Mr. Ch. J. Murray

delivered the opinion of the Court.

Mr. J. Heydeneeldt concurred.

The appellant, a free white citizen of this State, was convicted of murder upon the testimony of Chinese witnesses.

The point involved in this case, is the admissibility of such evidence.

The 394th section of the Act Concerning Civil Cases, provides that no Indian or Negro shall be allowed to testify as a witness in any action or proceeding in which a White person is a party.

The 14th section of the Act of April 16th, 1850, regulating Criminal Proceedings, provides that “No Black or Mulatto person, or Indian, shall be allowed to give evidence in favor of, or against a white man.”

The true point at which we are anxious to arrive is, the legal signification of the words, “ Black, Mulatto, Indian and White person,” and whether the Legislature adopted them as generic terms, or intended to limit their application to specific types of the human species.

Before considering this question, it is proper to remark the difference between the two sections of our statute, already *400quoted, tbe latter being more broad and comprehensive in its exclusion, by use of the word “Black,” instead of Negro.

[400] * Conceding, however, for the present, that the word “Black,” as used in the 14th section, and “ Negro,” in 394th, are convertible terms, and that the former was intended to include the latter, let us proceed to inquire who are excluded from testifying as witnesses under the term “Indian.”

When Columbus first landed upon the shores of this continent, in his attempt to discover a western passage to the Indies, he imagined that he had accomplished the object of his expedition, and that the Island of San Salvador was one of those Islands of the Chinese Sea, lying near the extremity of India, which had been described by navigators.

Acting upon this hypothesis, and also perhaps from the similarity of features and physical conformation, he gave to the Islanders the name of Indians, which appellation was universally adopted, and extended to the aboriginals of the New World, as well as of Asia.

From that time, down to a very recent period, the American Indians and the Mongolian, or Asiatic, were regarded as the same type of the human species.

In order to arrive at a correct understanding of the intention of our Legislature, it will be necessary to go back to the early history of legislation on this subject, our statute being only a transcript of those of older States.

At the period from which this legislation dates, those portions of Asia which include India proper, the Eastern Archipelago, and the countries washed by the Chinese waters, as far as then known, were denominated the Indies, from which the inhabitants had derived the generic name of Indians.

Ethnology, at that time, was unknown as a distinct science, or if known, had not reached that high point of perfection which it has since attained by the scientific inquiries and discoveries of the master minds of the last half century. New speculations had been made with regard to the moral or physical differences between the different races of mankind. These were general in their character, and *401limited to those visible and palpable variations which could not escape the attention of the most common observer.

The general, or perhaps universal opinion of that day was, * that there were but three distinct types of [401] the human species, which, in their turn, were subdivided into varieties of tribes. This opinion is still held by many scientific writers, and is supported by Cuvier, one .of the most eminent naturalists of modern times.

Many ingenious speculations have been resorted to for the purpose of sustaining this opinion. It has been supposed, and not without plausibility, that this continent was first peopled by Asiatics, who crossed Behring’s Straits, and from thence found their way down to the more fruitful climates of Mexico and South America. Almost every tribe has some tradition of coming from the North, and many of them, that their ancestors came from some remote country beyond the ocean.

Prom the eastern portions of Kamtschatka, the Aleutian Islands form a long and continuous group, extending eastward to that portion of the North American Continent inhabited by the Esquimaux. They appear to be a continuation of the lofty volcanic ranges which traverse the two continents, and are inhabited by a race who resemble, in’ a remarkable degree, in language and appearance, both the inhabitants of Kamtsehatka (who are admitted to be of the Mongolian type), and the Esquimaux, who again, in turn, resemble other tribes of American Indians. The similarity of the skull and pelvis, and the general configuration of the two races; the remarkable resemblance in eyes, beard, hair, and other peculiarities, together with the contiguity of the two continents, might well have led to the belief that this country was first peopled by the Asiatics, and that the difference between the different tribes and the parent stock was such as would necessarily arise from the circumstances of climate, pursuits, and other physical causes, and was no greater than that existing between the Arab and the European, both of whom were supposed to belong to the Caucasian race.

Although the discoveries of eminent archeologists, and *402the researches of modern geologists, have given to this continent an antiquity of thousands of years anterior to the evidence of man’s existence, and the light df modern science may have shown conclusively that it was not [402 peopled by the inhabitants * of Asia, but that the Aborigines are a distinct type, and as such claim a distinct origin, still, this would not in'any degree, alter the meaning of the term, and render that specific which was before generic.

We have adverted to these speculations for the purpose of showing that the name of Indian, from the time of Columbus to the present day, has been used to designate, not alone the North American Indian, but the whole of the Mongolian race, and that the name, though first applied probably through mistake, was afterwards continued as appropriate on account of the supposed common origin.

That this was the common opinion in the early history of American legislation, cannot be disputed, and, therefore, all legislation upon the subject must have borne relation to that opinion.

Can, then, the use of the word “Indian,” because at the present day it may be sometimes regarded as a specific, and not as a generic term, alter this conclusion ? We think not; because at the origin of the legislation we are considering, it was used and admitted in its common and ordinary acceptation, as a generic term, distinguishing the great Mongolian race, and as such, its meaning then became fixed by law, and in construing statutes the legal meaning of words must be preserved.

Again: the words of the Act must be construed in pari materia. It will not be disputed that “White” and “Negro” are generic terms, and refer to two of the great types of mankind. If these, as well as the word “Indian,” are not to be regarded as generic terms, including the two great races which they were intended to designate, but only specific, and applying to those whites and Negroes who were inhabitants of this continent at the time of the passage of the Act, the most anomalous consequences would ensue. The European white man who comes here would not be *403shielded from the testimony of the degraded and ■ demoralized caste, while the Negro, fresh from the coast of Africa, or the Indian of Patagonia, the Kanaka,' South Sea Islander, or New Hollander, would be admitted, upon their arrival, to testify against white citizens in our courts of law.

* To argue such a proposition would be an insult [403] to the good sense of the Legislature.

The evident intention of the Act was to throw around the citizen a protection for life and property, which could only be secured by removing him above the corrupting influences of degraded castes.

It can hardly be supposed that any Legislature would attempt this by excluding domestic negroes and Indians, who not unfrequently have correct notions of their obligations to society, and turning loose upon the community the more degraded tribes of the same species, who have nothing in common with us, in language, country or laws, ,.

We have, thus far, considered this subject on the hypothesis that the 14th section of the Act Regulating Criminal Proceedings and the 394th section of the Practice Act, were the same.

As before remarked, there is a wide difference between the two. The word * ‘ black ” may include all negroes, but the term “negro” does not’include all black persons.

By the use of this term in this connection, we understand it to mean the opposite of “white,” and that it should be taken as contradistinguished from all white persons.

In using the words ‘ ‘ no black or mulatto person, or Indian shall be allowed to give evidence for or against a white person,” the Legislature, if any intention can be ascribed to it, adopted the most comprehensive terms to embrace every known class or shade of color, as the apparent design was to protect the white person from the influence of all testimony other than that of persons of the same caste. The use of these terms must, by every sound rule of construction, exclude every one who is not of white blood.

The Act of Congress, in defining what description of aliens may become naturalized citizens, provides that every “free white citizen,” etc., etc. In speaking of this subject, *404Chancellor Kent says that “the Act confines the description to ‘white’ citizens, and that it is a matter of doubt, whether, under this provision, any of the tawny races of Asia can be admitted to citizenship.” (2 Kent’s Com. 72.)

