OPINION

MEYER, Justice.

In this case we decide whether the City of Minneapolis (the City) acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, or capriciously in designating an area near downtown Minneapolis as an historic preservation district. Respondent, Billy Graham Evangelistic Association (BGEA), owns four buildings in the designated district. By writ of certiorari, BGEA challenged the City’s designation and the court of appeals granted relief to BGEA. The City appeals.

Minnesota Statutes § 471.193 announces a state policy that the “historical, architectural, archaeological, engineering, and cultural heritage of this state is among its most important assets.” Minn.Stat. § 471.193, subd. 1 (2002). In order to promote the conservation of historic properties, the legislature granted local governments the power to establish commissions to designate districts or buildings of historic significance and to preserve those assets. Id., subds. 2, 3.

The City exercised the authority granted by the legislature and formed the Heritage Preservation Commission of the City of Minneapolis (HPC) under chapter 599 of the City code. Minneapolis, Minn., Code of Ordinances (Code) ch. 599 (2001). The commission is made up of ten members, chosen for their knowledge and expertise in the field of historic preservation. *119 See Code § 599.120(c) (2001). The commission considers seven criteria in determining whether a property is worthy of designation as a landmark or historic district.1 See Code § 599.210 (2001). Those criteria include the property’s association with significant events or periods, significant people, the City’s identity, a particular architectural or engineering style, or a unique landscape design. Id.

In November of 1999, a neighborhood group, the Citizens for a Loring Park Community, asked the HPC to study whether an area on and around Harmon Place, from Loring Park to 11th Street South, merited a designation as historic. The citizens’ group liked the mini-downtown feel of the area, with its eclectic group of businesses in one- to four-story buildings and pedestrian-friendly streets. In 2000, the HPC asked the City planning department to commission a study of the area for possible historic designation. The planning department contracted with Carole Zellie of Landscape Research to conduct the designation study. Zellie presented her report to the planning department in April of 2001. She concluded that an area comprising ten city blocks (see map appended to this opinion) merited historic designation for its role in the City’s historic automotive industry and met criteria 1 and 4 of the Code.2 The Zellie report concluded that the area could be designated for protection because of its past association as the hub of the automotive sales district in Minneapolis at the beginning of the 20th century.

The Zellie report explained that “the automobile dealership evolved into a prominent and very specialized building type” and that the Harmon Place area showed “some of the best efforts of local architects.” Various architectural styles for these buildings were “all arranged around the important display windows.” Zellie concluded that:

Harmon Place was synonymous with the Minneapolis automotive industry for fifty years, from the birth of the local and national industry to its dispersal to the suburbs. Twenty-two automotive buildings from the dozens which once lined Hennepin Avenue and Harmon Place survive in the ten-block [area]. Most of the contributing buddings still embody a good sense of an important era in the city’s growth, and illustrate a chapter of its transportation, economic, and social history.

Having determined that the area met two of the criteria for designation, Zellie analyzed each of the individual buildings in the area. Of the 42 buildings comprising the proposed District, Zellie found 26 were “contributing,” i.e., met criteria 1 and/or 4 of the ordinance, and 22 of those 26 fit the additional unifying characteristics Zellie *120identified: buildings constructed between 1907-1930 with some relation to the automobile industry. The remaining 16 properties were designated as “noncontributing.”

After Zellie’s study recommended historic designation for the Harmon Place Historic District (the District), the proposed designation began working its way through the approval process required by city ordinance. See Code §§ 599.200-.300 (2001).3 First, the HPC forwarded the Zellie report to the state historic preservation officer, who concurred that the District was eligible for preservation under criteria 1 and 4. Then the City Planning Department sent a letter to property owners in the District, informing them that a consultant had recommended historic designation, that they could access the report, and there would be a public hearing likely held in August of 2001. The City Planning Commission adopted the findings of the planning department and approved the designation on August 6, 2001. The proposed designation included five buildings owned by BGEA at that time: buildings 11,12,13, 25, and 27 (see map).

Meanwhile, in July 2001, the HPC denied a request from the University of St. Thomas to demolish five buildings that St. Thomas owned within the proposed District.4 St. Thomas appealed to the city council, which, on August 10, 2001, granted permission for the demolition of the requested buildings, including four buildings designated as contributing properties.

Before the first public hearing on the District’s historic designation, BGEA hired Charlene Roise, of Hess, Roise and Company, to conduct an independent study of the proposed District. Roise concluded that the Fawkes block, at the westernmost end of the proposed District, bordered by Hennepin Avenue, Harmon Place, and Maple Street, fit the criteria for designation as an historic district. She disagreed with the designation of the remainder of the nine blocks, however. She recommended the City designate the Fawkes block as a district, and then individually designate buildings numbered 4, 5, 10, and 14 as historic (none of which were owned by BGEA). Alternatively, Roise suggested the City divide the large proposed District into two subdistricts: the Fawkes block being the first; the second capturing a group of buildings in the area bounded by the alley that runs between Hennepin Avenue and Harmon Place, Yale Place, 11th Street, and Spruce Place. Her proposed alternative boundaries would still have captured two of BGEA’s buildings (those numbered 11 and 12) in the historic district.

Apparently in response to Roise’s report, the planning department revised the proposed District to exclude (1) the large “superblock” containing the Minneapolis Community College, the Minneapolis Area Vocational Technical Institute, and the H. *121Alden Smith house5 (buildings 15, 16, and 17), because the buildings did not contribute to the proposed District; (2) the frontage along Hennepin Avenue, because the character of the buildings did not reflect the character of the District and the only-contributing properties had been extensively remodeled; and (3) all of the property owned by the University of St. Thomas. The effect of the planning department’s revision was to split the District into two portions: the Fawkes block and a northeast portion.

The HPC held a public hearing on September 25, 2001, and in response to the significant interest in the designation, the HPC scheduled a second public hearing on October 16, 2001. At both meetings, there was significant opposition to the area’s historic designation by local property owners. The owners complained that they had not had enough input in the process, that the designation would decrease their buildings’ value, that the auto industry was not significant enough in the history of Minneapolis, and that the buildings had already been altered too much to merit designation. Additionally, Roise and Marjorie Pearson (also a consultant for BGEA) spoke on behalf of BGEA and urged limiting the historic designation to the Fawkes block and four individual buildings in the northeast portion.

Residents of the neighborhood spoke in favor of the designation at the public hearings, mentioning that they wanted to save the character of the area, its historic value, and the pedestrian-friendly nature of the District. City Council Member Lisa Goodman opined: “[Tjhis is about preserving one of the last, very unique architectural areas in the city.” At the October 16 HPC meeting a motion to approve the two sub-districts was amended to include five properties facing Hennepin Avenue (buildings numbered 21-25). The commissioners discussed why the HPC staff had recommended excluding them, and reasons for keeping them in the District. Finally, the HPC approved the designation of the two subdistricts, with the inclusion of the five buildings facing Hennepin Avenue. The HPC did not make written findings to support its inclusion of the Hennepin Avenue properties.

On October 31, the City’s Zoning and Planning Committee (Zoning) heard public testimony and then adopted the findings of the planning department, requested findings to support the inclusion of the Henne-pin Avenue properties, and approved the designation. Zoning then passed the recommendation on to the city council for final approval, together with findings that the inclusion of the Hennepin Avenue properties helped to preserve the integrity of the contributing properties and the character of the District. On November 9, 2001, the city council passed two resolutions, designating the southwest portion (Fawkes block) and the northeast portion (which included respondent BGEA’s four properties) as the Harmon Place Historic District.

On a writ of certiorari to the court of appeals, BGEA challenged the designation of the northeast portion of the District, claiming that the City acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably. The court of appeals agreed with some of BGEA’s claims as to how the City’s action was arbitrary, and did not address the remainder. The court focused on three aspects of the designation that it characterized as arbitrary: the inclusion of the properties facing Hennepin Avenue, the fact that only that portion of building 13 facing Harmon *122Place is included within the District, and the inconsistent use of an alley as a boundary. Billy Graham Evangelistic Ass’n v. City of Minneapolis, 653 N.W.2d 638, 644-46 (Minn.App.2002). The court reversed the City’s designation of the northeast portion of the District, finding it to be arbitrary and capricious. Id. at 646.

The City claims the court of appeals misstated the record and substantially departed from the usual course of justice in its standard of review of quasi-judicial decisions. BGEA reasserts the two broad claims it made to the court of appeals. First, BGEA argues that the City erred as a matter of law in interpreting the heritage preservation ordinance to permit inclusion of noncontributing properties in an historic district. Second, BGEA contends that the City’s designation of the District was arbitrary or capricious in various substantive and procedural ways. We review the City’s designation of historic property independently from the court of appeals. See Swanson v. City of Bloomington, 421 N.W.2d 307, 311 (1988); Northwestern College v. City of Arden Hills, 281 N.W.2d 865, 868 (Minn.1979). In our independent review of the City’s action, we will focus on BGEA’s arguments as to how the City’s action was unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious.

I.

We begin with BGEA’s argument that the City erred as a matter of law in interpreting the heritage preservation ordinance to permit inclusion of noncontributing properties in a district. We interpret an existing city ordinance de novo. Frank’s Nursery Sales, Inc. v. City of Roseville, 295 N.W.2d 604, 608 (Minn.1980).

The Code defines an historic district as “[ajll property within a defined area designated as an historic district by the city council because of the historical, cultural, architectural, archaeological or engineering significance of the district, or designated as an historic district by state law.” Code § 599.110 (2001) (emphasis added). The ordinance says the seven different “criteria shall be considered in determining whether a property is worthy of designation” and defines property as “[ajny land, building, structure or object, surface or subsurface area, natural or landscape feature.” Code §§ 599.210, 599.110 (2001) (emphasis added). BGEA interprets the word property to mean a singular structure, i.e., one building or parcel; and argues that each singular property must possess the required historical, cultural, or architectural significance. We do not read the ordinance so narrowly. The ordinance permits any building, structure, surface area, or landscape feature to be included in an historic district. The ordinance does not limit properties to those with historical significance. We conclude that the plain language of the ordinance allows for the inclusion of noncontributing properties within an historic district and the City did not err as a matter of law in permitting inclusion of some noncontributing properties in the District.6

II.

We turn to the central question in this case, whether the City acted arbitrari*123ly or capriciously in designating the northeast portion of the District. Recently we ruled that cities are engaged in quasi-judicial action when they designate buildings for heritage preservation. Handicraft Block Ltd. Partnership v. City of Minneapolis, 611 N.W.2d 16, 24 (Minn.2000). Because they are quasi-judicial acts, we affirm decisions to designate property as historic unless we make an independent determination that the decisions are unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious. See Horn v. City of Coon Rapids, 313 N.W.2d 409, 416-17 (Minn.1981).

As we explained in Zylka, which party bears the burden of proof will depend on whether the City stated reasons for its decision — if the City gave contemporaneous reasons, BGEA bears the burden of proof, and if not, the City must prove it did not act unreasonably, arbitrarily, or capriciously. Zylka v. City of Crystal, 283 Minn. 192, 198-99, 167 N.W.2d 45, 50-51 (1969). In this case, the City did make contemporaneous findings to support its decision. Various levels of city government made formal, written findings concerning the District. The final written findings came from Zoning, which made findings of fact after its October 30 meeting. Looking at the record as a whole, including hearing transcripts and written memoranda, the City made its reasoning clear and public as to the District. Therefore, BGEA bears the burden of proving that the City acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably in designating the District as historic.

