 12 hours solely for the purpose of interrogation may have resulted in an involuntary confession to robbery. After being arrested on the evening of August 31, 1999, in the District of Columbia on a Maryland warrant, Facón waived extradition to Prince George’s County. He arrived at the Prince George’s County police station at 10:00 p.m. on September 1,1999.

Facón was immediately placed in an interview room. From 10:30 until 11:55 p.m., a Prince George’s County robbery detective discussed Facon’s life, family, drug problems, and prior arrests. Facón refused to sign a Miranda, rights waiver, saying that he would discuss the crime in question, but did not *24“ ‘want to write anything, [or] ... to make a statement.’ ” 375 Md. at 443, 825 A.2d 1096.

He was left alone in the room from 11:44 p.m. until 12:22 a.m. on September 2. At that time, the same officer returned and they discussed the same topics until 3:20 a.m. After another break until 4:25 a.m., a different officer discussed general matters about Facon’s life. He told Facón that “he “would absolutely relay that [Facón] has a bad narcotic habit to the state’s attorney ... and that was about the best [he] could do.’ ” 375 Md. at 443, 825 A.2d 1096.

From 5:55 a.m. until 6:35 a.m., Facón was photographed. Questioning resumed, and the officer told Facón that “they were ‘done’ talking about [his] background, and began to review the evidence against [Facón].” 375 Md. at 443, 825 A.2d 1096. By this time, Facón “ ‘was getting tired,’ ” but asked “ ‘what does the statement entail.’ ” Id. Facón repeated that he did not want to write anything down. The officer replied that Facón would “ ‘have to sign a waiver form or we don’t get into the statement.’ ” Id.

At 7:08 a.m., Facón executed the Miranda rights waiver form. 375 Md. at 444, 825 A.2d 1096. At 7:45 a.m., he confessed to robbing a convenience store while he was under the influence of drugs. He was taken to a district court commissioner at 10:30 a.m., just over 12 hours after his arrival in the county.

The Court of Appeals first examined the extraterritorial effect of Md. Rule 4-212, addressing

[w]hether the twenty-four hour period following arrest, during which police are required to present an arrestee to a court commissioner, begins only when the arrestee enters the prosecuting jurisdiction, or includes that period of time following arrest in a neighboring jurisdiction.

375 Md. at 440, 825 A.2d 1096. The Court held “that the prompt presentment requirement under the Rule is not triggered where the defendant is held in custody outside of this State, absent evidence that officers of this State were working *25in conjunction with the other jurisdiction for purposes other than to secure extradition.” Id. at 449, 825 A.2d 1096.

The Court held that the time between arrest in another jurisdiction and arrival in Maryland must be considered in assessing voluntariness. Citing Williams, the Facón Court concluded that the Rule was violated even though presentment occurred within 24 hours after Facón arrived in Maryland. See 375 Md. at 453, 825 A.2d 1096. The suppression court erred in failing to “give any weight to the time [Facón] was in custody except for the period of time [he] spent with the interrogating officer[.]” Id. at 454, 825 A.2d 1096. The Court ordered a new trial with a new evidentiary hearing on Facon’s motion to suppress his confession, at which he could “present any evidence he deems relevant.” Id.

B. Suppression

Before trial, Perez moved to suppress the statements he made during custodial interrogation. The suppression court denied Perez’s motion, stating:

The Court, after considering the testimony of the defendant and the police officers and their rebuttal, also reviewing the pertinent opinions from the Appellate Courts, considers the totality of the circumstances and denies the motion to suppress.

In this Court, Perez renews his argument that his confessions should have been suppressed due to the delay in presentment, the “tag-team approach to interrogation,” the “continued interrogation in the [face] of repeated denials of guilt[,]” and “[t]he length of the interrogation[.]” He complains that the suppression court “denied the motion, without making any explicit findings of fact.”

The State initially countered that the circuit court’s decision should be upheld, given the number of hours that Perez was actually subjected to questioning; that he was allowed to sleep; and that he was given adequate food, drink, and bathroom opportunities. After considering Williams; Hiligh, and Facón, however, the State conceded that “Perez is enti*26tied to a remand for a new suppression hearing and trial.” We agree, for two reasons.

First, the suppression court did not make any specific factual findings. Only when findings are not required to review the suppression ruling, may we do so. See Gilliam v. State, 320 Md. 637, 647, 579 A.2d 744 (1990). When there are conflicts in the evidence, and findings are necessary for our independent constitutional review, however, we cannot affirm. See Lodowski, 307 Md. at 253, 513 A.2d 299. In the case before us, as previously indicated, Perez contradicted much of the State’s evidence, and there were several statements made at different times. Consequently, we might conclude that, in this case, specific findings were required for meaningful appellate review.

We do not rest our decision on that ground, however, because if the problem were only a lack of specific findings, an option that we would have to address is whether to remand, without vacating the convictions, for the court to make findings on the existing record. See Southern v. State, 371 Md. 93, 111, 807 A.2d 13 (2002). We need not decide whether we could and should remand for findings because we are compelled to vacate the convictions and remand for a new trial and suppression hearing because of the second reason.

The second reason is that the Williams Court, while not adopting “a new rule or any mandated procedure[,]” articulated a standard for how to assess a deliberate violation of the presentment rule, applicable to both a suppression court and a jury. 375 Md. at 433, 825 A.2d 1078.9 Ordinarily, on appellate *27review, the Court assumes that the hearing or trial court knew the law and properly applied it. See State v. Chaney, 375 Md. 168, 179, 825 A.2d 452 (2003) (“trial judges are presumed to know the law and to apply it properly”). We cannot engage in that presumption here because, not only is there a lack of specific findings, but neither Williams; Hiligh, nor Facón had been decided at the time of the proceedings in circuit court. Nevertheless, the Williams standard applies to this case because the issue was preserved and is still on direct review, and a decision interpreting a statute or rule, but not changing the common law, generally applies to pending cases. See American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Goldstein, 312 Md. 583, 591-592, 541 A.2d 955 (1988); McClain v. State, 288 Md. 456, 464, 419 A.2d 369 (1980); Schiller v. Lefkowitz, 242 Md. 461, 466, 219 A.2d 378 (1966).

Importantly, whether the holding in a new decision applies to all pending cases, to certain pending cases, or to causes of action or events that occur after the date of the new decision, the holding in the new decision applies to the parties before the court that produced that decision. American Trucking, 312 Md. at 592, 541 A.2d 955. The parties before the court do not get an opportunity to relitigate the relevant issue. Other*28wise, there would be little motivation to seek new rules of law or new interpretations of existing law. Stover v. Stover, 60 Md.App. 470, 476, 483 A.2d 783 (1984). Consequently, in Williams, while the case was remanded for a determination of the admissibility of Williams’ statements, an issue not decided on appeal, it was not remanded for a determination of whether the heavy weight standard applied. The heavy weight standard was adopted in Williams, and therefore was applied to the facts before the Court in that case.10

We shall address how application of the Williams standard is to be accomplished, because the way that it was applied in Williams does not necessarily determine how it should be applied in other cases. We read Williams as clearly announcing a new standard applicable to delays in presentment, for the reasons set forth above. We do not read the opinion as holding either that a new evidentiary suppression hearing is not permitted or holding, as a matter of law, that the heavy weight standard applies to a particular set of facts. Clearly there may be factual situations where the heavy weight standard does apply as a matter of law as well as fact, but this determination should be made by the suppression court, after a new hearing, as part of its consideration of the totality of the circumstances.