We are not disposed to leave this question in any [404] doubt. The word “white” has a distinct signification, which ex vi termini, excludes black, yellow, and all other colors. It will be observed, by reference to the first section of the second Article of the Constitution of this State, that none but white males can become electors, except in the case of Indians, who may be admitted, by special Act of the Legislature. On examination of the constitutional debates, it will be found that not a little difficulty existed in selecting these precise words, which were finally agreed upon as the most comprehensive that could be suggested to exclude all inferior races.

If the term “white,” as used in the Constitution, was not understood in its generic sense as including the Caucasian race, and necessarily excluding all others, where was the necessity of providing for the admission of Indians to the privilege of voting, by special legislation?

We are of the opinion that the words “white,” “negro,” “mullatto,” “Indian,” and “black person,” wherever they occur in our Constitution and laws, must be taken in their generic sense, and that, even admitting the Indian of this continent is not of the Mongolian type, that the words “black person,” in the 14th section, must be taken as contradistinguished from white, and necessarily excludes all races other than the Caucasian.

We have carefully considered all the consequences resulting from a different rule of construction, and are satisfied that even in a doubtful case, we would be impelled to this decision on grounds of public policy.

The same rule which would admit them to testify, would admit them to all the equal rights of citizenship, and we might soon see them at the polls, in the jury box, upon the bench, and in our legislative halls.

*405This is not a speculation which exists in the excited and over-heated imagination of the patriot and statesman, but it is an actual and present danger.

The anomalous spectacle of a distinct people, living in our community, recognizing no laws of this State, except through necessity, bringing with them their prejudices and national feuds, in which they indulge in open violation of law; * whose mendacity is proverbial; a race of [405] people whom nature has marked as inferior, and who are incapable of progress or intellectual development beyond a certain point, as their history has shown; differing in language, opinions, color, and physical conformation; between whom and ourselves nature has placed an impassable difference, is now presented, and for them is claimed, not only the right to swear away the life of a citizen, but the further privilege of participating with us in administering the affairs of our Government.

These facts were before the Legislature that framed this Act, and have been known as matters of public history to every subsequent Legislature.

There can be no doubt as to the intention of the Legislature, and that if it had ever been anticipated that this class of people were not embraced in the prohibition, then such specific words would have been employed as would have put the matter beyond any possible controversy.

For these reasons, tve are of opinion that the testimony was inadmissible.

The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.

Mr. Justice Wells dissented, as follows;

From the opinion of the Chief Justice, I most respectfully dissent.

By the Court, Crockett, J.:

The plaintiffs sue as copartners to recover from the city of Los Angeles the value of money and merchandise belonging to the copartnership, alleged to have been destroyed by the mob during a riot which occurred in that city in October, 1871. The action is founded on the Act of March 27, 1868 (Statutes 1867-8, p. 418), prescribing the conditions on which a city shall be liable for property destroyed in a riot.

The verdict and judgment were for the defendant, and the plaintiffs appeal.

There was evidence tending to show that immediately preceding the riot there were in the city of Los Angeles two *533rival companies of Chinese, at the head of one of which was Sam Yuen, one of the plaintiffs; that on the day of the riot two Chinamen were arranged before a Justice of the Peace, on the charge of having shot at Yo Hing, the chief of the rival company; that Sam Yuen offered his firm as bail for the accused; that about 5 o’clock in the afternoon six or seven Chinamen were found in the street, near the plaintiffs’ store, shooting at each other; that one of them was fatally wounded, before the arrival of the police; that one of the policemen entered the “corral,” an inclosed space in the rear of the plaintiffs’ store, for the purpose of quelling the disturbance, but found it filled with armed Chinamen, Avho immediately fired upon him, compelling him to retreat; that another policeman, on going to the front of the store, saw a Chinaman there with a pistol in his hand, and followed him into the store, which he found filled Avith armed Chinamen, who immediately closed the door and commenced firing upon him; that during the melee he was wounded with a pistol-shot in the arm, and with great difficulty escaped from the building, after numerous shots were fired at him; that one Thompson then approached the door, but was fired upon from Avithin, and was fatally wounded; after which those within the building continued to fire upon those in the street. That another policeman entered the store and found Sam Yuen there, who immediately leveled his pistol and fired at the officer, as did also several other Chinamen; that Sam Yuen knew the officer to be a policeman; that shortly afterward a large crowd collected in front of the store, and in the course of the afternoon and evening prior to 10 o’clock, assaulted the building, broke in the door and roof, and committed the damage Avhich is complained of.

The defenses are: First, that the plaintiffs, or at least one of them (Sam Yuen), instigated and brought about the riot by his unlawful conduct; second, that the plaintiffs made no attempt to notify the Mayor or Sheriff of the threatened riot, as required by the third section of the Act. That section provides that, in actions of this character, the plaintiff shall not recover if it appears that the damage “was occasioned, or in any manner aided, sanctioned, or permitted *534by the carelessness or negligence of such person or corporation, nor * * * * unless such party shall have used all reasonable diligence to prevent such damage, and shall have used all reasonable diligence to notify the Mayor of such city, or Sheriff of such county, of any threat or attempt to commit such injury to his property by any mob, and of the facts brought to his knowledge.” There was no evidence tending in the slightest degree to show that either of the plaintiffs made any effort whatever to notify the Mayor or any other officer of the threatened riot, or “ used all reasonable diligence to prevent ” the damage to their property. On the contrary, it appears from the uncontradicted testimony of the policeman, that when the shooting first commenced in the street, the plaintiffs’ store and the "corral ” in the rear of it were filled with armed Chinamen, who immediately fired on the. officers when attempting to preserve the peace. It is in the highest degree improbable that this large body of armed men could have assembled in the plaintiffs’ store, and in a sheltered place in the rear of it, without their knowledge and privity. The leader of the rival company or faction had been shot at the day before, and plaintiffs offered themselves as bail for his assailants. The arming and assembling of Sam Yuen’s clan doubtless had reference to an impending conflict between the two companies. If the plaintiffs had been anxious to prevent a riot, it is clear, from the proof, that they had ample opporunity to notify the Mayor, and to summon the police before the shooting commenced. But instead of requesting aid to prevent violence and bloodshed, it appears from the. testimony of one of the officers that Sam Yuen resisted the interference of the police, and himself fired at the officer. Another officer was wounded in the store, and a citizen, in attempting to quell the riot, was shot down ' at the door. On these facts the plaintiffs are not entitled to recover: 1st, because they made no effort to notify the Mayor; and, 2d, because at least one of them instigated and participated in the riot, whilst the circumstances raise a strong presumption that the others were cognizant of the impending conflict between the two companies and took no steps to *535prevent it. It is not probable that so large an armed force could have assembled in and around their store, pending the quarrel between the two companies, except with their knowledge of its purpose.

There was evidence tending to show that when the firing commenced in the street, and soon after in the store, Sam Yuen was at his private residence and not at the store. But the policeman (Sanchez) testifies positively that Sam Yuen fired at him in the store, and it was for the jury to decide upon the credibility of the witnesses.

During the examination of the witness Lopez, the plaintiffs asked him whether, after the firing commenced at the Coronel building, it was possible for a Chinaman to have gone on the street in that vicinity without being killed? The question being objected to, was ruled out by the Court, and this ruling is assigned as error. It is claimed to have been material, as tending to show that after the firing commenced it was impracticable for the plaintiffs to have notified the Mayor. But two other witnesses for the plaintiffs (Card and Harris) testified without objection “that during the progress of the riot it was unsafe for a Chinaman to be seen on the street,”, and there was no rebutting testimony on that point. The plaintiffs, therefore, had the benefit of that fact before the jury; and if the question to Lopez had been admitted, it could not have strengthened their case. But it was immaterial, for the reason that before the firing commenced, the plaintiffs must have had knowledge, as we have seen, of the impending danger, and had ample opportunity to notify the Mayor. So far from doing it, one of them actively participated in the riot, and resisted, with violence, the efforts of the police to quell it.

