2 Privacy and Cybersecurity 2 Privacy and Cybersecurity

2.1 [Jan 10] What is Privacy? 2.1 [Jan 10] What is Privacy?

THEMES

  • What is privacy?
  • What does the right to privacy protect?
  • What is a privacy violation?
  • Whose job is it to protect privacy?
  • What are some of the varying conceptions of privacy?

2.1.1 US Constitution, Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments 2.1.1 US Constitution, Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments

Amendment 4 (1789)

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

Amendment 14 (1868)

1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.

3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of President and Vice-President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability.

4. The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations and claims shall be held illegal and void.

5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.

Amendment 15

1. The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.

2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.

2.1.2 Katz v. United States 2.1.2 Katz v. United States

389 U.S. 347 (1967)

KATZ
v.
UNITED STATES.

No. 35.

Supreme Court of United States.

Argued October 17, 1967.
Decided December 18, 1967.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT.

Burton Marks and Harvey A. Schneider argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioner.

[348] John S. Martin, Jr., argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Spritzer, Assistant Attorney General Vinson and Beatrice Rosenberg.

MR. JUSTICE STEWART delivered the opinion of the Court.

The petitioner was convicted in the District Court for the Southern District of California under an eight-count indictment charging him with transmitting wagering information by telephone from Los Angeles to Miami and Boston, in violation of a federal statute.[1] At trial the Government was permitted, over the petitioner's objection, to introduce evidence of the petitioner's end of telephone conversations, overheard by FBI agents who had attached an electronic listening and recording device to the outside of the public telephone booth from which he had placed his calls. In affirming his conviction, the Court of Appeals rejected the contention that the recordings had been obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, [349] because "[t]here was no physical entrance into the area occupied by [the petitioner]."[2] We granted certiorari in order to consider the constitutional questions thus presented.[3]

The petitioner has phrased those questions as follows:

"A. Whether a public telephone booth is a constitutionally protected area so that evidence obtained by attaching an electronic listening recording device to the top of such a booth is obtained in violation of the right to privacy of the user of the booth.
[350] "B. Whether physical penetration of a constitutionally protected area is necessary before a search and seizure can be said to be violative of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution."

We decline to adopt this formulation of the issues. In the first place, the correct solution of Fourth Amendment problems is not necessarily promoted by incantation of the phrase "constitutionally protected area." Secondly, the Fourth Amendment cannot be translated into a general constitutional "right to privacy." That Amendment protects individual privacy against certain kinds of governmental intrusion, but its protections go further, and often have nothing to do with privacy at all.[4] Other provisions of the Constitution protect personal privacy from other forms of governmental invasion.[5] But the protection of a person's general right to privacy— his right to be let alone by other people[6]—is, like the [351] protection of his property and of his very life, left largely to the law of the individual States.[7]

Because of the misleading way the issues have been formulated, the parties have attached great significance to the characterization of the telephone booth from which the petitioner placed his calls. The petitioner has strenuously argued that the booth was a "constitutionally protected area." The Government has maintained with equal vigor that it was not.[8] But this effort to decide whether or not a given "area," viewed in the abstract, is "constitutionally protected" deflects attention from the problem presented by this case.[9] For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. See Lewis v. United States, 385 U. S. 206, 210; United States v. Lee, 274 U. S. 559, 563. But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected. [352] See Rios v. United States, 364 U. S. 253; Ex parte Jackson, 96 U. S. 727, 733.

The Government stresses the fact that the telephone booth from which the petitioner made his calls was constructed partly of glass, so that he was as visible after he entered it as he would have been if he had remained outside. But what he sought to exclude when he entered the booth was not the intruding eye—it was the uninvited ear. He did not shed his right to do so simply because he made his calls from a place where he might be seen. No less than an individual in a business office,[10] in a friend's apartment,[11] or in a taxicab,[12] a person in a telephone booth may rely upon the protection of the Fourth Amendment. One who occupies it, shuts the door behind him, and pays the toll that permits him to place a call is surely entitled to assume that the words he utters into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the world. To read the Constitution more narrowly is to ignore the vital role that the public telephone has come to play in private communication.

The Government contends, however, that the activities of its agents in this case should not be tested by Fourth Amendment requirements, for the surveillance technique they employed involved no physical penetration of the telephone booth from which the petitioner placed his calls. It is true that the absence of such penetration was at one time thought to foreclose further Fourth Amendment inquiry, Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438, 457, 464, 466; Goldman v. United States, 316 U. S. 129, 134-136, for that Amendment was thought to limit only searches and seizures of tangible [353] property.[13] But "[t]he premise that property interests control the right of the Government to search and seize has been discredited." Warden v. Hayden, 387 U. S. 294, 304. Thus, although a closely divided Court supposed in Olmstead that surveillance without any trespass and without the seizure of any material object fell outside the ambit of the Constitution, we have since departed from the narrow view on which that decision rested. Indeed, we have expressly held that the Fourth Amendment governs not only the seizure of tangible items, but extends as well to the recording of oral statements, over-heard without any "technical trespass under . . . local property law." Silverman v. United States, 365 U. S. 505, 511. Once this much is acknowledged, and once it is recognized that the Fourth Amendment protects people— and not simply "areas"—against unreasonable searches and seizures, it becomes clear that the reach of that Amendment cannot turn upon the presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any given enclosure.

We conclude that the underpinnings of Olmstead and Goldman have been so eroded by our subsequent decisions that the "trespass" doctrine there enunciated can no longer be regarded as controlling. The Government's activities in electronically listening to and recording the petitioner's words violated the privacy upon which he justifiably relied while using the telephone booth and thus constituted a "search and seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The fact that the electronic device employed to achieve that end did not happen to penetrate the wall of the booth can have no constitutional significance.

[354] The question remaining for decision, then, is whether the search and seizure conducted in this case complied with constitutional standards. In that regard, the Government's position is that its agents acted in an entirely defensible manner: They did not begin their electronic surveillance until investigation of the petitioner's activities had established a strong probability that he was using the telephone in question to transmit gambling information to persons in other States, in violation of federal law. Moreover, the surveillance was limited, both in scope and in duration, to the specific purpose of establishing the contents of the petitioner's unlawful telephonic communications. The agents confined their surveillance to the brief periods during which he used the telephone booth,[14] and they took great care to overhear only the conversations of the petitioner himself.[15]

Accepting this account of the Government's actions as accurate, it is clear that this surveillance was so narrowly circumscribed that a duly authorized magistrate, properly notified of the need for such investigation, specifically informed of the basis on which it was to proceed, and clearly apprised of the precise intrusion it would entail, could constitutionally have authorized, with appropriate safeguards, the very limited search and seizure that the Government asserts in fact took place. Only last Term we sustained the validity of [355] such an authorization, holding that, under sufficiently "precise and discriminate circumstances," a federal court may empower government agents to employ a concealed electronic device "for the narrow and particularized purpose of ascertaining the truth of the . . . allegations" of a "detailed factual affidavit alleging the commission of a specific criminal offense." Osborn v. United States, 385 U. S. 323, 329-330. Discussing that holding, the Court in Berger v. New York, 388 U. S. 41, said that "the order authorizing the use of the electronic device" in Osborn "afforded similar protections to those . . . of conventional warrants authorizing the seizure of tangible evidence." Through those protections, "no greater invasion of privacy was permitted than was necessary under the circumstances." Id., at 57.[16] Here, too, a similar [356] judicial order could have accommodated "the legitimate needs of law enforcement"[17] by authorizing the carefully limited use of electronic surveillance.

The Government urges that, because its agents relied upon the decisions in Olmstead and Goldman, and because they did no more here than they might properly have done with prior judicial sanction, we should retroactively validate their conduct. That we cannot do. It is apparent that the agents in this case acted with restraint. Yet the inescapable fact is that this restraint was imposed by the agents themselves, not by a judicial officer. They were not required, before commencing the search, to present their estimate of probable cause for detached scrutiny by a neutral magistrate. They were not compelled, during the conduct of the search itself, to observe precise limits established in advance by a specific court order. Nor were they directed, after the search had been completed, to notify the authorizing magistrate in detail of all that had been seized. In the absence of such safeguards, this Court has never sustained a search upon the sole ground that officers reasonably expected to find evidence of a particular crime and voluntarily confined their activities to the least intrusive [357] means consistent with that end. Searches conducted without warrants have been held unlawful "notwithstanding facts unquestionably showing probable cause," Agnello v. United States, 269 U. S. 20, 33, for the Constitution requires "that the deliberate, impartial judgment of a judicial officer . . . be interposed between the citizen and the police . . . ." Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U. S. 471, 481-482. "Over and again this Court has emphasized that the mandate of the [Fourth] Amendment requires adherence to judicial processes," United States v. Jeffers, 342 U. S. 48, 51, and that searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment[18]—subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.[19]

It is difficult to imagine how any of those exceptions could ever apply to the sort of search and seizure involved in this case. Even electronic surveillance substantially contemporaneous with an individual's arrest could hardly be deemed an "incident" of that arrest.[20] [358] Nor could the use of electronic surveillance without prior authorization be justified on grounds of "hot pursuit."[21] And, of course, the very nature of electronic surveillance precludes its use pursuant to the suspect's consent.[22]

The Government does not question these basic principles. Rather, it urges the creation of a new exception to cover this case.[23] It argues that surveillance of a telephone booth should be exempted from the usual requirement of advance authorization by a magistrate upon a showing of probable cause. We cannot agree. Omission of such authorization

"bypasses the safeguards provided by an objective predetermination of probable cause, and substitutes instead the far less reliable procedure of an after-the-event justification for the . . . search, too likely to be subtly influenced by the familiar shortcomings of hindsight judgment." Beck v. Ohio, 379 U. S. 89, 96.

And bypassing a neutral predetermination of the scope of a search leaves individuals secure from Fourth Amendment [359] violations "only in the discretion of the police." Id., at 97.

These considerations do not vanish when the search in question is transferred from the setting of a home, an office, or a hotel room to that of a telephone booth. Wherever a man may be, he is entitled to know that he will remain free from unreasonable searches and seizures. The government agents here ignored "the procedure of antecedent justification . . . that is central to the Fourth Amendment,"[24] a procedure that we hold to be a constitutional precondition of the kind of electronic surveillance involved in this case. Because the surveillance here failed to meet that condition, and because it led to the petitioner's conviction, the judgment must be reversed.

