Americas Mining Corp. v. Theriault

To generate a substantial amount of shareholder litigation, merely allowing shareholders suits, direct or derivative, is not sufficient. Somebody needs to have an incentive to bring the suit. If shareholder-plaintiffs only recovered their pro rata share of the recovery (indirectly in the case of a derivative suit), incentives to bring suit would be very low and, in light of substantial litigation costs, usually insufficient. Litigation would be hamstrung by the same collective action problem as proxy fights. Under the common fund doctrine, however, U.S. courts award a substantial part of the recovery to the plaintiff or, in the standard case, to the plaintiff lawyer. As Americas Mining shows, that award can be very substantial indeed.The litigation incentives generated by such awards strike some as excessive. For a while, virtually every M&A deal attracted shareholder litigation, albeit mostly with much lower or no recovery. Corporations tried various tactics to limit the amount of litigation they face, prompting recent amendments of the DGCL (sections 102(f) and 115 – read!).1. How does the court determine the right amount of the fee award? What criteria does it use, and what purposes does it aim to achieve? Are the criteria well calibrated to the purposes?2. Who is opposing the fee award, and why?3. Are the damage and fee awards sufficient to deter fiduciary duty violations similar to those at issue in this case?Note: I excerpt here only the passages relevant to the attorney fee award. The case below was In re Southern Peru (Del. Ch. 2011).