We do not understand the instructions or any of them, to assume, as claimed by counsel, that the plaintiffs, or one of them, did in fact instigate the riot; nor do we discover any error in the giving or refusal of instructions prejudicial to the plaintiffs,

Judgment affirmed. Remittitur forthwith.

Mr. Justice Miller

delivered the opinion of the court.

While this case presents for our consideration the same class of State statutes considered in Henderson et al. v. Mayor of the City of New York et al., and Commissioners of Immigration v. North German Lloyd, supra, p. 259, it differs from them in two very important points.

These are, First, The plaintiff in error was a passenger on a vessel from China, being a subject of the Emperor of China, and is held a prisoner because the owner or master of the vessel who brought her over refused to give a bond in the sum of $500 in gold, conditioned to indemnify all the counties, towns, and cities of California against liability for her support or maintenance for two years.

Secondly, The statute of California, unlike those of New York and Louisiana, does not require a bond for all passengers landing from a foreign country, but only for classes of passengers specifically described, among which are “ lewd and debauched women; ” to which class it is alleged plaintiff belongs.

The plaintiff, with some twenty other women, on the arrival of the steamer “ Japan ” from China, was singled out by the Commissioner of Immigration, an officer of the State of California, as belonging to that class, and the master of the vessel required to give the bond prescribed by law before he permitted them to land. This he refused to do, and detained them on board. They sued out a writ of habeas corpus, which by regular proceedings resulted in their committal, by order of the Supreme Court of the State, to the custody of the sheriff of the county and city of San Francisco, to await the return of the “ Japan,” which had left the port pending the progress of-*277the case; the order being to remand them to that vessel on her return, to be removed from the State.

All of plaintiff’s companions were released from the custody of the sheriff on a writ of habeas corpus issued by Mr. Justice Field of this court. But plaintiff by a writ of error brings the judgment of the Supreme Court of California to this court, for the purpose, as we suppose, of testing the constitutionality of the act under which she is held a prisoner. We regret very much, that, while the Attorney-General of the United States has deemed the matter of such importance as to argue it in person, there has been no argument in behalf of the State of California, the Commissioner of Immigration, or the Sheriff of San Francisco, in support of the authority by which plaintiff is held a prisoner; nor have we been furnished even with a brief in support of the statute of that State.

It is a most extraordinary statute. It provides that the Commissioner of Immigration is “ to satisfy himself whether or not any passenger who shall arrive in the State by vessels from any foreign port or place (who is not a citizen of the United States) is lunatic, idiotic, deaf, dumb, blind, crippled, or infirm, and is not accompanied by relatives who are able and willing to support him, or is likely, to become a public charge, or has been a pauper in any other country, or is from sickness or disease (existing either at the time of sailing from the port of departure or at the time of his arrival in the State) a public charge, or likely soon to become so, or is a convicted criminal, or a lewd or debauched woman; ” and no such person shall be permitted to land from the vessel, unless the master or owner or consignee shall give a separate bond in each case, conditioned to save harmless every county, city, and town of the State against any expense incurred for the relief, support, or care of such person for two years thereafter.

The commissioner is authorized to charge the sum of seventy-five cents for every examination of a passenger made by him; which sum he may collect of the master, owner, or consignee, or of the vessel by attachment. The bonds are to be prepared by the commissioner, and two sureties are required to each bond; and, for preparing the bond, the commissioner is allowed to charge and collect a fee of three dollars; and for each oath ad*278ministered to a surety, concerning his sufficiency as such, he may charge one dollar. It is expressly provided that there shall be a separate bond for each passenger; that there shall be two sureties on each bond, and that the same sureties must not be on more than one bond; and they must in all cases be residents of the State.

If the ship-master or owner prefers, he may commute for these bonds by paying such a sum of money as the commissioner may in each case think proper to exact; and, after retaining twenty per cent of the commutation-money for his services, the commissioner is required once a month to deposit the. balance with the Treasurer of the State. See c. 1, art. 7, of the Political Code of California, as modified by sect. 70 of the amendments of 1873, 1874.

It is hardly possible to conceive a statute more skilfully framed, to place in the hands of a single man the power to prevent entirely vessels engaged in a foreign trade, say with China, from carrying passengers, or to compel them to submit to systematic extortion of the grossest kind.

The commissioner has but to go aboard a vessel filled with passengers ignorant of our language and our laws, and without trial or hearing or evidence, but from the external appearances of persons with whose former habits he is unfamiliar, to point with his finger to twenty, as in this case, or a hundred if he chooses, and say to the master, “ These are idiots, these are paupers, these are convicted criminals, these are lewd women, and these others are debauched women. I have here a hundred blank forms of bonds, printed. I require you to fill me up and sign each of these for $500 in gold, and that you furnish me two hundred different men, residents of this State, and of sufficient means, as sureties on these bonds. I charge you five dollars in each case for preparing the bond and swearing your sureties; and I charge you seventy-five cents each for examining these passengers, and all others you have on board. If you don’t do this, you are forbidden to land your passengers under a heavy penalty. But I have the power to commute with you for all this for any sum I may choose to take in cash. I am open to an offer; for you must remember that twenty per cent of all I can get out of you goes into my own pocket, and the remainder into the treasury of California.”

*279If, as we have endeavored to show in the opinion in the preceding cases, we are at liberty to look to the effect of a statute for the test of its constitutionality, the argument need go no further.

But we have thus far only considered the effect of the statute on the owner of the vessel.

As regards the passengers, sect. 2968 declares that consuls, ministers, agents, or other public functionaries, of any foreign government, arriving in this State in their official capacity, are exempt from the provisions of this chapter.

All other passengers are subject to the order of the Commissioner of Immigration.

Individual foreigners, however distinguished at home for their social, their literary, or their political character, are helpless in the presence of this potent commissioner. Such a person may offer to furnish any amount of surety on his own bond, or deposit any sum of money; but the law of California takes no note of him. It is the master, owner, or consignee of the vessel alone whose bond can be accepted; and so a silly, an obstinate, or a wicked commissioner may bring disgrace upon the whole country, the enmity of a powerful nation, or the loss of an equally powerful friend.

While the occurrence' of the hypothetical case just stated may be highly improbable, we venture the assertion, that, if citizens of our own government were treated by any foreign nation as subjects of the Emperor of China have been actually treated under this law, no administration could withstand the call for a demand on such government for redress.

Or, if this plaintiff and her twenty companions had been subjects of the Queen of Great Britain, can any one doubt that this matter would have been the subject of international inquiry, if not of a direct claim for redress ? Upon whom would such a claim be made? Not upon the State of California; for, by our Constitution, she can hold no exterior relations with other nations. It would be made upon the government of the United States. If that government should get into a difficulty which would lead to war, or to suspension of intercourse, would California alone suffer, or all the Union ? If we should conclude that a pecuniary indemnity was proper as a satisfaction for the *280injury, would California pay it, or the Federal government? If that government has forbidden the 'States to hold negotiations with any foreign nations, or to declare war, and has taken the whole subject of these relations upon herself, has the Constitution, which provides for this, done so foolish a thing as to leave it in the power of the States to pass laws whose enforcement renders the general government liable to just reclamations which it must answer, while it does not prohibit to the States the acts for which it is held responsible ?

The Constitution of the United States is no such instrument. The passage of laws which concern the admission of citizens and subjects of foreign nations to our shores belongs to Congress, and not to the States. It has the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations: the responsibility for the •character of those regulations, and for the manner of their execution, belongs solely to the national government. If it be otherwise, a single State can, at her pleasure, embroil us in disastrous quarrels with other nations.

