3 Part II: Ownership 3 Part II: Ownership

3.1 Copyright History and Mechanics 3.1 Copyright History and Mechanics

3.1.1 Formalities 3.1.1 Formalities

3.1.1.1 Estate of Martin Luther King, Jr. v. CBS, Inc. 3.1.1.1 Estate of Martin Luther King, Jr. v. CBS, Inc.

194 F.3d 1211 (11th Cir. 1999)

ESTATE OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., INC., Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
CBS, INC., Defendant-Appellee.

No. 98-9079.
United States Court of Appeals,

Eleventh Circuit.
Nov. 5, 1999.

[1212] Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia.(No. 1:96-cv-3052-WCO), William C. O'Kelley, Judge.

Before ANDERSON, Chief Judge, RONEY, Senior Circuit Judge, and COOK[*], Senior

District Judge.

ANDERSON, Chief Judge:

The Estate of Martin Luther King, Jr., Inc. brought this copyright infringement action against CBS, Inc. after CBS produced a video documentary that used, without authorization, portions of civil rights leader Dr. Martin Luther King's [1213] famous "I Have a Dream" speech at the March on Washington on August 28, 1963. The district court granted summary judgment to CBS on the ground that Dr. King had engaged in a general publication of the speech, placing it into the public domain. Estate of Martin Luther King, Jr., Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 13 F.Supp.2d 1347 (N.D.Ga.1998). We now reverse.[**]

I. FACTS

The facts underlying this case form part of our national heritage and are well-known to many Americans. On the afternoon of August 28, 1963, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference ("SCLC") held the March on Washington ("March") to promote the growing civil rights movement. The events of the day were seen and heard by some 200,000 people gathered at the March, and were broadcast live via radio and television to a nationwide audience of millions of viewers. The highlight of the March was a rousing speech that Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., the SCLC's founder and president, gave in front of the Lincoln Memorial ("Speech"). The Speech contained the famous utterance, "I have a dream ...," which became symbolic of the civil rights movement. The SCLC had sought out wide press coverage of the March and the Speech, and these efforts were successful; the Speech was reported in daily newspapers across the country, was broadcast live on radio and television, and was extensively covered on television and radio subsequent to the live broadcast.

On September 30, 1963, approximately one month after the delivery of the Speech, Dr. King took steps to secure federal copyright protection for the Speech under the Copyright Act of 1909, and a certificate of registration of his claim to copyright was issued by the Copyright Office on October 2, 1963. Almost immediately thereafter, Dr. King filed suit in the Southern District of New York to enjoin the unauthorized sale of recordings of the Speech and won a preliminary injunction on December 13, 1963. King v. Mister Maestro, Inc., 224 F.Supp. 101 (S.D.N.Y.1963).

For the next twenty years, Dr. King and the Estate enjoyed copyright protection in the Speech and licensed it for a variety of uses, and renewed the copyright when necessary. In 1994, CBS entered into a contract with the Arts & Entertainment Network to produce a historical documentary series entitled "The 20th Century with Mike Wallace." One segment was devoted to "Martin Luther King, Jr. and The March on Washington." That episode contained material filmed by CBS during the March and extensive footage of the Speech (amounting to about 60% of its total content). CBS, however, did not seek the Estate's permission to use the Speech in this manner and refused to pay royalties to the Estate. The instant litigation ensued.

On summary judgment, the district court framed the issue as "whether the public delivery of Dr. King's speech ... constituted a general publication of the speech so as to place it in the public domain." 13 F.Supp.2d at 1351. After discussing the relevant case law, the district court held that Dr. King's "performance coupled with such wide and unlimited reproduction and dissemination as occurred concomitant to Dr. King's speech during the March on Washington can be seen only as a general publication which thrust the speech into the public domain." Id. at 1354.[1] Thus, the district court granted [1214] CBS's motion for summary judgment. The Estate now appeals to this Court.

II. DISCUSSION

We review the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo, with all facts and reasonable inferences therefrom reviewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Hale v. Tallapoosa County, 50 F.3d 1579, 1581 (11th Cir.1995). Summary judgment was due to be granted only if the forecast of evidence before the district court showed that there was no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party, i.e., CBS, was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).

Because of the dates of the critical events, the determinative issues in this case are properly analyzed under the Copyright Act of 1909 ("1909 Act"), rather than the Copyright Act of 1976 ("1976 Act") that is currently in effect. See Brown v. Tabb, 714 F.2d 1088, 1091 (11th Cir.1983) ("[T]he determination whether a work entered the public domain prior to the effective date of the 1976 Act must be made according the copyright law as it existed before that date."). The question is whether Dr. King's attempt to obtain statutory copyright protection on September 30, 1963 was effective, or whether it was a nullity because the Speech had already been forfeited to the public domain via a general publication.[2]

Under the regime created by the 1909 Act, an author received state common law protection automatically at the time of creation of a work. 1 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright 4.01[B] (1998) [hereinafter Nimmer ]. This state common law protection persisted until the moment of a general publication.[3] Silverman v. CBS Inc., 632 F.Supp. 1344, 1353 (S.D.N.Y.1986). When a general publication occurred, the author either forfeited his work to the public domain, see, e.g., White v. Kimmell, 193 F.2d 744 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 957 , 72 S.Ct. 1052, 96 L.Ed. 1357 (1952), or, if he had therebefore complied with federal statutory requirements, converted his common law copyright into a federal statutory copyright. See Mister Maestro, 224 F.Supp. at 105 ("The [statutory] copyright may be obtained before publication of such works but as soon as publication occurs there must be compliance with the requirements as to published works."); see generally 1 Nimmer 4.01[B].

In order to soften the hardship of the rule that publication destroys common law rights, courts developed a distinction between a "general publication" and a "limited publication." Brown, 714 F.2d at 1091 (citing American Vitagraph, Inc. v. Levy, 659 F.2d 1023, 1026-27 (9th Cir.1981)). Only a general publication divested a common law copyright. Id. A general publication occurred "when a work was made available to members of the public at large without regard to their identity or what they intended to do with the work." Id. (citing Burke v. National Broadcasting Co., 598 F.2d 688, 691 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 869 , 100 S.Ct. 144, 62 L.Ed.2d 93 (1979)). Conversely, a non-divesting limited publication was one that communicated the contents of a work to a select group and for a limited purpose, and [1215] without the right of diffusion, reproduction, distribution or sale. Id. (citing White, 193 F.2d at 746-47). The issue before us is whether Dr. King's delivery of the Speech was a general publication.

Numerous cases stand for the proposition that the performance of a work is not a general publication. See, e.g., Ferris v. Frohman, 223 U.S. 424, 433 , 32 S.Ct. 263, 265, 56 L.Ed. 492 (1912) ("The public representation of a dramatic composition, not printed and published, does not deprive the owner of his common-law right.... [T]he public performance of the play is not an abandonment of it to the public use."); Nutt v. National Inst. Incorporated for the Improvement of Memory, 31 F.2d 236, 238 (2d Cir.1929) ("The author of a literary composition, as a lecture, may profit from public delivery, but that does not constitute the kind of publication which deprives him of the protection of the copyright statute...."); Mister Maestro, 224 F.Supp. at 106 ( "The copyright statute itself plainly shows that 'oral delivery' of an address is not a dedication to the public."); McCarthy & Fischer v. White, 259 F. 364, 364 (S.D.N.Y.1919) (rejecting infringer's argument that "the presentation of the song ... in vaudeville prior to the date of copyright was a complete dedication to the public," because "[i]t is ... well settled that the public performance of a dramatic or musical composition is not an abandonment of the composition to the public"); Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Documentaries Unlimited, Inc., 42 Misc.2d 723, 248 N.Y.S.2d 809, 811 (1964) (holding with respect to news anchor's famous announcement of the death of President Kennedy that "[t]he rendering of a performance before the microphone does not constitute an abandonment of ownership or a dedication of it to the public at large"); cf. American Tobacco Co. v. Werckmeister, 207 U.S. 284, 299 , 28 S.Ct. 72, 77, 52 L.Ed. 208 (1907) (no general publication where there is merely "the exhibition of a work of art at a public exhibition"); Burke, 598 F.2d at 693 ("Publication did not occur merely because the film was shown to the general public."); Patterson v. Century Prods., Inc., 93 F.2d 489, 492-93 (2d Cir.1937) (no divestive general publication of motion picture occurred where "the distribution was limited to exhibitions of the picture without charge, no one was given the right to use the copies sent out for any purpose whatsoever," and "[t]he positive films were merely loaned for that purpose which did not permit copying"), cert. denied, 303 U.S. 655 , 58 S.Ct. 759, 82 L.Ed. 1114 (1938); see generally Nimmer 4.08, at 4-43 ("[T]he oral dissemination or performance of a literary, dramatic, or musical work does not constitute a publication of that work.").

It appears from the case law that a general publication occurs only in two situations. First, a general publication occurs if tangible copies of the work are distributed to the general public in such a manner as allows the public to exercise dominion and control over the work. See Burke, 598 F.2d at 693 ("The decisive issue was whether [the author's] release of the film itself to [a third party] was, under the circumstances, a general publication."); Mister Maestro, 224 F.Supp. at 107 (" 'A sine qua non of publication should be the acquisition by members of the public of a possessory interest in tangible copies of the work in question.' ") (quoting Nimmer, supra, 56 Colum. L.Rev. at 197); Nimmer, supra, 56 Colum. L.Rev. at 196 ("[E]ven if a performance were regarded as a copy of the work being performed, the act of publication would not occur merely by virtue of viewing the performance since an audience does not thereby gain such dominion over the copy as to warrant the conclusion that the work has been surrendered to the public."). Second, a general publication may occur if the work is exhibited or displayed in such a manner as to permit unrestricted copying by the general public. See American Tobacco, 207 U.S. at 300 , 28 S.Ct. at 77 ("We do not mean to say that the public exhibition of a painting or statue, where all might see and freely copy it, might not amount to [divestive] publication...."); Patterson, 93 F.2d at 492 [1216] ("The test of general publication is whether the exhibition of the work to the public is under such conditions as to show dedication without reservation of rights or only the right to view and inspect it without more."); Letter Edged in Black Press, Inc. v. Public Bldg. Comm'n of Chicago, 320 F.Supp. 1303, 1311 (N.D.Ill.1970) (invoking this exception where "there were no restrictions on copying [of a publicly displayed sculpture] and no guards preventing copying" and "every citizen was free to copy the maquette for his own pleasure and camera permits were available to members of the public"). However, the case law indicates that restrictions on copying may be implied, and that express limitations in that regard are deemed unnecessary. See American Tobacco, 207 U.S. at 300 , 28 S.Ct. at 77 (holding that there is no general publication where artwork is exhibited and "there are bylaws against copies, or where it is tacitly understood that no copying shall take place, and the public are admitted ... on the implied understanding that no improper advantage will be taken of the privilege" (emphasis added)); Burke, 598 F.2d at 693 (holding that releasing a film to a professor and host of an educational television program, and authorizing him to copy and broadcast same on public television was a limited publication because the grant of permission to use the film contained an implied condition against distributing copies of the film to others or using it for other purposes); Nutt, 31 F.2d at 238 (lectures were not generally published when delivered because oral delivery is not publication, and "[e]ven here the hearers are allowed to make copies of what was said for their personal use, they cannot later publish for profit that which they had not retained the right to sell").

The case law indicates that distribution to the news media, as opposed to the general public, for the purpose of enabling the reporting of a contemporary newsworthy event, is only a limited publication. For example, in Public Affairs Assoc., Inc. v. Rickover, 284 F.2d 262 (D.C.Cir.1960), vacated on other grounds, 369 U.S. 111 , 82 S.Ct. 580, 7 L.Ed.2d 604 (1962), the court said that general publication occurs only when there is "a studied effort not only to secure publicity for the contents of the addresses through the channels of information, but to go beyond customary sources of press or broadcasting in distributing the addresses to any interested individual." Id. at 270 (emphasis added). Although the Rickover court ultimately held that a general publication had occurred, it contrasted the "limited use of the addresses by the press for fair comment," i.e., limited publication, with "the unlimited distribution to anyone who was interested," i.e., general publication. Id. at 271. See also Mister Maestro, 224 F.Supp. at 107 (taking the position that solicitation of news coverage and distribution to the media amounts to only a limited publication); cf. Documentaries Unlimited, Inc., 248 N.Y.S.2d at 810-11 (news anchor's announcement concerning the assassination of President Kennedy was not generally published by virtue of the broadcast over the radio as newsworthy material). This rule comports with common sense; it does not force an author whose message happens to be newsworthy to choose between obtaining news coverage for his work and preserving his common-law copyright. As the dissenting judge in the Rickover case remarked (which remark was entirely consistent with the majority opinion in the case), "[t]here is nothing in the law which would compel this court to deprive the creator of the right to reap financial benefits from these efforts because, at the time of their creation, they had the added virtue of being newsworthy events of immediate public concern." Rickover, 284 F.2d at 273 (Washington, J., dissenting).

With the above principles in mind, in the summary judgment posture of this case and on the current state of this record, we are unable to conclude that CBS has demonstrated beyond any genuine issue of material fact that Dr. King, simply through his oral delivery of the [1217] Speech, engaged in a general publication making the Speech "available to members of the public at large without regard to their identity or what they intended to do with the work." Brown, 714 F.2d at 1091. A performance, no matter how broad the audience, is not a publication; to hold otherwise would be to upset a long line of precedent. This conclusion is not altered by the fact that the Speech was broadcast live to a broad radio and television audience and was the subject of extensive contemporaneous news coverage. We follow the above cited case law indicating that release to the news media for contemporary coverage of a newsworthy event is only a limited publication.[4]

Our conclusion finds significant support from Burke v. National Broadcasting Co., Inc., 598 F.2d 688 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 869 , 100 S.Ct. 144, 62 L.Ed.2d 93 (1979). Burke captured on film a highly unusual and dramatic encounter in which a zebra attacked a lioness who had killed the zebra's foal. Id. at 689. Grzimek, a professor and a host of an educational television program, wrote Burke requesting permission to use the film in his lectures and in the educational television program. Id. at 690. Burke responded affirmatively, sending Grzimek the film accompanied by a short reply that contained neither express authorization nor express restriction with respect to other possible uses of the film. Id. at 690, 693. Grzimek initially used the film only for the stated purposes, but later transmitted a copy of the film to a commercial company specializing in nature films, which in turn sold a production that included the film to NBC. The issue was whether Burke's common law copyright was forfeited to the public domain by virtue of the circumstances surrounding his seemingly unconditioned release of the film to Grzimek. In other words, the issue was whether there had been a general publication. The First Circuit held that only a limited publication had occurred, and that Burke's common law copyright [1218] had not been lost. Id. at 694. The court defined a general publication as occurring when a work is made available to the public at large without regard to who they are or what they propose to do with it, id. at 691; noted that courts have hesitated to find a general publication which divests a common law copyright, id.; and noted the settled law that a mere performance or exhibition of a work is not a general publication. Id. Recognizing that a general publication can be found if the public were free to copy the work on exhibit, the First Circuit held that a prohibition on copying can be tacitly understood. Id. (citing American Tobacco, 207 U.S. at 300 , 28 S.Ct. 72). Applying the foregoing principles, the court sustained Burke's common law copyright as against NBC. Id. at 690, 694. The Burke court held that Burke's authorization of Grzimek's broadcast of the film on noncommercial television did not result in a general publication. Id. at 693 ("Allowing the film to be used for the purposes requested was not a blanket authorization to use it for any purpose, much less to release it to a commercial producer."). The court recognized that Burke did not explicitly state that Grzimek could not distribute copies of the film to others, or use it for other purposes, but the court said "such limitations are reasonably to be implied." Id.

We believe that the authority granted to the press in the instant case-extensive news coverage including live broadcasts-is analogous to the authority granted in Burke. In Burke, authority was granted to the host of an educational television program to broadcast on television; in the instant case, authority was granted to the press for extensive news coverage, also including broadcasts on television. In both cases, the authority was granted to a limited group for a limited purpose. In both cases, the restrictions on copying and reproducing were implied. The soundness of our analogy to Burke is also supported by the foregoing case law indicating generally that distribution to the news media for the purpose of news coverage is only a limited publication.

The district court held that "the circumstances in this case take the work in question outside the parameters of the 'performance is not a publication' doctrine." 13 F.Supp.2d at 1351. These circumstances included "the overwhelmingly public nature of the speech and the fervent intentions of the March organizers to draw press attention." Id. Certainly, the Speech was one of a kind-a unique event in history.[5] However, the features that make the Speech unique-e.g., the huge audience and the Speech's significance in terms of newsworthiness and history-are features that, according to the case law, are not significant in the general versus limited publication analysis. With respect to the huge audience, the case law indicates that the general publication issue depends, not on the number of people involved, but rather on the fact that the work is made available to the public without regard to who they are or what they propose to do with it. See Brown v. Tabb, 714 F.2d 1088, 1091-92 (11th Cir.1983). For this proposition, Brown cited Burke, 598 F.2d at 691 ("[G]eneral publication depends on the author making the work available to those interested, and not on the number of people who actually express an interest."). To the same effect, see Mister Maestro, 224 F.Supp. at 106-07 (relying upon the "one or many persons" language in American Tobacco, 207 U.S. at 299 , 28 S.Ct. 72, and on Rickover ). In the instant case, the district court acknowledged that "[t]he size of the audience before which a work is performed cannot be the basis for a court's finding that a general publication has occurred." 13 F.Supp.2d at 1352.

[1219] With respect to the significance of the Speech in terms of newsworthiness and history, the case law again suggests that this feature should not play a substantial role in the analysis. As noted above, the D.C. Circuit in Rickover indicated that the wide press distribution of the speeches at issue there would not alone have constituted a general publication. Indeed, Mister Maestro so held with respect to the very Speech at issue before us. Also supporting this proposition is the case law above cited to the effect that size of the audience is not significant.

The district court cited Letter Edged in Black Press, Inc. v. Public Building Commission of Chicago, 320 F.Supp. 1303 (N.D.Ill.1970), CBS's best case, in support of its reasoning, see 13 F.Supp.2d at 1353-54, and that case warrants some exploration. In Letter Edged in Black, the question was whether the city had dedicated a Picasso sculpture (located in front of the Chicago Civic Center) to the public domain by general publication. The city had done the following: it carried out a massive campaign to publicize the monumental sculpture; it placed a maquette (portable model of the sculpture) on exhibition at a local museum; it gave photographs to the public upon request; it arranged for pictures of the sculpture to appear in several magazines of large national circulation; it sold a postcard featuring the sculpture; and it distributed numerous publications and reports containing photographs of the sculpture. Letter Edged in Black, 320 F.Supp. at 1306-07. After stating the controlling legal principles with regard to general and limited publication, the Letter Edged in Black court stated its view that the cumulation of these various acts by the city equated to general publication. Id. at 1309. The court then distinguished American Tobacco, 207 U.S. 284 , 28 S.Ct. 72, 52 L.Ed. 208, the primary authority that the city cited to support its theory of mere limited publication. In American Tobacco, the Supreme Court held that the display of a painting in a gallery did not constitute general publication putting the painting into the public domain. According to the Letter Edged in Black court, a cornerstone of American Tobacco was the fact that copying of the painting was strictly forbidden and the gallery strictly enforced the anti-copying rules. Letter Edged in Black, 320 F.Supp. at 1310. The court held that the facts in Letter Edged in Black were distinguishable:

In the case at bar there were no restrictions on copying and no guards preventing copying. Rather every citizen was free to copy the maquette for his own pleasure and camera permits were available to members of the public. At its first public display the press was freely allowed to photograph the maquette and publish these photographs in major newspapers and magazines. Further, officials at this first public showing of the maquette made uncopyrighted pictures of the maquette available on request. Were this activity strictly classified as limited publication, there would no longer be any meaningful distinction between limited and general publication.

Id. at 1311 (footnotes omitted).

The district court likened the instant case to Letter Edged in Black on the ground that there was a lack of restriction on copying and free allowance of reproduction by the press. However, we do not believe the analogy fits-at least not at this summary judgment stage. Significantly, in Letter Edged in Black there were manifestations of the city's intent to distribute generally among the public at large that have no parallels in the evidence we can consider in the instant summary judgment posture. The city gave photographs of the sculpture to the public, not merely the press, upon request. The city commercially sold a postcard featuring the sculpture. Copying was apparently widespread at an exhibit of the sculpture, and the city took no action to curtail copying and photographing by the public. Letter Edged in Black, 320 F.Supp. at 1306-07, 1311. At trial, CBS may well produce [1220] evidence that brings the instant case on all fours with Letter Edged in Black,[6] but the present state of the record does not support the analogy; to the contrary, the performance of the Speech in the instant case is more like the exhibition of the painting in the gallery in American Tobacco.[7]

Because there exist genuine issues of material fact as to whether a general publication occurred, we must reverse the district court's grant of summary judgment for CBS. It would be inappropriate for us to address CBS's other arguments, e.g., fair use and the First Amendment, because the district court did not address them, and because the relevant facts may not yet be fully developed. Of course, we express no opinion on the eventual merits of this litigation. The judgment of the district court is reversed and remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.[8]

---------------

COOK, Senior District Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part:

I concur in the result that was reached by my distinguished colleague, Chief Judge Anderson. Nevertheless, I write separately to express my own thoughts about this very complicated area of the law. To summarize, I agree with the proposition that this case is controlled by the 1909 Copyright Act, under which Dr. King did not lose copyright protection over his "I Have A Dream Speech" by placing it into the public domain based on the factors considered below. However, my reading of the law leads me to believe that a distinction between works that are performed and those that are not is crucial to a proper resolution of this dispute. I will attempt to explain my rationale, as well as the ramifications that flow from it.

Additionally, I agree with Chief Judge Anderson that the remaining issues that have been raised by the parties but not ruled upon by this Court in this appeal are not appropriate for an appellate ruling.[1]

[1221] The district court held that a general publication had occurred on the basis of the combined presence of three factors; namely, (1) the performance of the speech by Dr. King during the March on Washington, (2) its contemporaneous wide dissemination by the press, through the broadcasting and print media, which resulted from the concerted efforts of the March organizers to gain media attention, and (3) the lack of restrictions, explicit, implicit, or in practice, on the copying or reproduction of the speech by the press or public. See Estate of Martin Luther King, Jr., Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 13 F.Supp.2d 1347, 1353 (N.D.Ga.1998) [hereinafter King II ]. While agreeing with Chief Judge Anderson that the speech was not placed into the public domain on the basis of these factors, I do not reach this conclusion because of the limited publication rule. Rather, I rely upon the more fundamental principle that, in the context of performed works, none of these factors may be properly considered as having contributed to a general or limited publication in the absence of an authorized dissemination of a tangible copy of the work without copyright notice.

A.

In my opinion, the trial court erred by holding that Dr. King's performance of the speech was a factor which contributed to a general publication. The long-standing, well-understood, and accepted rule in copyright law is that performance does not constitute publication. See Ferris v. Frohman, 223 U.S. 424, 434-36 , 32 S.Ct. 263, 56 L.Ed. 492 (1912); see also 1 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright 4.08[A] (1998); 1 William F. Patry, Copyright Law and Practice at 417- 18 (1994); 18 Am.Jur.2d Copyright and Literary Property 13 (1985). This was the rule under state common law.

The public representation of a dramatic composition, not printed and published, does not deprive the owner of his common-law right, save by operation of statute. At common law, the public performance of the play is not an abandonment of it to the public use.

Ferris, 223 U.S. at 435 , 32 S.Ct. 263. This principle was also applied to the 1909 Act by the courts, and was eventually codified in the 1976 Act. Nimmer on Copyright 4.08[A] & n.1; 17 U.S.C. 101; see American Vitagraph, Inc. v. Levy, 659 F.2d 1023, 1028 (9th Cir.1981).

Inasmuch as the 1976 Act simply adopts the performance rule that existed under state common law and the 1909 Act, any reference to its provisions conclusively establishes that Dr. King's oration of his "I Have A Dream" speech should not be construed as contributing to a divestive publication.

"Publication" is the distribution of copies or phonorecords of a work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending. The offering to distribute copies or phonorecords to a group of persons for purposes of further distribution, public performance, or public display, constitutes publication. A public performance ... of a work does not of itself constitute publication.

17 U.S.C. 101 (emphasis added). Further, [t]o perform ... a work "publicly" means-

(1) to perform ... it at a place open to the public or at any place where a substantial number of persons outside of a normal circle of a family and its social acquaintances is gathered; or

(2 )to transmit or otherwise communicate a performance ... of the work to a place specified by clause (1) or to the public, by means of any device or process, whether the members of the public capable of receiving the performance or display receive it in the same place or in separate places and at the same time or at different times. [1222] Id. Dr. King's performance of the speech in the presence of over 200,000 individuals who had assembled for a demonstration at the Lincoln Memorial falls squarely within subclause (1) above, while the transmission of his speech by radio and television meets the criteria in subclause (2).

Moreover, consistent with the rationale behind the rule that performance is not a publication, I would hold that, for those controversies that are governed by the 1909 Act, neither a general nor a limited publication can ever occur merely from performance in the absence of an authorized distribution of a tangible copy of the work without a copyright notice or reservation of rights. Under the 1909 Act, a statutory copyright over a performed work could be obtained by two methods, each of which required the existence of a tangible copy. See Hirshon v. United Artists Corp., 243 F.2d 640, 644 (D.C.Cir.1957). Section 9 of the 1909 Act[2] provided that a copyright claim could be secured by affixing a notice to the tangible copies that were published or offered for sale.[3] On the other hand, if a performed work, such as a speech or musical or dramatic composition, had not been "reproduced in copies for sale,"[4] 11 of the 1909 Act permitted an author to gain statutory copyright protection only by depositing a tangible copy with the Copyright Office.[5] Due to their peculiar nature, there were too many cases in which the requirement under the 1909 Act (to wit, that a tangible copy must exist before statutory copyright protection could be obtained) was unrealistically onerous for performed works because of the common necessity to make last minute revisions to plays, or, as this case exemplifies, speeches.[6] See 1 Nimmer on Copyright 4.08[B]. The 1909 Act appears to have recognized this problem, as 2 (emphasis added) specified that "[n]othing in this title shall be construed to annul or limit the right of the author or proprietor of an unpublished work, at common law or equity, to prevent the copying, publication, or use of such unpublished work without his consent, and to obtain damages therefor." Thus, 2 recognized an absolute need for the strict adherence to a rule that, in the absence of a published tangible copy, a performance alone would never constitute a publication. Otherwise, an author could lose all copyright protection because of his inability to comply with the tangible copy requirement prior to the performance that was necessary to transform his common law copyright into a statutory copyright under 11 of the 1909 Act.

Therefore, it is my view that the trial court erred by failing to recognize the special nature of performed works such as speeches which was recognized by the principle under the common law and the 1909 Act that performance does not constitute publication in the absence of an authorized distribution of tangible copies without a copyright notice or a reservation of rights.[7] "[W]hatever the sufficiency of the rationale, whatever the bearing of pragmatic considerations, the law was clear prior to 1978, and remains clear that performance is not publication." 1 Nimmer on Copyright 4.08[B]. Consequently, I would reverse because the trial court relied upon Dr. King's performance of the [1223] speech to conclude that a general publication had occurred.

B.

The trial court ruled that the widespread dissemination of the speech, which was due in large measure to the efforts of the March organizers, supported the conclusion that it had been placed into the public domain. In my opinion, this reasoning is incorrect because the size of the audience before whom a work is performed is irrelevant to the issue of publication.

A conclusively established corollary to the rule, which prescribes that performance does not constitute a general publication, is the principle that the size of an audience before whom an unpublished work is performed is irrelevant to the issue of publication. Again, a return to the 1976 Act, which as to performance merely codified the prior copyright law that had existed under state common law and the 1909 Act, is informative. "[P]erformances ... for example-[are] not a publication no matter how many people are exposed to the work." H.R.Rep. No. 94- 1476, at 138 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5754. "Oral delivery of a speech does not constitute a publication thereof regardless of a vast national audience via television and radio." Nimmer on Copyright 4.08[A].

In holding that dissemination by performance could be so widespread as to constitute a general publication, the trial court relied upon International Tape Mfrs. Ass'n v. Gerstein, 344 F.Supp. 38, 56-57 (S.D.Fla.1972), vacated 494 F.2d 25 (5th Cir.1974). King II, 13 F.Supp.2d at 1351-52. I have doubts about whether Gerstein provides a sufficiently compelling authority upon which to base a ruling because it is questionable whether a vacated decision is a proper authority for precedential support. See Los Angeles County v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 634 n. 6, 99 S.Ct. 1379, 59 L.Ed.2d 642 (1979) (Supreme Court decision vacating judgment of Court of Appeals deprives opinion of lower appellate court of precedential effect). This is especially so inasmuch as the case was vacated on ripeness grounds. In Gerstein, the Court of Appeals was critical of the "abbreviated nature of the proceedings below" where "[t]he trial court had held no hearing, had received no evidence or affidavits, and had given defendants no opportunity to file an answer. There was no discovery. No one had moved for a summary judgment or judgment on the pleadings. The court simply responded to defendants' motion to dismiss by rendering judgment for plaintiff." Gerstein, 494 F.2d at 27 (footnote omitted).

More fundamentally, the reasoning of the Gerstein trial court must be rejected because, in my judgment, it is incorrect. There, the trial court relied upon three district court decisions (namely, R.C.A. Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F.2d 86 (2d Cir.1940), Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Miracle Record Co., 91 F.Supp. 473 (N.D.Ill.1950), and Egner v. E.C. Schirmer Music Co., 48 F.Supp. 187 (D.Mass.1942)) to support its conclusion that a sufficiently disseminated performance could result in a general publication. Gerstein, 344 F.Supp. at 56 n. 76. In each of these cases, the work, which was the subject of a copyright challenge, was of a type that was performed, namely music. To that extent, these cases are similar to Dr. King's "I Have A Dream" speech. However, none of these cases support the proposition that performance alone, if sufficiently widely disseminated, can constitute a general publication because each of the challenged works had been reduced to tangible copies which had been sold. Whiteman, 114 F.2d at 88; Miracle Record, 91 F.Supp. at 475; Egner, 48 F.Supp. at 189.

The trial court also relied upon Burke v. NBC, Inc., 598 F.2d 688, 691 (1st Cir.1979), in support of its assertion that publication alone, given sufficient dissemination, [1224] could result in a general publication.[8] King II, 13 F.Supp.2d at 1352. The trial court appears to have relied upon the language in Burke, which held that "[a] general publication is such dissemination of the work itself among the public as justifies the belief that it has been dedicated to the public and rendered common property." Burke, 598 F.2d at 691.

Although the reasoning of the trial court may have been justified on the basis of works that are manifested through a physical object, such as books or pieces of art, it is inapplicable to performed works because of the axiom that performance is not a publication, regardless of the size of the audience. This axiom negates any inference that the amount of the dissemination is sufficient to justify a belief that a performed work was dedicated to the public and thus entered into the public domain inasmuch as an inherent tension exists between the two doctrines. If the size of an audience has no effect on the rule that performance is not a publication, then no degree of dissemination due to performance could result in a dedication to the public. Importantly, the distinction that I seek to draw is consistent with the Ferris holding that performance does not amount to an abandonment of title or to a dedication of the work to the public at large. Ferris, 223 U.S. at 435 -36, 32 S.Ct. 263.

The logical result of the rule that performance cannot constitute a publication regardless of audience size is that an affirmative effort to obtain press coverage does not constitute an exception because media coverage does nothing more than increase the size of the audience, which is irrelevant to the issue of publication. Thus, I am of the opinion that the trial court erroneously found that a general publication existed in part because of the widespread dissemination of the speech that had been implemented by the concerted efforts of the March organizers to maximize press coverage. The trial court appears to have found the following factors to be determinative on this issue: (1) "the March organizers were aware of and encouraged the press' coverage of the March," (2) "the studied effort by March organizers to secure as wide dissemination of the March's speeches as possible," (3) "[d]issemination of the speakers' words to the greatest public audience possible was one goal of the March organizers," (4) "[t]he press was invited to attend and to film the day's events," (5) "[t]he March was broadcast live on multiple television networks and radio stations, and portions, including Dr. King's speech, were subsequently re-broadcast," (6) "[a]t no point was the press given express limitations regarding who could film the event or the extent to which their footage could be used," (7) "there is no indication that any such limitations were made or implied," and (8) "there is no record of objections by Dr. King or by other March participants or organizers as to the press' coverage of the event."[9] King II, 13 F.Supp.2d at 1352. All of these factors, with the exception of the first, were "crucial" to the finding by the trial court that a general publication had occurred. Id. I believe that this reasoning is incorrect as a matter of law. Since the size of the audience before whom a performance occurs is irrelevant, each of these considerations constitute an invalid basis upon which to find a general publication because they amount to nothing more than an effort to assure the dissemination of the performance to the largest audience possible.

[1225] Thus, the district court essentially created an exception to the audience-size-is-irrelevant rule based on the public interest in Dr. King's speech. There is no authority for such an exception. In the fair use decision of Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 555-60 , 569, 105 S.Ct. 2218, 85 L.Ed.2d 588 (1985), the Supreme Court premised its holding on the principle that the copyright laws protect all authors equally, regardless of the public import of, or interest in, their work. "Congress has not designed, and we see no warrant for judicially imposing, a 'compulsory license' permitting unfettered access to the unpublished copyrighted expression of public figures." Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 569 , 105 S.Ct. 2218.

C.

The trial court also determined that a failure to control copying or reproductions of the speech supported a finding of a general publication. King II, 13 F.Supp.2d at 1352. This principle appears to originate from American Tobacco Co. v. Werckmeister, 207 U.S. 284, 300 , 28 S.Ct. 72, 52 L.Ed. 208 (1907), which stated in dicta that "[w]e do not mean to say that the public exhibition of a painting or statue, where all might see and freely copy it, might not amount to publication within the statute, regardless of the artist's purpose or notice of reservation of rights which he takes no measure to protect." In addition, the decision by the trial court evidenced its reliance upon the principle from American Tobacco, 207 U.S. at 299 , 28 S.Ct. 72, in which the Supreme Court indicated that the test for a general publication is whether an exhibition of the work to the public evinces a dedication without a reservation of rights rather than merely the right to view and inspect. King II, 13 F.Supp.2d at 1352.

I believe that the court below erred when it failed to recognize that these maxims have no application in the context of performed works, as made clear by Ferris, which was decided over four years after American Tobacco. In Ferris, the Supreme Court, immediately after enunciating the rule that performance alone cannot constitute publication, quoted favorably from a treatise by Justice Story.

Story states the rule as follows: "So, where a dramatic performance has been allowed by the author to be acted at a theater, no person has a right to pirate such performance, and to publish copies of it surreptitiously; or to act it at another theater without the consent of the author or proprietor; for his permission to act it at a public theater does not amount to an abandonment of his title to it, or to a dedication of it to the public at large. " It has been said that the owner of a play cannot complain if the piece is reproduced from memory. But the distinction is without sound basis and has been repudiated.

Ferris, 223 U.S. at 435 -36, 32 S.Ct. 263 (emphasis added and citations omitted). The opportunity to copy or reproduce a performed work, or the fact of performance in and of itself, has no relevance to the issue of whether it has been placed into the public domain because the performance "does not amount to an abandonment of [the author's] title to it, or to a dedication of it to the public at large." See also Nutt v. National Inst. Inc. for the Improvement of Memory, 31 F.2d 236, 238 (2d Cir.1929) ("Even where the hearers are allowed to make copies of what was said for their personal use, they cannot later publish for profit that which they had not obtained the right to sell."). Moreover, given that Dr. King's speech enjoyed the automatic protection of common law copyright, it is significant that CBS did not point to any authority in which forfeiture was found on the basis of the copying activities or the reproduction of copyrighted work by a third party.

The trial court acknowledged the import of Ferris, but distinguished it in the following manner:

[h]owever, the case sub judice [sic] quite a different factual scenario from that confronted in Ferris v. Frohman, in which it was held that the performance of a play did not destroy common law [1226] copyright. A closer situation would be presented if the owner of the common law right to the play in Fromer v. Ferris [sic] had not only allowed the performance of his play but also had invited the press to attend, film, broadcast it live on numerous television and radio stations, and replay parts on news programs, and then the owner had sought and selectively asserted statutory copyright protection. The court does not believe that such inconsistent actions, as occurred in the captioned case, can be seen as anything other than a general publication extinguishing common law copyright protection.

King II, 13 F.Supp.2d at 1351. In support of this reasoning, the trial court opined that "[t]he concept that dissemination by performance could reach such heights as to be a publication is not a new one," relying upon Gerstein. King II, 13 F.Supp.2d at 1351. However, as indicated above, Gerstein does not validly support that proposition.[10]

The trial court also cited Letter Edged in Black Press, Inc. v. Public Bldg. Comm'n of Chicago, 320 F.Supp. 1303 (N.D.Ill.1970), where a general publication of a sculpture had been found to exist based upon the lack of restriction on the copying and successful efforts to court press coverage, with no restrictions on press reproductions. King II, 13 F.Supp.2d at 1354. However, I believe that Letter Edged in Black Press is not applicable to this controversy for several reasons.

First, that court had placed importance on the supplying of uncopyrighted tangible copies, in the form of photographs of the work, which were made available upon request. Letter Edged in Black Press, 320 F.Supp. at 1311. By contrast, no similar situation is presented in the decision below because the trial court expressly disavowed any reliance on the only two tangible copies in evidence. King II, 13 F.Supp.2d at 1353 n. 5.

Second, and more fundamentally, Letter Edged in Black Press is distinguishable, in that the copyrightable work at issue was physical and thus the application of the American Tobacco principles was justified. In contrast, the situation presented here involves a copyrightable work that is manifested by performance. The American Tobacco principles of unfettered copying and reproduction, or an exhibition which demonstrates a dedication without reservation of rights, are inapposite to performed works in the absence of an authorized distribution of tangible copies. Otherwise, it would be very difficult, if even possible, to explain the results in Silverman v. CBS, Inc., 632 F.Supp. 1344, 1347, 1350 (S.D.N.Y.1986), aff'd in part, vacated in part on other grounds by 870 F.2d 40 (2d Cir.1989) [11] and CBS, Inc. v. Documentaries Unlimited, Inc., 42 Misc.2d 723, 248 N.Y.S.2d 809, 811 (1964),[12] where Appellee was held by the trial court to have a valid copyright over radio broadcasts whose performances were ostensibly disseminated to thousands, or perhaps even millions, of people.

D.

For the reasons that have been explained above, I would hold that no publication, general or limited, occurred because Dr. King's delivery of his "I Have A Dream" speech was a mere performance of that work, and performance simply cannot constitute a publication regardless of (1) the size of the audience involved, or (2) efforts to obtain widespread contemporary [1227] news coverage under circumstances that may have allowed the copying of the work.[13] It is my belief that this analysis (1) differs significantly from one which is premised on a limited publication theory, and (2) also avoids the legal fiction of declaring that Dr. King's "I Have A Dream" speech, as a limited publication, was communicated to a select group for a narrow purpose, a holding that has been generally criticized by commentators.[14]

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RONEY, Senior Circuit Judge, dissenting:

I respectfully dissent on the ground that the district court correctly held there was a general publication. I would affirm on the basis of the district court opinion. Estate of Martin Luther King, Jr., Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 13 F.Supp.2d 1347 (N.D.Ga.1998).

---------------

NOTES:

[*] Honorable Julian Abele Cook, Jr., Senior U.S. District Judge for the Eastern District of Michigan, sitting by designation.

[**] Chief Judge Anderson and Judge Cook comprise the majority holding that there has been no publication of the speech that destroyed Dr. King's common law copyright protection. Chief Judge Anderson's reasoning is set out in this opinion; Judge Cook's related but somewhat different reasoning is set out in his separate opinion.

[1] The district court noted that there potentially was some additional evidence of general publication. First, the SCLC published a newsletter of wide circulation containing the full text of the Speech. Second, an advance text of the Speech may have been freely available to the public in a press tent at the March. However, the district court disregarded both of these items of evidence because the procedural posture of the case was one of summary judgment, and "material facts [were] in dispute as to whether the use of Dr. King's speech in the newsletter was authorized and also as to the actual availability of the advance text." 13 F.Supp.2d at 1353 n. 5.

[2] If Dr. King and the Estate had a valid copyright in the Speech under the 1909 Act, that copyright was carried forward under the 1976 Act pursuant to the provisions of 17 U.S.C. 304. In 1991, the copyright in the Speech was duly renewed.

[3] We stress that in this area of the law the word "publication" is "a legal word of art, denoting a process much more esoteric than is suggested by the lay definition of the term." Melville B. Nimmer, Copyright Publication, 56 Colum. L.Rev. 185, 185 (1956).

[4] We emphasize the summary judgment posture of this case, which necessitates that we disregard evidence that may be important or even dispositive at trial. In other words, in this summary judgment posture, we consider only the evidence with respect to which there is no genuine issue of material fact. This evidence includes only the fact of the oral delivery of the Speech to a large audience and the fact that the sponsors of the event including Dr. King sought and successfully obtained live broadcasts on radio and television and extensive contemporary coverage in the news media. In this regard, we do not consider at this stage of the litigation two potentially important pieces of evidence brought to our attention by CBS. First, an advance text of the Speech was apparently available in a press tent on the day of the speech. According to an eyewitness affidavit submitted by CBS, members of the public at large-not merely the press-were permitted access to the press tent and were given copies of the advance text. However, the Estate has proffered affidavits which contradict the statements of the CBS witness, and suggest that access was controlled by the SCLC within reasonable means. Moreover, the Estate argues that much of the content of the Speech was generated extemporaneously by Dr. King and was not contained in this advance text-an argument that we do not consider but that can be explored by the district court. Finding genuine issues of material fact with respect to the availability of the advance text to the general public, the district court disregarded CBS's allegations in this regard. 13 F.Supp.2d at 1353 n. 5. We agree, and do likewise.

Second, CBS has produced a September 1963 issue of the SCLC's newsletter in which the text of the Speech was reprinted in its entirety, with no copyright notice. The newsletter was widely circulated to the general public. Indeed, at oral argument, the Estate conceded that this reprinting of the Speech and wide distribution of the newsletter would constitute a general publication, if it were authorized by Dr. King. However, the Estate has raised the issue that Dr. King did not authorize this reprinting and distribution of the Speech. Finding genuine issues of fact in this regard, the district court disregarded this evidence. We agree, and do likewise.

Finally, we note that the opinion in Mister Maestro, 224 F.Supp. at 104, suggests that there may have been evidence of subsequent rebroadcasts of the Speech in movie houses and sales of phonograph records. We do not consider any such evidence because CBS has not argued in this appeal that such evidence is relevant at this stage. Moreover, the opinion in Mister Maestro suggests that there may be genuine issues of material fact (e.g., authorization) with respect to such evidence.

[5] The district court stated that "as one of the most public and most widely disseminated speeches in history, [the Speech] could be the poster child for general publications." 13 F.Supp.2d at 1353.

[6] For example, if the SCLC's reprinting of the text of the Speech in the September 1963 newsletter was authorized, see supra note 4, that reprinting might be analogous to the public distribution of photographs in Letter Edged in Black. Similarly, if CBS were to adduce evidence that Dr. King or his agents offered copies of the Speech indiscriminately to any member of the public who requested them, e.g., through the availability of the advance text in the press tent, that would make the facts of the instant case closer to those of Letter Edged in Black.

[7] Public Affairs Associates, Inc. v. Rickover, where the D.C. Circuit found a general publication by virtue of Admiral Rickover's distribution to the public of copies of his speeches, is also factually distinguishable. " 'In distributing the speeches, Admiral Rickover mailed some [copies] to individuals who had requested copies or who[m] Admiral Rickover believed would be interested in the subject. Some were sent by Admiral Rickover, approximately 50 in each case, to the sponsor of the speech to be made available to the press and others at the place where the speech was to be delivered.' " Rickover, 284 F.2d at 266 (emphasis added) (quoting the parties' agreed statement of facts). In short, as the court observed, "[a]nyone was welcome to a copy." Id. at 271. The present state of the record in the instant case does not allow us to draw similar conclusions with respect to Dr. King's Speech.

[8] The Estate also argued that the Newsletter should be excluded because CBS erroneously invoked the attorney work product doctrine to excuse its late disclosure of the Newsletter, and because such a violation of CBS's discovery obligations warrants suppression of the evidence. We decline to address the work product issue because our opinion on appeal expressly does not rely upon the Newsletter, see supra note 4, and because it is not at all clear that the district court would have suppressed the evidence even if there had been a discovery violation. I am authorized to say that Judge Roney joins in this regard.

---------------

[1] These issues include whether (1) a general publication occurred as a result of the distribution of tangible copies of the speech prior to Dr. King's copyright registration, (2) the fair use doctrine protects CBS, (3) CBS enjoys a First Amendment privilege against liability, and (4) CBS had an implied license to use its footage of the speech.

[2] Section 9 was renumbered to 10 by the 1947 amendments.

[3] If this condition was satisfied, 12 of the 1909 Act, which later became 13 by virtue of an amendment, allowed for the copyright to be registered by having two complete copies "promptly deposited" with the Copyright Office.

[4] At least one court appears to have construed this phrase to refer to unpublished works. Hirshon, 243 F.2d at 644.

[5] That section was codified at 17 U.S.C. 12 after the 1947 amendments.

[6] Dr. King made revisions to his "I Have A Dream" speech as late as 4:00 a.m. on the day of the March. King v. Mister Maestro, Inc., 224 F.Supp. 101, 103 (S.D.N.Y.1963).

[7] Presumably, the tangible copies would have to be substantially or essentially identical to the performed work.

[8] The trial court also cited Silverman v. CBS, Inc., 632 F.Supp. 1344, 1353 (S.D.N.Y.1986), aff'd in part, vacated in part on other grounds by 870 F.2d 40 (2d Cir.1989). However, the cited portion of the opinion does not support this proposition.

[9] Among these listed factors that were included by the trial court is the following statement: "Dr. King provided the press with an advance text of his speech to enable them to film and broadcast the events more easily." King II, 13 F.Supp.2d at 1352. However, the trial court later indicated that it did not rely upon the partial advance press draft to reach its conclusion. Id. at 1353 n. 5.

[10] See supra Part I(B).

[11] The court determined that CBS had a copyright over radio broadcasts of "The Amos 'n' Andy Show" from 1928 to 1948 because the " 'rendering of the performance before the microphone cannot be held to be an abandonment of ownership to it by the proprietor or a dedication of it to the public at large,' " quoting Uproar Co. v. NBC, 8 F.Supp. 358, 362 (D.Mass.1934), modified 81 F.2d 373 (1st Cir.1936).

[12] The court determined that CBS had a copyright over a radio broadcaster's news announcement concerning President Kennedy's assassination.

[13] For the same reasons as Chief Judge Anderson specifies in footnote four to his opinion, I also emphasize that this result has been reached without any reliance on the partial advance press draft or the SCLC newsletter.

[14] E.g., Nimmer on Copyright 4.13[A] n.11; Marshall A Leaffer, Understanding Copyright Law 4.5[C] at 112-13 (2d ed.1995); 1 William F. Patry, Copyright Law and Practice at 418 n.80 (1994); E. Fulton Brylawski, Publication: Its Role in Copyright Matters, Both Past and Present, 31 J. Copyright Soc. U.S.A. 507, 522 (1984).

3.1.1.2 2.3.2. Christopher Sprigman, "Reform(alizing) Copyright," 57 Stan. L. Rev. 485 (2004) 3.1.1.2 2.3.2. Christopher Sprigman, "Reform(alizing) Copyright," 57 Stan. L. Rev. 485 (2004)

REFORM(ALIZ)ING COPYRIGHT

Christopher Sprigman[*]

INTRODUCTION

I. THE TRADITIONAL CONTOURS OF “CONDITIONAL” COPYRIGHT

A. Formalities in the Early Copyright Statutes

B. From Conditional to Unconditional Copyright

1. Voluntary registration and notice

2. Renewal

II. FORMALITIES AND THE “TRADITIONAL CONTOURS” OF CONDITIONAL COPYRIGHT

A. Recording Ownership

1. “Signaling”

2. Maximizing private incentives

B. Formalities as a Copyright “Filter”

1. Registration and notice

2. Renewal

3. Effect of the renewal formality on the real term of copyright

4. The costs of copyright

C. Formalities and “Utilitarian” Copyright

1. The Intellectual Property Clause

D. Copyright’s Increasingly Uneasy Fit with the Constitution

1. Term extension without renewal filter

2. Formalities as a buffer between copyright and the First Amendment

E. Unconditional Copyright and U.S. Accession to the Berne Convention

1. The Berne Convention

2. Berne’s rule against formalities

3. Berne’s “practical hostility” to formalities

III. REFORMALIZING COPYRIGHT

A. Defining “Interoperable” Formalities in the Berne Convention

1. The reciprocity principle

2. The reciprocity principle and neighboring rights agreements

3. The reciprocity principle in practice

B. Defining “New-Style” Berne-Compliant Formalities

1. Reintroducing old-style formalities for U.S. authors

2. Withdrawal from Berne and reliance on the Universal Copyright Convention

3. Indefinitely renewable copyright

5. The Public Domain Enhancement Act

6. New-style formalities

CONCLUSION

[486] INTRODUCTION

The recent debate between those who oppose the current trend of expanding the duration and breadth of copyright control over creative works and those who welcome it has focused on large and abstract questions like the optimal duration of copyright,[1] whether extension of subsisting copyrights is constitutional,[2] the degree to which technology has either facilitated or inhibited control of copyrighted content,[3] and the effect that such control has on free speech, the public domain, and future creativity.[4] The debate has produced an insightful literature and a few creative (but thus far unsuccessful) lawsuits.[5] It has not, however, substantially altered the direction of recent [487] developments in the law, which continues to move in the direction of increased control.

This Article presumes that the trend toward greater control will continue. I will argue, however, that a few relatively modest and realistically implementable changes to the copyright laws could help address some of the legitimate concerns of the copyright critics while preserving the basic structure of the law that copyright proponents argue has served us well. Curiously, it is a few relatively small changes to copyright procedure, and not to the substantive rights granted by copyright, that may allow the law to reach this desirable end.

Copyright formalities. For most of our history, U.S. copyright law has included a system of procedural mechanisms, referred to collectively as “copyright formalities,” that helped to maintain copyright’s traditional balance between providing private incentives to authors and preserving a robust stock of public domain works from which future creators could draw. From the first copyright statute in 1790, Congress required that authors register their copyrights, give notice (by marking published copies with an indication of copyright status such as the “©” symbol, as well as other information about copyright ownership), and (perhaps most importantly) renew their rights after a relatively short initial term by reregistering their copyright. Failure to comply with these requirements either terminated the copyright (in the case of nonrenewal) or prevented it from arising in the first place.

Taken together, these formalities created data about the existence and duration of copyright for the work in question, and about who owned the copyright. Formalities also facilitated licensing by lowering the cost of identifying rightsholders, moved works for which copyright was not desired into the public domain, and encouraged the use of public domain works by lowering the cost of confirming that a work was available for use.

Deform(aliz)ing copyright. However, in a process that began in earnest with the Copyright Act of 1976[6] and culminated in successor legislation like the Berne Convention Implementation Act,[7] the Copyright Renewal Act,[8] and the Copyright Term Extension Act,[9] Congress pared back, and in some instances entirely discarded, copyright formalities. Under current law, copyright arises the moment an original piece of expression is fixed in a [488] “tangible medium of expression.”[10] Registration and notice, though encouraged,[11] are not required as conditions of protection. Renewal is gone altogether.

Beginning with the 1976 Act, then, the United States moved from a “conditional” copyright system that premised the existence and continuation of copyright on compliance with formalities to an “unconditional” system in which a reduced set of voluntary formalities plays only a minor role. Richard Epstein has aptly characterized these changes as “copyright law . . . flipped over from a system that protected only rights that were claimed to one that vests all rights, whether claimed or not.”[12] That is a fundamental shift in any property rights regime, and one that, in the copyright context, represented a break with almost two centuries of practice.

The advent of unconditional copyright has nonetheless generated little comment in the academic literature—perhaps because the very term “formalities” signals that the former requirements were trifling, ministerial, or more bothersome than helpful. To the extent the issue has been discussed at all, commentators have generally approved the trend[13] as a necessary predicate to

U.S. accession to the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works.[14] The Berne Convention is the most significant international copyright treaty, and it includes a provision prohibiting signatories from imposing copyright formalities as a condition to the protection of works of nationals of other member states.[15]

Reformalizing copyright. This Article lays out a scheme for “reformalizing” copyright—i.e., for moving copyright back to a conditional regime—but in a way that accounts for developments in technology and that allows the United States to remain in compliance with its undertakings in the Berne Convention and the subsequent Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of [489] Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs),[16] which incorporates by reference Berne’s standards, including the proscription of formalities.[17]

Part I of this Article describes the conditional copyright regime that characterized U.S. law for almost two centuries and explores the role that formalities played in maintaining copyright’s traditional balance.

Part II sets out the consequences of our post-1976 move away from conditional copyright and toward an unconditional system. In this Part, I argue that formalities served an important role in filtering out of copyright works for which exclusive rights are not expected to provide a benefit to authors, thereby focusing copyright protection on works for which exclusive rights could be expected to add to the inducement to creative effort that is the primary justification for copyright.

The removal of formalities has had a profound effect on the nature and reach of U.S. copyright law. In fact, although the lengthening of the copyright term has attracted significant attention, and the removal of formalities almost none, the latter arguably represents the more significant change in terms of expanding the domain of copyright beyond works for which application of the law is useful in inducing investment in creative works, and, consequently, reducing copyright’s social utility.

It nonetheless may be true that the elimination of mandatory formalities, at least the particular forms that the law imposed before 1976, made sense given the circumstances (principally the desire to gain admission to the Berne Convention) that faced Congress at the time. Very quickly, however, those circumstances have changed. The growth of the Internet, and, more broadly, of digital technologies, has opened up new possibilities for public access to and use of creative works that did not exist when Congress was removing formalities from copyright law. Before the digital age, the cost of copying and distribution had more effect on the ability of most people to access, use, and transform creative works than did the copyright laws. But now digital distribution is cheap and digital copying is essentially free. Today copyright law has emerged as the principal barrier to the creative reuse of a large amount of material that under the former conditional copyright regime would not have been subject to copyright in the first place. The majority of creative works have little or no commercial value, and the value of many initially successful works is quickly exhausted. For works that are not producing revenues, continued copyright protection serves no economic interest of the author. But in an [490] unconditional copyright system, commercially “dead” works are nonetheless locked up. They cannot be used as building blocks for (potentially valuable) new works without permission, and the cost of obtaining permission will often prevent use. In such instances copyright is radically unbalanced: its potential benefits are depleted, and it therefore imposes only social costs.