BGEA asserts that the City’s designation of the District’s boundaries was arbitrary or capricious because specific properties were treated arbitrarily, expert testimony was arbitrarily dismissed, the City did not comply with its own ordinance, and the City treated BGEA differently than the University of St. Thomas. We review the City’s actions to determine whether they comport with the ordinance’s criteria for historic designation. See Honn, 313 N.W.2d at 417 (noting that the arbitrariness inquiry in quasi-judicial actions focuses on whether the government action is in accord with the local ordinance). We note that the City’s designation criteria require the City to exercise its judgment about whether an historical event or place is “significant” or associated with distinctive elements of city “identity” and other such subjective criteria.

Specific Properties

BGEA argues that the City gave no reason for including certain noncontributing properties in the District, while other noncontributing properties were excluded; that apartment buildings and surface parking lots should not have been included in the District; that the inclusion of only the part of building 13 facing Harmon Place was indicative of arbitrariness; and that no reasons were given to support the inclusion of the properties facing Hennepin Avenue.

Based upon our independent review of the record in this case, we cannot conclude that the City acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, or capriciously in designating properties to be included in the District. The City gave contemporaneous rationale to support the inclusion and exclusion of all the properties that BGEA contests. The findings issued by Zoning detail the reasons for including the properties facing Hennepin Avenue, designating the block including building 13, and retaining certain noncontributing properties in the District. The Zellie report supports the District’s overall historic value and its comportment with the criteria in the ordinance. All necessary levels of city and state agencies approved the designation of this area as historic. The full District encompasses 31 *124buildings, the majority of which (23) an expert has deemed are contributing to the historic character of the area. Even the disputed northeast portion of the District has a reasonable number of contributing buildings (15 out of 20).

Some of BGEA’s complaints stem from changes in the District’s boundaries that were made by the City as the proposed historic designation made its way through various levels of city government. After receiving critiques of its larger, original proposed District, the City acted to ameliorate the economic effects of the designation on local property owners by splitting the District into two sections, whose combined area was significantly smaller than the original proposal. Downsizing the District and redrawing its boundaries was a rational response to the issues raised by property owners. In addition, it was rational for the City to include the areas with the highest concentration of contributing buildings (especially the buildings facing Harmon Place, the heart of the District) and to attempt to achieve recognizable boundaries for the historic District. We are concerned about the sufficiency of the reasons given for the inclusion in the District of only the part of building 13 facing Harmon Place and the Hennepin Avenue properties, given the somewhat marginal historic value of the northeast portion of the District. Nevertheless, evaluating the City’s determinations in the light of an ordinance with subjective and broadly-defined criteria for designation, we cannot conclude that the City’s decision-making was not rational. Therefore, we conclude that the City’s decision to include or exclude certain properties within the District was supported by legally sufficient reasons and was not unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious.

Expert Evidence

Next, BGEA criticizes the City’s treatment of experts in the hearing process. It asserts that the City ignored Roise’s opinions and that the City’s failure to rebut Roise’s report is evidence of an arbitrary decision. BGEA refers specifically to Roise’s opinion that apartment buildings should not be included in the District, that vacant lots destroyed the cohesion of the District, and that many of the contributing buildings had undergone significant changes.

The court of appeals also expressed concern that the HPC acted against the recommendation of an expert, referring not to Roise but to the planning department staff. The appellate panel stated that “no reason was offered to reject the staff member’s recommendation that the buildings facing Hennepin Avenue be excluded from the [District].” Billy Graham, 653 N.W.2d at 645. The court of appeals cited the rejection of the staff recommendation to exclude the properties facing Hennepin Avenue as a signal of an arbitrary act.

We recently touched upon the issue of experts in Schwardt v. County of Watonwan, 656 N.W.2d 383 (Minn.2003), and noted that local decisionmakers have discretion in weighing evidence. Id. at 388. Upon review, courts should not attempt to weigh the credibility of conflicting experts, but instead review the record to ensure that the decision was “legally sufficient,” i.e., had support in the record. See Barton Contracting Co. v. City of Afton, 268 N.W.2d 712, 718 (Minn.1978) (“The standard for assessing conflicting evidence * * * [in quasi-judicial cases, is] not to weigh the evidence, but to review the record to determine whether there was legal evidence to support the zoning authority’s decision.”). Cf BECA of Alexandria, LLP v. County of Douglas, 607 N.W.2d 459, 463 (Minn.App.2000); BBY Investors v. City of Maplewood, 467 N.W.2d 631, 635 (Minn.App.1991).

In this case the record shows that the City accepted all expert evidence that *125was proffered and took the experts’ opinions into consideration, in addition to the opinion of its staff. The experts gave conflicting testimony about the inclusion of various properties. For example, Zellie had included the Hennepin Avenue properties in her single district proposal while Roise had excluded them. Despite BGEA’s contention that the HPC did not consider Roise’s testimony, the record indicates that the planning department altered its recommendation for the District’s boundaries in response to Roise’s alternative proposal. Following Roise’s lead, the planning department recommended the alley between Harmon Place and Hennepin Avenue as a boundary, excluded a significant number of noncontributing buildings, and carved out two smaller subdistricts. With the recommendations of Roise, Zellie, and the planning department in hand, the commissioners voiced their reasons for drawing the District’s final boundaries. We conclude that the City acted appropriately in accepting and considering all expert testimony before reaching its decision, and there are sufficient facts in the record to support the City’s decision.

HPC’s Obligation Under the City Ordinance

BGEA alleges that procedural irregularities are evidence that the City aet-ed arbitrarily. Primarily, BGEA asserts the HPC failed to make findings sufficient to satisfy its obligation under the city ordinance.7 BGEA argues that all findings should have come from the HPC, instead of from Zoning. Because some findings originated with Zoning, BGEA asserts the entire designation should fail for arbitrariness.

The HPC is required to make findings under Code § 599.280 (2001).8 The HPC adopted some of the findings of the planning department, but did not add findings to justify including the Hennepin Avenue properties. Instead, Zoning developed findings to support the inclusion of the Hennepin Avenue properties. Thus, all findings did not originate with the HPC. We do not think the remedy for that failure, however, should be a judicial reversal of an historic designation that was approved by all levels of city government. There is no evidence that HPC’s failure to make findings prejudiced BGEA It was clear at the public meeting of the HPC on October 16 that the commission had voted to add the Hennepin Avenue properties back into the District; BGEA had notice of the HPC’s recommendation to Zoning. Indeed, a lawyer from BGEA spoke at the Zoning meeting on October 80. There is nothing more BGEA could have done to *126voice its opinion, even if the HPC had included specific findings about the Henne-pin Avenue buildings’ historic merit. Therefore, we conclude that the findings were sufficiently contemporaneous and adequate to support designating the entire northeast portion of the District.

The University of St. Thomas

BGEA alleges they were situated similarly to another property owner, the University of St. Thomas (St. Thomas), whose properties within the originally proposed District were approved for demolition. BGEA notes that four of St. Thomas’s buildings that were described as “contributing” in the Zellie report are now demolished, while the four BGEA buildings, three of which were “contributing,” are still standing and part of the District. BGEA asserts that St. Thomas received vastly different treatment at the hands of the City than did BGEA, with no rationale for doing so in the record, a practice that is prohibited by our holdings in Northwestern College, 281 N.W.2d at 869, and Hay v. Township of Grow, 296 Minn. 1, 7-8, 206 N.W.2d 19, 23-24 (1973).

We have held in multiple cases that “[a] zoning ordinance must operate uniformly on those similarly situated.” Northwestern College, 281 N.W.2d at 869; accord Hay, 296 Minn, at 7-8, 206 N.W.2d at 24. Disparate treatment of two similarly-situated property owners may be an indication that the local government is acting unreasonably or arbitrarily. See Northwestern College, 281 N.W.2d at 868-69.

In Northwestern College, two Christian colleges had applied for permits to expand their facilities. Id. at 867. The Arden Hills City Council denied Northwestern College’s permit application, alleging that a college was incompatible with an area zoned for residential use. Two months earlier, however, the council had approved a permit for Bethel College, which was also a college building in an area zoned for residential use. We determined there was no reason to treat the two colleges differently, and reversed the denial of Northwestern College’s permit application as arbitrary and a violation of due process. Id. at 869.

We do not agree that BGEA and St. Thomas were similarly-situated property owners who received disparate treatment. There were more similarities between Northwestern College and Bethel College than there are between BGEA and St. Thomas. In Northwestern, both applicants were Christian colleges, in the same type of zoned area, applying for very similar types of permits, and the city council approved one and denied the other within a span of two months. St. Thomas and BGEA are both nonprofit entities that owned contributing properties within the large district that Zellie originally proposed, but the similarities end there. BGEA chose to challenge the designation of the District in the first instance, which the City determines using the criteria in Code § 599.210.9 St. Thomas did not challenge the inclusion of its property within the District, but instead requested a “certificate of appropriateness” from the HPC, which the City determines using criteria in Code § 599.350(b) (2001).10 The standards *127involved in deciding the two questions are divergent and make these property owners dissimilar in the type of relief sought. Because the appropriateness of demolition considers factors other than the contributing status of the property, these properties were not similarly situated.

In addition to the City reviewing BGEA’s and St. Thomas’s requests using different criteria, the properties of BGEA and St. Thomas were situated differently within the Harmon Place area. St. Thomas’s buddings were concentrated on a block in which a very small area was taken up by contributing buildings, while BGEA’s buildings, especially 11 and 12, were in the heart of the northeast subdis-trict. We conclude that the City did not act arbitrarily in treating BGEA’s and St. Thomas’s buildings differently.

We conclude that the City of Minneapolis did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in designating the contested northeast portion of the District as historic. Under a higher standard of review we might reach a different result, given the somewhat marginal historic value of this area. Our decision is constrained by the significant deference that we accord the quasi-judicial actions of local governments and the broad and subjective criteria for historic designation set out in the ordinance.11 Because the historic designation meets the criteria in the ordinance, the City made findings in favor of its decision, and the City’s findings are supported by the record, we conclude the designation of the Harmon Place Historic District is neither unreasonable, arbitrary, nor capricious.

Reversed.

BLATZ, C.J., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

*128APPENDIX

GILBERT, Justice

(concurring in part, dissenting in part).

I concur that a historical district can include some noncontributing properties and that the standard of review is arbitrary and capricious. However, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s holding that the City did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in this case and would affirm the court of appeals.

This designation procedure hinges on a report (Zellie Report) prepared by the City’s commissioned consultant, Carole *129Zellie (consultant). This consultant studied a section on the southern edge of downtown Minneapolis, where the City’s automotive industry flourished from around the turn of the century to the 1950s. The consultant ultimately recommended that the area be designated a historic district. However, the Zellie Report contains a significant flaw — it ignores the historical and physical change that has occurred in this district since the late 1950s when the auto industry vacated this area. While the Zellie Report concedes that the auto industry era began in 1907 and ended in 1957 with “its dispersal to the suburbs,” the report represents a nostalgic summary of a bygone era and is written as if there had been no change in this area since the 1950s. The Zellie Report carries forward the history of this bygone era without taking into consideration the end of the era and the transformation of the district by the time it was being considered for historical designation.

The current configuration of this district doesn’t even come close to resembling “the hub of the automotive sales district in Minneapolis at the beginning of the 20th Century.” Redevelopment began with the I-94 freeway construction in 1965. Many of the auto-related buildings in this area have also been demolished and replaced by twelve surface parking lots. There are at least seven new buildings within the district, four apartment buildings and three buildings that haven’t been substantially remodeled. The automotive industry was eventually replaced by major educational and religious institutions and multiple housing.