We are not called upon by this statute to decide for or against the right of a State, in the absence of legislation by Congress, to protect herself by necessary and proper laws against paupers and convicted criminals from abroad; nor to lay down the definite limit of such right, if it exist. Such a right can only arise from a vital necessity for its exercise, and cannot be carried beyond the scope of that necessity. When a State statute, limited to provisions necessary and appropriate to that object alone, shall, in a proper controversy, come before us, it will be time enough to decide that question. The statute of California goes so far beyond what is necessary, or even appropriate, for this purpose, as to be wholly without any sound definition of the right under which it is supposed to be justified. Its manifest purpose, as we have already said, is, not to obtain indemnity, but money.

The amount to be taken is left in every case to the discretion of an officer, whose cupidity is stimulated by a reward of one-fifth of all he can obtain.

The money, when paid, does, not go to any fund for the benefit of immigrants, but is paid into the general treasury of the State, and devoted to the use of all her indigent citizens. *281The blind, or the deaf, or the dumb passenger is subject to contribution, whether he be a rich man or a pauper. The patriot, seeking our shores after an unsuccessful struggle against despotism in Europe or Asia, may be kept out because there his resistance has been adjudged a crime. The woman whose error has been repaired by a happy marriage and numerous children, and whose loving husband brings her with his wealth to a new home, may be told she must pay a round sum before she can land, because it is alleged that she was debauched by her husband before marriage. Whether a young woman’s manners are such as to justify the commissioner in calling, her lewd may be made to depend on the sum she will pay for the privilege of landing in San Francisco.

It is idle to pursue the criticism. In any view which we can take of this statute, it is in conflict with the Constitution of the United States, and therefore void.

Judgment reversed, and the case remanded, with directions to make an order discharging the prisoner from custody.

Mr. Justice Field

delivered the opinion of the court.

The appeal involyes a consideration of the validity of the act of Congress of October 1, 1888, prohibiting Chinese laborers from entering the United States who had departed before its passage, having a certificate issued’ under the act of 1882 as' amended by the act of 1884, granting them permission to return. The validity of the act is assailed as being in effect. an - expulsion from the' country of Chinese' laborers, in violation of existing treaties between the United States and the government of China, and of rights vested in them under the laws of Congress.

It will serve to present with greater, clearness the .nature and force of the objections to the act, if a brief -statement be made of the general character of the treaties between the two' countries and of the legislation of Congress to carry them into execution.

*590The first treaty between the UnitechStates and the Empire of China was concluded on the 3d of July, 1844, and ratified in December of the following year. 8 Stat. 592. Previous to that time there had been an extensive commerce between the two nations, that to China being confined to a single port. It was not, however, attended by any serious disturbances between our people there and the Chinese. In August, .1842, as the result of a war between England and China, a treaty was concluded stipulating for peace and friendship between them, and, among other things, that British subjects, with thpir. families and establishments, should be allowed to reside for the pulpóse of carrying on mercantile pursuits at the five principal ports of the empire. 6 Hertslet’s Commercial Treaties, 221; 3 Nouveau Kecueil Général de Traités (1842), 484. Actuated by a desire to establish by treaty friendly relations between the United States and the Chinese Empire, and to secure to our people the same commercial privileges which had been thus conceded to British. subjects, Congress placed at the disposal of the President the means to enable him to establish future commercial relations between the two countries “ on terms of national equal reciprocity.” Act of March, 1843Vc. 90, 5 Stat. 624. \A mission was accordingly sent by him to China, at the head of which-was.placed Mr. Caleb Cushing, a gentleman of large experience in public affairs. He found the Chinese government ready to concede by treaty to the United States all that had- been reluctantly, yielded to England through compulsion. As the result of his negotiations the treaty of 1844 was concluded- It stipulated, among other things, that there should be a. “perfect, permanent and universal peace, and a sincere and cordial amity ” between the two nations; that the five principal ports of the empire should be opened' to the citizens-of-the United States, who should be permitted to reside with their families and trade there, and to proceed with their vessels and merchandise to and from any foreign port and either of said five ports; and while peaceably attending to their affairs should receive the protection of the Chinese authorities. Senate Document No. 138, 28th Cong.' 2d Sess.

*591The treaty between England and China did not have the effect of securing permanent peace and friendship between those countries. British subjects in China were often subjected not only to the violence of mobs, but to insults and outrages from local authorities of the country, which led to. retaliatory measures for the punishment of the aggressors. To such an extent were these measures carried,- ,and such resistance offered to them, that in 1856 the two countries were in open war. England then, determined, with the cooperation of France, between which countries there seemed to be perfect accord, to secure from the government of ‘China, among other things, a recognition of the right of other powers to be represented there by accredited ministers, an extension of commercial intercourse with that country, and stipulations fpr religious freedom to all foreigners there, and for the suppression of piracy. England requested of -the President the concurrence and active co-operation of the United States similar to that which France had accorded, and to authorize our naval and political authorities to act in concert with the allied forces. ■ As this proposition involved a participation in existing hostilities, the request could not be acceded to, and the Secretary of State in his communication to the English government explained, that the war-making power of the United States was not vested in the President but in Congress, and that he had no authority, therefore, to order aggressive hostilities to be undertaken; But as the rights of citizens of the United States might be seriously' affected by the results of existing hostilities, and commercial intercourse between the United States and China be disturbed, it was deemed advisable to. send to China a minister plenipotentiary to represent our government and watch our interests there. Accordingly, Mr. William B. Keed, of. Philadelphia, was appointed such minister, and instructed, whilst abstaining from any direct interference, to aid by peaceful cooperation the objects the allied forces were seeking to accomplish. Senate Document No. 47, 35th Cong. 1st Sess. Through him a new treaty was negotiated with the Chinese government. It was concluded in June, 1858, and ratified in. August of the following year. *59212 Stat. 1023. It reiterated'the pledges of peace and friendship between the two nations, renewed the promise of protection to all citizens of the United States in China peaceably-attending to their affairs, and stipulated for security- to Christlan§¡ in the profession of their religion. Neither the treaty of 1844, nor that .of 1858, touched upon the migration and emigration of the citizens and subjects of the two'nations respectively from one country to the other. But in 1868 a great change in the relations-of the two nations was made in that respect. In that year a-mission from China, composed.of dis-' tinguished functionaries ■ pf that empire, came tq the United States witjh. the professed object of establishing closer relations between the two countries and their peoples. At its head Was placed Mr. Anson Burlingame,, an eminent citizen of-the United States, who had at one time represented this country as commissioner to China. He resigned : his office under our government to accept the position tendered to him by the Chinese government. ’ The mission was hailed in -the United States as the harbinger of a new era in the history of China. — as the opening up to . free intercourse with 'other, nations and peoples a country that for ages had been isolated and closed against foreigners, who were allowed to have intercourse and to trade with the Chinese only at a few designated places; and the belief was general, and confidently expressed, that great benefits would follow, to the world generally and especially to the United States! On' its arrival in Washington, additional articles to the treaty of 1858 were agreed-upon, which gave expression to the general desire that the two nations and • their peoples should be drawn closer .together. The new articles, eight in number,, were agreed to on- the 28th of . July, 1868, and ratifications of them .were exchanged at Pekin in November of the following year. 16 Stat. .739. Of these articles the 5th, 6th 'and 7th are as follows: •

• “ Article V. The United States of America anfl the Emperqr of China cordially recognize the inherent and inalienable right of inaij. ‘to change his home and allegiance, and also the mutual.i advantage of the free migration and emigration of their citizens and subjects respectively from the One country *593to the other for purposes of curiosity, of trade, or as permanent residents. The high contracting parties, therefore, join in reprobating any other than an entirely voluntary emigration for these purposes. They consequently agree to pass laws making it a penal offence for a citizen of the United States or Chinese subjects to take Chinese subjects either to the United States or to any other foreign' country, or for a Chinese- subject or citizen of the United States to take citizens of the United States to China or to any other foreign country without their free and voluntary consent, respectively.