Part III of the Article explores how reformalizing copyright might restore the balance between incentives and access that the old conditional system maintained. The Article does not, however, argue for unilateral readoption of old-style formalities by the United States. Such a move would fail because, among other problems, it would cause the United States to fall out of compliance with Berne and TRIPs, thereby removing the United States from the international copyright and trade systems. Part III offers two alternative paths to reformalization.

The reciprocity principle. The most direct route is to change Berne to permit—but not require—signatory nations to reformalize their domestic copyright laws and to apply those formalities to foreign as well as domestic works. Toward that end, this Article proposes revisions that remove Berne’s current prohibition of formalities. In place of the previous ban, the revised Berne Convention would adopt a “reciprocity principle” requiring that all Berne jurisdictions that impose formalities (1) permit foreign authors to comply with formalities in their national laws by complying with formalities either in their home country or in the work’s country of first publication or registration and (2) adhere to a set of standards set out in Berne that are designed to make different countries’ formalities “interoperable.”

These relatively small changes to Berne could, if properly implemented, support a system that allows authors (or publishers) to comply with formalities that may be imposed in any Berne nation simply by complying with formalities in their home country. Thus, Berne nations would realize the benefits of reformalizing their domestic law without creating significant transaction costs that would deter rightsholders from publishing their works in multiple jurisdictions.

New-style formalities. It is likely, however, that changes to the current text of the Berne Convention are not possible in the near term. That should not cause us to give up on formalities. Rather, that should lead us to ask whether we can formulate a set of “new-style” formalities that would capture as many of the benefits of the former system as possible while not depending for their effectiveness on forfeiture of copyright. If formalities of this type could be reintroduced into U.S. law, they would nudge our copyright laws back toward their utilitarian past while preserving our place in the international copyright system.

Toward that end, this Article proposes a system of formalities that, although nominally voluntary, are de facto mandatory for any rightsholder whose work may have commercial value. Noncompliance with the new-style [491] formalities would subject works to a perpetual and irrevocable “default license,” with royalties set at a very low level, thus effectively moving works into the public domain. Although compulsory licenses often are criticized on the ground that they demand that a price be set for the rights at issue without a market mechanism, the default licenses that would be implemented in the set of new-style formalities would not be susceptible to this criticism. Rather than setting a price for the rights in a copyrighted work, these licenses would merely establish a threshold—i.e., that the rights were valuable enough to merit the relatively trivial investment required to comply with formalities.

Such a system of new-style formalities would replicate the important work that our pre-1976 conditional copyright system was able to do: filtering commercially valueless works out of copyright and focusing the system on those works for which it could potentially do some good. Additionally, as we shall see, it is unlikely that a set of new-style formalities based on default licenses would run afoul of the antiformalities provision of the Berne Convention.

I. THE TRADITIONAL CONTOURS OF “CONDITIONAL” COPYRIGHT

A. Formalities in the Early Copyright Statutes

Viewed from the perspective of our current law, where copyright arises the moment a piece of creative expression is fixed in a tangible medium,[18] the early U.S. copyright laws are remarkable for the variety of hurdles that an author was made to clear to gain and maintain the protection of the law. The Copyright Act of 1790,[19] the first statute enacted under the authority established in the Constitution’s Intellectual Property Clause,[20] granted rights only to U.S. authors (and their executors, administrators, and assigns) limited to the “printing, reprinting, publishing and vending” of their maps, charts, and books.[21] The term of protection was quite short: the term of copyright in the 1790 Act was fourteen years, with a fourteen-year renewal if the author survived to the end of the initial term.[22] Most importantly for present purposes, the 1790 Act required compliance with a fairly demanding series of formalities, [492] both as a condition precedent to receiving copyright protection and as a prerequisite to maintaining protection past an initial term.

First, the 1790 Act conditioned protection on the author’s registration of his work with the clerk’s office of the district court where the author resided.[23]The registration condition applied to all works—even those previously copyrighted under pre-1790 state copyright law. These works were required to be reregistered in order to gain federal protection.[24]

Second, within two months thereafter, the author was required to give notice of his copyright by publishing proof of registration in a newspaper for at least four weeks.[25] In 1802, in an enactment described as “supplementary” to the 1790 Act, Congress required, in addition to newspaper notice, that any author seeking to obtain copyright “give information” by marking each copy of his work with a prescribed copyright notice.[26] The statute required the same proof of registration published in the newspaper notice to be inserted in all published copies of books “at full length in the title-page or in the page immediately following the title.”[27] Marking according to the prescribed form was also required on all charts and maps. In all cases, the information required included the identity and location of the author and the date of copyright.[28]

Third, the author was required to deposit a copy of the work with the Secretary of State within six months of publication.[29]

Fourth, as previously mentioned, a surviving author was permitted to renew the copyright for an additional fourteen years. Renewal required the 493[492] author to reregister the copyright and to publish proof of reregistration in a newspaper. Both actions were required to be taken within the final six months of the first term.[30]

Given the complexity of these formalities, the cost of compliance was not trivial, and the consequences of noncompliance were severe. Failure to comply would result in copyright failing to arise (registration), being unenforceable (notice, deposit), or being subject to early termination, with entry of the work into the public domain (renewal).

Thus, at its inception the American copyright system required compliance with a series of formalities that included registration, deposit, and notice via both marking and published announcement. The system also demanded reregistration (renewal) as a prerequisite for enjoyment of the full term of protection—a term which was very short, judged from the perspective of today’s extended copyright periods.

This emphasis on formalities established in the Founders’ copyright statutes stayed almost entirely intact through the revisions of the copyright law enacted in 1831[31] and 1909.[32] The 1831 Act extended the initial term of copyright to twenty-eight years,[33] but kept the registration, deposit, and notice requirements of the 1790 Act,[34] as well as the requirement that copyright owners renew their copyrights to secure the benefits of a second term.[35] In a supplemental enactment in 1834, Congress strengthened the registration requirement by requiring, for the purpose of maintaining an accurate record of copyright ownership, the recordation of “all deeds or instruments in writing for the transfer or assignment of copyrights.”[36] Failure to record a transfer within sixty days meant that the transfer would be judged “fraudulent and void against any subsequent purchaser or mortgagee for valuable consideration without notice.”[37]

Like the 1831 Act, the 1909 Act retained the registration,[38] notice,[39] and renewal[40] requirements—though it lengthened the renewal term from fourteen to twenty-eight years[41] and softened the registration requirement somewhat.[42][493] And there copyright came to rest, until its major revision—and the beginning of the move from conditional to unconditional copyright—in 1976.

B. From Conditional to Unconditional Copyright

Our former conditional copyright regime extended copyright protection only to those who took affirmative steps to claim copyright protection by registering their works, marking them with notice of copyright, and renewing their rights at the end of an initial term. In contrast, our current unconditional copyright regime grants copyright protection to all “fixed” creative works, whether or not the author or his assigns takes any affirmative steps to claim copyright protection. Unconditional copyright grants protection whether or not the work is registered, marked, or renewed. Protection is automatic and indiscriminate, regardless of the will of the author or his assigns.

1. Voluntary registration and notice

Of course, formalities have not disappeared entirely: current law relies on voluntary formalities and offers significant inducements to compliance. Registration creates a presumption of “constructive notice” that a work is under copyright,[43] which is useful to a plaintiff in an infringement action. More broadly, registration is a prerequisite to the initiation of an infringement action,[44] at least for works of U.S. origin. (Because a flat ban on enforcement of an unregistered copyright was believed to violate the Berne Convention,[45]there is no registration prerequisite to bringing suit for infringement of a work of foreign origin.) Current law also limits recovery of statutory damages and attorney’s fees to instances of infringement occurring after registration[46] and [495] disallows the defense of innocent infringement for works imprinted with notice of copyright.[47]

The law provides a somewhat weaker scheme to incent voluntary recordation of transfers of copyright ownership—recordation of transfers creates a presumption of constructive notice but is not a prerequisite to an infringement action, and failure to record does not limit infringement damages.[48]

However substantial these inducements may be for owners of valuable copyrights who foresee the possibility of infringement litigation, they are not a replacement for mandatory formalities. The current system of voluntary formalities creates no incentive for compliance for the large number of rightsholders who do not expect their works to produce significant revenue. For these rightsholders, any disadvantage that noncompliance may create in infringement litigation is irrelevant.

Data on the rate of copyright registration confirms what logic suggests. Figure 1 graphs the annual number of registrations for the period 1910-2000.[49]

FIGURE 1: COPYRIGHT REGISTRATIONS (EXCLUDING RENEWALS), 1910-2000

[NOT SHOWN]

[496] This graph, which has been taken from a study of U.S. Copyright Office data by William Landes and Richard Posner, shows that the gross number of registrations had been increasing sharply from the end of World War I through 1991. After 1991, however, the number of registrations stabilized at a level approximately twenty percent lower than that reached in 1991, despite very significant growth in the overall economy between that year and 2000 (a rate of growth that doubtless was mirrored, if not exceeded, by the increase in the nation’s “expressive output”).[50] The number of registrations should have continued to grow after 1991, perhaps at an even greater rate than it had in the prior decades, yet it dropped in 1992 and has failed to increase since.

Some portion of these missing registrations is comprised of authors who, because they see no realistic prospect of commercial return from their works and do not foresee infringement litigation, are not moved by the law’s current inducements to register. Under the pre-1976 conditional copyright system, their works would have moved immediately into the public domain, where they were usable without the need to ask permission and could potentially serve as building blocks for future works that might find commercial success. In our post-1976 unconditional regime, however, many of these works are effectively dead. They are copyrighted, and therefore are usable only with permission. But the cost of obtaining permission is far from trivial. The would-be user first must [496] locate a rightsholder, and then negotiate for rights. The cost of negotiating a license may be high when neither the licensor nor the licensee has any information from other market transactions that would help establish the value of a license. But many would-be users will never get to the negotiation stage: the cost of identifying rightsholders, without the benefit of a registry, and often without any reliable indication of current ownership from the work itself (either because the work is not marked with notice or because rights have been transferred without recordation), will often be enough to deter the use.

Perhaps the best illustration of the difficulties users face in identifying rightsholders is the admission of the major record companies in the Napster litigation that they were unable to produce a complete list of the copyrighted works they claimed to own.[51] Similarly, a visit to the website of the Harry Fox Agency, the organization set up by the music publishing industry to administer the collective licensing of musical copyrights, reveals that the agency has lost track of hundreds of music publishing companies to whom it may owe royalties.[52] If record companies and the music publishing industry’s own licensing agency are unable to quickly and cheaply identify the rightsholders to whom they should be sending royalty checks, the overall cost to users of doing so, especially in the case of works that are not commercially successful, is likely to be substantial.

Indeed, it is not surprising that the record companies apparently invest so little in maintaining careful records; many of the works that they own are worth too little, in terms of expected future revenues, to merit the expense required to keep track of them. The situation in books is probably worse: a study by Jason Schultz of data in annual book catalogs suggests that only a tiny fraction of the total number of books ever published is still in print—“for example, of 10,027 books published in the U.S. in 1930, only 174 [i.e., 1.7%] were still in print in 2001.”[53] Publishing companies with enormous back-catalogs of out-of-print books may find that the cost of negotiating licenses for many uses outweighs expected revenues. Their back-catalogs are, therefore, effectively dead.

In sum, the transaction costs imposed by a system of unconditional copyright prevent many uses that may otherwise have been made. For unregistered works—and probably for many registered works as well[54]—the current system imposes costs without producing countervailing benefits in the form of revenues to rightsholders.

[498] 2. Renewal

Unlike registration and notice, which live on as ghosts, the renewal term is well and truly dead. Under current law, all works dating from 1978 or later are protected for a “unified” term, which is currently set for individual works at life of the author plus seventy years, and for corporate and anonymous works at ninety-five years.[55]

FIGURE 2: COPYRIGHT RENEWALS, 1910-2000

[NOT SHOWN]

FIGURE 3: RATE OF COPYRIGHT RENEWAL, 1910-2000

[499] Figure 2 graphs the annual number of copyright renewals for the period 1910-2000; Figure 3 graphs the annual rate of copyright renewal—i.e., the number of renewals each year as a percentage of the total number of works for which the initial term was due to expire.[56] Both graphs show what one would expect: after renewal for pre-1978 works became automatic in 1992,[57] both the total number of renewals and the rate of renewal plummeted.[58]

[500] II. FORMALITIES AND THE “TRADITIONAL CONTOURS” OF CONDITIONAL COPYRIGHT

 To understand the role that formalities have traditionally played in copyright law, and the consequences of our move from conditional to unconditional copyright, it is helpful to think about formalities as they function in a different and perhaps more familiar context: real property.

When you buy a house, you record the transfer of title. You do so because the law requires you to, but if you take a moment to think about the reasons for the law, you will probably grasp fairly quickly that compliance is in your best interest. By recording your title, you will be able to prove your ownership when you eventually wish to sell the house. Indeed, you were probably only willing to buy it in the first place—and were able to convince the bank to grant you a mortgage—because you were able to confirm, through a title search, that the person who sold it to you actually held valid title and therefore had the right to convey the property.

In the case of real estate transactions, records of ownership are ordinarily maintained by local governments. The requirement that title be recorded is a form of government regulation, but no one complains, in this particular context, that government is interfering in the “free market” for real estate. For most people, their house is their biggest investment. Many would not be willing to make that investment without a clear record that the seller actually owns the house offered for sale. In this case, a regulatory scheme that creates a centralized record of ownership is a rational response to a fundamental characteristic of real estate—its expense, which makes would-be buyers uneasy unless ownership is transparent.

Formalities played an analogous role of recording ownership for the intangible form of property in literary and artistic works that we refer to as copyright. While the U.S. Copyright Office, which maintains the copyright registry, has never succeeded in making it as reliable or as easy to search as a typical real estate title registry, it was nonetheless the case that, back when registration was mandatory, the copyright registry allowed many would-be users of a creative work to determine quickly and inexpensively whether the work in question was indeed subject to copyright, and, if so, from whom to seek a license.

As in the case of real estate, formalities have been implemented in the copyright context because they address a special characteristic of the particular type of property at issue. The property interest protected by copyright is intangible—unlike real estate or personal property, the property embodied in copyright has no unique physical existence. A painting, a book, a compact disc containing an audio recording: all are physical objects, but the expression fixed [501] in each of them may, absent the workings of the law, freely be copied and ownership of copies transferred. Therefore, although the question of who owns a particular copy of a book presents no more difficulty than does ownership of any particular piece of personal property, the question of who owns rights in the expression contained in the book most often cannot be answered simply by understanding who owns the book. The registration, notice, and recordation formalities created the information about ownership that mere possession of a copyrighted work could not.

 Ownership in the copyright context may be less transparent than in the case of personal or real property, but the question of ownership is nonetheless a very important one to our copyright system for at least two reasons. The first is that the rights granted by the copyright laws are, unlike rights in most other forms of property, temporary. Of the various limitations that the Constitution’s Intellectual Property Clause imposes on Congress’s power to grant copyrights and patents, none is more visible than the dictate that exclusive rights may be granted only for “limited times.” This limitation, and others in the clause, are designed to balance the need to give authors and artists incentives to create with the equally important imperative, in a society committed to free expression, that public access to creative works not be impeded by government-granted monopoly. So the author (or his assign) is given a period of exclusive ownership during which he is free to profit from his work to whatever extent his exclusive right will allow. At the end of this period, however, the work remits to the public, making it available as the raw material for future acts of creativity.

Of course, if this balancing act is to work, would-be users need to know when ownership of a copyrighted work began and when it will end. By creating information about ownership and the term of protection—both at the inception of copyright (registration, notice), and later (recordation, renewal)—copyright formalities fulfilled the important function of signaling that works had moved from the private market to the public domain. As such, formalities were important in ensuring that the “limited times” requirement was operative at the level of individual works.

2. Maximizing private incentives

Ownership is also important for reasons that have to do not so much with maintaining the copyright balance, but with fully realizing the first element of that balance—i.e., copyright’s role in spurring creation of new works. Often, copyright owners profit by allowing others to exploit their works through licensing arrangements. Indeed, because exploitation of creative works often [502] requires significant investment that authors may be ill-placed to undertake, licensing is a crucial mechanism for transferring rights from authors to those entities—such as film studios, book publishers, and record companies—best able to exploit them.

Because licensing is efficient, intellectual property policy generally seeks to encourage it. Of course, licensing will be more prevalent if the transaction costs of negotiating a license are low; historically, copyright formalities helped to lower the transaction costs of licensing. They did so by creating information about ownership and the term of protection, which simplified the process of identifying licensors and also clarified the length of the term of exclusive ownership that would be the subject of a license.

B. Formalities as a Copyright “Filter”

Formalities constructed a record of ownership, but they served another, arguably even more important, function: allowing authors and artists to distinguish between works for which they desired copyright protection and those for which they did not. Formalities performed this “filtering” function in two ways.

1. Registration and notice

Until the 1976 Act, the registration and notice requirements served as initial conditions for which noncompliance meant copyright either did not arise or was unenforceable. Although these initial obligations were easily satisfied, many published works were neither registered nor marked with copyright notice, indicating that the authors did not desire the protection that the copyright laws would otherwise provide—i.e., that they did not project a net present value for royalty revenue from their work that exceeded the relatively trivial costs of complying with the formalities. Thus the registration and notice formalities imposed an initial filter separating works with significant potential commercial value for which authors desired protection from other works for which protection was irrelevant. The latter class of works moved immediately into the public domain, where it was freely usable by others (most importantly as the building material for new works) without fee or the need to ask permission. Furthermore, because of the notice formality, the public domain status of many works was readily recognizable under the pre-1976 rules, even without the need to consult a registry.

How important was this initial filter? In an age where a popular book or record can return many millions of dollars for its copyright owner, it may be difficult to understand why any creator would fail to comply with inexpensive and relatively simple formalities and allow a work eligible for copyright to fall into the public domain. But there are hints in the historical record suggesting [503] that noncompliance was common. This next section looks at the available historical data and attempts to quantify the effect of the initial filter.

Data on the effect of the registration formality: 1790-1870. Prior to the 1976 Act, all unpublished material was subject to perpetual common law copyright. The relevant question, then, is what percentage of published material was registered and made subject to copyright. The fact that a particular work was published suggests that it had some value, and one would assume that a relatively significant percentage of published works would be registered for the purpose of gaining protection under federal copyright. Yet a 1987 study by James Gilreath and Elizabeth Carter Wills of records assembled by the Library of Congress found that of the more than 15,000 maps, charts, and books (including pamphlets) that were published in the United States between 1790 and 1800, only 779 were registered and thus protected by copyright—a registration rate of approximately 5%.[59] William Maher, in a recent reexamination of the Gilreath/Wills study, finds that the earlier study made several errors that inflated the registration rate. Maher’s recalculation, using more complete bibliographic materials, suggests that the registration rate during that early period was even lower—3.28%.[60]

The Gilreath/Wills and Maher studies may both understate the rate of registration. Both studies count some published works from this period that were of foreign origin, and thus not eligible for protection under the 1790 Act. And neither study accounts for the loss of some early copyright records.[61] But even if the Gilreath/Wills and Maher studies offer only rough approximations, they suggest that a small percentage—probably at most only between 10% and 20% of works eligible for copyright protection—were registered in the decade following the 1790 Act.[62]

[504] I could not find any existing study that calculates a rate of copyright registration for any period following 1800. I therefore attempted my own post­1800 calculation. What follows is a study of data regarding the registration rate through 1870, which is the latest date for which data exists allowing estimates of both total copyright registrations (the numerator in my calculation) and total published copyrightable works (the denominator).[63]

Construction of both the numerator and the denominator posed significant difficulties. First, for the period between 1790 and 1870, only the copyright registrations for 1790 through 1800 have been indexed and published.[64]Though catalogued, the registrations for 1800 through 1870 have not been precisely quantified, subdivided by type or date, or published.[65] Compounding the challenge, over the period in question (1801-1870), imprints (1803), music (1831), and photographs (1865) were added to the types of items that could be copyrighted.

What I did have was a well-regarded estimate of 150,000 for total registrations for the period between 1790 and 1870.[66] This number may be too low, because some records have been lost, or too high, because not all copyrighted items were actually published.[67] Given an inability to correct for these factors, and given that they are likely to be relatively small and at least partially offsetting, we will use 149,221 as our numerator—150,000 total registrations for 1790 through 1870, minus 779 registrations for 1790 through 1800—in our attempt to quantify the impact of the registration requirement for the period from 1801 through 1870.

[505] Calculation of the denominator—total published works between 1801 and 1870—is more complex. The period from 1790 to 1800 lent itself to quantification for two principal reasons: first, because of the existence of a well-respected source for total imprints, Evans’s American Bibliography, and second, because only maps, charts, and books could be copyrighted. The Evans bibliographic collection was continued only through 1846.[68] Though there is a credible source for total copyrightable music titles produced in our period (i.e., 1831, when music became copyrightable, through 1870),[69] I could not find comparable sources for prints, maps, or photographs. Still, even taking the data we do have, the impact of the registration requirement appears considerable: from 1801 through 1870 we have records of 196,683 imprints and an estimate of 163,500 music titles, as compared to 149,221 total registrations, or 41.43% of published works being copyrighted. Thus, for the first seventy years of the nineteenth century, the data suggests that less than half of all published works were copyrighted.[70]

However, there are several areas of uncertainty that might cause this percentage to be incorrect. First, there are several potentially significant factors that make the 41.43% figure appear likely to be too high. Most obviously, because we only have a number for imprints through 1846, the denominator is almost certainly too small. There are several ways to correct for this data deficiency. Simply continuing the number of imprints recorded annually from 1847 through 1870 at the same level of production as 1846 gives a total of 383,475 imprints, making the percentage copyrighted drop to 27.28%. Continuing the trend in text production in this way is very conservative, given what we know about the growth of the publishing industry at this time[71] and [506] how much both population and GDP grew over this period—the latter made especially significant by the extent to which the data recorded by Evans and his successors tracks growth in both GDP and population. If instead of our assumption of no growth in annual text production, we correlate the annual production of texts with growth in population, then total texts leaps to 468,956, and the percentage copyrighted falls further to 23.59%; if tied to GDP growth, total texts would be 514,350, and the percentage copyrighted falls still further to 22.01%.

FIGURE 4: TOTAL TEXT PRODUCTION AND U.S. POPULATION GROWTH[72]

[NOT SHOWN]

[507] FIGURE 5: TOTAL TEXT PRODUCTION AND U.S. GDP GROWTH[73]

[NOT SHOWN]

It is important to note that one cannot assume that Evans’s successor collections actually succeeded in cataloging all imprints for 1790 through 1846; it is almost certainly the case that those collections undercounted significantly, especially for more ephemeral items like pamphlets. I have not found an estimate of the likely undercount, but it may be considerable. For example, Clarence Brigham’s survey of extant booksellers’ catalogs identifies twenty-five out of sixty-seven total that were not included by Evans, a 37% undercount.[74] The tendency for the bibliographic references to undercount would understate the denominator of our calculation and thus artificially inflate the estimate of the percentage of published works copyrighted.

The denominator would increase even more dramatically (and the percentage of works copyrighted would drop further) if there were a way of calculating the total number of copyrightable items within a periodical, since authors were required to secure the copyrights for their articles before publication, as Oliver Wendell Holmes, Sr., learned to his dismay.[75] In general, the numbers we have for periodicals in these collections undercount even the [508] titles of periodicals, let alone the articles within them.[76] There were approximately 1200 American newspapers in 1833 and 3000 in 1860.[77] As for periodicals, there were a few hundred in 1833 and more than a thousand in 1860.[78] Since there were no periodicals counted in the bibliographic collection for 1820 through 1846, these copyrightable items are not taken into account in the measure of the number of total imprints (i.e., in the denominator of our calculation).[79] To give some perspective of the undercount, if there were as few as a thousand periodicals published per year on average between 1820 and 1870, and if each of these periodicals contained two copyrightable articles per year, then periodicals alone would have accounted for all of the 150,000 copyright registrations between 1790 and 1870.

We might expect another potentially large increase in the denominator (i.e., another large drop in the percentage of works copyrighted) if we were able to reliably count copyrightable commercial work product (such as labels) produced during the relevant period. These works were copyrightable from 1803 and clearly were registered and deposited in significant enough numbers to arouse indignation in the Librarian of Congress.[80] In 1873 there were 2520 prints deposited, which shows a general awareness that these objects could be copyrighted, but this is likely a small portion of the total output of these works in that year, considering the country’s population was then already 43 million, with an economy of $119 billion.

There are also factors that would tend to decrease the denominator and thus increase our estimate of the percentage of works that were copyrighted. Evans and his successors included government publications in their lists, which were not copyrightable. More significantly, works by foreign authors were not copyrightable until after 1890, and these works comprised a large portion of American production. Here, too, there is no hard data, but there is a clear overall trend, namely toward a majority of works being written by American [509] authors by the 1840s.[81] An assumption that 50% of total texts were of foreign origin is conservative, as that figure is not only at the upper end of contemporary estimates, but also does not take into account that a disproportionately large percentage of the total number of texts in the denominator were produced in the final two decades of the period in question— i.e., at a time when works by American authors comprised the majority of works published in the United States. A brief inspection of the three bibliographic collections suggests—although an exact identification of all foreign works is impossible from the data provided—that foreign authors do not make up nearly half of the works recorded.[82] I have not found any similar estimates of the percentage of music publication that was the work of foreigners. Even discounting the total number of titles (both texts and music) by 50% and using the most conservative method for calculating the number of imprints between 1846 and 1870 (i.e., the flatline method), 54.56%, or just [510] more than one in two copyrightable works, were actually copyrighted for the period 1801 through 1870.

Examination of specialized collections. This global estimate is corroborated by evidence drawn from specialized bibliographic collections from the end of our period. Almost two decades ago, Professor Robert Harlan assembled and analyzed a uniquely comprehensive collection of 2571 works published in San Francisco from 1850 through 1870.[83]He found that the San Francisco publishing industry, in a period when the book publishing industry was much more advanced than it was for much of our broader 1801-1870 time frame, produced 632 books (defined as works over forty-nine pages), 202 broadsheets, and 1737 pamphlets and other ephemera.[84] Harlan has notes for 2053 of these works, recording whether individual works bore copyright notice. Harlan found that only 13.48% of these published and copyrightable texts were copyright noticed.[85] The percentage is higher for certain categories, such as collections of laws and cases (86.05%), almanacs and directories (74.42%), and books generally (56.34%). Of all remaining items, i.e., texts of forty-nine pages or less, only 3.95% were copyright noticed.

A review of some of the works studied by Harlan found that the works not copyright noticed were neither all ephemeral nor obviously different from or of less value (either commercial or cultural) than the works that were noticed. For example, A Practical Illustration of the Movements of Hurricanes, with Plain Directions How They May Be Avoided (eight pages, with diagrams, 1862) was not copyright noticed, while The Law of Storms: The Various Phenomena by Which Their Approach Can Be Ascertained with Certainty, and Practical Directions to Mariners for the Avoidance of Their Fury (nineteen pages, 1869) was noticed. The Miners’ Own Book: Containing Correct Illustrations and Descriptions of the Various Modes of California Mining, Including All the Improvements Introduced from the Earliest Day to the Present Time (thirty-two [511] pages, 1858) and Sketches of the Washoe Silver Mines (twenty-four pages, 1860) were not copyright noticed,[86] but Guide to the Colorado Mines (sixteen pages, including map, 1863) was noticed.

Most sermons were not copyright noticed, but liberal cleric Laurentine Hamilton, founder of the Hamilton Free Church,[87] did notice his sermons.[88]Joseph Josselyn, M.D., did not notice his medical work “Man, Know Thyself!”: A Treatise upon Sexual and Other Diseases (forty-seven pages, 1866), while the California Illustrated Family Medical Almanac was noticed and registered (1858). Not all works on law are copyright noticed. For example, James William Shaw’s pamphlet Land Titles in San Francisco (sixteen pages, 1862) was not noticed. Useful educational tools, though also often copyrighted, were not always. For instance, Bernhard Marks’s textbook Normal Tract on Numeration and Notation (fifteen pages, 1869), was noticed; John Martin Spalding’s more polemical Common Schools in the United States Compared with Those in Europe: Being a Review of the Work of Joseph Kay, Esq., on the Results of Primary Schools in Different European Countries (thirty-two pages, 1860) was not noticed.[89]

Interestingly, in examining Harlan’s data, I found several works that had been copyright noticed between 1851 and 1862 but were not recorded in the transcribed copyright records discussed above.[90] Harlan found the same phenomenon occurring when he examined the output of one of the major California publishers of this period, the Anton Roman firm. Of the sixty-five works Roman published from 1860 through 1870, forty-five, or 69% of the total, were copyright noticed, but of these Harlan could find only twenty-six, or [512] 40% of the total, actually registered in the records now at the Library of Congress.[91] So Roman apparently was making decisions not only regarding which works to copyright notice, but regarding which should be actually registered.

For the period after the centralization of copyright records in the Library of Congress, there is definitive information on the total number of copyright registrations by type. Unfortunately, because of the lack of bibliographic studies, calculating total production of copyrightable items after 1846 becomes impossible. Yet strong indications remain of the continued impact of the registration requirement after 1846, even in an increasingly commercial society. I conducted a survey of the holdings of the Bancroft Library at the University of California, Berkeley, for San Francisco publications for the year 1908 and found that 20.95% of works were copyrighted, with a significantly higher percentage of books copyrighted (34.09%) and a much smaller percentage of the remaining, more ephemeral items copyrighted (11.48%).[92]Though the San Francisco publishing industry declined considerably after 1870,[93] the works that were published, including those not copyrighted, could be of considerable political—especially local political—importance. For instance, The Treatment of the Exempt Classes of Chinese in the United States: A Statement from the Chinese in America by Poon Chew Ng (fifteen pages), Shame of the Relief; Being an Expose of the Disgraceful Methods of the Relief Committee During the Dark Days Following San Francisco’s Great Disaster by Mary Kelly (fifteen pages), and In the Shadow of the Gallows, an Innocent Man Condemned to Die: Resume of the Case of William Buckley, Who Will Die [513] on the Gallows Unless Governor Gillett Interferes by Frank J. Murphy (fifty­six pages) were not copyrighted.[94]

I also conducted a survey of the poster collection of the Hoover Institution Archives at Stanford University. The posters collected tended overwhelmingly to concern political issues. Of all the posters in the collection from before 1976 (a total of 5756), less than a third, at the most, were copyrighted.[95]

Copyright office data. Although it cannot alone quantify the rate of registration, Copyright Office data on the annual number of copyright registrations does suggest that the rate of registration is responsive to relatively small changes in registration fees. This suggests, in turn, that many authors do not project a significant net present value for their works, and consequently place a low value on copyright protection.

Referring back to Figure 1, which graphs the annual number of registrations for the period from 1910 to 2000, the data shows that registrations more than quintupled during this period, reflecting both economic and population growth. The absolute number of registrations fell briefly after 1976 (as one might expect, given the shift in that year from mandatory to voluntary registration), but quickly began to rise again, reaching a peak in 1991. After 1991, however, the number of registrations began to decline; by 2000, registrations had declined by almost twenty percent from the 1991 peak. Landes and Posner argue that the post-1991 decline is likely related to increases in the registration fee imposed during that period: the fee increased from $10 to $20 in 1991, and increased again to $30 in 2000.[96]These relatively trivial increases in the cost of registration, and the contemporaneous changes in the rate of registration, represent a kind of natural experiment suggesting that, at the beginning of the copyright term, many authors place a low net present value—as low as $20 or $30 plus the similarly trivial cost of complying with the deposit, notice, and renewal requirements—on their works.[97] More recent [514] data confirms that the number of registrations has remained flat at a level below its 1991 peak. In 2003 the Copyright Office registered 534,122 works;[98] in 2002, 521,041 works;[99] in 2001, 601,659 works.[100] These figures confirm that the basic dynamic of the 1992-2000 period has persisted: unlike prior to 1991, when registrations had been rising at a significant rate, registration growth has ceased following the increase in fees.

The registration requirement thus encouraged authors to assess the value of their works prior to first publication. If the author expected the work to have a commercial value in excess of the time-adjusted cost of complying with registration and other formalities, he would take the steps necessary to obtain copyright protection. But if the costs of protection exceeded the expected revenues from copyrighting, the author would not register the work.[101]

In sum, this initial filter separating commercially valuable works from commercially valueless works helped focus the pre-1976 copyright regime in a way that maximized the incentive value of copyright while reducing the social costs. It makes sense to exclude from copyright the many works for which (in the author’s judgment) protection is unlikely to provide more than trivial returns, for in those cases the primary effect of copyright is to burden subsequent use without countervailing private or public benefits.

[515] In our current unconditional copyright system, we have discarded this initial filter, and, as a result, copyright burdens the creative process in ways that it did not previously. For works that lack significant commercial value but nonetheless have some cultural significance—as, for example, an exemplar of some historical trend in politics, literature, or the arts—unconditional copyright raises the cost of copying the work for noncommercial or scholarly uses by at least the value of the time spent identifying the rightsholder and seeking permission.

An example of this problem would be an academic study of the advent and explosive growth of Internet “weblogs.”[102] Imagine that the author wished to use a large number of weblog postings as source material for his analysis. Unless the subject weblogs signaled freedom of use through a publicly noticed free license,[103] the academic who wanted to include a large number of weblog posts in his study would be obliged either to clear rights to each post (or at least each post from which he wanted to draw more than limited quotations), or to trust his fate to the vagaries of the fair use doctrine.[104] The burden of clearing rights for a large number of sources would make the academic project much more expensive.

Similarly, unconditional copyright also burdens potentially valuable transformative uses by raising the cost of using commercially valueless source material as building blocks for derivative works that take the original, improve on it, and find a market for the final product. Examples abound of derivative works that enjoy commercial success far surpassing their source material. One [516] relatively recent instance is the song “Superman,” a hit in 1986 for the Athens, Georgia, band R.E.M. “Superman” had originally been released in 1969 by The Clique, an obscure Houston, Texas, group. The Clique’s version of the song was not a hit (in fact, it was the “B side” to The Clique’s only hit single, “Sugar On Sunday”), and the band released only one album which, by the time R.E.M. recorded its cover, had long been “out of print.” Due, however, to the popularity of the R.E.M. cover version of “Superman,” a compilation recording of The Clique’s work was reissued in 1998.[105]

Reworkings of musical performances are addressed by the provision of the Copyright Act imposing compulsory licenses for “mechanical rights”—i.e., an automatic license that gives artists the ability to record and distribute their own versions of musical compositions for a fee set by statute.[106] But for derivative works other than new performances of musical compositions, an author wishing to use even the most obscure and commercially valueless material must identify a rightsholder and ask permission. The necessity of identifying rightsholders and negotiating rights raises the cost of creating derivative works. Consequently, output of potentially valuable derivative works will fall under an unconditional copyright regiume, in comparison to a conditional regime in which commercially valueless source materials are filtered out of the copyright system at their inception.

Although the utility of the registration and notice formalities seems obvious, they have more often been viewed, on balance, as a hindrance. A 1904 report by the Register of Copyrights makes that point, lamenting that “a system has gradually grown up under which valuable literary rights have come to depend upon exact compliance with the statutory formalities which have no relation to the equitable rights involved, and the question may very well be raised whether this condition should be continued.”[107] Criticism of formalities and tales of hardship arising from accidental noncompliance abound in the historical copyright literature.[108]

[517] There are two principal responses to the “unintentional noncompliance” objection to formalities. The first is that failure to comply with formalities is “endogenous”—i.e., failure to comply with mandatory formalities is evidence that the value of the work in question is less than the cost of educating oneself about and complying with a particular formality.[109] Because a person in possession of rights to a valuable work has an incentive to educate himself about the steps required to perfect and maintain those rights, we need not concern ourselves with noncompliance—it is not evidence of a failure of the system of formalities, but a signal that the prospect of obtaining or maintaining rights in the work is not valuable enough to merit the required investment in compliance.

Of course, many would prefer that noncompliance with formalities reflect an informed decision, rather than a mistake. The second response to the noncompliance problem proceeds from the assumption that we are not willing to ignore noncompliance as “endogenous.” The rate of noncompliance is dependent, to some extent, upon the difficulty of educating oneself about and then complying with a particular formality. Administering registration and renewal through simple online forms would lower the cost of complying with these formalities and reduce the incidence of unintentional noncompliance. Similarly, turning over the task of administering registration and renewal formalities to a number of private firms would, by sparking competition to expand the pool of consumers of “formalities-compliance services,” increase the availability of consumer information about compliance with formalities and further reduce the incidence of unintentional noncompliance. Professor Lawrence Lessig has suggested that private provision of formalities-compliance services could be modeled on the current system for registering Internet domain names—i.e., a central registry maintained by government or a public-private partnership (like the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN),[110] which maintains the main top-level Internet domains (.com, .org, .net)) into which many competing registrars feed the data that is submitted by consumers. (In the Internet context, firms like Stargate.com[111] and Network Solutions[112] compete to offer domain name registration services.) As Lessig notes, competition between competing registrars drives down the cost of registering an Internet domain name and increases the ease with which [518] registration occurs.[113] There is no reason that competition could not do the same in the context of compliance with copyright formalities.

There is one final observation (not exactly an objection) related to the filtering function of registration and notice. It might be argued that, even in our current unconditional system, authors are free to dedicate their works to the public domain, and therefore rather than reinstall formalities, we should encourage public domain deeding as a method of filtering commercially valueless works out of copyright. But dedication to the public domain is not a substitute for the filtering function that formalities provide in a conditional copyright system. First, there is no provision in our current unconditional regime establishing rules for how dedication may be accomplished, and it has never been conclusively determined under current law that one may irreversibly dedicate a work to the public domain (though dedication has been judicially enforced under pre-1976 law[114]).

Assuming dedication can be done, it must be accomplished by a license “to the world,” via, for example, a statement imprinted on all copies of a published work that “the author grants a nonexclusive right to any person to use this work in any way.” The process of dedication is thus the mirror image of compliance with registration and notice formalities. In a conditional system, a rightsholder must invest in compliance with formalities to obtain protection. In an unconditional system, a rightsholder must spend time and money on the process of dedication in order to disclaim protection. The conditional system relies on self-interest to filter commercially valueless works out of copyright. The dedication process in an unconditional system relies on altruism, and its effect is therefore inevitably limited.

To be clear, I do not mean to suggest that, in our current unconditional system, public domain dedication should not be encouraged. Dedication is not a complete answer, but it can help, and new ways should be found to make the process more effective. Creative Commons, a project formed by a group of activists, academics, and content creators to give rightsholders choices about how their works may be used in addition to the “all rights reserved” default of the formal copyright law, has been active on this front.[115]

Creative Commons provides a variety of “some rights reserved” licenses, including licenses allowing free use with attribution,[116] noncommercial use,[117] [519] use without the right to make derivative works,[118] and use with the requirement that the user make freely usable any derivative work created using the original source material (referred to as the “share-alike” license,[119] similar in purpose to the “copyleft” movement’s Open Software License[120] and GNU General Public License[121]). Creative Commons also provides a “no rights reserved” public domain dedication license, which provides a perpetual and unconditional license “for the benefit of the public at large and to the detriment of the Dedicator’s heirs and successors,”[122] as well as a “Founders’ Copyright” license, under which rightsholders agree to dedicate their work to the public domain after either a fourteen- or twenty-eight-year period.[123] I will return to Creative Commons later as we consider how to build and implement new-style formalities.

2. Renewal

Until it was eliminated by the 1976 Act (for pre-1978 works) and the Copyright Renewal Act (for all other works), the renewal formality served as another filter, one that operated later in the lifecycle of the copyrighted work as an ex post test of commercial viability.

The effect of the renewal requirement was, again, to measure authors’ desire for protection. The mechanism was the same as that for the initial filter of registration, only it measured not whether a work had commercial value at its inception, but whether its value was enduring. Works that retained commercial value at the end of the initial copyright term (first fourteen and later twenty-eight years) were renewed. Authors would not bother, however, to renew works that ceased to profit them at the end of the initial term and for which they held no realistic expectation of future profit. Historically, approximately 15% of works were renewed, meaning that 85% of works moved into the public domain—by consent of rightsholders—after a relatively short term of protection.

[520] Copyright Office data on renewal rates suggests that many authors place a low value on continued copyright protection at the end of an initial copyright term. In a 1961 report based on data subsequent to the 1909 Act, the head of the Copyright Office’s Examining Division stated that, for the minority of published works that were registered and for which notice of copyright was given, less than 15% of all copyrights were being renewed.[124]

Landes and Posner, looking at Copyright Office data from 1910 to 2000, arrived at the same average rate of renewal—around 15%.[125] Figures 2 and 3, above, graph the annual number of renewals and the rate of copyright renewal, respectively, during that period. The data shows that the gross number of renewals grew by a factor of more than ten between 1910 and 1991. But the percentage of works renewed remained low throughout the period. Working from the same data used by the Copyright Office, Landes and Posner estimate the rate of renewal at less than 11% for the period between 1883 and 1964, even though the renewal fee was trivial throughout this period.[126] The rate of renewal rose somewhat between 1980 and 1990, when it reached its single-year high of 22%. Beginning in 1992, however, the rate began to decline sharply. As noted above,[127] in 1992, renewal for works copyrighted between 1964 and 1977 became automatic under the Copyright Renewal Act, and the decline in renewal was in large part driven by the elimination of renewal as a formality. But because the 1992 amendments did not eliminate all incentive to renew a work, Landes and Posner argue that the decline in renewal is also likely to be related to increases in the renewal fee, which doubled to $12 in 1991, rose to $20 in 1993, and rose again to $45 in 2000.

If the general rate of renewal is low, renewal rates of certain significant classes of works were even lower: the renewal rate for books has averaged less than 8%, and for graphic arts approximately 3%.[128] The average renewal rate over this period for music is higher (32%),[129] which one would expect given the regularity with which even very old songs are reworked with new performers and arrangements. But the renewal rate even for music peaked in 1956 and fell steadily after that. By 1969, the end of the data period for renewals disaggregated by type of work, the renewal rate for music had fallen almost to the historical norm for all works of around 15%.[130]

[521] In sum, the renewal data reinforces what the registration data suggests— that the difference between an unconditional and a conditional copyright system, in terms of the scope of the works each system reaches, is profound. In a conditional system, a substantial fraction of copyrightable works is not valuable enough at inception to merit the investment necessary to secure protection. And only a small portion of works retains enough value at the end of an initial term to merit renewal. Using Copyright Office registration and renewal data, Landes and Posner estimate an average annual depreciation rate for copyrighted works ranging between 5.4% and 12.2%,[131] which results in an average expected commercial life for copyrighted works ranging from 8.2 to 18.5 years.[132] Working from copyrights registered in a single year, 1934, the authors estimate that 50% of the registered works had fully depreciated in just 10 years, 90% in 43 years, and 99% in 65 years.[133] These findings are supported by the results of a 1998 study by the Congressional Research Service (CRS), which examined a sample of copyrights renewed after an initial term of twenty-eight years. The CRS study concluded that only 11% of renewed copyrights in books, 12% in musical works, and 26% in motion pictures had some continuing commercial value.[134]

3. Effect of the renewal formality on the real term of copyright

The renewal formality made the “real” term of copyright (in contrast to the nominal term set out in the copyright statutes) very short by our current standards. For the subset of works that was not eliminated by the initial (registration and notice) filter and was therefore subject to copyright, the longest effective copyright term prior to the 1976 Act, at an average renewal rate of 15%, was 32.2 years.[135] Using the highest historical renewal figure for all works, 22% (in 1990), the average term of copyright would be 34.2 years.[136]

Under our current unconditional copyright system, there is no longer any filtering mechanism tailoring the terms of individual works, and, consequently, the real and nominal copyright terms have converged. The 1976 Act switched from a fixed term of years to an indeterminate term for works by individual authors: at first, life of the author plus fifty years, later extended by the CTEA [522] to life plus seventy years. For corporate works—known in the argot as “works for hire”—and anonymous works, the 1976 Act fixed a term of seventy-five years from the date of publication or one hundred years from creation, whichever expired first. The CTEA extended those terms to ninety-five and one hundred twenty years, respectively.

The copyright term is now sufficiently long that the net present value to the rightsholder of a copyright is practically indistinguishable from what it would be under a perpetual term. In an amicus curiae brief submitted to the Supreme Court in support of the petitioners in Eldred v. Ashcroft, a group of economists that included Nobel Prize winners George Akerlof, Kenneth Arrow, James Buchanan, Ronald Coase, and Milton Friedman argued that the current, post-CTEA copyright term of life plus seventy years has a net present value that is 99.88% of the value of a perpetual term.[137]

That the copyright term is now effectively perpetual is an odd development in a country whose constitution specifies that copyrights may be granted only for “limited times.”[138] As will be discussed in greater detail later in this Article, [523] copyright’s primary justification in the United States, at least as it has been articulated historically, is as a means of ensuring that creators realize a large enough share of whatever revenue their works may produce to ensure that they are induced to invest in production of creative works. Copyright in the United States has tended to focus on this utilitarian justification, in contrast to a natural rights or “labor desert” paradigm that premises copyright on protection of the author’s right to the fruits of his intellectual labor, or to a moral rights paradigm in which copyright serves mainly to protect an author’s control over his identity (i.e., personality) as reflected in his creative works.[139] As Professor Paul Goldstein and others have observed, although at the level of theory one might expect our utilitarian system to operate quite differently from systems in continental Europe that are purportedly based on a mixture of natural and moral rights justifications, in reality copyright systems in the developed world have converged, and now provide a set of protections that approach what one would expect under a natural rights paradigm.[140]

Of course, the natural rights justification for copyright does not necessarily demand a perpetual term; such a system might merely impose one that allowed the author to capture substantially all of the fruits of his labor—i.e., one in which the net present value of the term was practically indistinguishable from a perpetual term. That is, as the economists’ brief in Eldred shows, exactly the kind of term we now have under the U.S. system. But even as our notions regarding the optimal copyright term have shifted closer to the natural rights paradigm, the deeper rationale for the filtering function of copyright formalities is still relevant: requiring compliance with formalities helps to reduce the social costs imposed by granting exclusive rights in expression.

4. The costs of copyright

The social cost of monopoly. Any copyright system that grants exclusive rights, whether based in a utilitarian or natural/moral rights conception, imposes a number of different social costs. First, there is an obvious economic cost, which is a specific instance of the general problem of monopoly: If a  [524] particular creative work has a market value, exclusive rights will enable the creator to charge a supracompetitive price. Consequently, access to the work will be denied to those who value it in excess of the competitive price, but less than the supracompetitive price that the monopolist is able to command.[141]Copyright, then, creates deadweight losses in markets for expression.

The monopoly costs of copyright, while very real for works that possess significant commercial value, are relatively unimportant to the commercially valueless or exhausted works that conditional copyright filtered out but unconditional copyright locks up. While an unconditional system keeps economically spent works under copyright, the persistence of exclusive rights can do little to raise the price of a piece of expression that is commercially valueless—the rightsholder, in such an instance, may have a notional “monopoly” but lack any power to demand a supracompetitive price.

Copyright’s burdens on speech. Much more important for our purposes are the two types of “cultural” costs imposed by copyright. Copyright imposes a First Amendment cost inhering in the restrictions on free speech imposed when rightsholders are allowed to prevent copying of their works. The recent copyright dispute involving Diebold Election Systems provides an example of a potentially significant First Amendment cost imposed by copyright.

Diebold manufactures electronic voting machines. Sometime in early 2003 a hacker broke into the company’s computer systems and stole a large number of internal e-mails and memoranda. Some of the stolen documents included discussions of software bugs in Diebold voting machines and warnings that the machines may produce unverifiable results and are poorly protected against hackers.[142] In August 2003, an unknown person mailed approximately 13,000 pages of the stolen data to a number of activists concerned with electronic voting, many of whom published the Diebold e-mails and memos, or linked to those documents, on their websites.

In response, Diebold sent dozens of cease-and-desist notices, pursuant to the “notice and take-down” provisions of the Digital Millenium Copyright Act (DMCA),[143] to website publishers and Internet service providers (ISPs), demanding that they remove the documents from websites and cease linking to  [525] the documents. Two recipients of the Diebold letters, a group of Swarthmore College students and an ISP providing pro bono Internet hosting to nonprofit organizations, filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment that their publication of the Diebold documents is lawful.

The district court recently issued a summary judgment ruling that suggests Diebold’s copyright misadventures may backfire.[144] The case is still pending as of this writing, but the eventual result is less relevant for our purposes than what the facts of the case say about the free speech costs of unconditional copyright. Clearly, copyright incentives have little to do with whether Diebold creates the type of corporate documents at issue in this case. Diebold’s employees and contractors create and distribute these documents in the ordinary course of the company’s business, and they will continue to do so without regard to their copyright status. In our unconditional copyright system, where the Diebold documents gain automatic copyright protection at the moment of their fixation, the only function of copyright is to allow Diebold to inhibit public discussion of whether its voting machines are reliable. In contrast, in a reformalized system, most of the Diebold documents likely never would be subject to copyright in the first place (because Diebold does not expect to profit from the content itself, it almost certainly would not invest in compliance with formalities) and consequently Diebold would be unable to use copyright law as a means of limiting discussion regarding an issue of the highest public concern.[145]

The Diebold dispute shows us that by bringing within the scope of copyright a huge number of works for which its incentive system is irrelevant, our unconditional copyright regime makes the potential conflict between copyright and the First Amendment much more severe than it would be under a conditional regime.[146] This is an important point that no court has ever addressed, but which is quickly becoming salient.

[526] Copyright “buffering” doctrines and the First Amendment. When considering the potential friction between copyright and the First Amendment, courts (including the Supreme Court in Eldred) have often pointed to two doctrines, the idea/expression dichotomy and the fair use defense, that act as buffers preventing copyright from interfering unduly with free speech. Because copyright protects only expression, courts have reasoned, ideas remain free for others to discuss and build upon. And because it is sometimes important, in talking about an idea, to use a particular bit of expression that may be protected, the fair use doctrine operates to allow the use of portions of a protected work for certain purposes—chiefly academic and journalistic criticism, and parody—that are considered necessary to maintaining the vibrancy of political and cultural debate.

Although the Eldred Court was not entirely clear on the point, its opinion may be taken to suggest that these doctrines are “traditional contours” of copyright that, left untouched, suffice to protect copyright’s cohabitation with the First Amendment.[147] But the Court’s reliance on these doctrines is almost certain to come under increasing strain. The idea/expression dichotomy makes perfect sense for one medium, written text, where the separation of idea from expression is relatively straightforward. But the dichotomy never applied particularly well to nontextual media, such as music or graphic arts, where the “idea” is difficult, if not impossible, to separate from the expression. As technology shifts creativity toward new media that focus on “sampling,” “remixing,” or “mashing up” bits of film, text, music, and graphic arts, we can expect to see fewer instances where the idea/expression dichotomy can do much to insulate the use of “ideas” from infringement liability.

A similar dynamic is now undermining the fair use doctrine. In the old media world of paper books, celluloid films, magnetic videotapes, and vinyl recordings (or even, until recently, unencrypted CDs), one gained the ability to make a fair use simply by acquiring a copy of the work. Because there were exceedingly few analogues, in the analog world, to today’s digital encryption and rights-management technologies, one was granted access by virtue of possession. But in the digital environment, possession does not necessarily imply the ability to make fair uses. Digital works are often encrypted, and the DMCA imposes civil and criminal penalties for the use—or even the distribution—of technologies designed to circumvent copy controls protecting copyrighted works.[148] Courts in cases like Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley have held that the right of fair use does not imply a right of access to [527] copyrighted works that may be required to make a fair use.[149] That holding threatens to make fair use a mirage as technology shifts creativity from analog to digital media.

Assessing whether fair use includes some notion of fair access is one of the areas where copyright analogies from the analog world break down. Questions of access in the analog world only come up when the access sought is to someone else’s property. How could it be otherwise, since possession of analog materials necessarily entails access to make a copy? In contrast, the issue we confront in the digital world is access to one’s own property for the purpose of making fair uses. Put that way, a judicially established right of access would not seem to require much of a logical leap. But to say that there is not currently a judicially established right of access to make fair uses of copyrighted materials is not especially meaningful. In the analog world we lived in until only yesterday (at least in the time frame of the law), the question simply never came up.

For the moment, however, it is clear that if fair use in the digital environment depends on fair access, the opportunities to make fair uses in a world of strong (and legally enforced) encryption are going to be substantially restricted. As with the idea/expression dichotomy, the shift from the analog to the digital environment has altered (or, more precisely, has constricted) the “traditional contours” of the fair use doctrine. In the case of fair use, however, the effect is worse, because it is not simply the product of shifting technologies, but of government action—i.e., the DMCA, which prohibits circumvention without providing any exception for fair use access.

So if the idea/expression dichotomy and fair use have been enfeebled, are there other “traditional contours” of copyright that remain vigorous enough to mediate between copyright and the First Amendment? There is—or at least was—a third “buffer” that played a very significant role: copyright formalities. Under conditional copyright, formalities served to limit copyright protection to works that had independent value as expression. Works that lacked expression value ordinarily would not be copyrighted. The purpose of copyright is to incent expression ex ante, not to serve as a locking mechanism ex post. Copyright formalities created an incentive structure that aligned the material protected under copyright with the overarching justification for the regime. With the disappearance of formalities, perversions of copyright like we observe in the Diebold dispute become not only possible, but inevitable.

Copyright’s burden on creativity. In addition to burdening free speech, copyright also imposes costs on future creativity by shrinking the stock of preexisting materials available to future creators for use as building blocks in new works, which reduces consequentially the production of new works.[150] [528] Unlike the monopoly problem, copyright’s toll on future creativity arises regardless of whether a particular work has a market value.

