142 S.Ct. 1264

Supreme Court of the United States.

John H. RAMIREZ, Petitioner

v.

Bryan COLLIER, Executive Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, et al.

No. 21-5592

|

Argued November 9, 2021

|

Decided March 24, 2022

Chief Justice ROBERTS delivered the opinion of the Court.

*1272 A Texas jury sentenced John Ramirez to death for the brutal murder of Pablo Castro. In this litigation, Ramirez does not challenge his conviction. Nor does he challenge his sentence. He asks instead that his long-time pastor be allowed to pray with him and lay hands on him while he is being executed. He says that the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA)…requires this accommodation. Ramirez sought a preliminary injunction ordering Texas to permit his religious exercise if the State went forward with his execution. The District Court and Court of Appeals declined to grant such relief. We then stayed the execution and granted certiorari.

***

B

Texas scheduled Ramirez’s execution for February 2, 2017…[L]ast-minute litigation delay[ed] Ramirez’s execution for several years.

Texas rescheduled Ramirez’s execution for September 9, 2020. Ramirez… asked to have his pastor accompany him into the execution chamber. Prison officials denied the request…because, at the time, Texas’s execution protocol barred all spiritual advisors from entering the chamber. [citation omitted] A prior version of the protocol…allowed access for prison chaplains…But Texas employed only Christian and Muslim chaplains. In 2019, when a Buddhist inmate sought to have his spiritual advisor join him in the execution chamber, Texas declined to grant the accommodation. We stayed that execution pending certiorari, unless the State allowed a Buddhist spiritual advisor into the execution chamber. [citation omitted] In response, Texas amended its execution protocol to bar all chaplains from entering the execution chamber, so as not to discriminate among religions. [citation omitted]

Ramirez filed suit, arguing that Texas’s new execution protocol violated his rights under the First Amendment and RLUIPA. Ramirez’s complaint said that he was a Christian and had received religious guidance from Pastor Dana Moore since 2016. [citation omitted] Pastor Moore serves the Second Baptist Church in Corpus Christi, of which Ramirez is a member. Ramirez explained that he wanted his pastor “to be present at the time of his execution to pray with him and provide spiritual comfort and guidance in his final moments.” [citation omitted] Ramirez’s complaint focused on prayer and explained that his pastor “need not touch [him] at any time in the execution chamber.” [citation omitted]

Texas withdrew Ramirez’s death warrant before there were any further filings. As a result, the parties jointly agreed to dismiss the litigation without prejudice.

C

On February 5, 2021, Texas informed Ramirez that his new execution date would be September 8, 2021. Ramirez then filed a Step 1 prison grievance requesting that he “be allowed to have [his] spiritual advisor present in the death chamber.” [citation omitted] Texas again denied the request, but later changed course, amending its execution protocol to permit a prisoner’s spiritual advisor to be present in the execution chamber. [citation omitted]

Our [prior] decisions…seem to have precipitated the change. Both cases concerned prisoner requests to have a spiritual advisor present in the execution *1274 chamber. And in both cases, we declined to allow the executions to proceed unless the inmate was granted that accommodation. [In a dissent,] Justice KAVANAUGH… explained that States wishing to avoid such stays “should figure out a way to allow spiritual advisors into the execution room, as other States and the Federal Government have done.” [citation omitted]

Texas’s 2021 Execution Protocol did just that. It allows a prisoner’s spiritual advisor to enter the execution chamber, accompanied by a prison security escort. This accommodation is subject to various procedural requirements. [citation omitted] For instance, the prisoner must notify the warden of his choice of spiritual advisor within 30 days of learning his execution date...Additionally, the spiritual advisor must pass a background check and undergo training…And if the spiritual advisor is “disruptive,” he is subject to “immediate removal.” [citations omitted] The protocol says nothing about whether a spiritual advisor may pray aloud or touch an inmate for comfort. But Texas had long allowed its own prison chaplains to engage in such activities during executions, and it was against this backdrop that Texas enacted the new policy. [citations omitted]