“Article YI. Citizens of the United States visiting or residing in China shall enjoy the same privileges, immunities or éxemptions in respect to travel or residence, as may there be enjoyed by the citizens or subjects of the most favored nation. And, reciprocally, Chinese subjects visiting or residing in the United States shall enjoy the same privileges, immunities and exemptions ’ in respect to travel or residence as may there be enjoyed by the citizens or subjects of the most favored nation. But nothing herein contained shall be' held to confer naturalization upon citizens of the United States in China, nor upon the subjects of China in the United States.

“Article YII. Citizens of the United States shall enjoy all the privileges of the public educational' institutions under the control of the government of China; and, reciprocally, Chinese subjects shall enjoy all the privileges of the public educational institutions under the control of the government of the United States, which • are enjoyed in the respective countries by the' citizens or subjects of the most favored nation. The citizens of the United States may freely establish and maintain schools within the Empire of China at those places where foreigners are by treaty permitted to reside; and, reciprocally, Chinese subjécts may enjoy the same privileges and immunities in the United States.”

But notwithstanding these strong expressions of friendship and good will, and the desire they evince for free intercourse, events were transpiring oh the Pacific Coast which soon dissipated the anticipations indulged as to the benefits to follow the immigration of Chinese to this country. The previous *594treaties of 1844 and 1858 were confined principally to mutual declarations of peace and friendship and to stipulations for commercial intercourse at certain ports in China and for protection to our citizens whilst peaceably attending to their affairs. It was not until the additional articles of. 1868 were adopted that any public declaration was made by the two nations that there were-advantages in the free migration and emigration of their citizens and subjects respectively from one country to the other; and stipulations given that each should enjoy in the country of the other, with respect to travel or residence, the “ privileges, immunities, and exemptions ” enjoyed - Tty- citizens or subjects of the most favored nation. Whatever modifications have since been made to these general provisions have been caused by a well-founded apprehension — from the experience of years — that a limitation to the immigration of certain classes from China was essential to the peace of the community on the Pacific Coast, and possibly to the preservation of our civilization there. A few words on this point may not be deenied inappropriate here, they being confined to matters of public notoriety,- which have frequently been brought to the. attention of Congress. Report of Committee.of H. R. No, 872, 46th. Cong. 2d Sess.

The discovery of gold in California in 1848, as is well known, was followed by a large immigration thither from all parts of the world, attracted not only by the hope of gain from the mines, but from the great prices paid for all kinds of labor. The news of the discovery penetrated China, and laborers came from there in great numbers, a few with' their own means, but by far the greater number under contract with employers, for whose benefit they worked. These laborers readily secured employment, and, as domestic servants, and in various kinds of out-door work, proved to be exceedingly useful. For some years little opposition was made to them except when they sought to work in the mines, but, as their numbers increased, they began to engage in various mechanical pursuits and trades, and thus came iff competition with our artisans and mechanics, as well as our laborers in the field.

The competition steadily increased as the laborers came in *595crowds- on each steamer that arrived from China, or. Hong Kong, an adjacent English port. They were generally industrious and frugal. Not being accompanied by families, except in rare instances, their expenses were small; and they were content with the simplest fare, such as would not suffice for our laborers and artisans. The competition between them and our people was for this reason altogether in their favor, and the consequent irritation, proportionately deep and bitter, was followed, in many- cases, by open -conflicts, to' the great disturbance'of the public peace.

The differences of race added greatly to the difficulties of the situation. Notwithstanding the favorable provisions of. the'new articles of the treaty of 1868, by which all the privileges, immunities, and exemptions were extended to subjects of China in the United States which were accorded,to citizens or subjects of the most favored nation, they remained strangers in the land, residing apart by themselves, and adhering to the customs and usages of their own country. It seemed impossible for them to assimilate with our people or to make any change in their habits or modes of living. As they grew in numbers each year the people of the coast saw-, or believed they saw, in the facility of immigration, and in the crowded millions of China, where population presses upon the means of subsistence, great danger that at no distant day that portion of our country would be overrun by them unless prompt action Was taken to restrict their immigration. The people there accordingly petitioned earnestly for protective legislation.

In December, 1878, the convention which framed the present constitution of California, being , in session, took this subject up, and memorialized Congress upon it, setting forth, in substance, that the presence of Chinese laborers had a baneful effect upon the material interests of the State, and upon public, morals; that their immigration'was in numbers approaching the- character of an Oriental invasion, and was a menace to' our civilization; that .the discontent from this cause was not confined to any political party, or to any class or nationality, but was well-nigh universal; that they retained the habits and customs of their own country, and in fact constituted a *596Chinese settlement within the State, without; any interest in our country or its institutions; and praying Congress to. take measures to prevent their further immigration. , This memorial was presented to Congress in February, 1879.

So urgent and constant were the prayers for relief' against existing, and anticipated evils, both from the public authorities of the Pacific Coast and from private individuals, that Congress was- impelled to act on the subject. Many persons, however, both in and out of Congress, were of opinion that so long as the treaty remained unmodified, legislation restricting immigration would be a breach of faith with China. A statute was accordingly passed appropriating money to send commissioners to Chipa to act with our minister there in negotiating and concluding by treaty a settlement of such matters of interest between the two governments as might be confided to them. 21 Stat. 133, c. 88. Such commissioners were appointed, and as the result of their negotiations the supplementary treaty of November 17, 1880, was concluded and ratified in May of the following year. 22 Stat. 826.. It declares in its first article that “ Whenever, in the opinion of the Government of the United States, the coming of Chinese laborers to the United States, or their residence therein, affects or threatens to affect the interests- of that country, or to endanger the good order of the said country or of any locality within the territory thereof, the Government of China agrees that the Government of the United States may regulate, limit, or suspend such coming or residence, but may not absolutely prohibit it. The limitation or suspension shall ", be reasonable and shall apply only to Chinese who may go to the United States as laborers, other classes not being included ip the limitations. Legislation taken in regard to Chinese laborers will be of such a character only as is necessary to enforce, the regulation, limitation, or suspension of immigration, and immigrants shall not be subject to personal maltreatment or abuse.” In its second article' it' declares that “ Chinese subjects, whether proceeding to the United States as teachers, students, merchants, or from curiosity, together with their body and household servants, and Chinese laborers who are now in the United States shall *597be allowed to go and come of tbeir own free will and accord, and shall be accorded all the rights, privileges, immunities and exemptions which are accorded to the citizens and subjects of the most favored nation.”'