Individual acts of intellectual creativity may begin with a blank piece of paper, but the creative process itself is cumulative—every creative work builds on materials that already exist. Restraints on the ability to copy an entire work are likely to have only marginal effects on the creation of future works: although many creative works refer to previous works, such reference rarely involves literal copying of the entire predecessor work. But copyright reaches further than wholesale, literal copying. Copyright allows a rightsholder to restrain works that contain elements substantially similar to any more than a trivial portion of the rightsholder’s work.[151] In addition, the law gives the rightsholder control over derivative works—i.e., works that involve the transformative reuse of original (and therefore protected) elements of the rightsholder’s work.[152]

The costs of copyright that we have just reviewed are substantially higher in an unconditional copyright system. Formalities, at least as they operated in the conditional copyright system that existed before the 1976 Act, minimized the costs of exclusive rights while retaining all, or virtually all, of the benefits. They did so by focusing the protections of copyright on those works that were judged by their authors, first at their inception and then again after an initial period of protection, to be the kind of commercially valuable creative material that could, if protected by copyright, potentially provide an economic return. For these works, the incentive effect of copyright was potentially large enough to justify the cost of protection. But for works that are not expected to provide a return for their authors, protection involves only potential costs. Protection for works that authors judge commercially valueless—i.e., the majority of works— is a net loss for social welfare.

C. Formalities and “Utilitarian” Copyright

In addition to their role in focusing copyright (i.e., filtering) and creating ownership information, there is a deeper justification for formalities that ties together much of what has just been said: formalities are an important component of our original constitutional commitment to a utilitarian model of copyright. As we have moved closer to a natural rights paradigm in our copyright practice, the foundations of American copyright at both the constitutional and statutory levels have been obscured. But the original commitments are still there, awaiting the right plaintiff to revive them.

[529] 1. The Intellectual Property Clause

Why did the “traditional contours” of pre-1976 U.S. copyright law require compliance with so many bothersome formalities? In order to understand the role of formalities in our pre-1976 conditional copyright system, it is helpful first to look at the source of Congress’s authority to enact copyright laws: the Constitution’s Intellectual Property Clause. The clause does not itself require that Congress install any particular formality in copyright laws. Yet it reflects an original understanding of the purpose of copyright that led, in the early copyright statutes and for almost two centuries thereafter, to a system that relied heavily on formalities.

Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution confers upon Congress authority “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” As the Supreme Court has recognized, the Intellectual Property Clause is “both a grant of power and a limitation.”[153]But aside from formulating that aphorism, the Supreme Court has done little to limn either the power or the limitation, or to define the judicial role in ensuring that Congress’s copyright lawmaking remains within the boundaries set out by the clause.

The most significant continuing dispute in the interpretation of the Intellectual Property Clause involves the most basic question of interpretation: which part of the clause sets out the enumerated power? Edward Walterscheid has argued that the grant of power resides in the “promote . . . Progress” language, and that that power, moreover, is a general one that authorizes Congress to undertake a variety of schemes, such as the funding of medical research or grants to arts organizations, with the common purposes of encouraging discovery and spreading culture.[154] Walterscheid contends that the second part of the clause (the “exclusive Right[s]” language) was added only for the purpose of making clear that, subject to certain limitations, Congress was authorized to grant patents and copyrights as part of its general power to advance learning.[155]

More often, however, it has been argued that the power resides in the “exclusive Right[s]” part of the clause. According to this interpretation, the power granted is specific—i.e., Congress is authorized to grant limited-time exclusive rights for the purpose of advancing learning. The federal  [530] government’s general power to “promote . . . Progress” through other means, if it exists at all in the Constitution, must reside elsewhere.[156]

Questions also remain regarding how the clause limits Congress’s exercise of its power. The clause limits the copyright grant to the “writings” of “authors”—by virtue of these limitations, there can be no grant of exclusive rights in ideas (as opposed to expression), and no grants to publishers. There is also, as mentioned previously, the “limited times” requirement.

The clause also imposes a more general limitation. In Eldred v. Ashcroft, the Supreme Court announced that the “promote . . . Progress” phrase functions as a limitation on Congress’s power to enact copyright laws: “The ‘constitutional command’ . . . is that Congress, to the extent it enacts copyright laws at all, create a ‘system’ that ‘promote[s] the Progress of Science.’”[157]

The Court’s statement in Eldred provides no guidance regarding how judges are to determine whether one of Congress’s copyright enactments fails to promote progress. Nonetheless, even the bare statement in Eldred undercuts previous views that the “promote . . . Progress” language is merely a statement of purpose that functions neither as part of the congressional power, nor as a limitation of it.[158] More importantly, the Court’s statement in Eldred aligns its reading of the clause in the copyright context with its well-established approach in patent cases. In the patent context, the Court has long held that the “promote . . . Progress” language imposes a judicially enforceable constraint on Congress’s power.[159]

If the Supreme Court has left basic questions of textual interpretation unsettled, it has been relatively clear and consistent on an even more basic interpretive issue raised by the Intellectual Property Clause: the theoretical [531] foundation of intellectual property rights. It has long been established—at least at the level of judicial rhetoric—that copyright is not a natural right, but one created by positive law.[160]

The Supreme Court established that principle in the 1834 case of Wheaton

v. Peters.[161] In that case, Henry Wheaton, the first reporter of decisions of the Supreme Court, sued Richard Peters, his successor, alleging that a set of condensed volumes of Supreme Court opinions (Wheaton’s Reports) that Peters had published infringed Wheaton’s copyrights. In opposition, Peters pointed out that Wheaton could not assert a valid copyright in the Court’s opinions, which is what Peters had republished.[162] The Court agreed with Peters,[163] and could simply have dismissed Wheaton’s case on this ground. But it dealt with this potentially dispositive issue in the last paragraph of its opinion, choosing instead to focus on the much more difficult alternative defenses Peters had raised: (1) that Wheaton could only claim copyright in his published works under federal law, as the right did not exist at common law,[164]and (2) that Wheaton’s failure to timely deposit his volumes with the Secretary of State, and to give public notice in a newspaper of that deposit, vitiated any copyright he might otherwise hold under the copyright acts of 1790 and 1802.[165]

The Court upheld both of Peters’s defenses, holding that the author’s copyright in his published works is created by statute and does not exist at common law.[166] Wheaton argued that the use of the phrase “securing . . . exclusive rights” in the Intellectual Property Clause and “securing [to authors] the copies of maps, charts and books” in the founding copyright statute indicated that both the Constitution and the 1790 Act were “securing” to authors a right that already existed at common law, and that continued to exist.[167] The Court rejected that argument: both the clause and the 1790 Act,  [532] the Court stated, refer to inventions (i.e., patents) as well as literary works, and “it has never been pretended, by any one, either in this country or in England, that an inventor has a perpetual right, at common law, to sell the thing invented.”[168] Neither the clause nor the 1790 Act provided any reason to distinguish between the source of the exclusive right for inventions versus literary works. The Court also found, in a passage notable more for its forcefulness than its logic, that the language of the 1790 Act established that Congress was creating a right, not sanctioning an existing one:

That congress, in passing the act of 1790, did not legislate in reference to existing rights, appears clear, from the provision that the author, &c ‘shall have the sole right and liberty of printing,’ &c. Now if this exclusive right existed at common law, and congress were about to adopt legislative provisions for its protection, would they have used this language? Could they have deemed it necessary to vest a right already vested. Such a presumption is refuted by the words above quoted, and their force is not lessened by any other part of the act.[169]

Having found that copyright in published works was a right created by statute, the Court held that noncompliance with the statutory prerequisites— including those, such as deposit and notice, performed subsequent to publication—vitiates the copyright:

[T]he inquiry is made, shall the non performance of these subsequent conditions operate as a forfeiture of the right?

The answer is, that this is not a technical grant of precedent and subsequent conditions. All the conditions are important; the law requires them to be performed; and, consequently, their performance is essential to a perfect title.[170]

Facing an incomplete factual record, the Court remanded to the circuit court for a determination whether Wheaton had complied with the deposit and notice formalities.[171]

If the Supreme Court in Wheaton made clear that copyright is established by law, rather than merely enforced by it, then the obvious question is “For what purpose has the right been established?” Uniquely among the legislative powers enumerated in Article I, Section 8, the Intellectual Property Clause ties the power to grant patents and copyrights to a specified purpose—the promotion of progress in “science” (by which the Framers meant all forms of knowledge, including literature and the arts) and the “useful arts” (by which the Framers meant patentable inventions). The justification for copyright (and patent) set out in the clause is utilitarian: Congress is authorized to create exclusive rights not as an end in itself, but merely as a means of “promoting [533] progress.” The creation of exclusive rights will induce investment in literary, artistic, and scientific work, by, as Abraham Lincoln put it, “add[ing] the fuel of interest to the fire of genius.”[172] Whether granting exclusive rights is the means best suited to that end is one of the large questions that has produced an interesting debate but is left aside in this Article.

In its occasional encounters with the Intellectual Property Clause, the Supreme Court has spoken in the utilitarian language of incentives and access—though, as Professor Stewart Sterk has pointed out, the Court’s rhetoric has not been entirely consistent.[173] In United States v. Paramount Pictures, the Court wrote that “[t]he copyright law, like the patent statutes, makes reward to the owner a secondary consideration. . . . It is said that reward to the author or artist serves to induce release to the public of the products of his creative genius.”[174] In Mazer v. Stein, the Court wrote that “[t]he economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors.”[175] In Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, the Court wrote that the exclusive rights granted under the copyright laws “are neither unlimited nor primarily designed to provide a special private benefit. Rather, the limited grant is a means by which an important public purpose may be achieved. It is intended to motivate the creative activity of authors and inventors by the provision of a special reward . . . .”[176]

So at least at a high level of generality—i.e., in the Supreme Court’s obiter dicta on copyright’s overall purpose—American copyright law has been set on a utilitarian foundation. This model constructs copyright as a creature of positive law, by which exclusive rights (limited, in their application, by the express constraints set out in the Intellectual Property Clause) may be offered, or withheld, on whatever basis is rationally calculated to benefit the public. Congress, too, has often spoken in the same language. For example, consider this précis of utilitarian copyright from a legislative report on the Copyright Act of 1909:

[534] The enactment of copyright legislation by Congress under the terms of the Constitution is not based upon any natural right that the author has in his writings, for the Supreme Court has held that such rights as he has are purely statutory rights, but upon the ground that the welfare of the public will be served and progress of science and useful arts will be promoted by securing to authors for limited periods the exclusive rights to their writings. The Constitution does not establish copyrights, but provides that Congress shall have the power to grant such rights if it thinks best. Nor primarily for the benefit of the author, but primarily for the benefit of the public, such rights are given. . . .

In enacting a copyright law Congress must consider . . . two questions: First, how much will the legislation stimulate the producer and so benefit the public, and, second, how much will the monopoly granted be detrimental to the public? The granting of such exclusive rights, under the proper terms and conditions, confers a benefit upon the public that outweighs the evils of the temporary monopoly.[177]

D. Copyright’s Increasingly Uneasy Fit with the Constitution

If our copyright system were driven purely by the utilitarian concerns that undergird the Intellectual Property Clause, rather than by more concrete political considerations,[178]we might expect our copyright term to be relatively short and formalities to permeate the law. But while Congress and the courts have paid lip service to utilitarian copyright, they have, on a practical level, acquiesced to developments in the law—including the move from conditional to unconditional copyright, the broadening of the rights granted by copyright to cover nearly every conceivable use of the protected work (including the production of derivative works), and the extension of the term to a point that the return to rightsholders is indistinguishable from that produced by perpetual copyright—that together have made our theoretically utilitarian system almost [535] indistinguishable from continental European systems that are based on an author’s natural rights.[179]

The pressing question at this point, given the Supreme Court’s recent holding in Eldred v. Ashcroft, is, of course, “So what?” With the Eldred Court’s willingness to cede to Congress the task of reconciling the copyright laws to the demands of both the Intellectual Property Clause and the First Amendment, there seems to be little prospect that the judiciary will arrest copyright’s drift away from its utilitarian moorings.

And yet, embedded in the majority’s opinion in Eldred is a phrase that shows that a sudden collision between the copyright laws and the Constitution is still quite possible. The Court repelled the petitioners’ First Amendment claim by holding that “when . . . Congress has not altered the traditional contours of copyright protection, further First Amendment scrutiny is unnecessary.”[180] The Court is making a historical claim about what the “traditional contours” of copyright have been, and is asserting that because copyright has remained largely within these original metes and bounds, nothing has happened to disturb the Founders’ original conception that copyright is consistent with the First Amendment. The Court did much the same in turning away the petitioners’ Intellectual Property Clause challenge: “Congress’s unbroken practice since the founding generation [of extending both new and subsisting copyrights] thus overwhelms petitioners’ argument that the CTEA’s extension of existing copyright fails per se to ‘promote the Progress of Science.’”[181] “[A] page of history,” the Court said, “is worth a volume of logic.”[182]

History may indeed surpass logic as a useful tool in legal analysis, but neither method is particularly useful if you get the basic facts wrong.[183] The “traditional contours” of copyright have not been altered as much as they have been obliterated—by, among other developments, our recent transition from conditional to unconditional copyright. Before 1976, copyright applied to a minority of works; it now applies to all. Before 1976, the effective copyright  [536] term for the large majority of works was twenty-eight years; today copyright imposes a uniform term lasting, on average, three times as long. Considering the distance our law has traveled in the evolution from conditional to unconditional copyright, it is difficult at this point to understand which of copyright’s “traditional contours” the Court believes remain undisturbed.

It is not enough to look, as the Court did in Eldred, at the copyright term in isolation. When one looks more closely at the effects of a series of seemingly minor changes to the copyright law—changes that are unrelated (or at least not facially related) to the copyright term—it is clear that the “traditional contours” of our copyright system went through a disjunction during the move from conditional to unconditional copyright. Of course, it may be difficult just now, considering the result in Eldred, to see exactly how the increasing detachment of U.S. copyright law from its constitutional underpinnings could lead to judicial intervention and invalidation of elements of the law. The following are two possible arguments that have been advanced in Kahle v. Ashcroft, a lawsuit filed recently in a federal court in California.[184]

1. Term extension without renewal filter

Copyright’s potential collision with the Constitution could take the form of an Intellectual Property Clause challenge to copyright extension that is somewhat narrower—but no less potentially disruptive to the status quo—than that posed in Eldred. The argument urges a reevaluation of the historical record, based on an observation about the effect of the renewal formality on copyright extensions that was never raised in Eldred.

While Congress had extended the term of subsisting copyrights on several occasions prior to the CTEA, in every case before the CTEA, the subsisting copyrights whose terms were extended were required to pass at some point through the filter of renewal. The 1831 Act extended the initial term of subsisting copyrights from fourteen to twenty-eight years, but within a regime that required copyright owners to renew their copyright to secure the benefits of the maximum term of forty-two years.[185] The 1909 Act likewise extended the renewal term of subsisting copyrights, but the Act expressly limited its effect to works that had been renewed.[186] Even the 1976 Act, which began the march toward unconditional copyright and again extended the term of subsisting copyrights, limited its extension to works that had been renewed.[187]

[537] Thus, every extension of subsisting copyrights prior to the CTEA conditioned the maximum copyright term upon the copyright holder satisfying a renewal requirement. In contrast, the CTEA’s twenty-year extension of subsisting copyrights was granted indiscriminately. But because the renewal requirement survived in American law until the Copyright Renewal Act[188]removed renewal entirely in 1992, the effect of this extension differed dramatically depending upon the period during which the initial copyright was granted.

For registered works published between January 1, 1923, and December 31, 1963, the CTEA extended the term of any subsisting copyright by twenty years. But because the average renewal rate for works published between 1923 and 1963 was just 15%, 85% of the works originally copyrighted during that period had already passed into the public domain. Thus, while the CTEA extended the terms of subsisting copyrights, the filter of renewal had already eliminated the vast majority of copyrights granted during this period from copyright regulation. The burdens of copyright, therefore, were visited only on those works that had passed through the renewal filter—i.e., only those works for which continuing protection could be expected to provide some return for the author to offset the social costs imposed by continued exclusivity.

For registered works published between January 1, 1964, and December 31, 1978, the CTEA extended the term of subsisting copyrights by the same twenty years. But because the Copyright Renewal Act had granted an automatic renewal to all subsisting copyrights not yet in their renewal term, the CTEA extended the copyright term of a class of works in which, according to historical data, approximately eighty-five percent of the copyrights would never have been renewed. In contrast to the situation described above, the CTEA visited the burdens of copyright protection on all works from our recent past, including the majority that would not have passed through the renewal filter. As a consequence, for a large percentage of these works, costs were imposed without the promise of any offsetting benefit.

2. Formalities as a buffer between copyright and the First Amendment

In addition to the narrowed Intellectual Property Clause challenge, the plaintiffs in Kahle press a related First Amendment attack. The Eldred Court rejected the petitioners’ First Amendment claim based on a conclusion that the CTEA “ha[d] not altered the traditional contours of copyright protection.”[189]But “the traditional contours of copyright protection” in America established a conditional copyright regime. Copyrights were granted, and maintained, only if rightsholders took affirmative steps to secure their rights.

[538] As discussed above,[190] these “traditional contours” of copyright protection served important First Amendment interests. By requiring copyright owners to signal a desire to continue the protection of copyright, the traditional requirement of renewal limited copyright to just those works whose owners had a sufficient continuing interest in restricting use of the works. Other works were available for public use in creating new speech. Likewise, the registration and notice requirements provided clarity by identifying the copyright holder and the term of protection, thus facilitating the spread of knowledge through use of public domain material and licensing of works still under copyright. Like the doctrine of “fair use,” these structural limitations on the scope of copyright’s regulation narrowly tailored the reach of the law to those contexts within which copyright would act as an “engine of free expression.”[191] The registration and notice requirements also excluded copyright from those contexts within which the regulation would simply act as a brake on free expression.

These changes to the copyright laws, as they are applied to and affect a large volume of creative work that would never have had its copyrights renewed, do not advance any legitimate government interest. They instead impose substantial burdens on speech without advancing the only legitimate interest the government might have—namely, to continue returns to rightsholders in the small minority of work that continues to have commercial value, in the hope of maximizing incentives to produce creative work.[192] In particular, with respect to works created after January 1, 1964, and before January 1, 1978, these changes have imposed an unconstitutional burden on speech. The term for works created between January 1, 1964, and December 31, 1977, was extended by nineteen years by the 1976 Act. The term was then automatically renewed by the Copyright Renewal Act in 1992. Finally, the term was unconditionally extended by twenty years by the CTEA in 1998. Thus, even though historical data suggests that more than eighty-five percent of these [539] works would never have had their copyrights renewed, the law automatically extended their terms by sixty-seven years. This is the first category of copyrighted works in U.S. history which has had its term extended automatically without ever passing through the filter of renewal.

Because these changes have altered the “traditional contours” of copyright, they should be evaluated under heightened First Amendment scrutiny. But even under the less exacting rational basis standard, the burdens created by these changes for certain categories of copyrighted works far outweigh any plausible benefits.

E. Unconditional Copyright and U.S. Accession to the Berne Convention

The move from conditional to unconditional copyright is bad intellectual property policy. It also threatens to bring copyright into conflict with the Constitution. So what possessed us to do it? There were many factors, including gripes about the difficulties of complying with formalities that were often badly administered by the Copyright Office and the severe consequences (i.e., loss of copyright protection) arising from failure to comply.[193] But by far the primary reason for the removal of copyright formalities was the desire on the part of the content industries and their supporters in Congress to accede— more than a century after its promulgation—to the Berne Convention.

1. The Berne Convention

The Berne Convention, which dates from 1886, was the fruit of negotiations that had been proceeding since the first International Congress of Authors and Artists met in Brussels in 1858.[194] In its current form,[195] the Berne Convention obliges signatories to honor two basic principles: (1) a “national treatment” principle reqiring all signatory nations to grant the same rights to foreign authors that they grant to their own authors; and (2) a “baseline protection” principle requiring signatory countries to adhere in their domestic  [540] law to certain minimum levels of protection as specified in the Convention.[196]The Convention’s baseline requirements include a copyright term for works by individual authors of life of the author plus fifty years,[197] and a prohibition on formalities that affect the “enjoyment and exercise” of copyright.[198]

In 1886, when the Convention was first promulgated, the United States had not entered into a single copyright-related international agreement. The United States entered the international copyright system in 1891, when it concluded the first of a series of bilateral copyright agreements with France,[199] Great Britain,[200] and Germany.[201] In 1955, the United States acceded to the Universal Copyright Convention (UCC), an instrument that established multilateral copyright relations between signatories to the Berne Convention and other nations, including the United States, that considered the Berne Convention’s minimum standards incompatible with domestic law. As a measure to accommodate the United States, the UCC allowed member states to impose formalities as a condition of protection.[202]

The United States did not accede to the Berne Convention until 1989, and the Convention’s prohibition of formalities is perhaps the primary reason that the United States, alone among industrialized nations, remained outside the Convention for its first century. Nonetheless, many U.S. authors secured the Berne Convention’s benefits prior to U.S. accession by simultaneously publishing their works in Canada, a Berne signatory.[203] As Professor Graeme Austin has noted, “Adoption of this practice by American authors wealthy or sophisticated enough to do so ensured that many of the benefits of the Convention accrued to American copyright industries. American society, however, shouldered few of its burdens.”[204]

[541] 2. Berne’s rule against formalities

Curiously, the Berne Convention allowed formalities at its inception, providing that enjoyment of the rights prescribed by the Convention were subject “to the accomplishment of the conditions and formalities prescribed by law in the country of origin of the work.”[205] By 1908, however, Berne had been amended to provide that member countries must not condition the acquisition, exercise, or enjoyment of copyright protection for the works of foreign authors on the observance of any formality.[206]

The current version of the Convention’s prohibition against formalities is set out in Article 5(2) of the 1971 Paris Act, which provides that

[t]he enjoyment and the exercise of these rights shall not be subject to any formality; such enjoyment and such exercise shall be independent of the existence of protection in the country of the origin of the work. Consequently, apart from the provisions of this Convention, the extent of protection, as well as the means of redress afforded to the author to protect his rights, shall be governed exclusively by the laws of the country where protection is claimed.[207]

The term “formality” is not defined, but is understood in the sense of an administrative obligation set out in a national law that imposes a condition necessary for a copyright to exist, or for the right to continue or to be practically available.[208] Those provisions of U.S. law that provide for voluntary formalities—i.e., voluntary notice, registration, and recordation of transfers— and that provide incentives for compliance[209] either apply only to U.S. works (for example, in the case of the bar on bringing infringement litigation absent registration, which was believed to negate the right to “exercise” the copyright and thus to qualify as a prohibited formality under Berne[210]) or are not the type of formality that Berne prohibits.[211]

[542] Importantly, although the terms of Article 5(2) bar the imposition of formalities on foreign authors, signatory nations remain free to impose formalities on the works of their own nationals.[212] As the World Intellectual Property Organization’s (WIPO) official exegesis of the Berne Convention explains, the freedom from formalities provided by the Convention

exists independently of any protection that the work enjoys in its country of origin. In fact, such country remains absolutely free to subordinate the existence or exercise of the rights on that work in that country to such conditions or formalities as it thinks fit: it is purely a matter of domestic law.[213]

The United States’s accession to Berne, therefore, did not require the wholesale removal of mandatory registration, notice, and recordation of transfers. Rather, the application of these mandatory formalities could simply have been limited to the works of U.S. authors, which have long comprised a large majority of works published in the United States.[214] Voluntary registration and notice formalities, along with the current system of inducements to compliance, could have been established for the works of foreign authors.

Though the matter is not free from doubt, there is also a strong argument that Berne accession did not require the removal of mandatory renewal for U.S. works. Article 7(1) of Berne prescribes a minimum term of protection for the works of individual authors of life of the author plus fifty years.[215] But it is [543] clear that Berne members may impose a registration formality on domestic authors—i.e., they can condition the enjoyment of any portion of the minimum term for native works upon registration. Similarly, Berne member states should be able to condition enjoyment for native authors of some portion of the “minimum” term on compliance with the formality. In both instances, the law would continue to offer a Berne-compliant minimum term.

3. Berne’s “practical hostility” to formalities

Why does the Berne Convention prohibit the imposition of formalities on foreign authors? The response most often has been made at the level of copyright theory: that formalities are out of step with the natural rights theory of copyright, which has been characterized as the “Grundnorm” of the Berne Convention.[216]

That explanation is deeply unsatisfying, for the degree to which formalities are inconsistent with natural rights-based copyright is easily overstated. Even the nations of continental Europe, whose copyright systems are most closely identified with a natural rights framework, do not provide for perpetual copyright, but balance authors’ rights with the public interest in the advancement of learning.[217] Consequently, even in so-called “natural rights” systems, copyrights expire, works enter the public domain, and the law therefore must seek some form of “utilitarian” balance between private incentives and public access. Indeed, even in a system that imposed a perpetual copyright, requiring registration and notice would nonetheless be a sensible step. As has been detailed above, a reliable and easily accessed ownership registry encourages transfers and licensing by lowering the cost to the would-be transferee or licensee of identifying rightsholders. A system focused on returns to authors should therefore seek to maximize authors’ rewards with modest investments in administrative mechanisms, such as a registry, that reduce transaction costs.

[544] Again, there is no sharp disjunction between “natural rights” and “utilitarian” copyright systems in the manner one would expect if copyright were driven by theory rather than exigency. The primary difference between the utilitarian and natural rights approaches is which side of the balance is emphasized. Formalities could play an important role in any system of limited-term copyrights in maximizing copyright’s social utility by focusing protection.

So how are we to explain Berne’s aversion to formalities? The simplest and best explanation is much more prosaic than the one commonly offered. The overarching purpose of the Berne Convention is to provide protection to authors whose works will be published in many countries. Perhaps the most practically important element of that protection—more important for the protection of authors’ interests than establishing a minimum copyright term—is to avoid the necessity that authors comply with mandatory formalities in every country in which their works are published or may be found. Berne’s proscription of mandatory formalities is a rational response to the difficulty of complying (and maintaining compliance) with differently administered formalities that may have been, absent the Convention, imposed in dozens of national systems, some with registries, some without, and none of which shares information.

Evidence for this view can be found in the origins of the Berne Convention. The first stirrings of a movement toward an international copyright system were felt at the 1858 Brussels Conference on Literary and Artistic Property, which was organized by a group of Belgian authors and academics and attended by representatives from each major European country and the United States.[218] The Brussels Conference passed a series of resolutions establishing the rough outlines of an international copyright system. Among those resolutions was one directing that authors should be required to comply with formalities only in their home countries.[219] The domestic law of many countries at that time required compliance with formalities as a condition of protection.[220]

This initial approach of limiting formalities to an author’s home country was adopted in additional instruments preceding Berne, including the 1878 resolutions of the “Paris Congress,” which was presided over by Victor Hugo.[221] It was also the approach taken in the initial text of the Berne Convention itself,[222] which included a provision setting out evidentiary presumptions designed to assist authors in establishing before foreign tribunals [545] their compliance with home-country formalities.[223] So why, in the revisions to Berne adopted in Berlin in 1908, did the Convention move from a limited acceptance of formalities to a broader proscription?

Professor Sam Ricketson identifies a number of reasons, including the difficulty that authors faced, even with the assistance of the evidentiary presumptions, in proving home-country compliance.[224] In addition, there was a broader interpretive problem: despite the signatories’ clear intent that an author’s compliance with formalities in his home country was sufficient to gain protection under the domestic law of all Berne signatories, some national tribunals, interpreting the Convention as prohibiting formalities imposed by domestic law only on foreign authors, took the view that the works of foreign authors were subject to the same formalities imposed on native works.[225] In 1896, the French government proposed an amendment to the Convention that would clarify the matter, but the Berne nations ultimately agreed only to an Interpretive Declaration—i.e., an “authentic interpretation rather than a new disposition”—along the lines the French had proposed.[226] It was these practical problems in administering Berne’s original approach to formalities that drove the eventual decision to move to a complete ban.

This observation is helpful in better understanding the Berne Convention, but, more usefully for our purposes here, it also has important implications for the status of formalities in U.S. copyright law. In deciding whether a particular formality interferes with the “enjoyment and . . . exercise” of copyright, and thereby runs afoul of Article 5(2) of the Convention, it is important to understand that Berne’s antiformality principle does not arise from any supposed foundational incompatibility between formalities and an authors’ rights copyright framework. We will turn now to consider how formalities may be reintroduced into the U.S. system, in light of both the problems that Berne was trying to solve and technological developments that now allow much less burdensome approaches to solving the same problems.

III. REFORMALIZING COPYRIGHT

A. Defining “Interoperable” Formalities in the Berne Convention

Berne’s prohibition of formalities dates from 1908, a time in which requiring authors to comply with formalities in the many countries in which a work may be published—i.e., requiring an author (or publisher) to inform himself about the requirements of the law in countries with which he has no [546] familiarity, and then to obtain and fill out forms in a variety of languages— would be difficult, expensive, and often result in unintentional noncompliance and the loss of valuable rights. Article 5(2) of the current Paris Text of the Berne Convention was promulgated in 1971, but the nature of the problem had not changed in the intervening sixty-three years: copyright systems remained substantively and procedurally diverse, the mechanisms of compliance in many countries remained balky, and the costs of informing oneself about requirements in different countries, and then complying with them, remained high.

Since 1971, however, there has been a series of technological changes that could make compliance with a redesigned set of formalities quick and easy. Those changes involve, of course, computers and the Internet. Now it is possible for an author publishing a work internationally to comply with formalities in his or her home country, or in the country of a work’s first publication, and to have the data generated by that compliance formatted and transmitted reliably and nearly costlessly to other jurisdictions. But changes in technology alone are not enough—changes to the law are also required. To make compliance cheap, the law must ensure that data generated in one jurisdiction will be sufficient to permit compliance in any jurisdiction that chooses to reintroduce formalities into its domestic copyright laws.

The simplest way to take advantage of what technology now allows would be to propose a new Berne text that removes the prohibition in Article 5(2) of the current Paris Act and replaces it with a provision allowing member countries to impose formalities, provided that they adhere to a set of standards that make formalities “interoperable” across jurisdictions.[227] What would the changes to the Berne Convention look like?

1. The reciprocity principle

The most direct approach would install a “reciprocity principle” alongside the existing national treatment and minimum standards principles that now drive Berne. The reciprocity principle would require that all Berne jurisdictions [547] that impose formalities permit foreign authors to comply with formalities in their national laws by complying with formalities either in their home country or in the work’s country of first publication or registration. The reciprocity principle would not require any particular Berne nation to impose formalities— i.e., it would not modify Berne’s current minimum standards requirements. It would, rather, require only that Berne nations that choose to reformalize their domestic copyright laws do so according to standards set out in Berne.

Some nations may, of course, choose not to reintroduce formalities into their domestic law. But if some Berne Union countries have formalities, and others do not, the possibility arises that the home country of an author, or the nation of first publication of his work, will not have a registration requirement to which other Berne countries with formalities can grant reciprocity. To accommodate authors in this category who wish to comply with formalities across Berne jurisdictions, the Berne nations should also establish a centralized WIPO registry, subject to the same standards agreed upon by Berne members and subject also to the condition that all Berne nations will grant reciprocity.

To make the reciprocity principle practically workable, Berne signatories would enter into a side agreement that would standardize across jurisdictions the data required to register a copyright and standardize formatting of that data so that registration information—authors’ names and addresses, creation and registration dates, etc.—may readily be shared among jurisdictions. Berne signatories could then establish an information-sharing agreement whereby registration data obtained in one country could be made available to other jurisdictions, at the rightsholder’s discretion. As the secretariat for the Berne Union, WIPO would be well placed to coordinate the actual transfer of data among Berne members.

Taking this approach, it is not necessary to amend Berne to prescribe a minimum set of formalities. It would suffice, rather, simply to remove the Article 5(2) prohibition, to install the reciprocity principle, to work out a set of standards to ensure interoperability, and then to leave to the member states the decision whether to reinstall formalities or not.

2. The reciprocity principle and neighboring rights agreements

For countries that, unlike the United States, do not include protection for performances, sound recordings (also referred to as “phonograms”), and broadcasts in their copyright laws, but locate them instead in separate “neighboring rights” statutes, reformalization of domestic law must include changes to the law governing both types of rights. Similarly, the same reciprocity principle that would be installed into the Berne Convention must also be introduced into the applicable international agreements governing neighboring rights—an issue of some complexity.

[548] The principal international agreement defining protection of neighboring rights is the 1961 International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations, also known as the Rome Convention.[228] This instrument extends Berne-style national treatment and minimum rights principles to neighboring rights, although the minimum terms established are shorter.[229] Unlike Berne Article 5(2), Article 11 of the Rome Convention does not prohibit signatories from conditioning protection of neighboring rights on formalities. Article 11 provides, however, that any signatory that conditions protection for performers on, or producers of, phonograms on compliance with formalities must permit its requirements to be met by affixing a prescribed notice to the recording or its container. Adoption of the reciprocity principle, therefore, would require replacement of the rule allowing blanket compliance through notice with formalities pertaining to protection of phonograms.

The 1973 Convention for the Protection of Producers of Phonograms Against Unauthorized Distribution of Their Phonograms, referred to as the Geneva Phonograms Convention, which is aimed at cross-border record piracy, requires signatories to protect qualifying phonogram producers “against the making of duplicates without the consent of the producer and against the importation of such duplicates, provided that any such making or importation is for the purpose of distribution to the public, and against the distribution of such duplicates to the public.”[230] Like the Rome Convention, the Geneva Phonograms Convention allows signatories to impose formalities as a condition of protection for phonograms, but provides that affixation of notice must suffice to comply with all mandatory formalities.[231] Thus, the same changes that would be required to the Rome Convention must also be applied to the Geneva Phonograms Convention.

Now that we have seen what changes to international law are necessary to shift the treatment of formalities from hostility (Berne), or at best, grudging acceptance (Rome and Geneva), to acceptance with reciprocity, let us briefly [549] examine how such a system would work with respect to each of the familiar types of formalities.

3. The reciprocity principle in practice

Registration. The application of the reciprocity principle to the registration formality is comparatively straightforward. Once a work is registered in one jurisdiction (or with the centralized WIPO registry), it would be registered in all Berne Union jurisdictions that have reinstalled a registration formality in their domestic law.

Recordation of transfers. The same scheme established for registration should also apply to recordation of transfers—a transfer that is successfully recorded in one jurisdiction (or with the WIPO registry) should suffice to record that transfer in all jurisdictions in which the work previously has been registered.

Notice. Berne Union nations would be free, under the reciprocity principle, to require that notice be given for some or all works. Of course, if a Berne nation creates an effective, easily accessible copyright registry, there is little to be gained by also requiring notice: the registry should provide enough information to make the tracing of copyright ownership simple and cheap.[232] In the instance, however, that some Berne signatories choose to include a notice requirement in their reformalized domestic law, the signatories should agree to standardize the form of notice for different types of works to ensure (1) that no more information is required to be elicited to comply with notice requirements than was supplied to complete registration, and (2) that the same form of notice that suffices in one jurisdiction for any particular type of work will also be accepted throughout the Berne Union. These rules would prevent differing standards for notice that might cause unintentional loss of rights. They would also encourage publication with the standardized form of notice even in those jurisdictions that do not require it as a condition of protection.

Renewal. Creating a renewal formality that is interoperable across jurisdictions raises a number of somewhat more complex problems, but should be achievable with an increased level of coordination among Berne members. The first problem is whether, in order to permit Berne nations to reinstall the renewal formality, a revised Berne Convention would have to remove the provision in the current version of Berne requiring all signatories to grant a [550] minimum copyright term of life of the author plus fifty years.[233] The answer is likely no. Berne’s prohibition of formalities is contained in an article separate from its minimum term requirements. Remove the current ban on formalities, and nothing in the Convention specifies that the term, if offered equally to every author, must be enjoyed in full by every author without condition. The second problem is a more practical one: how to coordinate renewal across jurisdictions when different Berne member states may impose renewal requirements at different points in the copyright term. A simple application of the reciprocity principle threatens to create substantial confusion. If a rightsholder who complies with the renewal formality in the jurisdiction in which a work was first registered is deemed to have complied with renewal in any jurisdiction in which a renewal is required, then absent detailed knowledge of the point at which renewal may be required in a potentially large number of Berne jurisdictions, a would-be user will find it difficult to determine whether a work has been timely renewed.

For example, suppose that a work is first registered in country A, which imposes a renewal requirement at thirty years. Twenty-five years into the work’s term, a would-be user in country B inquires whether the work is in the public domain. Country B imposes a renewal formality at fifteen years. The user sees that the work was registered twenty-five years ago; under country B’s law, the work would have passed into the public domain when the rightsholder failed to timely renew. But under country A’s laws, the work is still in its initial term; renewal will not be required for another five years. Accordingly, under a simple application of the reciprocity principle, unless the user understands (1) where the work was first registered, (2) when the renewal requirement occurs in that jurisdiction, and (3) that country A’s renewal requirement is the relevant one, the user will not easily be able to determine whether the work is in the public domain.

These information problems can be mitigated, of course, even if they cannot be eliminated. The standardized registration and notice format should include information on the nation of the work’s first registration, and that information should be made available in all online registry sites maintained in the various Berne nations. In addition, Berne signatories should be encouraged to disseminate information about the rules governing renewal, and how to determine which renewal term applies to a particular work. Taken together, these measures might mean that the benefit, in terms of the simplicity of a straightforward application of the reciprocity principle to renewal, outweighs the cost in terms of the increased complexity of determining the status of rights.

An alternative, which would require a greater degree of coordination among Berne nations, would be to standardize renewal terms for all jurisdictions that reinstall a renewal formality in their domestic law. The [551] reciprocity principle would then apply to grant automatic compliance with all Berne nations’ renewal requirements based on timely compliance with the requirement in the country of first registration, or by renewing with WIPO, if original registration was made with the WIPO registry. Based on the depreciation calculations made by Landes and Posner, the Berne nations could impose more than one renewal obligation during the copyright term. A first renewal obligation set at ten years would move approximately 50% of registered works into the public domain. A second renewal requirement set in the vicinity of forty-three years would result in only 10% of the number of originally registered works remaining under copyright. A third renewal requirement set at sixty-five years would move all but 1% of the number of originally registered works into the public domain. The works left under copyright after sixty-five years would be those of truly enduring commercial value for which the full term of copyright would be likely to provide significant continuing benefits.

B. Defining “New-Style” Berne-Compliant Formalities

If changing Berne to explicitly permit formalities is not possible, is there still a way to reformalize U.S. domestic law? There are several alternatives of varying merit. The next few pages will first briefly discuss two long-shot possibilities: the reintroduction of formalities for U.S. (but not foreign) authors and U.S. withdrawal from Berne (which, for reasons that will quickly become obvious, this Article does not recommend). I then focus on an alternative that seems much more sensible: the reintroduction into U.S. law of “new-style” formalities that provide the benefits of traditional formalities, but that do not run afoul of Berne’s proscription of conditions that interfere with the “exercise and enjoyment” of copyright.

1. Reintroducing old-style formalities for U.S. authors

Because Berne does not prevent signatories from imposing formalities on the works of domestic authors or authors from non-Berne signatory nations, the United States could have retained a full set of traditional formalities for those works. In fact, an advisory group established by the Department of State to assess what changes to U.S. law would be necessary for Berne accession advocated this position, as part of a more broadly minimalist approach to the implementation of Berne that sought to alter only those portions of U.S. law that the group deemed clearly irreconcilable with the Convention.[234]

[552] The minimalist approach of restricting unconditional copyright to foreign authors is, for reasons that are not difficult to imagine (e.g., the antipathy to granting foreign authors more rights than U.S. authors), not the approach that Congress took. Whether the politics of copyright are likely ever to shift in a way that would make the minimalist approach to unconditional copyright viable is a question beyond the scope of this Article. It is worth noting, however, that restricting unconditional copyright to foreign works would represent a significant improvement on the status quo without creating any risk of noncompliance with Berne.

2. Withdrawal from Berne and reliance on the Universal Copyright Convention

Because the United States is a signatory to the UCC, and because before it acceded to Berne the United States negotiated bilateral copyright agreements with several nations that were not UCC signatories, it would be possible for the United States to withdraw from Berne and rely instead on the UCC, which, unlike Berne, allows the imposition of formalities for the works of both domestic and foreign authors. This strategy would, however, impose unacceptable costs, the largest of which would arise from our resulting noncompliance with the TRIPs accord, which incorporates by reference Berne’s standards, and with the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which replicates Berne’s ban on formalities. Although its applicability is subject to considerable debate, it is also possible that a provision of Berne’s Appendix Declaration would prevent U.S. authors from claiming the benefits of the UCC in countries that are Berne signatories.[235]

A further cost of withdrawal would arise from Berne Article 6(1), which permits Berne nations to restrict the protection accorded to works of authors who are nationals of a non-Berne country that “fails to protect in an adequate manner the works of [Berne nationals].”[236] There is little commentary on this provision, so it is difficult to forecast whether subjecting foreign works to formalities (at least formalities that do not discriminate between domestic and foreign works, and for which compliance is easy and cheap) would rise to the level of a “fail[ure] to protect in an adequate manner” the rights of foreign authors.

[553] 3. Indefinitely renewable copyright

Landes and Posner have proposed a system of indefinitely renewable copyrights—i.e., a perpetual copyright term, conditioned on periodic renewal.[237] Landes and Posner suggest that such a system would result in more works entering the public domain more quickly; their conclusions in this regard are very likely correct. The Landes and Posner proposal is subject, however, to two critiques: the first is significant, and the second, for my purposes, is determinative.

First, a system of indefinitely renewable copyrights would prevent any work of enduring commercial value (many of which would also have important cultural value) from ever entering the public domain. For reasons explained above, extending copyright indefinitely for valuable works raises the cost of transformative use of these works and would give rightsholders a perpetual veto power over uses they don’t like. These cultural and First Amendment costs are not balanced by countervailing benefits. Because the current regime of limited but very long copyright terms gives rightsholders virtually the same return (from a net present value perspective) as would be produced under a perpetual term, a shift to perpetual copyright for valuable works would yield no significant enhancement to the incentive to create.

Landes and Posner also discuss a series of limited-term options conditioned on repeated renewal requirements. These avoid the first objection, but they do not avoid the second: because they employ an old-style renewal formality (i.e., one that results in termination of rights for failure to comply), and because none of the proposals would guarantee a minimum term of life plus fifty years, all versions of the Landes and Posner approach would require the United States to withdraw from the Berne Convention.[238] The authors make note of the incompatibility of their proposal with Berne,[239] but their concerns, unlike mine, are focused solely on the economic effects of the proposal, not on its consequences for U.S. participation in the international copyright system.[240]

[554] 4. The Public Domain Enhancement Act

Another possible approach is set out in a bill currently before Congress, the Public Domain Enhancement Act (PDEA).[241] Sponsored by Representative Zoe Lofgren, a California Democrat, the PDEA would give copyright owners of works by U.S. authors unfettered rights for fifty years. At that point the copyright holder would be required to file a notice of continuation and pay a $1 fee every ten years to continue the copyright. Because only a small number of works would retain any commercial value at the expiry of the minimum term, most copyright owners would not bother to file a notice of continuation and pay the fee. On September 4, 2003, the PDEA was referred to the House Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property. There it has languished.

Unlike the Posner and Landes proposal, the PDEA is very likely compatible with Berne. The renewal requirement is limited to the works of U.S. authors, thereby avoiding conflict with Berne’s rule against formalities. Although the renewal provision may cut off a work’s copyright prior to the expiration of Berne’s minimum term, that should not, for the reasons given above, cause Berne noncompliance.[242] Nonetheless, the PDEA is vulnerable to the critique that its effect is limited to tinkering around the margins: A large percentage of works are commercially valueless at inception or have an initial value that is quickly depleted. All of these works, however, would continue under the PDEA to be subject to a very long copyright term. While fifty years is certainly better than life plus seventy years, it may reasonably be asked whether the game is worth the candle.

5. New-style formalities

A fifth option, and by far the most attractive, is to formulate and install in

U.S. law a set of new-style formalities that apply to both domestic and foreign works. New-style formalities would provide the filtering and information-creation benefits of traditional formalities. However, there is a good argument that, if structured properly, new-style formalities would not affect copyright’s [554] “enjoyment and exercise,” and would, therefore, comply with our Berne obligations under the current Paris Act. This approach is attractive because it would require changes only to U.S. law; Berne, TRIPs, and the other international agreements that govern copyright and neighboring rights would remain undisturbed. Integrating new-style formalities with the current text of the Berne Convention does, however, raise several significant questions.

First, exactly what is a condition that interferes with the “enjoyment and exercise” of copyright? A solid starting point is that that language at least means that failure to comply with a formality cannot formally terminate the right, or prevent it from arising in the first place. It is unclear how much further “enjoyment and exercise” goes than that; I will return to this problem later.

Assuming for the moment that Article 5(2) allows a range of options short of formal nullification of copyright, we are still faced with a difficult problem: new-style formalities have to create a sufficient incentive for compliance to construct a reliable record of ownership and to reliably signal copyright status, but cannot use the forfeiture of rights to incent compliance.

The simplest solution would be to preserve formally voluntary registration, notice, and recordation of transfers (and reestablish a formally voluntary renewal formality) for all works, including works of foreign authors, but then incent compliance by exposing the works of noncompliant rightsholders to a “default” license that allows use for a predetermined fee. The royalty payable under the default license would be low. Ideally, the royalty to license a work that a rightsholder has failed to register, notice, reregister in the case of a transfer (i.e., record), or renew should be set to approximate the cost of complying with these formalities (i.e., the total cost of informing oneself about the details of compliance and then satisfying them). That way a rightsholder who expects his work to produce revenue exceeding the cost of complying with the relevant formality will prefer to comply with the formality, whereas a rightsholder who expects his work to produce revenue amounting to less than the cost of compliance will prefer to expose his work to the default license. (The rare rightsholder who estimates the likely revenues from his work to be equal to the cost of complying with the formality will be indifferent between compliance and exposure to the license.)

This system of formally voluntary formalities plus default licenses—which I have referred to previously as “new-style” formalities—establishes indirectly what the traditional system of compulsory formalities did directly: it eases access to commercially valueless works for which protection (or the continuation of protection) serves no purpose and focuses the system on those works for which protection is needed to ensure that the rightsholder is able to appropriate the commercial value of the expression. For the filtering function to work, of course, the government would have to maintain an easily accessible and up-to-date public registry. Given current computer database and search technology, this would not be difficult.

[556] Importantly, the use of default licenses in a system of new-style formalities avoids the general objection to the compulsory licensing of intellectual property goods: the need for a legislature, agency, or court to set a price for the license in the absence of market negotiations. With respect to the particular use of default licenses proposed here, compliance with the formalities—or the failure to comply—serves as a price signal. Failure to comply means that the rightsholder places a minimal value on the right, a value no greater than the cost of compliance. That is all we need to know about works for which rightsholders fail to comply with formalities. And by exposing these works to a default license, we are giving these rightsholders nothing less than what they themselves expect in term of returns. The system of default licenses is therefore efficient: it removes transaction costs that would otherwise frequently prevent use, while charging an approximately optimal price (i.e., near zero) for a license. With respect to works for which rightsholders comply with formalities, the market continues to set the prices of licenses.

Default licenses can be analogized to the “penalty defaults” of the type proposed by Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner as gap-filling rules for incomplete contracts.[243] Default rules in contract theory are intended to fill gaps in contracts by providing the parties with what they likely would have contracted for. “Penalty defaults” are gap-filling rules that are designed to give at least one party to the contract an incentive to contract around the default and therefore to choose affirmatively a preferred contract provision. Penalty defaults are purposefully designed to impose what the parties would not want, in order to encourage the parties to negotiate the solution that they do want. Importantly, penalty defaults incent contracting parties to reveal information to one another that might not be revealed otherwise.

Although Ayres and Gertner formulate and apply their theory of penalty defaults in the contract law context, the theory can be applied in the intellectual property context as well. The default licenses that back new-style formalities are a kind of penalty default rule, in that they are precisely the outcome that the owner of a valuable copyright would not desire. The existence of the license encourages owners of certain works to produce information that might not be produced otherwise—i.e., that their works are sufficiently valuable that continued copyright protection makes sense.

This system of voluntary formalities backed with default licenses raises an immediate question: do they comply with the Berne Convention (and, thereby, with TRIPs)? Although there are arguments both ways, I believe that the better reading of Berne would permit new-style formalities.

Article 5(2) and economic rights. The first issue is whether new-style formalities offend the Berne Article 5(2) proscription of formalities that [557] interfere with the “enjoyment and exercise” of copyright. There are two senses in which that phrase may be interpreted. The first relates to enjoyment and exercise of the author’s economic rights. Under Article 9(1) of the Berne Convention, authors of literary and artistic works have the exclusive right of authorizing the reproduction of those works “in any manner or form.” This includes traditional photocopying, digital copying, or any other form of copying of the entire work or any part thereof. These exclusive rights include, as a necessary corollary, the right to refuse to authorize reproduction of a protected work. This right to exclude is the mainspring of the author’s economic right: by restricting reproduction, the author may reduce output of his work and thereby realize supracompetitive returns if his work lacks ready substitutes.

Nevertheless, authors who fail to comply with new-style formalities and thereby lose their previously existing right to exclude are likely not, as a category, deprived of any aspect of the “enjoyment and exercise” of the economic rights appertaining to their copyright. An author who fails to comply with new-style formalities is merely converting an entitlement that is initially protected by a property right (the right to exclude, realized through injunctions and infringement damages) into an entitlement protected by a liability right (the right to recover revenues from use via a default license).[244] Even though new-style formalities set up the liability rule as the default, and require authors to opt out to preserve their ability to exploit the property rule, the system—unlike the usual system of compulsory licenses—is still voluntary. And if the royalty payable under the license is set correctly, owners of copyrights with projected values lower than the cost of complying with a formality should actually prefer the liability right as a means of exploiting their copyrights.

Creating an exploitation option based on a liability rule is a modest extension of what the current regime provides. In the copyright system we have now, rightsholders are allowed to choose the best approaches within the existing set of property rules for exploiting their copyrights, whether via exclusion and collection of infringement damages, a program of licensing and collection of license royalties, or a mixture of the two. New-style formalities would expand the existing process by establishing a liability rule option in the form of a default license for works not valuable enough to justify customized licensing. Again, whether the default license applies is within the control of the rightsholder, and therefore a rightsholder’s decision to rely on that liability rule, rather than on a property rule, to protect the enjoyment and exercise of his copyright is not a forfeiture of rights. It is, rather, a signal that a particular rightsholder believes that a one-size-fits-all liability rule based on a default license is preferable, because of low transaction costs, to a property right [558] exploited through (expensive) customized licensing or enforced through (expensive and protracted) infringement litigation.

The function of new-style formalities, in sum, would be to establish decision points at which rightsholders would be obliged to choose whether to stay within the typical system of property rules or to switch to a liability rule as the means to exercise and enjoy their copyright. Thus, new-style formalities do not touch on the existence or continuation of copyright, but merely on the manner in which rights are exploited. The difference is important, as the WIPO commentary to Article 5(2) makes clear: “what is at issue here is the recognition and scope of protection and not the various possible ways of exploiting the rights given by the law.”[245]

Of course, the “signal” that authors send via compliance or noncompliance with new-style formalities is unlikely to accurately reflect the underlying value of a work in every instance. Some authors will doubtless underestimate the future revenues that their works may bring in, and will mistakenly opt not to comply with formalities and expose their work to a default license. It is important to note that the possibility of error cuts both ways: some authors will mistakenly opt to invest in compliance with formalities for works that are unlikely to produce revenues greater than the cost of compliance. But despite the certainty that some authors will make the wrong decision, it is nonetheless true that authors (and assigns such as publishers) are the parties best placed to decide whether the likely returns from a particular work are great enough to merit investment in compliance with formalities, so the signal-to-noise ratio is likely to be usefully high. In any event, if an author is uncertain regarding his work’s future value, he retains the option of making the relatively small investment required to comply with formalities as a form of insurance against incorrectly valuing his asset.

There is a rejoinder to these arguments that proceeds from a different view of what exactly Berne protects the “enjoyment and exercise” of. What Berne protects, this objection would argue, is not the author’s overall ability to exploit his copyright, but something more specific: the enjoyment and exercise of an author’s right to exclude, a right that is granted in Article 9(1) of the Convention as well as in domestic law. The right to exclude, according to this objection, is not merely an initial entitlement, but is the subject of Berne’s protection for the entire term of copyright. Accordingly, even if rightsholders are free to alienate their right to exclude (via, for example, a voluntary license or a dedication to the public domain), Berne prohibits governments from conditioning the right to exclude on compliance with a formality. Berne prohibits, in other words, using noncompliance with a formality as a trigger to shift a work from property rule to liability rule status.

[559] This is a colorable argument, but is, I believe, an overreading of Berne. The right to control reproduction—to exclude others from making copies—is, as Article 9(1) of Berne makes clear, the core right granted under copyright. So copyright is structured to protect an author’s interests, using a property rule as the initial entitlement. But there is nothing inevitable about this choice; it is, rather, a practical one. Authors’ interest in their works could have been protected by using a liability rule as the initial entitlement, except that structuring the entitlement in that way would require government to set a price for the use of copyrighted works. In general, we do not believe that government is well placed to set prices. In the absence of any indication that government would be able to set a more accurate price for the right to reproduce a copyrighted asset than would be set by a market transaction (and to do it more cheaply as well), it makes sense to base copyright in a property rule, at least with respect to the initial entitlement.[246] It also makes sense to limit government’s ability to mandate access to copyrighted works to the extent that we fear that the nonmarket pricing decisions that such mandated access would make necessary are unlikely to accurately track the market value of the asset. Article 9(2) of Berne limits such government-mandated “exceptions” from the author’s exclusive right; I will return to that provision shortly. But the important point is that the purpose of the copyright system is not to protect a rightsholder’s property right qua property right. The purpose of the copyright system is to protect a rightsholder’s ability to use his initial entitlement, which comes in the form of a property right, as a lever to pursue the exploitation strategy best suited to his particular interests.