It is so ordered.

MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, with whom MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN joins, concurring.

While I join the opinion of the Court, I feel compelled to reply to the separate concurring opinion of my Brother WHITE, which I view as a wholly unwarranted green light for the Executive Branch to resort to electronic eaves-dropping without a warrant in cases which the Executive Branch itself labels "national security" matters.

Neither the President nor the Attorney General is a magistrate. In matters where they believe national security may be involved they are not detached, disinterested, and neutral as a court or magistrate must be. Under the separation of powers created by the Constitution, the Executive Branch is not supposed to be neutral and disinterested. Rather it should vigorously investigate [360] and prevent breaches of national security and prosecute those who violate the pertinent federal laws. The President and Attorney General are properly interested parties, cast in the role of adversary, in national security cases. They may even be the intended victims of subversive action. Since spies and saboteurs are as entitled to the protection of the Fourth Amendment as suspected gamblers like petitioner, I cannot agree that where spies and saboteurs are involved adequate protection of Fourth Amendment rights is assured when the President and Attorney General assume both the position of adversary-and-prosecutor and disinterested, neutral magistrate.

There is, so far as I understand constitutional history, no distinction under the Fourth Amendment between types of crimes. Article III, § 3, gives "treason" a very narrow definition and puts restrictions on its proof. But the Fourth Amendment draws no lines between various substantive offenses. The arrests in cases of "hot pursuit" and the arrests on visible or other evidence of probable cause cut across the board and are not peculiar to any kind of crime.

I would respect the present lines of distinction and not improvise because a particular crime seems particularly heinous. When the Framers took that step, as they did with treason, the worst crime of all, they made their purpose manifest.

MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, concurring.

I join the opinion of the Court, which I read to hold only (a) that an enclosed telephone booth is an area where, like a home, Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383, and unlike a field, Hester v. United States, 265 U. S. 57, a person has a constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy; (b) that electronic as well as physical intrusion into a place that is in this sense private may constitute a violation of the Fourth Amendment; [361] and (c) that the invasion of a constitutionally protected area by federal authorities is, as the Court has long held, presumptively unreasonable in the absence of a search warrant.

As the Court's opinion states, "the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places." The question, however, is what protection it affords to those people. Generally, as here, the answer to that question requires reference to a "place." My understanding of the rule that has emerged from prior decisions is that there is a twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as "reasonable." Thus a man's home is, for most purposes, a place where he expects privacy, but objects, activities, or statements that he exposes to the "plain view" of outsiders are not "protected" because no intention to keep them to himself has been exhibited. On the other hand, conversations in the open would not be protected against being overheard, for the expectation of privacy under the circumstances would be unreasonable. Cf. Hester v. United States, supra.

The critical fact in this case is that "[o]ne who occupies it, [a telephone booth] shuts the door behind him, and pays the toll that permits him to place a call is surely entitled to assume" that his conversation is not being intercepted. Ante, at 352. The point is not that the booth is "accessible to the public" at other times, ante, at 351, but that it is a temporarily private place whose momentary occupants' expectations of freedom from intrusion are recognized as reasonable. Cf. Rios v. United States, 364 U. S. 253.

In Silverman v. United States, 365 U. S. 505, we held that eavesdropping accomplished by means of an electronic device that penetrated the premises occupied by petitioner was a violation of the Fourth Amendment. [362] That case established that interception of conversations reasonably intended to be private could constitute a "search and seizure," and that the examination or taking of physical property was not required. This view of the Fourth Amendment was followed in Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U. S. 471, at 485, and Berger v. New York, 388 U. S. 41, at 51. Also compare Osborn v. United States, 385 U. S. 323, at 327. In Silverman we found it unnecessary to re-examine Goldman v. United States, 316 U. S. 129, which had held that electronic surveillance accomplished without the physical penetration of petitioner's premises by a tangible object did not violate the Fourth Amendment. This case requires us to reconsider Goldman, and I agree that it should now be overruled.[25] Its limitation on Fourth Amendment protection is, in the present day, bad physics as well as bad law, for reasonable expectations of privacy may be defeated by electronic as well as physical invasion.

Finally, I do not read the Court's opinion to declare that no interception of a conversation one-half of which occurs in a public telephone booth can be reasonable in the absence of a warrant. As elsewhere under the Fourth Amendment, warrants are the general rule, to which the legitimate needs of law enforcement may demand specific exceptions. It will be time enough to consider any such exceptions when an appropriate occasion presents itself, and I agree with the Court that this is not one.

MR. JUSTICE WHITE, concurring.

I agree that the official surveillance of petitioner's telephone conversations in a public booth must be subjected [363] to the test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment and that on the record now before us the particular surveillance undertaken was unreasonable absent a warrant properly authorizing it. This application of the Fourth Amendment need not interfere with legitimate needs of law enforcement.[26]

In joining the Court's opinion, I note the Court's acknowledgment that there are circumstances in which it is reasonable to search without a warrant. In this connection, in footnote 23 the Court points out that today's decision does not reach national security cases. Wiretapping to protect the security of the Nation has been authorized by successive Presidents. The present Administration would apparently save national security cases from restrictions against wiretapping. See Berger v. New York, 388 U. S. 41, 112-118 (1967) (WHITE, J., [364] dissenting). We should not require the warrant procedure and the magistrate's judgment if the President of the United States or his chief legal officer, the Attorney General, has considered the requirements of national security and authorized electronic surveillance as reasonable.

MR. JUSTICE BLACK, dissenting.

If I could agree with the Court that eavesdropping carried on by electronic means (equivalent to wiretapping) constitutes a "search" or "seizure," I would be happy to join the Court's opinion. For on that premise my Brother STEWART sets out methods in accord with the Fourth Amendment to guide States in the enactment and enforcement of laws passed to regulate wiretapping by government. In this respect today's opinion differs sharply from Berger v. New York, 388 U. S. 41, decided last Term, which held void on its face a New York statute authorizing wiretapping on warrants issued by magistrates on showings of probable cause. The Berger case also set up what appeared to be insuperable obstacles to the valid passage of such wiretapping laws by States. The Court's opinion in this case, however, removes the doubts about state power in this field and abates to a large extent the confusion and near-paralyzing effect of the Berger holding. Notwithstanding these good efforts of the Court, I am still unable to agree with its interpretation of the Fourth Amendment.

My basic objection is twofold: (1) I do not believe that the words of the Amendment will bear the meaning given them by today's decision, and (2) I do not believe that it is the proper role of this Court to rewrite the Amendment in order "to bring it into harmony with the times" and thus reach a result that many people believe to be desirable.

[365] While I realize that an argument based on the meaning of words lacks the scope, and no doubt the appeal, of broad policy discussions and philosophical discourses on such nebulous subjects as privacy, for me the language of the Amendment is the crucial place to look in construing a written document such as our Constitution. The Fourth Amendment says that

"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."

The first clause protects "persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures . . . ." These words connote the idea of tangible things with size, form, and weight, things capable of being searched, seized, or both. The second clause of the Amendment still further establishes its Framers' purpose to limit its protection to tangible things by providing that no warrants shall issue but those "particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." A conversation overheard by eavesdropping, whether by plain snooping or wiretapping, is not tangible and, under the normally accepted meanings of the words, can neither be searched nor seized. In addition the language of the second clause indicates that the Amendment refers not only to something tangible so it can be seized but to something already in existence so it can be described. Yet the Court's interpretation would have the Amendment apply to overhearing future conversations which by their very nature are nonexistent until they take place. How can one "describe" a future conversation, and, if one cannot, how can a magistrate issue a warrant to eavesdrop one in the future? It is argued that information showing what [366] is expected to be said is sufficient to limit the boundaries of what later can be admitted into evidence; but does such general information really meet the specific language of the Amendment which says "particularly describing"? Rather than using language in a completely artificial way, I must conclude that the Fourth Amendment simply does not apply to eavesdropping.

Tapping telephone wires, of course, was an unknown possibility at the time the Fourth Amendment was adopted. But eavesdropping (and wiretapping is nothing more than eavesdropping by telephone) was, as even the majority opinion in Berger, supra, recognized, "an ancient practice which at common law was condemned as a nuisance. 4 Blackstone, Commentaries 168. In those days the eavesdropper listened by naked ear under the eaves of houses or their windows, or beyond their walls seeking out private discourse." 388 U. S., at 45. There can be no doubt that the Framers were aware of this practice, and if they had desired to outlaw or restrict the use of evidence obtained by eavesdropping, I believe that they would have used the appropriate language to do so in the Fourth Amendment. They certainly would not have left such a task to the ingenuity of language-stretching judges. No one, it seems to me, can read the debates on the Bill of Rights without reaching the conclusion that its Framers and critics well knew the meaning of the words they used, what they would be understood to mean by others, their scope and their limitations. Under these circumstances it strikes me as a charge against their scholarship, their common sense and their candor to give to the Fourth Amendment's language the eavesdropping meaning the Court imputes to it today.

I do not deny that common sense requires and that this Court often has said that the Bill of Rights' safeguards should be given a liberal construction. This [367] principle, however, does not justify construing the search and seizure amendment as applying to eavesdropping or the "seizure" of conversations. The Fourth Amendment was aimed directly at the abhorred practice of breaking in, ransacking and searching homes and other buildings and seizing people's personal belongings without warrants issued by magistrates. The Amendment deserves, and this Court has given it, a liberal construction in order to protect against warrantless searches of buildings and seizures of tangible personal effects. But until today this Court has refused to say that eavesdropping comes within the ambit of Fourth Amendment restrictions. See, e. g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438 (1928), and Goldman v. United States, 316 U. S. 129 (1942).

So far I have attempted to state why I think the words of the Fourth Amendment prevent its application to eavesdropping. It is important now to show that this has been the traditional view of the Amendment's scope since its adoption and that the Court's decision in this case, along with its amorphous holding in Berger last Term, marks the first real departure from that view.