D

On June 11, 2021, Ramirez filed the grievance that is at the center of this case. Having successfully petitioned the State to allow his pastor into the execution chamber, he requested that his pastor be permitted to “lay hands” on him and “pray over” him while the execution was taking place…Ramirez’s grievance explains that it is “part of my faith to have my spiritual advisor lay hands on me anytime I am sick or dying.” [citation omitted] Texas denied the grievance on July 2, 2021. It said that spiritual advisors are “not allowed to touch an inmate while inside the execution chamber,” though it did not point to any provision of its execution protocol requiring this result. [citation omitted]

Ramirez appealed within the prison system by filing a Step 2 grievance on July 8, 2021…But with less than a month to go until his September 8 execution date, prison officials had still not ruled on that appeal. So on August 10 he filed suit in Federal District Court. Ramirez alleged that the refusal of prison officials to allow Pastor Moore to lay hands on him in the execution chamber violated his rights under RLUIPA and the First Amendment. Ramirez sought preliminary and permanent injunctive relief barring state officials from executing him unless they granted the religious accommodation.

On August 16, 2021, Ramirez’s attorney inquired whether Pastor Moore would be allowed to pray audibly with Ramirez during the execution. Prison officials responded three days later that the pastor would not…So on August 22 Ramirez filed an amended complaint seeking an injunction that would allow Pastor Moore to lay hands on him and pray with him during the execution. [citation omitted]

Ramirez also sought a stay of execution while the District Court considered his claims. The District Court denied the request, as did the Fifth Circuit. [citation omitted] Judge Dennis dissented. In his view, Ramirez’s RLUIPA claims were likely to succeed because the prison’s policies burdened religious exercise and were not the least restrictive means of furthering the State’s compelling interest in the security of the execution. [citation omitted]

We then stayed Ramirez’s execution, granted certiorari, and heard argument on an expedited basis. [citation omitted] Ramirez’s certiorari petition asked us to determine whether Texas’s restrictions on religious touch and audible prayer violate either RLUIPA or the Free Exercise Clause. Ramirez’s merits brief addresses only RLUIPA, however, so we do not consider any standalone argument under the Free Exercise Clause.

We are also mindful that, while we have had full briefing and oral argument in this Court, the case comes to us in a preliminary posture: The question is whether Ramirez’s execution without the requested participation of his pastor should be halted, pending full consideration of his claims on a complete record. The parties agree that the relief sought is properly characterized as a preliminary injunction. Under such circumstances, the party seeking relief “must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” [citation omitted]

II

We…have little trouble concluding that the grievance was timely, and that we may proceed to the merits.

III

Congress enacted RLUIPA, and its sister statute the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993…in the aftermath of our decisions in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 108 L.Ed.2d 876 (1990), and City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 117 S.Ct. 2157, 138 L.Ed.2d 624 (1997). [citations omitted] Both statutes aim to ensure “greater protection for religious exercise than is available under the First Amendment.” [citation omitted]

RLUIPA provides that “[n]o government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution”—including state prisoners—“even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that person—(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.” [citation omitted] A plaintiff bears the initial burden of proving that a prison policy “implicates his religious exercise.”[citation omitted] Although RLUIPA protects “any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief,”…a prisoner’s requested accommodation “must be sincerely based on a religious belief and not some other motivation.” [citation omitted] The burden on the prisoner’s religious exercise must also be “substantial[ ].” [citation omitted] Once a plaintiff makes such a showing, the burden flips and the government must “demonstrate[ ] that imposition of the burden on that person” is the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling governmental interest. [citations omitted] This allocation of respective burdens applies in the preliminary injunction context. [citation omitted]

A

To begin, we think Ramirez is likely to succeed in proving that his religious requests are “sincerely based on a religious belief.” [citation omitted] Ramirez seeks to have his pastor lay hands on him and pray over him during the execution. Both are traditional forms of religious exercise. [citation omitted] As Ramirez’s grievance states, “it is part of my faith to have my spiritual advisor lay hands on me anytime I am sick or dying.” [citation omitted] Pastor Moore, who has ministered to Ramirez for four years, agrees that prayer accompanied by touch is “a significant part of our faith tradition as Baptists.” [citation omitted] And neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals doubted that Ramirez had a sincere religious basis for his requested accommodations.