Seen in that light, it makes little sense to lump default licenses, in which use is priced with the assistance of robust information produced by the author himself, together with typical compulsory licenses, in which price is determined by fiat (or, at best, fiat following administrative hearings at which rightsholders and would-be compulsory licensees offer contending and self-serving accounts of the worth of the assets at issue). Unlike in the case of ordinary compulsory licenses, the default licenses attending new-style formalities do not threaten to interfere with the exclusive rights of any rightsholder who does not consider the use of a default license to be in his interest. The objection to new-style formalities, then, is reduced to a narrow protest that government should not force authors to decide whether to exploit their right via a property rule or a liability rule, or, alternatively, that if government does force the choice, the default should be a property rule rather than a liability rule (i.e., rightsholders should have to affirmatively “opt in” to a liability rule). These arguments would make the right to exclude truly totemic. Berne (and domestic copyright law) would no longer be focused on protecting authors’ abilities to exploit their works, but would be bound up instead in [560] enforcing a particular property rule, not just as an initial entitlement, but as a perpetual entitlement, even in instances where authors (and the public) would benefit from the use of an alternative means of exploitation.

Article 9(2), TRIPs Article 13, and copyright “exceptions.” So the best reading of Article 5(2), in my view, would be one which allows new-style formalities. But assume for the moment, contrary to the arguments laid out above, that the right to exclude is in fact a totemic right under Berne. Assume then that the Article 5(2) prohibition of formalities that interfere with the “enjoyment and exercise” of copyright focuses narrowly on maintaining inviolate, throughout the term of copyright, the right to exclude, i.e., the property rule. Assume also that new-style formalities impermissibly interfere with the enjoyment and exercise of that right. The default licenses that enforce new-style formalities may nonetheless still be permissible under Article 9(2), which permits exceptions to the exclusive reproduction right in certain “special cases,” provided that the excepted reproduction “does not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and does not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the author.” Article 13 of the TRIPs accord contains similar language and generalizes Berne’s exceptions to all of the exclusive rights granted under Berne and TRIPs (e.g., the rights to create derivative works, to authorize public performances, and to authorize broadcasts).[247]

Ricketson states that exceptions permitted under Article 9(2) are subject in all cases to respect for the author’s moral rights;[248] that much is evident from the three-step test in Article 9(2), which mixes economic and moral rights concerns. It is also clear that the three criteria for restricting exclusive rights must all be met in order for restrictions to be permissible. Further guidance in how to apply the Article 9(2) test is available from the Report on the Berne Revision Conference held in Stockholm in 1967:

If it is considered that reproduction conflicts with the normal exploitation of the work, reproduction is not permitted at all. If it is considered that reproduction does not conflict with the normal exploitation of the work, the next step would be to consider whether it does not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the author. Only if such is not the case would it be possible in certain special cases to introduce a compulsory license, or to provide for use without payment. A practical example might be photocopying for various purposes. If it consists of producing a very large number of copies, it may not be permitted, as it conflicts with a normal exploitation of the work. [561] If it implies a rather large number of copies for use in industrial undertakings, it may not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the author, provided that, according to national legislation, an equitable remuneration is paid. If a small number of copies is made, photocopying may be permitted without payment, particularly for individual or scientific use.[249]

There is another more recent, and perhaps more useful, interpretation of the exceptions language. In June 2000, a dispute resolution panel of the World Trade Organization (WTO) issued a report,[250] in an action brought by the European Communities, holding that Section 110(5) of the Copyright Act,[251] a provision establishing royalty-free compulsory licenses for the public performance of radio or television transmissions of nondramatic musical works for businesses, including restaurants and bars, below a certain size or using certain “homestyle” stereo and television equipment, did not qualify as a permitted exception under Article 13 of the TRIPs accord.[252] The WTO panel stated that Berne Article 9(2) and TRIPs Article 13 were to be construed in a manner that avoided conflict,[253] and it limned the scope of each of the three elements of the Berne Article 9(2)/TRIPs Article 13 test.

“Normal exploitation.” Whether a system of default licenses conflicts with the “normal exploitation” of a work can be thought of in two different ways. One would reflect a totemic view of the right to exclude: that right, this argument would hold, is the “normal” way in which works are exploited, and therefore default licenses, which substitute a liability rule for the exclusionary property rule, are incompatible with “normal exploitation.” But by that reasoning, all compulsory licenses would run afoul of the “normal exploitation” element of the Article 9(2) test, a result which makes no sense against the background of a Berne provision intended to regulate, but not to prohibit, the use of exceptions such as compulsory licenses.

The second, and better, construction of the “normal exploitation” element would ask whether a default license would result, in comparison with normal copyright remedies, in rightsholders in the aggregate realizing lower returns from their works—or, as the WTO panel framed the question, whether the excepted use would “enter into economic competition with the ways that right holders normally extract economic value from . . . the work . . . and thereby [562] deprive them of significant or tangible commercial gains.”[254] As outlined above, default licenses would apply only when a rightsholder failed to comply with a low-cost formality. Failure to comply is a signal that the net present value of expected future revenues from a work is lower than the cost of compliance. The fee payable under the default license (i.e., the fee payable by each user) is set to approximate the cost of compliance. Thus, for works that fall under the default license, on average the rightsholder’s ability to “exploit” the work will be, if anything, enhanced.

The argument that new-style formalities will not impair rightsholders’ abilities to exploit their works finds powerful support in the fair use doctrine, which often has been characterized as a limitation on exclusive rights that immunizes uses for which the transaction costs of negotiating a license exceed the potential return to rightsholders from the license.[255] Articles 10 and 10bis of the Berne Convention list certain fair use-type exceptions to the exclusive reproduction right; these include limited rights to make quotations[256] and to use works in aid of teaching[257] and news reporting.[258] Berne’s provision for fair use shows that the Convention permits incursions on the exclusive reproduction right when transaction costs make negotiated arrangements too costly. The default licenses that back new-style formalities can be supported on the same grounds—in fact, they are in some respects less invasive than fair use, because use under a default license results in compensation, whereas use under the fair use doctrine does not.

“Legitimate interests” and moral rights. The second requirement—that an exempted reproduction “not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the author”—is susceptible, at least in part, to the same analysis. To the extent that the author’s “legitimate interests” are taken to mean his ability to capture whatever rents his exclusive rights will return, the default license does not interfere.[259] To the extent, however, that the phrase “legitimate interests” refers to the author’s moral rights, additional analysis is required.

[563] The “legitimate interests” of copyright holders (as well as the “enjoyment and exercise” of copyright) is tied, as well, to the moral rights that Berne requires signatories to grant to authors.[260] Article 6bis of the Berne Convention requires member states to grant authors rights of paternity (i.e., the “right to claim authorship”) and integrity (i.e., the “right to object to any distortion, mutilation or other modification” that would prejudice the author’s reputation).[261] These rights are independent of the author’s economic rights, survive the transfer of those economic rights,[262] and must, in most instances, persist for at least the expiry of the economic rights, even following the death of the author.[263]

It must be noted that since acceding to the Berne Convention, the United States has refused to fully incorporate into its domestic law the moral rights set out in Article 6bis. Instead, the United States has relied on a number of different sources, including an author’s right under copyright law to control derivative works; state unfair competition, defamation, and privacy laws; and the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 (VARA),[264] an amendment to the copyright law granting limited rights of paternity and integrity to a narrowly defined class of “works of visual art,”[265] to approximate the Berne requirements. Whether the United States currently complies with Berne Article 6bis is a subject beyond the scope of this Article.[266] But it seems likely that current U.S. law, if it complies at all, does so only minimally. The question is whether subjecting certain works to the default licenses that attend new-style formalities would subtract meaningfully from a level of protection for paternity and integrity rights that is already stinting. If so, then the United States may fall out of compliance with Article 6bis (or, perhaps, make its continued noncompliance no longer tolerable).

[564] Regardless of whether current U.S. protection of paternity and integrity rights meets Berne minima, installing a system of new-style formalities need not touch these rights at all: although the works of noncompliant rightsholders would be subject to default licensing, the copyrights on works affected by the regime would nonetheless be left formally intact. Accordingly, there is no reason why the law could not specify that use of works under the default licenses is subject, in all cases, to whatever (narrow) protection current U.S. law affords to paternity and integrity rights.

But new-style formalities could go further, in a way that would strengthen the United States’s commitment to facilitating the exercise of Berne-mandated moral rights. One method would be to infuse into new-style formalities the type of “some rights reserved” copyright customization that Creative Commons provides now.[267] New-style registration, notice, recordation of transfers, and renewal could be designed to allow rightsholders to signal exactly which rights they wish to retain, and which freedoms are allowed. The difference is that instead of relying on a Creative Commons license, rightsholders’ choices about which rights to reserve would be enforceable as a matter of positive law.

There are two potential advantages of the integration of new-style formalities with the Creative Commons approach. First, it could be used to strengthen U.S. compliance with Berne-mandated moral rights. Authors who comply with new-style formalities could be permitted, in exchange for a blanket grant of permission to use their works, to demand attribution in all cases, even in instances, such as fair use, where the rightsholder would not currently have the power to enforce such a demand. Similarly, authors who comply with new-style formalities would be able to protect their integrity rights, by permitting reproduction but restricting derivative uses.[268]

The second advantage is normative: by disaggregating economic from moral rights, and the moral rights of paternity and integrity from one another, new-style registration, notice, recordation, and renewal would allow us to understand over time what people want in terms of rights for different types of works, and how those desires change (if they do at all). That information would be useful in the debate over future changes to the copyright laws.

[565] FIGURE 6: LICENSE DISTRIBUTION CHOICES OF CREATIVE COMMONS LICENSE USERS

[NOT SHOWN]

The data set out in Figure 6—data which was provided by Creative Commons—shows the choices that Creative Commons licensors have made over the first two years of the organization’s existence regarding which rights to reserve and which to give away. Although rightsholders who seek out, or become informed about, Creative Commons and decide to enter into a Creative Commons license are certainly not representative of rightsholders as a broader group, the Creative Commons license distribution data gives us some insight into what the world might look like when copyright is no longer an on/off switch, but is more finely variegated.

Perhaps most unexpectedly, the data shows that a significant majority (67%) of Creative Commons licensors allow the use of their content in the creation of derivative works. This data suggests that many rightsholders would voluntarily abandon control over derivative works, which is an element both of the author’s economic right and his right of integrity—although most who do so (again 67%) would limit use to noncommercial derivative works.

In contrast, the Creative Commons data shows that almost all licensors (97%) require attribution in exchange for permission to use their works. That number suggests that the norm favoring attribution is strong, and, consequently, that we may succeed in moving copyright closer to rightsholders’ expectations and simultaneously free a large amount of creative work if we install a [566] mechanism for exchanging the right to control reproduction for a stronger commitment to provide attribution.

“Certain special cases.” The final element of Article 9(2), the “certain special cases” requirement, is exceedingly difficult to pin down. The first area of difficulty is determining whether the element imposes a separate constraint at all. The official WIPO commentary on Article 9(2) does not lay out any guidelines for determining whether an exception fits under the “certain special cases” language. Indeed, the commentary fails to mention “certain special cases” as a separate requirement, and instead discusses only the “two conditions” of protecting normal exploitation and avoiding unreasonable prejudice to legitimate expectations—suggesting, perhaps, that the “certain special cases” language does no more than reflect a situation in which the two principal factors are met.[269] The same sense is conveyed in the extract, quoted above, from the Report of the Stockholm Revision of the Berne Convention, which focuses on the “normal exploitation” and “legitimate interests” elements, and suggests again that the “certain special cases” language refers entirely to instances in which neither element is impinged upon.

The WTO panel took a different approach. Interpreting each of Article 13’s three requirements to avoid any “redundancy or inutility,”[270]the panel held that the “certain special cases” language imposed a separate constraint on exceptions and, in fact, that exceptions must first be shown to meet its requirements before analysis of the other criteria is undertaken.[271] The panel read the “certain special cases” language to require that exceptions be “clearly defined”[272] and “narrow in [a] quantitative as well as a qualitative sense.”[273]Applying these standards, the panel invalidated Section 110(5)(B)’s broad grant of compulsory licenses for nondramatic musical works for businesses, holding that the exception could not qualify as “narrow” when, according to evidence before the panel, 70% of all restaurants, 73% of all bars, and 45% of all retail stores qualified for compulsory licenses under the provision.[274] In contrast, the panel upheld the provisions of Section 110(5)(A) granting compulsory licenses for dramatic musical works where the standards set out in the statute would allow only 16% of restaurants, 13.5% of bars, and 18% of retail stores to qualify for royalty-free compulsory licenses for a narrower class of copyrighted works.[275]

[567] For reasons that have been discussed earlier in this Article, we would expect a large number of authors to fail to comply with registration and notice requirements, and, similarly, the majority of rightsholders to fail to comply with a renewal formality. Accordingly, a large number of works (in both absolute and percentage terms) will be exposed to default licenses in a system of new-style formalities. So one might read the WTO panel’s holding that exceptions must be “narrow in a quantitative as well as a qualitative sense” as ruling default licenses out as an exception permissible under Berne 9(2) or TRIPs 13.

It should be noted, however, that the WTO panel’s report was issued in a case involving royalty-free compulsory licensing, which means that, unlike in the case of default licenses, the WTO panel was dealing with an exception that eliminates rightsholders’ ability to receive compensation for their work for the excepted uses. In that context, and in the absence of any particular provision in Berne or TRIPs approving the particular compulsory licenses at issue, an independent “special cases” element makes sense. If the touchstone of the exceptions provision is preserving rightsholders’ abilities to profit from their works, application of the “normal exploitation” and “legitimate interests” elements might theoretically provide all the information needed to determine whether an exception should be permitted. But, in practice, whether a particular exception interferes with “normal exploitation” or a rightsholder’s “legitimate interests” may be difficult to determine with certainty. The “certain special cases” element can therefore be seen as providing an easily administered threshold test: does this exception affect a large enough share of the potential licensing market that it is likely to interfere with a rightsholder’s ability to exploit his work?

But what role should the “certain special cases” element play in a case like default licenses, where there is no systematic interference with rightsholders’ economic interests? In such an instance, the “certain special cases” language may be both theoretically and practically coterminous with the “normal exploitation” element, i.e., the number of works to which an exception applies is required to be sufficiently limited that the market for a particular work is not substantially affected. For works that have a ready market, even a relatively small amount of excepted usage might affect the rightsholder’s ability to exploit the work. But because the default licenses connected to new-style formalities apply only after a rightsholder signals that his work does not enjoy a substantial commercial market, even a relatively large number of excepted uses made under a default license would not interfere with the rightsholder’s own understanding of his ability to exploit the work. Put differently, there is a strong argument that because default licenses arise only when the author or rightsholder sends a signal that his work lacks significant commercial value, the default license applies only in the “special case” where a liability rule is preferred by the rightsholder.

[568] Perhaps the most that can be said at this point about the “special cases” element—and indeed about the Berne Article 9(2)/TRIPs Article 13 test altogether—is (1) that on a proper reading of Berne Article 5(2), the need to justify new-style formalities as an “exception” will never arise, and (2) if the exceptions provision is applicable, the elements of the test are sufficiently indeterminate (at least as they apply to default licenses, a mechanism that the Berne drafters could not have had in mind when they formulated the Article 9(2) test) that the application of the test will involve not so much testing new-style formalities under the formal elements as an evaluation of whether the system of new-style formalities serves (or undermines) the foundational principles of the Berne Convention. If Berne is focused on protecting authors’ ability to exploit their works, new-style formalities will be compatible with the Convention. If Berne is focused, instead, on enforcing a particular property rule, regardless of authors’ interests, then new-style formalities may fail under the current text of the Convention.

CONCLUSION

My hope in writing this Article is that reformalization might reduce the current friction over copyright to a level conducive to a broader discussion about intellectual property reform. As the discussion above makes clear, the stifling of creativity—as well as free speech—created by the current unconditional copyright regime will only become worse with the passage of time. Unlike more radical proposals for reforming copyright law, reformalization is a task that can be accomplished with a few manageable and realistic changes to international and domestic law and without endangering the interests of any particular segment of the copyright community. Just as importantly, unlike more limited proposals, reformalization would ensure that creative material lacking commercial value becomes available for reuse immediately.

With clear rules governing copyright protection and a formalities-compliance system making use of the best technology available, a reformalized copyright regime would reinstate the best aspects of the old U.S. copyright system while leaving behind the bureaucratic difficulties that turned “formalities” into a despised term decades ago. Though this Article does not offer a political road map for achieving the legislative changes needed for reformalization, the proposal outlined above shows that significant reform can take place without damaging the interests of copyright owners who would otherwise have strong incentives to oppose the creation of a less restrictive copyright regime. The challenge now is to turn these academic concepts into actual changes in domestic and international laws. 

[*]Fellow, Center for Internet and Society, Stanford Law

School. The author would like to thank Lawrence Lessig, Richard Epstein, Terry Fisher, Graeme Dinwoodie, Glenn Brown, Lauren Gelman, Jennifer Granick, Elizabeth Rader, Mark Lemley, Laurence Helfer, Abner Greene, Brett Frischmann, Yuko Noguchi, Goodwin Liu, Kal Raustiala, Justin Hughes, Jim Pastore, and the participants in the Center for Internet and Society’s Speaker Series for their helpful discussions and comments. Special thanks to Robert Harlan, Sonia Moss, Anthony Bliss, Don Krummel, and, especially, Darien Shanske and Joe Gratz for their substantial assistance with historical materials.

[1] See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae George A. Akerlof et al., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537

U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-618) [hereinafter Economists’ Brief]; WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 210-53 (2003).

[2] See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, The Dubious Constitutionality of the Copyright Term Extension Act, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 123 (2002); Tyler T. Ochoa, Patent and Copyright Term Extension and the Constitution: A Historical Perspective, 49 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 19 (2001); Shira Perlmutter, Participation in the International Copyright System as a Means to Promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 323 (2002).

[3] See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999); James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the Public Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33 (2003).

[4] See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE (2004) [hereinafter LESSIG, FREE CULTURE]; LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS (2001); Tom W. Bell, Indelicate Imbalancing in Copyright and Patent Law, in COPY FIGHTS 1 (Adam Thierer & Clyde Wayne Crews eds., 2002); Robert P. Merges, One Hundred Years of Solicitude: Intellectual Property Law 1900-2000, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2187 (2000); R. Polk Wagner, Information Wants to Be Free: Intellectual Property and the Mythologies of Control, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 995 (2003).

[5] See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003); Complaint, Kahle v. Ashcroft, No. C04-01127 (N.D. Cal. filed Mar. 22, 2004), available at http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/about/ cases/Civil%20Complaint%203-22-04.pdf (last visited Oct. 4, 2004) [hereinafter Kahle Complaint]; First Amended Complaint, Golan v. Ashcroft, No. 01-B-1854 (D. Colo. filed Feb. 18, 2003), available at http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/about/cases/Amended%20 Complaint.pdf (last visited Oct. 4, 2004).

[6] Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 [hereinafter 1976 Act].

[7] Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 [hereinafter BCIA].

[8] This Act is part of the larger Copyright Amendments Act of 1992. See Copyright Amendments Act of 1992 §§ 101-102, Pub. L. No. 102-307, 106 Stat. 264, 264-66 (1992) [hereinafter CAA].

[9] Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998) [hereinafter CTEA].

[10] 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2000).

[11] See infra text accompanying notes 43-58.

[12] Epstein, supra note 2, at 124.

[13] See, e.g., 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 17.01[B][1][a] (2004) (observing that Berne’s “enlightened approach to copyright protection is notable for its antipathy to formalities”); Jane C. Ginsburg & John M. Kernochan, One Hundred and Two Years Later: The U.S. Joins the Berne Convention, 13 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 1, 38 (1988) (listing, among benefits of Berne accession, elimination of “barbaric forfeitures for lapses in formalities”). But see LESSIG, FREE CULTURE, supra note 4, at 250 (“Rather than abandoning formalities totally, the response [of the Berne drafters] should have been to embrace a more equitable system of registration.”).

[14] See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Paris Act, July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Berne Convention]. All citations in this Article to the Berne Convention are to the Paris Act unless otherwise noted. The Paris Act, to which the United States acceded on March 1, 1989, is the currently effective text of the Berne Convention.

[15] Id. art. 3(1).

[16] Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS—RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPs].

[17] TRIPs Article 9 incorporates Articles 1-21 of the Berne Convention, with the exception of Article 6bis (which concerns moral rights).

[18] See supra text accompanying note 10.

[19] Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (1790) [hereinafter 1790 Act].

[20] U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. This clause is often referred to as the Patent Clause, the Copyright Clause, or the Intellectual Property Clause. Although the term “intellectual property” was unknown at the time of the Constitution’s framing, and although the concept of intellectual property covers more ground than just patents and copyrights, I have chosen the third formulation to refer to the congressional power in this clause, because it is the only formulation that captures both types of exclusive rights authorized in the clause.

[21] 1790 Act, supra note 19, § 1. The 1790 Act gave authors no exclusive right to derivative works, or to public performance or display of their works.

[22] Id.

[23] Id. § 3.

[24] See William J. Maher, Copyright Term, Retrospective Extension, and the Copyright Law of 1790 in Historical Context, 49 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 1021, 1023 (2002). Interestingly, Maher’s examination of bibliographic records from the period 1790 to 1800 reveals that only twelve works subject to preexisting state copyright law were reregistered under the 1790 Act—a tiny fraction (1.74%) of the works registered during that period. Id. at 1025. Moreover, at the time of their reregistration, only three of the works dated from before 1784. Id. Although nine of the twelve states that had copyright laws prior to 1790 required works to be registered as a condition of protection, most of the state registration records from this period have been lost, so it is impossible to say how many works were registered under state copyright and were eligible for reregistration under the 1790 Act. See G. Thomas Tanselle, Copyright Records and the Bibliographer, 22 STUD. BIBLIOGRAPHY 77, 82-84 (1969). Nonetheless, the very low absolute number of works reregistered following the 1790 Act (i.e., reregistration of works that were previously subject to state copyrights that were preempted by the 1790 Act) is consistent with much more expansive recent data, discussed infra at text accompanying notes 124-134, showing that copyrighted works have, on average, a short commercial life before their value is fully depreciated.

[25] 1790 Act, supra note 19, § 3.

[26] Act of Apr. 29, 1802, ch. 36, 2 Stat. 171 (1802).

[27] Id. § 1.

[28] Id.

[29] 1790 Act, supra note 19, § 4. Responsibility for accepting registration and deposit was later moved to the Librarian of Congress. See Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, §§ 85, 109­110, 16 Stat. 198, 212, 215 (1870).

[30] 1790 Act, supra note 19, § 1.

[31] Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, 4 Stat. 436 (1831) [hereinafter 1831 Act].

[32] Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909) (repealed 1976) [hereinafter 1909 Act].

[33] 1831 Act, supra note 31, § 16.

[34] Id. §§ 3-5.

[35] Id. § 2.

[36] Act of June 30, 1934, ch. 157, 4 Stat. 728 (1834).

[37] Id.

[38] 1909 Act, supra note 32, § 1.

[39] Id. §§ 1, 19-21.

[40] Id. § 24.

[41] Id. § 23.

[42] The 1909 Act allowed protection to attach upon “publication of the work with the notice of copyright,” id. § 12, so following 1909 it was publication with notice, rather than registration, that served as the formality that gave rise to copyright. Following publication, however, the Act required that the author “promptly” deposit copies of the work with the Copyright Office, id. § 13, and, although the statute is not clear on this point, Professor Nimmer has noted that authors were required to submit an application for registration along with the deposit. 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 13, § 7.16[A][2][b]. Rightsholders were barred from bringing a lawsuit for infringement of the copyright until they had complied with the registration and deposit formalities. 1909 Act, supra note 32, § 12. In addition, the Register of Copyrights was authorized to make a demand for deposit; failure to promptly comply (within three months from any part of the United States except for “outlying territorial possessions,” and within six months from anywhere else) would result in fines and the voiding of the copyright. Id. § 13.

[43] 17 U.S.C. § 410(c) (2000).

[44] Id. § 411.

[45] See Final Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on U.S. Adherence to the Berne Convention, 10 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 513, 572-73 (1986) [hereinafter Final Report].

[46] 17 U.S.C. § 412 (2000).

[47] See, e.g., id. § 401(d).

[48] Id. § 205(c). The law continues to require deposit, but punishes failure to comply

with a fine, rather than with forfeiture of the copyright. Id. § 407(d). 49.LANDES & POSNER, supra note 1, at 236.

[50] Id. at 235.

[51] See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 925 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (recounting record companies’ contention that “it would be burdensome or even impossible to identify all of the copyrighted music they own”), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).

[52] See Harry Fox Agency, Inc., HFA Is Looking for These Publishers, at

http://harryfox.com/public/infoUpdateList.jsp (last visited Oct. 30, 2004).  53.LANDES & POSNER, supra note 1, at 212 (explaining results of study).

[54] See infra p. 501.

[55] 17 U.S.C. §§ 302-304 (2000 & Supp. II 2002).

[56] These graphs are, like Figure 1, drawn from LANDES & POSNER, supra note 1, at 236, and are based on Copyright Office data collected by those authors.

[57] CAA, supra note 8, § 102.

[58] That renewals did not fall to zero is due to provisions of the North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 103-182, 107 Stat. 2057 (1993), and the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (URAA) § 514, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809, 4976 (1994), which together restored the copyright of certain foreign works that had fallen into the public domain for failure to comply with mandatory formalities. These foreign works are restored “for the remainder of the term of copyright that the work would have otherwise been granted in the United States if the work never entered the public domain in the United States.” 17 U.S.C. § 104A(a)(1)(B) (2000).

[59] See James Gilreath, Editor’s Preface to FEDERAL COPYRIGHT RECORDS 1790-1800, at ix, ix (James Gilreath ed. & Elizabeth Carter Wills compiler, 1987).

[60] See Maher, supra note 24, at 1024 n.8. Using additional information obtained from ROGER BRISTOL, SUPPLEMENT TO CHARLES EVANS’ AMERICANBIBLIOGRAPHY (1970), about the number of works published in the United States, and correcting for duplicate copyright registrations in Gilreath’s records, Maher arrives at a larger number of published works (20,829) and a smaller number of copyright registrations (684).

[61] Gilreath, supra note 59, at ix; Maher, supra note 24, at 1023-27. Further, in relying on the number of total texts found in CHARLES EVANS, AMERICAN BIBLIOGRAPHY (1941), Maher is repeating some instances where Evans double-counted and included foreign texts. The recent online version of American Bibliography (available at http://infoweb.newsbank.com to users with a password), which includes the supplement to American Bibliography (a password-protected description of which is available at http://infoweb.newsbank.com/iw-search/we/Evans/?p_action=help), provides a lower total number for texts produced in 1790-1800 (12,303) than Maher’s.

[62] There is some anecdotal evidence that the percentage of published works subject to copyright remained low, although probably not as low as at copyright’s inception. In a 1961 report to Congress, the Register of Copyrights stated that “most of the great mass of published material” did not bear a copyright notice, indicating that many authors were simply not interested in securing copyright at all. HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 87TH CONG., REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW 62 (Comm. Print 1961); see also H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 143 (1976) (explaining that the copyright notice requirement serves four principal functions: “(1) It has the effect of placing in the public domain a substantial body of published material that no one is interested in copyrighting; (2) It informs the public as to whether a particular work is copyrighted; (3) It identifies the copyright owner; and (4) It shows the date of publication.”).

[63] I received invaluable assistance from Joe Gratz and Darien Shanske in conducting historical research for this Article. Though the discussion of our findings makes reference to the author in the singular, this stylistic convention is adopted to ensure clarity and ease of reading, and not to suggest that the author conducted the research independently.

[64] This was done in FEDERAL COPYRIGHT RECORDS 1790-1800, supra note 59.

[65] See ALICE D. SCHREYER, THE HISTORY OF BOOKS: A GUIDE TO SELECTED RESOURCES IN THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 94 (1987).

[66] The estimate is from Martin A. Roberts, Records in the Copyright Office of the Library of Congress Deposited by the United States District Courts, 1790-1870, 31 PROC. BIBLIOGRAPHICAL SOC’Y AM. 81, 94 (1937). It is cited as authoritative by SCHREYER, supra note 65, at 90; see also U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, 106TH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDING SEPTEMBER 30, 2003, at 62 n.1 (2003); Tanselle, supra note 24.

[67] Roberts, supra note 66, at 87, 92.

[68] For 1801 through 1819, there is AMERICAN BIBLIOGRAPHY: A PRELIMINARY CHECKLIST (Ralph R. Shaw & Richard H. Shoemaker compilers, 1958). For 1819 through 1846, there is A CHECKLIST OF AMERICAN IMPRINTS (Richard H. Shoemaker et al. compilers, 1964).

[69] D.W. Krummel, Counting Every Star; or, Historical Statistics on Music Publishing in the United States, 10 ANUARIO INTERAMERICANO DE INVESTIGACION MUSICAL 175, 182 (1974).

[70] Because this figure includes some registrations for prints, maps, and photographs in the numerator, but does not include any provision for these works in the denominator, it overstates the rate of registration by some unknown, but likely small, amount.

[71] The period between 1845 and 1857 is described as “the greatest boom the business had ever witnessed.” 1 JOHN TEBBEL, A HISTORY OF PUBLISHING IN THE UNITED STATES 245 (1972). Between 1850 and 1870, the total value of all printing and publishing in the United States increased from $14,812,227 to $80,939,756. Downing Palmer O’Harra, Book Publishing in the United States 1860 to 1901, Including Statistical Tables and Charts to 1927, at 112 (1928) (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Illinois) (on file with author) (citing the 1905, 1914, 1921, and 1925 editions of the U.S. Census Bureau’s Census of Manufactures). Though these raw figures do not account for inflation and, as noted by O’Harra, collection methods probably improved over the period (further inflating the total growth), id. at 111, the overall trend is clear.

[72] For information on texts, see A CHECKLIST OF AMERICAN IMPRINTS, supra note 68; AMERICAN BIBLIOGRAPHY: A PRELIMINARY CHECKLIST, supra note 68; EVANS, supra note

[61] For population and GDP information, see Louis D. Johnston & Samuel H. Williamson, Source Note for US GDP, 1789-2002 (2003), at http://www.eh.net/hmit/gdp/GDPsource.htm (last visited Sept. 9, 2004).

[73] The information regarding U.S. GDP in Figure 5 comes from Johnston & Williamson, supra note 72.

[74] Clarence Brigham, American Booksellers’ Catalogues, 1734-1800, in ESSAYS HONORING LAWRENCE C. WROTH 31 (1951).

[75] See Mifflin v. R.H. White Co., 190 U.S. 260 (1903); Holmes v. Hurst, 174 U.S. 82 (1899).

[76] Evans lists newspapers and periodicals once for each year of publication, while Shaw and Shoemaker (1801-1819) list them only once and Shoemaker et al. (1820-1846) do not list periodicals at all. See A CHECKLIST OF AMERICAN IMPRINTS, supra note 68, at v; AMERICAN BIBLIOGRAPHY: A PRELIMINARY CHECKLIST, supra note 68, at ix.

[77]FRANK LUTHER MOTT, AMERICAN JOURNALISM 216 (rev. ed. 1950).

[78] Id. Another source puts the total number of American periodicals in 1872 (just after the end of our period) at 8110. M.B. Iwinski, La Statistique Internationale Des Imprimés, BULLETIN DE L’INSTITUT INTERNATIONAL DE BIBLIOGRAPHIE 1, 66 (1911).

[79] See A CHECKLIST OF AMERICAN IMPRINTS, supra note 68, at v.

[80] Specifically, the Librarian complained in 1872 about the deposit of “printed labels, with or without pictorial embellishment, designed for use on cigar-boxes, patent medicines, and other articles of manufacture.” ANNUAL REPORT OF THE LIBRARIAN OF CONGRESS EXHIBITING PROGRESS OF THE LIBRARY DURING YEAR ENDED DECEMBER 1, 1872, at 4 (1872). This is confirmed by Roberts, who attests to seeing records of “patent medicine labels, cigar-box linings, photographs, and all the other miscellanea which the copyright laws were called to protect.” Roberts, supra note 66, at 92; see also Tanselle, supra note 24, at 86.

[81] One contemporary source put the percentage of foreign works and reprints at 45% between 1830 and 1842 and 30% in 1853. NIKELUS TRÜBNER, TRÜBNER’S BIBLIOGRAPHIC GUIDE TO AMERICAN LITERATURE, at xxiii-iv (1855). Trübner’s numbers for 1853 are cited without comment by Tebbel. 2 TEBBEL, supra note 71, at 23. Another contemporary source puts the percentage of foreign works in 1835 at about 40%; however, this source also states that in 1833 there were “one-third more foreign than original” books. ROSALIND REMER, PRINTERS AND MEN OF CAPITAL 149 (1996) (citing 2 BOOKSELLER’S ADVERTISER AND MONTHLY REGISTER OF NEW PUBLICATIONS AMERICAN AND FOREIGN 2 (1836)). Another contemporary source for the 1850s also apparently confirmed Trübner, finding percentages of original American titles to be roughly 61%, 58%, and 73% for the years 1853, 1854, and 1855, respectively. See CLARENCE GOHDES, AMERICAN LITERATURE IN NINETEENTH­CENTURY ENGLAND 42 n.66 (1944) (citing SAMPSON LOW, THE AMERICAN CATALOGUE OF BOOKS vi (1856)). Certainly the trend was toward American authors; Tebbel summarizes as follows:

The first half of the nineteenth century witnessed the steady swing away from British to American authors, notwithstanding the immense popularity of Scott and Dickens. In 1820, the ratio had been thirty American to seventy British; in 1856, it was eighty American to twenty British. While these figures may not be quite accurate, they disclose the trend unmistakably.

1 TEBBEL, supra note 71, at 221. Tebbel follows another contemporary source here, Goodrich, who states that the balance shifted toward American authors in the 1840s. 2 S.G. GOODRICH, RECOLLECTIONS OF A LIFETIME 389 (1856); see also Aubert J. Clark, The Movement for Intellectual Copyright in Nineteenth Century America 38-39 (1960) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Catholic University of America) (on file with author) (doubting that the percentage of American bestsellers that were pirated between 1800 and 1860 was as high as 50%). For the years 1890 through 1916, books by foreigners averaged 44% (for the twenty years that complete information was collected). 2 TEBBEL, supra note 71, at 710 (citing FRED E. WOODWARD, A GRAPHIC SURVEY OF BOOK PUBLICATION, 1890­1916 (U.S. Bureau of Educ., Bulletin No. 14, 1917)).

[82] This was also confirmed by my inspection of all the California imprints calalogued in Robert Harlan, Printing for the Instant City: San Francisco at Mid-Century, in GETTING THE BOOKS OUT 137 (Michael Hackenberg ed., 1985). Only around one percent were of foreign origin. No doubt this number is lower than the number nationwide, as San Francisco publishers were clearly focused on providing works of local interest and many reprints appeared within periodicals.

[83] Statistics provided by Professor Robert Harlan (July 28, 2004) (results of study examining San Francisco imprints from 1850 through 1870) (on file with author).

[84] Harlan, supra note 82, at 154. Harlan adds that he doubts as many as one in four examples of job work (e.g., labels) published in San Francisco during the period has survived, even though the number of ephemera in his collection outnumbers books by over three to one. Id. at 145. The copyright registration records for California for the period 1851 through 1862 are available; these records indicate that only about 56% of all the works copyrighted in California for this period (293 items) were texts. CALIFORNIA IMPRINTS, 1833­1862, A BIBLIOGRAPHY 480-504 (Robert Greenwood ed., Seiko June Suzuki & Marjorie Pulliam compilers, 1961). Examples of job work copyrighted include labels for the “Eureka Compound for Fever & Ague” (1852) and “Fish’s Infallible Hair Restorative” (1861), and a blank of a membership certificate from the Committee of Vigilance for San Francisco (1856). So a substantial amount of copyrightable work most likely has been lost and cannot be counted in the denominator of any registration rate calculation.

[85] The percentage reflects 198 copyrighted items out of 1469 total copyrightable items. The figure for total copyrightable material is probably too low, as it was reached using very strict criteria to determine which items would have been copyrightable.

[86] Interestingly, DeGroot’s map of the Washoe Mines was registered (item #203, 1860).

[87] For background information on Laurentine Hamilton, see First Unitarian Church of Oakland, Welcome to the First Unitarian Church of Oakland, at http://uuoakland.org/history.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 2004).

[88] Charles Wadsworth, for instance, did not notice his many sermons when published as pamphlets, but his publisher, Anton Roman, did notice a collection of his sermons even though at least two (and probably most, if not all) of the sermons in the collection had already been published as pamphlets and were thus in the public domain.

[89] A 1963 Practicing Law Institute monograph on copyright law by Barbara Ringer and Paul Gitlin was published without notice and immediately entered the public domain. See BARBARA A. RINGER & PAUL GITLIN, COPYRIGHTS (1963). Ringer was perhaps the person most familiar with copyright formalities at that time; when the book was published, she was Assistant Register for Examining at the U.S. Copyright Office. (She would later serve as Register of Copyrights between 1973 and 1980.) It is exceedingly unlikely that the chief examiner for the Copyright Office responsible for enforcing the notice formality mistakenly omitted notice from her own monograph on copyright law, and it is likely that many other such omissions were deliberate.

[90] For example, the Marysville Directory for the Year 1855 is copyright noticed, but not registered, even though the same publisher’s Directory for Sacramento for 1853-54 is registered. Also, LEWIS SHEARER, A DIGEST OF THE DECISIONS AND OPINIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA (1859) is noticed, but not registered.

[91] Statistics provided by Professor Robert Harlan (July 28, 2004) (on file with author). There are some more suggestive examples from Harlan’s data of individuals making decisions regarding which works to notice. The California Immigrant Union copyright noticed its informational work entitled All About California, and the Inducements to Settle There (seventy-four pages, 1870), but not its political works, such as Arguments in Favor of Immigration with an Explanation of the Measures Recommended by the Immigrant Union (twenty-six pages, 1870) or Common Sense Applied to the Immigrant Question: Showing Why the “California Immigrant Union” was Founded and What It Expects to Do (sixty-four pages, 1869). Jacob Leon Stone does not notice his Reply to Bishop Colenso’s Attack upon the Pentateuch (one hundred eleven pages, 1863), but does notice Slavery and the Bible; or Slavery as Seen in its Punishment (forty-eight pages, 1863). In general, political statements were not noticed, which makes sense, since often the whole point was to publicize a point of view, often unpopular, such as George C. Bates’s published speech entitled, Address of Geo.

C. Bates, Esq., Which He Was Prevented from Delivering at Sacramento, on Saturday, April 19th, 1856, by a Mob.

[92] For this survey I compared the records of the Bancroft Library with the published copyright records for 1908.

[93] Harlan, supra note 82, at 162. This sample is much thinner, with a total of 105 copyrightable items.

[94] The campaign was apparently successful, based on the later publication of another pamphlet, The William Buckley Case: Convicted of Murder and Sentenced to Be Hanged, Released from Prison by Governor Jas. M. Gillett on October 16, 1909 (1910). The Buckley case was not one of a simple murder but was connected with larger labor issues, as Buckley was accused of killing a strikebreaker.

[95] Specifically, 4162 did not have a date, which is a conservative proxy for lack of notice (the presence of a date is not tantamount to notice). Based on a sample of fifty posters, we found no examples of a poster properly noticed without a date, though technically, post­1909, this would have been possible for some posters.

[96]LANDES & POSNER, supra note 1, at 235. Landes and Posner note that another factor potentially contributing to the decline in registrations may be that “since 1989 registration has no longer been a condition for bringing an infringement suit for foreign works protected [under] the Berne Convention.” Id. at 235 n.40. However, because foreign works constitute a small percentage of works registered in the United States, the total exemption of foreign works from voluntary registration is a relatively unimportant determinant of registration rates.

[97] Note that the consequences of failing to register a copyright are more limited post­1976. Failure to register in the post-1976 unconditional regime does not move a work into the public domain, which raises the possibility that the decline in registrations after 1991 is the result of many rightsholders delaying registration until an infringement occurs. It is only after registering a work that a U.S. rightsholder may initiate an infringement suit. 17 U.S.C. § 411 (2000). However, failure to register at the work’s inception still imposes a penalty: a rightsholder may recover neither statutory damages nor attorney’s fees for the period of nonregistration. Id. § 412. Given the difficulty of proving actual damages in an infringement suit, and the possibility that infringement may go undetected for long periods, the rightsholder who waits until detecting infringement to register his work risks forfeiting a substantial share of the infringement damages he might have recovered had he registered at the beginning of the term. Accordingly, any rightsholder who, at the inception of a copyright term, forecasts a substantial net present value for his work is likely to register. Accordingly, the correlation between the post-1991 decline in registrations and the concomitant fee increases holds, even though registration no longer is equivalent to complete forfeiture of rights.

[98] U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 66, at 62.

[99] U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, 105TH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDING SEPTEMBER 30, 2002, at 8 (2002).

[100] U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, 104TH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDING SEPTEMBER 30, 2001, at 2 (2001).

[101] If an author (or, perhaps more relevantly, a publisher) foresees little commercial value for a particular work, that work may be neither registered nor published, in which case the federal copyright term would not commence under pre-1976 law. See 1909 Act, supra note 32, §§ 10-11. Rather, the work would have been subject to perpetual common law copyright. However, under post-1976 rules, fixation in a tangible medium, not publication, is the trigger for copyright. See supra text accompanying note 10.

[102] A weblog (sometimes shortened to “blog”) is a website, usually of noncommercial origin, that uses a dated log format updated on a daily or very frequent basis to provide information about a particular subject or range of subjects. Weblog content may be written by the blog’s owner, gleaned from other Internet or non-Internet sources, or contributed by users. A weblog may consist of the “postings” of the blog’s owner, or may accept postings from users. For examples of popular weblogs, see Slashdot, at http://slashdot.org (last visited Sept. 9, 2004), a user-driven blog focused on issues of interest to the computer programming community, or TalkingPointsMemo, at http://talkingpointsmemo.com (last visited Sept. 9, 2004), a political weblog authored by Joshua Micah Marshall, a Washington, D.C., journalist.

[103] Some weblogs do precisely that. See, e.g., Bag and Baggage, at http://bgbg.blogspot.com/ (last visited Oct. 11, 2004) (weblog of appellate and intellectual property lawyer Denise Howell). See infra text accompanying notes 115-123 for discussion of Creative Commons, an organization that has developed special licenses to allow the public free use of copyright-protected works.

[104] For a large and diverse set of examples of uses of copyrighted material that might conceivably be deemed “fair” but have nonetheless drawn allegations of infringement and demands to cease and desist, see Electronic Frontier Found. et al., Chilling Effects Clearinghouse, at http://www.chillingeffects.org (last visited Sept. 9, 2004). The need for both would-be users and rightsholders to engage in expensive legal analysis of the four indeterminate factors that together comprise the statutory test for fair use, 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000), is itself a cost imposed with significantly greater frequency in an unconditional copyright regime.

[105] See ARTISTDirect, Inc., The Clique: Biography, at http://store.artistdirect.com/ music/artist/bio/0,,415704,00.html?artist=The+Clique (last visited Oct. 11, 2004).

[106] 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2000). The compulsory license provision requires that notice be given to the licensor within thirty days of making the recording and before any distribution occurs. But, in a proviso that is especially relevant here, § 115(b)(1) provides that “[i]f the registration or other public records of the Copyright Office do not identify the copyright owner and include an address at which notice can be served, it shall be sufficient to file the notice of intention in the Copyright Office.”

[107]THORVALD SOLBERG, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, REPORT ON COPYRIGHT LEGISLATION 25 (1904).

[108] See, e.g., Copyright Law Revision: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights, 89th Cong. 68 (1965) (statement of Abraham L. Kaminstein, Register of Copyrights) (“The [1909 Act] contains a number of highly technical requirements concerning copyright notice, registration, and deposit, and the recording of assignments which are not only burdensome and difficult to understand but which, in too many cases, result in a complete loss of copyright protection.”).

[109] See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 1, at 238.

[110] Internet Corp. for Assigned Names and Numbers, ICANN Information, at http://www.icann.org/general (last visited Sept. 9, 2004); see also LESSIG, FREE CULTURE, supra note 4, at 288-89.

[111] See generally Stargate.com Inc., Welcome to Stargate.com, at http://www.stargateinc.com (last visited Sept. 9, 2004).

[112] See generally Network Solutions, Home, at http://www.networksolutions.com /en_US (last visited Sept. 9, 2004).

[113] See LESSIG, FREE CULTURE, supra note 4, at 289.

[114] See, e.g., Bell v. Combined Registry Co., 397 F.Supp. 1241 (N.D. Ill. 1975) (holding that a rightsholder had abandoned the copyright by authorizing others to use it without limitation and writing in his diary that it was a “gift” to the world ), aff’d, 536 F.2d 164 (7th Cir. 1976).

[115] Creative Commons, About Us, at http://creativecommons.org/learn/aboutus (last visited Sept. 9, 2004).

[116] Creative Commons, Creative Commons Deed: Attribution 2.0, at http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0 (last visited Nov. 29, 2004). 

[117] Creative Commons, Creative Commons Deed: NonCommercial 1.0, at http://creativecommons.org/licenses/nc/1.0 (last visited Sept. 9, 2004).

[118] Creative Commons, Creative Commons Deed: NoDerivs 1.0, at http://creativecommons.org/licenses/nd/1.0 (last visited Sept. 9, 2004).

[119] Creative Commons, Creative Commons Deed: ShareAlike 1.0, at http://creativecommons.org/licenses/sa/1.0 (last visited Sept. 9, 2004).

[120] Open Source Initiative, Open Software License v. 2.0, at http://www.opensource.org/licenses/osl-2.0.php (last visited Sept. 9, 2004).

[121] Free Software Found., GNU General Public License, at http://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl.html (last visited Sept. 9, 2004).

[122] Creative Commons, Creative Commons Public Domain Dedication, at http://creativecommons.org/licenses/publicdomain (last visited Sept. 9, 2004).

[123] Creative Commons, The Founders’ Copyright, at http://creativecommons.org/ projects/founderscopyright (last visited Sept. 9, 2004).

[124] Barbara A. Ringer, Renewal of Copyright, in 1 STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT 503, app. at 616-20 (Arthur Fisher memorial ed. 1963).

[125]LANDES & POSNER, supra note 1, at 236. 126. “The renewal fee was $1 from 1909 to 1947, $2 from 1948 to 1965, $4 from 1966 to 1977, $6 from 1978 to 1990, $12 from 1991 to 1992, $20 from 1993 to 1999, and $45 from 2000 to the present.” Id. at 212 n.8.

[127] See supra text accompanying note 57.

[128] See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 1, at 241-44.

[129] Id. at 243.

[130] Id. at 242.

[131] Id. at 238-39.

[132] Id. at 240.

[133] Id.

[134] See EDWARD B. RAPPAPORT, COPYRIGHT TERM EXTENSION: ESTIMATING THE ECONOMIC VALUES (Cong. Research Serv. Report 98-144E, 1998).

[135] Under pre-1976 law, the longest duration for either the initial or renewal term was twenty-eight years. Accordingly, using a renewal rate of 15%, the average term of copyright equals (0.15 * 56) + (0.85 * 28).

[136] Using the highest renewal figure of 22%, the calculation is (0.22 * 56) + (0.78 * 28).

[137] See Economists’ Brief, supra note 1, at 8.

[138] I am indebted to Tim Phillips for pointing out to me just how odd an effectively perpetual term is given the Founders’ very different conception of an appropriate term. Correspondence between Madison, who crafted the Intellectual Property Clause, and Jefferson suggests that the Founders thought of the proper length of a limited copyright term in quite specific actuarial terms. Having resigned himself to the inclusion of a clause authorizing Congress to create copyrights and patents—a power he initially opposed as liable to lead to the creation of dangerous “monopolies”—Jefferson proposed in a letter (posted from France) of August 28, 1789 that copyrights and patents be limited in duration to a fixed term of years. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Aug. 28, 1789), in 7 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 444, 451 (Andrew A. Lipscomb & Albert Ellery Bergh eds., 1904). Several days afterward, in two letters dated September 6, 1789, Jefferson proposed a term of nineteen years, based on an actuarial calculation. In his first letter on that date, Jefferson framed the issue as follows:

The question, whether one generation of men has a right to bind another, seems never to have been started on this [the European side] or our [American] side of the water. . . . [T]hat no such obligation can be so transmitted I think very capable of proof. I set out on this ground, which I suppose to be self evident, that the earth belongs in usufruct to the living; that the dead have neither powers nor rights over it .

Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), in 7 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra, at 454, 454 (emphasis in original). In an addendum to that letter, Jefferson reduced his principle to a concrete number:

Buffon gives us a table of twenty-three thousand nine hundred and ninety-four deaths, stating the ages at which they happened. To draw from these the result I have occasioned for, I suppose a society in which twenty-three thousand nine hundred and ninety-four persons are born every year, and live to the age stated in Buffon’s table. Then, the following inferences may be drawn. Such a society will consist constantly of six hundred and seventeen thousand seven hundred and three persons, of all ages. Of those living at any one instant of time, one half will be dead in twenty-four years and eight months. In such a society, ten thousand six hundred and seventy-five will arrive every year at the age of twenty-one years complete. It will constantly have three hundred and forty-eight thousand four hundred and seventeen persons of all ages above twenty one years, and the half of those twenty-one years and upwards living at any one instant of time, will be dead in eighteen years and eight months, or say nineteen years. 

Then, the contracts, constitutions and laws of every such society become void in nineteen

years from their date. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Dr. Gem (Sept. 6, 1789), in 7 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra, at 462, 462-63. The same computation using life tables from 1992 yields a Jeffersonian copyright term of between thirty and thirty-five years. See 2 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, VITAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES 1992: MORTALITY, pt. A, § 6, tbl.6-1 (1996).

[139] See generally Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO.

L.J. 287 (1988); Carla Hesse, The Rise of Intellectual Property, 700 B.C.-A.D. 2000: An Idea in the Balance, DAEDALUS, Spring 2002, at 26.

[140] See, e.g., 1 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT § 1.13.2.3 (2d ed. 2004).

[141] For a more fully developed account of the benefits and costs of copyright, see Linda R. Cohen & Roger G. Noll, Intellectual Property, Antitrust and the New Economy, 62

U. PITT. L. REV. 453 (2001).

[142] For factual background, see First Amended Complaint, Online Policy Group v. Diebold Inc., No. C 03-04913 JF, 2004 WL 2203382 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2004), available at http://www.eff.org/legal/ISP_liability/OPG_v_Diebold/First_Amended_Complaint.pdf (last visited Sept. 9, 2004).

[143] Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998). The DMCA provides a “safe harbor” provision as an incentive for ISPs to take down user-posted content when they receive cease­and-desist letters such as the ones sent by Diebold. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (2000). By removing the content, or forcing the user to do so, for a minimum of ten days, an ISP can immunize itself from any copyright claim. 17 U.S.C. § 512(g)(2)(C).

[144] Online Policy Group v. Diebold Inc., No. C 03-04913 JF, 2004 WL 2203382

(N.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2004), available at http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/about/cases/20040930_ Diebold_SJ_Order.pdf (last visited Nov. 11, 2004).

[145] Note that under the pre-1976 regime, where federal copyright commenced upon “publication” and perpetual common law copyright applied to unpublished works, Diebold’s unpublished corporate memoranda would likely have been subject to common law copyright, and Diebold would still have had a powerful copyright lever. (I say “likely,” rather than “certainly,” because the pre-1976 rules determining what constituted “publication”—the trigger that terminated state common law copyright and moved a work into the federal system—were the subject of substantial debate and confusion. See William S. Strauss, Protection of Unpublished Works, in 1 STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 124, at 189, 198­

[205] In contrast, under a reformalized version of our post-1976 system, where federal copyright arises upon fixation, documents like the Diebold memoranda would seldom enter the copyright system.

[146] See, e.g., Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communication Servs., Inc., 923 F. Supp. 1231 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (holding that copyright could be used to prevent distribution of Church of Scientology materials). See generally Jed Rubenfeld, The Freedom of Imagination: Copyright’s Constitutionality, 112 YALE L.J. 1 (2002) (limning copyright’s conflicts with the First Amendment and suggesting limitations to constitutionalize copyright).

[147] Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 220 (2003).

[148] 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2000).

[149] See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 458-59 (2d Cir. 2001).

[150] See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 1, at 58-60 (providing examples of transformative use of preexisting materials in the works of Shakespeare, Yeats, and Eliot, among others).

[151] See 2 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 140, § 7.2.1.2.

[152] Id. § 7.4.1.1.

[153] Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5 (1966).

[154] Edward C. Walterscheid, To Promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts: The Anatomy of a Congressional Power, 43 IDEA 1 (2002).

[155] Id. at 7.

[156] See, e.g., DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST PERIOD, 1789-1801, at 93 (1997) (arguing that the Intellectual Property Clause confers “not a general power to ‘promote the progress of science and the useful arts,’ but only the power to grant limited exclusive rights in order to accomplish that goal”).

[157] 537 U.S. 186, 212 (2003) (quoting Graham, 383 U.S. at 6).

[158] Compare Schnapper v. Foley, 667 F.2d 102, 112 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (concluding that introductory language does not limit congressional power), and Mitchell Bros. Film Group v. Cinema Adult Theater, 604 F.2d 852, 860 (5th Cir. 1979) (same), and 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 13, § 1.03 (arguing that the promote progress phrase “is in the main explanatory of the purpose of copyright, without in itself constituting a rigid standard against which any copyright act must be measured”), with Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (suggesting, in dicta, that the promote progress language may inform the meaning of otherwise ambiguous statutory language: “When technological change has rendered its literal terms ambiguous, the Copyright Act must be construed in light of [its] basic purpose.”).

[159] See Graham, 383 U.S. at 5-6 (“Congress in the exercise of the patent power may not overreach the restraints imposed by the stated constitutional purpose.”); Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 154 (1950) (Douglas, J., concurring) (“Congress acts under the restraint imposed by the statement of purpose in Art. I, § 8.”).

[160] For a comprehensive summary of the natural rights, utilitarian, communitarian, and other theories of intellectual property, see Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: MORAL, LEGAL, AND INTERNATIONAL DILEMMAS 107 (Adam D. Moore ed., 1997).

[161] 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 657 (1834); cf. Jane C. Ginsburg, A Tale of Two Copyrights: Literary Property in Revolutionary France and America, 147 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DU DROIT D’AUTEUR 125, 141-47 (1991) (tracing mix of utilitarian and authors’ rights motivations in early development of both U.S. and French copyright laws).

[162] 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) at 619.