The government of China thus agreed that notwithstanding the stipulations of former treaties, the United States might regulate, limit, or suspend the coming of Chinese laborers, or their residence therein, without absolutely forbidding it, whenever in their opinion the interests of the. country, or of any part of it, might require such action. Legislation for such regulation, limitation, or suspension was entrusted to the discretion of our government, with the condition that it should only be such as might be necessary for that purpose, and that the immigrants should not be maltreated or abused. On the 6th of May, 1882,.an act of Congress was approved, to carry this supplementary treaty into effect. 22 Stat. 58, c. 126. It is entitled “ An act to execute certain treaty stipulations relating to Chinese.” Its first section declares that after ninety days from the .passage of .the act, and for the period of ten years from its date, the coming, of Chinese laborers to the United States is suspended, and that it shall be unlawful for any such laborer to come, or, having come, to remain within the United States. The second makes it a misdemeanor, punishable by fine, to which imprisonment may be added, for the master of any vessel knowingly to bring within. the United States from a foreign- country, and land, any such Chinese laborer. The third provides that those two sections shall not apply to Chinese laborers who were in the United. States November 17, 1880, or who should come within ninety days-after the passage of the act. The fourth declares that, for the purpose of identifying the laborers who were here 'on the 17th of November, 1880, or who should come within the ninety days mentioned, and to-furnish them with “the proper evidence” of their right to go from and come to the United States, the “ collector of customs of the district from which any such Chinese laborer shall depart from the United States shall, in person or by deputy, go-on* board each, vessel having on board any such Chinese laborer and cleared or about to sail *598from his district for a foreign port, and on suoh vessel make a. list of all such Chinese laborers, which shall be entered in reg-' istry books to be kept for that purpose, in which shall be stated the name, age, Occupation, last place of residence, physical marks or peculiarities and all facts necessary for the identification of each of suck Chinese laborers, which books shall be safely kept in the custom-house;’” and each laborer thus departing shall be entitled to receive, from the collector or his deputy, a certificate containing such particulars, corresponding with the registry, as may serve to identify him. The. certificate herein provided for,” says the section, “ shall entitle the Chinese laborer to whom the same is issued to return to and re-enter the United States upon producing and delivering th'e same to the collector of customs of the district at which such Chinese laborer shall se,ek to re-enter.”

The enforcement of this act with respect to laborers who were in the United States on November 17, 1880, was attended with great embarrassment, from the suspicious, nature, in many instances, of the testimony offered to establish the residence of the parties, arising from the loose notions entertained by the witnesses of the obligation of an oath. This fact led to a desire for further legislation restricting the evidence receivable, and the amendatory act of July 5, 1884, was accordingly passed. 23 Stat. 115, c. 220. The committee of the House of Representatives on foreign affairs, to whom the original bill was referred, in reporting it back, recommending its passage, stated that there had been such manifold evasions, as well as attempted evasions, of the act of 1882, that it had failed to meet the demands which called it into existence.Report in H. R. No. 614, 48th Cong. 1st -Sess. To obviate the difficulties attending its enforcement the amendatory act of 1884 declared that the certificate which the laborer must obtain “ shall be the only evidence permissible to establish his right of re-entry” into the..United States.

This act was held by this court not to require the certificate from laborers who were in the United States on- the 17th of November, 1880, who had departed out of the country before May 6, 1882, and remained out until after July 5, 1884. *599 Chew Heong v. United States, 112 U. S. 536. The same difficulties and embarrassments continued with respect to the proof of their former residence. Parties were able to pass successfully the required examination as to their residence before November 17; 1880, who, it was generally believed, had never visited our shores. To prevent the possibility of the policy of excluding Chinese laborers being evaded, the act of October 1, 1888, the validity of which is the subject, of consideration in this case, was passed. It is entitled “An. acta supplement to an act entitled ‘ An act to execute certain treaty stipulations relating to Chinese,’ approved the sixth day,of May, eighteen hundred and eighty-two.” 25 Stat. 504, c. 1064: It is as follows:.

“ Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Bepresentatmes of the United States of America in Congress assembled,' That from and after the passage of this act, it shall be unlawful' for any Chinese laborer who shall at any time heretofore have been, or who may now. or hereafter be, a resident within the United States, and who shall have departed, or shall depart therefrom, and shall not have returned before the passage of this act, to return to, or remain in, the United States.

“ Sec. 2. That no certificates of identity provided for in the fourth and fifth sections of the act to which this is- a supplement shall hereafter be issued; and every certificate heretofore issued in pursuance thereof is-hereby declared void .and of no effect, and the Chinese laborer claiming admission by virtue thereof shall not be permitted to enter the United States.

“ Sec. 3. That all the duties prescribed, liabilities, penalties, and forfeitures imposed, and the powers -conferred bv the second, tenth, eleventh and twelfth sections of the act (to which this is a supplement,- are hereby extended and made applicable to the provisions of this act. '

“ Sec. 4. That all such part or parts -of the act to which' this is a supplement as are inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed.

“ Approved October 1, 1888.”

The validity of this act, as already mentioned, is assailed, as being in effect an expulsion from the country of Chinese *600laborers in violation of existing treaties between the United States and the government of China, and of rights vested in them under the laws of Congress. The objection that the act is in conflict with the treaties was earnestly pressed in the court below, and the answer to it constitutes the principal part of its opinion. 36 Fed. Kep. 431. Here the objection made is, that the act of 1888 impairs a right vested under the treaty of 1880, as a law of the United States, and the statutes of 1882 and of 1884 passed in execution of it. It must be conceded that the act of 1888 is in contravention of express stipulations of the treaty of 1868 and of the supplemental treaty of 1880, but it is not on that account invalid or to be restricted in its enforcement. The treaties were of no greater legal obligation than the act of Congress. By the Constitution, laws made in pursuance thereof and treaties made under the authority of the United States are both declared to be the supreme-law of the land, and no paramount authority is given to one over the other. A treaty, it is true, is in its nature a contract between nations and is often merely promissory in its character, requiring legislation to carry its stipulations into effect. Such legislation will be open to future repeal or amendment. If the treaty operates by its own force, and relates to a subject within the power of .Congress, it can be deemed in that particular only the equivalent of a legislative act, to be repealed or modified at the pleasure of Congress. In either case the last expression of the sovereign will must control.

The effect of legislation upon conflicting treaty stipulations was elaborately considered in The Head Money Cases, and it was there adjudged' “ that so far as a treaty made by the United States with any foreign nation can become the subject of judicial -cognizance in the courts of this country, it is subject to such acts as Congress may pass for its enforcement, modification, or repeal.” 112 U. S. 580, 599. This doctrine was affirmed and followed in Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U. S. 190, 195. It will not be presumed that the legislative department of the government will lightly pass laws which are in conflict with the treaties of the country; but that circumstances may arise which would not only justify the government in disre*601gárding their stipulations, but demand in the interests of the country that it should do so, there' can be no question. Unexpected events may call for a change in the policy of the country. Neglect or violation of stipulations. on the part, of the other contracting.party may require corresponding^ action on our part. When a reciprocal engagement is not carried out by one of the contracting -parties, the other may also decline to keep the corresponding engagement. In 1798 the conduct towards this country of the government of France was of such a character that Congress declared that the United States were freed and exonerated from the stipulations of previous treaties with that country.. Its act on the subject was as follows:

“An Act to declare the treaties heretofore concluded with France, no longer obligatory on the United States.

“ Whereas the treaties concluded between the United .States and France have been repeatedly violated on the part of the French government; and the just claims of the United States for reparation of the injuries so committed have been refused; and their attempts to negotiate an amicable adjustment of all-complaints between the two nations have been repelled with indignity; And whereas, under authority of the French government, there is yet pursued against the United States a. system of predatory violence,- infracting the said treaties, and hostile to the rights of a free and independent nation:

“ Be~it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the United States are of right freed and exonerated from the stipulations of the treaties, and of. the consular convention, heretofore-concluded between the United States and Frapce; and that the same shall not henceforth be regarded as legally, •obligatory on the government or citizens of the United States.” 1 Stat. 578, c. 67.