Respondents’ argument to the contrary turns in large part on a complaint Ramirez filed in 2020. [citation omitted] Ramirez filed the complaint while *1278 Texas’s prior execution protocol, which banned all spiritual advisors from the execution chamber, was in place. See App. 56–70, 111. The complaint sought Pastor Moore’s presence and prayer in the chamber, but disclaimed any need for touch. [citation omitted] As respondents see things, this shows that Ramirez’s current request for touch is insincere.

Ramirez responds that the 2020 complaint was inaccurate, and that he would have amended it had the litigation continued. [citation omitted] The litigation, however, did not proceed, because the parties jointly agreed to dismiss the suit without prejudice less than a week after it was filed. [citation omitted] Ramirez’s specific statement in his prior complaint is certainly probative on the issue of sincerity; evolving litigation positions may suggest a prisoner’s goal is delay rather than sincere religious exercise. [citation omitted] Under the facts of this case, however, we do not think the prior complaint—dismissed without prejudice and by agreement one week after it was filed—outweighs the ample evidence that Ramirez’s beliefs are sincere. Respondents do not dispute that any burden their policy imposes on Ramirez’s religious exercise is substantial. [citation omitted]

B

Because Ramirez is likely to succeed in showing that Texas’s policy substantially burdens his exercise of religion, respondents must prove that their refusal to accommodate the exercise both (1) furthers “a compelling governmental interest,” and (2) is the “least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.” [citation omitted] Under RLUIPA, the government cannot discharge this burden by pointing to “broadly formulated interests.” [citation omitted] It must instead “demonstrate that the compelling interest test is satisfied through application of the challenged law [to] the particular claimant whose sincere exercise of religion is being substantially burdened.” [citation omitted]

Here, the government has not shown that it is likely to carry that burden.

1

As for audible prayer, there is a rich history of clerical prayer at the time of a prisoner’s execution, dating back well before the founding of our Nation. [citation omitted] For example, at Newgate Prison—one of London’s most notorious jails—an Anglican priest would stand and pray with the condemned in their final moments. [citation omitted] By the early 1700s, that practice had evolved to permit prisoners to be “attended by a minister, or even a priest, of their own communion.” [citation omitted] Prayer at the time of execution was also commonplace in the American Colonies. [citation omitted] And during the Revolutionary War, General George Washington ordered that “prisoners under sentence of death” “be attended with such Chaplains, as they choose”—including at the time of their execution. [citations omitted] These chaplains often spoke and prayed with the condemned during their final moments. [citations omitted]

A tradition of such prayer continued throughout our Nation’s history. [citation omitted] The practice continues today. In 2020 and 2021, the Federal Bureau of Prisons allowed religious advisors to speak or pray audibly with inmates during at least six federal executions. [citation omitted] What’s more, Texas itself appears to have long allowed prison chaplains to pray with inmates in the execution chamber, deciding to prohibit such prayer only in the last several years. [citation omitted]

Despite this long history, prison officials now insist that a categorical ban on audible prayer in the execution chamber is the least restrictive means of furthering two compelling governmental interests.

***

Respondents’ argument thus comes down to conjecture regarding what a hypothetical spiritual advisor might do in some future case. “Such speculation is insufficient to satisfy” respondents’ burden,…and fails to engage in the sort of case-by-case analysis that RLUIPA requires. [citation omitted]

What’s more, there appear to be less restrictive ways to handle any concerns. Prison officials could impose reasonable restrictions on audible prayer in the execution chamber—such as limiting the volume of any prayer so that medical officials can monitor an inmate’s condition, requiring silence during critical points in the execution process (including when an execution warrant is read or officials must communicate with one another), allowing a spiritual advisor to speak only with the inmate, and subjecting advisors to immediate removal for failure to comply with any rule. Prison officials could also require spiritual advisors to sign penalty-backed pledges agreeing to abide by all such limitations.

Given the current record, respondents have not shown that a total ban on audible prayer is the least restrictive means of furthering their asserted interests.