The question that separates the majority opinion of this Court from the opinion authored by Judge Adkins is whether the Williams court mandates a conclusion that the heavy weight standard applies as a matter of law. In her concurring and dissenting opinion, Judge Adkins concludes that it does.

We conclude that, for the reasons set forth in this opinion, a new evidentiary suppression hearing may be conducted in the case before us. We are not holding that one or *29more of appellant’s statements are inadmissible as a matter of law or that application of the heavy weight standard is mandated. After the trial court makes a determination, its ruling will be subject to appellate review. We are merely holding that the trial court makes the determination in the first instance.

Having decided that a new suppression hearing is warranted, we must vacate appellant’s convictions for two reasons. First, as a general matter, we are not permitted to do so under Maryland law. Southern, 371 Md. at 111-12, 807 A.2d 13; Gill v. State, 265 Md. 350, 289 A.2d 575 (1972). Second, in light of Williams, the jury instructions will be different, as discussed below.

In Southern, v. State, the Court of Appeals held that this Court erred by remanding the case, requiring the circuit court to rule on the constitutionally of a detention in a new suppression hearing, without first vacating the convictions. 371 Md. at 111-12, 807 A.2d 13. Additionally, however, the Court held that the ruling on the motion to suppress became the law of the case because the State failed to meet its burden of proof at the suppression hearing, and on remand, the State was not entitled to another hearing. Id. at 106-07, 807 A.2d 13. That is not the situation here and the law of the case doctrine does not apply. See Tu v. State, 336 Md. 406, 420, 648 A.2d 993 (1994) (“Reversal for the erroneous denial of a motion to suppress does not, in and of itself, preclude any trial court reconsideration of the admissibility of the State’s evidence that was the subject of the suppression motion, at least if the reconsideration presents a legal theory that was not ruled upon on the prior appeal. Further, facts that are relevant to applying that previously unadjudicated legal theory and that were not previously presented may be considered by the trial court, even if those facts were known to the State at the time of the original trial court ruling”); Lodowski, 307 Md. at 256-58, 513 A.2d 299 (stating that the remedy when findings at a suppression hearing were inadequate was a new trial and a “new plenary suppression hearing”).

*30The suppression court, on remand, should conduct a new hearing and make a determination regarding whether there was unnecessary delay for the deliberate and sole purpose of obtaining a confession and, based on that determination, apply the appropriate standard. The Court of Appeals recently reaffirmed that an appellate court should defer to a trial court’s findings of facts, even when the issue is a violation of the First Amendment, which requires especially close appellate review. Polk v. State, 378 Md. 1, 21, 835 A.2d 575 (2003). Whether delay in presentment was unnecessary, deliberate, and for the sole purpose of obtaining a confession involves, at least in part, first level fact finding.

The Court of Appeals in Johnson v. State specifically recognized that not all delays are unnecessary, much less for the deliberate and sole purpose of obtaining a confession. 282 Md. 314, 329, 384 A.2d 709 (1978). For example, a delay may be necessary for routine administrative procedures, to determine whether a charging document should be issued, to verify the commission of the crimes specified in the charging document, to obtain information likely to be a significant aid in averting harm to persons or loss of property, to obtain relevant non-testimonial information likely to be significant in identifying other persons who might have been involved with the arrestee, or to prevent the loss of evidence. Id.

In the case before us, the record indicates that, prior to the arrest of appellant, someone named Mahar confessed to someone named Fox that he and another person committed the crimes in question. At the time of that confession, Mahar and Fox were incarcerated in the Prince George’s County Detention Center. Presumably, Fox told the police. The police then questioned Mahar, who advised them that appellant and someone named Gordon had committed the crimes. The police obtained arrest warrants for appellant and Gordon.

It is also relevant to note that the victim, Shashi Tharpar, identified her murderer as a tall black man in the dying declaration discussed below. The record indicates that Gordon fit that description. Additionally, a detective testified that *31it was his understanding that an arrestee could not be kept unnecessarily for the purpose of obtaining a confession and that the police kept appellant to follow up on leads.

Finally, we note, before moving to the effect of waivers, that pursuant to section 10-912, a delay in presentment, even of the type that meets the heavy weight standard, cannot be the sole reason for finding involuntariness. Additionally, it is worth repeating that the ultimate issue is voluntariness. Voluntariness is determined by the totality of the circumstances and compliance with the presentment rule is one factor. Since Williams, if it is determined that one of the factors is deliberate noncompliance with the prompt presentment requirement for the sole purpose of obtaining a confession, that factor is to be given very heavy weight.

On remand, therefore, the court should consider the arguments made by the parties, all relevant evidence and, with respect to each statement, determine whether the heavy weight standard applies. If so, the court should utilize this standard in making a voluntariness determination. In determining voluntariness, and thus admissibility, the court should resolve factual disputes and identify the circumstances considered by it as part of the totality.

C. Waiver

As part of the voluntariness determination, the court should also consider the waivers executed by appellant. The Williams Court did not base its decision on waiver, or the lack thereof, but it did state that a voluntary waiver is valid. 375 Md. at 432-33, 825 A.2d 1078. Indeed, the Court squarely upheld the validity of waivers with respect to a delay in presentment, even when the exclusionary rule was in effect, in Logan v. State, 289 Md. 460, 425 A.2d 632 (1981).11 In Simkus *32v. State, 296 Md. 718, 721-22, 464 A.2d 1055 (1983), the Court upheld the validity of a prompt presentment waiver when the arrestee was not told that he could terminate the interrogation or that he would be taken before a judicial officer without delay.

As observed in Williams, the federal courts have not been uniform in addressing delay in presentment when the delay exceeds 6 hours. Similarly, with respect to express waivers, the federal courts have not been uniform. Many courts have held that a valid waiver of Miranda rights constitutes a valid waiver of prompt presentment. The District of Columbia has so held even in situations where the delay is comparable or even longer than the delay in the case before us. See, e.g., Outlaw v. United States, 806 A.2d 1192, 1200 (D.C.2002) (“We have held repeatedly that a valid waiver of an individual’s Miranda rights is also a waiver of his Mallory right to presentment without unnecessary delay.”) (internal quotations omitted), and United States v. Bell, 740 A.2d 958, 963 (D.C.App.1999).