[163] Id. at 668.

[164] Id. at 625.

[165] Id. at 634-35.

[166] Id. at 657 (“The argument that a literary man is as much entitled to the product of his labour as any other member of society, cannot be controverted. And the answer is, that he realises [sic] this product by the transfer of his manuscripts, or in the sale of his works, when first published.”).

[167] Id. at 660-61.

[168] Id. at 661.

[169] Id.

[170] Id. at 664-65.

[171] Id. at 667.

[172] Abraham Lincoln, Second Lectures on Discoveries and Inventions (Feb. 11, 1859), in 3 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 356, 363 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953).

[173] Stewart E. Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1197, 1203 (1996); cf. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (“Sacrificial days devoted to such creative activities deserve rewards commensurate with the services rendered.”).

[174] 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948).

[175] 347 U.S. at 219.

[176] 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984); see also Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422

U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (“The immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return for an ‘author’s’ creative labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good.”).

[177] H.R. REP. NO. 60-2222, at 7 (1909). Almost a century earlier, Thomas Jefferson

expressed the same idea with characteristic felicity: If nature has made any one thing less susceptible than all others of exclusive property, it is the action of the thinking power called an idea, which an individual may exclusively possess as long as he keeps it to himself; but the moment it is divulged, it forces itself into the possession of every one, and the receiver cannot dispossess himself of it. Its peculiar character, too, is that no one possesses the less, because every other possesses the whole of it. He who receives an idea from me, receives instruction himself without lessening mine; as he who lights his taper at mine, receives light without darkening me. . . . Inventions then cannot, in nature, be a subject of property. Society may give an exclusive right to the profits arising from them, as an encouragement to men to pursue ideas which may produce utility, but this may or may not be done, according to the will and convenience of the society, without claim or complaint from anybody.

Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), in 13 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 138, at 326, 333-34.

[178] See generally LANDES & POSNER, supra note 1, ch. 15 (discussing the political economy of intellectual property law).

[179] See 1 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 140, § 1.13.2. 

[180] Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003).

[181] Id. at 213-14 (quoting Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 175 (1926)).

[182] Id. at 200 (quoting New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921)).

[183] Unfortunately, the Court’s First Amendment logic is no better than its history. The Court errs by downplaying the First Amendment concern, stating that the inquiry is less exacting where “speakers assert the right to make other people’s speeches,” rather than their own. Id. at 221. But characterizing the claim as “a right to make other people’s speeches” misses the core free speech issue posed by copyright extension. The Court frames the issue as focused on pure copying. Much more important is the right to engage in transformative use—i.e., to employ some elements of another’s speech for the purpose of building one’s own speech. This kind of appropriation and “remixing” is a common way that speech is constructed in our culture, but the Court’s framing of the issue pretends that only copying, and not creativity, is at stake.

[184] Kahle Complaint, supra note 5. The author is co-counsel for plaintiffs in this lawsuit.

[185] See supra notes 33, 35 and accompanying text.

[186] See supra text accompanying notes 38-42.

[187] See 1976 Act, supra note 6, § 304.

[188] CAA, supra note 8, §§ 101-102.

[189] Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003). 

[190] See supra text accompanying notes 147-149.

[191] Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985).

[192] The petitioners in Eldred argued that, unlike in the case of prospective term extension, extension of subsisting copyrights could not possibly contribute to increased incentive to invest in the creation of new works. Because existing works cannot be created anew, it makes no sense to throw additional money at owners of subsisting copyrights. The response of the Eldred majority to this commonsense observation is perhaps the weakest part of its opinion. Given Congress’s repeated extensions of both new and subsisting copyrights, the Court asserted, authors could reasonably expect to receive “a copyright not only for the time in place when protection is gained, but also for any renewal or extension legislated during that time.” 537 U.S. at 214-15. But given that the pre-CTEA copyright term of life of the author plus fifty years already provided a return to the rightsholder that approached one hundred percent of the net present value of a perpetual term, see supra text accompanying note 134, it makes no sense to maintain that extension of subsisting copyrights provides any additional inducement to authors.

[193] See, e.g., Copyright Law Revision, supra note 108, at 68 (statement of Abraham

L. Kaminstein, Register of Copyrights).

[194] See Jane C. Ginsburg, International Copyright: From a “Bundle” of National Copyright Laws to a Supranational Code?, 47 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 265, 267 (2000).

[195] The Berne Convention has been revised repeatedly; particular revisions are referred to as “acts.” The group of countries that are signatories to the Convention, referred to collectively as the “Berne Union,” has an existence separate from any particular act. When the Convention is revised, Union members are not required to adhere to the new revision as a condition to remaining within the Union. A country may join the Union at any time by acceding to the most recent version of the Convention. The treaty obligations of any particular Union member are measured by the terms of the particular act or acts to which that member has acceded. See PAUL GOLDSTEIN, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT 20-21 (2001).

[196] Berne Convention, supra note 14, art. 5(1). Under the Berne Convention’s “points of attachment” rules, a work is entitled to Berne Convention protection in signatory nations if its author is a national or domiciliary of a signatory state or if the work is first or simultaneously published in a signatory state. See id. arts. 3(1)(a), 3(1)(b), 3(2).

[197] Id. art. 7(1).

[198] Id. art. 5(2).

[199] Proclamation No. 3, 27 Stat. 981 (July 1, 1891).

[200] Id.

[201] Proclamation No. 24, 27 Stat. 1021 (Apr. 15, 1892).

[202] Universal Copyright Convention, Geneva Text, Sept. 6, 1952, art. 3(2), 6 U.S.T. 2731, 2735, 216 U.N.T.S. 132, 136.

[203] Graeme W. Austin, Does the Copyright Clause Mandate Isolationism?, 26 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 17, 42 (2002).

[204] Id. This “back door” to Berne has, since 1914, been subject to the power of Union members to retaliate against authors who are nationals of non-Union countries but obtain Berne protection through first publication in a Union country, if the author’s country of nationality “fails to protect in an adequate manner the works of authors who are nationals of one of the countries of the Union.” Berne Convention, supra note 14, art. 6(1).

[205] Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, art. 2(2), reprinted in ARPAD BOGSCH, BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC WORKS, FROM 1886 TO 1986, at 228, 228 (World Intellectual Prop. Org. Public’n No. 877(E), 1986) [hereinafter BERNE CONVENTION FROM 1886 TO 1896].

[206] Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Berlin Act, Nov. 13, 1908, art. 4(2), reprinted in BERNE CONVENTION FROM 1886 TO 1986, supra note 205, at 229, 229.

[207] Berne Convention, supra note 14, art. 5(2).

[208]WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., GUIDE TO THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC WORKS (PARIS ACT, 1971) 33 (1978) [hereinafter WIPO GUIDE]; see also SAM RICKETSON, THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC WORKS: 1886-1986, at 222-23 (1987).

[209] See supra text accompanying notes 43-54.

[210] See STEPHEN M. STEWART, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBOURING RIGHTS 106 (1983) (“[T]he necessity to register before bringing an action would probably be regarded as a ‘formality’ as it negates the ‘exercise’ of the right without such registration.”); Mayer Gabay, The United States Copyright System and the Berne Convention, 26 BULL.

COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 202, 208 (1979) (“It is true that registration is ‘permissive’ and does not, under the 1976 Act, constitute a condition precedent for acquisition of copyright. But these factors merely give rise to a bare right that is incapable of being exercised in a U.S. court of law until registration is effected.”).

[211] The fact that registration affords successful infringement plaintiffs the opportunity to collect statutory damages and attorney’s fees, for example, is not believed to violate the Berne Convention, because that instrument does not itself require that a country provide for such recoveries. See Gabay, supra note 210, at 209-10; Melville B. Nimmer, Implications of the Prospective Revisions of the Berne Convention and the United States Copyright Law, 19 STAN. L. REV. 499, 514 (1967).

[212] Berne Convention, supra note 14, art. 5(2).

[213]WIPO GUIDE, supra note 208, at 33. WIPO, one of the sixteen specialized agencies of the United Nations system of organizations, is the principal forum for negotiation of international intellectual property agreements. Headquartered in Geneva, Switzerland, WIPO administers twenty-three international treaties dealing with different aspects of intellectual property protection. WIPO counts 179 nations as member states. For more information on WIPO’s mission, see World Intellectual Prop. Org., Medium-Term Plan for WIPO Program Activities, at http://www.wipo.int/about-wipo/en/dgo/pub487.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 2004).

[214] See supra note 81.

[215] Berne Convention, supra note 14, art. 7(1); see also id. art. 7(2) (establishing for cinematographic works a minimum term of fifty years after publication, or, for unreleased films, fifty years after production); id. art. 7(3) (establishing for anonymous and pseudonymous works a minimum term of fifty years after publication); id. art. 7(4) (establishing for photographs and works of applied art a minimum term of twenty-five years following a work’s production in countries that protect these types of works).

[216] Alan Story, Burn Berne: Why the Leading International Copyright Convention Must Be Repealed, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 763, 771 (2003); see also Hesse, supra note 139, at 40 (“[Berne] tended to strengthen universalist claims for protection of inviolable natural rights against statutory limits imposed by particular nations on utilitarian grounds.”).

[217] The European Union required member nations to adopt a uniform life-plus­seventy term in a 1996 directive. Council Directive 93/98/EEC of 29 October 1993 Harmonizing the Term of Protection of Copyright and Certain Related Rights, 1993 O.J. (L 290) 9 [hereinafter EU Directive]. The EU Directive has now become the global benchmark. It was cited as a factor in the CTEA’s installment of an identical term in U.S. law, see Eldred

v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 195-96 (2003), and is reflected in domestic legislation in a number of countries both within and outside Europe, see Shauna C. Bryce, Life Plus Seventy: The Extension of Copyright Terms in the European Union and Proposed Legislation in the United States, 37 HARV. INT’L L.J. 525, 529 (1996).

[218] See RICKETSON, supra note 208, at 41-42.

[219] Id. at 42-43.

[220] Id. at 201.

[221] Id. at 46-47.

[222] See supra text accompanying notes 205-206.

[223]RICKETSON, supra note 208, at 202-03.

[224] Id.

[225] Id. at 201.

[226] Id. at 85-86.

[227] The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) also contains provisions related to intellectual property. See, e.g., North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., arts. 1708 (trademark), 1709 (patent), 1710 (semiconductor design), 1711 (trade secrets), 32 I.L.M. 605, 672-75 (implemented by 107 Stat. 2057). In particular, NAFTA Article 1703(2) mirrors the Berne Article 5(2) proscription of formalities, and must likewise be modified to permit reformalization of domestic law in the United States. NAFTA Article 1703(2) provides that “[n]o Party may, as a condition of according national treatment under this Article, require rights holders to comply with any formalities or conditions in order to acquire rights in respect of copyright and related rights.” Id. art. 1703(2). Since NAFTA signatories Canada, Mexico, and the United States are all parties to a text of the Berne Convention that prohibits formalities, NAFTA Article 1703(2) is largely duplicative of Berne on the issue of formalities. 

[228] International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organisations, Oct. 26, 1961, 12 U.S.T. 2377, 496 U.N.T.S. 43

[229] Article 14 of the Rome Convention established minimum twenty-year terms for both phonograms and performances, measured either from the date of performance (for unfixed performances) or from the date of fixation (for performances recorded on phonograms). Id. art. 14. Article 17 of the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 105-17, 36 I.L.M. 65 (1996), and Article 14(5) of TRIPs, supra note 16, extend these minimum terms to fifty years. TRIPs Article 14(5) also imposes a minimum twenty-year term for broadcasts. Id. art. 14(5).

[230] Convention for the Protection of Producers of Phonograms Against Unauthorized Duplication of Their Phonograms, Oct. 29, 1971, art. 2, 25 U.S.T. 309, 325, 866 U.N.T.S. 67, 72.

[231] Id. art. 5.

[232] Indeed, because notice on existing works usually cannot be updated, notice can give misleading information regarding current ownership. For countries that choose to require notice, the marking requirement should be refocused to provide would-be users with information facilitating access to the registry, where the most up-to-date information on ownership would be available.

[233] See supra note 215.

[234] See Final Report, supra note 45, app. A at 622 (1986) (“[W]e have proposed what we think are minimal amendments to the law, only where change is clearly required, based upon widely shared understandings of Berne obligations . . . . A number of the alternatives we propose for consideration seek to exploit the distinction in treatment between works of foreign and national origin permitted by the Berne Convention.”). 235.RICKETSON, supra note 208, at 856.

[236] Berne Convention, supra note 14, art. 6(1).

[237].LANDES & POSNER, supra note 1, ch. 8; William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 471 (2003).

[238] Incompatibility with Berne’s rule against formalities could be avoided, of course, by limiting the proposal to works of U.S. authors. But even such a limitation would not prevent incompatibility with the life-plus-fifty minimum term requirement, which applies to all works.

[239]LANDES & POSNER, supra note 1, at 215 n.15.

[240] In a forthcoming article, William Patry and Richard Posner argue that the problems created by ever-longer copyright terms in a deformalized system should be addressed by expanding the fair use doctrine to immunize use of works where a reasonable inquiry fails to identify a rightsholder from whom a license may be sought. William F. Patry & Richard A. Posner, Fair Use and Statutory Reform in the Wake of Eldred, 92 CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2004) (working draft on file with author). The Patry and Posner article does not attempt to describe in any detail what a “reasonable inquiry” is, or how reasonableness might be assessed in particular cases. The uncertainty attending a “reasonableness” standard, combined with the investments that would be required to undertake searches in every instance, suggests that expanding fair use would be a more costly and less effective solution than direct reformalization. In addition, the expansion of fair use to immunize users unable to identify rightsholders following a “reasonable inquiry” would raise a separate issue of Berne compliance. Berne Articles 10 and 10bis narrowly circumscribe the type of fair use rules that signatories may establish in domestic legislation. Although a full analysis of these provisions is outside the scope of this Article, suffice it to say that the Berne status of the fair use expansion proposed by Patry and Posner will be subject to debate.

[241] H.R. 2601, 108th Cong. (2003).

[242] See supra text accompanying note 214.

[243] Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 97-98 (1989).

[244] See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1092-93 (1972).

[245] WIPO Guide, supra note 208, at 33.

[246] Cf. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 244, at 1126.

[247] TRIPs Article 13 provides that “[m]embers shall confine limitations or exceptions to exclusive rights to certain special cases which do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the right holder.” TRIPs, supra note 16, art. 13; see also Jane C. Ginsburg, Toward Supranational Copyright Law? The WTO Panel Decision and the “Three-Step Test” for Copyright Exceptions, 187 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DU DROIT D’AUTEUR 3 (2001) (analyzing the meaning of Article 13).

[248]RICKETSON, supra note 208, at 489.

[249]WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., RECORDS OF THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CONFERENCE OF STOCKHOLM 1145-46 (1967).

[250] World Trade Org., Report of the Panel, United States—Section 110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act, WT/DS160/R (June 15, 2000) [hereinafter Panel Report].

[251] 17 U.S.C. § 110(5) (2000).

[252] Panel Report, supra note 250, ¶ 7.1. For a good summary of the details of § 110(5), see Laurence R. Helfer, World Music on a U.S. Stage: A Berne/TRIPs and Economic Analysis of the Fairness in Music Licensing Act, 80 B.U. L. REV. 93, 96-98 (2000).

[253] Panel Report, supra note 250, ¶ 6.66.

[254] Id. ¶ 6.183; accord RICKETSON, supra note 208, at 483 (stating that “normal exploitation” refers to “the ways in which an author might reasonably be expected to exploit his work in the normal course of events”).

[255] See generally 2 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 140, ch. 10 (explaining the fair use doctrine).

[256] Berne Convention, supra note 14, art. 10(1).

[257] Id. art. 10(2).

[258] Id. art. 10bis(2).

[259] Even if default licenses did systematically interfere with rightsholders’ ability to profit from their works, that interference remains permissible so long as it does not create “unreasonable prejudice.” As the WTO panel made clear, whether an exception creates “unreasonable prejudice” will depend in part on whether compensation is provided to rightsholders: “in cases where there would be [a] serious loss of profit for the copyright owner, the law should provide him with some compensation (a system of compulsory licensing with equitable remuneration).” Panel Report, supra note 250, ¶ 6.229 n.205 (quoting WIPO Guide, supra note 208, at 56).

[260] Although the facts before the WTO panel did not involve exceptions alleged to affect moral rights, the panel suggested in its report that a rightsholder’s “legitimate interests” need not be “limited to actual or potential economic advantage or detriment.” Id.

[261] Berne Convention, supra note 14, art. 6bis(1).

[262] Id.

[263] Id. art. 6bis(2).

[264] Pub. L. No. 101-650, §§ 601-610, 104 Stat. 5089, 5128-33 (1990) (codified in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).

[265] 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2000). As Goldstein notes, the moral rights granted under VARA extend to a small number of valuable works that exist only in a single copy or that are published in signed and numbered editions of no more than two hundred copies, and are subject to limitations that “exempt[] from liability virtually all significant commercial uses of artistic works.” GOLDSTEIN, supra note 195, at 284.

[266] For a compelling argument that the United States has failed to comply with the Berne standards for moral rights, see John Henry Merryman, The Refrigerator of Bernard Buffet, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 1023 (1976). 6.223.

[267] See supra text accompanying notes 115-123.

[268] This bolstering of the integrity right is limited, of course, by the demands of the First Amendment. Any attempt to limit parody or criticism through a restriction on derivative works should be repelled by the fair use doctrine.

[269] WIPO Guide, supra note 208, at 55-57.

[270] Panel Report, supra note 250, ¶ 6.97.

[271] Id. ¶ 6.160.

[272] Id. ¶ 6.108.

[273] Id. ¶ 6.109.

[274] Id. ¶¶ 6.122, 6.133.

[275] Id. ¶¶ 6.142, 6.159.

3.1.2 Copyright Term 3.1.2 Copyright Term

3.1.2.3 Eldred v. Ashcroft 3.1.2.3 Eldred v. Ashcroft

537 U.S. 186

ELDRED ET AL.
v.
ASHCROFT, ATTORNEY GENERAL

No. 01-618.

Supreme Court of United States.

Argued October 9, 2002.

Decided January 15, 2003.

The Copyright and Patent Clause, U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 8, provides as to copyrights: "Congress shall have Power ... [t]o promote the Progress of Science . . . by securing [to Authors] for limited Times ... the exclusive Right to their ... Writings." In the 1998 Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA), Congress enlarged the duration of copyrights by 20 years: Under the 1976 Copyright Act (1976 Act), copyright protection generally lasted from a work's creation until 50 years after the author's death; under the CTEA, most copyrights now run from creation until 70 years after the author's death, 17 U.S.C. § 302(a). As in the case of prior copyright extensions, principally in 1831, 1909, and 1976, Congress provided for application of the enlarged terms to existing and future copyrights alike.

Petitioners, whose products or services build on copyrighted works that have gone into the public domain, brought this suit seeking a determination that the CTEA fails constitutional review under both the Copyright Clause's "limited Times" prescription and the First Amendment's free speech guarantee. Petitioners do not challenge the CTEA's "life-plus-70-years" timespan itself. They maintain that Congress went awry not with respect to newly created works, but in enlarging the term for published works with existing copyrights. The "limited Tim[e]" in effect when a copyright is secured, petitioners urge, becomes the constitutional boundary, a clear line beyond the power of Congress to extend. As to the First Amendment, petitioners contend that the CTEA is a content-neutral regulation of speech that fails inspection under the heightened judicial scrutiny appropriate for such regulations. The District Court entered judgment on the pleadings for the Attorney General (respondent here), holding that the CTEA does not violate the Copyright Clause's "limited Times" restriction because the CTEA's terms, though longer than the 1976 Act's terms, are still limited, not perpetual, and therefore fit within Congress' discretion. The court also held that there are no First Amendment rights to use the copyrighted works of others. The District of Columbia Circuit affirmed. In that court's unanimous view, Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, foreclosed petitioners' First Amendment challenge to the CTEA. The appeals court reasoned that copyright does not impermissibly [537 U.S. 187] restrict free speech, for it grants the author an exclusive right only to the specific form of expression; it does not shield any idea or fact contained in the copyrighted work, and it allows for "fair use" even of the expression itself. A majority of the court also rejected petitioners' Copyright Clause claim. The court ruled that Circuit precedent precluded petitioners' plea for interpretation of the "limited Times" prescription with a view to the Clause's preambular statement of purpose: "To promote the Progress of Science." The court found nothing in the constitutional text or history to suggest that a term of years for a copyright is not a "limited Tim[e]" if it may later be extended for another "limited Tim[e]." Recounting that the First Congress made the 1790 Copyright Act applicable to existing copyrights arising under state copyright laws, the court held that that construction by contemporaries of the Constitution's formation merited almost conclusive weight under Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 57. As early as McClurg v. Kingsland, 1 How. 202, the Court of Appeals recognized, this Court made it plain that the Copyright Clause permits Congress to amplify an existing patent's terms. The court added that this Court has been similarly deferential to Congress' judgment regarding copyright. E. g., Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417. Concerning petitioners' assertion that Congress could evade the limitation on its authority by stringing together an unlimited number of "limited Times," the court stated that such legislative misbehavior clearly was not before it. Rather, the court emphasized, the CTEA matched the baseline term for United States copyrights with the European Union term in order to meet contemporary circumstances.

Held: In placing existing and future copyrights in parity in the CTEA, Congress acted within its authority and did not transgress constitutional limitations. Pp. 199-222.

1. The CTEA's extension of existing copyrights does not exceed Congress' power under the Copyright Clause. Pp. 199-218.

(a) Guided by text, history, and precedent, this Court cannot agree with petitioners that extending the duration of existing copyrights is categorically beyond Congress' Copyright Clause authority. Although conceding that the CTEA's baseline term of life plus 70 years qualifies as a "limited Tim[e]" as applied to future copyrights, petitioners contend that existing copyrights extended to endure for that same term are not "limited." In petitioners' view, a time prescription, once set, becomes forever "fixed" or "inalterable." The word "limited," however, does not convey a meaning so constricted. At the time of the Framing, "limited" meant what it means today: confined within certain bounds, restrained, or circumscribed. Thus understood, a timespan appropriately "limited" [537 U.S. 188] as applied to future copyrights does not automatically cease to be "limited" when applied to existing copyrights. To comprehend the scope of Congress' Copyright Clause power, "a page of history is worth a volume of logic." New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349. History reveals an unbroken congressional practice of granting to authors of works with existing copyrights the benefit of term extensions so that all under copyright protection will be governed evenhandedly under the same regime. Moreover, because the Clause empowering Congress to confer copyrights also authorizes patents, the Court's inquiry is significantly informed by the fact that early Congresses extended the duration of numerous individual patents as well as copyrights. Lower courts saw no "limited Times" impediment to such extensions. Further, although this Court never before has had occasion to decide whether extending existing copyrights complies with the "limited Times" prescription, the Court has found no constitutional barrier to the legislative expansion of existing patents. See, e. g., McClurg, 1 How., at 206. Congress' consistent historical practice reflects a judgment that an author who sold his work a week before should not be placed in a worse situation than the author who sold his work the day after enactment of a copyright extension. The CTEA follows this historical practice by keeping the 1976 Act's duration provisions largely in place and simply adding 20 years to each of them.

The CTEA is a rational exercise of the legislative authority conferred by the Copyright Clause. On this point, the Court defers substantially to Congress. Sony, 464 U.S., at 429. The CTEA reflects judgments of a kind Congress typically makes, judgments the Court cannot dismiss as outside the Legislature's domain. A key factor in the CTEA's passage was a 1993 European Union (EU) directive instructing EU members to establish a baseline copyright term of life plus 70 years and to deny this longer term to the works of any non-EU country whose laws did not secure the same extended term. By extending the baseline United States copyright term, Congress sought to ensure that American authors would receive the same copyright protection in Europe as their European counterparts. The CTEA may also provide greater incentive for American and other authors to create and disseminate their work in the United States. Additionally, Congress passed the CTEA in light of demographic, economic, and technological changes, and rationally credited projections that longer terms would encourage copyright holders to invest in the restoration and public distribution of their works. Pp. 199-208.

(b) Petitioners' Copyright Clause arguments, which rely on several novel readings of the Clause, are unpersuasive. Pp. 208-218.

[537 U.S. 189] (1) Nothing before this Court warrants construction of the CTEA's 20-year term extension as a congressional attempt to evade or override the "limited Times" constraint. Critically, petitioners fail to show how the CTEA crosses a constitutionally significant threshold with respect to "limited Times" that the 1831, 1909, and 1976 Acts did not. Those earlier Acts did not create perpetual copyrights, and neither does the CTEA. Pp. 208-210.

(2) Petitioners' dominant series of arguments, premised on the proposition that Congress may not extend an existing copyright absent new consideration from the author, are unavailing. The first such contention, that the CTEA's extension of existing copyrights overlooks the requirement of "originality," incorrectly relies on Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345, 359. That case did not touch on the duration of copyright protection. Rather, it addressed only the core question of copyrightability. Explaining the originality requirement, Feist trained on the Copyright Clause words "Authors" and "Writings," id., at 346-347, and did not construe the "limited Times" prescription, as to which the originality requirement has no bearing. Also unavailing is petitioners' second argument, that the CTEA's extension of existing copyrights fails to "promote the Progress of Science" because it does not stimulate the creation of new works, but merely adds value to works already created. The justifications that motivated Congress to enact the CTEA, set forth supra, provide a rational basis for concluding that the CTEA "promote[s] the Progress of Science." Moreover, Congress' unbroken practice since the founding generation of applying new definitions or adjustments of the copyright term to both future works and existing works overwhelms petitioners' argument. Also rejected is petitioners' third contention, that the CTEA's extension of existing copyrights without demanding additional consideration ignores copyright's quid pro quo, whereby Congress grants the author of an original work an "exclusive Right" for a "limited Tim[e]" in exchange for a dedication to the public thereafter. Given Congress' consistent placement of existing copyright holders in parity with future holders, the author of a work created in the last 170 years would reasonably comprehend, as the protection offered her, a copyright not only for the time in place when protection is gained, but also for any renewal or extension legislated during that time. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 229, and Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146, both of which involved the federal patent regime, are not to the contrary, since neither concerned the extension of a patent's duration nor suggested that such an extension [537 U.S. 190] might be constitutionally infirm. Furthermore, given crucial distinctions between patents and copyrights, one cannot extract from language in the Court's patent decisions—language not trained on a grant's duration—genuine support for petitioners' quid pro quo argument. Patents and copyrights do not entail the same exchange, since immediate disclosure is not the objective of, but is exacted from, the patentee, whereas disclosure is the desired objective of the author seeking copyright protection. Moreover, while copyright gives the holder no monopoly on any knowledge, fact, or idea, the grant of a patent prevents full use by others of the inventor's knowledge. Pp. 210-217.

(3) The "congruence and proportionality" standard of review described in cases evaluating exercises of Congress' power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment has never been applied outside the § 5 context. It does not hold sway for judicial review of legislation enacted, as copyright laws are, pursuant to Article I authorization. Section 5 authorizes Congress to "enforce" commands contained in and incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment. The Copyright Clause, in contrast, empowers Congress to define the scope of the substantive right. See Sony, 464 U.S., at 429. Judicial deference to such congressional definition is "but a corollary to the grant to Congress of any Article I power." Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 6. It would be no more appropriate for this Court to subject the CTEA to "congruence and proportionality" review than it would be to hold the Act unconstitutional per se. Pp. 217-218.

2. The CTEA's extension of existing and future copyrights does not violate the First Amendment. That Amendment and the Copyright Clause were adopted close in time. This proximity indicates the Framers' view that copyright's limited monopolies are compatible with free speech principles. In addition, copyright law contains built-in First Amendment accommodations. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S., at 560. First, 17 U.S.C. § 102(b), which makes only expression, not ideas, eligible for copyright protection, strikes a definitional balance between the First Amendment and copyright law by permitting free communication of facts while still protecting an author's expression. Harper & Row, 471 U.S., at 556. Second, the "fair use" defense codified at § 107 allows the public to use not only facts and ideas contained in a copyrighted work, but also expression itself for limited purposes. "Fair use" thereby affords considerable latitude for scholarship and comment, id., at 560, and even for parody, see Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569. The CTEA itself supplements these traditional First Amendment safeguards in two prescriptions: The first allows libraries and similar institutions to reproduce and distribute copies of certain published works for scholarly purposes during the last 20 years of any copyright [537 U.S. 191] term, if the work is not already being exploited commercially and further copies are unavailable at a reasonable price, § 108(h); the second exempts small businesses from having to pay performance royalties on music played from licensed radio, television, and similar facilities, § 110(5)(B). Finally, petitioners' reliance on Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641, is misplaced. Turner Broadcasting involved a statute requiring cable television operators to carry and transmit broadcast stations through their proprietary cable systems. The CTEA, in contrast, does not oblige anyone to reproduce another's speech against the carrier's will. Instead, it protects authors' original expression from unrestricted exploitation. The First Amendment securely protects the freedom to make—or decline to make—one's own speech; it bears less heavily when speakers assert the right to make other people's speeches. When, as in this case, Congress has not altered the traditional contours of copyright protection, further First Amendment scrutiny is unnecessary. See, e. g., Harper & Row, 471 U.S., at 560. Pp. 218-222.

239 F.3d 372, affirmed.

GINSBURG, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C. J., and O'CONNOR, SCALIA, KENNEDY, SOUTER, and THOMAS, JJ., joined. STEVENS, J., post, p. 222, and BREYER, J., post, p. 242, filed dissenting opinions.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT.

Lawrence Lessig argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Kathleen M. Sullivan, Alan B. Morrison, Edward Lee, Charles Fried, Geoffrey S. Stewart, Donald B. Ayer, Robert P. Ducatman, Daniel H. Bromberg, Charles R. Nesson, and Jonathan L. Zittrain.

Solicitor General Olson argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Assistant Attorney General McCallum, Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, Jeffrey A. Lamken, William Kanter, and John S. Koppel.[*]

[537 U.S. 192] JUSTICE GINSBURG delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case concerns the authority the Constitution assigns to Congress to prescribe the duration of copyrights. The Copyright and Patent Clause of the Constitution, Art. I, § 8, cl. 8, provides as to copyrights: "Congress shall have [537 U.S. 193] Power ... [t]o promote the Progress of Science ... by securing [to Authors] for limited Times ... the exclusive Right to their . . . Writings." In 1998, in the measure here under inspection, Congress enlarged the duration of copyrights by 20 years. Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA), Pub. L. 105-298, §§ 102(b) and (d), 112 Stat. 2827-2828 (amending 17 U.S.C. §§ 302, 304). As in the case of prior extensions, principally in 1831, 1909, and 1976, Congress provided for application of the enlarged terms to existing and future copyrights alike.

Petitioners are individuals and businesses whose products or services build on copyrighted works that have gone into the public domain. They seek a determination that the CTEA fails constitutional review under both the Copyright Clause's "limited Times" prescription and the First Amendment's free speech guarantee. Under the 1976 Copyright Act, copyright protection generally lasted from the work's creation until 50 years after the author's death. Pub. L. 94-553, § 302(a), 90 Stat. 2572 (1976 Act). Under the CTEA, most copyrights now run from creation until 70 years after the author's death. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a). Petitioners do not challenge the "life-plus-70-years" timespan itself. "Whether 50 years is enough, or 70 years too much," they acknowledge, "is not a judgment meet for this Court." Brief for Petitioners 14.[1] Congress went awry, petitioners maintain, not with respect to newly created works, but in enlarging the term for published works with existing copyrights. The "limited Tim[e]" in effect when a copyright is secured, petitioners urge, becomes the constitutional boundary, a clear line beyond the power of Congress to extend. See ibid. As to the First Amendment, petitioners contend that the CTEA is a content-neutral regulation of speech that fails inspection [537 U.S. 194] under the heightened judicial scrutiny appropriate for such regulations.

In accord with the District Court and the Court of Appeals, we reject petitioners' challenges to the CTEA. In that 1998 legislation, as in all previous copyright term extensions, Congress placed existing and future copyrights in parity. In prescribing that alignment, we hold, Congress acted within its authority and did not transgress constitutional limitations.

I

A

We evaluate petitioners' challenge to the constitutionality of the CTEA against the backdrop of Congress' previous exercises of its authority under the Copyright Clause. The Nation's first copyright statute, enacted in 1790, provided a federal copyright term of 14 years from the date of publication, renewable for an additional 14 years if the author survived the first term. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124 (1790 Act). The 1790 Act's renewable 14-year term applied to existing works (i. e., works already published and works created but not yet published) and future works alike. Ibid. Congress expanded the federal copyright term to 42 years in 1831 (28 years from publication, renewable for an additional 14 years), and to 56 years in 1909 (28 years from publication, renewable for an additional 28 years). Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, §§ 1, 16, 4 Stat. 436, 439 (1831 Act); Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, §§ 23-24, 35 Stat. 1080-1081 (1909 Act). Both times, Congress applied the new copyright term to existing and future works, 1831 Act §§ 1, 16; 1909 Act §§ 23-24; to qualify for the 1831 extension, an existing work had to be in its initial copyright term at the time the Act became effective, 1831 Act §§ 1, 16.

In 1976, Congress altered the method for computing federal copyright terms. 1976 Act §§ 302-304. For works created [537 U.S. 195] by identified natural persons, the 1976 Act provided that federal copyright protection would run from the work's creation, not—as in the 1790, 1831, and 1909 Acts—its publication; protection would last until 50 years after the author's death. § 302(a). In these respects, the 1976 Act aligned United States copyright terms with the then-dominant international standard adopted under the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works. See H. R. Rep. No. 94-1476, p. 135 (1976). For anonymous works, pseudonymous works, and works made for hire, the 1976 Act provided a term of 75 years from publication or 100 years from creation, whichever expired first. § 302(c).

These new copyright terms, the 1976 Act instructed, governed all works not published by its effective date of January 1, 1978, regardless of when the works were created. §§ 302-303. For published works with existing copyrights as of that date, the 1976 Act granted a copyright term of 75 years from the date of publication, §§ 304(a) and (b), a 19-year increase over the 56-year term applicable under the 1909 Act.

The measure at issue here, the CTEA, installed the fourth major duration extension of federal copyrights.[2] Retaining the general structure of the 1976 Act, the CTEA enlarges the terms of all existing and future copyrights by 20 years. For works created by identified natural persons, the term now lasts from creation until 70 years after the author's [537 U.S. 196] death. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a). This standard harmonizes the baseline United States copyright term with the term adopted by the European Union in 1993. See Council Directive 93/98/EEC of 29 October 1993 Harmonizing the Term of Protection of Copyright and Certain Related Rights, 1993 Official J. Eur. Coms. (L 290), p. 9 (EU Council Directive 93/98). For anonymous works, pseudonymous works, and works made for hire, the term is 95 years from publication or 120 years from creation, whichever expires first. 17 U.S.C. § 302(c).

Paralleling the 1976 Act, the CTEA applies these new terms to all works not published by January 1, 1978. §§ 302(a), 303(a). For works published before 1978 with existing copyrights as of the CTEA's effective date, the CTEA extends the term to 95 years from publication. §§ 304(a) and (b). Thus, in common with the 1831, 1909, and 1976 Acts, the CTEA's new terms apply to both future and existing copyrights.[3]

B

Petitioners' suit challenges the CTEA's constitutionality under both the Copyright Clause and the First Amendment. On cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings, the District Court entered judgment for the Attorney General (respondent here). 74 F. Supp.2d 1 (DC 1999). The court held that the CTEA does not violate the "limited Times" restriction of the Copyright Clause because the CTEA's terms, though [537 U.S. 197] longer than the 1976 Act's terms, are still limited, not perpetual, and therefore fit within Congress' discretion. Id., at 3. The court also held that "there are no First Amendment rights to use the copyrighted works of others." Ibid.

The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed. 239 F.3d 372 (2001). In that court's unanimous view, Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539 (1985), foreclosed petitioners' First Amendment challenge to the CTEA. 239 F.3d, at 375. Copyright, the court reasoned, does not impermissibly restrict free speech, for it grants the author an exclusive right only to the specific form of expression; it does not shield any idea or fact contained in the copyrighted work, and it allows for "fair use" even of the expression itself. Id., at 375-376.

A majority of the Court of Appeals also upheld the CTEA against petitioners' contention that the measure exceeds Congress' power under the Copyright Clause. Specifically, the court rejected petitioners' plea for interpretation of the "limited Times" prescription not discretely but with a view to the "preambular statement of purpose" contained in the Copyright Clause: "To promote the Progress of Science." Id., at 377-378. Circuit precedent, Schnapper v. Foley, 667 F.2d 102 (CADC 1981), the court determined, precluded that plea. In this regard, the court took into account petitioners' acknowledgment that the preamble itself places no substantive limit on Congress' legislative power. 239 F.3d, at 378.

The appeals court found nothing in the constitutional text or its history to suggest that "a term of years for a copyright is not a `limited Time' if it may later be extended for another `limited Time.'" Id., at 379. The court recounted that "the First Congress made the Copyright Act of 1790 applicable to subsisting copyrights arising under the copyright laws of the several states." Ibid. That construction of Congress' authority under the Copyright Clause "by [those] contemporary with [the Constitution's] formation," the court said, merited [537 U.S. 198] "very great" and in this case "almost conclusive" weight. Ibid. (quoting Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 57 (1884)). As early as McClurg v. Kingsland, 1 How. 202 (1843), the Court of Appeals added, this Court had made it "plain" that the same Clause permits Congress to "amplify the terms of an existing patent." 239 F.3d, at 380. The appeals court recognized that this Court has been similarly deferential to the judgment of Congress in the realm of copyright. Ibid. (citing Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984); Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207 (1990)).

Concerning petitioners' assertion that Congress might evade the limitation on its authority by stringing together "an unlimited number of `limited Times,'" the Court of Appeals stated that such legislative misbehavior "clearly is not the situation before us." 239 F.3d, at 379. Rather, the court noted, the CTEA "matches" the baseline term for "United States copyrights [with] the terms of copyrights granted by the European Union." Ibid. "[I]n an era of multinational publishers and instantaneous electronic transmission," the court said, "harmonization in this regard has obvious practical benefits" and is "a `necessary and proper' measure to meet contemporary circumstances rather than a step on the way to making copyrights perpetual." Ibid.

Judge Sentelle dissented in part. He concluded that Congress lacks power under the Copyright Clause to expand the copyright terms of existing works. Id., at 380-384. The Court of Appeals subsequently denied rehearing and rehearing en banc. 255 F.3d 849 (2001).

We granted certiorari to address two questions: whether the CTEA's extension of existing copyrights exceeds Congress' power under the Copyright Clause; and whether the CTEA's extension of existing and future copyrights violates the First Amendment. 534 U.S. 1126 and 1160 (2002). We now answer those two questions in the negative and affirm.

[537 U.S. 199] II

A

We address first the determination of the courts below that Congress has authority under the Copyright Clause to extend the terms of existing copyrights. Text, history, and precedent, we conclude, confirm that the Copyright Clause empowers Congress to prescribe "limited Times" for copyright protection and to secure the same level and duration of protection for all copyright holders, present and future.

The CTEA's baseline term of life plus 70 years, petitioners concede, qualifies as a "limited Tim[e]" as applied to future copyrights.[4] Petitioners contend, however, that existing copyrights extended to endure for that same term are not "limited." Petitioners' argument essentially reads into the text of the Copyright Clause the command that a time prescription, once set, becomes forever "fixed" or "inalterable." The word "limited," however, does not convey a meaning so constricted. At the time of the Framing, that word meant what it means today: "confine[d] within certain bounds," "restrain[ed]," or "circumscribe[d]." S. Johnson, A Dictionary of the English Language (7th ed. 1785); see T. Sheridan, A Complete Dictionary of the English Language (6th ed. 1796) ("confine[d] within certain bounds"); Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1312 (1976) ("confined within limits"; "restricted in extent, number, or duration"). Thus understood, a timespan appropriately "limited" as applied to future copyrights does not automatically cease to be "limited" when applied to existing copyrights. And as we observe, infra, at 209-210, there is no cause to suspect that a [537 U.S. 200] purpose to evade the "limited Times" prescription prompted Congress to adopt the CTEA.

To comprehend the scope of Congress' power under the Copyright Clause, "a page of history is worth a volume of logic." New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921) (Holmes, J.). History reveals an unbroken congressional practice of granting to authors of works with existing copyrights the benefit of term extensions so that all under copyright protection will be governed evenhandedly under the same regime. As earlier recounted, see supra, at 194, the First Congress accorded the protections of the Nation's first federal copyright statute to existing and future works alike. 1790 Act § 1.[5] Since then, Congress has regularly applied [537 U.S. 201] duration extensions to both existing and future copyrights. 1831 Act §§ 1, 16; 1909 Act §§ 23-24; 1976 Act §§ 302-303; 17 U.S.C. §§ 302-304.[6]

Because the Clause empowering Congress to confer copyrights also authorizes patents, congressional practice with respect to patents informs our inquiry. We count it significant that early Congresses extended the duration of numerous individual patents as well as copyrights. See, e. g., Act of Jan. 7, 1808, ch. 6, 6 Stat. 70 (patent); Act of Mar. 3, 1809, ch. 35, 6 Stat. 80 (patent); Act of Feb. 7, 1815, ch. 36, 6 Stat. 147 (patent); Act of May 24, 1828, ch. 145, 6 Stat. 389 (copyright); Act of Feb. 11, 1830, ch. 13, 6 Stat. 403 (copyright); [537 U.S. 202] see generally Ochoa, Patent and Copyright Term Extension and the Constitution: A Historical Perspective, 49 J. Copyright Soc. 19 (2001). The courts saw no "limited Times" impediment to such extensions; renewed or extended terms were upheld in the early days, for example, by Chief Justice Marshall and Justice Story sitting as circuit justices. See Evans v. Jordan, 8 F. Cas. 872, 874 (No. 4,564) (CC Va. 1813) (Marshall, J.) ("Th[e] construction of the constitution which admits the renewal of a patent, is not controverted. A renewed patent ... confers the same rights, with an original."), aff'd, 9 Cranch 199 (1815); Blanchard v. Sprague, 3 F. Cas. 648, 650 (No. 1,518) (CC Mass. 1839) (Story, J.) ("I never have entertained any doubt of the constitutional authority of congress" to enact a 14-year patent extension that "operates retrospectively"); see also Evans v. Robinson, 8 F. Cas. 886, 888 (No. 4,571) (CC Md. 1813) (Congresses "have the exclusive right ... to limit the times for which a patent right shall be granted, and are not restrained from renewing a patent or prolonging" it.).[7]

Further, although prior to the instant case this Court did not have occasion to decide whether extending the duration of existing copyrights complies with the "limited Times" prescription, the Court has found no constitutional barrier to the legislative expansion of existing patents.[8] McClurg v. [537 U.S. 203] Kingsland, 1 How. 202 (1843), is the pathsetting precedent. The patentee in that case was unprotected under the law in force when the patent issued because he had allowed his employer briefly to practice the invention before he obtained the patent. Only upon enactment, two years later, of an exemption for such allowances did the patent become valid, retroactive to the time it issued. McClurg upheld retroactive application of the new law. The Court explained that the legal regime governing a particular patent "depend[s] on the law as it stood at the emanation of the patent, together with such changes as have been since made; for though they may be retrospective in their operation, that is not a sound objection to their validity." Id., at 206.[9] Neither is it a sound [537 U.S. 204] objection to the validity of a copyright term extension, enacted pursuant to the same constitutional grant of authority, that the enlarged term covers existing copyrights.

Congress' consistent historical practice of applying newly enacted copyright terms to future and existing copyrights reflects a judgment stated concisely by Representative Huntington at the time of the 1831 Act: "[J]ustice, policy, and equity alike forb[id]" that an "author who had sold his [work] a week ago, be placed in a worse situation than the author who should sell his work the day after the passing of [the] act." 7 Cong. Deb. 424 (1831); accord, Symposium, The Constitutionality of Copyright Term Extension, 18 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L. J. 651, 694 (2000) (Prof. Miller) ("[S]ince 1790, it has indeed been Congress's policy that the author of yesterday's work should not get a lesser reward than the author of tomorrow's work just because Congress passed a statute lengthening the term today."). The CTEA follows this historical practice by keeping the duration provisions of the 1976 Act largely in place and simply adding 20 years to each of them. Guided by text, history, and precedent, we cannot agree with petitioners' submission that extending the duration of existing copyrights is categorically beyond Congress' authority under the Copyright Clause.

Satisfied that the CTEA complies with the "limited Times" prescription, we turn now to whether it is a rational exercise of the legislative authority conferred by the Copyright Clause. On that point, we defer substantially to Congress. [537 U.S. 205] Sony, 464 U.S., at 429 ("[I]t is Congress that has been assigned the task of defining the scope of the limited monopoly that should be granted to authors ... in order to give the public appropriate access to their work product.").[10]

The CTEA reflects judgments of a kind Congress typically makes, judgments we cannot dismiss as outside the Legislature's domain. As respondent describes, see Brief for Respondent 37-38, a key factor in the CTEA's passage was a 1993 European Union (EU) directive instructing EU members to establish a copyright term of life plus 70 years. EU Council Directive 93/98, Art. 1(1), p. 11; see 144 Cong. Rec. S12377-S12378 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1998) (statement of Sen. Hatch). Consistent with the Berne Convention, the EU directed its members to deny this longer term to the works of any non-EU country whose laws did not secure the same extended term. See Berne Conv. Art. 7(8); P. Goldstein, International Copyright § 5.3, p. 239 (2001). By extending the baseline United States copyright term to life plus 70 years, Congress sought to ensure that American authors would receive [537 U.S. 206] the same copyright protection in Europe as their European counterparts.[11] The CTEA may also provide greater incentive for American and other authors to create and disseminate their work in the United States. See Perlmutter, Participation in the International Copyright System as a Means to Promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts, 36 Loyola (LA) L. Rev. 323, 330 (2002) ("[M]atching th[e] level of [copyright] protection in the United States [to that in the EU] can ensure stronger protection for U.S. works abroad and avoid competitive disadvantages vis-à-vis foreign rightholders."); see also id., at 332 (the United States could not "play a leadership role" in the give-and-take evolution of the international copyright system, indeed it would "lose all flexibility," "if the only way to promote the progress of science were to provide incentives to create new works").[12]

In addition to international concerns,[13] Congress passed the CTEA in light of demographic, economic, and technological [537 U.S. 207] changes, Brief for Respondent 25-26, 33, and nn. 23 and 24,[14] and rationally credited projections that longer terms would encourage copyright holders to invest in the restoration and public distribution of their works, id., at 34-37; see H. R. Rep. No. 105-452, p. 4 (1998) (term extension "provide[s] copyright owners generally with the incentive to restore older works and further disseminate them to the public").[15]

[537 U.S. 208] In sum, we find that the CTEA is a rational enactment; we are not at liberty to second-guess congressional determinations and policy judgments of this order, however debatable or arguably unwise they may be. Accordingly, we cannot conclude that the CTEA — which continues the unbroken congressional practice of treating future and existing copyrights in parity for term extension purposes — is an impermissible exercise of Congress' power under the Copyright Clause.

B

Petitioners' Copyright Clause arguments rely on several novel readings of the Clause. We next address these arguments and explain why we find them unpersuasive.

1

Petitioners contend that even if the CTEA's 20-year term extension is literally a "limited Tim[e]," permitting Congress to extend existing copyrights allows it to evade the "limited Times" constraint by creating effectively perpetual copyrights through repeated extensions. We disagree.

[537 U.S. 209] As the Court of Appeals observed, a regime of perpetual copyrights "clearly is not the situation before us." 239 F.3d, at 379. Nothing before this Court warrants construction of the CTEA's 20-year term extension as a congressional attempt to evade or override the "limited Times" constraint.[16] Critically, we again emphasize, petitioners fail to [537 U.S. 210] show how the CTEA crosses a constitutionally significant threshold with respect to "limited Times" that the 1831, 1909, and 1976 Acts did not. See supra, at 194-196; Austin, supra n. 13, at 56 ("If extending copyright protection to works already in existence is constitutionally suspect," so is "extending the protections of U.S. copyright law to works by foreign authors that had already been created and even first published when the federal rights attached."). Those earlier Acts did not create perpetual copyrights, and neither does the CTEA.[17]

2

Petitioners dominantly advance a series of arguments all premised on the proposition that Congress may not extend an existing copyright absent new consideration from the author. They pursue this main theme under three headings. Petitioners contend that the CTEA's extension of existing copyrights (1) overlooks the requirement of "originality," (2) fails to "promote the Progress of Science," and (3) ignores copyright's quid pro quo.

[537 U.S. 211] Petitioners' "originality" argument draws on Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991). In Feist, we observed that "[t]he sine qua non of copyright is originality," id., at 345, and held that copyright protection is unavailable to "a narrow category of works in which the creative spark is utterly lacking or so trivial as to be virtually nonexistent," id., at 359. Relying on Feist, petitioners urge that even if a work is sufficiently "original" to qualify for copyright protection in the first instance, any extension of the copyright's duration is impermissible because, once published, a work is no longer original.

Feist, however, did not touch on the duration of copyright protection. Rather, the decision addressed the core question of copyrightability, i. e., the "creative spark" a work must have to be eligible for copyright protection at all. Explaining the originality requirement, Feist trained on the Copyright Clause words "Authors" and "Writings." Id., at 346-347. The decision did not construe the "limited Times" for which a work may be protected, and the originality requirement has no bearing on that prescription.

More forcibly, petitioners contend that the CTEA's extension of existing copyrights does not "promote the Progress of Science" as contemplated by the preambular language of the Copyright Clause. Art. I, § 8, cl. 8. To sustain this objection, petitioners do not argue that the Clause's preamble is an independently enforceable limit on Congress' power. See 239 F.3d, at 378 (Petitioners acknowledge that "the preamble of the Copyright Clause is not a substantive limit on Congress' legislative power." (internal quotation marks omitted)). Rather, they maintain that the preambular language identifies the sole end to which Congress may legislate; accordingly, they conclude, the meaning of "limited Times" must be "determined in light of that specified end." Brief for Petitioners 19. The CTEA's extension of existing copyrights categorically fails to "promote the Progress of Science," petitioners argue, because it does not stimulate the [537 U.S. 212] creation of new works but merely adds value to works already created.

As petitioners point out, we have described the Copyright Clause as "both a grant of power and a limitation," Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 5 (1966), and have said that "[t]he primary objective of copyright" is "[t]o promote the Progress of Science," Feist, 499 U.S., at 349. The "constitutional command," we have recognized, is that Congress, to the extent it enacts copyright laws at all, create a "system" that "promote[s] the Progress of Science." Graham, 383 U.S., at 6.[18]

We have also stressed, however, that it is generally for Congress, not the courts, to decide how best to pursue the Copyright Clause's objectives. See Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S., at 230 ("Th[e] evolution of the duration of copyright protection tellingly illustrates the difficulties Congress faces. . . . [I]t is not our role to alter the delicate balance [537 U.S. 213] Congress has labored to achieve."); Sony, 464 U.S., at 429 ("[I]t is Congress that has been assigned the task of defining the scope of [rights] that should be granted to authors or to inventors in order to give the public appropriate access to their work product."); Graham, 383 U.S., at 6 ("Within the limits of the constitutional grant, the Congress may, of course, implement the stated purpose of the Framers by selecting the policy which in its judgment best effectuates the constitutional aim."). The justifications we earlier set out for Congress' enactment of the CTEA, supra, at 205-207, provide a rational basis for the conclusion that the CTEA "promote[s] the Progress of Science."

On the issue of copyright duration, Congress, from the start, has routinely applied new definitions or adjustments of the copyright term to both future works and existing works not yet in the public domain.[19] Such consistent congressional practice is entitled to "very great weight, and when it is remembered that the rights thus established have not been disputed during a period of [over two] centur[ies], it is almost conclusive." Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S., at 57. Indeed, "[t]his Court has repeatedly laid down the principle that a contemporaneous legislative exposition of the Constitution when the founders of our Government and framers of our Constitution were actively participating in public affairs, acquiesced in for a long term of years, fixes the construction to be given [the Constitution's] provisions." Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 175 (1926). Congress' unbroken practice since the founding generation [537 U.S. 214] thus overwhelms petitioners' argument that the CTEA's extension of existing copyrights fails per se to "promote the Progress of Science."[20]

Closely related to petitioners' preambular argument, or a variant of it, is their assertion that the Copyright Clause "imbeds a quid pro quo." Brief for Petitioners 23. They contend, in this regard, that Congress may grant to an "Autho[r]" an "exclusive Right" for a "limited Tim[e]," but only in exchange for a "Writin[g]." Congress' power to confer copyright protection, petitioners argue, is thus contingent upon an exchange: The author of an original work receives an "exclusive Right" for a "limited Tim[e]" in exchange for a dedication to the public thereafter. Extending an existing copyright without demanding additional consideration, petitioners maintain, bestows an unpaid-for benefit on copyright holders and their heirs, in violation of the quid pro quo requirement.

We can demur to petitioners' description of the Copyright Clause as a grant of legislative authority empowering Congress "to secure a bargain — this for that." Id., at 16; see Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) ("The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in `Science and useful Arts.'"). But the legislative evolution earlier recalled demonstrates what the bargain entails. Given the consistent placement of existing copyright [537 U.S. 215] holders in parity with future holders, the author of a work created in the last 170 years would reasonably comprehend, as the "this" offered her, a copyright not only for the time in place when protection is gained, but also for any renewal or extension legislated during that time.[21] Congress could rationally seek to "promote . . . Progress" by including in every copyright statute an express guarantee that authors would receive the benefit of any later legislative extension of the copyright term. Nothing in the Copyright Clause bars Congress from creating the same incentive by adopting the same position as a matter of unbroken practice. See Brief for Respondent 31-32.

Neither Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964), nor Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989), is to the contrary. In both cases, we invalidated the application of certain state laws as inconsistent with the federal patent regime. Sears, 376 U.S., at 231-233; Bonito, 489 U.S., at 152. Describing Congress' constitutional authority to confer patents, Bonito Boats noted: "The Patent Clause itself reflects a balance between the need to encourage innovation and the avoidance of monopolies which stifle competition without any concomitant advance in the `Progress of Science and useful Arts.'" Id., at 146. [537 U.S. 216] Sears similarly stated that "[p]atents are not given as favors ... but are meant to encourage invention by rewarding the inventor with the right, limited to a term of years fixed by the patent, to exclude others from the use of his invention." 376 U.S., at 229. Neither case concerned the extension of a patent's duration. Nor did either suggest that such an extension might be constitutionally infirm. Rather, Bonito Boats reiterated the Court's unclouded understanding: "It is for Congress to determine if the present system" effectuates the goals of the Copyright and Patent Clause. 489 U.S., at 168. And as we have documented, see supra, at 201-204, Congress has many times sought to effectuate those goals by extending existing patents.