The first case to reach this Court which actually involved a clear-cut test of the Fourth Amendment's applicability to eavesdropping through a wiretap was, of course, Olmstead, supra. In holding that the interception of private telephone conversations by means of wiretapping was not a violation of the Fourth Amendment, this Court, speaking through Mr. Chief Justice Taft, examined the language of the Amendment and found, just as I do now, that the words could not be stretched to encompass overheard conversations:

"The Amendment itself shows that the search is to be of material things—the person, the house, his papers or his effects. The description of the warrant necessary to make the proceeding lawful, is [368] that it must specify the place to be searched and the person or things to be seized. . . .
.....
"Justice Bradley in the Boyd case [Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616], and Justice Clark[e] in the Gouled case [Gouled v. United States, 255 U. S. 298], said that the Fifth Amendment and the Fourth Amendment were to be liberally construed to effect the purpose of the framers of the Constitution in the interest of liberty. But that can not justify enlargement of the language employed beyond the possible practical meaning of houses, persons, papers, and effects, or so to apply the words search and seizure as to forbid hearing or sight." 277 U. S., at 464-465.

Goldman v. United States, 316 U. S. 129, is an even clearer example of this Court's traditional refusal to consider eavesdropping as being covered by the Fourth Amendment. There federal agents used a detectaphone, which was placed on the wall of an adjoining room, to listen to the conversation of a defendant carried on in his private office and intended to be confined within the four walls of the room. This Court, referring to Olmstead, found no Fourth Amendment violation.

It should be noted that the Court in Olmstead based its decision squarely on the fact that wiretapping or eavesdropping does not violate the Fourth Amendment. As shown, supra, in the cited quotation from the case, the Court went to great pains to examine the actual language of the Amendment and found that the words used simply could not be stretched to cover eavesdropping. That there was no trespass was not the determinative factor, and indeed the Court in citing Hester v. United States, 265 U. S. 57, indicated that even where there was a trespass the Fourth Amendment does not automatically apply to evidence obtained by "hearing or [369] sight." The Olmstead majority characterized Hester as holding "that the testimony of two officers of the law who trespassed on the defendant's land, concealed themselves one hundred yards away from his house and saw him come out and hand a bottle of whiskey to another, was not inadmissible. While there was a trespass, there was no search of person, house, papers or effects." 277 U. S., at 465. Thus the clear holding of the Olmstead and Goldman cases, undiluted by any question of trespass, is that eavesdropping, in both its original and modern forms, is not violative of the Fourth Amendment.

While my reading of the Olmstead and Goldman cases convinces me that they were decided on the basis of the inapplicability of the wording of the Fourth Amendment to eavesdropping, and not on any trespass basis, this is not to say that unauthorized intrusion has not played an important role in search and seizure cases. This Court has adopted an exclusionary rule to bar evidence obtained by means of such intrusions. As I made clear in my dissenting opinion in Berger v. New York, 388 U. S. 41, 76, I continue to believe that this exclusionary rule formulated in Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383, rests on the "supervisory power" of this Court over other federal courts and is not rooted in the Fourth Amendment. See Wolf v. Colorado, concurring opinion, 338 U. S. 25, 39, at 40. See also Mapp v. Ohio, concurring opinion, 367 U. S. 643, 661-666. This rule has caused the Court to refuse to accept evidence where there has been such an intrusion regardless of whether there has been a search or seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment. As this Court said in Lopez v. United States, 373 U. S. 427, 438-439, "The Court has in the past sustained instances of `electronic eavesdropping' against constitutional challenge, when devices have been used to enable government agents to overhear conversations which would have been beyond the reach of the human ear [citing [370] Olmstead and Goldman]. It has been insisted only that the electronic device not be planted by an unlawful physical invasion of a constitutionally protected area. Silverman v. United States."

To support its new interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, which in effect amounts to a rewriting of the language, the Court's opinion concludes that "the underpinnings of Olmstead and Goldman have been . . . eroded by our subsequent decisions . . . ." But the only cases cited as accomplishing this "eroding" are Silverman v. United States, 365 U. S. 505, and Warden v. Hayden, 387 U. S. 294. Neither of these cases "eroded" Olmstead or Goldman. Silverman is an interesting choice since there the Court expressly refused to re-examine the rationale of Olmstead or Goldman although such a re-examination was strenuously urged upon the Court by the petitioners' counsel. Also it is significant that in Silverman, as the Court described it, "the eavesdropping was accomplished by means of an unauthorized physical penetration into the premises occupied by the petitioners," 365 U. S., at 509, thus calling into play the supervisory exclusionary rule of evidence. As I have pointed out above, where there is an unauthorized intrusion, this Court has rejected admission of evidence obtained regardless of whether there has been an unconstitutional search and seizure. The majority's decision here relies heavily on the statement in the opinion that the Court "need not pause to consider whether or not there was a technical trespass under the local property law relating to party walls." (At 511.) Yet this statement should not becloud the fact that time and again the opinion emphasizes that there has been an unauthorized intrusion: "For a fair reading of the record in this case shows that the eavesdropping was accomplished by means of an unauthorized physical penetration into the premises occupied by the petitioners." (At 509, emphasis added.) "Eavesdropping [371] accomplished by means of such a physical intrusion is beyond the pale of even those decisions . . . ." (At 509, emphasis added.) "Here . . . the officers overheard the petitioners' conversations only by usurping part of the petitioners' house or office . . . ." (At 511, emphasis added.) "[D]ecision here . . . is based upon the reality of an actual intrusion . . . ." (At 512, emphasis added.) "We find no occasion to re-examine Goldman here, but we decline to go beyond it, by even a fraction of an inch." (At 512, emphasis added.) As if this were not enough, Justices Clark and Whittaker concurred with the following statement: "In view of the determination by the majority that the unauthorized physical penetration into petitioners' premises constituted sufficient trespass to remove this case from the coverage of earlier decisions, we feel obliged to join in the Court's opinion." (At 513, emphasis added.) As I made clear in my dissent in Berger, the Court in Silverman held the evidence should be excluded by virtue of the exclusionary rule and "I would not have agreed with the Court's opinion in Silverman . . . had I thought that the result depended on finding a violation of the Fourth Amendment . . . ." 388 U. S., at 79-80. In light of this and the fact that the Court expressly refused to re-examine Olmstead and Goldman, I cannot read Silverman as overturning the interpretation stated very plainly in Olmstead and followed in Goldman that eavesdropping is not covered by the Fourth Amendment.

The other "eroding" case cited in the Court's opinion is Warden v. Hayden, 387 U. S. 294. It appears that this case is cited for the proposition that the Fourth Amendment applies to "intangibles," such as conversation, and the following ambiguous statement is quoted from the opinion: "The premise that property interests control the right of the Government to search and seize has been discredited." 387 U. S., at 304. But far from being concerned [372] with eavesdropping, Warden v. Hayden upholds the seizure of clothes, certainly tangibles by any definition. The discussion of property interests was involved only with the common-law rule that the right to seize property depended upon proof of a superior property interest.

Thus, I think that although the Court attempts to convey the impression that for some reason today Olmstead and Goldman are no longer good law, it must face up to the fact that these cases have never been overruled or even "eroded." It is the Court's opinions in this case and Berger which for the first time since 1791, when the Fourth Amendment was adopted, have declared that eavesdropping is subject to Fourth Amendment restrictions and that conversations can be "seized."[27] I must align myself with all those judges who up to this year have never been able to impute such a meaning to the words of the Amendment.

[373] Since I see no way in which the words of the Fourth Amendment can be construed to apply to eavesdropping, that closes the matter for me. In interpreting the Bill of Rights, I willingly go as far as a liberal construction of the language takes me, but I simply cannot in good conscience give a meaning to words which they have never before been thought to have and which they certainly do not have in common ordinary usage. I will not distort the words of the Amendment in order to "keep the Constitution up to date" or "to bring it into harmony with the times." It was never meant that this Court have such power, which in effect would make us a continuously functioning constitutional convention.

With this decision the Court has completed, I hope, its rewriting of the Fourth Amendment, which started only recently when the Court began referring incessantly to the Fourth Amendment not so much as a law against unreasonable searches and seizures as one to protect an individual's privacy. By clever word juggling the Court finds it plausible to argue that language aimed specifically at searches and seizures of things that can be searched and seized may, to protect privacy, be applied to eavesdropped evidence of conversations that can neither be searched nor seized. Few things happen to an individual that do not affect his privacy in one way or another. Thus, by arbitrarily substituting the Court's language, designed to protect privacy, for the Constitution's language, designed to protect against unreasonable searches and seizures, the Court has made the Fourth Amendment its vehicle for holding all laws violative of the Constitution which offend the Court's broadest concept of privacy. As I said in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479, "The Court talks about a constitutional `right of privacy' as though there is some constitutional provision or provisions forbidding any law ever to be passed which might abridge the `privacy' [374] of individuals. But there is not." (Dissenting opinion, at 508.) I made clear in that dissent my fear of the dangers involved when this Court uses the "broad, abstract and ambiguous concept" of "privacy" as a "comprehensive substitute for the Fourth Amendment's guarantee against `unreasonable searches and seizures.' " (See generally dissenting opinion, at 507-527.)

The Fourth Amendment protects privacy only to the extent that it prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures of "persons, houses, papers, and effects." No general right is created by the Amendment so as to give this Court the unlimited power to hold unconstitutional everything which affects privacy. Certainly the Framers, well acquainted as they were with the excesses of governmental power, did not intend to grant this Court such omnipotent lawmaking authority as that. The history of governments proves that it is dangerous to freedom to repose such powers in courts.

For these reasons I respectfully dissent.

---------

[1]18 U. S. C. § 1084. That statute provides in pertinent part:

"(a) Whoever being engaged in the business of betting or wagering knowingly uses a wire communication facility for the transmission in interstate or foreign commerce of bets or wagers or information assisting in the placing of bets or wagers on any sporting event or contest, or for the transmission of a wire communication which entitles the recipient to receive money or credit as a result of bets or wagers, or for information assisting in the placing of bets or wagers, shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.

"(b) Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent the transmission in interstate or foreign commerce of information for use in news reporting of sporting events or contests, or for the transmission of information assisting in the placing of bets or wagers on a sporting event or contest from a State where betting on that sporting event or contest is legal into a State in which such betting is legal."