Many courts have stated that a Miranda waiver constitutes a waiver of prompt presentment, but despite using unqualified language, the facts frequently, but not always, involved a relatively short period of delay. In some of the cases, it appears the delay was not deliberate for a malevolent purpose, and in other cases, it is not clear. See, e.g., United States v. Salamanca, 990 F.2d 629, 634 (D.C.Cir.1993) (“The Miranda decision substantially undercut the need for exclusion of custodial statements solely on the ground of delay in bringing the defendant before a magistrate, as one of the purposes of appearing before a magistrate is to have the defendant’s rights explained to him — rights now explained in a Miranda warning.”); Pettyjohn v. United States, 419 F.2d 651, 656 (D.C.Cir.1969) (“by validly waiving his Miranda right to silence and an attorney, and by agreeing to speak with the police, [appellant] has thereby also waived any Mallory right *33to be brought before a magistrate as quickly as possible.”) (internal quotations omitted); O’Neal v. United States, 411 F.2d 131 (5th Cir.1969) (noting that, following Miranda, if a suspect is given the necessary warnings, and if, knowing this, he still chooses to speak, he cannot then claim to be harmed under Mallory for the delay in being taken to the Commissioner); United States v. Christopher, 956 F.2d 536, 538 (6th Cir.1991) (upholding the District Court’s finding that appellant’s waiver of Miranda rights also constituted a waiver of his right to prompt presentment); United States v. Barlow, 693 F.2d 954, 959 (6th Cir.1982) (“waiver of one’s Miranda rights also constitutes a waiver under McNabb[ v. U.S., 318 U.S. 332, 63 S.Ct. 608, 87 L.Ed. 819] Mallory”); United States v. Indian Boy X, 565 F.2d 585, 591 (9th Cir.1977) (stating that a waiver of Miranda rights also constitutes a waiver of prompt presentment); and United States v. Lukens, 735 F.Supp. 387, 391, n. 1 (D.Wy.1990) (“Even assuming arguendo that the delay was unnecessary, suppression of the statements would nonetheless be inappropriate in view of his valid Miranda waiver.... ”).

Moreover, a long delay may be relevant to the voluntariness of a Miranda waiver, even if a Miranda waiver is otherwise effective to waive the right to prompt presentment. See United States v. Wilson, 838 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir.1988) (“The government’s reliance on the waiver of Miranda rights becomes weaker as the period of pre-arraignment detention increases. If unreasonable delay ... can itself form the basis for a finding of involuntariness, that same delay may also suggest involuntariness of the Miranda waiver.”).

In the case before us, appellant signed 8 waivers: 6 expressly relating to Miranda rights and 2 expressly relating to delay in presentment. While we are not suggesting that Maryland law follows Pettyjohn and that a Miranda waiver constitutes a waiver of a violation of the prompt presentment rule, waivers are part of the totality of the circumstances and relevant to a voluntariness determination.

*34Additionally, in the case before us, Perez was advised of his Miranda rights immediately and repeatedly. It is not clear whether Perez was given a copy of the charging document, application, or arrest warrant or, if so, when. It is not clear whether one or more of those documents contained a statement of a right to be presented to a judicial officer. It is unknown whether Perez was orally advised of his right to prompt presentment other than when he executed written waivers expressly referring to that right. These factors may be relevant to voluntariness of a statement.

Of particular relevance here is the effect of a waiver of prompt presentment occurring after the prompt presentment requirement may have been violated. In the context of this case, by analogy to Miranda rights, in the event of a prompt presentment violation, followed by a valid waiver, a confession obtained after a valid waiver would not necessarily be tainted. See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 314, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 84 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985); Kennedy v. State, 289 Md. 54, 68-69, 421 A.2d 1376 (1980) (a confession obtained after presentment to two different commissioners held voluntary, despite earlier violation of prompt presentment rule). In Meyer v. State, 43 Md.App. 427, 437-39, 406 A.2d 427 (1979), this Court held that illegal delay had been dissipated by presentment to a commissioner, rest for two hours, and a Miranda waiver, preceding renewed interrogation resulting in a confession.

Perez executed two written waivers expressly relating to delay in presentment. Those waivers, if otherwise effective,12 waive only any delay in presentment violations that occurred subsequent to the waivers. Moreover, the waivers are not relevant to determine whether statements made prior to the waivers were voluntary. The subsequent violations of the prompt presentment Rule, however, if validly waived, would not necessarily be tainted by a violation(s) that occurred prior to the waivers. In other words, if the waivers were *35voluntarily given, even if a violation of the prompt presentment Rule occurred prior to the waiver, and the delay was deliberate and purposeful, subsequent confessions would not necessarily be inadmissible, if they were otherwise voluntary. This statement would also be true if the prior violation, as one factor to consider, resulted in a determination that confessions prior to the waiver were inadmissible. For example, in this case, the remand court could determine that, prior to the express waiver of presentment which occurred after 23 hours, the prompt presentment Rule had been violated, either deliberately and purposefully or merely unnecessarily. When considered with all other relevant factors, the remand court could then find that the earlier confessions were involuntary. The court could nevertheless determine that the waiver of presentment was voluntary and that the subsequent confessions were thus voluntary and admissible.

To the extent that the effect of waivers in a situation like the one before us is unclear, it constitutes another reason why the suppression court, on remand, should review the issues de novo.

II. Jury Instructions

To guide the trial court and parties on remand, we shall reach the related issue of whether the trial court should have instructed the jury about the presentment requirement in Md. Rule 4-212.

At trial, Perez’s counsel asked the trial court to instruct the jury about the prompt presentment requirement by reading Rule 4-212. The court refused to do so. Instead, it gave the following instruction, taken from a pattern instruction regarding statements made by a defendant:

In deciding whether the [defendant’s] statement was voluntary, consider all of the circumstances surrounding the statement, including ... whether the defendant was taken before a district court commissioner without unnecessary *36delay following the arrest, and, if not, whether that affected the voluntariness of the statement[.]

See MPJI-Crim. 3:18 (2001).

Perez argues that the trial court erred in refusing to tell the jury “that the law provides that a defendant must be taken before a judicial officer of the District Court without unnecessary delay and in no event later than 24 hours after arrest.” In his view, the court’s brief mention of unnecessary delay was materially incomplete in that:

(1) “it contained no reference to any specific period of time,” so that jurors did not have a “yardstick by which to measure ... what ‘unnecessary’ delay could be” or whether the two day delay in presenting Perez to the commissioner affected the voluntariness of his statements; and

(2) “[t]he instruction did not touch upon the impeachment value of the 24 hour rule, in weighing the credibility of some of the State’s witnesses.”

The State contends that the pattern jury instruction given by the trial court was sufficient because:

(1) “the jury was made aware of the substance of Rule 4-212(e), even if the number ‘24’ was not actually contained within the trial judge’s instruction,” through defense counsel’s cross-examination of police detectives and closing argument; and

(2) “giving the requested instruction ... would have been misleading” in that it “would suggest a ‘hard and fast’ rule where none exists[.]”