We note, furthermore, that patents and copyrights do not entail the same exchange, and that our references to a quid pro quo typically appear in the patent context. See, e. g., J. E. M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 142 (2001) ("The disclosure required by the Patent Act is `the quid pro quo of the right to exclude.'" (quoting Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 484 (1974))); Bonito Boats, 489 U.S., at 161 ("the quid pro quo of substantial creative effort required by the federal [patent] statute"); Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534 (1966) ("The basic quid pro quo ... for granting a patent monopoly is the benefit derived by the public from an invention with substantial utility."); Pennock v. Dialogue, 2 Pet. 1, 23 (1829) (If an invention is already commonly known and used when the patent is sought, "there might be sound reason for presuming, that the legislature did not intend to grant an exclusive right," given the absence of a "quid pro quo."). This is understandable, given that immediate disclosure is not the objective of, but is exacted from, the patentee. It is the price paid for the exclusivity secured. See J. E. M. Ag Supply, 534 U.S., at 142. For the author seeking copyright protection, in contrast, disclosure is the desired objective, not something exacted from the author in exchange for the copyright.

[537 U.S. 217] Indeed, since the 1976 Act, copyright has run from creation, not publication. See 1976 Act § 302(a); 17 U.S.C. § 302(a).

Further distinguishing the two kinds of intellectual property, copyright gives the holder no monopoly on any knowledge. A reader of an author's writing may make full use of any fact or idea she acquires from her reading. See § 102(b). The grant of a patent, on the other hand, does prevent full use by others of the inventor's knowledge. See Brief for Respondent 22; Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, 191 F.2d 99, 103, n. 16 (CA2 1951) (The monopoly granted by a copyright "is not a monopoly of knowledge. The grant of a patent does prevent full use being made of knowledge, but the reader of a book is not by the copyright laws prevented from making full use of any information he may acquire from his reading." (quoting W. Copinger, Law of Copyright 2 (7th ed. 1936))). In light of these distinctions, one cannot extract from language in our patent decisions — language not trained on a grant's duration — genuine support for petitioners' bold view. Accordingly, we reject the proposition that a quid pro quo requirement stops Congress from expanding copyright's term in a manner that puts existing and future copyrights in parity.[22]

3

As an alternative to their various arguments that extending existing copyrights violates the Copyright Clause per se, petitioners urge heightened judicial review of such extensions to ensure that they appropriately pursue the purposes of the Clause. See Brief for Petitioners 31-32. Specifically, [537 U.S. 218] petitioners ask us to apply the "congruence and proportionality" standard described in cases evaluating exercises of Congress' power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e. g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). But we have never applied that standard outside the § 5 context; it does not hold sway for judicial review of legislation enacted, as copyright laws are, pursuant to Article I authorization.

Section 5 authorizes Congress to enforce commands contained in and incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment. Amdt. 14, § 5 ("The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." (emphasis added)). The Copyright Clause, in contrast, empowers Congress to define the scope of the substantive right. See Sony, 464 U.S., at 429. Judicial deference to such congressional definition is "but a corollary to the grant to Congress of any Article I power." Graham, 383 U.S., at 6. It would be no more appropriate for us to subject the CTEA to "congruence and proportionality" review under the Copyright Clause than it would be for us to hold the Act unconstitutional per se.

For the several reasons stated, we find no Copyright Clause impediment to the CTEA's extension of existing copyrights.

III

Petitioners separately argue that the CTEA is a content-neutral regulation of speech that fails heightened judicial review under the First Amendment.[23] We reject petitioners' [537 U.S. 219] plea for imposition of uncommonly strict scrutiny on a copyright scheme that incorporates its own speech-protective purposes and safeguards. The Copyright Clause and First Amendment were adopted close in time. This proximity indicates that, in the Framers' view, copyright's limited monopolies are compatible with free speech principles. Indeed, copyright's purpose is to promote the creation and publication of free expression. As Harper & Row observed: "[T]he Framers intended copyright itself to be the engine of free expression. By establishing a marketable right to the use of one's expression, copyright supplies the economic incentive to create and disseminate ideas." 471 U.S., at 558.

In addition to spurring the creation and publication of new expression, copyright law contains built-in First Amendment accommodations. See id., at 560. First, it distinguishes between ideas and expression and makes only the latter eligible for copyright protection. Specifically, 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) provides: "In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work." As we said in Harper & Row, this "idea/expression dichotomy strike[s] a definitional balance between the First Amendment and the Copyright Act by permitting free communication of facts while still protecting an author's expression." 471 U.S., at 556 (internal quotation marks omitted). Due to this distinction, every idea, theory, and fact in a copyrighted work becomes instantly available for public exploitation at the moment of publication. See Feist, 499 U.S., at 349-350.

Second, the "fair use" defense allows the public to use not only facts and ideas contained in a copyrighted work, but also expression itself in certain circumstances. Codified at 17 U.S.C. § 107, the defense provides: "[T]he fair use of a [537 U.S. 220] copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies . . ., for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright." The fair use defense affords considerable "latitude for scholarship and comment," Harper & Row, 471 U.S., at 560, and even for parody, see Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994) (rap group's musical parody of Roy Orbison's "Oh, Pretty Woman" may be fair use).

The CTEA itself supplements these traditional First Amendment safeguards. First, it allows libraries, archives, and similar institutions to "reproduce" and "distribute, display, or perform in facsimile or digital form" copies of certain published works "during the last 20 years of any term of copyright ... for purposes of preservation, scholarship, or research" if the work is not already being exploited commercially and further copies are unavailable at a reasonable price. 17 U.S.C. § 108(h); see Brief for Respondent 36. Second, Title II of the CTEA, known as the Fairness in Music Licensing Act of 1998, exempts small businesses, restaurants, and like entities from having to pay performance royalties on music played from licensed radio, television, and similar facilities. 17 U.S.C. § 110(5)(B); see Brief for Representative F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., et al. as Amici Curiae 5-6, n. 3.

Finally, the case petitioners principally rely upon for their First Amendment argument, Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994), bears little on copyright. The statute at issue in Turner required cable operators to carry and transmit broadcast stations through their proprietary cable systems. Those "must-carry" provisions, we explained, implicated "the heart of the First Amendment," namely, "the principle that each person should decide for himself or herself the ideas and beliefs deserving of expression, consideration, and adherence." Id., at 641.

[537 U.S. 221] The CTEA, in contrast, does not oblige anyone to reproduce another's speech against the carrier's will. Instead, it protects authors' original expression from unrestricted exploitation. Protection of that order does not raise the free speech concerns present when the government compels or burdens the communication of particular facts or ideas. The First Amendment securely protects the freedom to make— or decline to make—one's own speech; it bears less heavily when speakers assert the right to make other people's speeches. To the extent such assertions raise First Amendment concerns, copyright's built-in free speech safeguards are generally adequate to address them. We recognize that the D. C. Circuit spoke too broadly when it declared copyrights "categorically immune from challenges under the First Amendment." 239 F. 3d, at 375. But when, as in this case, Congress has not altered the traditional contours of copyright protection, further First Amendment scrutiny is unnecessary. See Harper & Row, 471 U. S., at 560; cf. San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 483 U. S. 522 (1987).[24]

IV

If petitioners' vision of the Copyright Clause held sway, it would do more than render the CTEA's duration extensions unconstitutional as to existing works. Indeed, petitioners' assertion that the provisions of the CTEA are not severable would make the CTEA's enlarged terms invalid even as to [537 U.S. 222] tomorrow's work. The 1976 Act's time extensions, which set the pattern that the CTEA followed, would be vulnerable as well.

As we read the Framers' instruction, the Copyright Clause empowers Congress to determine the intellectual property regimes that, overall, in that body's judgment, will serve the ends of the Clause. See Graham, 383 U. S., at 6 (Congress may "implement the stated purpose of the Framers by selecting the policy which in its judgment best effectuates the constitutional aim." (emphasis added)). Beneath the facade of their inventive constitutional interpretation, petitioners forcefully urge that Congress pursued very bad policy in prescribing the CTEA's long terms. The wisdom of Congress' action, however, is not within our province to second-guess. Satisfied that the legislation before us remains inside the domain the Constitution assigns to the First Branch, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

It is so ordered.

JUSTICE STEVENS, dissenting.

Writing for a unanimous Court in 1964, Justice Black stated that it is obvious that a State could not "extend the life of a patent beyond its expiration date," Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U. S. 225, 231 (1964).[1] As I shall explain, the reasons why a State may not extend the life of a patent apply to Congress as well. If Congress may not expand the scope of a patent monopoly, it also may not extend [537 U.S. 223] the life of a copyright beyond its expiration date. Accordingly, insofar as the 1998 Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, 112 Stat. 2827, purported to extend the life of unexpired copyrights, it is invalid. Because the majority's contrary conclusion rests on the mistaken premise that this Court has virtually no role in reviewing congressional grants of monopoly privileges to authors, inventors, and their successors, I respectfully dissent.

I

The authority to issue copyrights stems from the same Clause in the Constitution that created the patent power. It provides:

"Congress shall have Power . . . To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." Art. I, § 8, cl. 8.

It is well settled that the Clause is "both a grant of power and a limitation" and that Congress "may not overreach the restraints imposed by the stated constitutional purpose." Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U. S. 1, 5-6 (1966). As we have made clear in the patent context, that purpose has two dimensions. Most obviously the grant of exclusive rights to their respective writings and discoveries is intended to encourage the creativity of "Authors and Inventors." But the requirement that those exclusive grants be for "limited Times" serves the ultimate purpose of promoting the "Progress of Science and useful Arts" by guaranteeing that those innovations will enter the public domain as soon as the period of exclusivity expires:

"Once the patent issues, it is strictly construed, United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U. S. 265, 280 (1942), it cannot be used to secure any monopoly beyond that contained in the patent, Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U. S. 488, 492 (1942), . . . and especially relevant [537 U.S. 224] here, when the patent expires the monopoly created by it expires, too, and the right to make the article—including the right to make it in precisely the shape it carried when patented—passes to the public. Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U. S. 111, 120-122 (1938); Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U. S. 169, 185 (1896)." Sears, Roebuck & Co., 376 U. S., at 230.

It is that ultimate purpose that explains why a patent may not issue unless it discloses the invention in such detail that one skilled in the art may copy it. See, e. g., Grant v. Raymond, 6 Pet. 218, 247 (1832) (Marshall, C. J.) ("The third section [of the 1793 Act] requires, as preliminary to a patent, a correct specification and description of the thing discovered. This is necessary in order to give the public, after the privilege shall expire, the advantage for which the privilege is allowed, and is the foundation of the power to issue the patent"). Complete disclosure as a precondition to the issuance of a patent is part of the quid pro quo that justifies the limited monopoly for the inventor as consideration for full and immediate access by the public when the limited time expires.[2]

Almost two centuries ago the Court plainly stated that public access to inventions at the earliest possible date was the essential purpose of the Clause:

"While one great object was, by holding out a reasonable reward to inventors and giving them an exclusive right to their inventions for a limited period, to stimulate the efforts of genius; the main object was `to promote the [537 U.S. 225] progress of science and useful arts;' and this could be done best, by giving the public at large a right to make, construct, use, and vend the thing invented, at as early a period as possible, having a due regard to the rights of the inventor. If an inventor should be permitted to hold back from the knowledge of the public the secrets of his invention; if he should for a long period of years retain the monopoly, and make, and sell his invention publicly, and thus gather the whole profits of it, relying upon his superior skill and knowledge of the structure; and then, and then only, when the danger of competition should force him to secure the exclusive right, he should be allowed to take out a patent, and thus exclude the public from any farther use than what should be derived under it during his fourteen years; it would materially retard the progress of science and the useful arts, and give a premium to those, who should be least prompt to communicate their discoveries." Pennock v. Dialogue, 2 Pet. 1, 18 (1829).

Pennock held that an inventor could not extend the period of patent protection by postponing his application for the patent while exploiting the invention commercially. As we recently explained, "implicit in the Patent Clause itself" is the understanding "that free exploitation of ideas will be the rule, to which the protection of a federal patent is the exception. Moreover, the ultimate goal of the patent system is to bring new designs and technologies into the public domain through disclosure." Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U. S. 141, 151 (1989).

The issuance of a patent is appropriately regarded as a quid pro quo—the grant of a limited right for the inventor's disclosure and subsequent contribution to the public domain. See, e. g., Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, Inc., 525 U. S. 55, 63 (1998) ("[T]he patent system represents a carefully crafted bargain that encourages both the creation and the public disclosure of new and useful advances in technology, in return [537 U.S. 226] for an exclusive monopoly for a limited period of time"). It would be manifestly unfair if, after issuing a patent, the Government as a representative of the public sought to modify the bargain by shortening the term of the patent in order to accelerate public access to the invention. The fairness considerations that underlie the constitutional protections against ex post facto laws and laws impairing the obligation of contracts would presumably disable Congress from making such a retroactive change in the public's bargain with an inventor without providing compensation for the taking. Those same considerations should protect members of the public who make plans to exploit an invention as soon as it enters the public domain from a retroactive modification of the bargain that extends the term of the patent monopoly. As I discuss below, the few historical exceptions to this rule do not undermine the constitutional analysis. For quite plainly, the limitations "implicit in the Patent Clause itself," 489 U. S., at 151, adequately explain why neither a State nor Congress may "extend the life of a patent beyond its expiration date," Sears, Roebuck & Co., 376 U. S., at 231.[3]

Neither the purpose of encouraging new inventions nor the overriding interest in advancing progress by adding knowledge to the public domain is served by retroactively increasing the inventor's compensation for a completed invention and frustrating the legitimate expectations of members of the public who want to make use of it in a free [537 U.S. 227] market. Because those twin purposes provide the only avenue for congressional action under the Copyright/Patent Clause of the Constitution, any other action is manifestly unconstitutional.

II

We have recognized that these twin purposes of encouraging new works and adding to the public domain apply to copyrights as well as patents. Thus, with regard to copyrights on motion pictures, we have clearly identified the overriding interest in the "release to the public of the products of [the author's] creative genius." United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U. S. 131, 158 (1948).[4] And, as with patents, we have emphasized that the overriding purpose of providing a reward for authors' creative activity is to motivate that activity and "to allow the public access to the products of their genius after the limited period of exclusive control has expired." Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U. S. 417, 429 (1984). Ex post facto extensions of copyrights result in a gratuitous transfer of wealth from the public to authors, publishers, and their successors in interest. Such retroactive extensions do not even arguably serve either of the purposes of the Copyright/Patent Clause. The reasons why such extensions of the patent monopoly are unconstitutional apply to copyrights as well.

Respondent, however, advances four arguments in support of the constitutionality of such retroactive extensions: (1) The first Copyright Act enacted shortly after the Constitution [537 U.S. 228] was ratified applied to works that had already been produced; (2) later Congresses have repeatedly authorized extensions of copyrights and patents; (3) such extensions promote the useful arts by giving copyright holders an incentive to preserve and restore certain valuable motion pictures; and (4) as a matter of equity, whenever Congress provides a longer term as an incentive to the creation of new works by authors, it should provide an equivalent reward to the owners of all unexpired copyrights. None of these arguments is persuasive.

III

Congress first enacted legislation under the Copyright/Patent Clause in 1790 when it passed bills creating federal patent and copyright protection. Because the content of that first legislation, the debate that accompanied it, and the differences between the initial versions and the bills that ultimately passed provide strong evidence of early Congresses' understanding of the constitutional limits of the Copyright/Patent Clause, I examine both the initial copyright and patent statutes.

Congress first considered intellectual property statutes in its inaugural session in 1789. The bill debated, House Resolution 10—"a bill to promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries," 3 Documentary History of First Federal Congress of the United States 94 (L. de Pauw, C. Bickford, & L. Hauptman eds. 1977) (hereinafter Documentary History)—provided both copyright and patent protection for similar terms.[5] The first Congress did not pass H. R. 10, though a similar version was [537 U.S. 229] reintroduced in the second Congress in 1790. After minimal debate, however, the House of Representatives began consideration of two separate bills, one covering patents and the other copyrights. Because, as the majority recognizes, "congressional practice with respect to patents informs our inquiry," ante, at 201, I consider the history of both patent and copyright legislation.

The Patent Act

What eventually became the Patent Act of 1790 had its genesis in House Resolution 41, introduced on February 16, 1790. That resolution differed from H. R. 10 in one important respect. Whereas H. R. 10 would have extended patent protection to only those inventions that were "not before known or used," H. R. 41, by contrast, added the phrase "within the United States" to that limitation and expressly authorized patent protection for "any person, who shall after the passing of this act, first import into the United States . . . any . . . device . . . not before used or known in the said States." 6 Documentary History 1626-1632. This change would have authorized patents of importation, providing United States patent protection for inventions already in use elsewhere. This change, however, was short lived and was removed by a floor amendment on March 5, 1789. Walterscheid 125. Though exact records of the floor debate are lost, correspondence from House Members indicate that doubts about the constitutionality of such a provision led to its removal. Representative Thomas Fitzsimmons wrote to a leading industrialist that day stating that the section "`allowing to Importers, was left out, the Constitutional power being Questionable.'" Id., at 126 (quoting Letter from Rep. Thomas Fitzsimmons to Tench Coxe (Mar. 5, 1790)). James Madison himself recognized this constitutional limitation on patents of importation, flatly stating that the constitution "forbids patents for that purpose." 13 Papers [537 U.S. 230] of James Madison 128 (C. Hobson & R. Rutland eds. 1981) (reprinting letter to Tench Coxe (Mar. 28, 1790)).[6]

The final version of the 1790 Patent Act, 1 Stat. 109, did not contain the geographic qualifier and thus did not provide for patents of importation. This statutory omission, coupled with the contemporaneous statements by legislators, provides strong evidence that Congress recognized significant limitations on their constitutional authority under the Copyright/Patent Clause to extend protection to a class of intellectual properties. This recognition of a categorical constitutional limitation is fundamentally at odds with the majority's reading of Article I, § 8, to provide essentially no limit on congressional action under the Clause. If early congressional practice does, indeed, inform our analysis, as it should, then the majority's judicial excision of these constitutional limits cannot be correct.

The Copyright Act

Congress also passed the first Copyright Act, 1 Stat. 124, in 1790. At that time there were a number of maps, charts, and books that had already been printed, some of which were copyrighted under state laws and some of which were arguably entitled to perpetual protection under the common law. The federal statute applied to those works as well as to new works. In some cases the application of the new federal rule reduced the pre-existing protections, and in others it [537 U.S. 231] may have increased the protection.[7] What is significant is that the statute provided a general rule creating new federal rights that supplanted the diverse state rights that previously existed. It did not extend or attach to any of those pre-existing state and common-law rights: "That congress, in passing the act of 1790, did not legislate in reference to existing rights, appears clear." Wheaton v. Peters, 8 Pet. 591, 661 (1834); see also Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U. S. 123, 127 (1932) ("As this Court has repeatedly said, the Congress did not sanction an existing right but created a new one"). Congress set in place a federal structure governing certain types of intellectual property for the new Republic. That Congress exercised its unquestionable constitutional authority to create a new federal system securing rights for authors and inventors in 1790 does not provide support for the proposition that Congress can extend pre-existing federal protections retroactively.

Respondent places great weight on this first congressional action, arguing that it proves that "Congress thus unquestionably understood that it had authority to apply a new, more favorable copyright term to existing works." Brief for Respondent 12-13. That understanding, however, is not relevant to the question presented by this case—whether "Congress has the power under the Copyright Clause to extend retroactively the term of existing copyrights?" Brief for [537 U.S. 232] Petitioners i.[8] Precisely put, the question presented by this case does not even implicate the 1790 Act, for that Act created, rather than extended, copyright protection. That this law applied to works already in existence says nothing about the First Congress' conception of its power to extend this newly created federal right.

Moreover, Members of Congress in 1790 were well aware of the distinction between the creation of new copyright regimes and the extension of existing copyrights. The 1790 Act was patterned, in many ways, after the Statute of Anne enacted in England in 1710. 8 Ann., c. 19; see Fred Fisher Music Co. v. M. Witmark & Sons, 318 U. S. 643, 647-648 (1943). The English statute, in addition to providing authors with copyrights on new works for a term of 14 years renewable for another 14-year term, also replaced the booksellers' claimed perpetual rights in existing works with a single 21-year term. In 1735, the booksellers proposed an amendment that would have extended the terms of existing copyrights until 1756, but the amendment was defeated. Opponents of the amendment had argued that if the bill were to pass, it would "in Effect be establishing a perpetual Monopoly . . . only to increase the private Gain of the [537 U.S. 233] Booksellers . . . ."[9] The authors of the federal statute that used the Statute of Anne as a model were familiar with this history. Accordingly, this Court should be especially wary of relying on Congress' creation of a new system to support the proposition that Congress unquestionably understood that it had constitutional authority to extend existing copyrights.

IV

Since the creation of federal patent and copyright protection in 1790, Congress has passed a variety of legislation, both providing specific relief for individual authors and inventors as well as changing the general statutes conferring patent and copyright privileges. Some of the changes did indeed, as the majority describes, extend existing protections retroactively. Other changes, however, did not do so. A more complete and comprehensive look at the history of congressional action under the Copyright/Patent Clause demonstrates that history, in this case, does not provide the "`volume of logic,'" ante, at 200, necessary to sustain the Sonny Bono Act's constitutionality.

Congress, aside from changing the process of applying for a patent in the 1793 Patent Act, did not significantly alter the basic patent and copyright systems for the next 40 years. During this time, however, Congress did consider many private bills. Respondent seeks support from "Congress's historical practice of using its Copyright and Patent Clause authority to extend the terms of individual patents and copyrights." Brief for Respondent 13. Carefully read, [537 U.S. 234] however, these private bills do not support respondent's historical gloss, but rather significantly undermine the historical claim.

The first example relied upon by respondent, the extension of Oliver Evans' patent in 1808, ch. 13, 6 Stat. 70, demonstrates the pitfalls of relying on an incomplete historical analysis. Evans, an inventor who had developed several improvements in milling flour, received the third federal patent on January 7, 1791. See Federico, Patent Trials of Oliver Evans, 27 J. Pat. Off. Soc. 586, 590 (1945). Under the 14-year term provided by the 1790 Patent Act, this patent was to expire on January 7, 1805. Claiming that 14 years had not provided him a sufficient time to realize income from his invention and that the net profits were spent developing improvements on the steam engine, Evans first sought an extension of his patent in December 1804. Id., at 598; 14 Annals of Cong. 1002 (1805). Unsuccessful in 1804, he tried again in 1805, and yet again in 1806, to persuade Congress to pass his private bill. Undaunted, Evans tried one last time to revive his expired patent after receiving an adverse judgment in an infringement action. See Evans v. Chambers, 8 F. Cas. 837 (No. 4,555) (CC Pa. 1807). This time, his effort at private legislation was successful, and Congress passed a bill extending his patent for 14 years. See An Act for the relief of Oliver Evans, 6 Stat. 70. This legislation, passed January 21, 1808, restored a patent monopoly for an invention that had been in the public domain for over four years. As such, this Act unquestionably exceeded Congress' authority under the Copyright/Patent Clause: "The Congress in the exercise of the patent power may not overreach the restraints imposed by the stated constitutional purpose. . . . Congress may not authorize the issuance of patents whose effects are to remove existent knowledge from the public domain, or to restrict free access to materials already available." Graham, 383 U. S., at 5-6 (emphasis added).

[537 U.S. 235] This extension of patent protection to an expired patent was not an isolated incident. Congress passed private bills either directly extending patents or allowing otherwise untimely applicants to apply for patent extensions for approximately 75 patents between 1790 and 1875. Of these 75 patents, at least 56 had already fallen into the public domain.[10] The fact that this repeated practice was patently unconstitutional completely undermines the majority's reliance on this history as "significant." Ante, at 201.

Copyright legislation has a similar history. The federal Copyright Act was first amended in 1831. That amendment, like later amendments, not only authorized a longer term for new works, but also extended the terms of unexpired copyrights. Respondent argues that that historical practice effectively establishes the constitutionality of retroactive extensions of unexpired copyrights. Of course, the practice buttressess the presumption of validity that attaches to every Act of Congress. But, as our decision in INS v. Chadha, 462 U. S. 919 (1983), demonstrates, the fact that Congress has repeatedly acted on a mistaken interpretation of the Constitution does not qualify our duty to invalidate an unconstitutional practice when it is finally challenged in an appropriate case. As Justice White pointed out in his dissent in Chadha, that case sounded the "death knell for nearly 200 other statutory provisions" in which Congress had exercised a "`legislative veto.'" Id., at 967. Regardless of the effect of unconstitutional enactments of Congress, the scope of "`the constitutional power of Congress . . . is ultimately a [537 U.S. 236] judicial rather than a legislative question, and can be settled finally only by this Court.'" United States v. Morrison, 529 U. S. 598, 614 (2000) (quoting Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U. S. 241, 273 (1964) (Black, J., concurring)). For, as this Court has long recognized, "[i]t is obviously correct that no one acquires a vested or protected right in violation of the Constitution by long use, even when that span of time covers our entire national existence." Walz v. Tax Comm'n of City of New York, 397 U. S. 664, 678 (1970).

It would be particularly unwise to attach constitutional significance to the 1831 amendment because of the very different legal landscape against which it was enacted. Congress based its authority to pass the amendment on grounds shortly thereafter declared improper by the Court. The Judiciary Committee Report prepared for the House of Representatives asserted that "an author has an exclusive and perpetual right, in preference to any other, to the fruits of his labor." 7 Cong. Deb., App., p. cxx (1831). The floor debate echoed this same sentiment. See, e. g., id., at 424 (statement of Mr. Verplanck (rejecting the idea that copyright involved "an implied contract existing between an author and the public" for "[t]here was no contract; the work of an author was the result of his own labor" and copyright was "merely a legal provision for the protection of a natural right")). This sweat-of-the-brow view of copyright, however, was emphatically rejected by this Court in 1834 in Wheaton v. Peters, 8 Pet., at 661 ("Congress, then, by this act, instead of sanctioning an existing right, as contended for, created it"). No presumption of validity should attach to a statutory enactment that relied on a shortly thereafter discredited interpretation of the basis for congressional power.[11]

[537 U.S. 237] In 1861, Congress amended the term of patents, from a 14-year term plus opportunity for 7-year extension to a flat 17 years with no extension permitted. Act of Mar. 2, 1861, ch. 88, § 16, 12 Stat. 249. This change was not retroactive, but rather only applied to "all patents hereafter granted." Ibid. To be sure, Congress, at many times in its history, has retroactively extended the terms of existing copyrights and patents. This history, however, reveals a much more heterogeneous practice than respondent contends. It is replete with actions that were unquestionably unconstitutional. Though relevant, the history is not dispositive of the constitutionality of the Sonny Bono Act.

The general presumption that historic practice illuminates the constitutionality of congressional action is not controlling in this case. That presumption is strongest when the earliest acts of Congress are considered, for the overlap of identity between those who created the Constitution and those who first constituted Congress provides "contemporaneous and weighty evidence" of the Constitution's "true meaning." Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U. S. 265, 297 (1888). But that strong presumption does not attach to congressional action in 1831, because no member of the 1831 Congress had been a delegate to the framing convention 44 years earlier.

Moreover, judicial opinions relied upon by the majority interpreting early legislative enactments have either been implicitly overruled or do not support the proposition claimed. Graham flatly contradicts the cases relied on by the majority and respondent for support that "renewed or extended terms [537 U.S. 238] were upheld in the early days." Ante, at 202.[12] Evans v. Jordan, 8 F. Cas. 872, 874 (No. 4,564) (CC Va. 1813) (Marshall, J.); Evans v. Robinson, 8 F. Cas. 886, 888 (No. 4,571) (CC Md. 1813); and Blanchard v. Sprague, 3 F. Cas. 648, 650 (No. 1,518) (CC Mass. 1839) (Story, J.), all held that private bills passed by Congress extending previously expired patents were valid. Evans v. Jordan and Evans v. Robinson both considered Oliver Evans' private bill discussed above while Blanchard involved ch. 213, 6 Stat. 589, which extended Thomas Blanchard's patent after it had been in the public domain for five months. Irrespective of what circuit courts held "in the early days," ante, at 202, such holdings have been implicitly overruled by Graham and, therefore, provide no support for respondent in the present constitutional inquiry.

The majority's reliance on the other patent case it cites is similarly misplaced. Contrary to the suggestion in the Court's opinion, McClurg v. Kingsland, 1 How. 202 (1843), did not involve the "legislative expansion" of an existing patent. Ante, at 202. The question in that case was whether the former employer of the inventor, one James Harley, could be held liable as an infringer for continuing to use the process that Harley had invented in 1834 when he was in its employ. The Court first held that the employer's use of the process before the patent issued was not a public [537 U.S. 239] use that would invalidate the patent, even if it might have had that effect prior to the amendment of the patent statute in 1836. 1 How., at 206-208. The Court then disposed of the case on the ground that a statute enacted in 1839 protected the alleged infringer's right to continue to use the process after the patent issued. Id., at 209-211. Our opinion said nothing about the power of Congress to extend the life of an issued patent. It did note that Congress has plenary power to legislate on the subject of patents provided "that they do not take away the rights of property in existing patents." Id., at 206. The fact that Congress cannot change the bargain between the public and the patentee in a way that disadvantages the patentee is, of course, fully consistent with the view that it cannot enlarge the patent monopoly to the detriment of the public after a patent has issued.

The history of retroactive extensions of existing and expired copyrights and patents, though relevant, is not conclusive of the constitutionality of the Sonny Bono Act. The fact that the Court has not previously passed upon the constitutionality of retroactive copyright extensions does not insulate the present extension from constitutional challenge.

V

Respondent also argues that the Act promotes the useful arts by providing incentives to restore old movies. For at least three reasons, the interest in preserving perishable copies of old copyrighted films does not justify a wholesale extension of existing copyrights. First, such restoration and preservation will not even arguably promote any new works by authors or inventors. And, of course, any original expression in the restoration and preservation of movies will receive new copyright protection.[13] Second, however strong [537 U.S. 240] the justification for preserving such works may be, that justification applies equally to works whose copyrights have already expired. Yet no one seriously contends that the Copyright/Patent Clause would authorize the grant of monopoly privileges for works already in the public domain solely to encourage their restoration. Finally, even if this concern with aging movies would permit congressional protection, the remedy offered—a blanket extension of all copyrights —simply bears no relationship to the alleged harm.

VI

Finally, respondent relies on concerns of equity to justify the retroactive extension. If Congress concludes that a longer period of exclusivity is necessary in order to provide an adequate incentive to authors to produce new works, respondent seems to believe that simple fairness requires that the same lengthened period be provided to authors whose works have already been completed and copyrighted. This is a classic non sequitur. The reason for increasing the inducement to create something new simply does not apply to an already-created work. To the contrary, the equity argument actually provides strong support for petitioners. Members of the public were entitled to rely on a promised access to copyrighted or patented works at the expiration of the terms specified when the exclusive privileges were granted. On the other hand, authors will receive the full benefit of the exclusive terms that were promised as an inducement to their creativity, and have no equitable claim to increased compensation for doing nothing more.

[537 U.S. 241] One must indulge in two untenable assumptions to find support in the equitable argument offered by respondent— that the public interest in free access to copyrighted works is entirely worthless and that authors, as a class, should receive a windfall solely based on completed creative activity. Indeed, Congress has apparently indulged in those assumptions for under the series of extensions to copyrights, with the exception of works which required renewal and which were not renewed, no copyrighted work created in the past 80 years has entered the public domain or will do so until 2019. But as our cases repeatedly and consistently emphasize, ultimate public access is the overriding purpose of the constitutional provision. See, e. g., Sony Corp., 464 U. S., at 429. Ex post facto extensions of existing copyrights, unsupported by any consideration of the public interest, frustrate the central purpose of the Clause.

VII

The express grant of a perpetual copyright would unquestionably violate the textual requirement that the authors' exclusive rights be only "for limited Times." Whether the extraordinary length of the grants authorized by the 1998 Act are invalid because they are the functional equivalent of perpetual copyrights is a question that need not be answered in this case because the question presented by the certiorari petition merely challenges Congress' power to extend retroactively the terms of existing copyrights. Accordingly, there is no need to determine whether the deference that is normally given to congressional policy judgments may save from judicial review its decision respecting the appropriate length of the term.[14] It is important to note, however, that [537 U.S. 242] a categorical rule prohibiting retroactive extensions would effectively preclude perpetual copyrights. More importantly, as the House of Lords recognized when it refused to amend the Statute of Anne in 1735, unless the Clause is construed to embody such a categorical rule, Congress may extend existing monopoly privileges ad infinitum under the majority's analysis.

By failing to protect the public interest in free access to the products of inventive and artistic genius—indeed, by virtually ignoring the central purpose of the Copyright/Patent Clause—the Court has quitclaimed to Congress its principal responsibility in this area of the law. Fairly read, the Court has stated that Congress' actions under the Copyright/Patent Clause are, for all intents and purposes, judicially unreviewable. That result cannot be squared with the basic tenets of our constitutional structure. It is not hyperbole to recall the trenchant words of Chief Justice John Marshall: "It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is." Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803). We should discharge that responsibility as we did in Chadha.

I respectfully dissent.

JUSTICE BREYER, dissenting.

The Constitution's Copyright Clause grants Congress the power to "promote the Progress of Science . . . by securing for limited Times to Authors . . . the exclusive Right to their respective Writings." Art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (emphasis added). The statute before us, the 1998 Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, extends the term of most existing copyrights [537 U.S. 243] to 95 years and that of many new copyrights to 70 years after the author's death. The economic effect of this 20-year extension—the longest blanket extension since the Nation's founding—is to make the copyright term not limited, but virtually perpetual. Its primary legal effect is to grant the extended term not to authors, but to their heirs, estates, or corporate successors. And most importantly, its practical effect is not to promote, but to inhibit, the progress of "Science" —by which word the Framers meant learning or knowledge, E. Walterscheid, The Nature of the Intellectual Property Clause: A Study in Historical Perspective 125-126 (2002).

The majority believes these conclusions rest upon practical judgments that at most suggest the statute is unwise, not that it is unconstitutional. Legal distinctions, however, are often matters of degree. Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Knox, 277 U. S. 218, 223 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting), overruled in part by Alabama v. King & Boozer, 314 U. S. 1, 8-9 (1941); accord, Walz v. Tax Comm'n of City of New York, 397 U. S. 664, 678-679 (1970). And in this case the failings of degree are so serious that they amount to failings of constitutional kind. Although the Copyright Clause grants broad legislative power to Congress, that grant has limits. And in my view this statute falls outside them.

I

The "monopoly privileges" that the Copyright Clause confers "are neither unlimited nor primarily designed to provide a special private benefit." Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U. S. 417, 429 (1984); cf. Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U. S. 1, 5 (1966). This Court has made clear that the Clause's limitations are judicially enforceable. E. g., Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U. S. 82, 93-94 (1879). And, in assessing this statute for that purpose, I would take into account the fact that the Constitution is a single document, that it contains both a [537 U.S. 244] Copyright Clause and a First Amendment, and that the two are related.

The Copyright Clause and the First Amendment seek related objectives—the creation and dissemination of information. When working in tandem, these provisions mutually reinforce each other, the first serving as an "engine of free expression," Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U. S. 539, 558 (1985), the second assuring that government throws up no obstacle to its dissemination. At the same time, a particular statute that exceeds proper Copyright Clause bounds may set Clause and Amendment at cross-purposes, thereby depriving the public of the speech-related benefits that the Founders, through both, have promised.

Consequently, I would review plausible claims that a copyright statute seriously, and unjustifiably, restricts the dissemination of speech somewhat more carefully than reference to this Court's traditional Copyright Clause jurisprudence might suggest, cf. ante, at 204-205, and n. 10. There is no need in this case to characterize that review as a search for "`congruence and proportionality,'" ante, at 218, or as some other variation of what this Court has called "intermediate scrutiny," e. g., San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 483 U. S. 522, 536-537 (1987) (applying intermediate scrutiny to a variant of normal trademark protection). Cf. Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U. S. 377, 402-403 (2000) (BREYER, J., concurring) (test of proportionality between burdens and benefits "where a law significantly implicates competing constitutionally protected interests"). Rather, it is necessary only to recognize that this statute involves not pure economic regulation, but regulation of expression, and what may count as rational where economic regulation is at issue is not necessarily rational where we focus on expression—in a Nation constitutionally dedicated to the free dissemination of speech, information, learning, and culture. In this sense [537 U.S. 245] only, and where line-drawing among constitutional interests is at issue, I would look harder than does the majority at the statute's rationality—though less hard than precedent might justify, see, e. g., Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U. S. 432, 446-450 (1985); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U. S. 202, 223-224 (1982); Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U. S. 528, 534-538 (1973).

Thus, I would find that the statute lacks the constitutionally necessary rational support (1) if the significant benefits that it bestows are private, not public; (2) if it threatens seriously to undermine the expressive values that the Copyright Clause embodies; and (3) if it cannot find justification in any significant Clause-related objective. Where, after examination of the statute, it becomes difficult, if not impossible, even to dispute these characterizations, Congress' "choice is clearly wrong." Helvering v. Davis, 301 U. S. 619, 640 (1937).

II

A

Because we must examine the relevant statutory effects in light of the Copyright Clause's own purposes, we should begin by reviewing the basic objectives of that Clause. The Clause authorizes a "tax on readers for the purpose of giving a bounty to writers." 56 Parl. Deb. (3d Ser.) (1841) 341, 350 (Lord Macaulay). Why? What constitutional purposes does the "bounty" serve?

The Constitution itself describes the basic Clause objective as one of "promot[ing] the Progress of Science," i. e., knowledge and learning. The Clause exists not to "provide a special private benefit," Sony, supra, at 429, but "to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good," Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U. S. 151, 156 (1975). It does so by "motivat[ing] the creative activity of authors" through "the provision of a special reward." Sony, supra, at 429. The "reward" is a means, not an end. And that is [537 U.S. 246] why the copyright term is limited. It is limited so that its beneficiaries—the public—"will not be permanently deprived of the fruits of an artist's labors." Stewart v. Abend, 495 U. S. 207, 228 (1990).

That is how the Court previously has described the Clause's objectives. See also Mazer v. Stein, 347 U. S. 201, 219 (1954) ("[C]opyright law . . . makes reward to the owner a secondary consideration" (internal quotation marks omitted)); Sony, 464 U. S., at 429 ("[L]imited grant" is "intended . . . to allow the public access to the products of [authors'] genius after the limited period of exclusive control has expired"); Harper & Row, supra, at 545 (Copyright is "intended to increase and not to impede the harvest of knowledge"). But cf. ante, at 212, n. 18. And, in doing so, the Court simply has reiterated the views of the Founders.

Madison, like Jefferson and others in the founding generation, warned against the dangers of monopolies. See, e. g., Monopolies. Perpetuities. Corporations. Ecclesiastical Endowments. in J. Madison, Writings 756 (J. Rakove ed. 1999) (hereinafter Madison on Monopolies); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (July 31, 1788), in 13 Papers of Thomas Jefferson 443 (J. Boyd ed. 1956) (hereinafter Papers of Thomas Jefferson) (arguing against even copyright monopolies); 2 Annals of Cong. 1917 (1791) (statement of Rep. Jackson in the First Congress, Feb. 1791) ("What was it drove our forefathers to this country? Was it not the ecclesiastical corporations and perpetual monopolies of England and Scotland?"). Madison noted that the Constitution had "limited them to two cases, the authors of Books, and of useful inventions." Madison on Monopolies 756. He thought that in those two cases monopoly is justified because it amounts to "compensation for" an actual community "benefit" and because the monopoly is "temporary"— the term originally being 14 years (once renewable). Ibid. Madison concluded that "under that limitation a sufficient recompence and encouragement may be given." Ibid. But [537 U.S. 247] he warned in general that monopolies must be "guarded with strictness agst abuse." Ibid.

Many Members of the Legislative Branch have expressed themselves similarly. Those who wrote the House Report on the landmark Copyright Act of 1909, for example, said that copyright was not designed "primarily" to "benefit" the "author" or "any particular class of citizens, however worthy." H. R. Rep. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess., 6-7 (1909). Rather, under the Constitution, copyright was designed "primarily for the benefit of the public," for "the benefit of the great body of people, in that it will stimulate writing and invention." Id., at 7. And were a copyright statute not "believed, in fact, to accomplish" the basic constitutional objective of advancing learning, that statute "would be beyond the power of Congress" to enact. Id., at 6-7. Similarly, those who wrote the House Report on legislation that implemented the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works said that "[t]he constitutional purpose of copyright is to facilitate the flow of ideas in the interest of learning." H. R. Rep. No. 100-609, p. 22 (1988) (internal quotation marks omitted). They added:

"Under the U. S. Constitution, the primary objective of copyright law is not to reward the author, but rather to secure for the public the benefits derived from the authors' labors. By giving authors an incentive to create, the public benefits in two ways: when the original expression is created and . . . when the limited term . . . expires and the creation is added to the public domain." Id., at 17.

For present purposes, then, we should take the following as well established: that copyright statutes must serve public, not private, ends; that they must seek "to promote the Progress" of knowledge and learning; and that they must do so both by creating incentives for authors to produce and by removing the related restrictions on dissemination after [537 U.S. 248] expiration of a copyright's "limited Tim[e]"—a time that (like "a limited monarch") is "restrain[ed]" and "circumscribe[d]," "not [left] at large," 2 S. Johnson, A Dictionary of the English Language 1151 (4th rev. ed. 1773). I would examine the statute's effects in light of these well-established constitutional purposes.

B

This statute, like virtually every copyright statute, imposes upon the public certain expression-related costs in the form of (1) royalties that may be higher than necessary to evoke creation of the relevant work, and (2) a requirement that one seeking to reproduce a copyrighted work must obtain the copyright holder's permission. The first of these costs translates into higher prices that will potentially restrict a work's dissemination. The second means search costs that themselves may prevent reproduction even where the author has no objection. Although these costs are, in a sense, inevitable concomitants of copyright protection, there are special reasons for thinking them especially serious here.

First, the present statute primarily benefits the holders of existing copyrights, i. e., copyrights on works already created. And a Congressional Research Service (CRS) study prepared for Congress indicates that the added royalty-related sum that the law will transfer to existing copyright holders is large. E. Rappaport, CRS Report for Congress, Copyright Term Extension: Estimating the Economic Values (1998) (hereinafter CRS Report). In conjunction with official figures on copyright renewals, the CRS Report indicates that only about 2% of copyrights between 55 and 75 years old retain commercial value—i. e., still generate royalties after that time. Brief for Petitioners 7 (estimate, uncontested by respondent, based on data from the CRS, Census Bureau, and Library of Congress). But books, songs, and movies of that vintage still earn about $400 million per year in royalties. CRS Report 8, 12, 15. Hence, (despite declining [537 U.S. 249] consumer interest in any given work over time) one might conservatively estimate that 20 extra years of copyright protection will mean the transfer of several billion extra royalty dollars to holders of existing copyrights—copyrights that, together, already will have earned many billions of dollars in royalty "reward." See id., at 16.

The extra royalty payments will not come from thin air. Rather, they ultimately come from those who wish to read or see or hear those classic books or films or recordings that have survived. Even the $500,000 that United Airlines has had to pay for the right to play George Gershwin's 1924 classic Rhapsody in Blue represents a cost of doing business, potentially reflected in the ticket prices of those who fly. See Ganzel, Copyright or Copywrong? 39 Training 36, 42 (Dec. 2002). Further, the likely amounts of extra royalty payments are large enough to suggest that unnecessarily high prices will unnecessarily restrict distribution of classic works (or lead to disobedience of the law)—not just in theory but in practice. Cf. CRS Report 3 ("[N]ew, cheaper editions can be expected when works come out of copyright"); Brief for College Art Association et al. as Amici Curiae 24 (One year after expiration of copyright on Willa Cather's My Antonia, seven new editions appeared at prices ranging from $2 to $24); Ganzel, supra, at 40-41, 44 (describing later abandoned plans to charge individual Girl Scout camps $257 to $1,439 annually for a license to sing songs such as God Bless America around a campfire).

A second, equally important, cause for concern arises out of the fact that copyright extension imposes a "permissions" requirement—not only upon potential users of "classic" works that still retain commercial value, but also upon potential users of any other work still in copyright. Again using CRS estimates, one can estimate that, by 2018, the number of such works 75 years of age or older will be about 350,000. See Brief for Petitioners 7. Because the Copyright Act of 1976 abolished the requirement that an owner must renew a [537 U.S. 250] copyright, such still-in-copyright works (of little or no commercial value) will eventually number in the millions. See Pub. L. 94-553, §§ 302-304, 90 Stat. 2572-2576; U. S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Census, Statistical History of the United States: From Colonial Times to the Present 956 (1976) (hereinafter Statistical History).

The potential users of such works include not only movie buffs and aging jazz fans, but also historians, scholars, teachers, writers, artists, database operators, and researchers of all kinds—those who want to make the past accessible for their own use or for that of others. The permissions requirement can inhibit their ability to accomplish that task. Indeed, in an age where computer-accessible databases promise to facilitate research and learning, the permissions requirement can stand as a significant obstacle to realization of that technological hope.

The reason is that the permissions requirement can inhibit or prevent the use of old works (particularly those without commercial value): (1) because it may prove expensive to track down or to contract with the copyright holder, (2) because the holder may prove impossible to find, or (3) because the holder when found may deny permission either outright or through misinformed efforts to bargain. The CRS, for example, has found that the cost of seeking permission "can be prohibitive." CRS Report 4. And amici, along with petitioners, provide examples of the kinds of significant harm at issue.

Thus, the American Association of Law Libraries points out that the clearance process associated with creating an electronic archive, Documenting the American South, "consumed approximately a dozen man-hours" per work. Brief for American Association of Law Libraries et al. as Amici Curiae 20. The College Art Association says that the costs of obtaining permission for use of single images, short excerpts, and other short works can become prohibitively high; it describes the abandonment of efforts to include, e. g., campaign [537 U.S. 251] songs, film excerpts, and documents exposing "horrors of the chain gang" in historical works or archives; and it points to examples in which copyright holders in effect have used their control of copyright to try to control the content of historical or cultural works. Brief for College Art Association et al. as Amici Curiae 7-13. The National Writers Union provides similar examples. Brief for National Writers Union et al. as Amici Curiae 25-27. Petitioners point to music fees that may prevent youth or community orchestras, or church choirs, from performing early 20th-century music. Brief for Petitioners 3-5; see also App. 16-17 (Copyright extension caused abandonment of plans to sell sheet music of Maurice Ravel's Alborada Del Gracioso). Amici for petitioners describe how electronic databases tend to avoid adding to their collections works whose copyright holders may prove difficult to contact, see, e. g., Arms, Getting the Picture: Observations from the Library of Congress on Providing Online Access to Pictorial Images, 48 Library Trends 379, 405 (1999) (describing how this tendency applies to the Library of Congress' own digital archives).

As I have said, to some extent costs of this kind accompany any copyright law, regardless of the length of the copyright term. But to extend that term, preventing works from the 1920's and 1930's from falling into the public domain, will dramatically increase the size of the costs just as— perversely—the likely benefits from protection diminish. See infra, at 254-256. The older the work, the less likely it retains commercial value, and the harder it will likely prove to find the current copyright holder. The older the work, the more likely it will prove useful to the historian, artist, or teacher. The older the work, the less likely it is that a sense of authors' rights can justify a copyright holder's decision not to permit reproduction, for the more likely it is that the copyright holder making the decision is not the work's creator, but, say, a corporation or a great-grandchild whom the work's creator never knew. Similarly, the costs of obtaining [537 U.S. 252] permission, now perhaps ranging in the millions of dollars, will multiply as the number of holders of affected copyrights increases from several hundred thousand to several million. See supra, at 249-250. The costs to the users of nonprofit databases, now numbering in the low millions, will multiply as the use of those computer-assisted databases becomes more prevalent. See, e. g., Brief for Internet Archive et al. as Amici Curiae 2, 21, and n. 37 (describing nonprofit Project Gutenberg). And the qualitative costs to education, learning, and research will multiply as our children become ever more dependent for the content of their knowledge upon computer-accessible databases—thereby condemning that which is not so accessible, say, the cultural content of early 20th-century history, to a kind of intellectual purgatory from which it will not easily emerge.

The majority finds my description of these permissions-related harms overstated in light of Congress' inclusion of a statutory exemption, which, during the last 20 years of a copyright term, exempts "facsimile or digital" reproduction by a "library or archives" "for purposes of preservation, scholarship, or research," 17 U. S. C. § 108(h). Ante, at 220. This exemption, however, applies only where the copy is made for the special listed purposes; it simply permits a library (not any other subsequent users) to make "a copy" for those purposes; it covers only "published" works not "subject to normal commercial exploitation" and not obtainable, apparently not even as a used copy, at a "reasonable price"; and it insists that the library assure itself through "reasonable investigation" that these conditions have been met. § 108(h). What database proprietor can rely on so limited an exemption—particularly when the phrase "reasonable investigation" is so open-ended and particularly if the database has commercial, as well as noncommercial, aspects?

The majority also invokes the "fair use" exception, and it notes that copyright law itself is restricted to protection of a work's expression, not its substantive content. Ante, at [537 U.S. 253] 219-220. Neither the exception nor the restriction, however, would necessarily help those who wish to obtain from electronic databases material that is not there—say, teachers wishing their students to see albums of Depression Era photographs, to read the recorded words of those who actually lived under slavery, or to contrast, say, Gary Cooper's heroic portrayal of Sergeant York with filmed reality from the battlefield of Verdun. Such harm, and more, see supra, at 248-252, will occur despite the 1998 Act's exemptions and despite the other "First Amendment safeguards" in which the majority places its trust, ante, at 219-220.

I should add that the Motion Picture Association of America also finds my concerns overstated, at least with respect to films, because the extension will sometimes make it profitable to reissue old films, saving them from extinction. Brief for Motion Picture Association of America, Inc., as Amicus Curiae 14-24. Other film preservationists note, however, that only a small minority of the many films, particularly silent films, from the 1920's and 1930's have been preserved. 1 Report of the Librarian of Congress, Film Preservation 1993, pp. 3-4 (Half of all pre-1950 feature films and more than 80% of all such pre-1929 films have already been lost); cf. Brief for Hal Roach Studios et al. as Amici Curiae 18 (Out of 1,200 Twenties Era silent films still under copyright, 63 are now available on digital video disc). They seek to preserve the remainder. See, e. g., Brief for Internet Archive et al. as Amici Curiae 22 (Nonprofit database digitized 1,001 public-domain films, releasing them online without charge); 1 Film Preservation 1993, supra, at 23 (reporting well over 200,000 titles held in public archives). And they tell us that copyright extension will impede preservation by forbidding the reproduction of films within their own or within other public collections. Brief for Hal Roach Studios et al. as Amici Curiae 10-21; see also Brief for Internet Archive et al. as Amici Curiae 16-29; Brief for American Association of Law Libraries et al. as Amici Curiae 26-27.

[537 U.S. 254] Because this subsection concerns only costs, not countervailing benefits, I shall simply note here that, with respect to films as with respect to other works, extension does cause substantial harm to efforts to preserve and to disseminate works that were created long ago. And I shall turn to the second half of the equation: Could Congress reasonably have found that the extension's toll-related and permissions-related harms are justified by extension's countervailing preservationist incentives or in other ways?

C

What copyright-related benefits might justify the statute's extension of copyright protection? First, no one could reasonably conclude that copyright's traditional economic rationale applies here. The extension will not act as an economic spur encouraging authors to create new works. See Mazer, 347 U. S., at 219 (The "economic philosophy" of the Copyright Clause is to "advance public welfare" by "encourag[ing] individual effort" through "personal gain"); see also ante, at 212, n. 18 ("[C]opyright law serves public ends by providing individuals with an incentive to pursue private ones"). No potential author can reasonably believe that he has more than a tiny chance of writing a classic that will survive commercially long enough for the copyright extension to matter. After all, if, after 55 to 75 years, only 2% of all copyrights retain commercial value, the percentage surviving after 75 years or more (a typical pre-extension copyright term)—must be far smaller. See supra, at 248; CRS Report 7 (estimating that, even after copyright renewal, about 3.8% of copyrighted books go out of print each year). And any remaining monetary incentive is diminished dramatically by the fact that the relevant royalties will not arrive until 75 years or more into the future, when, not the author, but distant heirs, or shareholders in a successor corporation, will receive them. Using assumptions about the time value of money provided us by a group of economists (including five [537 U.S. 255] Nobel prize winners), Brief for George A. Akerlof et al. as Amici Curiae 5-7, it seems fair to say that, for example, a 1% likelihood of earning $100 annually for 20 years, starting 75 years into the future, is worth less than seven cents today. See id., App. 3a; see also CRS Report 5. See generally Appendix, Part A, infra.

What potential Shakespeare, Wharton, or Hemingway would be moved by such a sum? What monetarily motivated Melville would not realize that he could do better for his grandchildren by putting a few dollars into an interest-bearing bank account? The Court itself finds no evidence to the contrary. It refers to testimony before Congress (1) that the copyright system's incentives encourage creation, and (2) (referring to Noah Webster) that income earned from one work can help support an artist who "`continue[s] to create.'" Ante, at 208, n. 15. But the first of these amounts to no more than a set of undeniably true propositions about the value of incentives in general. And the applicability of the second to this Act is mysterious. How will extension help today's Noah Webster create new works 50 years after his death? Or is that hypothetical Webster supposed to support himself with the extension's present discounted value, i. e., a few pennies? Or (to change the metaphor) is the argument that Dumas fils would have written more books had Dumas père's Three Musketeers earned more royalties?