The most significant change in the district came in the “super block” area, which clearly divided the automotive industries’ concentration into two distinct areas. The super block area contains major new structures that now cater to higher education and cover over two square blocks.1 It houses what is now known as the Minneapolis Community and Technical College. Notwithstanding the complete changeover in this two-block area, the consultant recommended that these buildings be included in this historical district. Wisely, the City planning department rejected this part of their expert’s recommendation and excluded this super block from historical designation. As a result, the planning department revision split the district into two portions commonly known as the Fawkes block and the northeast portion.2 It is the northeast portion of the district, which is the subject of this appeal.

Considerable changes have taken place in the northeast section of the district since the late 1950s. For instance, substantial religious institutions emerged in this area. In 1914, across the street from this designated area, the Basilica of St. Mary’s Church was constructed. At the north end is the First Baptist Church. Then, the Northwestern Bible and Train*130ing School was developed here in the 1940s and 1950s. Subsequently, the Billy Graham Association purchased and occupied five buildings in the district beginning in 1950 (buildings 11, 12, 13, 25 and 27). Finally, to complete this cycle, the University of St. Thomas (St. Thomas) campus acquired large portions of the historically designated district and was permitted to demolish five buildings in this area and expanded the downtown campus. This activity began in 2001 and continued through the final historical designation process.

In 1971, the City of Minneapolis zoned the northeast portion high density, multiple residential housing and established the Loring Park Redevelopment District. Thirty-six of the 42 buildings in this area were razed. They were replaced by the Loring Greenway developed in 1976, 43 Greenway Gables town homes in 1980, and the Laurel Village developed in 1986. Four older apartment buildings (buildings 6, 36, 37 and 39) are also part of the northeast section.3 At the time the consultant issued the Zellie Report there was also one hotel in the northeast section (building 26).4

If the City had commenced this historical designation back in 1971, at or about the time the historical district designation was first authorized by the legislature, it might be a different situation. See Act of April 22, 1971, ch. 128, 1971 Minn. Laws 253, 253-54 (codified at Minn.Stat. § 471.193 (1974)). However, after all of this redevelopment activity, only twelve buildings in the northeast portion of this historical district can legitimately be classified as auto industry related (buildings 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 23 and 36). Although buildings 2, 25 and 37 were designated as contributing, that characterization is inaccurate. Buildings 2 and 39 were demolished by St. Thomas, building 25 underwent extensive renovations, and building 37 is an apartment building. The remaining twelve contributing properties represent less than 30 percent of the surface area of those initially recommended in the northeastern section of the historical district, two of which are apartment complexes (buildings 6 and 36).

As pointed out by a unanimous panel of the court of appeals, the City’s planning commission essentially redrew the boundaries that were recommended by the paid consultant and by the City planning department staff. See Billy Graham Evangelistic Assoc. v. City of Minneapolis, 653 N.W.2d 638, 645 (Minn.App.2002). It is in redrawing these boundaries that the City acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner. First, the inclusion of the Hennepin Avenue properties, buildings 21 though 25, within the district is arbitrary and capricious. The City included the Hennepin Avenue properties within the district despite the planning department’s recommendation to exclude the properties because “[t]his portion of Hennepin Avenue frontage possesses a different character and development potential than the remainder of the district.” See Minneapolis, Minnesota, Code of Ordinances (Code) § 599.280 (2001) (“In making its findings and recommendation, the commission shall consider * * * the city planning commission’s comments”). Moreover, when the Heritage Preservation Commission of the City of Minneapolis (HPC) decided to include the Hennepin Avenue properties *131within the district, it failed to make fold-ings explaining its decision to ignore the planning department’s recommendation and redraw the boundaries. See Code § 599.280 (“[following the public hearing, [HPC] shall make findings with respect to the proposed designation”). Failing to follow procedural guidelines is an indicator that the City acted in an arbitrary manner. See Amcon Corp. v. City of Eagan, 348 N.W.2d 66, 75 (Minn.1984) (“The city’s own comprehensive plan and map designate the property at issue as roadside business. While this designation is not binding, a refusal to zone accordingly is evidence that the city is acting in an arbitrary manner.”). While the zoning and planning committee (zoning) ultimately made written findings justifying the inclusion of the Hennepin Avenue properties, these findings were largely conclusory. Zoning found that two of the five properties are classified as contributing properties and “[including the properties within the historic district will help to preserve the integrity of these buildings and the character of the district.” Such conclusory findings mitigate against a finding that the City acted in a reasonable manner. See Historic Green Springs, Inc. v. Bergland, 497 F.Supp. 839, 850-51 (E.D.Va.1980) (stating that conclusory findings provide minimal insight into whether a decision is arbitrary or capricious).

The arbitrary nature of the decision to include the Hennepin Avenue properties within the district is further illustrated by the fact that the Zellie Report designated only two of the five Hennepin Avenue buildings as contributing. Additionally, both of these “contributing” buildings have lost much of their historical value as they have “undergone varying degrees of alteration, including modernization of windows, redesign of building entrances or blocking of original window openings.” The majority admits that the northeast portion has a “somewhat marginal historic value.” Thus, this “combination of danger signals” — ignoring its own committee’s recommendation, lack of findings and marginal historical value suggest that the City acted arbitrarily when it included the Hen-nepin Avenue properties in the district. See Cable Communications Bd. v. Nor-West Cable Communications P’ship, 356 N.W.2d 658, 669 (Minn.1984) (“The court will intervene, however, where there is a ‘combination of danger signals which suggest the agency has not taken a “hard look” at the salient problems’ and the decision lacks ‘articulated standards and reflective findings.’ ”) (quoting Reserve Mining Co. v. Herbst, 256 N.W.2d 808, 825 (Minn.1977)) (internal citations omitted).

Another indicator that the City acted arbitrarily and capriciously in designating the district historic is that the City bisected building 13 so that it is partially within and partially without the designated district, even though both parts of the building are designated noncontributing. Discussing building 13, the majority concludes that “[w]e are concerned about the sufficiency of the reasons given for the inclusion in the District of only the part of building 13 facing Harmon Place * * * given the somewhat marginal historic value of the northeast portion of the District.” Nevertheless, the majority determines that the City’s bisection of building 13 was rational.

The commission failed to make findings as to why it bisected building 13, or why this decision is rational. The only finding with respect to building 13 was made by the City planning committee that stated buildings 2, 4, 6, 8,10,12, and 13 should be included in the district because all “but one” contribute to the district. However, none of the various government agencies articulated any findings with respect to why building 13, which is located at the *132end of the row and is noncontributing, was included in this group. Additionally, there are not any findings relating to why building 13 was bisected when the entire building is noncontributing. Where an entire building has been designated noncontributing, to designate only one part of the building historic is per se arbitrary, where the City failed to make any findings to justify its decision. Cf. Amcon Corp. v. City of Eagan, 348 N.W.2d 66, 75 (Minn.1984) (holding that “[t]he failure of the city to advance any rationale for not following its comprehensive plan and not granting RB classification is strong evidence of arbitrary action”).

The inclusion of building 13 in the historic district at all is inexplicable considering that the building was constructed in 1980 and in light of the City’s decision to exclude from the district buildings 15 and 17, which are also newly constructed, nonconforming buildings. Accordingly, the City excluded two new properties from the district and included a portion of one new property in the district without articulating a basis in the record to explain why these buildings should be treated in a different manner. Importantly, none of these buildings were associated with the automobile industry in any manner. There is no basis to support this disparate treatment.

The City also acted arbitrarily when during the designation process it allowed St. Thomas to demolish four contributing properties that were originally in the northeast portion (buildings 2, 39, 41 and 42), and then removed the entire parcel owned by St. Thomas from the district. In allowing St. Thomas to demolish buildings, the City treated similarly situated properties differently. As BGEA points out, “[t]he City freed St. Thomas from the restrictions of historic designation but imposed those restrictions [on BGEA].” It is well established that “[a] zoning ordinance must operate uniformly on those similarly situated.” Northwestern College v. City of Arden Hills, 281 N.W.2d 865, 869 (Minn.1979). The majority concludes that BGEA and St. Thomas are not similar because St. Thomas requested a “certificate of appropriateness” instead of challenging the designation of the district. Thus, the majority concludes that “[t]he standards involved in deciding the two questions are divergent and make these property owners dissimilar in the type of relief sought.” However, BGEA and St. Thomas are actually quite similar. They are both nonprofit entities that owned contributing properties within the large district originally proposed by the Zellie Report. Allowing the contributing buildings owned by St. Thomas to be demolished while including similar noncontributing buildings owned by BGEA within the district is per se disparate treatment. Thus, based on this record, the City did act in an arbitrary and capricious manner in treating similarly situated properties differently by allowing the demolition of contributing properties while including noncontributing property.

Finally, although I agree that some noncontributing property can be included within a historical district, those properties should not predominate over contributing properties. Further, noncontributing properties should only be included when they add value or support the architecture of the district. Building 13 adds nothing to the historic or architectural significance of this district. It is a special use, single-user-type of building that has now been stripped of its value and may even be rendered unusable. This arbitrary and capricious action of the City should not be condoned by this court nor should we give our approval to this unbounded exercise of significant governmental power just short of a “taking” in an eminent domain context. The “constrainft]” and “deference” *133the majority accords the City in this appeal amounts to an abdication of our judicial power. The majority’s decision rubber stamps a defective, disparate and improper use of governmental power. If this action by the City is not arbitrary and capricious, what is? We must draw the line somewhere. In doing so, we are not substituting “our own judgment about the historic value of the District” as the majority opinion states, but rather exercising our independent legal judgment to ensure that another branch of government conducts its business according to the law, rather than according to its whim or wishes.

HANSON, Justice

(concurring in part, dissenting in part).

I join in the concurrence and dissent of Justice Gilbert.

G. STEVEN AGEE, Justice.

In this appeal, we consider whether the Danville City Council (the "city council") acted contrary to law or so arbitrarily as to constitute an abuse of discretion when it affirmed the decision of the Danville Commission of Architectural Review (the "commission") not to grant a certificate of appropriateness. Carl T. Norton, appellant, also argues that the city ordinances at issue creating the commission exceed the power granted by Virginia Code § 15.2-2306, and are therefore ultra vires and void. For the reasons discussed below, the judgment of the trial court will be reversed.

*128I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW

Norton owns a home on Main Street in the historic district of the City of Danville on what is commonly referred to as "Millionaires Row." Norton's house, constructed in 1884, is described as an outstanding example of the Italianate style of architecture. Across Main Street from Norton's house is the Sutherlin mansion which is considered to be the best example of Italianate architecture in the city.

During the spring and summer of 2001, Norton's house was burglarized on three separate occasions. That fall, upon the recommendation of Danville police, Norton replaced the existing wooden front door of his home with a door containing glass panes to help officers patrolling Norton's neighborhood see into the house.

Approximately four months after the installation of the new glass door, Kenneth C. Gillie, Jr. ("Gillie"), the director of the Danville Planning Division and the city's zoning administrator, drove by Norton's home and saw the new door. Gillie sent a letter to Norton informing him that he would need to obtain a certificate of appropriateness from the commission if he wanted to keep the glass-paned front door. Otherwise, Norton would have to reinstall a wooden door or be subject to a criminal charge.

The city council established the seven-member commission pursuant to Code § 15.2-2306 to review improvements made in the Danville historic district within view of a public right-of-way or place. For any such improvement to be lawful, the commission must issue a certificate of appropriateness.

In March 2002, the commission denied Norton's application for a certificate of appropriateness for the glass-paned front door. The commission instructed Norton to restore the front door to its "original condition," which the commission determined to be a wooden door with no glass panes. Norton reapplied for a certificate of appropriateness which the commission again denied in May 2002 with a commission member stating the Norton home was "perhaps one of the few remaining original wooden door houses in this City."