When a defendant challenges the voluntariness of a custodial confession at trial, the court must give a requested voluntariness instruction even if the court is convinced the statement was voluntary. See Hof v. State, 337 Md. at 601, 655 A.2d 370; Brittingham v. State, 306 Md. 654, 666-67, 511 A.2d 45 (1986); Bellamy v. State, 50 Md.App. 65, 73, 435 A.2d 821 (1981), cert. denied, 292 Md. 376 (1982). The pattern jury instruction provides that the jury must find that a defendant’s statement was voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt, and if the jury so finds, it should give it such weight as it believes it *37deserves. The instruction utilizes a totality of the circumstances approach and lists various factors, including delay in presentment.

In Williams and Hiligh, the Court of Appeals recognized that defendants challenging the voluntariness of a confession are entitled to a jury instruction with respect to the standard adopted by Williams. There is no indication, however, that the pattern instruction does not accurately state the law, except for the Williams standard, and the jury should be instructed to consider all relevant circumstances. The difference is that the jury should also be instructed that, in determining voluntariness, it must determine whether any delay in presentment was unnecessary, deliberate, and for the purpose of obtaining a confession and, if so, to give that factor very heavy weight. The Hiligh Court held that, “[e]ven if the [suppression] judge ... allowed the confession into evidence, he would, under Williams, have been required, on request, to instruct the jury on the heavy weight to be accorded any deliberate and unnecessary delay.” Hiligh, 375 Md. at 474, 825 A.2d 1108. In the event of a waiver, or waivers, as in this case, if the confession is determined to be admissible, the jury should nevertheless be instructed to determine voluntariness of such waivers. See Hof, 337 Md. at 601, 655 A.2d 370.

To be sure, neither counsel nor the trial court had the benefit of Williams, Hiligh, or Facón at trial. We recognize that defense counsel did not request the “heavy weight” instruction that he was entitled to under Williams and Hiligh. Instead, he asked for the text of the prompt presentment rule itself, including its “24 hour” provision.

Whether the 24 hour provision in Rule 4-212 should be incorporated into an instruction, a question different from the heavy weight instruction, depends on the circumstances of each case. In some cases, where delay is an issue, the 24 hour period may not be the issue. In this case, where the delay exceeds 24 hours, it seems advisable to include the 24 hour provision. When the delay is less than 24 hours, however, it should not be given if, in the context of the trial, it would *38mislead the jury into believing the State has at least 24 hours. If it is given, care should be taken to explain that the State is not automatically entitled to 24 hours. In all events, the jury should be instructed that unnecessary delay is but one of the factors to consider.

Because Perez’s convictions are being vacated, we need not decide whether a failure to include a reference to the 24 hour period, as requested, constituted reversible error, or whether cross-examination, exhibits, and argument by counsel, referring to the 24 hour period, adequately advised the jury of the requirements imposed under Rule 4-212.

III. Dying Declaration

Perez contends that the trial court abused its discretion and materially prejudiced his defense by precluding testimony from four witnesses who heard Shashi Tharpar identify the person who shot her as a tall black male. Because Perez is 5'7" and light skinned, and there is no evidence that Perez fired the shots that killed either of the Tharpars, Perez hoped to use this description of the assailant as an exculpatory dying declaration.13 The admissibility of Shashi Tharpar’s statements is likely to recur in any retrial, so we shall address it for the benefit of the remand court and the parties.

Under Md. Rule 5-804(b)(2), if the declarant is unavailable as a witness in a homicide prosecution, the rule against hearsay does not exclude a “statement made by a declarant, while believing that the declarant’s death was immi*39nent, concerning the cause or circumstances of what the declarant believed to be his or her impending death.” The statement may be made in response to a question, but must reflect the victim’s personal knowledge. See 6A Lynn McClain, Maryland Evidence § 804(2):1(b), at 425-26 (2d ed. 2001). Statements identifying the person who shot the victim fall within this rule. See Connor v. State, 225 Md. 543, 553, 171 A.2d 699, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 906, 82 S.Ct. 186, 7 L.Ed.2d 100 (1961); Jones v. State, 38 Md.App. 288, 298, 380 A.2d 659 (1977), rev’d on other grounds by State v. Frye, 283 Md. 709, 393 A.2d 1372 (1978).

The admissibility of a dying declaration depends on whether, at the time the victim made the statement, he or she believed that death was impending. See Connor, 225 Md. at 551, 171 A.2d 699. “The required abandonment of all hope of recovery may be proved by the declarant’s statement or by others’ statements to the declarant, or it may be inferred from the circumstances[,]” including “the fatal quality of the wound.” McClain, supra, at 426; see Jones, 38 Md.App. at 298, 380 A.2d 659. It is not “necessary for the victim to state that she expected to die. It is sufficient if her condition is such (and she is aware of it) as to warrant an inference of impending death.” Connor, 225 Md. at 551, 171 A.2d 699. For example, a shooting victim’s request for a priest or for someone to take care of her child may indicate the victim’s belief in her impending death. See id. Alternatively, a statement by another person to the victim, or in the victim’s presence, might establish that the victim heard something that caused her to believe that she was likely to die soon. See Jones, 38 Md.App. at 298, 380 A.2d 659.

A victim’s request for medical help does not necessarily mean that she holds out hope for recovery. In Jones, we recognized that a victim of a shotgun blast had abandoned all hope of recovery even though he asked to be taken to the hospital and requested medical help. The victim’s statements that he knew he was dying were not negated by his “requests for medical assistance, which indicated hope for amelioration *40of pain but not a hope of recovery.” Jones, 38 McLApp. at 300, 380 A.2d 659.

Here, the trial court granted the State’s motion in limine to exclude testimony about Mrs. Tharpar’s description of her assailant, after defense counsel proffered statements by three police officers and one emergency medical technician.14 To establish admissibility, defense counsel pointed to one statement by an emergency medical technician:

[Defense Counsel]: Your Honor, I’ve got Christie Branan ... and she’s going to say that the victim was conscious of being shot, conscious of where she was shot, she’s covered in blood, she wiped her mouth full of blood so she could talk, she was alert, she was oriented, she was conscious of her pain, she said she knew the person who shot her, he worked at the office. I have her statement here.[15]

[Prosecutor]: It does not address my objection that she knew she was dying. In fact, just the opposite.

[Defense Counsel]: I have case law, [Willie Lee Jones}, Court of Special Appeals, Connor versus State .... All these cases agree that the [declarant’s] belief of impending death may be inferred from the circumstances in which the declarant is found at the time the declarant makes the . declarations....

The Court: But I think to be cautious that if he’s able to establish that she is aware she is dying—

[Prosecutor]: There’s no evidence that she knew she was dying.

The Court: Do you have any evidence?

*41[Defense Counsel]: She died very shortly thereafter. She knew she’d been shot in the face. She knew — she thought she’d been shot in the head. She’d been shot in the neck[,] over one eye[,J and over the other eye. Of course she somehow thought she was dying. And the jury can infer from the circumstances that she did. Her belief in her impending death may be inferred from the circumstances in which she....

The Court: Any more of the facts?

[Defense Counsel]: Any more of the facts, no.

The Court: All right. Your motion in limine is granted. The Court is not satisfied that she was aware of the very first requirement, impending death. (Emphasis added.)