Regardless, even if this cited testimony were meant more specifically to tell Congress that somehow, somewhere, some potential author might be moved by the thought of great-grandchildren receiving copyright royalties a century hence, so might some potential author also be moved by the thought of royalties being paid for two centuries, five centuries, 1,000 years, "'til the End of Time." And from a rational economic perspective the time difference among these periods makes no real difference. The present extension will produce a copyright period of protection that, even under conservative [537 U.S. 256] assumptions, is worth more than 99.8% of protection in perpetuity (more than 99.99% for a songwriter like Irving Berlin and a song like Alexander's Ragtime Band). See Appendix, Part A, infra. The lack of a practically meaningful distinction from an author's ex ante perspective between (a) the statute's extended terms and (b) an infinite term makes this latest extension difficult to square with the Constitution's insistence on "limited Times." Cf. Tr. of Oral Arg. 34 (Solicitor General's related concession).

I am not certain why the Court considers it relevant in this respect that "[n]othing . . . warrants construction of the [1998 Act's] 20-year term extension as a congressional attempt to evade or override the 'limited Times' constraint." Ante, at 209. Of course Congress did not intend to act unconstitutionally. But it may have sought to test the Constitution's limits. After all, the statute was named after a Member of Congress, who, the legislative history records, "wanted the term of copyright protection to last forever." 144 Cong. Rec. H9952 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1998) (statement of Rep. Mary Bono). See also Copyright Term, Film Labeling, and Film Preservation Legislation: Hearings on H. R. 989 et al. before the Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property of the House Judiciary Committee, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., 94 (1995) (hereinafter House Hearings) (statement of Rep. Sonny Bono) (questioning why copyrights should ever expire); ibid. (statement of Rep. Berman) ("I guess we could . . . just make a permanent moratorium on the expiration of copyrights"); id., at 230 (statement of Rep. Hoke) ("Why 70 years? Why not forever? Why not 150 years?"); cf. ibid. (statement of the Register of Copyrights) (In Copyright Office proceedings, "[t]he Songwriters Guild suggested a perpetual term"); id., at 234 (statement of Quincy Jones) ("I'm particularly fascinated with Representative Hoke's statement. . . . [W]hy not forever?"); id., at 277 (statement of Quincy Jones) ("If we can start with 70, add 20, it would be a good start"). And the statute ended up creating a term so long that (were the vesting [537 U.S. 257] of 19th-century real property at issue) it would typically violate the traditional rule against perpetuities. See 10 R. Powell, Real Property §§ 71.02[2]-[3], p. 71-11 (M. Wolf ed. 2002) (traditional rule that estate must vest, if at all, within lives in being plus 21 years); cf. id., § 71.03, at 71-15 (modern statutory perpetuity term of 90 years, 5 years shorter than 95-year copyright terms).

In any event, the incentive-related numbers are far too small for Congress to have concluded rationally, even with respect to new works, that the extension's economic-incentive effect could justify the serious expression-related harms earlier described. See Part II-B, supra. And, of course, in respect to works already created—the source of many of the harms previously described—the statute creates no economic incentive at all. See ante, at 226-227 (STEVENS, J., dissenting).

Second, the Court relies heavily for justification upon international uniformity of terms. Ante, at 196, 205-206. Although it can be helpful to look to international norms and legal experience in understanding American law, cf. Printz v. United States, 521 U. S. 898, 977 (1997) (BREYER, J., dissenting), in this case the justification based upon foreign rules is surprisingly weak. Those who claim that significant copyright-related benefits flow from greater international uniformity of terms point to the fact that the nations of the European Union have adopted a system of copyright terms uniform among themselves. And the extension before this Court implements a term of life plus 70 years that appears to conform with the European standard. But how does "uniformity" help to justify this statute?

Despite appearances, the statute does not create a uniform American-European term with respect to the lion's share of the economically significant works that it affects—all works made "for hire" and all existing works created prior to 1978. See Appendix, Part B, infra. With respect to those works the American statute produces an extended term of 95 years [537 U.S. 258] while comparable European rights in "for hire" works last for periods that vary from 50 years to 70 years to life plus 70 years. Compare 17 U. S. C. §§ 302(c), 304(a)-(b), with Council Directive 93/98/EEC of 29 October 1993 Harmonizing the Term of Protection of Copyright and Certain Related Rights, Arts. 1-3, 1993 Official J. Eur. Coms. (L 290), pp. 11-12 (hereinafter EU Council Directive 93/98). Neither does the statute create uniformity with respect to anonymous or pseudonymous works. Compare 17 U. S. C. §§ 302(c), 304(a)-(b), with EU Council Directive 93/98, Art. 1, p. 11.

The statute does produce uniformity with respect to copyrights in new, post-1977 works attributed to natural persons. Compare 17 U. S. C. § 302(a) with EU Council Directive 93/98, Art. 1(1), p. 11. But these works constitute only a subset (likely a minority) of works that retain commercial value after 75 years. See Appendix, Part B, infra. And the fact that uniformity comes so late, if at all, means that bringing American law into conformity with this particular aspect of European law will neither encourage creation nor benefit the long-dead author in any other important way.

What benefit, then, might this partial future uniformity achieve? The majority refers to "greater incentive for American and other authors to create and disseminate their work in the United States," and cites a law review article suggesting a need to "`avoid competitive disadvantages.'" Ante, at 206. The Solicitor General elaborates on this theme, postulating that because uncorrected disuniformity would permit Europe, not the United States, to hold out the prospect of protection lasting for "life plus 70 years" (instead of "life plus 50 years"), a potential author might decide to publish initially in Europe, delaying American publication. Brief for Respondent 38. And the statute, by creating a uniformly longer term, corrects for the disincentive that this disuniformity might otherwise produce.

That disincentive, however, could not possibly bring about serious harm of the sort that the Court, the Solicitor General, [537 U.S. 259] or the law review author fears. For one thing, it is unclear just who will be hurt and how, should American publication come second—for the Berne Convention still offers full protection as long as a second publication is delayed by 30 days. See Berne Conv. Arts. 3(4), 5(4). For another, few, if any, potential authors would turn a "where to publish" decision upon this particular difference in the length of the copyright term. As we have seen, the present commercial value of any such difference amounts at most to comparative pennies. See supra, at 254-256. And a commercial decision that turned upon such a difference would have had to have rested previously upon a knife edge so fine as to be invisible. A rational legislature could not give major weight to an invisible, likely nonexistent incentive-related effect.

But if there is no incentive-related benefit, what is the benefit of the future uniformity that the statute only partially achieves? Unlike the Copyright Act of 1976, this statute does not constitute part of an American effort to conform to an important international treaty like the Berne Convention. See H. R. Rep. No. 94-1476, pp. 135-136 (1976) (The 1976 Act's life-plus-50 term was "required for adherence to the Berne Convention"); S. Rep. No. 94-473, p. 118 (1975) (same). Nor does European acceptance of the longer term seem to reflect more than special European institutional considerations, i. e., the needs of, and the international politics surrounding, the development of the European Union. House Hearings 230 (statement of the Register of Copyrights); id., at 396-398 (statement of J. Reichman). European and American copyright law have long coexisted despite important differences, including Europe's traditional respect for authors' "moral rights" and the absence in Europe of constitutional restraints that restrict copyrights to "limited Times." See, e. g., Kwall, Copyright and the Moral Right: Is an American Marriage Possible? 38 Vand. L. Rev. 1-3 (1985) (moral rights); House Hearings 187 (testimony of the Register of Copyrights) ("limited [T]imes").

[537 U.S. 260] In sum, the partial, future uniformity that the 1998 Act promises cannot reasonably be said to justify extension of the copyright term for new works. And concerns with uniformity cannot possibly justify the extension of the new term to older works, for the statute there creates no uniformity at all.

Third, several publishers and filmmakers argue that the statute provides incentives to those who act as publishers to republish and to redistribute older copyrighted works. This claim cannot justify this statute, however, because the rationale is inconsistent with the basic purpose of the Copyright Clause—as understood by the Framers and by this Court. The Clause assumes an initial grant of monopoly, designed primarily to encourage creation, followed by termination of the monopoly grant in order to promote dissemination of already-created works. It assumes that it is the disappearance of the monopoly grant, not its perpetuation, that will, on balance, promote the dissemination of works already in existence. This view of the Clause does not deny the empirical possibility that grant of a copyright monopoly to the heirs or successors of a long-dead author could on occasion help publishers resurrect the work, say, of a long-lost Shakespeare. But it does deny Congress the Copyright Clause power to base its actions primarily upon that empirical possibility —lest copyright grants become perpetual, lest on balance they restrict dissemination, lest too often they seek to bestow benefits that are solely retroactive.

This view of the Clause finds strong support in the writings of Madison, in the antimonopoly environment in which the Framers wrote the Clause, and in the history of the Clause's English antecedent, the Statute of Anne—a statute which sought to break up a publishers' monopoly by offering, as an alternative, an author's monopoly of limited duration. See Patterson, Understanding the Copyright Clause, 47 J. Copyright Soc. 365, 379 (2000) (Statute of Anne); L. Patterson, Copyright in Historical Perspective 144-147 (1968) [537 U.S. 261] (same); Madison on Monopolies 756-757; Papers of Thomas Jefferson 442-443; The Constitutional Convention and the Formation of the Union 334, 338 (W. Solberg 2d ed. 1990); see also supra, at 246-247.

This view finds virtually conclusive support in the Court's own precedents. See Sony, 464 U.S., at 429 (The Copyright Clause is "intended . . . to allow the public access ... after the limited period of exclusive control"); Stewart, 495 U. S., at 228 (The copyright term is limited to avoid "permanently depriv[ing]" the public of "the fruits of an artist's labors"); see also supra, at 245-246.

This view also finds textual support in the Copyright Clause's word "limited." Cf. J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution § 558, p. 402 (R. Rotunda & J. Nowak eds. 1987) (The Copyright Clause benefits the public in part because it "admit[s] the people at large, after a short interval, to the full possession and enjoyment of all writings . . . without restraint" (emphasis added)). It finds added textual support in the word "Authors," which is difficult to reconcile with a rationale that rests entirely upon incentives given to publishers perhaps long after the death of the work's creator. Cf. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U. S. 340, 346-347 (1991).

It finds empirical support in sources that underscore the wisdom of the Framers' judgment. See CRS Report 3 ("[N]ew, cheaper editions can be expected when works come out of copyright"); see also Part II-B, supra. And it draws logical support from the endlessly self-perpetuating nature of the publishers' claim and the difficulty of finding any kind of logical stopping place were this Court to accept such a uniquely publisher-related rationale. (Would it justify continuing to extend copyrights indefinitely, say, for those granted to F. Scott Fitzgerald or his lesser known contemporaries? Would it not, in principle, justify continued protection of the works of Shakespeare, Melville, Mozart, or perhaps Salieri, Mozart's currently less popular contemporary? [537 U.S. 262] Could it justify yet further extension of the copyright on the song Happy Birthday to You (melody first published in 1893, song copyrighted after litigation in 1935), still in effect and currently owned by a subsidiary of AOL Time Warner? See Profitable "Happy Birthday," Times of London, Aug. 5, 2000, p. 6.)

Given this support, it is difficult to accept the conflicting rationale that the publishers advance, namely, that extension, rather than limitation, of the grant will, by rewarding publishers with a form of monopoly, promote, rather than retard, the dissemination of works already in existence. Indeed, given these considerations, this rationale seems constitutionally perverse—unable, constitutionally speaking, to justify the blanket extension here at issue. Cf. ante, at 239-240 (STEVENS, J., dissenting).

Fourth, the statute's legislative history suggests another possible justification. That history refers frequently to the financial assistance the statute will bring the entertainment industry, particularly through the promotion of exports. See, e. g., S. Rep. No. 104-315, p. 3 (1996) ("The purpose of the bill is to ensure adequate copyright protection for American works in foreign nations and the continued economic benefits of a healthy surplus balance of trade"); 144 Cong. Rec., at H9951 (statement of Rep. Foley) (noting "the importance of this issue to America's creative community," "[w]hether it is Sony, BMI, Disney," or other companies). I recognize that Congress has sometimes found that suppression of competition will help Americans sell abroad—though it has simultaneously taken care to protect American buyers from higher domestic prices. See, e. g., Webb-Pomerene Act (Export Trade), 40 Stat. 516, as amended, 15 U. S. C. §§61-65; see also IA P. Areeda & H. Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶ 251a, pp. 134-137 (2d ed. 2000) (criticizing export cartels). In doing so, however, Congress has exercised its commerce, not its copyright, power. I can find nothing in the Copyright Clause that would authorize Congress to enhance the [537 U.S. 263] copyright grant's monopoly power, likely leading to higher prices both at home and abroad, solely in order to produce higher foreign earnings. That objective is not a copyright objective. Nor, standing alone, is it related to any other objective more closely tied to the Clause itself. Neither can higher corporate profits alone justify the grant's enhancement. 1The Clause seeks public, not private, benefits.

Finally, the Court mentions as possible justifications "demographic, economic, and technological changes"—by which the Court apparently means the facts that today people communicate with the help of modern technology, live longer, and have children at a later age. Ante, at 206-207, and n. 14. The first fact seems to argue not for, but instead against, extension. See Part II-B, supra. The second fact seems already corrected for by the 1976 Act's life-plus-50 term, which automatically grows with lifespans. Cf. Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Deaths: Final Data for 2000 (2002) (Table 8) (reporting a 4-year increase in expected lifespan between 1976 and 1998). And the third fact—that adults are having children later in life—is a makeweight at best, providing no explanation of why the 1976 Act's term of 50 years after an author's death—a longer term than was available to authors themselves for most of our Nation's history—is an insufficient potential bequest. The weakness of these final rationales simply underscores the conclusion that emerges from consideration of earlier attempts at justification: There is no legitimate, serious copyright-related justification for this statute.

III

The Court is concerned that our holding in this case not inhibit the broad decisionmaking leeway that the Copyright Clause grants Congress. Ante, at 204-205, 208, 222. It is concerned about the implications of today's decision for the Copyright Act of 1976—an Act that changed copyright's basic term from 56 years (assuming renewal) to life of the [537 U.S. 264] author plus 50 years, ante, at 194-195. Ante, at 222. It is concerned about having to determine just how many years of copyright is too many—a determination that it fears would require it to find the "right" constitutional number, a task for which the Court is not well suited. See ibid.; but cf. ante, at 210, n. 17.

I share the Court's initial concern, about intrusion upon the decisionmaking authority of Congress. See ante, at 205, n. 10. But I do not believe it intrudes upon that authority to find the statute unconstitutional on the basis of (1) a legal analysis of the Copyright Clause's objectives, see supra, at 245-248, 260-263; (2) the total implausibility of any incentive effect, see supra, at 254-257; and (3) the statute's apparent failure to provide significant international uniformity, see supra, at 257-260. Nor does it intrude upon congressional authority to consider rationality in light of the expressive values underlying the Copyright Clause, related as it is to the First Amendment, and given the constitutional importance of correctly drawing the relevant Clause/Amendment boundary. Supra, at 243-245. We cannot avoid the need to examine the statute carefully by saying that "Congress has not altered the traditional contours of copyright protection," ante, at 221, for the sentence points to the question, rather than the answer. Nor should we avoid that examination here. That degree of judicial vigilance—at the far outer boundaries of the Clause—is warranted if we are to avoid the monopolies and consequent restrictions of expression that the Clause, read consistently with the First Amendment, seeks to preclude. And that vigilance is all the more necessary in a new century that will see intellectual property rights and the forms of expression that underlie them play an ever more important role in the Nation's economy and the lives of its citizens.

I do not share the Court's concern that my view of the 1998 Act could automatically doom the 1976 Act. Unlike the present statute, the 1976 Act thoroughly revised copyright law and enabled the United States to join the Berne Convention [537 U.S. 265] —an international treaty that requires the 1976 Act's basic life-plus-50 term as a condition for substantive protections from a copyright's very inception, Berne Conv. Art. 7(1). Consequently, the balance of copyright-related harms and benefits there is far less one sided. The same is true of the 1909 and 1831 Acts, which, in any event, provided for maximum terms of 56 years or 42 years while requiring renewal after 28 years, with most copyrighted works falling into the public domain after that 28-year period, well before the putative maximum terms had elapsed. See ante, at 194; Statistical History 956-957. Regardless, the law provides means to protect those who have reasonably relied upon prior copyright statutes. See Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U. S. 728, 746 (1984). And, in any event, we are not here considering, and we need not consider, the constitutionality of other copyright statutes.

Neither do I share the Court's aversion to line-drawing in this case. Even if it is difficult to draw a single clear bright line, the Court could easily decide (as I would decide) that this particular statute simply goes too far. And such examples —of what goes too far—sometimes offer better constitutional guidance than more absolute-sounding rules. In any event, "this Court sits" in part to decide when a statute exceeds a constitutional boundary. See Panhandle Oil, 277 U. S., at 223 (Holmes, J., dissenting). In my view, "[t]ext, history, and precedent," ante, at 199, support both the need to draw lines in general and the need to draw the line here short of this statute. See supra, at 242-248, 260-263. But see ante, at 199, n. 4.

Finally, the Court complains that I have not "restrained" my argument or "train[ed my] fire, as petitioners do, on Congress' choice to place existing and future copyrights in parity." Ante, at 193, n. 1, and 199, n. 4. The reason that I have not so limited my argument is my willingness to accept, for purposes of this opinion, the Court's understanding that, for reasons of "[j]ustice, policy, and equity"—as well as established [537 U.S. 266] historical practice—it is not "categorically beyond Congress' authority" to "exten[d] the duration of existing copyrights" to achieve such parity. Ante, at 204 (internal quotation marks omitted). I have accepted this view, however, only for argument's sake—putting to the side, for the present, JUSTICE STEVENS' persuasive arguments to the contrary, ante, at 226-242 (dissenting opinion). And I make this assumption only to emphasize the lack of rational justification for the present statute. A desire for "parity" between A (old copyrights) and B (new copyrights) cannot justify extending A when there is no rational justification for extending B. At the very least (if I put aside my rationality characterization), to ask B to support A here is like asking Tom Thumb to support Paul Bunyan's ox. Where the case for extending new copyrights is itself so weak, what "justice," what "policy," what "equity" can warrant the tolls and barriers that extension of existing copyrights imposes?

IV

This statute will cause serious expression-related harm. It will likely restrict traditional dissemination of copyrighted works. It will likely inhibit new forms of dissemination through the use of new technology. It threatens to interfere with efforts to preserve our Nation's historical and cultural heritage and efforts to use that heritage, say, to educate our Nation's children. It is easy to understand how the statute might benefit the private financial interests of corporations or heirs who own existing copyrights. But I cannot find any constitutionally legitimate, copyright-related way in which the statute will benefit the public. Indeed, in respect to existing works, the serious public harm and the virtually nonexistent public benefit could not be more clear.

I have set forth the analysis upon which I rest these judgments. This analysis leads inexorably to the conclusion that the statute cannot be understood rationally to advance a constitutionally legitimate interest. The statute falls outside [537 U.S. 267] the scope of legislative power that the Copyright Clause, read in light of the First Amendment, grants to Congress. I would hold the statute unconstitutional.

I respectfully dissent.

APPENDIX TO OPINION OF BREYER, J.

A

The text's estimates of the economic value of 1998 Act copyrights relative to the economic value of a perpetual copyright, supra, at 255-256, as well as the incremental value of a 20-year extension of a 75-year term, supra, at 254-255, rest upon the conservative future value and discount rate assumptions set forth in the brief of economist amici. Brief for George A. Akerlof et al. as Amici Curiae 5-7. Under these assumptions, if an author expects to live 30 years after writing a book, the copyright extension (by increasing the copyright term from "life of the author plus 50 years" to "life of the author plus 70 years") increases the author's expected income from that book—i. e., the economic incentive to write—by no more than about 0.33%. Id., at 6.

The text assumes that the extension creates a term of 95 years (the term corresponding to works made for hire and for all existing pre-1978 copyrights). Under the economists' conservative assumptions, the value of a 95-year copyright is slightly more than 99.8% of the value of a perpetual copyright. See also Tr. of Oral Arg. 50 (Petitioners' statement of the 99.8% figure). If a "life plus 70" term applies, and if an author lives 78 years after creation of a work (as with Irving Berlin and Alexander's Ragtime Band), the same assumptions yield a figure of 99.996%.

The most unrealistically conservative aspect of these assumptions, i. e., the aspect most unrealistically favorable to the majority, is the assumption of a constant future income stream. In fact, as noted in the text, supra, at 248, uncontested data indicate that no author could rationally expect [537 U.S. 268] that a stream of copyright royalties will be constant forever. Indeed, only about 2% of copyrights can be expected to retain commercial value at the end of 55 to 75 years. Ibid. Thus, in the overwhelming majority of cases, the ultimate value of the extension to copyright holders will be zero, and the economic difference between the extended copyright and a perpetual copyright will be zero.

Nonetheless, there remains a small 2% or so chance that a given work will remain profitable. The CRS Report suggests a way to take account of both that likelihood and the related "decay" in a work's commercial viability: Find the annual decay rate that corresponds to the percentage of works that become commercially unavailable in any given year, and then discount the revenue for each successive year accordingly. See CRS Report 7. Following this approach, if one estimates, conservatively, that a full 2% of all works survives at the end of 75 years, the corresponding annual decay rate is about 5%. I instead (and again conservatively) use the 3.8% decay rate the CRS has applied in the case of books whose copyrights were renewed between 1950 and 1970. Ibid. Using this 3.8% decay rate and the economist amici's proposed 7% discount rate, the value of a 95-year copyright is more realistically estimated not as 99.8%, but as 99.996% of the value of a perpetual copyright. The comparable "Irving Berlin" figure is 99.99999%. (With a 5% decay rate, the figures are 99.999% and 99.999998%, respectively.) Even these figures seem likely to be underestimates in the sense that they assume that, if a work is still commercially available, it earns as much as it did in a year shortly after its creation.

B

Conclusions regarding the economic significance of "works made for hire" are judgmental because statistical information about the ratio of "for hire" works to all works is scarce. Cf. Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U. S. 730, 737-738, n. 4 (1989). But we know that, as of 1955, [537 U.S. 269] copyrights on "for hire" works accounted for 40% of newly registered copyrights. Varmer, Works Made for Hire and on Commission, Study No. 13, in Copyright Law Revision Studies Nos. 1-19, prepared for the Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., 139, n. 49 (Comm. Print 1960). We also know that copyrights on works typically made for hire—feature-length movies—were renewed, and since the 1930's apparently have remained commercially viable, at a higher than average rate. CRS Report 13-14. Further, we know that "harmonization" looks to benefit United States exports, see, e. g., H. R. Rep. No. 105-452, p. 4 (1998), and that films and sound recordings account for the dominant share of export revenues earned by new copyrighted works of potential lasting commercial value (i. e., works other than computer software), S. Siwek, Copyright Industries in the U. S. Economy: The 2002 Report 17. It also appears generally accepted that, in these categories, "for hire" works predominate. E. g., House Hearings 176 (testimony of the Register of Copyrights) ("[A]udiovisual works are generally works made for hire"). Taken together, these circumstances support the conclusion in the text that the extension fails to create uniformity where it would appear to be most important—pre-1978 copyrighted works nearing the end of their pre-extension terms, and works made for hire.

__________

[*] Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American Association of Law Libraries et al. by Arnold P. Lutzker and Carl H. Settlemyer III; for the College Art Association et al. by Jeffrey P. Cunard and Bruce P. Keller; for the Eagle Forum Education & Legal Defense Fund et al. by Karen Tripp and Phyllis Schlafly; for the Free Software Foundation by Eben Moglen; for Intellectual Property Law Professors by Jonathan Weinberg; for the Internet Archive et al. by Deirdre K. Mulligan, Mark A. Lemley, and Steven M. Harris; and for Jack M. Balkin et al. by Burt Neuborne.

Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Intellectual Property Law Association by Baila H. Celedonia, Mark E. Haddad, and Roger W. Parkhurst; for the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers et al. by Carey R. Ramos, Peter L. Felcher, Drew S. Days III, Beth S. Brinkmann, and Paul Goldstein; for Amsong, Inc., by Dorothy M. Weber; for AOL Time Warner, Inc., by Kenneth W. Starr, Richard A. Cordray, Daryl Joseffer, Paul T. Cappuccio, Edward J. Weiss, and Shira Perlmutter; for the Association of American Publishers et al. by Charles S. Sims and Jon A. Baumgarten; for the Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., et al. by Paul Bender and Michael R. Klipper; for the Directors Guild of America et al. by George H. Cohen, Leon Dayan, and Laurence Gold; for Dr. Seuss Enterprises, L. P., et al. by Karl ZoBell, Nancy O. Dix, Cathy Ann Bencivengo, Randall E. Kay, and Herbert B. Cheyette; for the Intellectual Property Owners Association by Charles D. Ossola and Ronald E. Myrick; for the International Coalition for Copyright Protection by Eric Lieberman; for the Motion Picture Association of America, Inc., by Seth P. Waxman, Randolph D. Moss, Edward C. DuMont, Neil M. Richards, and Simon Barsky; for the Recording Artists Coalition by Thomas G. Corcoran, Jr.; for the Recording Industry Association of America by Donald B. Verrilli, Jr., Thomas J. Perrelli, William M. Hohengarten, Matthew J. Oppenheim, and Stanley Pierre-Louis; for the Songwriters Guild of America by Floyd Abrams and Joel Kurtzberg; for Jack Beeson et al. by I. Fred Koenigsberg and Gaela K. Gehring Flores; for Senator Orrin G. Hatch by Thomas R. Lee; for Edward Samuels, pro se; and for Representative F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., et al. by Arthur B. Culvahouse, Jr., and Robert M. Schwartz.

Briefs of amici curiae were filed for Hal Roach Studios et al. by H. Jefferson Powell and David Lange; for Intel Corp. by James M. Burger; for the Nashville Songwriters Association International by Stephen K. Rush; for the New York Intellectual Property Law Association by Bruce M. Wexler and Peter Saxon; for the National Writers Union et al. by Peter Jaszi; for the Progressive Intellectual Property Law Association et al. by Michael H. Davis; for George A. Akerlof et al. by Roy T. Englert, Jr.; for Tyler T. Ochoa et al. by Mr. Ochoa; and for Malla Pollack, pro se.

[1] JUSTICE BREYER's dissent is not similarly restrained. He makes no effort meaningfully to distinguish existing copyrights from future grants. See, e. g., post, at 242-243, 254-260, 264-266. Under his reasoning, the CTEA's 20-year extension is globally unconstitutional.

[2] Asserting that the last several decades have seen a proliferation of copyright legislation in departure from Congress' traditional pace of legislative amendment in this area, petitioners cite nine statutes passed between 1962 and 1974, each of which incrementally extended existing copyrights for brief periods. See Pub. L. 87-668, 76 Stat. 555; Pub. L. 89-142, 79 Stat. 581; Pub. L. 90-141, 81 Stat. 464; Pub. L. 90-416, 82 Stat. 397; Pub. L. 91-147, 83 Stat. 360; Pub. L. 91-555, 84 Stat. 1441; Pub. L. 92-170, 85 Stat. 490; Pub. L. 92-566, 86 Stat. 1181; Pub. L. 93-573, Title I, 88 Stat. 1873. As respondent (Attorney General Ashcroft) points out, however, these statutes were all temporary placeholders subsumed into the systemic changes effected by the 1976 Act. Brief for Respondent 9.

[3] Petitioners argue that the 1790 Act must be distinguished from the later Acts on the ground that it covered existing works but did not extend existing copyrights. Reply Brief 3-7. The parties disagree on the question whether the 1790 Act's copyright term should be regarded in part as compensation for the loss of any then existing state- or common-law copyright protections. See Brief for Petitioners 28-30; Brief for Respondent 17, n. 9; Reply Brief 3-7. Without resolving that dispute, we underscore that the First Congress clearly did confer copyright protection on works that had already been created.

[4] We note again that JUSTICE BREYER makes no such concession. See supra, at 193, n. 1. He does not train his fire, as petitioners do, on Congress' choice to place existing and future copyrights in parity. Moving beyond the bounds of the parties' presentations, and with abundant policy arguments but precious little support from precedent, he would condemn Congress' entire product as irrational.

[5] This approach comported with English practice at the time. The Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Ann. c. 19, provided copyright protection to books not yet composed or published, books already composed but not yet published, and books already composed and published. See ibid. ("[T]he author of any book or books already composed, and not printed and published, or that shall hereafter be composed, and his assignee or assigns, shall have the sole liberty of printing and reprinting such book and books for the term of fourteen years, to commence from the day of the first publishing the same, and no longer."); ibid. ("[T]he author of any book or books already printed ... or the bookseller or booksellers, printer or printers, or other person or persons, who hath or have purchased or acquired the copy or copies of any book or books, in order to print or reprint the same, shall have the sole right and liberty of printing such book and books for the term of one and twenty years, to commence from the said tenth day of April, and no longer.").

JUSTICE STEVENS stresses the rejection of a proposed amendment to the Statute of Anne that would have extended the term of existing copyrights, and reports that opponents of the extension feared it would perpetuate the monopoly position enjoyed by English booksellers. Post, at 232-233, and n. 9. But the English Parliament confronted a situation that never existed in the United States. Through the late 17th century, a government-sanctioned printing monopoly was held by the Stationers' Company, "the ancient London guild of printers and booksellers." M. Rose, Authors and Owners: The Invention of Copyright 4 (1993); see L. Patterson, Copyright in Historical Perspective ch. 3 (1968). Although that legal monopoly ended in 1695, concerns about monopolistic practices remained, and the 18th-century English Parliament was resistant to any enhancement of booksellers' and publishers' entrenched position. See Rose, supra, at 52-56. In this country, in contrast, competition among publishers, printers, and booksellers was "intens[e]" at the time of the founding, and "there was not even a rough analog to the Stationers' Company on the horizon." Nachbar, Constructing Copyright's Mythology, 6 Green Bag 2d 37, 45 (2002). The Framers guarded against the future accumulation of monopoly power in booksellers and publishers by authorizing Congress to vest copyrights only in "Authors." JUSTICE STEVENS does not even attempt to explain how Parliament's response to England's experience with a publishing monopoly may be construed to impose a constitutional limitation on Congress' power to extend copyrights granted to "Authors."

[6] Moreover, the precise duration of a federal copyright has never been fixed at the time of the initial grant. The 1790 Act provided a federal copyright term of 14 years from the work's publication, renewable for an additional 14 years if the author survived and applied for an additional term. § 1. Congress retained that approach in subsequent statutes. See Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 217 (1990) ("Since the earliest copyright statute in this country, the copyright term of ownership has been split between an original term and a renewal term."). Similarly, under the method for measuring copyright terms established by the 1976 Act and retained by the CTEA, the baseline copyright term is measured in part by the life of the author, rendering its duration indeterminate at the time of the grant. See 1976 Act § 302(a); 17 U.S.C. § 302(a).

[7] JUSTICE STEVENS would sweep away these decisions, asserting that Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1 (1966), "flatly contradicts" them. Post, at 237. Nothing but wishful thinking underpins that assertion. The controversy in Graham involved no patent extension. Graham addressed an invention's very eligibility for patent protection, and spent no words on Congress' power to enlarge a patent's duration.

[8] JUSTICE STEVENS recites words from Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964), supporting the uncontroversial proposition that a State may not "extend the life of a patent beyond its expiration date," id., at 231, then boldly asserts that for the same reasons Congress may not do so either. See post, at 222, 226. But Sears placed no reins on Congress' authority to extend a patent's life. The full sentence in Sears, from which JUSTICE STEVENS extracts words, reads: "Obviously a State could not, consistently with the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, extend the life of a patent beyond its expiration date or give a patent on an article which lacked the level of invention required for federal patents." 376 U.S., at 231. The point insistently made in Sears is no more and no less than this: States may not enact measures inconsistent with the federal patent laws. Ibid. ("[A] State cannot encroach upon the federal patent laws directly ... [and] cannot ... give protection of a kind that clashes with the objectives of the federal patent laws."). A decision thus rooted in the Supremacy Clause cannot be turned around to shrink congressional choices.

Also unavailing is JUSTICE STEVENS' appeal to language found in a private letter written by James Madison. Post, at 230, n. 6; see also dissenting opinion of BREYER, J., post, at 246-247, 260, 261. Respondent points to a better "demonstrat[ion]," post, at 226, n. 3 (STEVENS, J., dissenting), of Madison's and other Framers' understanding of the scope of Congress' power to extend patents: "[T]hen-President Thomas Jefferson — the first administrator of the patent system, and perhaps the Founder with the narrowest view of the copyright and patent powers — signed the 1808 and 1809 patent term extensions into law; ... James Madison, who drafted the Constitution's `limited Times' language, issued the extended patents under those laws as Secretary of State; and ... Madison as President signed another patent term extension in 1815." Brief for Respondent 15.

[9] JUSTICE STEVENS reads McClurg to convey that "Congress cannot change the bargain between the public and the patentee in a way that disadvantages the patentee." Post, at 239. But McClurg concerned no such change. To the contrary, as JUSTICE STEVENS acknowledges, McClurg held that use of an invention by the patentee's employer did not invalidate the inventor's 1834 patent, "even if it might have had that effect prior to the amendment of the patent statute in 1836." Post, at 239. In other words, McClurg evaluated the patentee's rights not simply in light of the patent law in force at the time the patent issued, but also in light of "such changes as ha[d] been since made." 1 How., at 206. It is thus inescapably plain that McClurg upheld the application of expanded patent protection to an existing patent.

[10] JUSTICE BREYER would adopt a heightened, three-part test for the constitutionality of copyright enactments. Post, at 245. He would invalidate the CTEA as irrational in part because, in his view, harmonizing the United States and European Union baseline copyright terms "apparent[ly]" fails to achieve "significant" uniformity. Post, at 264. But see infra this page and 206. The novelty of the "rational basis" approach he presents is plain. Cf. Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 383 (2001) (BREYER, J., dissenting) ("Rational-basis review — with its presumptions favoring constitutionality — is `a paradigm of judicial restraint.'" (quoting FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 314 (1993))). Rather than subjecting Congress' legislative choices in the copyright area to heightened judicial scrutiny, we have stressed that "it is not our role to alter the delicate balance Congress has labored to achieve." Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S., at 230; see Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984). Congress' exercise of its Copyright Clause authority must be rational, but JUSTICE BREYER'S stringent version of rationality is unknown to our literary property jurisprudence.

[11] Responding to an inquiry whether copyrights could be extended "forever," Register of Copyrights Marybeth Peters emphasized the dominant reason for the CTEA: "There certainly are proponents of perpetual copyright: We heard that in our proceeding on term extension. The Songwriters Guild suggested a perpetual term. However, our Constitution says limited times, but there really isn't a very good indication on what limited times is. The reason why you're going to life-plus-70 today is because Europe has gone that way . . . ." Copyright Term, Film Labeling, and Film Preservation Legislation: Hearings on H. R. 989 et al. before the Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., 230 (1995) (hereinafter House Hearings).

[12] The author of the law review article cited in text, Shira Perlmutter, currently a vice president of AOL Time Warner, was at the time of the CTEA's enactment Associate Register for Policy and International Affairs, United States Copyright Office.

[13] See also Austin, Does the Copyright Clause Mandate Isolationism? 26 Colum. J. L. & Arts 17, 59 (2002) (cautioning against "an isolationist reading of the Copyright Clause that is in tension with ... America's international copyright relations over the last hundred or so years").

[14] Members of Congress expressed the view that, as a result of increases in human longevity and in parents' average age when their children are born, the pre-CTEA term did not adequately secure "the right to profit from licensing one's work during one's lifetime and to take pride and comfort in knowing that one's children — and perhaps their children — might also benefit from one's posthumous popularity." 141 Cong. Rec. 6553 (1995) (statement of Sen. Feinstein); see 144 Cong. Rec. S12377 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1998) (statement of Sen. Hatch) ("Among the main developments [compelling reconsideration of the 1976 Act's term] is the effect of demographic trends, such as increasing longevity and the trend toward rearing children later in life, on the effectiveness of the life-plus-50 term to provide adequate protection for American creators and their heirs."). Also cited was "the failure of the U.S. copyright term to keep pace with the substantially increased commercial life of copyrighted works resulting from the rapid growth in communications media." Ibid. (statement of Sen. Hatch); cf. Sony, 464 U.S., at 430-431 ("From its beginning, the law of copyright has developed in response to significant changes in technology. . . . [A]s new developments have occurred in this country, it has been the Congress that has fashioned the new rules that new technology made necessary.").

[15] JUSTICE BREYER urges that the economic incentives accompanying copyright term extension are too insignificant to "mov[e]" any author with a "rational economic perspective." Post, at 255; see post, at 254-257. Calibrating rational economic incentives, however, like "fashion[ing] ... new rules [in light of] new technology," Sony, 464 U.S., at 431, is a task primarily for Congress, not the courts. Congress heard testimony from a number of prominent artists; each expressed the belief that the copyright system's assurance of fair compensation for themselves and their heirs was an incentive to create. See, e. g., House Hearings 233-239 (statement of Quincy Jones); Copyright Term Extension Act of 1995: Hearing before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., 55-56 (1995) (statement of Bob Dylan); id., at 56-57 (statement of Don Henley); id., at 57 (statement of Carlos Santana). We would not take Congress to task for crediting this evidence which, as JUSTICE BREYER acknowledges, reflects general "propositions about the value of incentives" that are "undeniably true." Post, at 255.

Congress also heard testimony from Register of Copyrights Marybeth Peters and others regarding the economic incentives created by the CTEA. According to the Register, extending the copyright for existing works "could ... provide additional income that would finance the production and publication of new works." House Hearings 158. "Authors would not be able to continue to create," the Register explained, "unless they earned income on their finished works. The public benefits not only from an author's original work but also from his or her further creations. Although this truism may be illustrated in many ways, one of the best examples is Noah Webster[,] who supported his entire family from the earnings on his speller and grammar during the twenty years he took to complete his dictionary." Id., at 165.

[16] JUSTICE BREYER agrees that "Congress did not intend to act unconstitutionally" when it enacted the CTEA, post, at 256, yet in his very next breath, he seems to make just that accusation, ibid. What else is one to glean from his selection of scattered statements from individual Members of Congress? He does not identify any statement in the statutory text that installs a perpetual copyright, for there is none. But even if the statutory text were sufficiently ambiguous to warrant recourse to legislative history, JUSTICE BREYER'S selections are not the sort to which this Court accords high value: "In surveying legislative history we have repeatedly stated that the authoritative source for finding the Legislature's intent lies in the Committee Reports on the bill, which `represen[t] the considered and collective understanding of those [Members of Congress] involved in drafting and studying proposed legislation.'" Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 76 (1984) (quoting Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 186 (1969)). The House and Senate Reports accompanying the CTEA reflect no purpose to make copyright a forever thing. Notably, the Senate Report expressly acknowledged that the Constitution "clearly precludes Congress from granting unlimited protection for copyrighted works," S. Rep. No. 104-315, p. 11 (1996), and disclaimed any intent to contravene that prohibition, ibid. Members of Congress instrumental in the CTEA's passage spoke to similar effect. See, e. g., 144 Cong. Rec. H1458 (daily ed. Mar. 25, 1998) (statement of Rep. Coble) (observing that "copyright protection should be for a limited time only" and that "[p]erpetual protection does not benefit society").

JUSTICE BREYER nevertheless insists that the "economic effect" of the CTEA is to make the copyright term "virtually perpetual." Post, at 243. Relying on formulas and assumptions provided in an amicus brief supporting petitioners, he stresses that the CTEA creates a copyright term worth 99.8% of the value of a perpetual copyright. Post, at 254-256. If JUSTICE BREYER'S calculations were a basis for holding the CTEA unconstitutional, then the 1976 Act would surely fall as well, for — under the same assumptions he indulges — the term set by that Act secures 99.4% of the value of a perpetual term. See Brief for George A. Akerlof et al. as Amici Curiae 6, n. 6 (describing the relevant formula). Indeed, on that analysis even the "limited" character of the 1909 (97.7%) and 1831 (94.1%) Acts might be suspect. JUSTICE BREYER several times places the Founding Fathers on his side. See, e. g., post, at 246-247, 260, 261. It is doubtful, however, that those architects of our Nation, in framing the "limited Times" prescription, thought in terms of the calculator rather than the calendar.

[17] Respondent notes that the CTEA's life-plus-70-years baseline term is expected to produce an average copyright duration of 95 years, and that this term "resembles some other long-accepted durational practices in the law, such as 99-year leases of real property and bequests within the rule against perpetuities." Brief for Respondent 27, n. 18. Whether such referents mark the outer boundary of "limited Times" is not before us today. JUSTICE BREYER suggests that the CTEA's baseline term extends beyond that typically permitted by the traditional rule against perpetuities. Post, at 256-257. The traditional common-law rule looks to lives in being plus 21 years. Under that rule, the period before a bequest vests could easily equal or exceed the anticipated average copyright term under the CTEA. If, for example, the vesting period on a deed were defined with reference to the life of an infant, the sum of the measuring life plus 21 years could commonly add up to 95 years.

[18] JUSTICE STEVENS' characterization of reward to the author as "a secondary consideration" of copyright law, post, at 227, n. 4 (internal quotation marks omitted), understates the relationship between such rewards and the "Progress of Science." As we have explained, "[t]he economic philosophy behind the [Copyright] [C]lause ... is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors." Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954). Accordingly, "copyright law celebrates the profit motive, recognizing that the incentive to profit from the exploitation of copyrights will redound to the public benefit by resulting in the proliferation of knowledge.... The profit motive is the engine that ensures the progress of science." American Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 802 F. Supp. 1, 27 (SDNY 1992), aff'd, 60 F.3d 913 (CA2 1994). Rewarding authors for their creative labor and "promot[ing] ... Progress" are thus complementary; as James Madison observed, in copyright "[t]he public good fully coincides . . . with the claims of individuals." The Federalist No. 43, p. 272 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). JUSTICE BREYER's assertion that "copyright statutes must serve public, not private, ends," post, at 247, similarly misses the mark. The two ends are not mutually exclusive; copyright law serves public ends by providing individuals with an incentive to pursue private ones.

[19] As we have noted, see supra, at 196, n. 3, petitioners seek to distinguish the 1790 Act from those that followed. They argue that by requiring authors seeking its protection to surrender whatever rights they had under state law, the 1790 Act enhanced uniformity and certainty and thus "promote[d] . . . Progress." See Brief for Petitioners 28-31. This account of the 1790 Act simply confirms, however, that the First Congress understood it could "promote ... Progress" by extending copyright protection to existing works. Every subsequent adjustment of copyright's duration, including the CTEA, reflects a similar understanding.

[20] JUSTICE STEVENS, post, at 235, refers to the "legislative veto" held unconstitutional in INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), and observes that we reached that decision despite its impact on federal laws geared to our "contemporary political system," id., at 967 (White, J., dissenting). Placing existing works in parity with future works for copyright purposes, in contrast, is not a similarly pragmatic endeavor responsive to modern times. It is a measure of the kind Congress has enacted under its Patent and Copyright Clause authority since the founding generation. See supra, at 194-196.

[21] Standard copyright assignment agreements reflect this expectation. See, e. g., A. Kohn & B. Kohn, Music Licensing 471 (3d ed. 1992-2002) (short form copyright assignment for musical composition, under which assignor conveys all rights to the work, "including the copyrights and proprietary rights therein and in any and all versions of said musical composition(s), and any renewals and extensions thereof (whether presently available or subsequently available as a result of intervening legislation)" (emphasis added)); 5 M. Nimmer & D. Nimmer, Copyright § 21.11[B], p. 21-305 (2002) (short form copyright assignment under which assignor conveys all assets relating to the work, "including without limitation, copyrights and renewals and/or extensions thereof"); 6 id., § 30.04[B][1], p. 30-325 (form composer-producer agreement under which composer "assigns to Producer all rights (copyrights, rights under copyright and otherwise, whether now or hereafter known) and all renewals and extensions (as may now or hereafter exist)").

[22] The fact that patent and copyright involve different exchanges does not, of course, mean that we may not be guided in our "limited Times" analysis by Congress' repeated extensions of existing patents. See supra, at 201-204. If patent's quid pro quo is more exacting than copyright's, then Congress' repeated extension of existing patents without constitutional objection suggests even more strongly that similar legislation with respect to copyrights is constitutionally permissible.

[23] Petitioners originally framed this argument as implicating the CTEA's extension of both existing and future copyrights. See Pet. for Cert. i. Now, however, they train on the CTEA's extension of existing copyrights and urge against consideration of the CTEA's First Amendment validity as applied to future copyrights. See Brief for Petitioners 39-48; Reply Brief 16-17; Tr. of Oral Arg. 11-13. We therefore consider petitioners' argument as so limited. We note, however, that petitioners do not explain how their First Amendment argument is moored to the prospective/retrospective line they urge us to draw, nor do they say whether or how their free speech argument applies to copyright duration but not to other aspects of copyright protection, notably scope.

[24] We are not persuaded by petitioners' attempt to distinguish Harper & Row on the ground that it involved an infringement suit rather than a declaratory action of the kind here presented. As respondent observes, the same legal question can arise in either posture. See Brief for Respondent 42. In both postures, it is appropriate to construe copyright's internal safeguards to accommodate First Amendment concerns. Cf. United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U. S. 64, 78 (1994) ("It is . . . incumbent upon us to read the statute to eliminate [serious constitutional] doubts so long as such a reading is not plainly contrary to the intent of Congress.").

__________

[1] Justice Harlan wrote a brief concurrence, but did not disagree with this statement. Justice Black's statement echoed a portion of Attorney General Wirt's argument in Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 171 (1824): "The law of Congress declares, that all inventors of useful improvements throughout the United States, shall be entitled to the exclusive right in their discoveries for fourteen years only. The law of New-York declares, that this inventor shall be entitled to the exclusive use of his discovery for thirty years, and as much longer as the State shall permit. The law of Congress, by limiting the exclusive right to fourteen years, in effect declares, that after the expiration of that time, the discovery shall be the common right of the whole people of the United States."

[2] Attorney General Wirt made this precise point in his argument in Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat., at 175: "The limitation is not for the advantage of the inventor, but of society at large, which is to take the benefit of the invention after the period of limitation has expired. The patentee pays a duty on his patent, which is an effective source of revenue to the United States. It is virtually a contract between each patentee and the people of the United States, by which the time of exclusive and secure enjoyment is limited, and then the benefit of the discovery results to the public."

[3] The Court acknowledges that this proposition is "uncontroversial" today, see ante, at 202, n. 8, but overlooks the fact that it was highly controversial in the early 1800's. See n. 11, infra. The Court assumes that the Sears holding rested entirely on the pre-emptive effect of congressional statutes even though the opinion itself, like the opinions in Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U. S. 1 (1966), and Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U. S. 141 (1989), also relied on the pre-emptive effect of the constitutional provision. That at least some of the Framers recognized that the Constitution itself imposed a limitation even before Congress acted is demonstrated by Madison's letter, quoted in n. 6, infra.

[4] "The copyright law, like the patent statutes, makes reward to the owner a secondary consideration. In Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U. S. 123, 127, Chief Justice Hughes spoke as follows respecting the copyright monopoly granted by Congress, `The sole interest of the United States and the primary object in conferring the monopoly lie in the general benefits derived by the public from the labors of authors.' It is said that reward to the author or artist serves to induce release to the public of the products of his creative genius." 334 U. S., at 158.

[5] A copy of this bill specifically identified has not been found, though strong support exists for considering a bill from that session as H. R. 10. See E. Walterscheid, To Promote the Progress of Useful Arts: American Patent Law and Administration, 1798-1836, pp. 87-88 (1998) (hereinafter Walterscheid). This bill is reprinted in 4 Documentary History 513-519.

[6] "Your idea of appropriating a district of territory to the encouragement of imported inventions is new and worthy of consideration. I can not but apprehend however that the clause in the constitution which forbids patents for that purpose will lie equally in the way of your expedient. Congress seem to be tied down to the single mode of encouraging inventions by granting the exclusive benefit of them for a limited time, and therefore to have no more power to give a further encouragement out of a fund of land than a fund of money. This fetter on the National Legislature tho' an unfortunate one, was a deliberate one. The Latitude of authority now wished for was strongly urged and expressly rejected." Madison's description of the Copyright/Patent Clause as a "fetter on the National Legislature" is fully consistent with this Court's opinion in Graham.

[7] Importantly, even this first Act required a quid pro quo in order to receive federal copyright protection. In order to receive protection under the Act, the author was first required to register the work: "That no person shall be entitled to the benefit of this act, in cases where any map, chart, book or books, hath or have been already printed and published, unless he shall first deposit, and in all other cases, unless he shall before publication deposit a printed copy of the title of such map, chart, book or books, in the clerk's office of the district court where the author or proprietor shall reside." § 3, 1 Stat. 124. This registration requirement in federal district court—a requirement obviously not required under the various state laws protecting written works—further illustrates that the 1790 Act created new rights, rather than extending existing rights.

[8] Respondent's reformulation of the questions presented by this case confuses this basic distinction. We granted certiorari to consider the question: "Did the D. C. Circuit err in holding that Congress has the power under the Copyright Clause to extend retroactively the term of existing copyrights?" Respondent's reformulation of the first question presented —"Whether the 20-year extension of the terms of all unexpired copyrights . . . violates the Copyright Clause of the Constitution insofar as it applies to works in existence when it took effect"—significantly changes the substance of inquiry by changing the focus from the federal statute at issue to irrelevant common-law protections. Brief for Respondent I. Indeed, this reformulation violated this Court's Rule 24(1)(a), which states that "the brief [on the merits] may not raise additional questions or change the substance of the questions already presented in" the petition for certiorari.

[9] "A LETTER to a MEMBER of Parliament concerning the Bill now depending . . . for making more effectual an Act in the 8th Year of the Reign of Queen Anne, entituled, An Act for the Encouragement of Learning, by . . . Vesting the Copies of Printed Books in the Authors or Purchasers." Document reproduced in Goldsmiths'—Kress Library of Economic Literature, Segment I: Printed Books Through 1800, Microfilm No. 7300 (reel 460).

[10] See, e. g., ch. 74, 6 Stat. 458 (patent had expired for three months); ch. 113, 6 Stat. 467 (patent had expired for over two years); ch. 213, 6 Stat. 589 (patent had expired for five months); ch. 158, 9 Stat. 734 (patent had expired for over two years); ch. 72, 14 Stat. 621 (patent had expired nearly four years); ch. 175, 15 Stat. 461 (patent had expired for over two years); ch. 15, 16 Stat. 613 (patent had expired for six years); ch. 317, 16 Stat. 659 (patent had expired for nearly four years); ch. 439, 17 Stat. 689 (patent had expired for over two years).

[11] In the period before our decision in Wheaton, the pre-emptive effect of the Patent/Copyright Clause was also a matter of serious debate within the legal profession. Indeed, in their argument in this Court in Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat., at 44-61, 141-157, the defenders of New York's grant of a 30-year monopoly on the passenger trade between New Jersey and Manhattan argued that the Clause actually should be interpreted as confirming the State's authority to grant monopoly privileges that supplemented any federal grant. That argument is, of course, flatly inconsistent with our recent unanimous decision in Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U. S. 141 (1989). Although Attorney General Wirt had urged the Court to endorse our present interpretation of the Clause, its implicit limitations were unsettled when the 1831 Copyright Act was passed.

[12] It is true, as the majority points out, ante, at 202, n. 7, that Graham did not expressly overrule those earlier cases because Graham did not address the issue whether Congress could revive expired patents. That observation does not even arguably justify reliance on a set of old circuit court cases to support a proposition that is inconsistent with our present understanding of the limits imposed by the Copyright/Patent Clause. After all, a unanimous Court recently endorsed the precise analysis that the majority now seeks to characterize as "wishful thinking." Ante, at 202, n. 7. See Bonito Boats, 489 U. S., at 146 ("Congress may not create patent monopolies of unlimited duration, nor may it 'authorize the issuance of patents whose effects are to remove existent knowledge from the public domain, or to restrict free access to materials already available'" (quoting Graham, 383 U. S., at 6)).

[13] Indeed, the Lodging of the Motion Picture Association of America, Inc., as Amicus Curiae illustrates the significant creative work involved in releasing these classics. The Casablanca Digital Video Disc (DVD) contains a "documentary You Must Remember This, hosted by Lauren Bacall and featuring recently unearthed outtakes" and an "[a]ll-new introduction by Lauren Bacall." Disc cover text. Similarly, the Citizen Kane DVD includes "[t]wo feature-length audio commentaries: one by film critic Roger Ebert and the other by director/Welles biographer Peter Bogdanovich" and a "gallery of storyboards, rare photos, alternate ad campaigns, studio correspondence, call sheets and other memorabilia" in addition to a 2-hour documentary. Disc cover text.

[14] Similarly, the validity of earlier retroactive extensions of copyright protection is not at issue in this case. To decide the question now presented, we need not consider whether the reliance and expectation interests that have been established by prior extensions passed years ago would alter the result. Cf. Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U. S. 728, 746 (1984) ("We have recognized, in a number of contexts, the legitimacy of protecting reasonable reliance on prior law even when that requires allowing an unconstitutional statute to remain in effect for a limited period of time"). Those interests are not at issue now, because the act under review in this case was passed only four years ago and has been under challenge in court since shortly after its enactment.

3.1.3 Renewals and Transfers 3.1.3 Renewals and Transfers

3.1.3.1 Stewart v. Abend 3.1.3.1 Stewart v. Abend

495 U.S. 207
110 S.Ct. 1750
109 L.Ed.2d 184

James STEWART, et al., Petitioners
v.

Sheldon ABEND, DBA Authors Research Company.

No. 88-2102.
Argued Jan. 9, 1990.
Decided April 24, 1990.

Syllabus

In 1945, author Cornell Woolrich agreed to assign the motion picture rights to several of his stories, including the one at issue, to petitioners' predecessor in interest. He also agreed to renew the copyrights in the stories at the appropriate time and to assign the same motion picture rights to the predecessor in interest for the 28-year renewal term provided by the Copyright Act of 1909. The film version of the story in question was produced and distributed in 1954. Woolrich died in 1968 without a surviving spouse or child and before he could obtain the rights in the renewal term for petitioners as promised. In 1969, his executor renewed the copyright in the story and assigned the renewal rights to respondent Abend. Apparently in reliance on Rohauer v. Killiam Shows, Inc., 551 F.2d 484 (CA2)—which held that the owner of the copyright in a derivative work may continue to use the existing derivative work according to the original grant from the author of the pre-existing work even if the grant of rights in the pre-existing work lapsed—petitioners subsequently re-released and publicly exhibited the film. Abend filed suit, alleging, among other things, that the re-release infringed his copyright in the story because petitioners' right to use the story during the renewal term lapsed when Woolrich died. The District Court granted petitioners' motions for summary judgment based on Rohauer and the "fair use" defense. The Court of Appeals reversed, rejecting the reasoning of Rohauer. Relying on Miller Music Corp. v. Charles N. Daniels, Inc., 362 U.S. 373, 80 S.Ct. 792, 4 L.Ed.2d 804—which held that assignment of renewal rights by an author before the time for renewal arrives cannot defeat the right of the author's statutory successor to the renewal rights if the author dies before the right to renewal accrues—the court concluded that petitioners received from Woolrich only an expectancy in the renewal rights that never matured, and that his executor, as his statutory successor, was entitled to renew the copyright and to assign it to Abend. The court also determined that petitioners' use of Woolrich's story in their film was not fair use.