[2] 369 F. 2d 130, 134.

[3]386 U. S. 954. The petition for certiorari also challenged the validity of a warrant authorizing the search of the petitioner's premises. In light of our disposition of this case, we do not reach that issue.

We find no merit in the petitioner's further suggestion that his indictment must be dismissed. After his conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, he testified before a federal grand jury concerning the charges involved here. Because he was compelled to testify pursuant to a grant of immunity, 48 Stat. 1096, as amended, 47 U. S. C. § 409(l), it is clear that the fruit of his testimony cannot be used against him in any future trial. But the petitioner asks for more. He contends that his conviction must be vacated and the charges against him dismissed lest he be "subjected to [a] penalty . . . on account of [a] . . . matter . . . concerning which he [was] compelled. . . to testify . . . ." 47 U. S. C. § 409 (l). Frank v. United States, 347 F. 2d 486. We disagree. In relevant part, § 409 (l) substantially repeats the language of the Compulsory Testimony Act of 1893, 27 Stat. 443, 49 U. S. C. § 46, which was Congress' response to this Court's statement that an immunity statute can supplant the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination only if it affords adequate protection from future prosecution or conviction. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S. 547, 585-586. The statutory provision here involved was designed to provide such protection, see Brown v. United States, 359 U. S. 41, 45-46, not to confer immunity from punishment pursuant to a prior prosecution and adjudication of guilt. Cf. Reina v. United States, 364 U. S. 507, 513-514.

[4] "The average man would very likely not have his feelings soothed any more by having his property seized openly than by having it seized privately and by stealth. . . . And a person can be just as much, if not more, irritated, annoyed and injured by an unceremonious public arrest by a policeman as he is by a seizure in the privacy of his office or home." Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479, 509 (dissenting opinion of MR. JUSTICE BLACK).

[5] The First Amendment, for example, imposes limitations upon governmental abridgment of "freedom to associate and privacy in one's associations." NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U. S. 449, 462. The Third Amendment's prohibition against the unconsented peace-time quartering of soldiers protects another aspect of privacy from governmental intrusion. To some extent, the Fifth Amendment too "reflects the Constitution's concern for . . . `. . . the right of each individual "to a private enclave where he may lead a private life." ' " Tehan v. Shott, 382 U. S. 406, 416. Virtually every governmental action interferes with personal privacy to some degree. The question in each case is whether that interference violates a command of the United States Constitution.

[6] See Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1890).

[7] See, e. g., Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U. S. 374. Cf. Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U. S. 622; Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U. S. 77.

[8] In support of their respective claims, the parties have compiled competing lists of "protected areas" for our consideration. It appears to be common ground that a private home is such an area, Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383, but that an open field is not. Hester v. United States, 265 U. S. 57. Defending the inclusion of a telephone booth in his list the petitioner cites United States v. Stone, 232 F. Supp. 396, and United States v. Madison, 32 L. W. 2243 (D. C. Ct. Gen. Sess.). Urging that the telephone booth should be excluded, the Government finds support in United States v. Borgese, 235 F. Supp. 286.

[9] It is true that this Court has occasionally described its conclusions in terms of "constitutionally protected areas," see, e. g., Silverman v. United States, 365 U. S. 505, 510, 512; Lopez v. United States, 373 U. S. 427, 438-439; Berger v. New York, 388 U. S. 41, 57, 59, but we have never suggested that this concept can serve as a talismanic solution to every Fourth Amendment problem.

[10] Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U. S. 385.

[11] Jones v. United States, 362 U. S. 257.

[12] Rios v. United States, 364 U. S. 253.

[13] See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438, 464-466. We do not deal in this case with the law of detention or arrest under the Fourth Amendment.

[14] Based upon their previous visual observations of the petitioner, the agents correctly predicted that he would use the telephone booth for several minutes at approximately the same time each morning. The petitioner was subjected to electronic surveillance only during this predetermined period. Six recordings, averaging some three minutes each, were obtained and admitted in evidence. They preserved the petitioner's end of conversations concerning the placing of bets and the receipt of wagering information.

[15] On the single occasion when the statements of another person were inadvertently intercepted, the agents refrained from listening to them.

[16] Although the protections afforded the petitioner in Osborn were "similar . . . to those . . . of conventional warrants," they were not identical. A conventional warrant ordinarily serves to notify the suspect of an intended search. But if Osborn had been told in advance that federal officers intended to record his conversations, the point of making such recordings would obviously have been lost; the evidence in question could not have been obtained. In omitting any requirement of advance notice, the federal court that authorized electronic surveillance in Osborn simply recognized, as has this Court, that officers need not announce their purpose before conducting an otherwise authorized search if such an announcement would provoke the escape of the suspect or the destruction of critical evidence. See Ker v. California,374 U. S. 23, 37-41.

Although some have thought that this "exception to the notice requirement where exigent circumstances are present," id., at 39, should be deemed inapplicable where police enter a home before its occupants are aware that officers are present, id., at 55-58 (opinion of MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN), the reasons for such a limitation have no bearing here. However true it may be that "[i]nnocent citizens should not suffer the shock, fright or embarrassment attendant upon an unannounced police intrusion," id., at 57, and that "the requirement of awareness . . . serves to minimize the hazards of the officers' dangerous calling," id., at 57-58, these considerations are not relevant to the problems presented by judicially authorized electronic surveillance.

Nor do the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure impose an inflexible requirement of prior notice. Rule 41 (d) does require federal officers to serve upon the person searched a copy of the warrant and a receipt describing the material obtained, but it does not invariably require that this be done before the search takes place. Nordelli v. United States, 24 F. 2d 665, 666-667.

Thus the fact that the petitioner in Osborn was unaware that his words were being electronically transcribed did not prevent this Court from sustaining his conviction, and did not prevent the Court in Berger from reaching the conclusion that the use of the recording device sanctioned in Osborn was entirely lawful. 388 U. S. 41, 57.

[17] Lopez v. United States, 373 U. S. 427, 464 (dissenting opinion of MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN).

[18] See, e. g., Jones v. United States, 357 U. S. 493, 497-499; Rios v. United States, 364 U. S. 253, 261; Chapman v. United States, 365 U. S. 610, 613-615; Stoner v. California, 376 U. S. 483, 486-487.

[19] See, e. g., Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 153, 156; McDonald v. United States, 335 U. S. 451, 454-456; Brinegar v. United States, 338 U. S. 160, 174-177; Cooper v. California, 386 U. S. 58; Warden v. Hayden, 387 U. S. 294, 298-300.

[20] In Agnello v. United States,269 U. S. 20, 30, the Court stated:

"The right without a search warrant contemporaneously to search persons lawfully arrested while committing crime and to search the place where the arrest is made in order to find and seize things connected with the crime as its fruits or as the means by which it was committed, as well as weapons and other things to effect an escape from custody, is not to be doubted."

Whatever one's view of "the long-standing practice of searching for other proofs of guilt within the control of the accused found upon arrest," United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U. S. 56, 61; cf. id., at 71-79 (dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter), the concept of an "incidental" search cannot readily be extended to include surreptitious surveillance of an individual either immediately before, or immediately after, his arrest.

[21] Although "[t]he Fourth Amendment does not require police officers to delay in the course of an investigation if to do so would gravely endanger their lives or the lives of others," Warden v. Hayden, 387 U. S. 294, 298-299, there seems little likelihood that electronic surveillance would be a realistic possibility in a situation so fraught with urgency.

[22] A search to which an individual consents meets Fourth Amendment requirements, Zap v. United States, 328 U. S. 624, but of course "the usefulness of electronic surveillance depends on lack of notice to the suspect." Lopez v. United States, 373 U. S. 427, 463 (dissenting opinion of MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN).

[23] Whether safeguards other than prior authorization by a magistrate would satisfy the Fourth Amendment in a situation involving the national security is a question not presented by this case.

[24] See Osborn v. United States, 385 U. S. 323, 330.

[25] I also think that the course of development evinced by Silverman, supra, Wong Sun, supra, Berger, supra, and today's decision must be recognized as overruling Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438, which essentially rested on the ground that conversations were not subject to the protection of the Fourth Amendment.

[26] In previous cases, which are undisturbed by today's decision, the Court has upheld, as reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, admission at trial of evidence obtained (1) by an undercover police agent to whom a defendant speaks without knowledge that he is in the employ of the police, Hoffa v. United States, 385 U. S. 293 (1966); (2) by a recording device hidden on the person of such an informant, Lopez v. United States, 373 U. S. 427 (1963); Osborn v. United States, 385 U. S. 323 (1966); and (3) by a policeman listening to the secret micro-wave transmissions of an agent conversing with the defendant in another location, On Lee v. United States, 343 U. S. 747 (1952). When one man speaks to another he takes all the risks ordinarily inherent in so doing, including the risk that the man to whom he speaks will make public what he has heard. The Fourth Amendment does not protect against unreliable (or law-abiding) associates. Hoffa v. United States, supra. It is but a logical and reasonable extension of this principle that a man take the risk that his hearer, free to memorize what he hears for later verbatim repetitions, is instead recording it or transmitting it to another. The present case deals with an entirely different situation, for as the Court emphasizes the petitioner "sought to exclude . . . the uninvited ear," and spoke under circumstances in which a reasonable person would assume that uninvited ears were not listening.

[27] The first paragraph of my Brother HARLAN'S concurring opinion is susceptible of the interpretation, although probably not intended, that this Court "has long held" eavesdropping to be a violation of the Fourth Amendment and therefore "presumptively unreasonable in the absence of a search warrant." There is no reference to any long line of cases, but simply a citation to Silverman, and several cases following it, to establish this historical proposition. In the first place, as I have indicated in this opinion, I do not read Silverman as holding any such thing; and in the second place, Silverman was decided in 1961. Thus, whatever it held, it cannot be said it "has [been] long held." I think my Brother HARLAN recognizes this later in his opinion when he admits that the Court must now overrule Olmstead and Goldman. In having to overrule these cases in order to establish the holding the Court adopts today, it becomes clear that the Court is promulgating new doctrine instead of merely following what it "has long held." This is emphasized by my Brother HARLAN'S claim that it is "bad physics" to adhere to Goldman. Such an assertion simply illustrates the propensity of some members of the Court to rely on their limited understanding of modern scientific subjects in order to fit the Constitution to the times and give its language a meaning that it will not tolerate.