2

Respondents’ categorical ban on religious touch in the execution chamber fares no better. They point to three governmental interests they say are compelling: security in the execution chamber, preventing unnecessary suffering, and avoiding further emotional trauma to the victim’s family members. All three goals are commendable. But again, respondents fail to show that a categorical ban on touch is the least restrictive means of accomplishing any of them.

Texas does nothing to rebut these obvious alternatives, instead suggesting that it is Ramirez’s burden to “identify any less restrictive means.” [citation omitted] That gets things backward. Once a plaintiff has made out his initial case under RLUIPA, it is the government that must show its policy “is the least restrictive means of furthering [a] compelling governmental interest.” [citation omitted]

*** 

We conclude that Ramirez is likely to prevail on his claim that Texas’s categorical ban on religious touch in the execution chamber is inconsistent with his rights under RLUIPA.

IV

A

Our conclusion that Ramirez is likely to prevail on the merits of his RLUIPA *1282 claims does not end the matter. As noted earlier, he must also show “that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” [citation omitted].

We think these factors also favor an injunction. Ramirez is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of injunctive relief because he will be unable to engage in protected religious exercise in the final moments of his life. Compensation paid to his estate would not remedy this harm, which is spiritual rather than pecuniary.

Additionally, the balance of equities and public interest tilt in Ramirez’s favor…By passing RLUIPA, Congress determined that prisoners like Ramirez have a strong interest in avoiding substantial burdens on their religious exercise, even while confined. At the same time, “[b]oth the State and the victims of crime have an important interest in the timely enforcement of a sentence.”[citation omitted] Given these respective interests, a tailored injunction of the sort Ramirez seeks—rather than a stay of execution—will be the proper form of equitable relief when a prisoner raises a RLUIPA claim in the execution context. [citation omitted]…Because it is possible to accommodate Ramirez’s sincere religious beliefs without delaying or impeding his execution, we conclude that the balance of equities and the public interest favor his requested relief.

***

C

As we have explained, the resolution of RLUIPA claims in the prisoner context requires a case-specific consideration of the particular circumstances and claims. At the same time, timely resolution of such claims could be facilitated if States were to adopt policies anticipating and addressing issues likely to arise. Doing so would assist both prison officials responsible for carrying out executions and prisoners preparing to confront the end of life according to their religious beliefs.

The first step would be to specify reasonable rules on the time for prisoners to request religious accommodations, and for prison officials to respond. [citation omitted] States could also adopt streamlined procedures for claims involving requests like those at issue in this case, so that these potentially complicated matters can be litigated at all levels well in advance of any scheduled execution.  If spiritual advisors are to be admitted into the execution chamber, it would also seem reasonable to require some training on procedures, including any restrictions on their movements or conduct. When a spiritual advisor would enter and must leave could be spelled out. If the advisor is to touch the prisoner, the State might also specify where and for how long. And, as noted, if audible prayer is to occur, a variety of considerations might be set forth in advance to avoid disruption. [citation omitted] It may also be reasonable to document the advisor’s advance agreement to comply with any restrictions.

If States adopt clear rules in advance, it should be the rare case that requires last-minute resort to the federal courts. If such cases do arise and a court determines that relief is appropriate under RLUIPA, the proper remedy is an injunction ordering the accommodation, not a stay of the execution. This approach balances the State’s interest in carrying out capital sentences without delay and the prisoner’s interest in religious exercise.

One final point bears mentioning. Our holding today arises in the context of a preliminary injunction. And our analysis turns on Texas’s specific execution protocol, chamber, and historical practices. Further proceedings on remand, if necessary, might shed additional light on Texas’s interests, and on whether its policies are narrowly tailored. But such proceedings might also contribute to further delay in carrying out the sentence. The State will have to determine where its interest lies in going forward.

*1284 * * *

We hold that Ramirez is likely to prevail on the merits of his RLUIPA claims, and that the other preliminary injunction factors justify relief. If Texas reschedules Ramirez’s execution and declines to permit audible prayer or religious touch, the District Court should therefore enter appropriate preliminary relief. The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

[Concurring and dissenting opinions are omitted]