Defense counsel noted that he also had statements from three police witnesses and pointed out that “we need to establish ... the identity of the assailant, and we need to exclude ... Perez, and that’s what these dying declarations are all about.” Repeating that it did “not believe it’s a dying declaration[,]” the court again granted the motion. Defense counsel then asked to have all four statements “put ... into evidence for the ruling upon the motion in limine.” The court accepted the statements, but allowed them only to be “placed on the record.”

In their written statements, the four witnesses related that they heard Shashi Tharpar describe her assailant:

Sgt. M.L. Romba responded to the animal hospital at 13:20 on September 15, 1999. He found Shashi Tharpar “laying under the counter” and “drifting in and out.” She was alert but “in a great deal of pain.” “She stated that a black male had entered the store three time[s] during the day and asked questions about a cat.” She described him “as a tall thin black male.”

Police Officer Denault responded at 13:27. He asked Shashi Tharpar “for a description of the suspect, and she stated that he was black and that he was tall.” She also “stated that the suspect had come into the hospital three times.” *42Christine Branan, an emergency medical technician, stated that “while doing [a] patient assessment,” she asked Mrs. Tharpar “where she felt she might have been shot. She replied ‘the back of her head.’ ” She stabilized her neck and “clear[ed] her airway from the copious amount of blood[.]” She “kept conversation with her by asking her did she know the person who may have shot her. She said yes. [Bran-nan] asked her did he work at the office [and] she replied with he was new. Shortly [they] arrived at the hospital.” Police officer T. Boone stated that while he was in the trauma room at Prince General Hospital, Shashi Tharpar told him her name, date of birth, and age. She “stated that the suspect was a black male in his 30’s wearing a gray shirt.” He was “tall” with “short hair.” She “stated that she never met the suspect prior to the shooting.” She was pronounced dead at 15:06.

Given the delayed presentment grounds for vacating Perez’s conviction, we need not decide whether the trial court abused its discretion in excluding the evidence based solely on the limited verbal proffer of defense counsel. To guide the court and the parties on remand, however, we shall address Perez’s complaint that the court should have admitted Mrs. Tharpar’s description of her lone assailant.

As defense counsel pointed out, there was compelling circumstantial evidence to support a finding that Shashi Tharpar was aware of her impending death. At the time she described her assailant, Mrs. Tharpar had been shot over both eyes and in the neck. She also suffered severe blunt force trauma to the back of her head. She was found lying near her murdered husband, in a pool of her own blood; at times, she had to have her mouth cleared of blood to speak; and, by all accounts, she was in a great deal of pain. She explicitly stated that she was aware that she had been shot in the head.

Moreover, there was circumstantial evidence to support a finding that her statements were reliable. Witnesses described her as alert despite her pain and wounds. She obviously was able to provide responsive answers to questions *43from a number of police and medical personnel. Her descriptions of her assailant to them were consistent. In the hour and a half before she died of her head wounds, she identified a single, tall, black, male assailant. That description supported Perez’s claim that he was not the shooter and that he was not present for the crimes, and was potentially inconsistent with the State’s theory that Perez was present and took an active role during the robbery and murders.

Nonetheless, we see nothing that necessarily required the trial court to conclude that Mrs. Tharpar believed she was about to die. She made no statements to that effect, nor was there evidence that any medical or police personnel told her so. There was no evidence that she exercised her faith in a manner indicating her belief that she was dying, or that she expressed other sentiments or wishes indicating that belief. Therefore, we cannot say that the trial court necessarily erred in concluding that the evidence was not sufficient to establish that Mrs. Tharpar believed she would die soon.

What concerns us, however, is that the trial court asked for “more facts[,]” then immediately ruled that it was “not satisfied that she was aware of the very first requirement, impending death[,]” without saying why it was not satisfied with the “facts” that were presented and without reviewing the three statements by the police officers. This brief rationale for excluding the statements leaves us uncertain whether the trial court understood that it was not necessary for the defense to present direct evidence, such as statements by Mrs. Tharpar or statements to her, in order to establish that she believed she would soon die.16

*44On one hand, if the trial court recognized that such circumstantial evidence could support a finding that Mrs. Tharpar believed her death was impending, but was simply not persuaded that the proffered evidence did so, then the court applied the correct legal standard. On the other hand, if the court believed that, in addition to circumstantial evidence regarding the grievous nature of Mrs. Tharpar’s wounds and her physical and mental condition, the defense had to offer direct evidence, such as, for example, a statement that she knew she was dying, as in Jones, or requests for last rites and that others take care of her family, as in Connor, then the court’s ruling was tainted by its failure to recognize that such direct evidence was not necessary. See, e.g., United States v. Peppers, 302 F.3d 120, 138-39 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1062, 123 S.Ct. 647, 154 L.Ed.2d 548 (2002)(recognizing analogous lack of clarity in trial court’s ruling excluding exculpatory dying declaration).

Our concern about the basis for the trial court’s ruling is heightened by the court’s failure to consider the proffered written statements by police who were with the victim between the time she was discovered and the time she died. There were a number of witnesses who detailed her fatal head injuries, her copious bleeding, and her pain. We can only speculate whether this additional evidence would have tipped the evidentiary scales in favor of admissibility, because the court apparently did not review it.

Given the need for a new trial in this case, however, and that the admissibility of these statements may be raised and decided anew at retrial, we raise these concerns only prospectively. For the reasons we have discussed, we anticipate a thorough consideration of all the proffered direct and circumstantial evidence bearing on whether Mrs. Tharpar believed *45her death was imminent when she described her assailant, as well as a clearly stated explanation for any in limine ruling on this evidence. See, e.g., United States v. Peppers, 302 F.3d at 139 (“the issue may be raised anew at retrial, and on remand the [trial court] should revisit this ruling if [it] misapprehended the evidence it should consider”).17

JUDGMENT VACATED. CASE REMANDED TO THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION. COSTS TO BE PAID BY PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY.

ADKINS, J., filed an opinion concurring and dissenting, joined by DAVIS, HOLLANDER, SALMON, SONNER and WENNER, JJ.

ADKINS, Judge,

concurring and dissenting.

I concur in the majority’s decision to reverse Perez’s convictions, but write separately to disagree with its rationale and with its conclusion that the 12, 15, and 37 hour presentment delays preceding Perez’s statements might have been necessary.

Majority’s Rationale For Reversing

I cannot join in the majority’s conclusion that reversal is required only because “the Williams Court ... articulated a standard for how to assess a deliberate violation of the presentment rule[.]” In my view, that holding does not follow the Court of Appeals’ decision in Williams v. State, 375 Md. 404, 825 A.2d 1078 (2003). For the reasons set forth in this section, I disagree with the majority’s rationale for its decision. As set forth in the following section, I concur that Williams requires reversal, but for the same reason cited by the Williams Court — because the suppression court did not *46indicate that it was giving heavy weight to unnecessary delay that preceded Perez’s statements.