2.1.3 Hunter v. Southam, [1984] 2 SCR 145 2.1.3 Hunter v. Southam, [1984] 2 SCR 145

Supreme Court of Canada

Constitutional law—Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms—Unreasonable search and seizure—Combines Investigation Act search and seizure powers—Standards required for issuance of warrant—Standards not specified—Neutrality of arbiter issuing warrant—Whether search and seizure powers of Combines Investigation Act inconsistent with s. 8 of Charter and therefore of no force or effect—Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s. 8—Combines Investigation Act, R.S.C 1970, c. C-23, ss. 10(1), (3).

Pursuant to s. 10(1) of the Combines Investigation Act, the Director of Investigation and Research of the - Combines Investigation Branch authorized several Combines Investigation officers to enter and examine documents and other things at a respondent’s business premises in Edmonton “and elsewhere in Canada”. The authorization was certified by a member of the Restrictive Trade Practices Commission pursuant to s. 10(3) of the Act. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms was proclaimed after the authorization was made but before the actual search had begun. Respondent unsuccessfully sought an interim injunction pending trial of the question whether the search was in violation of s. 8 of the Charter—the unreasonable search and seizure provision. The Alberta Court of Appeal ordered all documents taken from the respondent’s premises sealed as an interim measure and proceeded with the appeal on the basis that the issue of whether s. 10 was inconsistent

[Page 146]

with the Constitution could have been properly dealt with as an application for summary judgment at first instance. Appellants appeal from that Court’s finding that s. 10(3), and, by implication, s. 10(1) of the Act, were inconsistent with the Charter and therefore of no force or effect.

Held: The appeal should be dismissed.

The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms is a purposive document, the provisions of which must be subjected to a purposive analysis. Section 8 of the Charter guarantees a broad and general right to be secure from unreasonable searches and seizures which extends at least so far as to protect the right of privacy from unjustified state intrusion. Its purpose requires that unjustified searches be prevented. It is not enough that a determination be made, after the fact, that the search should not have been conducted. This can only be accomplished by a requirement of prior authorization. Accordingly, prior authorization, where feasible, is a precondition for a valid search and seizure. It follows that warrantless searches are prima facie unreasonable under s. 8. The party seeking to justify a warrantless search bears the onus of rebutting the presumption of unreasonableness.

Section 10(3) of the Combines Investigation Act provides for prior authorization of searches by a member of the Restrictive Trade Practices Commission. The procedures established by s. 10(3), however, are constitutionally defective in two respects.

First, for the authorization procedure to be meaningful, it is necessary for the person authorizing the search to be able to assess the conflicting interests of the state and the individual in an entirely neutral and impartial manner. This means that while the person considering the prior authorization need not be a judge, he must nevertheless, at a minimum, be capable of acting judicially. Inter alia, he must not be someone charged with investigative or prosecutorial functions under the relevant statutory scheme. The significant investigatory functions bestowed upon the Restrictive Trade Practices Commission and its members by the Act vitiated a member’s ability to act in a judicial capacity in authorizing a s. 10(3) search and seizure and do not accord

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with the neutrality and detachment necessary to balance the interests involved.

Second, reasonable and probable grounds, established upon oath, to believe that an offence has been committed and that there is evidence to be found at the place of the search, constitutes the minimum standard consistent with s. 8 of the Charter for authorizing searches and seizures. Subsections 10(1) and 10(3) of the Act do not embody such a requirement. They do not, therefore, measure up to the standard imposed by s. 8 of the CharterThe Court will not attempt to save the Act by reading into it the appropriate standards for issuing a warrant. It should not fall to the courts to fill in the details necessary to render legislative lacunae constitutional.

In the result, subss. 10(1) and 10(3) of the Combines Investigation Act are inconsistent with the Charter and of no force or effect because they fail to specify an appropriate standard for the issuance of warrants and designate an improper arbiter to issue them.

Attorney General of Canada v. Law Society of British Columbia, 1982 CanLII 29 (SCC)[1982] 2 S.C.R. 307, followed; Petrofina Canada Ltd. v. Chairman, Restrictive Trade Practices Commission (No. 2), [1980] 2 F.C. 386, applied; Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), adopted; Entick v. Carrington (1765), 19 St. Tr. 1029, 1 Wils. K.B. 275; The Queen v. Metropolitan Toronto Pharmacists’ Association (unreported, Ont. H.C., May 4, 1983); Edwards v. Attorney-General for Canada, 1929 CanLII 438 (UK JCPC)[1930] A.C. 124Minister of Home Affairs v. Fisher, [1980] A.C. 319M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819); United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950); Inland Revenue Commissioners v. Rossminster Ltd., [1980] 1 All E.R. 80Minister of National Revenue v. Coopers and Lybrand, 1978 CanLII 13 (SCC)[1979] 1 S.C.R. 495McKay v. The Queen, 1965 CanLII 3 (SCC)[1965] S.C.R. 798, referred to.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Alberta Court of Appeal 1983 ABCA 32 (CanLII)[1983] 3 W.W.R. 385147 D.L.R. (3d) 42024 Alta. L.R. (2d) 30742 A.R. 93, allowing an appeal (heard as a proper case to have been treated at first instance as an application for summary judgment) from a judgment of Cavanagh J. dismissing an application for an interim injunction pending trial of the matter in issue. Appeal dismissed.

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Eric A. Bowie, Q.C., and Ingrid C Hutton, Q.C., for the appellants.

A.H. Lefever and F.S. Kozak, for the respondent.

The judgment of the Court was delivered by

DICKSON J.—The Constitution of Canada, which includes the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedomsis the supreme law of Canada. Any law inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution is, to the extent of the inconsistency, of no force or effect. Section 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 so mandates. The constitutional question posed in this appeal is whether s. 10(3), and by implication s. 10(1), of the Combines Investigation Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-23, (the “Act”) are inconsistent with s. 8 of the Charter by reason of authorizing unreasonable searches and seizures and are therefore of no force and effect.

Background

Subsections 10(1) and 10(3) of the Combines Investigation Act provide:

10. (1) Subject to subsection (3), in any inquiry under this Act the Director [of Investigation and Research of the Combines Investigation Branch] or any representative authorized by him may enter any premises on which the Director believes there may be evidence relevant to the matters being inquired into and may examine any thing on the premises and may copy or take away for further examination or copying any book, paper, record of other document that in the opinion of the Director or his authorized representative, as the case may be, may afford such evidence.

(3) Before exercising the power conferred by subsection (1), the Director or his representative shall produce a certificate from a member of the [Restrictive Trade Practices] Commission, which may be granted on the ex parte application of the Director, authorizing the exercise of such power.

On April 13, 1982, in the course of an inquiry under the Act, the appellant Lawson A.W. Hunter, Director of Investigation and Research of the Combines Investigation Branch, authorized the

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other appellants, Messrs. Milton, Murphy, McAlpine and Marroco, all Combines Investigation officers, to exercise his authority under s. 10 of the Act to enter and examine documents and other things at the business premises of the Edmonton Journal, a division of the respondent corporation, Southam Inc.

On April 16, 1982, in fulfilment of the requirement in s. 10(3) of the Act, Dr. Frank Roseman, a member of the Restrictive Trade Practices Commission, (the “R.T.P.C.”) certified his authorization of this exercise of the Director’s powers.

On April 17, 1982, the Constitution Act, 1982incorporating the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms was proclaimed. Section 8 of the Charter provides:

8. Everyone has the right to be secure against unreasonable search or seizure.

On April 19, 1982 the officers presented their certified authorization at the premises of the Edmonton Journal. The English version of this certificate reads as follows:

In the matter of the Combines Investigation Act and section 33 and section 34(1)(c) thereof

and

in the matter of an Inquiry relating to the Production, Distribution and Supply of Newspapers and Related Products in Edmonton

TO:

M.J. Milton

M.L. Murphy

J.A. McAlpine

A.P. Marrocco

being my representatives under section 10 of the Combines Investigation Act

You are hereby authorized to enter upon the premises hereinafter mentioned, on which I believe there may be evidence relevant to this inquiry, and examine anything thereon and copy or take away for copying any book, paper, record or other document that in your opinion may afford such evidence.

The premises referred to herein are those occupied by or on behalf of

Southam Inc.
10006-101 Street
Edmonton, Alberta

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and elsewhere in Canada

This authorization is not valid after May 31, 1982.

Dated in Hull, in the Province of Quebec this 13th day of April 1982.

Lawson A.W. Hunter

Director of Investigation and Research

Combines Investigation Act

I hereby certify that the above exercise of powers is authorized pursuant to Section 10 of the Combines Investigation Act.

Dated in Ottawa, in the Province of Ontario, this 16th day of April, 1982.

Frank Roseman, Member,

Restrictive Trade Practices Commission

The authorization has a breathtaking sweep; it is tantamount to a licence to roam at large on the premises of Southam Inc. at the stated address “and elsewhere in Canada”.

On April 20 the officers commenced the search. They said they wished to search every file of Southam Inc. at 10006 - 101 Street, Edmonton, except files in the news room but including all files of J. Patrick O’Callaghan, publisher of the Edmonton Journal. They declined to give the name of any person whose complaint had initiated the inquiry, or to say under which section of the Act the inquiry had been begun. They also declined to give more specific information as to the subject matter of the inquiry than that contained in the authorization to search.

At noon of April 20, Southam Inc. served upon the officers of the Combines Investigation Branch a notice of motion for an interim injunction. The application was heard by Cavanagh J. who held that although Southam had raised a serious question as to whether the search was in violation of s. 8 of the Charterthe balance of convenience militated in favour of denying the interlocutory injunction pending trial of the matter. At the hearing, the appellants maintained, unsuccessfully, that the Director of Investigation and Research, and his authorized representatives, acting pursuant to s. 10 of the Act were a “federal board, commission or other tribunal” within s. 2 of the Federal Court

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Act and that the Federal Court, not the provincial courts of Alberta, had jurisdiction.