Norton appealed the commission's decision to the city council, which affirmed the commission's decision, noting "the CAR [the commission] feels the door was wooden when it was built." Neither the commission nor the city council recited a factual basis for determining the appearance or composition of the original door or whether it was indeed a solid wooden door at the time the house was built.

As authorized by the city code, Norton appealed to the Circuit Court of the City of Danville, arguing the commission's action was "arbitrary." Norton also averred the applicable municipal ordinances exceeded the power granted by state statute rendering those ordinances, and the actions taken under them, ultra vires and void. In affirming the city council decision, the trial court ruled that the issue of whether Norton's home should have a glass front door was fairly debatable and therefore "the Court cannot substitute its judgment for that of City Council." We awarded Norton this appeal.

II. ANALYSIS

We have not previously examined the scope of judicial review under the historical preservation area statute, Code § 15.2-2306. Accordingly, we begin our analysis with Norton's challenge to the validity of the municipal ordinances, enacted pursuant to that statute, which is the basis of his initial assignments of error.1

A. Validity of the Municipal Ordinances

Virginia Code § 15.2-2306(3) and Danville City Code § 41-109 authorize a limited appeal from the city council's decision regarding historic preservation matters. In pertinent part, Virginia Code § 15.2-2306(3), states:

The court may reverse or modify the decision of the governing body, in whole or in

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part, if it finds upon review that the decision of the governing body is contrary to law or that its decision is arbitrary and constitutes an abuse of discretion, or it may affirm the decision of the governing body.

Code § 15.2-2306(3). Accordingly, the Danville City Code provides that a person aggrieved by a final decision of the city council may file a petition with the circuit court as follows:

The Circuit Court may reverse or modify the decision of the City Council, in whole or in part, if it finds upon review that the decision of the City Council is contrary to law or that its decision is arbitrary and constitutes an abuse of discretion; or, it may affirm the decision of the City Council.

Danville City Code § 41-109.2

Similar to a board of zoning appeals, an architectural review commission "is a creature of statute possessing only those powers expressly conferred upon it." Lake George Corp. v. Standing, 211 Va. 733, 735, 180 S.E.2d 522, 523 (1971). In Board of Zoning Appeals v. University Square Associates, 246 Va. 290, 435 S.E.2d 385 (1993), this Court held that judicial review of a decision of a board of zoning appeals is limited to the issues delineated in the statute governing the appeal to a circuit court. We recognized under the limited standard of review provided in the statute governing zoning appeals, "the certiorari process does not authorize a trial court to rule on the validity or constitutionality of legislation underlying a board of zoning appeals decision." Id. at 294, 435 S.E.2d at 388. Therefore, "a party seeking judicial review of a board of zoning appeals decision may not challenge the validity of underlying zoning legislation." Id. at 295, 435 S.E.2d at 388. The same analysis applies in judicial review of a governing body's decision derived from an architectural review commission action.

The historical preservation area statute, Code § 15.2-2306(3), limits judicial review of a governing body's decision to whether that decision is "arbitrary and constitutes an abuse of discretion," or "is contrary to law," similar to the standards applied by the courts in reviewing zoning decisions under Code § 15.2-2314. As in University Square Associates, Norton's challenge to the underlying ordinance as ultra vires and violative of the Dillon rule,3 is barred from consideration in judicial review of the city council's action concerning the certificate of appropriateness. Code § 15.2-2306(3), and the derivative municipal ordinance, grant the trial court authority to review the city council's specific act under the ordinance, not the validity of the ordinance itself.4 Therefore, we do not consider Norton's initial assignments of error because they are beyond the scope of review authorized by Code § 15.2-2306.

B. The City Council's Actions as Arbitrary and Unreasonable

Norton's remaining assignment of error challenges the city council's action on the certificate of appropriateness as "arbitrary and unreasonable." He contends his evidence showing city council's action was unreasonable was not met by evidence of reasonableness by the city council so as to make the issue fairly debatable. Norton avers the trial court's holding to the contrary is reversible error. For the reasons discussed below, we agree with Norton.

"When a governing body of any locality reserves unto itself the right to issue special exceptions, the grant or denial of such exceptions is a legislative function." Board of Supervisors v. McDonald's Corp., 261 Va.

*130583, 589, 544 S.E.2d 334, 338 (2001) (citing Cole v. City Council of Waynesboro, 218 Va. 827, 837, 241 S.E.2d 765, 771 (1978)). Such legislative actions are presumptively correct. Id.; see also County of Lancaster v. Cowardin, 239 Va. 522, 525, 391 S.E.2d 267, 269 (1990). We have often acknowledged this presumption in cases involving applications for "deviations" from zoning regulations. See e.g., Board of Supervisors v. Robertson, 266 Va. 525, 532, 587 S.E.2d 570, 575 (2003); see generally Board of Supervisors v. Stickley, 263 Va. 1, 556 S.E.2d 748 (2002). The city council's legislative action regarding Norton's application for a certificate of appropriateness is analogous and subject to the same presumption and standard of review.

"Legislative action is reasonable if the matter in issue is fairly debatable." Board of Supervisors v. Lerner, 221 Va. 30, 34, 267 S.E.2d 100, 102 (1980). An issue may be said to be "fairly debatable when the evidence offered in support of the opposing views would lead objective and reasonable persons to reach different conclusions." Board of Supervisors v. Williams, 216 Va. 49, 58, 216 S.E.2d 33, 40 (1975). "The burden of proof is on him who assails it to prove that it is clearly unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and that it bears no reasonable or substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare." Turner v. Board of Supervisors, 263 Va. 283, 288, 559 S.E.2d 683, 686 (2002).

As we stated in Board of Supervisors v. Snell Constr. Corp., 214 Va. 655, 202 S.E.2d 889 (1974):

Where presumptive reasonableness is challenged by probative evidence of unreasonableness, the challenge must be met by some evidence of reasonableness. If evidence of reasonableness is sufficient to make the question fairly debatable, the ordinance `must be sustained.' If not, the evidence of unreasonableness defeats the presumption of reasonableness and the ordinance cannot be sustained.

Id. at 659, 202 S.E.2d at 893; see also Board of Supervisors v. Jackson, 221 Va. 328, 333, 269 S.E.2d 381, 385 (1980).

As the applicant for a certificate of appropriateness, Norton bore the burden of presenting evidence that the city council's actions were unreasonable. If Norton presented such evidence, the burden shifted to the city council to produce some evidence that its actions were reasonable thereby rendering the issue fairly debatable. In this case, the city council failed to meet its evidentiary burden.

Norton presented evidence to the trial court that many other houses in the historic preservation district had glass doors. A house of similar Italianate style, the Sutherlin mansion, directly across the street from Norton's home, had a wooden door facing Main Street but commercial glass doors on a side entrance visible from a public street. He also produced evidence showing his home has three other glass doors, besides the front door at issue, which are visible from the street.

Norton called Gillie as a witness during the trial, who testified as follows on direct examination:

Q. What evidence do you have to show that the initial door was all wood?

A. We have seen photos of the door that was all wood. I have seen the door personally and it was all wood.

Q. Well, when was the house built?

A. In the 1880s.

Q. 1884?

A. Somewhere around that.

Q. So you weren't around in 1884, you didn't see the doors?

A. No, sir.

Q. When you say "initially," you mean the way it was when you first saw it?

A. Yes.

Q. You don't know what it was initially?

A. No.

Q. But you're saying the reason that you eliminated the glass part was that initially it had wooden doors.

A. To the best of my knowledge, it had wooden doors.

Q. And that's to your knowledge?

*131

A. Yes.

Q. And you first saw it when?

A. 1992.

Norton thus met his burden to show probative evidence of unreasonableness in the city council's action to compel him to install a wooden door. Norton's evidence reflected that the commission and the city council acted to compel him to install a wooden door on the unsupported supposition such a door existed in 1884, although no evidence directly established that the house featured a wooden door before 1992.

To meet Norton's evidence of unreasonableness, the city council was obligated to put forth some evidence of reasonableness for its decision in order to carry its burden to render the matter fairly debatable. Despite this low threshold, the city council failed to present evidence demonstrating that its decision was reasonable. This is due, in large part, to the fact that the city council presented no witnesses and offered no exhibits to demonstrate there was a wooden door before 1992, such as demonstrative historical photographs or similar items of evidence.

No witness testified for the city council to verify how the original nature of the door was determined. Although Norton was ordered to restore the door to its deemed original condition, the commission and the city council admitted in their proceedings that they did not know what type of door was on the house when it was originally constructed. Similarly, the city council offered no explanation why its mandate that Norton's house have a wooden front door was reasonable, when other glass-paned doors on the house are clearly viewable by the public.

The city council did not meet Norton's evidence that its actions were unreasonable with evidence of reasonableness. The trial court thus erred in concluding the issue was fairly debatable because the city council failed to meet its burden of proof. As a matter of law, the trial court could not conclude the issue was fairly debatable because the city council adduced no evidence of reasonableness.

III. CONCLUSION

For these reasons, we conclude the trial court could not in this proceeding consider Norton's challenges to the validity of the Danville City ordinances. We also conclude that the city council failed to meet its evidentiary burden to demonstrate that its actions were reasonable in affirming the commission's refusal to grant the certificate of appropriateness. Accordingly, the trial court erred in holding the city council's action to be fairly debatable. The judgment of the trial court will be reversed and final judgment will be entered.

Reversed and final judgment.

Jacobs, J.

When the defendant board of appeals granted the defendant Cellular One a special permit to construct a tower measuring 190 feet in height, the plaintiffs brought a complaint in the Superior Court pursuant to G. L. c. 40A, § 17, seeking annulment of the permit. After its motion for summary judgment alleging that the plaintiffs lacked standing was denied, Cellular One sought reconsideration before *686another judge claiming that Barvenik v. Aldermen of Newton, 33 Mass. App. Ct. 129 (1992), decided after the denial of the motion, required rejection of the plaintiffs’ claim of standing. This appeal ensued when the second judge allowed the motion for reconsideration and ordered summary judgment dismissing the plaintiffs’ complaint.

The parties’ submissions under Mass.R.Civ.P. 56, 365 Mass. 824 (1974), establish that the plaintiffs own a home on the westerly shore of Bloody Pond in Plymouth approximately 1,500 feet3 to the west of the proposed tower site and separated from it by the pond, a conservation forest area, and a highway (Route 3). Both the tower site and home are located within the same “rural residential” zone as defined by the town of Plymouth zoning by-laws. An affidavit filed in behalf of the plaintiffs asserts that all commercial uses are prohibited in that zone and that the minimum permitted lot size is 60,000 square feet.

The special permit was granted under the following zoning by-law:

“300.09 HEIGHT

NO STRUCTURE SHALL BE BUILT, CONSTRUCTED, ERECTED, OR ADDED TO ABOVE A HEIGHT OF THIRTY-FIVE (35) FEET; EXCEPT UTILITY POLES, WHICH SHALL NOT BE MORE THAN FORTY-ONE (41) FEET; WITHOUT A *687SPECIAL PERMIT FROM THE BOARD OF APPEALS, AFTER A FINDING BY THE BOARD THAT THERE IS NO FEASIBLE ALTERNATIVE TO THE PROPOSED HEIGHT, THAT IT IS THE MINIMUM NECESSARY, THAT THERE IS A CLEAR AND SPECIFIC PUBLIC BENEFIT WHICH MAY BE REALIZED ONLY BY EXCEEDING 35' IN HEIGHT, AND THAT THE PROPOSED STRUCTURE WILL NOT IN ANY WAY DETRACT FROM THE VISUAL CHARACTER OR QUALITY OF THE ADJACENT BUILDINGS, THE NEIGHBORHOOD OR THE TOWN AS A WHOLE.”