This act, as seen, applied in terms only to the future. Of course, whatever of a permanent character had been executed or vested under the treaties was not affected by it. . In that respect the abrogation of the obligations of a treaty operates, *602like the repeal of a. law, only upon the future, leaving transactions executed under it to stand unaffected. The validity of this legislative release from the stipulations of the treaties was of course not a matter for judicial cognizance. The question whether our government is justified in disregarding its engagements with another nation is not one for the determination of the courts. ' This subject was fully considered by Mr. Justice Curtis, whilst sitting at the circuit, in Taylor v. Morton, 2 Curtis, 454, 459, and he held that whilst it would always be a matter of the utmost gravity and delicacy to refuse to execute a treaty, the power to do so was prerogative, of which no nation could be deprived without deeply affecting its independence ; but whether a treaty with a foreign sovereign had been violated by him, whether the consideration of a particular stipulation of a treaty had been voluntarily withdrawn by one party so as to no longer be obligatory upon the other, and whether the views, and acts of a foreign sovereign, manifested through his representative, had given just occasion to the political departments of our government to withhc d the execution of a promise contained in a treaty or to act in direct contravention of such promise, were not judicial, questions ; that the power to determine them has not been confided to' the judiciairy, which has no suitable means to execute it, but to the executive, and legislative departments of the government ; and that it belongs to diplomacy and legislation, and not to the administration of existing laws. And the learned justice, added,, as a necessary consequence of these conclusions, . that if Congress .has this power, it is wholly immaterial to inquire whether it has, by the statute complained of, departed from the treaty or not; or, if it has, whether- such departure was accidental or designed; -and if. the latter, whether the reasons therefor were good or bad. These views were reasserted and fully adopted by this court in Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U. S. 190, 195. And may add to the concluding observation of the learned justice, that if the power mentioned is vested in Congress, any reflection upon its motives, or the motives of any of its members- in exercising it, would be entirely uncalled for.- This court is not a censor of the morals *603of other departments of the government.; it is not invested with any authority to pass judgment upon the motives of their conduct. "When once it is established that Congress, possesses the power, to pass an act, our province ends with its construction, and its application to cases as they are presented- fiar determination. Congress has the power under the Constitution to declare war, and in two instances where the power has been exercised — in the war of 1812 against Great Britain, and in 1846 against Mexico — the propriety and-wisdom and justice of its action were vehemently assailed by some of the ablest and best men in the country, but no one doubted the legality of the proceeding, and any imputation by this or any other court of the United States upon the motives of the members of Congress who in either case voted for the declaration, would have been justly the cause of animadversion. We do not mean to intimate that the moral aspects of'legislative acts may hot be proper subjects of consideration. Undoubtedly they may be, at proper times and places, before, the public, in the halls of Congress, and in. all the modes by which the public mind can be influenced. Public opinion thus enlightened, brought to bear upon legislation, will do more than all other causes to prevent abuses; but the province of the courts is to pass upon the validity of laws, not to make them, and when their validity is established, to declare their meaning and apply their provisions. All else lies beyond their domain.

. There being nothing in the treaties between China and the United States to impair the validity, of the act of Congress of-October 1, 1888, was it on any other ground beyond the competency of Congress to pass it ? If so, it must be because it was not within the power of Congress to prohibit Chinese laborers who had at the time departed from the United States, or should subsequently depart, from returning to the United States.' Those laborers are not citizens of the United States; they are aliens. That the government of the United States, through the action of the legislative department, can exclude aliens "from its territory, is a proposition which we do not think open to controversy. Jurisdiction over its own territory to that extent is an incident of every independent nation.’ It is a part. of its in*604dependence. If it could not exclude aliens it would be to. that. extent subject to the control of another power. As said by this court in the. case of The Exchange, 7 Cranch, 116, 136, speaking by Chief Justice Marshall:. “The jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is necessarily exclusive and absolute. It is susceptible of no limitation not imposed by itself. Any restriction upon it, deriving validity.from an external source, would imply a diminution of its sovereignty to the extent of the restriction, and an investment of that sovereignty to the same extent in that power which could impose such restriction.-. All exceptions, therefore, to the full and complete power of a nation within its own territories, must be'traced up to the consent of the nation itself. They can flow from no other legitimate source;”

While under our. Constitution and form of government the great mass of local matters is controlled by local authorities, the, United States; in their relation to foreign countries and their- subjects or citizens are one nation, invested with powers which belong to independent nations, the exercise of which can be invoked for the maintenance of its absolute independence and security throughout its entire territory. The powers to declare war, make treaties, suppress insurrection, repel invasion,, regulate foreign commerce, secure republican governments to the States, and admit subjects of other nations .to citizenship, are all sovereign powers, restricted in their exercise only by the Constitution itself and considerations of public policy and justice which control, more or less, the conduct of all civilized nations. As said by this court in the case of Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 413, speaking by the sainé great Chief Justice: “ That the United States'form, for many, and for most important purposes,-a single nation, has not yet been , denied, in war, .wé are . one people. In making peace /we are one people. In all commercial regulations, we are one land the same people. In many other respects, the American-people are one; and the government winch is alone capable* of controlling and managing their interests in all these respects, is the government of the Union. It is their government, and in that characterthey have no other. America has chosen to *605be in many respects, and to many purposes, a. nation; and for all these purposes her government is complete; to all these objects, it is competent. The people have declared, that in the exercise of all powers given for these objects, it is supreme. It can then in affecting these objects legitimately control all individuals or governments within the American territory. The constitution and laws of a State, so far as they are repugnant to the Constitution and laws of the United States, are absolutely void. These States are constituent parts of the United States.' They are members of one great empire — for some-.purposes sovereign, for some purposes subordinate.” The same view is expressed in a different form by Mr. Justice Bradley, in Knox v. Lee, 12 Wall. 457, 555, where he-observes that “the United States is not only a government, but it is a national government, and the only government in this country that has the character of nationality. It is invested with power over all the foreign relations of the country, war, peace and negotiations and intercourse with other nations; all. which are forbidden to the state governments. It has jurisdiction, over all those general subjects of legislation and sovereignty which affect the interests of the whole people equally and alike, and which require uniformity of regulations and laws, such as the coinage, weights and measures, bankruptcies, the postal system, patent and copyright laws, the public lands and interstate commerce, all which subjects are expressly or impliedly 'prohibited to the state governments. It has power to suppress insurrections, as well as to repel invasions, and to organize, arm, discipline and call into service the militia of the whole country; The President is charged with the. duty and invested with the power to take care that the laws be faithfully executed. The judiciary has jurisdiction to decide controversies between the States, and, between, their respective citizens, as well as questions of national concern; and the government is clothed with power to guarantee to every State a republican form of government, and to protect each of them against invasion and domestic violence.”

The control of local matters being left to local authorities, and national matters being entrusted to the government of the *606Union, the problem of free institutions existing over a widely extended country, having different climates and varied interests, has been happily solved'.' For local interests the several States of the Union exist, but for national purposes,, embracing our relations with foreign nations, we are but one people, one nation, one power.

To preserve its independence, and give security against foreign aggression and encroachment, is the highest duty of every nation, and to attain these ends nearly all other considerations are to be subordinated. It matters not in what form such aggression and encroachment come, whether from the foreign nation acting in its national character or from vast hordes, of its people crowding in upon us. ' The government, possessing the powers which are to be exercised for protection and security, is clothed with authority to determine the occasion on which the powers shall be called forth; and its determination, so far as the subjects affected are concerned, are necessarily conclusive upon all its departments and officers. If, therefore, the government of the United States, through its legislative department, considers the presence of foreigners of a different race in this country, who will not assimilate with us, to be dangerous to its peace and security, their exclusion is not to be stayed because at the time there are no actual hostilities with- the nation of which the foreigners are subjects. The existence of war would render the necessity of the proceeding only more obvious and pressing. The same necessity, in a less pressing degree, may arise when war does, not exist, and the same authority which adjudges the necessity in one case must also” determine it in the other. In both cases its determination is conclusive upon the judiciary. If the government of the country of which the foreigners .excluded are subjects is dissatisfied with this action it can make complaint to the executive head of our government, or resort to any other measure which, in its-judgment, its interests or dignity may demand; and there lies its only remedy.