Southam appealed to the Alberta Court of Appeal. The appellants also appealed, from that part of the judgment which held that the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench had jurisdiction. As an interim provision the Court of Appeal ordered that the documents taken from the premises of the Edmonton Journal be sealed pending resolution of the appeal. After hearing the parties, the Court held that the case was a proper one to have been treated at first instance as an application for summary judgment on the issues of (1) whether the Alberta courts or the Federal Court had jurisdiction to make the orders requested and (2) whether s. 10 of the Act was in whole or in part inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution. The Court therefore directed that the appeal itself be heard on this basis. At the subsequent hearing, the judgment of this Court in Attorney General of Canada v. Law Society of British Columbia1982 CanLII 29 (SCC)[1982] 2 S.C.R. 307, having by then been delivered, the present appellants abandoned their challenge to the jurisdiction of the Alberta courts and addressed their arguments solely to the substantive issue of the constitutionality of s. 10 of the Act. A unanimous five-judge panel of the Alberta Court of Appeal, speaking through Prowse J.A., held that s. 10(3) and by implication s. 10(1), of the Act were inconsistent with the provisions of s. 8 of the Charter and therefore of no force or effect. It is from this ruling that the present appellants bring their appeal before this Court.

II The Positions of the Parties

A) The Respondent, Southam Inc.

In alleging that subss. 10(1) and 10(3) of the Combines Investigation Act are inconsistent with the right to be secure against unreasonable search and seizure, Southam Inc. relies heavily on the historic protections afforded by common law and by statute as defining the correct standard of reasonableness for purposes of s. 8 of the CharterThis was essentially the approach taken by Prowse J.A. when he said:

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The roots of the right to be so secure are embedded in the common law and the safeguards according that right are found in common law, in statutes subsequently enacted, and in decisions of the courts made as the society in which we live has evolved. The expression of the right in a constitutional document reminds us of those roots and the tradition associated with the right. One would be presumptuous to assume that we have attained the zenith of our development as a civilization and that the right accorded an individual is frozen for eternity. Section 8, however, requires us to be ever mindful of some of the criteria that have been applied in the past in securing the right.

Applying this approach, Prowse J.A. concluded—correctly in Southam Inc.’s submission—that, absent exceptional circumstances, the provisions of s. 443 of the Criminal Code, which extends to investigations of Criminal Code offences the procedural safeguards the common law required for entries and searches for stolen goods, constitute the minimal prerequisites for reasonable searches and seizures in connection with the investigation of any criminal offence, including possible violations of the Combines Investigation Act. Prowse J.A. summarized these procedural safeguards in the following propositions:

(a) the power to authorize a search and seizure is given to an impartial and independent person (at common law a justice) who is bound to act judicially in discharging that function,

(b) that evidence must satisfy the justice that the person seeking the authority has reasonable ground to suspect that an offence had been committed,

(c) that evidence must satisfy the justice that the person seeking the authority has reasonable grounds to believe, at common law, that stolen property may be on the premises or, under s. 443(1)(b), that something will afford evidence of an offence may be recovered, and

(d) there must be evidence on oath before him.

Southam Inc. contends that subss. 10(1) and 10(3) fail to provide any of these safeguards. In its submission, the approval by a member of the

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R.T.P.C. of the Director’s decision to authorize search and seizure is not approval by an independent arbiter or neutral and impartial person. It argues further that subss. 10(1) and 10(3) do not require that the R.T.P.C. member be satisfied that the Director has reasonable grounds to suspect an offence has been committed or to believe there may be evidence at the place at which the Director wishes to search, nor does it require evidence under oath about these matters. In fact, Southam Inc. contends, as these subsections have been judicially interpreted in cases such as Petrofina Canada Ltd. v. Chairman, Restrictive Trade Practices Commission (No. 2), [1980] 2 F.C. 386, they prevent the R.T.P.C. member from ascertaining or passing judgment on anything except that there is, de facto, an inquiry in progress under the Act, an interpretation which, in Southam’s submission, constitutes the R.T.P.C. member as merely a “rubber stamp” for the Director’s decision to authorize a search. For all these reasons, Southam submits, giving effect to subss. 10(1) and 10(3) could yield no other result than an unreasonable search and seizure.

B) The Appellants

The appellants take a different view. In their submission the constitutionality of s. 10 ought to be considered on the basis of whether its provisions could be applied consistently with the CharterIt is their contention that they can. In their view, approval by the R.T.P.C. member does constitute authorization by a neutral and impartial arbiter. They deny there is any reasonable apprehension of bias attaching to him or to his function in approving the Director’s authorizations to enter and search premises. As to the further requirements cited by Prowse J.A. and amplified on by Southam Inc., the appellants implicitly deny that an easy parallel can be drawn between the offences set out in the Criminal Code and those created by the Combines Investigation Act so as to justify invoking the procedural safeguards in s. 443 as the proper standard of reasonableness for searches and seizures by the authorities in connection with these latter offences. In their submission combines

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offences require specialized techniques for their detection and suppression. They say that for such offences, as compared to most other criminal offences, there is inherently less basis for certainty and specificity, both as to the commission of an offence and as to the existence of specific physical evidence in relation to such offence. In this context, they contend, s. 10 does not authorize “unreasonable” search or seizure. Further, the appellants argue, the wording of s. 10 does not prevent the R.T.P.C. member in appropriate cases from requiring, for instance, evidence under oath before he approves the Director’s authorization. In any event, they maintain, it cannot be said that s. 10 is incapable of being applied in a manner which does not offend the Constitution, and it ought not, therefore, to be struck down. At most it ought to be read down so as to include any necessary procedural safeguards. In support, they cite the decision of Van Camp J. in The Queen v. Metropolitan Toronto Pharmacists’ Association (unreported, Ont. H.C., May 4, 1983).

III “Unreasonable” Search or Seizure

At the outset it is important to note that the issue in this appeal concerns the constitutional validity of a statute authorizing a search and seizure. It does not concern the reasonableness or otherwise of the manner in which the appellants carried out their statutory authority. It is not the conduct of the appellants, but rather the legislation under which they acted, to which attention must be directed.

As is clear from the arguments of the parties as well as from the judgment of Prowse J.A., the crux of this case is the meaning to be given to the term “unreasonable” in the s. 8 guarantee of freedom from unreasonable search or seizure. The guarantee is vague and open. The American courts have had the advantage of a number of specific prerequisites articulated in the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, as well as a history

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of colonial opposition to certain Crown investigatory practices from which to draw out the nature of the interests protected by that Amendment and the kinds of conduct it proscribes. There is none of this in s. 8. There is no specificity in the section beyond the bare guarantee of freedom from “unreasonable” search and seizure; nor is there any particular historical, political or philosophic context capable of providing an obvious gloss on the meaning of the guarantee.

It is clear that the meaning of “unreasonable” cannot be determined by recourse to a dictionary, nor for that matter, by reference to the rules of statutory construction. The task of expounding a constitution is crucially different from that of construing a statute. A statute defines present rights and obligations. It is easily enacted and as easily repealed. A constitution, by contrast, is drafted with an eye to the future. Its function is to provide a continuing framework for the legitimate exercise of governmental power and, when joined by a Bill or a Charter of Rightsfor the unremitting protection of individual rights and liberties. Once enacted, its provisions cannot easily be repealed or amended. It must, therefore, be capable of growth and development over time to meet new social, political and historical realities often unimagined by its framers. The judiciary is the guardian of the constitution and must, in interpreting its provisions, bear these considerations in mind. Professor Paul Freund expressed this idea aptly when he admonished the American courts “not to read the provisions of the Constitution like a last will and testament lest it become one”.

The need for a broad perspective in approaching constitutional documents is a familiar theme in Canadian constitutional jurisprudence. It is contained in Viscount Sankey’s classic formulation in Edwards v. Attorney-General for Canada1929 CanLII 438 (UK JCPC)[1930] A.C. 124, at p. 136, cited and applied in countless Canadian cases:

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The British North America Act planted in Canada a living tree capable of growth and expansion within its natural limits. The object of the Act was to grant a Constitution to Canada… Their Lordships do not conceive it to be the duty of this Board—it is certainly not their desire—to cut down the provisions of the Act by a narrow and technical construction, but rather to give it a large and liberal interpretation.

More recently, in Minister of Home Affairs v. Fisher, [1980] A.C. 319, dealing with the Bermudian Constitution, Lord Wilberforce reiterated at p. 328 that a constitution is a document “sui generis, calling for principles of interpretation of its own, suitable to its character”, and that as such, a constitution incorporating a Bill of Rights calls for:

…a generous interpretation avoiding what has been called “the austerity of tabulated legalism,” suitable to give individuals the full measure of the fundamental rights and freedoms referred to.

Such a broad, purposive analysis, which interprets specific provisions of a constitutional document in the light of its larger objects is also consonant with the classical principles of American constitutional construction enunciated by Chief Justice Marshall in M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). It is, as well, the approach I intend to take in the present case.

I begin with the obvious. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms is a purposive document. Its purpose is to guarantee and to protect, within the limits of reason, the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms it enshrines. It is intended to constrain governmental action inconsistent with those rights and freedoms; it is not in itself an authorization for governmental action. In the present case this means, as Prowse J.A. pointed out, that in guaranteeing the right to be secure from unreasonable searches and seizures, s. 8 acts as a limitation on whatever powers of search and seizure the federal or provincial governments already and otherwise possess. It does not in itself confer any powers, even of “reasonable” search and seizure,

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on these governments. This leads, in my view, to the further conclusion that an assessment of the constitutionality of a search and seizure, or of a statute authorizing a search or seizure, must focus on its “reasonable” or “unreasonable” impact on the subject of the search or the seizure, and not simply on its rationality in furthering some valid government objective.

Since the proper approach to the interpretation of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms is a purposive one, before it is possible to assess the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the impact of a search or of a statute authorizing a search, it is first necessary to specify the purpose underlying s. 8: in other words, to delineate the nature of the interests it is meant to protect.