In their rule 56 submissions the plaintiffs claim that they constructed and situated their home “to take maximum advantage of the rural beauty, not only of the pond, but of the surrounding rolling topography.” They express a concern that the tower would be “clearly visible from almost every window” of their home and would defeat their expectation of being “insulated from any commercial activity” by the rural residential zoning designation. They further contend that they are aggrieved by the decision to permit construction of the tower in that it would (1) “significantly impact the visual character and quality of [their] neighborhood,” (2) would “diminish [ ] the value of [their] home,” and (3) would cause microwave emissions harmful to their health.

Under G. L. c. 40A, § 17, aggrieved person status is the jurisdictional prerequisite to judicial review of a decision by a board of appeals or other special permit granting body. See Barvenik v. Aldermen of Newton, supra at 130-131; Cohen v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Plymouth, 35 Mass. App. Ct. 619, 620 (1993); Watros v. Greater Lynn Mental Health and Retardation Assn., Inc., ante 657, 664-666 (1994). The plaintiffs concede that they are not entitled to the presumptive standing accorded to “parties in interest” as that term is defined in G. L. c. 40A, § 11. Barvenik v. Aldermen of Newton, supra at 131 & n.7. However, in their opposition to the motion for summary judgment, they claim that the spe*688cial permit issued to Cellular One violates specific property rights and interests of theirs which are within the scope of concern and protection of the by-law in issue. We agree.

The unsubstantiated representations of the plaintiffs relative to diminution of property value and harmful emissions likely constitute speculative personal opinions which are factually inadequate to establish aggrieved status, even for purposes of withstanding a motion for summary judgment. Cohen v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Plymouth, supra at 622-623. Marashlian v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Newburyport, post 931 (1994). See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 565-566 (1992) (“Standing . . . requires, at the summary judgment stage, a factual showing of perceptible harm”).

Similarly, the plaintiffs’ expressed concern with visual impact might be dismissed as aesthetic sensitivity insufficient to impart standing, see Harvard Square Defense Fund, Inc. v. Planning Bd. of Cambridge, 27 Mass. App. Ct. 491, 493 (1989), were it not for the specific provisions of the Plymouth zoning by-law. By conditioning the grant of a special permit under § 300.09 of that by-law on a finding, as was here made, that “[t]he proposed structure will not in any way detract from the visual character or quality of the neighborhood,” the town of Plymouth created and defined a protected interest. Compare Circle Lounge & Grille, Inc. v. Board of Appeal of Boston, 324 Mass. 427, 431 (1949). For the purpose of summary judgment standing analysis, the plaintiffs have brought themselves within the legal scope of that protection by establishing the direct visual effect of the proposed tower, not only on their home, but also on the neighborhood in which both their home and the tower site are located.

Deposition testimony that the tops of existing utility poles on the east side of Route 3 are visible from the plaintiffs’ home, coupled with evidence that the proposed 190-foot tower is to be located just 255 feet easterly of Route 3, supports a reasonable inference that the tower will be clearly visible from their home and sufficiently particularizes their general contention of visual impact to remove it from the *689realm of speculative and generalized aesthetic concern. Moreover, the fact that the tower site and the plaintiffs’ home are situated within the same zoning district and near opposite shores of Bloody Pond, places them, for summary judgment purposes, within the same “neighborhood” as that word is used in § 300.09 of the Plymouth zoning by-law and imparts standing to the plaintiffs as protected occupants of that neighborhood.

There is no necessity for us to address the plaintiffs’ argument that their ownership of property within the same zoning district as the proposed tower site gives them a legitimate interest in preserving the integrity of the district. See Murray v. Board of Appeals of Barnstable, 22 Mass. App. Ct. 473, 476 (1986); Cohen v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Plymouth, supra at 624 & n.5. Also, our conclusion that the plaintiffs have standing for summary judgment purposes does not preclude a contrary determination based on evidence introduced at trial that controverts the submissions now before us or establishes that the plaintiffs’ property or legal rights will not be more adversely affected by the tower than by present uses or uses permitted as of right. Barvenik v. Aldermen of Newton, supra at 133. The judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded to the Superior Court.

So ordered.

Armstrong, C.J.

The zoning board of appeals of Plymouth (board) granted Gladstone Development Corporation (Glad*53stone) a special permit to build a condominium complex on a site bordering Plymouth harbor. The plaintiff Sheehan, as trustee of Eight Mates Trust, a neighboring property owner, appealed the grant of the permit under G. L. c. 40A, § 17. The judge affirmed the board’s decision, further concluding that Sheehan brought her action in bad faith. He awarded Gladstone legal but not actual costs3 incurred in defending the action. The case is before us on Sheehan’s appeal from the judgment and on Gladstone’s cross-appeal challenging the judge’s refusal to award actual costs and attorney’s fees based on the finding of bad faith.

The Gladstone site is located within Plymouth’s waterfront zoning district. Plymouth Harbor forms the site’s northern border. Other boundaries are an abandoned railroad track to the south; Hedge Road, a public way, to the west; and private residences to the east. The site consists of approximately eleven acres, and its prominent features are a three-acre pond on its northwestern portion and a wooded hill on its southeastern portion. Gladstone proposes to build a forty-two-unit, nine-building condominium complex. Eight buildings located on the hill will house sixteen two-bedroom units and twenty-six three-bedroom units. The final building, a clubhouse located by the pond, will include an outdoor swimming pool, showers, bathrooms, and pool maintenance equipment. The project will also include parking, walking trails, stairs and trails to the beach, and a gazebo overlooking the pond. The board found, and Sheehan does not appear to dispute, that the proposed design is “of high standards.”4

The Sheehan, or Eight Mates Trust, property consists of several contiguous parcels of land along the western side of Hedge Road and the southerly side of the railroad track. The land is largely undeveloped with the exception of some com*54mercial buildings. Unlike the Gladstone property, the Sheehan property lacks harbor frontage.

Sheehan raises several issues on appeal. First, she argues that the trial court erred in its conclusion that the development met the tree preservation and parking requirements necessary for a grant of a special permit. Second, she argues that the development violates provisions in Plymouth’s zoning bylaw concerning public access to the shoreline. Finally, she argues that the judge erred in finding that she brought her action in bad faith. On cross appeal, Gladstone argues that Sheehan lacked standing to challenge the board’s decision and that the judge erroneously limited the bad faith damages to service of process, witness attendance, and deposition fees.

1. Standing. General Laws c. 40A, § 17, allows “[a]ny person aggrieved” by a decision of a board of appeals to challenge the decision in Superior Court. At least one of the Eight Mates Trust lots abuts an abutter within 300 feet of the Gladstone site; under G. L. c. 40A, § 11, this creates a rebuttable presumption that Sheehan as trustee is a person aggrieved. See Marashlian v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Newburyport, 421 Mass. 719, 721 (1996). Once a defendant offers evidence to rebut the presumption, as Gladstone did, the presumption ends and the judge is required to decide the issue of the plaintiff’s standing on the basis of all the evidence. See Bedford v. Trustees of Boston Univ., 25 Mass. App. Ct. 372, 376 (1988).

To survive a challenge to standing, the plaintiff must “demonstrate, not merely speculate, that there has been some infringement of his legal rights.” Denneny v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Seekonk, 59 Mass. App. Ct. 208, 211 (2003). We do not read the term “person aggrieved” narrowly, but the claimed injury or loss must be “personal to the plaintiff, not merely reflective of the concerns of the community.” Ibid. See Barvenik v. Aldermen of Newton, 33 Mass. App. Ct. 129, 132 (1992) (injury must be “special and different from the concerns of the rest of the community”).

Whether an individual is aggrieved is a question of fact for the trial judge, Marashlian v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Newburyport, 421 Mass. at 721, which should not be reversed unless clearly erroneous. Paulding v. Bruins, 18 Mass. App. Ct. *55707, 709 (1984). The judge concluded that the trust property would lose some of its limited harbor view and the environmental and aesthetic benefits of a nearby wooded hill. Both factors would be an asset in selling or developing the trust property for residential purposes, sufficient grounds for standing based on the judge’s reading of Tsagronis v. Board of Appeals of Wareham, 415 Mass. 329, 330 n.4 (1993). The judge also found that the trust property had protected environmental, harbor view, and conservation interests under “various provisions of the Plymouth Zoning Bylaw.” See Monks v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Plymouth, 37 Mass. App. Ct. 685, 688 (1994).5

“Generally, concerns about the visual impact of a structure do not suffice to confer standing,” Martin v. Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 434 Mass. 141, 146 (2001), and we do not read the Tsagronis case to confer standing on a property owner who claims that development will obstruct a water view. See Tsagronis, 415 Mass. at 335 (Abrams, J., dissenting), quoting from Nigro v. Jones, 332 Mass. 741, 744 (1955) (arguing that “a substantial deprivation of fight, enough to render the occupation of the house uncomfortable according to the ordinary notions of mankind,” is necessary for standing). See also Denneny v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Seekonk, 59 Mass. App. Ct. at 216 & n.10. Sheehan’s concern with the visual impact of development on a nearby wooded hill strikes us as the type of aesthetic sensibility insufficient to impart standing, as we discussed in Harvard Square Defense Fund, Inc. v. Planning Bd. of Cambridge, 27 Mass. App. Ct. 491, 493 (1989). See Monks v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Plymouth, 37 Mass. App. Ct. at 688. However, the judge’s conclusion that the bylaw created additional protected environmental, harbor view, and conservation interests sufficient to provide Sheehan with standing was, as in the Monks case, supra, not clearly erroneous. Moreover, the judge had the benefit of a view, which put him in a better position than us to judge the potential impact of the Gladstone clubhouse on the trust property. The judge’s finding that Sheehan has standing is not clearly erroneous.

2. Special permit conditions. In granting a special permit, the *56board must set forth the reasons for its decision that proposed development meets the applicable statutory and bylaw standards, Josephs v. Board of Appeals of Brookline, 362 Mass. 290, 295 (1972), including affirmative findings as to the existence of each condition required for the granting of the special permit. Vazza Properties, Inc. v. City Council of Woburn, 1 Mass. App. Ct. 308, 311 (1973). The Superior Court judge is required to hear the matter de nova and must independently find that each statutory or bylaw condition is met. Ibid.

Under § 401.09(C)(5) of the Plymouth zoning bylaw, a special permit is required for the construction of residences in a waterfront zone. In addition to the general requirements applicable to all special permit uses, waterfront special permit uses are subject to a series of “environmental design conditions.” Sheehan concentrates on the bylaw conditions regarding parking and tree preservation.

a. Parking. Sheehan first argues that the board and the trial judge failed to make adequate findings that Gladstone’s proposed development satisfied the off-street parking conditions contained in §§ 305.01 and 305.11 of the bylaw. The board determined that 109 parking spaces were required under the bylaw and that the requirement was satisfied by the 115 spaces provided for in the Gladstone development plans. These numbers reflect an accurate application of the formula set out in § 305.11 for multifamily dwellings,6 and constitute the necessary affirmative finding. Compare Josephs v. Board of Appeals of Brookline, 362 Mass. at 299 (findings inadequate where they did not reflect specific application of mathematical formulae as required by pertinent bylaw provisions); Howland v. Board of Appeals of Plymouth, 13 Mass. App. Ct. 520, 523 (1982) (same). The Superior Court judge made identical calculations. Sheehan argues that the bylaw required the board to treat the clubhouse, which is for the exclusive use of the residents, as an independent use with additional parking needs. As we observed in another *57case, logic suggests otherwise. See Trustees of Boston College v. Aldermen of Newton, 58 Mass. App. Ct. 794, 807 & n.16 (2003) (simply aggregating parking requirements for different uses on site would result in “overcounting” of required parking spaces when, for example, “the same individual occupies a bed, a classroom seat, or a dining hall seat”).