The holding in Williams cannot be reconciled with the majority’s decision to reverse so that the trial court can decide whether, in light of Williams, to admit Perez’s statements without giving them heavy weight. The Williams Court reversed three murder convictions, but significantly did not hold that the admissibility of the challenged confessions should be reconsidered on retrial. Instead, the Williams Court unanimously concluded that the suppression court erred by failing to give heavy weight to the unnecessary delay preceding Williams’ three statements; the Court then held that the challenged statements must be excluded. See id. at 416, 825 A.2d 1078 (when Court of Appeals gave unnecessary delay preceding murder statements heavy weight, “it becomes clear that those statements were involuntary and therefore inadmissible”). This holding is inconsistent with the majority’s view that Williams necessitates only a new suppression hearing at which the trial court could find the delay preceding Perez’s statements was necessary and need not be given heavy weight. The Williams Court rejected, as a matter of law, the possibility that this delay could be found necessary. In my view, we must do the same in this case.

The majority’s rationale rests on its concern that the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County needs an opportunity to decide whether, under Williams, the prompt presentment rule was violated by Perez’s lengthy presentment delay. Yet the Williams Court emphasized that Maryland courts, like “nearly all courts[,]” have long held that delaying presentment to obtain a confession is a violation of the prompt presentment rule that weighs against a finding of voluntariness. See Williams, 375 Md. at 424, 825 A.2d 1078 (citing federal and Court of Special Appeals cases); Young v. State, 68 Md.App. 121, 134, 510 A.2d 599 (1986); Meyer v. State, 43 Md.App. 427, 434, 406 A.2d 427 (1979). The majority, curiously, does not mention this precedent, or the Court of Appeals’ rationale for giving this species of presentment delay heavy weight. The Williams Court stated that prompt presentment is “designed *47to provide the defendant with a clear explanation of more basic Constitutional and statutory rights.” Williams, 375 Md. at 430, 825 A.2d 1078. The reason that a violation of that right “must be given special weight in determining voluntariness is that, when the right it is designed to protect is transgressed, there may be no practical way of calculating the actual effect of the transgression.” Id.

That rationale reflects the longstanding judicial recognition that, when a person accused of a crime is not afforded the constitutional and statutory protections given during presentment before a district court commissioner, it may never be possible to determine whether that suspect, “had he been presented timely to a Commissioner, ... would have acquiesced in ... [subsequent] interrogations and confessed to ... murders[.]” Id. at 431, 825 A.2d 1078. When an arrestee confesses as a result of police interrogation conducted without counsel and before the initial appearance, any “judicial caution” regarding the value of defense counsel in avoiding self-incrimination has “lost its purposed]” See Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 455, 77 S.Ct. 1356, 1360, 1 L.Ed.2d 1479 (1957); see also Williams, 375 Md. at 424, 825 A.2d 1078 (citing Mallory for the proposition that “nearly all courts agree” that the purpose of obtaining incriminating statements is “not a proper basis upon which to delay presentment”); Johnson v. State, 282 Md. 314, 321-22, 384 A.2d 709 (1978) (“In Maryland, as elsewhere,” two of the important functions of the prompt presentment rule are to ensure that the accused will be promptly advised of right to counsel and of “due process right to be free from coercive investigatory methods”).

The Williams Court recognized that presentment delays for the sole purpose of obtaining incriminating statements are, by their very nature, both deliberate and unnecessary, and reviewed why such delays are given heavy weight in the voluntariness calculus. When the Court of Appeals has held specifically that a new suppression hearing was not necessary to determine that a presentment delay for the sole purpose of interrogation should be weighed heavily against a finding of voluntariness, see id. at 433, 825 A.2d 1078, we cannot disre*48gard that holding. As the Williams Court pointed out in its conclusion, “the notion that [such] a confession ... is under a cloud of suspicion contravenes neither logic[,] nor practical human experience,” nor existing jurisprudence. See id. at 434, 825 A.2d 1078. I would hold, for the reasons discussed below, that the delay preceding all of Perez’s confessions was unnecessary because it was solely for the purpose of obtaining incriminating statements, and that reversal is required because the suppression court failed to indicate that it was giving this unnecessary delay the heavy weight that it merits in this case.

Unnecessary Delay Rationale For Reversing

The majority directs “[t]he suppression court, on remand, [to] conduct a new hearing and make a determination regarding whether there was unnecessary delay for the deliberate and sole purpose of obtaining a confession[.]” Implicit in that holding is the prospect that the delay preceding all three of the challenged statements might have been necessary. As noted above, I believe that this conclusion fails to apply the holdings of Williams and Hiligh.

I submit that, to be consistent with Williams and Hiligh, we must hold as a matter of law that the patent reason that the police did not take Perez “down the hall” to the available commissioner was that they wanted to obtain incriminating statements from him before doing so. What the majority opinion omits is that detectives who testified for the State during the three day suppression hearing admitted that they continued to interview Perez despite his initial denials of involvement, and even after he admitted some knowledge and involvement, because they were not satisfied with his previous statements:

• Detectives Hoffman and Turner testified that they accused Perez of being involved in the murder during the first forty minute interview that began less than an hour after Perez’s arrest, at 1:00 a.m. on August 9. Perez denied any knowledge or involvement.

*49• They left Perez alone from 1:40 to 2:20 a.m., then returned and, in Turner’s words, “fished for information” by telling Perez that Gordon said he was the shooter. That second interview lasted 80 minutes, until approximately 3:45 a.m. But Perez continued to deny any knowledge or involvement.

• During the next hour, detectives left Perez alone while they conferred with each other in an adjacent room “about what was going on in the interview.”

• Detective Turner explained that he returned alone to interview Perez from 4:40 to 5:50 a.m. because he thought Perez was being evasive in his comments regarding the murders. Although Perez continued to deny any knowledge or involvement, Turner “didn’t take it” as an indication “that he did not want to answer any questions about that,” but rather, as an indication “that he didn’t want to implicate himself any more than he already had.”

• At 7:25 a.m. on August 9, because Perez was still denying any knowledge or involvement, Detective Rhone was “assigned to go in and talk to Mr. Perez about any information he had ... about the murder[s].” Although he did not know when Perez had arrived at CID, Rhone continued to interview Perez “one on one” over the next seven hours, with only bathroom breaks. Rhone began by getting biographical information in order to build “rapport with him and so he would understand who I was and what I needed out of the interview.” Perez continued to deny any knowledge or involvement. It was 10:15 a.m., nearly three hours after Rhone began to interview Perez and 10 hours after his arrest, before Perez even admitted having seen Gordon with a gun. It was approximately two hours later — 12 hours after Perez’s arrest — that he began his first written statement.

• After Perez completed that statement at 2:00 p.m., there was a break in the interview, during which detectives discussed the new information. Not satisfied with Perez’s first statement, Rhone reentered at 2:58 p.m. and obtained another Miranda waiver and a second statement.

*50• After Perez completed his second written statement at 5:01 p.m., Hoffman asked Detective Canales to conduct a voice stress test. That was complete at 8:10 p.m.