The'power of the government to exclude foreigners from the country whenever, in. its judgment, the public interests require such exclusion, has been asserted in repeated instances, *607and never denied by the executive or legislative departments. In a communication made in December, 1852, to M^. A. Dudley Mann, at one time a special agent of the Department of State in Europe, Mr. Everett, then Secretary of State under President Eillmore, writes: “ This government could never give up the right of excluding foreigners whose presence it might deem a source of danger to the United States.” “ Nor will this government consider such exclusion of American citizens from Bussia necessarily a matter of- diplomatic complaint to' that country.” In a dispatch to Mr. Fay, our minister to Switzerland, in March, 1856, Mr. Marcy, Secretary of State under President Pierce, writes: “Every society possesses the undoubted right to determine who shall compose its members, - and it is exercised by all nations, both in peace and war.” “ It may always be questionable whether a resort to this power is warranted by the circumstances, or what department of the government is empowered to -exert it; but there can be no doubt that it is possessed by all nations, and that each may decide for itself when the occasion arises demanding its exercise.” In a communication in September, 1869, to Mr. Washburné, our minister to France, Mr. Fish, Secretary of State under President Grant, uses this language: “ The control of the people within its limits, and the right to expel from its territory persons who are dangerous to the peace of the State, are too clearly within the essential attributes of sovereignty to be seriously contested. Strangers visiting or sojourning in a foreign country voluntarily submit themselves to its laws and customs, and the municipal laws of France, authorizing the expulsion of strangers, are not of such recent date, nor has the exercise of the power by the government of France been so infrequent, that sojourners within her territory can claim surprise when the power is put in force.” In a communication to Mr. Foster, our minister to Mexico, in July, 1819, Mr. Evarts, Secretary of State under President Hayes, referring to the power vested in the constitution of Mexico to expel objectionable foreigners, says: “ The admission that, as that constitution now stands and is interpreted, foreigners who render themselves harmful or objectionable to the general govern*608ment must expect to be liable to the exercise of the power adverted Ijo, even in time of peace, remains, and no good reason is. seen for departing from that conclusion now. But, while there may be no expedient basis on which to found objection, on principle and in advance of a special case thereunder, to the' constitutional right thus asserted by Mexico, yet the manner of carrying out such asserted right may be' highly objectionable. You would be fully justified in making earnest remonstrances should a citizen of the United States be expelled' from Mexican territory without just steps to assure the grounds of such expulsion, and in bringing the fact to the immediate knowledge of the Department.” In a communication to Mr. W. J: Stillman, under date of August'3, 1882,. Mr. Frelinghuysen, Secretary • of State under President Arthur, writes •: “ This government cannot contest the right of foreign governments to exclude, on police or other grounds, American citizens' from their shores.” "Wharton’s International' Law Digest,. § 206. ' .

The exclusion of -paupers, criminals-and persons afflicted with incurable diseases, for which statutes have been passed, is only an application of the same power to particular classes of persons, whose'presence is deemed injurious or q source of danger -to the country. As applied to them; there) has never been any question as to the power to exclude them. The power is constantly exercised; its existence is involved in the right of self-preservation. -As to paupers, itT makes no difference by whose aid they are brought to the country. As Mr. Fish, when Secretary, of v State, wrote, in a communication under date of December 26, 1812, to Mr. James Moulding, of Liverpool, the government of the United States “is' not willing and will not consent to receive the pauper class of any. community who may. be sent or may be assisted in their immigration at the expense of government or of municipal authorities.”- As to criminals, the power of exclusion has always been exercised, even in the absence of any statute on the subject. In a despatch to Mr. Cramer, our minister to Switzerland, in December, 1881, Mr. Blaine, Secretary of State under President Arthur,- writes: “While, under the Constitution and *609the laws, this country is open to the honest and industrious immigrant, it has no room outside-of its prisons or almshouses for depraved and incorrigible criminals or hopelessly dependent paupers who may have become a pest or burden, or both, to their own country.” Wharton’s Int. Law Dig., supra.

The power of exclusion of foreigners being an incident of sovereignty belonging to the government of the United States, as a part of those sovereign powers delegated by the Constitution, the right to its exercise at any time when, in the judgment of the government, the interests of the country require it, cannot be granted away or restrained on behalf Of any one. The powers of government are delegated in trust to the United States, and are incapable of transfer to any other parties. They cannot be abandoned or surrendered. Nor can their exercise be hampered, when needed for the public good, by any considerations of private interest.' The exercise of these public trusts is not the subject of barter or contract. Whatever license, therefore, Chinese laborers, may have obtained, previous to the áct of October 1, 1888, to return to the United States áfter their departure, is held at the will of the government, revocable -at any time, at its pleasure. Whether a proper consideration by our government of its previous laws, or a proper respect for the nation whose subjects are affected by its action, ought to have qualified its, inhibition and made it applicable only to persons departing from the country after the passage of the act, are not questions for judicial determination. If there be any just ground of complaint on the' part of China, it must be made to the political department of our government, which is alone competent to act upon the subject. The rights and interests created by a treaty, which hfyve become so vested that its expiration or abrogation will fipt destroy or impair them, are such as are connected- with -and lie in property, capable of sale and transfer, or other disposition, not such as are personal and untransferable in their char-: acter. Thus'in, The Head Money Cases, the court speaks of certain rights being in some instances conferred upon the citizens or subjects of one nation residing in the territorial limits of the other, .which are “capable of enforcement as *610between private parties in the courts of the country.” “ An illustration of this character,” it adds, “ is found in treaties which regulate the mutual fights of citizens and subjects of the contracting nations in regard to rights of property by descent or inheritance, when, the individuals concerned are aliens.” 112 U. S. 580, 598. The passage cited by counsel from the language of Mr. Justice Washington in Society for the Propagation of the Gospel v. New Haven, 8 Wheat. 464, 493, also illustrates this doctrine. There the learned justice observes that “ if real estate be purchased or' secured under a treaty, it would be most mischievous to admit that the extinguishment of the treaty extinguished the right to such estate. In truth, it no more affects such han the repeal of a municipal law affects rights acquired under it.” Of this doctrine there can be no question in this court; but far different is this case, where a continued suspension of the exercise of a governmental power is insisted upon as a right, because, by the favor and consent of the government, it has not heretofore been exerted with respect to the appellant or to the class to which he belongs.’ Between, property rights not affected by the termination or abrogation of a treaty, and expectations of benefits from the continuance of existing legislation, there is as wide a difference- as between realization and hopes.

During the argument reference was made by counsel to the alien law of June 25, 1798, and to- opinions expressed at the time by men of great ability and learning against its constitutionality. 1 Stat. 570, c. 58. We do not attach importance-to those .opinions in their bearing upon this case. The act vested in the President power to order all such aliens as he should judge dangerous to the peace and safety of the United States, or'should have reasonable grounds to suspect were concerned in -any treasonable or secret machination against the government,, to depart out of the territory of the United States within such time as should be expressed in his order. There were other'provisions also distinguishing it. from the act under -consideration. The act was passed during a period of great political excitement, and it was attacked and .defended with great *611zeal and ability. It. is enough, however, to say that it is entirely different from the- act before us, and the validity of its provisions was never brought to the test of judicial decision in the courts of the United States.

Order affirmed.