Sheehan argues that § 305.01 of the bylaw, which requires special permit uses to provide parking on the same lot as the principal use served, or else parking on other properties within 400 feet of the principal building,7 bars the board from counting sixteen spaces located at the clubhouse (which is more than 400 feet from the nearest residence) towards the required 109 parking spaces. The bylaw is phrased disjunctively; it does not forbid inclusion of such on-site parking spaces in calculating the total,8 and given that its dominant purpose is to locate parking on-site, see Howland v. Board of Appeals of Plymouth, 13 Mass. App. Ct. at 522-523, we should not imply such a restriction. The board and the Superior Court judge made adequate findings that the parking requirements of the bylaw were met. See Josephs v. Board of Appeals of Brookline, 362 Mass. at 295.

b. Tree preservation. Gladstone’s detailed “planting plan” located in the record appendix refutes Sheehan’s first argument that Gladstone did not submit a site plan detailing “natural trees and foliage to be maintained” and “specific new planting by size and location” as required by § 205.03(C)(4) of the bylaw.

Sheehan argues that the board and the judge failed to make adequate findings that the Gladstone development satisfied two *58sections of the by-law: section 205.03(D)(1), which limits tree clearance to an “absolute practical minimum,” and § 301.05, which provides that lots covered by mature trees of greater than five inches in breast-height diameter should not be thinned by more than fifty percent, and that all such trees lying outside of areas of actual construction should be preserved.

The board made four findings addressing tree coverage: first, the upland portion of the Gladstone development is “thickly wooded”; second, “some tree removal” would occur on that portion of the site; third, the removal would be compensated for by the proposed landscaping plan; and finally, retaining walls would be used to preserve existing vegetation. The judge, who took a view of the site, made additional findings: first, that the clearing of trees would be limited to the minimmn necessary for construction, access, and reasonable open space; second, that the fifty-percent thinning requirement did not apply because the site was not covered with mature trees more than five inches in breast-height diameter; and finally, that trees exceeding that diameter located outside of the areas of actual construction activity would be preserved.

The judge’s findings amply satisfied the requirement that he independently find that the special permit condition regarding tree preservation had been met. See Vazza Properties, Inc., v. City Council of Woburn, 1 Mass. App. Ct. at 311. Findings from the board that more directly addressed §§ 205.03(D)(1) and 301.05 would have been preferable. However, certain findings — that the landscaping plan adequately compensated for any tree clearance caused by construction and that the proposed retaining walls would preserve natural vegetation reflected the board’s concern for the bylaw conditions — implied that the conditions were met, and supported the ultimate decision to grant the special permit. See Shoppers’ World, Inc. v. Beacon Terrace Realty, Inc., 353 Mass. 63, 67 (1967) (board must set forth substantial facts that “rightly can move an impartial mind, acting judicially, to the definite conclusion reached”), quoting from Prusik v. Board of Appeal of Boston, 262 Mass. 451, 457-458 (1928). Compare Pierce v. Board of Appeals of Carver, 2 Mass. App. Ct. 5, 6 (1974) (invalidating grant of special permit when board neither found nor implied that bylaw condition *59had been met). The board “avoided the common vice of parroting the statutory standards for a grant of a special permit in lieu of findings.” Campbell v. City Council of Lynn, 32 Mass. App. Ct. 152, 159 (1992), quoting from Tebo v. Board of Appeals of Shrewsbury, 22 Mass. App. Ct. 618, 622 (1986).

3. Shoreline access. Section 401.09(C)(5) of the zoning bylaw provides that multifamily and single-family attached residential construction in waterfront districts is to be “designed not to preclude public access to and along the shoreline.” The parties direct us to no Massachusetts case that addresses the degree of public access necessary to satisfy such a provision.9 In the context of a development of relatively small compass, we do not read the phrase “not to preclude” as requiring affirmative measures to expand traditional public shoreline rights such as the dedication of an easement. Compare those portions of town bylaws explicitly contemplating the dedication of an easement in Patel v. Planning Bd. of N. Andover, 27 Mass. App. Ct. 477, 478 (1989), and Sullivan v. Planning Bd. of Acton, 38 Mass. App. Ct. 918, 920-921 (1995).

“Preclude” is commonly defined as “to make impossible by *60necessary consequence.” Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 977 (11th ed. 2003). The judge credited the testimony of Gladstone employees that the project will not erect barriers to impede the public’s traditional rights to the area between the high and low water marks for “fishing, fowling and navigation,” see Opinion of the Justices, 365 Mass. 681, 685 (1974), and the record indicates that the development will take some affirmative steps to increase shoreline access, such as building stairways to the beach and creating “visual corridors” across the site to the bay. The impossibility of public shoreline access is not a necessary consequence of the Gladstone development. Gladstone is not proposing a gated community designed to preclude public access in violation of the bylaw. Gladstone has done as much as the bylaw requires.

Sheehan next points to § 401.09(E)(2), a paragraph that states that waterfront uses “should be designed to allow pedestrian access to and along the shore for a minimum distance of ten (10) feet inland from the mean high water mark.” As to access along the shore, nothing Gladstone proposes blocks such lateral access. As to access “to” the shore, i.e., across the Gladstone property, we again do not read into the bylaw a mandate that the board exact the dedication of a route of public access as a condition of granting a special permit. In contrast to the mandatory (“shall”) phraseology of the next following paragraph of the section (§ 401.09[E][3]10), this paragraph indicates a recommended (“should”), rather than a required, course of action. See Uglietta v. City Clerk of Somerville, 32 Mass. App. Ct. 742, 744-745 (1992), quoting from 2A Sands, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 57.11 (4th ed. 1984) (“Where both mandatory and directory verbs are used in the same statute . . . it is a fair inference that the legislature realized the difference in meaning, and intended that the verbs used should carry with them their ordinary meanings”). See also United States v. Maria, 186 F.3d 65, 70 (2d Cir. 1999); Qwest Corp. v. Federal Communications Commn., 258 F.3d 1191, 1200 (10th Cir. 2001) (where “shall” and “should” appear in the same section, “should” indicates a recommended course of action); State v. Garrett, 80 Wash. App. *61651, 652 (1996) (same). Moreover, the phraseology of the bylaw paragraph, “minimum distance of ten (10) feet inland from the mean high water mark,” indicates that the bylaw is directed to preserving the beach bordering the mean high water mark, not the provision of access routes across private property to the beach.

4. Bad faith. General Laws c. 40A, § 17, inserted by St. 1975, c. 808, § 3, provides that a court may assess costs against a party appealing a grant of a special permit if it appears that the appellant “acted in bad faith or with malice in making the appeal to the court.”11 Prior to the initiation of this suit, Sheehan’s husband, who the judge found was clothed with apparent authority to speak for the trust, discussed with Gladstone the possibility of the Sheehans either selling the trust lots to Gladstone or obtaining a right of way to the shoreline from Gladstone and developing the lots itself. Nothing came of the discussions. The judge concluded that the Sheehan complaint was a bad-faith attempt to use the leverage of the lawsuit to “unfairly extract an economic advantage or a right of way concession from Gladstone and to block or drive up the costs of a project that might compete with development on the Eight Mates parcel.” We reverse that portion of the judge’s decision.

Generally, bad faith actions are those “interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation.” Hahn v. Planning Bd. of Stoughton, 403 Mass. 332, 337 (1988), quoting from Fed.R.Civ.P. 11 (1987). That a property owner looks first to sell his interest and then to protect it by way of a lawsuit is unexceptional; the temporal sequence alone does not evince bad faith. Nothing in the evidence indicates that Sheehan filed suit to harass Gladstone or to drive up its costs, as contrasted, for example, with the effort to secure for the benefit of the trust property a public use easement to the shore, which Sheehan could reasonably argue was the mandate of the bylaw. Contrast Pirie v. First Congregational Church, 43 Mass. App. Ct. 908, 911 (1997), where the plaintiff’s bad faith motivation was *62evinced by statements such as: “You will probably ultimately get to do what you want, but I’m warning you, I will take you through every legal process and deplete your resources in the process. Then you won’t be able to afford what you want to do.” Nor, at this point, have the Sheehans engaged in the type of extensive, baseless legal maneuvering that is intended solely to cause delay. See, e.g., Pollack v. Kelly, 372 Mass. 469, 477 & n.5 (1977) (repeated, premature appeals); Hahn v. Planning Bd. of Stoughton, 403 Mass. at 334, 337 (multiple actions and appeals at each stage of case); Ashford v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Authy., 421 Mass. 563, 568-569 (1995) (improper appeals). Absent evidence of improper motives, the finding of bad faith cannot stand.

So much of the judgment as awards costs to Gladstone on the basis of bad faith by the plaintiff is reversed. The judgment is otherwise affirmed.

So ordered.

Pierron, J.:

R.H. Gump Revocable Trust and Nordyke Ventures, L.L.C. (collectively “Gump”) appeal the decision of the district court affirming the decision of the City of Wichita (City) to deny a conditional use permit to allow construction of a cellular communications tower. Gump argues City acted unreasonably, City’s decision was not supported by substantial evidence under the Telecommunications Act of 1996, and City acted unreasonably by considering the court’s remand in executive session. We affirm.

R.H. Gump Revocable Trust, in the care of R.H. Gump, is the owner of real property located 600 feet east of Woodlawn on the south side of Kellogg Avenue in Wichita. Nordyke Ventures, L.L.C., in the care of Mark Nordyke, builds and leases wireless communication facilities.

In July 2000, City and Sedgwick County approved a Wireless Communication Master Plan (master plan) to address the growing needs of the wireless communication industry and incorporated tire plan into the Wichita-Sedgwick County Unified Zoning Code (UZC). Communication companies are allowed construction of new disguised ground-mount facility towers up to 85 feet high by administrative permit. There is no prohibition for building new *503disguised ground-mount towers in excess of 85 feet, but such towers require a conditional use permit approved by City.

In March 2003, Gump filed a request seeking a conditional use permit to construct a “stealth flagpole” tower for use by Cricket Communications on the real property in question. Gump proposed a wireless communication tower, to house all the antenna equipment, having an initial height of 135 feet, with provisions to extend tire height of tire tower to 165 feet if necessary to allow other carriers to use the same support structure in the future. A large United States flag would be flown from the flagpole to help disguise its utilitarian purpose.

The Metropolitan Area Planning Department (MAPD) reviewed Gump’s application and found the proposed tower conformed to the guidelines of the UZC and master plan and recommended approval of tire conditional use subject to certain conditions. The Wichita/Sedgwick County Metropolitan Area Planning Commission (MAPC). granted its approval after a public hearing on April 24, 2003, subject to several maintenance-type conditions and that the flag should be illuminated only at night. The MAPC based its approval on several findings: tire mixture of commercial and residential uses along the Kellogg corridor, compatibility, “limited commercial” zoning of the property, visual impact lessened by design, conformance to master plan, and FAA approval.

On May 5,2003, the District Advisory Board for Council District II (DAB II) also voted to recommend that the application be approved. The only difference between DAB II’s recommendation and MAPC’s was that DAB II preferred the MAPD’s recommendation that the flag be displayed only during daylight hours to avoid the need for nighttime lighting of the flag.