• Rhone returned again sometime during the morning of August 10 because the detectives wanted to talk to Perez about their theory, based on the autopsy, that “it could not have been ... one person that committed this incident, because one weapon was a knife and one weapon was a gun.” He again asked Perez about his involvement in the murders, based on the autopsy, what had been learned from Gordon, and the results of Perez’s voice stress test.

Williams and Hiligh dictate that we hold as a matter of law that this evidence from the detectives who interviewed Perez conclusively established that the sole reason for delaying Perez’s presentment was to obtain incriminating statements from him. Like Williams, Perez initially denied participating in the murders, but Prince George’s County detectives refused to accept his exculpatory statements and continued their questioning while consulting with each other regarding the results of the interviews as they continued in progress. Both cases feature “in and out” sequential interviews by different officers over a lengthy period of time, during which the suspect was confined, except for bathroom breaks, to an 8 or 9 foot square room with a single locked door with a peephole and no windows. Indeed, while Williams denied involvement in the murders for only two hours after the police began to question him about those crimes, Perez denied any involvement in the Tharpar murders for more than ten hours.

Although the majority correctly observes that determining why the police delayed presentment of Perez involves first level factual findings, it notably does not suggest that there is any evidence in this suppression record to support a finding that the police had some “necessary” reason for delaying Perez’s presentment. Appellate courts routinely review suppression records to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to support the suppression court’s factual findings and whether, in light of that evidence, the court’s legal conclu*51sion was correct. See, e.g., Scott v. State, 366 Md. 121, 147, 782 A.2d 862 (2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 940, 122 S.Ct. 1324, 152 L.Ed.2d 231 (2002)(“We review the [suppression] court’s factual findings in the light most favorable to the State, pursuant to a clear error standard, but we review the legal conclusions de novo”)-, Ferris v. State, 355 Md. 356, 374-75, 377-79, 735 A.2d 491 (1999)(relying on suppression record to hold that suppression court erred in finding that police had articulable suspicion for continuing detention of motorist after purpose for traffic stop was accomplished). Thus, even if we were to rely on the presumption that courts properly apply the law to fill in the blank created by the suppression court’s silence about why the police delayed Perez’s presentment for more than two days after his arrest, and, thus, to conclude that the court found that there was some other reason than to obtain inculpatory statements from him, we still must review the evidence adduced at the suppression hearing to determine whether it could have supported such a finding. I respectfully submit that there is no evidence in this suppression record upon which any court could conclude that there was some other reason for delaying Perez’s presentment.

It is especially significant that the State has not disputed that the purpose for this presentment delay was to question Perez. The State has never advanced, in the trial court or on appeal, any administrative reason for delaying Perez’s presentment. Nor has it argued that the questioning was necessary to preserve evanescent evidence, to protect lives or property, or to apprehend Perez’s alleged accomplice, who was already jailed. Although it initially argued that delay for this type of questioning was necessary and, in any event, of no discernable effect on the voluntariness of Perez’s statements, after Williams and Hiligh, the State did not suggest that the delay was for some reason other than to interrogate Perez. Nor did it specifically argue that the delay was necessary.

In my view, the suppression record created by the State makes it clear that Perez’s presentment delay was more “unnecessary” than the delays preceding the statements in *52Williams.18 Cf. Williams, 375 Md. at 424-25, 825 A.2d 1078 (immediate availability of commissioner made “[t]he entire delay” after police obtained defendant’s statements about robberies unnecessary); cf. also Hiligh, 375 Md. at 473, 825 A.2d 1108 (delay after police obtained all information and completed all administrative work necessary to charge defendant, “as a matter of both law and fact, was unnecessary”). In particular, I note the following, which the majority does not consider in its opinion:

• Williams was 19 years old when he arrested and interrogated. 17 year old Perez was two years younger, still living as a minor in his parents’ care.

• In contrast to Williams, in which part of the delay was attributable to uncertainty about Williams’ possible involvement in the murders, no part of the delay here can be attributed to uncertainty about Perez’s possible involvement in the murders. Williams was arrested without a warrant on suspicion of an unrelated robbery that occurred only hours earlier, without any suspicion that he might be involved in the murders to which he eventually confessed. But Perez was arrested on a warrant for possible involvement in the nine month old murders to which he confessed. Cf. also Hiligh v. State, 375 Md. 456, 461, 825 A.2d 1108 (2003) (police obtained photo identification before deciding to charge).

• Similarly, while some of the delay in Williams and Hiligh might be attributed to uncertainty about the identity of the person arrested, none of the delay here can be attributed to uncertainty about Perez’s identity. *53Williams’ true identity was not confirmed for nearly seven hours after his arrest. In contrast, Perez’s identity was confirmed before his arrest.

• In further contrast to Williams, none of the delay here is attributable to investigation of other crimes. Williams was questioned about the robberies that precipitated his arrest, during the first nine hours after his arrest; he quickly confessed to those crimes when the police legitimately questioned him in an effort to ascertain “basic information about their suspect and ... about his involvement in the two robberies, so that he could be identified and charged.” Williams, 375 Md. at 423, 825 A.2d 1078. In contrast, detectives testified that they had enough information against Perez to obtain an arrest warrant and that they accused Perez of involvement in the Tharpar murders during their first interview, which began only an hour after his arrest.

• To an even greater degree than in Williams, the effect of Perez’s presentment delay was exacerbated by overnight confinement in a small interview room. While Williams was left to sleep in the interrogation room during a single “midnight to morning” period; Perez was questioned during two consecutive “overnighters.” Perez was left to sleep only intermittently between questioning sessions; he gave his first and second statements after the first overnighter and his third statement after the second.

Perez’s case presents an even clearer instance than Williams of deliberate and unnecessary delay for the purpose of obtaining confessions. This is the specific type of presentment delay that, according to the Court of Appeals, Rule 4-212 “absolutely forbids.” See Hiligh, 375 Md. at 473, 825 A.2d 1108. Williams and Hiligh, like this case, address only this particular “species” of presentment delay, not the broader “genus” of delays that occur for other reasons, with which the majority appears to be concerned. Once the Court of Appeals decides a question of Maryland law, we must follow and apply *54its ruling. The least that Williams and Hiligh require us to conclude is that the 12, 15, and 37 hour presentment delays before Perez made his statements were unnecessary and, thus, were entitled to heavy weight.19

The court did not decide that these delays were unnecessary, nor did it indicate that it was giving any weight to such delays. The court’s terse reference to “the totality of the circumstances,” in its single-sentence bench ruling at the end of the three day suppression hearing, makes no mention of delay. Given the significant presentment delay established by this record, and defense counsel’s emphasis on it as grounds for suppression,201 cannot conclude from mere silence that the court properly weighed this delay when it decided that all of *55Perez’s statements were voluntary. See Williams, 375 Md. at 434, 825 A.2d 1078.