Historically, the common law protections with regard to governmental searches and seizures were based on the right to enjoy property and were linked to the law of trespass. It was on this basis that in the great case of Entick v. Carrington (1765), 19 St. Tr. 1029, 1 Wils. K.B. 275, the Court refused to countenance a search purportedly authorized by the executive, to discover evidence that might link the plaintiff to certain seditious libels. Lord Camden prefaced his discussion of the rights in question by saying, at p. 1066 [19 St. Tr. 1029]:

The great end, for which men entered into society, was to preserve their property. That right is preserved sacred and incommunicable in all instances, where it has not been taken away or abridged by some public law for the good of the whole.

The defendants argued that their oaths as King’s messengers required them to conduct the search in question and ought to prevail over the plaintiff’s property rights. Lord Camden rejected this contention, at p. 291 [1 Wils. K.B. 275]:

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…our law holds the property of every man so sacred, that no man can set his foot upon his neighbour’s close without his leave: if he does he is a trespasser, though he does no damage at all; if he will tread upon his neighbour’s ground, he must justify it by law.

Lord Camden could find no exception from this principle for the benefit of King’s messengers. He held that neither the instrusions nor the purported authorizations were supportable on the basis of the existing law. That law would only have countenanced such an entry if the search were for stolen goods and if authorized by a justice on the basis of evidence upon oath that there was “strong cause” to believe the goods were concealed in the place sought to be searched. In view of the lack of proper legal authorization for the governmental intrusion, the plaintiff was protected from the intended search and seizure by the ordinary law of trespass.

In my view the interests protected by s. 8 are of a wider ambit than those enunciated in Entick v. Carrington. Section 8 is an entrenched constitutional provision. It is not therefore vulnerable to encroachment by legislative enactments in the same way as common law protections. There is, further, nothing in the language of the section to restrict it to the protection of property or to associate it with the law of trespass. It guarantees a broad and general right to be secure from unreasonable search and seizure.

The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, also guarantees a broad right. It provides:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

Construing this provision in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), Stewart J. delivering the

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majority opinion of the United States Supreme Court declared at p. 351 that “the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places”. Justice Stewart rejected any necessary connection between that Amendment and the notion of trespass. With respect, I believe this approach is equally appropriate in construing the protections in s. 8 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

In Katz, Stewart J. discussed the notion of a right to privacy, which he described at p. 350 as “his right to be let alone by other people”. Although Stewart J. was careful not to identify the Fourth Amendment exclusively with the protection of this right, nor to see the Amendment as the only provision in the Bill of Rights relevant to its interpretation, it is clear that this notion played a prominent role in his construction of the nature and the limits of the American constitutional protection against unreasonable search and seizure. In the Alberta Court of Appeal, Prowse J.A. took a similar approach to s. 8, which he described as dealing “with one aspect of what has been referred to as the right of privacy, which is the right to be secure against encroachment upon the citizens’ reasonable expectation of privacy in a free and democratic society”.

Like the Supreme Court of the United States, I would be wary of foreclosing the possibility that the right to be secure against unreasonable search and seizure might protect interests beyond the right of privacy, but for purposes of the present appeal I am satisfied that its protections go at least that far. The guarantee of security from unreasonable search and seizure only protects a reasonable expectation. This limitation on the right guaranteed by s. 8, whether it is expressed negatively as freedom from “unreasonable” search and seizure, or positively as an entitlement to a “reasonable” expectation of privacy, indicates that an assessment must be made as to whether in a particular situation the public’s interest in being left alone by government must give way to the government’s interest in intruding on the individual’s privacy in

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order to advance its goals, notably those of law enforcement.

The question that remains, and the one upon which the present appeal hinges, is how this assessment is to be made. When is it to be made, by whom and on what basis? Here again, I think the proper approach is a purposive one.

A) When is the Balance of Interests to be Assessed?

If the issue to be resolved in assessing the constitutionality of searches under s. 10 were in fact the governmental interest in carrying out a given search outweighed that of the individual in resisting the governmental intrusion upon his privacy, then it would be appropriate to determine the balance of the competing interests after the search had been conducted. Such a post facto analysis would, however, be seriously at odds with the purpose of s. 8. That purpose is, as I have said, to protect individuals from unjustified state intrusions upon their privacy. That purpose requires a means of preventing unjustified searches before they happen, not simply of determining, after the fact, whether they ought to have occurred in the first place. This, in my view, can only be accomplished by a system of prior authorization, not one of subsequent validation.

A requirement of prior authorization, usually in the form of a valid warrant, has been a consistent prerequisite for a valid search and seizure both at common law and under most statutes. Such a requirement puts the onus on the state to demonstrate the superiority of its interest to that of the individual. As such it accords with the apparent intention of the Charter to prefer, where feasible, the right of the individual to be free from state interference to the interests of the state in advancing its purposes through such interference.

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I recognize that it may not be reasonable in every instance to insist on prior authorization in order to validate governmental intrusions upon individuals’ expectations of privacy. Nevertheless, where it is feasible to obtain prior authorization, I would hold that such authorization is a precondition for a valid search and seizure.

Here also, the decision in Katz, supra, is relevant. In United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950), the Supreme Court of the United States had held that a search without warrant was not ipso facto unreasonable. Seventeen years later, however, in Katz, Stewart J. concluded that a warrantless search was prima facie “unreasonable” under the Fourth Amendment. The terms of the Fourth Amendment are not identical to those of s. 8 and American decisions can be transplanted to the Canadian context only with the greatest caution. Nevertheless, I would in the present instance respectfully adopt Stewart J.’s formulation as equally applicable to the concept of “unreasonableness” under s. 8, and would require the party seeking to justify a warrantless search to rebut this presumption of unreasonableness.

In the present case the appellants make no argument that it is unfeasible or unnecessary to obtain prior authorization for the searches contemplated by the. Combines Investigation Act and, in my view, no such argument could be made. I would therefore conclude that in the absence of a valid procedure for prior authorization searches conducted under the Act would be unreasonable. In the event, s. 10(3) does purport to establish a requirement for prior authorization, specifying, as it does, that searches and seizures conducted under s. 10(1) must be authorized by a member of the R.T.P.C. The question then becomes whether s. 10(3) provides for an acceptable prior authorization procedure.

B) Who Must Grant the Authorization?

The purpose of a requirement of prior authorization is to provide an opportunity, before the event, for the conflicting interests of the state and the individual to be assessed, so that the individu-

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al’s right to privacy will be breached only where the appropriate standard has been met, and the interests of the state are thus demonstrably superior. For such an authorization procedure to be meaningful it is necessary for the person authorizing the search to be able to assess the evidence as to whether that standard has been met, in an entirely neutral and impartial manner. At common law the power to issue a search warrant was reserved for a justice. In the recent English case of Inland Revenue Commissioners v. Rossminster Ltd., [1980] 1 All E.R. 80, Viscount Dilhorne suggested at p. 87 that the power to authorize administrative searches and seizures be given to “a more senior judge”. While it may be wise, in view of the sensitivity of the task, to assign the decision whether an authorization should be issued to a judicial officer, I agree with Prowse J.A. that this is not a necessary precondition for safeguarding the right enshrined in s. 8. The person performing this function need not be a judge, but he must at a minimum be capable of acting judicially.

In Minister of National Revenue v. Coopers and Lybrand1978 CanLII 13 (SCC)[1979] 1 S.C.R. 495, this Court had occasion to discuss the difference between an administrative and a judicial function in the authorization of a search and seizure. The Income Tax Act1970-71-72 (Can.), c. 63, as amended, confers upon the Minister a number of powers including, in s. 231(4), the power under certain conditions to authorize the entry and search of buildings. At p. 507 the Court described the Minister’s powers as “fundamentally administrative”, going on to explain:

The power he exercises under s. 231(4) is properly characterized as investigatory, rather than adjudicatory. He will collect material and advice from many sources. In deciding whether to exercise the right… [to authorize entry and search], he will be governed by many considerations, dominant among which is the public interest and his duty as an executive officer of the government to administer the Act to the best of his ability. The decision to seek authority to enter and

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search will be guided by public policy and expediency, having regard to all the circumstances.

The Court contrasted these powers with the judicial powers which s. 231(4) conferred on a judge of the superior or county court to approve the Minister’s authorization.

Under the scheme envisaged by s. 10 of the Combines Investigation Act it is clear that the Director exercises administrative powers analogous to those of the Minister under s. 231(4) of the Income Tax ActThey too are investigatory rather than adjudicatory, with his decision to seek approval for an authorization to enter and search premises equally guided by considerations of expediency and public policy. But what of the member of the R.T.P.C. whom s. 10(3) empowers to approve the Director’s authorization? Is his function investigatory or adjudicatory? In the Alberta Court of Appeal Prowse J.A. carefully reviewed the respective powers of the Director and the Commission and concluded that the Act was not entirely successful in separating the role of the Director as investigator and prosecutor from that of the Commission as adjudicator. In his view circumstances may arise under the Act where “the Director is acting as investigator and prosecutor and the Commission is acting as investigator and judge with respect to breaches of the Act”. Southam Inc. summarizes and enlarges upon Prowse J.A.’s analysis, producing the following list of investigatory functions bestowed upon the Commission or one of its members by the Act:

(i) the power in s. 47 to instruct the Director to commence a s. 8 inquiry;

(ii) the power to cause evidence to be gathered pursuant to ss. 9, 10, 12 and 17;

(iii) the power to issue a s. 17 order;

(iv) the power under ss. 17, 22(2)(b) to seek further or better evidence after the Commission has commenced a hearing;

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(v) the power under s. 22(2)(b) after commencing a hearing and receiving evidence to direct the Director to make further inquiry and, in effect, to go back to the investigatory stage;

(vi) the power under s. 22(2)(c) to compel the Director to turn over to the R.T.P.C. copies of all books, papers, records or other documents obtained by the Director in such further inquiry;

(vii) the power under s. 27.1 to order the Director to give evidence before any other federal board, commission or other tribunal;

(viii) the power under s. 45.1 to seek production of statistics for evidence in an inquiry;

(ix) the power to deliver to the Director all books, papers, records or other documents produced on a s. 17 hearing;

(x) the power under s. 13 to request the appointment and instruction of counsel to assist in the inquiry.