On May 20, 2003, City considered Gump’s request for a conditional use permit. Council Member Schlapp moved, and City voted unanimously, to return the application to MAPC, and if necessary the DAB II, for reconsideration of their recommendations. City requested that MAPC address three issues:

“1. Are other structures or buildings that have been suggested by Staff and the public available for location of some or all of the antenna needs of the applicant? *504Could multiple shorter towers or flagpoles that do not have the same visual impact on the surrounding neighborhoods meet some of the applicant’s needs?

“2. If a facility disguised as a tall flagpole were to be approved, what conditions should be considered for display of any type of flag on such a flagpole?

“3. Is the City adequately protected in the event the applicants (or other users) are financially unable to maintain the facility?”

MAPC considered City’s remand request on June 5, 2003. At the MAPC hearing, several citizens spoke against the request and stated numerous concerns and questions. MAPC voted (12 to 1) not to change the previous recommendation of approval subject to the same conditions, including allowing lighting of the flag at night. In its decision, MAPC considered the planning staffs lengdiy response to the three questions raised by City.

City reconsidered Gump’s request for a conditional use permit at a hearing on June 17, 2003. The acting director of planning reviewed the application for a conditional use permit for the council. After a review of the record, MAPC’s reconsideration of the item, along with the original MAPC hearing record, and additional information in the record, Schlapp moved that the application should be denied based on 10 factors: (1) Even with a disguised structure, the proposal is not compatible with the use and character of the neighborhood; (2) extensive beautification efforts in the Kellogg freeway area and negative visual impact from residential and recreation areas; (3) does not conform to the design guidelines of master plan; (4) does not conform to the location guidelines of master plan; (5) does not conform to structural design of master plan; (6) does not conform to co-location guidelines of masterplan; (7) overwhelming opposition to proposal; (8) visual impact of tall pole; (9) this is the third attempt to place a wireless facility at this location; and:

“10. Upon review of the total record, . . . the relative gain to the public health, safety and welfare by a denial of this application as compared to the loss in value or the hardship imposed upon the applicant, requires a denial of the application. The applicant has less detrimental alternatives it can pursue to enhance its wireless services in this area.”

City denied the conditional use permit to Gump by a vote of 4 to 2.

*505Gump appealed to the district court claiming the action of City in denying die conditional use permit was without authority and unreasonable. Gump contended the decision was based on improper criteria, contrary to the evidence received in the case, and contrary to the professional recommendations of MAPC and DAB II.

The district court conducted several hearings on the conditional use permit in early 2004. On July 22, 2004, the court issued an order outlining the proceedings up to that date and then remanding to City as follows:

“14. The record discloses citizen opposition based on the aesthetic impact and/ or visual appearance of the tower. The ‘findings’ of the Council in denying the application appear to be based entirely on the aesthetic impact or visual impact of the tower. However, in Finding #10, the Council concluded that ‘the relative gain to the public health, safety, and welfare by denial of the application as compared to the loss in value or the hardship imposed upon the applicant, requires a denial of the application.’ This finding is conclusory, vague, and appears to lack factual support. Because this ‘finding’ may have a material impact on the Court’s ultimate decision in this matter, the Court directs the Council to clarify the factual underpinnings of their finding.”

City considered the district court’s remand order at the September 14,2004, council meeting while in executive session. City unanimously adopted additional findings of fact as presented by its law department. Concerning the gain to public health, safety, and welfare of the community, City addressed: (1) the impact of fighting the flag and that the visual impact of the proposed tower exists whether or not the flag is lighted; (2) treatment of the flag and fear Gump will not fulfill its requirement to properly care for the size of flag necessary for the flagpole; (3) previous findings on the impingement of the aesthetics and visual impact of the flagpole; and (4) previous outlined failures of the application to conform to the master plan.

Concerning the loss in value or tire hardship imposed upon the applicant, City stated: (1) property owner will not be denied all value because other commercial uses are possible on the property; (2) location is not essential to the ability of the wireless industry to *506provide complete coverage and availability of alternative sites; and (3) multiple shorter towers could meet Gump’s needs.

Concerning the balance of the public interest to Gump’s hardship, City addressed: (1) conflicting facts and strong opinions in the case; (2) alternative sites; and (3) the strong weight of the facts showing a detrimental impact on the general health, safety, and welfare of the community and how this Golden factor weighs for the denial of the application. See Golden v. City of Overland Park, 224 Kan. 591, 584 P.2d 130 (1978), City unanimously adopted the additional findings.

After City adopted the additional findings on remand, the district court took up the ultimate issues in this case at a hearing on Gump’s motion to permit discovery. The district court denied tire motion to permit discovery and announced, sua sponte, that it was prepared to rule on the merits of the case. After consideration of the original findings, arguments of counsel, and amended City findings, the court concluded: (1) City’s determination was based solely upon tire visual impact and aesthetics of the proposed tower; (2) City was entitled under the law to make its determination on that basis; (3) Gump had not proven the unreasonableness of the denial of the conditional use permit; and (4) City had taken into account the benefit or harm involved to the community at large and had exercised its discretion to make a decision on that basis that was not so wide of the mark that it was outside the realm of fair debate.

The district court denied Gump’s motion for reconsideration and found that City’s action in denying the conditional use permit was based on “substantial evidence” as that term is defined in U. S. Cell. Tele. v. Great. Tulsa Broken Arrow, OK, 340 F.3d 1122 (10th Cir. 2003). Gump appeals.

Gump argues City’s denial of the conditional use permit was unreasonable. Gump argues that its application for a conditional use permit complied with, in every objective way possible, all the requirements of the master plan and that even City’s professional planning staff recommended approval of the permit with various conditions.

The tenets of our standard of review are well established in cases of zoning matters.

*507“In zoning appeals, the standard of review for district courts as well as for this court is set forth in Combined Investment Co. v. Board of Butler County Comm’rs, 227 Kan. 17, 28, 605 P.2d 533 (1980):

‘(1) The local zoning authority, and not the court, has the right to prescribe, change or refuse to change, zoning.

‘(2) The district court’s power is limited to determining

(a) the lawfulness of the action taken, and

(b) the reasonableness of such action.

‘(3) There is a presumption that the zoning authority acted reasonably.

‘(4) The landowner has the burden of proving unreasonableness by a preponderance of the evidence.

‘(5) A court may not substitute its judgment for that of the administrative body, and should not declare the action unreasonable unless clearly compelled to do so by the evidence.

‘(6) Action is unreasonable when it is so arbitrary that it can be said it was taken without regard to the benefit or harm involved to the community at large, including all interested parties, and was so wide of the mark that its unreasonableness lies outside the realm of fair debate.

‘(7) Whether action is reasonable or not is a question of law, to be determined upon the basis of the facts which were presented to the zoning authority.

‘(8) An appellate court must make the same review of the zoning authority’s action as did the district court.’ ” McPherson Landfill, Inc. v. Board of Shawnee County Comm'rs, 274 Kan. 303, 306, 49 P.3d 522 (2002).

Examining the reasonableness of the planning authority’s decision is also well established in Kansas law, also known as the Golden factors. In Golden, 224 Kan. at 597, the Kansas Supreme Court observed:

“A mere yes or no vote upon a motion to grant or deny [a request for zoning change] leaves a reviewing court, be it trial or appellate, in a quandary as to why or on what basis the board took its action. A board, council or commission, in denying or granting a specific zoning change, should enter a written order, summarizing the evidence before it and stating the factors which it considered in arriving at its determination.”

The following Golden zoning factors are suggestions and other factors may be equally or more important factors depending of the circumstances of the particular case: (1) the character of the neighborhood; (2) the zoning and uses of properties nearby; (3) the suitability of the subject property for the uses to which it has been restricted; (4) the extent to which removal of the restrictions will detrimentally affect nearby property; (5) the length of time the *508subject property has remained vacant as zoned; (6) the gain to the public health, safety, and welfare by the possible diminution in value of the developer’s property as compared to the hardship imposed on the individual landowners; (7) tire recommendations of a permanent or professional planning staff; and (8) the conformance of the requested change to tire city’s master or comprehensive plan. See Golden, 224 Kan. at 598.

“The local zoning authority, and not the court, has the right to prescribe, change, or refuse to change zoning. The district court’s power is limited to determining the lawfulness of the action taken and the reasonableness of such action.” Board of Johnson County Comm’rs v. City of Olathe, 263 Kan. 667, Syl. ¶ 1, 952 P.2d 1302 (1998). “Reasonableness is a question of law to be determined on the facts. On appeal, we apply the same standard as tire trial court. [Citation omitted.]” Rodrock Enterprises, L.P. v. City of Olathe, 28 Kan. App. 2d 860, 863, 21 P.3d 598, rev. denied 271 Kan. 1037 (2001).

Initially, we recognize that City is not following the recommendation of the MAPC. However, this is not per se arbitrary. The court in Houston v. Board of City Commissioners, 218 Kan. 323, 330, 543 P.2d 1010 (1975), addressed this very argument:

“Their second argument on arbitrariness is that the city commission was per se arbitrary in rejecting the recommendation of the planning commission. The argument misconceives tire respective roles of the two bodies.

‘. . . [T]he function of the planning commission is advisory only, its authority being limited to a study of the facts and submission of its recommendations to the governing body wherein authority to taire final action lies.’ (Burke & McCaffrey, Inc. v. City of Merriam, 198 Kan. 325, 327, 424 P.2d 483.)”

Gump contends the findings adopted by City are without support in the record which exposes its findings regarding the “aesthetics” or “visual impact” to a high degree of suspicion as to the existence of an adequate basis for such a finding. Gump argues City established rules for cellular towers in its master plan. Gump complied with all of the rules, the MAPC approved the application with conditions, and City denied the application because of neighborhood opposition to the tower appearance. Gump contends City cannot deny an application on aesthetics alone.

*509The district court has cut to the essence of this case — City’s determination was based solely upon the visual impact and aesthetics of the proposed stealth tower. The court found City was entitled under the law to make this determination and Gump had not proven the unreasonableness of the denial of the conditional use permit. The court also found City had taken into account the benefit or harm involved to the community at large and had exercised its discretion to make a decision on that basis that was not so wide of the mark that it was outside the realm of fair debate. We agree.

City had to balance the benefits and the harms to all parties involved and come to a resolution of the case. The master plan contemplates this type of harm/benefit analysis by requiring approval by conditional use permit of telecommunication towers that extend over 85 feet in height.

While no case is directly on point, several cases addressed by the parties provide valuable assistance on the aesthetics factor in zoning appeals. In Houston, 218 Kan. 323, the court considered a zoning change from light commercial to multiple family. In opposition to tire change, tire plaintiffs argued that preserving the character of the neighborhood was not a legitimate purpose of a zoning ordinance because the result was aesthetic and not related to the public welfare. In ultimately holding that preserving the residential character of the neighborhood was a legitimate purpose of the zoning ordinance, the Houston court stated:

“It does plaintiffs no good to characterize the purpose here as ‘aesthetic.’ As long ago as 1923 we recognized in a zoning case that ‘[t]here is an aesthetic and cultural side of municipal development which may be fostered within reasonable limitations. [Citations omitted.] Such legislation is merely a liberalized application of the general welfare purposes of state and federal constitutions.’ (Ware v. City of Wichita, 113 Kan. 153, 157, 214 Pac. 99.) Along the same lines, in upholding an urban renewal project the United States Supreme Court commented on the ‘public welfare’ aspect of the police power:

‘. . . The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive. See Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 424, 96 L. Ed. 469, 72 S. Ct. 405. The values it represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary. It is within the power of the legislature to determine that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as *510carefully patrolled.’ (Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33, 99 L. Ed. 27, 75 S. Ct. 98.