It is especially significant that the suppression court did not discuss each of Perez’s three statements separately. In Lodowski v. State, 307 Md. 233, 253, 256-58, 513 A.2d 299, the Court of Appeals held that the suppression court was obligated to determine whether each of three challenged statements was voluntary by considering the circumstances in which each one was made, and that its failure to do so required a new trial. On a record such as this, the suppression court should have scrutinized the evolving circumstances in which Perez made each statement to determine if each met the test of voluntariness. See Williams, 375 Md. at 431-32, 825 A.2d 1078; Hiligh, 375 Md. at 474-75, 825 A.2d 1108. Unlike the majority, which rests its decision to reverse on a rationale that is inconsistent with the holding in Williams, I would reverse, under the precedent established by Williams, Hiligh, Facón, and Lodowski, because the suppression court failed to indicate that it had considered the circumstances surrounding each challenged statement, including the heavy weight of the unnecessary presentment delay.

Waiver

With respect to the effect of the two “commissioner’s waivers” that Perez signed, I cannot join in the majority’s suggestion that a Miranda waiver that does not include any reference to a suspect’s right to prompt presentment might operate as a waiver of that right. Again, I believe that would not be consistent with Williams.

The Williams Court cited the effective use of Miranda rights waivers as precedent for the police to advise suspects in an analogous manner of their right to prompt presentment and to obtain a written waiver of that right.

The same approach can easily and effectively be used with respect to the right to prompt presentment for an accused detained pursuant to an arrest. It would be a simple matter for the police to advise the accused as well of his or her right to prompt presentment before a *56District Court Commissioner, that the Commissioner is a judicial officer not connected with the police, and that the Commissioner, among other things, will inform the accused of each offense with which he or she is charged, including the allowable penalties attached to those charges, furnish the accused with a written copy of the charges, advise the accused of his or her right to counsel, make a pre-trial release determination, and if ... the accused has been charged with a felony beyond the jurisdiction of the District Court, of his or her right to a preliminary hearing before a judge. The police could inform the defendant that he or she may waive that right of prompt presentment and agree to submit to interrogation, subject to the right to end the interrogation at any time and demand to be taken promptly before a Commissioner.

Williams, 375 Md. at 432, 825 A.2d 1078 (emphasis added).

The Williams Court recognized, however, that prompt presentment waivers, like Miranda waivers, can be effective only if given before an unnecessary delay yields an inculpatory statement. See id. at 432-33, 825 A.2d 1078 (suggesting that presentment waiver practice could be modeled on established practice of obtaining a Miranda waiver “[t]hat helps to establish that any statement made thereafter is voluntary”)(emphasis added). Here, the State asserted that Perez’s first two statements were made 12 and 15 hours after arrest. Prince George’s County detectives testified, however, that Perez was not advised of his right to prompt presentment or presented with these waiver forms until after he had been at the station for approximately 24 hours.21 For that reason, the waivers here did not provide post hoc “coverage” for Perez’s first two statements. A confession obtained during an unnecessary *57presentment delay for interrogation cannot be “cured” after the fact by either a subsequent presentment or a subsequent waiver of the right to presentment. The waivers executed by Perez carry no weight in determining the admissibility of the first two statements by Perez.

Perez’s third statement, begun after 37 hours of custodial interrogation, followed not one, but two, waivers. But the Williams Court caveated that any

delay in presentment, even with a waiver, must be reasonable. The Rule already sets 24 hours as an outside limit for presentment, and, absent some truly extraordinary circumstance, we would not expect any delay incurred for purposes of interrogation to extend beyond that time period.

Id. at 433 n. 4, 825 A.2d 1078 (emphasis added).

The suppression court did not address whether it found “truly extraordinary circumstances” justifying the 37 hour delay preceding the third statement. I see none argued by the State and none contemplated by the majority. In the absence of any evidence of extraordinary circumstances explaining why Perez was not taken to the commissioner during those 37 hours, I would hold, in accordance with Williams, that the two waivers, by themselves, cannot excuse the delay preceding the third statement.

Jury Instructions

Although I agree with the majority’s concern that courts should refrain from giving any instruction that may suggest to the jury that the State has a 24 hour “safe harbor” to question suspects, I see little risk in telling the jury about the 24 hour guideline, even in cases in which the presentment delay was less than 24 hours. It would be a simple matter to instruct the jury, as the majority recognizes, that “the State is not automatically entitled to 24 hours.”

As for this case, which does involve a presentment delay in excess of 24 hours, I read both Williams and Hiligh as implicitly recognizing that, when asked, the trial court must instruct the jury that the law requires police to present an *58accused to a judicial officer without unnecessary delay, which, except in unusual circumstances, is generally within 24 hours after arrest. That request was made by Perez’s counsel. In my view, it was error for the trial court to deny defense counsel’s request.

Just as an instruction about the special weight of deliberate and unnecessary delays supplies the jury with an important yardstick for determining whether a challenged statement was voluntary, so too, does an instruction regarding the 24 hour guideline. I agree with Perez that, with no guidance as to the meaning of “unnecessary delay,” the jury may mistakenly fail to weigh such delays heavily against a voluntariness finding. Cf Hof v. State, 337 Md. 581, 602, 655 A.2d 370 (1995)(instruc-tion that failed to provide guidance as to how voluntariness determination is to be made was “wholly inadequate”).

I am not persuaded by the State’s contention that such an instruction would mislead the jury into believing that presentment within 24 hours is a “hard and fast rule.” The State overstates that risk. The trial court can ensure that the jury understands that 24 hours is merely a guideline for evaluating whether a particular delay was necessary. Rather than telling the jury that presentment may “in no event” be delayed more than 24 hours, the court can say that presentment may not be unnecessarily delayed, and that delays in excess of 24 hours must be considered unnecessary unless there are extraordinary circumstances justifying that delay. I see no good reason to keep the jury in the dark about the 24 hour guideline. It exists for a good and simple reason — because the length of any deliberate delay in presentment should be justified by legitimate reasons for that delay.

The State’s argument that cross-examination and argument by defense counsel adequately advised the jury of the requirements imposed under Rule 4-212 is not persuasive. The jury was instructed that counsel’s argument and comments were not evidence. Moreover, the police detectives’ testimony regarding the 24 hour guideline for presentment was equivocal at best. In fact, the detective who created, and got Perez to *59sign, the so-called “Commissioner’s waiver” forms notably told the jury that, in his five years as a homicide detective, he was not aware of any law requiring that Perez be taken to the district court commissioner within 24 hours.

Given that testimony, and the court’s subsequent failure to tell the jury that police are required by law to take an accused to a district court commissioner without unnecessary delay, or to otherwise explain the 24 hour guideline, the jury might have concluded that there was no presentment requirement or no guideline. Perez had a legal right to have the court, rather than defense counsel, instruct the jury on law that was relevant to the voluntariness issues that were critical to his defense.

Finally, I also agree with Perez that, in his particular case, the jury might have considered such instructions in resolving the conflicting accounts of what happened during Perez’s interrogation. For example, jurors might have found it significant that the police were aware of the prompt presentment obligation and of the 24 hour benchmark, in deciding whether Perez voluntarily made the statements 12, 15, and 37 hours after his arrest, as the police claimed, or whether he made those statements much later, in the hours just before he was taken to the commissioner, as Perez claimed.22