In my view, investing the Commission or its members with significant investigatory functions has the result of vitiating the ability of a member of the Commission to act in a judicial capacity when authorizing a search or seizure under s. 10(3). This is not, of course, a matter of impugning the honesty or good faith of the Commission or its members. It is rather a conclusion that the administrative nature of the Commission’s investigatory duties (with its quite proper reference points in considerations of public policy and effective enforcement of the Act) ill-accords with the neutrality and detachment necessary to assess whether the evidence reveals that the point has been reached where the interests of the individual must constitutionally give way to those of the state. A member of the R.T.P.C. passing on the appropriateness of a proposed search under the Combines Investigation Act is caught by the maxim nemo judex in sua causa. He simply cannot be the impartial arbiter necessary to grant an effective authorization.

On this basis alone I would conclude that the prior authorization mandated by s. 10(3) of the

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Combines Investigation Act is inadequate to satisfy the requirement of s. 8 of the Charter and consequently a search carried out under the authority of subss. 10(1) and 10(3) is an unreasonable one. Since, however, the Alberta Court of Appeal found other, perhaps even more serious defects in these provisions I pass on to consider whether even if s. 10(3) did specify a truly neutral and detached arbiter to authorize searches it would nevertheless remain inconsistent with s. 8 of the Charter.

C) On What Basis must the Balance of Interests be Assessed?

Section 10 is terse in the extreme on the subject of criteria for issuing an authorization for entry, search and seizure. Section 10(3) merely states that an R.T.P.C. member may grant an authorization ex parte. The only explicit criteria for granting such an authorization are those mentioned in s. 10(1), namely: (1) that an inquiry under the Act must be in progress, and (2) that the Director must believe that the premises may contain relevant evidence.

In cases argued before passage of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms the courts took a narrow view of what s. 10 required or permitted the R.T.P.C. member to consider when asked to authorize search and seizure. In Petrofïna Canada Ltd. v. Chairman, Restrictive Trade Practices Commission (No. 2), supra, the applicant challenged authorizations under ss. 9(2) and 10(3) of the Act on the grounds, inter alia, that the members who gave their authorizations did not show that they had before them sufficient information to enable them to determine the legality of the inquiry then in progress or the reasonableness of the Director’s belief that circumstances warranted the exercise of his powers. The Federal Court of Appeal rejected the relevance of such considerations to the members’ decisions, at p. 391:

In making the decisions that sections 9 and 10 require them to make, the Members must act judicially…

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However, that duty to act judicially applies only to the decisions that the Members are required to make under sections 9(2) and 10(3). Under those provisions, the Members are neither required nor authorized to determine the legality of the Director’s decision to hold an inquiry; they are merely required to ascertain that there is, de facto, an inquiry in progress under the Act. The Members are not required or authorized, either, to pass judgment on the reasonableness of the motives prompting the Director to exercise his powers under sections 9 and 10. As the Members did not have to make decisions on those two points, they cannot, in my opinion, be blamed for not having required information on those points.

As Prowse J.A. pointed out, if the powers of a Commission member are as the Federal Court of Appeal found them to be, then it follows that the decision of the Director in the course of an inquiry to exercise his powers of entry, search and seizure is effectively unreviewable. The extent of the privacy of the individual would be left to the discretion of the Director. A provision authorizing such an unreviewable power would clearly be inconsistent with s. 8 of the Charter.

Assuming, arguendo, that the Federal Court of Appeal was wrong, and the member is authorized, or even required, to satisfy himself as to (1) the legality of the inquiry and (2) the reasonableness of the Director’s belief that there may be evidence relevant to the matters being inquired into, would that remove the inconsistency with s. 8?

To read subss. 10(1) and 10(3) as simply allowing the authorizing party to satisfy himself on these questions, without requiring him to do so, would in my view be clearly inadequate. Such an amorphous standard cannot provide a meaningful criterion for securing the right guaranteed by s. 8. The location of the constitutional balance between a justifiable expectation of privacy and the legitimate needs of the state cannot depend on the subjective appreciation of individual adjudicators. Some objective standard must be established.

Requiring the authorizing party to satisfy himself as to the legality of the inquiry and the

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reasonableness of the Director’s belief in the possible existence of relevant evidence, would have the advantage of substituting an objective standard for an amorphous one, but would, in my view, still be inadequate. The problem is with the stipulation of a reasonable belief that evidence may be uncovered in the search. Here again it is useful, in my view, to adopt a purposive approach. The purpose of an objective criterion for granting prior authorization to conduct a search or seizure is to provide a consistent standard for identifying the point at which the interests of the state in such intrusions come to prevail over the interests of the individual in resisting them. To associate it with an applicant’s reasonable belief that relevant evidence may be uncovered by the search, would be to define the proper standard as the possibility of finding evidence. This is a very low standard which would validate intrusion on the basis of suspicion, and authorize fishing expeditions of considerable latitude. It would tip the balance strongly in favour of the state and limit the right of the individual to resist, to only the most egregious intrusions. I do not believe that this is a proper standard for securing the right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure.

Anglo-Canadian legal and political traditions point to a higher standard. The common law required evidence on oath which gave “strong reason to believe” that stolen goods were concealed in the place to be searched before a warrant would issue. Section 443 of the Criminal Code authorizes a warrant only where there has been information upon oath that there is “reasonable ground to believe” that there is evidence of an offence in the place to be searched. The American Bill of Rights provides that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation…” The phrasing is slightly different but the standard in each of these formulations is identical. The state’s interest in detecting and preventing crime begins to prevail over the individual’s interest in being left alone at the point where credibly-based probability replaces suspicion. History has confirmed the appropriateness of this requirement

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as the threshold for subordinating the expectation of privacy to the needs of law enforcement. Where the state’s interest is not simply law enforcement as, for instance, where state security is involved, or where the individual’s interest is not simply his expectation of privacy as, for instance, when the search threatens his bodily integrity, the relevant standard might well be a different one. That is not the situation in the present case. In cases like the present, reasonable and probable grounds, established upon oath, to believe that an offence has been committed and that there is evidence to be found at the place of the search, constitutes the minimum standard, consistent with s. 8 of the Charterfor authorizing search and seizure. In so far as subss. 10(1) and 10(3) of the Combines Investigation Act do not embody such a requirement, I would hold them to be further inconsistent with s. 8.

D) Reading In and Reading Down

The appellants submit that even if subss. 10(1) and 10(3) do not specify a standard consistent with s. 8 for authorizing entry, search and seizure, they should not be struck down as inconsistent with the Charterbut rather that the appropriate standard should be read into these provisions. An analogy is drawn to the case of McKay v. The Queen1965 CanLII 3 (SCC)[1965] S.C.R. 798, in which this Court held that a local ordinance regulating the use of property by prohibiting the erection of unauthorized signs, though apparently without limits, could not have been intended unconstitutionally to encroach on federal competence over elections, and should therefore be “read down” so as not to apply to election signs. In the present case, the overt inconsistency with s. 8 manifested by the lack of a neutral and detached arbiter renders the appellants’ submissions on reading in appropriate standards for issuing a warrant purely academic. Even if this were not the case, however, I would be disin-

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clined to give effect to these submissions. While the courts are guardians of the Constitution and of individuals’ rights under it, it is the legislature’s responsibility to enact legislation that embodies appropriate safeguards to comply with the Constitution’s requirements. It should not fall to the courts to fill in the details that will render legislative lacunae constitutional. Without appropriate safeguards legislation authorizing search and seizure is inconsistent with s. 8 of the CharterAs I have said, any law inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution is, to the extent of the inconsistency, of no force or effect. I would hold subss. 10(1) and 10(3) of the Combines Investigation Act to be inconsistent with the Charter and of no force and effect, as much for their failure to specify an appropriate standard for the issuance of warrants as for their designation of an improper arbiter to issue them.

IV Section 1

Section 1 of the Charter provides:

1. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.

The phrase “demonstrably justified” puts the onus of justifying a limitation on a right or freedom set out in the Charter on the party seeking to limit. In the present case the appellants have made no submissions capable of supporting a claim that even if searches under subss. 10(1) and 10(3) are “unreasonable” within the meaning of s. 8, they are nevertheless a reasonable limit, demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society, on the right set out in s. 8. It is, therefore, not necessary in this case to consider the relationship between s. 8 and s. 1. I leave to another day the difficult question of the relationship between those two sections and, more particularly, what further

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balancing of interests, if any, may be contemplated by s. 1, beyond that envisaged by s. 8.

Conclusion

By order of Chief Justice Laskin the constitutional question was stated as follows:

Did the Alberta Court of Appeal err in holding that subsection 10(3), and by implication subsection 10(1), of the Combines Investigation Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-23 are inconsistent with the provisions of Section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and that they are therefore of no force or effect?

I would answer that question in the negative. I would dismiss the appeal with costs to the respondent.

Appeal dismissed with costs.

Solicitor for the appellants: R. Tassé, Ottawa.

Solicitors for the respondent: Reynolds, Mirth & Côté, Edmonton.

2.1.4 ICCPR, Article 17 [READ All] 2.1.4 ICCPR, Article 17 [READ All]

Article 17

1. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation.

2. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.

2.2 [Jan 11–part 1] Private Sector Privacy: The Case of Facebook 2.2 [Jan 11–part 1] Private Sector Privacy: The Case of Facebook

  • What is the significance, of any, of a company recognizing that privacy is a human right?
  • Does the law regulate our privacy vis-a-vis corporations? Or do the company's polices and procedures do so?
  • How can you tell what privacy rights you have against a corporation?
  • How should companies collect, store, and use individuals' private data?
  • Is the big tech business model fundamentally incompatible with privacy?

2.3 [Jan 11–part 2] Securing Privacy 2.3 [Jan 11–part 2] Securing Privacy

  • What is security? 
  • What is a security trade-off?
  • What is encryption? How does it work?
  • What is the difference between encryption at rest and encryption in transit?
  • What is the "Going Dark" problem? Is it really a problem?
  • Should we weaken encryption to permit governments to access data?

2.4 [Jan 12] Cybersecurity: Offensive and Defensive 2.4 [Jan 12] Cybersecurity: Offensive and Defensive

  • What is an attack surface?
  • What is a zero-day vulnerability?
  • Why are offensive cyber-weapons "chinks in our cyber-defense?"
  • When is the use of cyber-weapons defensible?
  • What is the role of the private sector in defending against cybersecurity threats?