And see Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 39 L. Ed. 2d 797, 94 S. Ct. 1536, where the Court upheld an ordinance zoning an entire village for single family dwellings. In so doing the Court observed: ‘ . . . The police power is not confined to elimination of filth, stench, and unhealthy places. It is ample to lay out zones where family values, youth values, and the blessings of quiet seclusion and clean air make the area a sanctuary for people.’ (Id. p. 9.)

“The zoning here, of course, is not ‘aesthetic’ in the sense that it purports to control the appearance of plaintiffs’ property. The objective sought is the exclusion of commercial uses from a residential area. Any ‘aesthetic’ effect is purely incidental and entirely permissible. See Anno., Zoning-Aesthetic Considerations, 21 A.L.R.3d 1222.” 218 Kan. at 329.

In Robert L. Reike Bldg. Co. v. City of Overland Park, 232 Kan. 634, 657 P.2d 1121 (1983), the court upheld an ordinance regulating attention attracting devices, such as searchlights, on property located within the city. In concluding that the zoning regulations were valid and constitutional and fell within the police power of the city, the court stated:

“The evidence in this case includes the testimony of several expert witnesses to the effect that the maintenance and operation of searchlights on a regular basis would have measurable adverse impact on the valuation and marketability of nearby residential properties. Although the courts have not been in complete accord in the past, the current trend of the decisions is to permit regulation for aesthetic reasons. See Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 101 S. Ct. 2882, 69 L.Ed.2d 800.” 232 Kan. at 642-43.

In Blockbuster Video, Inc. v. City of Overland Park, 24 Kan. App. 2d 358, 948 P.2d 179 (1997), the court relied on both Houston and Rieke in holding that the city had the power to enforce zoning regulations concerning types of awnings based on aesthetics. The Blockbuster court stated: “There is an aesthetic and cultural side of municipal development which can be fostered within reasonable limits; regulation of redevelopment or new development is permitted for aesthetic reasons. K.S.A. 12-755.” 24 Kan. App. 2d 358, Syl. ¶2.

Gump argues City’s decision in this case was pure subjectivity. Gump maintains pure subjectivity is what distinguishes the case at bar from Houston, Rieke, and Blockbuster where there were objective reasons as well. Gump submits that because of the inher*511ently subjective nature of a decision based solely upon appearance, the court must impose some type of objective standard by which the court can determine the reasonableness of the decision or have sufficient other objective reasons to support the action of the governing body.

City argues that even if the application meets all the technical requirements in the master plan concerning a telecommunications structure, it is still a quasi-judicial decision of MAPC and City concerning the impact of the structure on the neighborhood and community. City argues that we are not to reweigh the evidence pursuant to the Golden factors, but review whether its findings were reasonable. City contends that while a party may dispute its judgment on the Golden factors, it is clear that City considered the evidence presented and made its decision. City states that it does not have to make the best decision, only a reasonable one.

This case does not present the garden variety of zoning appeals where the granting or denial of a zoning request has a public health, safety, and welfare facet to it. As indicated by the district court, the aesthetics or the visual appearance of this tower is at the heart of whether to allow construction of a stealth flagpole to house the telecommunication equipment. This aesthetical consideration permeates nearly all of City’s reasons for denying the conditional use application.

We also find there is public opposition to this conditional use permit. Neighborhood objections are not legally sufficient to deny use, or even conditional uses, of land. However, it remains a consideration in the ultimate decision. “Zoning is not to be based upon a plebiscite of the neighbors, and although their wishes are to be considered, the final ruling is to be governed by consideration of the benefit or harm involved to the community at large.” Waterstradt v. Board of Commissioners, 203 Kan. 317, Syl. ¶ 3, 454 P.2d 445 (1969).

City decided that the proposed stealth flagpole was incompatible and inconsistent with the area. There were no other flagpoles of that size, and extensive beautification efforts had been made in the area. We agree with the district court that City had taken into account the benefit or harm involved to the community at large *512and had exercised it discretion to make a decision on that basis that was not so wide of the mark that it was outside the realm of fair debate. While we may or may not fully agree with City, it is the body in charge of the aesthetical considerations of the community and the character of its neighborhoods. We do not find City has breached the Blockbuster standard of “an aesthetic and cultural side of municipal development which can be fostered within reasonable limits.” 24 Kan. App. 2d 358, Syl. ¶ 2.

While aesthetic considerations may not be as precise as more technical measures and must be carefully reviewed to assure that they are not just a vague justification for arbitrary and capricious decisions, they may be considered as a basis for zoning rulings.

Gump next makes a rather brief argument that the district court erred in holding that substantial evidence existed under the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (Act) to support the denial of the conditional used application.

The Act gives ultimate authority to local governing bodies. See 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B) (2000); Cellular Telephone v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 197 F.3d 64, 68 (3d Cir. 1999) (The Act expressly preserves local zoning authority over the placement, construction, and modification of personal wireless service facilities.). The Act also provides that denials of a request to place, construct, or modify personal wireless service facilities must be “supported by substantial evidence contained in a written record.” 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iii).

Gump simply cites the Act and various case law for the argument that even in the federal regulations for the telecommunication industry, decisions of the governing body must be supported by substantial evidence. Gump argues the only evidence in the record to support City’s decision was the fact that a number of area residents had stated that the stealth tower would not look good in the neighborhood. Gump surmises that if all it takes in a zoning case is for neighbors to state that they object to the appearance of the proposed structure, then no applicant can ever be successful in challenging a zoning decision.

City argues the district court applied the correct review of City’s denial of the conditional use permit. The court determined: “The *513City has taken into account the benefit or harm involved to the community at large, and has exercised a decision on that basis that is not so wide of the mark that its unreasonableness is outside the realm of fair debate.” City states the court’s standard is not too far afoot from the substantial evidence standard applied in Broken Arrow, 340 F.3d at 1133:

“ ‘Substantial evidence is such evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support the conclusion reached by the [decisionmaker]. Substantial evidence requires more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance.’ Sandoval v. Aetna Life & Casualty Ins. Co., 967 F.2d 377, 382 (10th Cir. 1992) (internal quotation marks omitted). ‘The possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an administrative agency’s findings from being supported by substantial evidence.’ Curtis, Inc. v. I.C.C., 662 F.2d 680, 685 (10th Cir. 1981).”

City argues there has been no allegation that the denial of the application will prevent Gump or Cricket from serving the community. City argues there is sufficient evidence as previously explained to affirm both the decision of City and the court under the Golden factors and under the Act.

As stated in our previous analysis, we find there is substantial evidence to support City’s denial of Gump’s conditional use application, although reasonable persons might have found otherwise.

Last, Gump argues City denied it an open hearing when it considered the district court’s remand order in executive session. Gump states that it is highly unlikely that notice and an opportunity to be heard would have swayed the City to reach different findings, but nevertheless it is insufficient to allow the council to proceed in executive session without notice under the guise that the matter involves litigation.

Gump cites Tri-County Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Board of Harper County Comm’rs, 32 Kan. App. 2d 1168, 95 P.3d 1012 (2004), not for its similar fact pattern, but for a general statement that due process must be provided in quasi-judicial functions of zoning decisions. In a quasi-judicial proceeding, it is incumbent upon the authority to comply with the requirements of due process in its proceedings. Thus, the proceedings must be fair, open, and impartial. A denial of due process renders the resulting decision *514void. See Suburban Medical Center v. Olathe Community Hosp., 226 Kan. 320, 330-32, 597 P.2d 654 (1979).

In Houston, 218 Kan. at 330-31, the court addressed due process concerns in a situation where both a planning commission and a governing body are involved.

“Complaint is also made of the city’s procedure in adopting zoning ordinances. The city commission’s policy is that public hearings on zoning matters are to be conducted by the planning commission as provided by statute. An additional public hearing before the city commission is not conducted unless a party alleges either that the planning commission hearing was unfair or that there are new facts or new evidence.

“In this case plaintiffs were afforded a hearing before die city commission, at which counsel, Mrs. Fiedler, Mr. Houston and Mr. Luinstra were all heard. The record shows, in fact, that bodi counsel and Mr. Houston were allowed additional time to present their arguments to the city commission. Under diese circumstances tiieir complaint really is that diey were heard as a matter of grace and not of right. Such a complaint is purely academic, since they were in no way prejudiced by the city’s procedure.

“But even if the city commission had not heard them diey would have no valid grounds for complaint. There is no allegation that the city did not stricdy comply with the procedure set forth in K.S.A. 1974 Supp. 12-708. The required notice was given, and two full and complete hearings were held by die planning commission, at which plaintiffs appeared in person or by counsel. The substance of the arguments pro and con was recorded, and a complete record of the proceedings was certified to die governing body on each occasion. There is nothing in the statute requiring the city commission to rehear die matters which were presented to die planning commission, nor are we cited any authority which would impose such a requirement as a matter of constitutional law.

“A contention similar to plaintiffs’ was made in Tulsa Rock Co. v. Board of Cty. Com’rs of Rogers Cty., Okl. App., 531 P.2d 351 (1974). There a full hearing was held by the planning commission but die city commissioners’ meeting at which die zoning ordinance was adopted was held widiout notice and no hearing was held by that body. As here, die city commission reversed the recommendation of the planning commission. The court gave short shrift to the landowner’s procedural complaint, observing, ‘The law does not require that the Board (of city commissioners) duplicate the Planning Commission hearing; it provides for a hearing by the Planning Commission, and such a hearing was in fact held and resulted in recommendations which were sent to die defendant Board and considered by it.’ (P. 357.)

“So in this case, under its policy the city commission stands ready to hear anything new, but declines to rehear evidence or arguments which have already *515been presented. We find nothing objectionable in such a procedure.” 218 Kan. at 331.

Gump raises no argument that it was denied due process, including all the proceedings before MAPC, except for die fact that City held an executive session to discuss the district court’s remand order. City directs the court to its policy that it does not hold public hearings concerning any zoning or other planning items on which MAPC has already held an official public hearing.

It is not settled law what process was due Gump on the remand. In Board of Lincoln County Comm'rs v. Berner, 5 Kan. App. 2d 104, 613 P.2d 676 (1980), the court stated: “In view of the holding in Houston, we conclude that notice and hearing are not required by due process for the meeting in which die plan is adopted by the planning board, provided there was notice and a public hearing prior to the said meeting of adoption.”

In the instant case, the district court did not order City to hold additional hearings or take additional evidence. The court’s direction was clear: “Because this ‘finding’ [No. 10] may have a material impact on the Court’s ultimate decision in this matter, the Court directs the [City] to clarify the factual underpinnings of their finding.”

Gump does not dispute that it was able to present City additional evidence, in the form of the district court transcript, for City’s deliberations in executive session. There is no evidence City would not have examined any additional evidence Gump would have submitted as well. After deliberations in executive sessions, City took up the remand order on its agenda on September 14, 2004, and made additional findings as directed by the court. We find no violation of due process concerning City’s actions on the court’s remand order.

We find support for our overall decision in Omnipoint Communications v. White Plains, 430 F.3d 259 (2d Cir. 2005), which has similar facts. We do not find the cited case of Sprint PCS Assets, L.L.C. v. City of La Canada, 435 F.3d 993 (9th Cir. 2006), to be of assistance as the applicable state laws placed extreme lim*516Rations on the use of aesthetic consideration in cases involving the approval of telecommunications antennas.

Affirmed.