Held:

1. The distribution and publication of a derivative work during the copyright renewal term of a pre-existing work incorporated into the-[208] derivative work infringes the rights of the owner of the pre-existing work where the author of that work agreed to assign the rights in the renewal term to the derivative work's owner but died before the commencement of the renewal period and the statutory successor does not assign the right to use the pre-existing work to the owner of the derivative work. Pp. 216-236.

(a) The renewal provisions of the 1909 and 1976 Copyright Acts, their legislative history, and the case law interpreting them establish that they were intended both to give the author a second chance to obtain fair remuneration for his creative efforts and to provide his family, or his executors absent surviving family, with a "new estate" if he died before the renewal period arrived. Under Miller Music, although the author may assign all of his exclusive rights in the copyrighted work by assigning the renewal copyright without limitation, the assignee holds nothing if the author dies before commencement of the renewal period. This being the rule with respect to all of the renewal rights, it follows, a fortiori, that assignees such as petitioners of the right to produce a derivative work or some other portion of the renewal rights also hold nothing but an unfulfilled and unenforceable expectancy if the author dies before the renewal period, unless the assignees secure a transfer of the renewal rights from the author's statutory successor. Pp. 216-221.

(b) Petitioners' contention that any right the owner of rights in the pre-existing work might have had to sue for infringement that occurs during the renewal term is extinguished by creation of the new work is not supported by any express provision of the Act nor by the rationale as to the scope of protection achieved in a derivative work, and is contrary to the axiomatic principle that a person may exploit only such copyrighted literary material as he either owns or is licensed to use. Section 7 of the 1909 Act and § 103(b) of the 1976 Act made explicit the well-settled rule that the owner of a derivative work receives copyright protection only for the material contributed by him and to the extent he has obtained a grant of rights in the pre-existing work. Pp. 221-224.

(c) Nor is petitioners' position supported by the termination provisions of the 1976 Act, which, for works existing in their original or renewal terms as of January 1, 1978, empowered the author to gain an additional 19 years' copyright protection by terminating any grant of rights at the end of the renewal term, except, under 17 U.S.C. § 304(c)(6)(A) (1988 ed.), the right to use a derivative work for which the owner of the derivative work has held valid rights in the original and renewal terms. No overarching policy preventing authors of pre-existing works from blocking distribution of derivative works may be inferred from § 304(c)(6)(A), which was part of a compromise between competing special inter-[209] ests. In fact, the plain language of the section indicates that Congress assumed that the owner of the pre-existing work continued to possess the right to sue for infringement even after incorporation of that work into the derivative work, since, otherwise, Congress would not have explicitly withdrawn the right to terminate use rights in the limited circumstances contemplated by the section. Pp. 224-227.

(d) Thus, the Rohauer theory is supported by neither the 1909 nor the 1976 Act. Even if it were, however, the "rule" of that case would make little sense when applied across the derivative works spectrum. For example, although the contribution by the derivative author of a condensed book might be little as compared to that of the original author, publication of the book would not infringe the pre-existing work under the Rohauer "rule" even though the derivative author has no license or grant of rights in the pre-existing work. In fact, the Rohauer "rule" is considered to be an interest-balancing approach. Pp. 227-228.

(e) Petitioners' contention that the rule applied here will undermine the Copyright Act's policy of ensuring the dissemination of creative works is better addressed by Congress than the courts. In attempting to fulfill its constitutional mandate to "secur[e] for limited Times to Authors . . . the exclusive Right to their Respective Writings," Congress has created a balance between the artist's right to control the work during the term of the copyright protection and the public's need for access to creative works. Absent an explicit statement of congressional intent that the rights in the renewal term of an owner of a pre-existing work are extinguished when his work is incorporated into another work, it is not the role of this Court to alter the delicate balance Congress has labored to achieve. Pp. 228-230.

(f) Section 6 of the 1909 Act, 17 U.S.C. § 7 (1976 ed.)—which provides that derivate works when produced with the consent of the copyright proprietor of the pre-existing work "shall be regarded as new works subject to copyright . . .; but the publication of any such new works shall not affect the force or validity of any subsisting copyright upon the matter employed . . .," or be construed to affect the copyright status of the original work—does not, as the dissent contends, give the original author the power to sell the rights to make a derivative work that upon creation and copyright would be completely independent of the original work. This assertion is derived from three erroneous premises. First, since the plain meaning of the "force or validity" clause is that the copyright in the "matter employed"—i.e., the pre-existing work when it is incorporated into the derivative work is not abrogated by publication of the derivative work, the dissent misreads § 7 when it asserts that only the copyright in the "original work" survives the author's conveyance of derivative rights. Second, the substitution of "publication" for "copy right" [210] in the final version of the force or validity clause does not, as the dissent contends, establish that it was the publication of the derivative work, and not the copyright, that was not to "affect . . . any subsisting copyright." Since publication of a work without proper notice sent it into the public domain under the 1909 Act, the language change was necessary to ensure that the publication of a derivative work without proper notice, including smaller portions that had not been previously published and separately copyrighted, would not result in those sections moving into the public domain. Third, the dissent errs in interpreting § 3 of the 1909 Act—which provides that a copyright protects all copyrightable component parts of a work and "all matter therein in which copyright is already subsisting, but without extending the duration or scope of such copyright"—as indicating, when read with § 7, that the copyright on derivative work extends to both the new material and that "in which the copyright is already subsisting," such that the derivative work proprietor has the right to publish and distribute the entire work absent permission from the owner of the pre-existing work. When § 7 states that derivative works "shall be regarded as new works subject to copyright," it simply confirms that § 3's provision that one can obtain copyright in a work, parts of which were already copyrighted, extends to derivative works. More important, § 7's second clause merely clarifies what might have been otherwise unclear—that the § 3 principle of preservation of the duration or scope of the subsisting copyright applies to derivative works, and that neither the scope of the copyright in the matter employed nor the duration of the copyright in the derivative work is undermined by publication of the derivative work. Pp. 230-236.

2. Petitioners' unauthorized use of Woolrich's story in their film does not constitute a noninfringing "fair use." The film does not fall into any of the categories of fair use enumerated in 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988 ed.); e.g., criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, or research. Nor does it meet any of the nonexclusive criteria that § 107 requires a court to consider. First, since petitioners received $12 million from the film's re-release during the renewal term, their use was commercial rather than educational. Second, the nature of the copyrighted work is fictional and creative rather than factual. Third, the story was a substantial portion of the film, which expressly used its unique setting, characters, plot, and sequence of events. Fourth, and most important, the record supports the conclusion that re-release of the film impinged on Abend's ability to market new versions of the story. Pp. 236-238.

863 F.2d 1465 (CA9 1988), affirmed and remanded.

[211] O'CONNOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BRENNAN, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, and KENNEDY, JJ., joined. WHITE, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 238. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which REHNQUIST, C.J., and SCALIA, J., joined, post, p. 239.

Louis P. Petrich, Los Angeles, Cal., for petitioners.

Peter J. Anderson for respondent.

Justice O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

The author of a pre-existing work may assign to another the right to use it in a derivative work. In this case the author of a pre-existing work agreed to assign the rights in his renewal copyright term to the owner of a derivative work, but died before the commencement of the renewal period. The question presented is whether the owner of the derivative work infringed the rights of the successor owner of the pre-existing work by continued distribution and publication of the derivative work during the renewal term of the pre-existing work.

I

Cornell Woolrich authored the story "It Had to Be Murder," which was first published in February 1942 in Dime Detective Magazine. The magazine's publisher, Popular Publications, Inc., obtained the rights to magazine publication of the story and Woolrich retained all other rights. Popular Publications obtained a blanket copyright for the issue of Dime Detective Magazine in which "It Had to Be Murder" was published.

[212] The Copyright Act of 1909, 35 Stat. 1075, 17 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (1976 ed.) (1909 Act), provided authors a 28-year initial term of copyright protection plus a 28-year renewal term. See 17 U.S.C. § 24 (1976 ed.). In 1945, Woolrich agreed to assign the rights to make motion picture versions of six of his stories, including "It Had to Be Murder," to B.G. De Sylva Productions for $9,250. He also agreed to renew the copyrights in the stories at the appropriate time and to assign the same motion picture rights to De Sylva Productions for the 28-year renewal term. In 1953, actor Jimmy Stewart and director Alfred Hitchcock formed a production company, Patron, Inc., which obtained the motion picture rights in "It Had to Be Murder" from De Sylva's successors in interest for $10,000.

In 1954, Patron, Inc., along with Paramount Pictures, produced and distributed "Rear Window," the motion picture version of Woolrich's story "It Had to Be Murder." Woolrich died in 1968 before he could obtain the rights in the renewal term for petitioners as promised and without a surviving spouse or child. He left his property to a trust administered by his executor, Chase Manhattan Bank, for the benefit of Columbia University. On December 29, 1969, Chase Manhattan Bank renewed the copyright in the "It Had to Be Murder" story pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 24 (1976 ed.). Chase Manhattan assigned the renewal rights to respondent Abend for $650 plus 10% of all proceeds from exploitation of the story.

"Rear Window" was broadcast on the ABC television network in 1971. Respondent then notified petitioners Hitchcock (now represented by cotrustees of his will), Stewart, and MCA Inc., the owners of the "Rear Window" motion picture and renewal rights in the motion picture, that he owned the renewal rights in the copyright and that their distribution of the motion picture without his permission infringed his copyright in the story. Hitchcock, Stewart, and MCA nonetheless entered into a second license with ABC to [213] rebroadcast the motion picture. In 1974, respondent filed suit against these same petitioners, and others, in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, alleging copyright infringement. Respondent dismissed his complaint in return for $25,000.

Three years later, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit decided Rohauer v. Killiam Shows, Inc., 551 F.2d 484, cert. denied, 431 U.S. 949, 97 S.Ct. 2666, 53 L.Ed.2d 266 (1977), in which it held that the owner of the copyright in a derivative work[1] may continue to use the existing derivative work according to the original grant from the author of the pre-existing work even if the grant of rights in the pre-existing work lapsed. 551 F.2d, at 494. Several years later, apparently in reliance on Rohauer, petitioners re-released the motion picture in a variety of media, including new 35 and 16 millimeter prints for theatrical exhibition in the United States, videocassettes, and videodiscs. They also publicly exhibited the motion picture in theaters, over cable television, and through videodisc and videocassette rentals and sales.

Respondent then brought the instant suit in the United States District Court for the Central District of California against Hitchcock, Stewart, MCA, and Universal Film Exchanges, a subsidiary of MCA and the distributor of the motion picture. Respondent's complaint alleges that the re-release of the motion picture infringes his copyright in the story because petitioners' right to use the story during the renewal term lapsed when Woolrich died before he could register for the renewal term and transfer his renewal rights to them. Respondent also contends that petitioners have interfered with his rights in the renewal term of the story in other ways. He alleges that he sought to contract with Home Box [214] Office (HBO) to produce a play and television version of the story, but that petitioners wrote to him and HBO stating that neither he nor HBO could use either the title, "Rear Window" or "It Had to Be Murder." Respondent also alleges that petitioners further interfered with the renewal copyright in the story by attempting to sell the right to make a television sequel and that the re-release of the original motion picture itself interfered with his ability to produce other derivative works.

Petitioners filed motions for summary judgment, one based on the decision in Rohauer, supra, and the other based on alleged defects in the story's copyright. Respondent moved for summary judgment on the ground that petitioners' use of the motion picture constituted copyright infringement. Petitioners responded with a third motion for summary judgment based on a "fair use" defense. The District Court granted petitioners' motions for summary judgment based on Rohauer and the fair use defense and denied respondent's motion for summary judgment, as well as petitioners' motion for summary judgment alleging defects in the story's copyright. Respondent appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and petitioners cross-appealed.

The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that respondent's copyright in the renewal term of the story was not defective, Abend v. MCA, Inc., 863 F.2d 1465, 1472 (1988). The issue before the court, therefore, was whether petitioners were entitled to distribute and exhibit the motion picture without respondent's permission despite respondent's valid copyright in the pre-existing story. Relying on the renewal provision of the 1909 Act, 17 U.S.C. § 24 (1976 ed.), respondent argued before the Court of Appeals that because he obtained from Chase Manhattan Bank, the statutory successor, the renewal right free and clear of any purported assignments of any interest in the renewal copyright, petitioners' distribution and publication of "Rear Window" without authorization infringed his renewal copyright. Petitioners responded that [215] they had the right to continue to exploit "Rear Window" during the 28-year renewal period because Woolrich had agreed to assign to petitioners' predecessor in interest the motion picture rights in the story for the renewal period.

Petitioners also relied, as did the District Court, on the decision in Rohauer v. Killiam Shows, Inc., supra. In Rohauer, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that statutory successors to the renewal copyright in a pre-existing work under § 24 could not "depriv[e] the proprietor of the derivative copyright of a right . . . to use so much of the underlying copyrighted work as already has been embodied in the copyrighted derivative work, as a matter of copyright law." Id., at 492. The Court of Appeals in the instant case rejected this reasoning, concluding that even if the pre-existing work had been incorporated into a derivative work, use of the pre-existing work was infringing unless the owner of the derivative work held a valid grant of rights in the renewal term.

The court relied on Miller Music Corp. v. Charles N. Daniels, Inc., 362 U.S. 373, 80 S.Ct. 792, 4 L.Ed.2d 804 (1960), in which we held that assignment of renewal rights by an author before the time for renewal arrives cannot defeat the right of the author's statutory successor to the renewal rights if the author dies before the right to renewal accrues. An assignee of the renewal rights takes only an expectancy: "Until [the time for registration of renewal rights] arrives, assignees of renewal rights take the risk that the rights acquired may never vest in their assignors. A purchaser of such an interest is deprived of nothing. Like all purchasers of contingent interests, he takes subject to the possibility that the contingency may not occur." Id., at 378, 80 S.Ct., at 796. The Court of Appeals reasoned that "[i]f Miller Music makes assignment of the full renewal rights in the underlying copyright unenforceable when the author dies before effecting renewal of the copyright, then, a fortiori, an assignment of part of the rights in the underlying work, the right to produce a movie version, must [216] also be unenforceable if the author dies before effecting renewal of the underlying copyright." 863 F.2d, at 1476. Finding further support in the legislative history of the 1909 Act and rejecting the Rohauer court's reliance on the equities and the termination provisions of the 1976 Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 203(b)(1), 304(c)(6)(A) the Court of Appeals concluded that petitioners received from Woolrich only an expectancy in the renewal rights that never matured; upon Woolrich's death, Woolrich's statutory successor, Chase Manhattan Bank, became "entitled to a renewal and extension of the copyright," which Chase Manhattan secured "within one year prior to the expiration of the original term of copyright." 17 U.S.C. § 24 (1976 ed.). Chase Manhattan then assigned the existing rights in the copyright to respondent.

The Court of Appeals also addressed at length the proper remedy, an issue not relevant to the issue on which we granted certiorari. We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict between the decision in Rohauer, supra, and the decision below. 493 U.S. 807, 110 S.Ct. 47, 107 L.Ed.2d 16 (1989). Petitioners do not challenge the Court of Appeals' determination that respondent's copyright in the renewal term is valid, and we express no opinion regarding the Court of Appeals' decision on this point.

II

A.

Petitioners would have us read into the Copyright Act a limitation on the statutorily created rights of the owner of an underlying work. They argue in essence that the rights of the owner of the copyright in the derivative use of the pre-existing work are extinguished once it is incorporated into the derivative work, assuming the author of the pre-existing work has agreed to assign his renewal rights. Because we find no support for such a curtailment of rights in either the 1909 Act or the 1976 Act, or in the legislative history of either, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

[217] Petitioners and amicus Register of Copyrights assert, as the Court of Appeals assumed, that § 23 of the 1909 Act, and the case law interpreting that provision, directly control the disposition of this case. Respondent counters that the provisions of the 1976 Act control, but that the 1976 Act reenacted § 24 in § 304 and, therefore, the language and judicial interpretation of § 24 are relevant to our consideration of this case. Under either theory, we must look to the language of and case law interpreting § 24.

The right of renewal found in § 24 provides authors a second opportunity to obtain remuneration for their works. Section 24 provides:

"[T]he author of [a copyrighted] work, if still living, or the widow, widower, or children of the author, if the author be not living, or if such author, widow, widower, or children be not living, then the author's executors, or in the absence of a will, his next of kin shall be entitled to a renewal and extension of the copyright in such work for a further term of twenty-eight years when application for such renewal and extension shall have been made to the copyright office and duly registered therein within one year prior to the expiration of the original term of copyright." 17 U.S.C. § 24 (1976 ed.)

Since the earliest copyright statute in this country, the copyright term of ownership has been split between an original term and a renewal term. Originally, the renewal was intended merely to serve as an extension of the original term; at the end of the original term, the renewal could be effected and claimed by the author, if living, or by the author's executors, administrators, or assigns. See Copyright Act of May 31, 1790, ch. XV, § 1, 1 Stat. 124. In 1831, Congress altered the provision so that the author could assign his contingent interest in the renewal term, but could not, through his assignment, divest the rights of his widow or children in the renewal term. See Copyright Act of February 3, 1831, ch. XVI, 4 Stat. 436; see also G. Curtis, Law of Copyright 235 [218] (1847). The 1831 renewal provisions created "an entirely new policy, completely dissevering the title, breaking up the continuance . . . and vesting an absolutely new title eo nomine in the persons designated." White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Goff, 187 F. 247, 250 (CA1 1911). In this way, Congress attempted to give the author a second chance to control and benefit from his work. Congress also intended to secure to the author's family the opportunity to exploit the work if the author died before he could register for the renewal term. See Bricker, Renewal and Extension of Copyright, 29 S.Cal.L.Rev. 23, 27 (1955) ("The renewal term of copyright is the law's second chance to the author and his family to profit from his mental labors"). "The evident purpose of [the renewal provision] is to provide for the family of the author after his death. Since the author cannot assign his family's renewal rights, [it] takes the form of a compulsory bequest of the copyright to the designated persons." De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 582, 76 S.Ct. 974, 981, 100 L.Ed. 1415 (1956). See Fred Fisher Music Co. v. M. Witmark & Sons, 318 U.S. 643, 651, 63 S.Ct. 773, 776, 87 L.Ed. 1055 (1943) (if at the end of the original copyright period, the author is not living, "his family stand[s] in more need of the only means of subsistence ordinarily left to them" (citation omitted)).

In its debates leading up to the Copyright Act of 1909, Congress elaborated upon the policy underlying a system comprised of an original term and a completely separate renewal term. See G. Ricordi & Co. v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 189 F.2d 469, 471 (CA2) (the renewal right "creates a new estate, and the . . . cases which have dealt with the subject assert that the new estate is clear of all rights, interests or licenses granted under the original copyright"), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 849, 72 S.Ct. 77, 96 L.Ed. 641 (1951). "It not infrequently happens that the author sells his copyright outright to a publisher for a comparatively small sum." H.R.Rep. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess., 14 (1909). The renewal term permits the author, originally in a poor bargaining position, to renegoti [219] ate the terms of the grant once the value of the work has been tested. "[U]nlike real property and other forms of personal property, [a copyright] is by its very nature incapable of accurate monetary evaluation prior to its exploitation." 2 M. Nimmer & D. Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 9.02, p. 9-23 (1989) (hereinafter Nimmer). "If the work proves to be a great success and lives beyond the term of twenty-eight years, . . . it should be the exclusive right of the author to take the renewal term, and the law should be framed . . . so that [the author] could not be deprived of that right." H.R.Rep. No. 2222, supra, at 14. With these purposes in mind, Congress enacted the renewal provision of the Copyright Act of 1909, 17 U.S.C. § 24 (1976 ed.). With respect to works in their original or renewal term as of January 1, 1978, Congress retained the two-term system of copyright protection in the 1976 Act. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 304(a) and (b) (1988 ed.) (incorporating language of 17 U.S.C. § 24 (1976 ed.)).

Applying these principles in Miller Music Corp. v. Charles N. Daniels, Inc., 362 U.S. 373, 80 S.Ct. 792, 4 L.Ed.2d 804 (1960), this Court held that when an author dies before the renewal period arrives, his executor is entitled to the renewal rights, even though the author previously assigned his renewal rights to another party. "An assignment by an author of his renewal rights made before the original copyright expires is valid against the world, if the author is alive at the commencement of the renewal period. [Fred] Fisher Co. v. [M.] Witmark & Sons, 318 U.S. 643 [63 S.Ct. 773], so holds." Id., 362 U.S., at 375, 80 S.Ct., at 794. If the author dies before that time, the "next of kin obtain the renewal copyright free of any claim founded upon an assignment made by the author in his lifetime. These results follow not because the author's assignment is invalid but because he had only an expectancy to assign; and his death, prior to the renewal period, terminates his interest in the renewal which by § 24 vests in the named classes." Ibid. The legislative history of the 1909 Act echoes this view: "The right of renewal is contingent. It does not vest until the end [of the original term].

[220] If [the author] is alive at the time of renewal, then the original contract may pass it, but his widow or children or other persons entitled would not be bound by that contract." 5 Legislative History of the 1909 Copyright Act, Part K, p. 77 (E. Brylawski & A. Goldman eds. 1976) (statement of Mr. Hale).[2] Thus, the renewal provisions were intended to give the author a second chance to obtain fair remuneration for his creative efforts and to provide the author's family a "new estate" if the author died before the renewal period arrived.

An author holds a bundle of exclusive rights in the copyrighted work, among them the right to copy and the right to incorporate the work into derivative works.[3] By assigning the renewal copyright in the work without limitation, as in Miller Music, the author assigns all of these rights. After Miller Music, if the author dies before the commencement of the renewal period, the assignee holds nothing. If the assignee of all of the renewal rights holds nothing upon the death of the assignor before arrival of the renewal period, [221] then, a fortiori, the assignee of a portion of the renewal rights, e.g., the right to produce a derivative work, must also hold nothing. See also Brief for Register of Copyrights as Amicus Curiae 22 ("[A]ny assignment of renewal rights made during the original term is void if the author dies before the renewal period"). Therefore, if the author dies before the renewal period, then the assignee may continue to use the original work only if the author's successor transfers the renewal rights to the assignee. This is the rule adopted by the Court of Appeals below and advocated by the Register of Copyrights. See 863 F.2d, at 1478; Brief for Register of Copyrights as Amicus Curiae 22. Application of this rule to this case should end the inquiry. Woolrich died before the commencement of the renewal period in the story, and, therefore, petitioners hold only an unfulfilled expectancy. Petitioners have been "deprived of nothing. Like all purchasers of contingent interests, [they took] subject to the possibility that the contingency may not occur." Miller Music, supra, 362 U.S., at 378, 80 S.Ct., at 796.

B

The reason that our inquiry does not end here, and that we granted certiorari, is that the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reached a contrary result in Rohauer v. Killiam Shows, Inc., 551 F.2d 484 (1977). Petitioners' theory is drawn largely from Rohauer. The Court of Appeals in Rohauer attempted to craft a "proper reconciliation" between the owner of the pre-existing work, who held the right to the work pursuant to Miller Music, and the owner of the derivative work, who had a great deal to lose if the work could not be published or distributed. 551 F.2d, at 490. Addressing a case factually similar to this case, the court concluded that even if the death of the author caused the renewal rights in the pre-existing work to revert to the statutory successor, the owner of the derivative work could continue to exploit that work. The court reasoned that the 1976 Act and the relevant precedents did not preclude such a re [222] sult and that it was necessitated by a balancing of the equities:

"[T]he equities lie preponderantly in favor of the proprietor of the derivative copyright. In contrast to the situation where an assignee or licensee has done nothing more than print, publicize and distribute a copyrighted story or novel, a person who with the consent of the author has created an opera or a motion picture film will often have made contributions literary, musical and economic, as great as or greater than the original author. . . . [T]he purchaser of derivative rights has no truly effective way to protect himself against the eventuality of the author's death before the renewal period since there is no way of telling who will be the surviving widow, children or next of kin or the executor until that date arrives." Id., at 493.

The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit thereby shifted the focus from the right to use the pre-existing work in a derivative work to a right inhering in the created derivative work itself. By rendering the renewal right to use the original work irrelevant, the court created an exception to our ruling in Miller Music and, as petitioners concede, created an "intrusion" on the statutorily created rights of the owner of the pre-existing work in the renewal term. Brief for Petitioners 33.

Though petitioners do not, indeed could not, argue that its language expressly supports the theory they draw from Rohauer, they implicitly rely on § 6 of the 1909 Act, 17 U.S.C. § 7 (1976 ed.), which states that "dramatizations . . . of copyrighted works when produced with the consent of the proprietor of the copyright in such works . . . shall be regarded as new works subject to copyright under the provisions of this title." Petitioners maintain that the creation of the "new," i.e., derivative, work extinguishes any right the owner of rights in the pre-existing work might have had to sue for infringement that occurs during the renewal term.

[223] We think, as stated in Nimmer, that "[t]his conclusion is neither warranted by any express provision of the Copyright Act, nor by the rationale as to the scope of protection achieved in a derivative work. It is moreover contrary to the axiomatic copyright principle that a person may exploit only such copyrighted literary material as he either owns or is licensed to use." 1 Nimmer § 3.07[A], pp. 3-23 to 3-24 (footnotes omitted). The aspects of a derivative work added by the derivative author are that author's property, but the element drawn from the pre-existing work remains on grant from the owner of the pre-existing work. See Russell v. Price, 612 F.2d 1123, 1128 (CA9 1979) (reaffirming "well-established doctrine that a derivative copyright protects only the new material contained in the derivative work, not the matter derived from the underlying work"), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 952, 100 S.Ct. 2919, 64 L.Ed.2d 809 (1980); see also Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 547, 105 S.Ct. 2218, 2223, 85 L.Ed.2d 588 (1985) ("The copyright is limited to those aspects of the work termed 'expression'—that display the stamp of the author's originality"). So long as the pre-existing work remains out of the public domain, its use is infringing if one who employs the work does not have a valid license or assignment for use of the pre-existing work. Russell v. Price, supra, at 1128 ("[E]stablished doctrine prevents unauthorized copying or other infringing use of the underlying work or any part of that work contained in the derivative product so long as the underlying work itself remains copyrighted"). It is irrelevant whether the pre-existing work is inseparably intertwined with the derivative work. See Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Cos., 538 F.2d 14, 20 (CA2 1976) ("[C]opyright in the underlying script survives intact despite the incorporation of that work into a derivative work"). Indeed, the plain language of § 7 supports the view that the full force of the copyright in the pre-existing work is preserved despite incorporation into the derivative work. See 17 U.S.C. § 7 (1976 ed.) (publication of the derivative work "shall not affect the force or validity of [224] any subsisting copyright upon the matter employed"); see also 17 U.S.C. § 3 (1976 ed.) (copyright protection of a work extends to "all matter therein in which copyright is already subsisting, but without extending the duration or scope of such copyright"). This well-settled rule also was made explicit in the 1976 Act:

"The copyright in a compilation or derivative work extends only to the material contributed by the author of such work, as distinguished from the preexisting material employed in the work, and does not imply any exclusive right in the preexisting material. The copyright in such work is independent of, and does not affect or enlarge the scope, duration, ownership, or subsistence of, any copyright protection in the pre-existing material." 17 U.S.C. § 103(b).

See also B. Ringer, Renewal of Copyright (1960), reprinted as Copyright Law Revision Study No. 31, prepared for the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 2d. Sess., 169-170 (1961) ("[O]n the basis of judicial authority, legislative history, and the opinions of the commentators, . . . someone cannot avoid his obligations to the owner of a renewal copyright merely because he created and copyrighted a 'new version' under a license or assignment which terminated at the end of the first term") (footnotes omitted).

Properly conceding there is no explicit support for their theory in the 1909 Act, its legislative history, or the case law, petitioners contend, as did the court in Rohauer, that the termination provisions of the 1976 Act, while not controlling, support their theory of the case. For works existing in their original or renewal terms as of January 1, 1978, the 1976 Act added 19 years to the 1909 Act's provision of 28 years of initial copyright protection and 28 years of renewal protection. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 304(a) and (b). For those works, the author has the power to terminate the grant of rights at the end of the renewal term and, therefore, to gain the benefit of that additional 19 years of protection. See [225] § 304(c). In effect, the 1976 Act provides a third opportunity for the author to benefit from a work in its original or renewal term as of January 1, 1978. Congress, however, created one exception to the author's right to terminate: The author may not, at the end of the renewal term, terminate the right to use a derivative work for which the owner of the derivative work has held valid rights in the original and renewal terms. See § 304(c)(6)(A). The author, however, may terminate the right to create new derivative works. Ibid. For example, if petitioners held a valid copyright in the story throughout the original and renewal terms, and the renewal term in "Rear Window" were about to expire, petitioners could continue to distribute the motion picture even if respondent terminated the grant of rights, but could not create a new motion picture version of the story. Both the court in Rohauer and petitioners infer from this exception to the right to terminate an intent by Congress to prevent authors of pre-existing works from blocking distribution of derivative works. In other words, because Congress decided not to permit authors to exercise a third opportunity to benefit from a work incorporated into a derivative work, the Act expresses a general policy of undermining the author's second opportunity. We disagree.

The process of compromise between competing special interests leading to the enactment of the 1976 Act undermines any such attempt to draw an overarching policy out of § 304(c)(6)(A), which only prevents termination with respect to works in their original or renewal copyright terms as of January 1, 1978, and only at the end of the renewal period. See Ringer, First Thoughts on the Copyright Act of 1976, 13 Copyright 187, 188-189 (1977) (each provision of 1976 Act was drafted through series of compromises between interested parties). More specifically, § 304(c)

"was part of a compromise package involving the controversial and intertwined issues of initial ownership, duration of copyright, and reversion of rights. The Regis [226] ter, convinced that the opposition . . . would scuttle the proposed legislation, drafted a number of alternative proposals. . . .

"Finally, the Copyright Office succeeded in urging negotiations among representatives of authors, composers, book and music publishers, and motion picture studios that produced a compromise on the substance and language of several provisions.

. . . . .

"Because the controversy surrounding the provisions disappeared once the parties reached a compromise, however, Congress gave the provisions little or no detailed consideration. . . . Thus, there is no evidence whatsoever of what members of Congress believed the language to mean." Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72 Cornell L. Rev. 857, 865-868 (1987) (footnotes omitted).

In fact, if the 1976 Act's termination provisions provide any guidance at all in this case, they tilt against petitioners' theory. The plain language of the termination provision itself indicates that Congress assumed that the owner of the pre-existing work possessed the right to sue for infringement even after incorporation of the pre-existing work in the derivative work.

"A derivative work prepared under authority of the grant before its termination may continue to be utilized under the terms of the grant after its termination, but this privilege does not extend to the preparation after the termination of other derivative works based upon the copyrighted work covered by the terminated grant." § 304(c)(6)(A) (emphasis added).

Congress would not have stated explicitly in § 304(c)(6)(A) that, at the end of the renewal term, the owner of the rights in the pre-existing work may not terminate use rights in existing derivative works unless Congress had assumed that [227] the owner continued to hold the right to sue for infringement even after incorporation of the pre-existing work into the derivative work. Cf. Mills Music, Inc. v. Snyder, 469 U.S. 153, 164, 105 S.Ct. 638, 645, 83 L.Ed.2d 556 (1985) (§ 304(c)(6)(A) "carves out an exception from the reversion of rights that takes place when an author exercises his right to termination").

Accordingly, we conclude that neither the 1909 Act nor the 1976 Act provides support for the theory set forth in Rohauer. And even if the theory found some support in the statute or the legislative history, the approach set forth in Rohauer is problematic. Petitioners characterize the result in Rohauer as a bright-line "rule." The Court of Appeals in Rohauer, however, expressly implemented policy considerations as a means of reconciling what it viewed as the competing interests in that case. See 551 F.2d, at 493-494. While the result in Rohauer might make some sense in some contexts, it makes no sense in others. In the case of a condensed book, for example, the contribution by the derivative author may be little, while the contribution by the original author is great. Yet, under the Rohauer "rule," publication of the condensed book would not infringe the pre-existing work even though the derivative author has no license or valid grant of rights in the pre-existing work. See Brief for Committee for Literary Property Studies as Amicus Curiae 29-31; see also Brief for Songwriters Guild of America as Amicus Curiae 11-12 (policy reasons set forth in Rohauer make little sense when applied to musical compositions). Thus, even if the Rohauer "rule" made sense in terms of policy in that case, it makes little sense when it is applied across the derivative works spectrum. Indeed, in the view of the commentators, Rohauer did not announce a "rule," but rather an "interest-balancing approach." See Jaszi, When Works Collide: Derivative Motion Pictures, Underlying Rights, and the Public Interest, 28 UCLA L.Rev. 715, 758-761 (1981); Note, Derivative Copyright and the 1909 [228] Act—New Clarity or Confusion?, 44 Brooklyn L.Rev. 905, 926-927 (1978).

Finally, petitioners urge us to consider the policies underlying the Copyright Act. They argue that the rule announced by the Court of Appeals will undermine one of the policies of the Act—the dissemination of creative works—by leading to many fewer works reaching the public. Amicus Columbia Pictures asserts that "[s]ome owners of underlying work renewal copyrights may refuse to negotiate, preferring instead to retire their copyrighted works, and all derivative works based thereon, from public use. Others may make demands—like respondent's demand for 50% of petitioners' future gross proceeds in excess of advertising expenses . . . which are so exorbitant that a negotiated economic accommodation will be impossible." Brief for Columbia Pictures et al. as Amici Curiae 21. These arguments are better addressed by Congress than the courts.

In any event, the complaint that respondent's monetary request in this case is so high as to preclude agreement fails to acknowledge that an initially high asking price does not preclude bargaining. Presumably, respondent is asking for a share in the proceeds because he wants to profit from the distribution of the work, not because he seeks suppression of it.

Moreover, although dissemination of creative works is a goal of the Copyright Act, the Act creates a balance between the artist's right to control the work during the term of the copyright protection and the public's need for access to creative works. The copyright term is limited so that the public will not be permanently deprived of the fruits of an artist's labors. See Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429, 104 S.Ct. 774, 782, 78 L.Ed.2d 574 (1984) (the limited monopoly conferred by the Copyright Act "is intended to motivate creative activity of authors and inventors by the provision of a special reward, and to allow the public access to the products of their genius after the limited period of exclusive control has expired"). But nothing in the copyright statutes would [229] prevent an author from hoarding all of his works during the term of the copyright. In fact, this Court has held that a copyright owner has the capacity arbitrarily to refuse to license one who seeks to exploit the work. See Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127, 52 S.Ct. 546, 547, 76 L.Ed. 1010 (1932).

The limited monopoly granted to the artist is intended to provide the necessary bargaining capital to garner a fair price for the value of the works passing into public use. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S., at 546, 105 S.Ct., at 2223 ("The rights conferred by copyright are designed to assure contributors to the store of knowledge a fair return for their labors"); Register of Copyrights, Copyright Law Revision, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., 6 (Comm.Print 1961) ("While some limitations and conditions on copyright are essential in the public interest, they should not be so burdensome and strict as to deprive authors of their just reward. . . . [T]heir rights should be broad enough to give them a fair share of the revenue to be derived from the market for their works"). When an author produces a work which later commands a higher price in the market than the original bargain provided, the copyright statute is designed to provide the author the power to negotiate for the realized value of the work. That is how the separate renewal term was intended to operate. See Ringer, Renewal of Copyright (1960), reprinted as Copyright Law Revision Study No. 31, prepared for the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 2d. Sess., 125 (1961) ("Congress wanted to give [the author] an opportunity to benefit from the success of his work and to renegotiate disadvantageous bargains . . . made at a time when the value of the work [wa]s unknown or conjectural and the author . . . necessarily in a poor bargaining position"). At heart, petitioners' true complaint is that they will have to pay more for the use of works they have employed in creating their own works. But such a result was contemplated by Congress and is consistent with the goals of the Copyright Act.

[230] With the Copyright Act of 1790, Congress provided an initial term of protection plus a renewal term that did not survive the author. In the Copyright Act of 1831, Congress devised a completely separate renewal term that survived the death of the author so as to create a "new estate" and to benefit the author's family, and, with the passage of the 1909 Act, his executors. See supra, at 217-219. The 1976 Copyright Act provides a single, fixed term, but provides an inalienable termination right. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 203, 302. This evolution of the duration of copyright protection tellingly illustrates the difficulties Congress faces in attempting to "secur[e] for limited Times to Authors . . . the exclusive Right to their respective Writings." U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Absent an explicit statement of congressional intent that the rights in the renewal term of an owner of a pre-existing work are extinguished upon incorporation of his work into another work, it is not our role to alter the delicate balance Congress has labored to achieve.

C

In a creative, though ultimately indefensible, exposition of the 1909 Act, the dissent attempts to breathe life into petitioners' suggestion that the derivative work is somehow independent of the pre-existing work. Although no Court of Appeals in the 81 years since enactment of the 1909 Act has held as much, and although the petitioners have not argued the point, the dissent contends that "§ 7 was intended to . . . give the original author the power to sell the right to make a derivative work that upon creation and copyright would be completely independent of the original work." Post, at 244; see also post, at 248. This assertion, far removed from the more modest holding of Rohauer, is derived from three erroneous premises.

First, we think the dissent misreads § 7, which provides:

"Compilations or abridgments, adaptations, arrangements, dramatizations, translations, or other versions of [231] works in the public domain or of copyrighted works when produced with the consent of the proprietor of the copyright in such works, or works republished with new matter, shall be regarded as new works subject to copyright under the provisions of this title; but the publication of any such new works shall not affect the force or validity of any subsisting copyright upon the matter employed or any part thereof, or be construed to imply an exclusive right to such use of the original works, or to secure or extend copyright in such original works." 17 U.S.C. § 7 (1976 ed.).

The provision consists of one sentence with two clauses divided by a semicolon. The first clause lists the types of works that may be derivative works, explains that one may incorporate either copyrighted or public domain works into a derivative work, and further explains that the derivative work itself is copyrightable. The clause also expressly limits incorporation of copyrighted works to instances where the owner of the pre-existing work "consents."

The second clause explains what publication of the new work does not portend: Publication of the derivative work does not "affect the force or validity of any subsisting copyright upon the matter employed " (emphasis added); publication of the derivative work does not mean that use of the original work in other works is precluded; and publication does not mean that a copyright in the original work shall be secured, e.g., if the work was in the public domain, or extended, as where the original work was copyrighted before the date that the derivative work is copyrighted. The plain meaning of the italicized sentence is that the copyright in the "matter employed"—the pre-existing work when it is incorporated into the derivative work—is not abrogated by publication of the new work. The succeeding phrases preserve the copyright status of the original work: Publication does not operate to prohibit other uses of the original work or to [232] "secure or extend copyright in such original works." Cf. post, at 249.

The dissent fails to heed § 7's preservation of copyright in both the "matter employed" and the "original work." Under its theory, only the latter is preserved. See post, at 253 ("author's right to sell his derivative rights is exercised when consent is conveyed and completed when the derivative work is copyrighted"); post, at 250 (underlying work "owner . . . retains full dominion and control over all other means of exploiting" underlying work). In light of § 7's explicit preservation of the "force and validity" of the copyright in the "matter employed," the dissent is clearly wrong when it asserts that § 7 was intended to create a work that is "completely independent" of the pre-existing work. Post, at 245. The dissent further errs when it unjustifiably presumes that § 7 "limit[s] the enforceability of the derivative copyright." Post, at 249.

According to the dissent, § 7 requires the derivative work author to obtain "consent of the proprietor of the copyright" in the pre-existing work, because "§ 7 . . . derogate[s] in some manner from the underlying author's copyright rights." Post, at 241. The more natural inference to be drawn from the requirement of consent is that Congress simply intended that a derivative work author may not employ a copyrighted work without the author's permission, although of course he can obtain copyright protection for his own original additions.

The text of § 7 reveals that it is not "surplusage." Post, at 244. It does not merely stand for the proposition that authors receive copyright protection for their original additions. It also limits the effect of the publication of the derivative work on the underlying work. See supra, at 231 and this page. Nowhere else in the Act does Congress address the treatment to be afforded derivative works. The principle that additions and improvements to existing works of art receive copyright protection was settled at the time the 1909 Act was enacted, a principle that Congress simply codified in § 7.

[233] Second, the dissent attempts to undercut the plain meaning of § 7 by looking to its legislative history and the substitution of the term "publication" for "copyright" in the force or validity clause. According to the dissent, that particular alteration in the proposed bill "made clear that it was the publication of the derivative work, not the copyright itself, that was not to 'affect the force or validity of any subsisting copyright.' " Post, at 249. Under the 1909 Act, it was necessary to publish the work with proper notice to obtain copyright. Publication of a work without proper notice automatically sent a work into the public domain. See generally 2 Nimmer § 7.02[C][1]; 17 U.S.C. § 10 (1976 ed.). The language change was suggested only to ensure that the publication of a "new compiled work" without proper notice, including smaller portions that had not been previously published and separately copyrighted, would not result in those sections moving into the public domain. See Note, 44 Brooklyn L.Rev., at 919-920. Had the bill retained the term "copyright," publication alone could have affected the force or validity of the copyright in the pre-existing work. Thus, far from telling us anything about the copyright in the derivative work, as the dissent apparently believes it does, the language change merely reflects the practical operation of the Act.

Third, we think the dissent errs in its reading of § 3. Section 3 provides:

"The copyright provided by this title shall protect all the copyrightable component parts of the work copyrighted, and all matter therein in which copyright is already subsisting, but without extending the duration or scope of such copyright." 17 U.S.C. § 3 (1976 ed.).

The dissent reasons that § 7, "read together with § 3, plainly indicates that the copyright on a derivative work extends to both the new material and that 'in which copyright is already subsisting.' The author or proprietor of the derivative work therefore has the statutory right to publish and distribute the entire work." Post, at 241. Section 3, however, [234] undermines, rather than supports, the dissent's ultimate conclusion that the derivative work is "completely independent" of the pre-existing work. Post, at 245. Section 3 makes three distinct points: (1) copyright protects the copyrightable parts of the work; (2) copyright extends to parts of the work in which copyright was already obtained, and (3) the duration or scope of the copyright already obtained will not be extended. Important for this case is that § 3 provides that one can obtain copyright in a work where parts of the work are already copyrighted. For example, one could obtain a copyright in an opera even though three of the songs to be used were already copyrighted. This, and only this, is what is meant in § 7 when it states that "[c]ompilations or abridgments, adaptations, arrangements, dramatizations, translations or other versions of works . . . or works republished with new matter shall be regarded as new works subject to copyright under the provisions of this title."

More important, however, is that under the express language of § 3, one obtains a copyright on the entire work, but the parts previously copyrighted get copyright protection only according to the "duration or scope" of the already existing copyright. Thus, if an author attempts to obtain copyright in a book derived from a short story, he can obtain copyright on the book for the full copyright term, but will receive protection of the story parts only for the duration and scope of the rights previously obtained. Correlatively, if an author attempts to copyright a novel, e.g., about Cinderella, and the story elements are already in the public domain, the author holds a copyright in the novel, but may receive protection only for his original additions to the Cinderella story. See McCaleb v. Fox Film Corp., 299 F. 48 (CA5 1924); American Code Co. v. Bensinger, 282 F. 829 (CA2 1922).

The plain language of the first clause of § 7 ensures that this scheme is carried out with respect to "[c]ompilations or abridgments, adaptations, arrangements, dramatizations, translations, or other versions of works in the public domain [235] or of copyrighted works . . . or works republished with new matter," i.e., derivative works. The second clause of § 7 clarifies what might have been otherwise unclear—that the principle in § 3 of preservation of the duration or scope of the subsisting copyright applies to derivative works, and that neither the scope of the copyright in the matter employed nor the duration of the copyright in the original work is undermined by publication of the derivative work. See Adventures in Good Eating v. Best Places to Eat, 131 F.2d 809, 813, n. 3 (CA7 1942); G. Ricordi & Co. v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 189 F.2d 469 (CA2), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 849, 72 S.Ct. 77, 96 L.Ed. 641 (1951); Russell v. Price, 612 F.2d, at 1128; see also 1 Nimmer § 3.07.

If one reads the plain language of § 7 and § 3 together, one must conclude that they were enacted in no small part to ensure that the copyright in the pre-existing work would not be abrogated by the derivative work. Section 7 requires consent by the author of the pre-existing work before the derivative work may be produced, and both provisions explicitly require that the copyright in the "subsisting work" will not be abrogated by incorporation of the work into another work.

If the dissent's theory were correct, § 3 need only say that "copyright provided by this title shall protect all the copyrightable component parts of the work copyrighted, and all matter therein in which copyright is already subsisting." Instead, § 3 goes on to say that the latter coverage exists "without extending the duration or scope of such copyright." Clearly, the 1909 Act's plain language requires that the underlying work's copyright term exists independently of the derivative work's term, even when incorporated and even though the derivative work holder owns copyright in the whole "work." If the terms must exist separately, each copyright term must be examined for the validity and scope of its grant of rights.

In this case, the grant of rights in the pre-existing work lapsed and, therefore, the derivative work owners' rights to [236] use those portions of the pre-existing work incorporated into the derivative work expired. Thus, continued use would be infringing; whether the derivative work may continue to be published is a matter of remedy, an issue which is not before us. To say otherwise is to say that the derivative work nullifies the "force" of the copyright in the "matter employed." Whether or not we believe that this is good policy, this is the system Congress has provided, as evidenced by the language of the 1909 Act and the cases decided under the 1909 Act. Although the dissent's theory may have been a plausible option for a legislature to have chosen, Congress did not so provide.

III

Petitioners assert that even if their use of "It Had to Be Murder" is unauthorized, it is a fair use and, therefore, not infringing. At common law, "the property of the author . . . in his intellectual creation [was] absolute until he voluntarily part[ed] with the same." American Tobacco Co. v. Werckmeister, 207 U.S. 284, 299, 28 S.Ct. 72, 77, 52 L.Ed. 208 (1907). The fair use doctrine, which is incorporated into the 1976 Act, evolved in response to this absolute rule. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S., at 549-551, 105 S.Ct., at 2224-2226. The doctrine is an " 'equitable rule of reason,' " Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S., at 448, 104 S.Ct., at 792, which "permits courts to avoid rigid application of the copyright statute when, on occasion, it would stifle the very creativity which that law is designed to foster." Iowa State University Research Foundation, Inc. v. American Broadcasting Cos., 621 F.2d 57, 60 (CA2 1980). Petitioners contend that the fair use doctrine should be employed in this case to "avoid [a] rigid applicatio[n] of the Copyright Act." Brief for Petitioners 42.

In 17 U.S.C. § 107, Congress provided examples of fair use, e.g., copying "for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research," and listed four [237] nonexclusive factors that a court must consider in determining whether an unauthorized use is not infringing:

"(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;

"(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;

"(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and

"(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work."

The Court of Appeals determined that the use of Woolrich's story in petitioners' motion picture was not fair use. We agree. The motion picture neither falls into any of the categories enumerated in § 107 nor meets the four criteria set forth in § 107. "[E]very [unauthorized] commercial use of copyrighted material is presumptively an unfair exploitation of the monopoly privilege that belongs to the owner of the copyright." Sony Corp. of America v. Universal Studios, Inc., supra, 464 U.S., at 451, 104 S.Ct., at 793. Petitioners received $12 million from the re-release of the motion picture during the renewal term. 863 F.2d, at 1468. Petitioners asserted before the Court of Appeals that their use was educational rather than commercial. The Court of Appeals found nothing in the record to support this assertion, nor do we.

Applying the second factor, the Court of Appeals pointed out that "[a] use is less likely to be deemed fair when the copyrighted work is a creative product." 863 F.2d, at 1481 (citing Brewer v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 749 F.2d 527, 529 (CA9 1984)). In general, fair use is more likely to be found in factual works than in fictional works. See 3 Nimmer § 13.05[A], pp. 13-77 to 13-78 ("[A]pplication of the fair use defense [is] greater . . . in the case of factual works than in the case of works of fiction or fantasy"); cf. Harper & Row, 471 U.S., at 563, 105 S.Ct., at 2232 ("The law generally recognizes a greater need to disseminate factual works than works of fiction or fan tasy").

[238] A motion picture based on a fictional short story obviously falls into the latter category.

Examining the third factor, the Court of Appeals determined that the story was a substantial portion of the motion picture. See 471 U.S., at 564-565, 105 S.Ct., at 2232-2233 (finding unfair use where quotation from book " 'took what was essentially the heart of the book' "). The motion picture expressly uses the story's unique setting, characters, plot, and sequence of events. Petitioners argue that the story constituted only 20% of the motion picture's story line, Brief for Petitioners 40, n. 69, but that does not mean that a substantial portion of the story was not used in the motion picture. "[A] taking may not be excused merely because it is insubstantial with respect to the infringing work." Harper & Row, supra, at 565, 105 S.Ct., at 2233.

The fourth factor is the "most important, and indeed, central fair use factor." 3 Nimmer § 13.05[A], p. 13-81. The record supports the Court of Appeals' conclusion that re-release of the film impinged on the ability to market new versions of the story. Common sense would yield the same conclusion. Thus, all four factors point to unfair use. "This case presents a classic example of an unfair use: a commercial use of a fictional story that adversely affects the story owner's adaptation rights." 863 F.2d, at 1482.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Justice WHITE, concurring in the judgment.

Although I am not convinced, as the Court seems to be, that the decision in Miller Music Corp. v. Charles N. Daniels, Inc., 362 U.S. 373, 80 S.Ct. 792, 4 L.Ed.2d 804 (1960), was required by the Copyright Act, neither am I convinced that it was an impermissible construction of the statute. And because Miller Music, in my view, requires the result reached by the Court in this case, I concur in the judgment of affirmance.

[239] Justice STEVENS, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and Justice SCALIA join, dissenting.

The Constitution authorizes the Congress:

"To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries. . . ." U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, Cl. 8.

Section 6 of the Copyright Act of 1909, 35 Stat. 1077, 17 U.S.C. § 7 (1970 ed.) (hereinafter § 7), furthers that purpose; § 24 of that Act, 17 U.S.C. § 24 (1970 ed.) (hereinafter § 24), as construed by the Court in this case, does not. It is therefore appropriate to begin with § 7.[1]

I

In a copyright case, as in any other case, the language of the statute provides the starting point. Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 739, 109 S.Ct. 2166, 2172, 104 L.Ed.2d 811 (1989); Mills Music, Inc. v. Snyder, 469 U.S. 153, 164, 105 S.Ct. 638, 645, 83 L.Ed.2d 556 (1985).

Section 7 provides in pertinent part:

"Compilations or abridgments, adaptations, arrangements, dramatizations, translations, or other versions of [240] works in the public domain or of copyrighted works when produced with the consent of the proprietor of the copyright in such works . . . shall be regarded as new works subject to copyright under the provisions of this title; but the publication of any such new works shall not affect the force or validity of any subsisting copyright upon the matter employed or any part thereof, or be construed to imply an exclusive right to such use of the original works, or to secure or extend copyright in such original works."

This statutory provision deals with derivative works—works that include both old material and new material. The plain language of § 7 confers on the entire derivative work—not just the new material contained therein—the status of all other works of authorship, that of "new works subject to copyright under the provisions of this title." Among those rights is that specified in § 3 of the 1909 Act, 17 U.S.C. § 3 (1976 ed.), which applies both to composite and derivative works and states that "the copyright provided by this Act shall protect all the copyrightable component parts of the work copyrighted, and all matter therein in which copyright is already subsisting, but without extending the duration or scope of such copyright." In turn, under § 1, U.S.C. § 1 (1976 ed.), the author or proprietor of the copyright has the right to distribute and publicly perform the copyrighted derivative work. §§ 1(a), 1(d).[2] The statute does not say [241] anything about the duration of the copyright being limited to the underlying work's original term; rather, derivative works made with the consent of the author and derivative works based on matter in the public domain are treated identically. They are both given independent copyright protection. Section 7, read together with § 3, plainly indicates that the copyright on a derivative work extends to both the new material and that "in which copyright is already subsisting." § 3. The author or proprietor of the derivative work therefore has the statutory right to publish and distribute the entire work.[3]

The structure of § 7 confirms this reading. The statute does not merely provide the derivative author with a right to copyright but goes on to set limitations and conditions on that copyright. The statute makes "the consent of the proprietor of the [underlying] copyright" a precondition for copyright of the derivative work, a provision that would make little sense if the copyright provided by § 7 did not derogate in some manner from the underlying author's copyright rights.[4] The [242] statute also directs that the right granted the derivative work proprietor should not "be construed to imply an exclusive right to such use of the original works," suggesting, by negative implication, that it should be read to include a non-exclusive right to use of the original works. The provision that publication "shall not affect the force or validity of any subsisting copyright" also suggests that publication would otherwise have the capacity to affect the force or validity of the original copyright: By publishing the derivative work [243] without satisfying the notice requirements of the Act, the derivative author would dedicate to the public not only his own original contribution, but also that of the original author. Conversely, the limitation that publication does not "secure or extend copyright in such original works" would be unnecessary if the copyrighted derivative work did not include within it some of the material covered by the earlier copyright, or if the term of the derivative copyright did not extend beyond the life of the original copyright.[5] Although the derivative copyright protects only the new material contained within the new work, that limitation is not the product of the limited extent of the copyright—which encompasses both new and old material—but rather of the specific statutory language restricting its effect against third parties.[6]

[244] Any other interpretation would render the provision largely surplusage. The Copyright Act of 1909 elsewhere accords protection to "all the writings of an author," § 4, including dramatic composition, § 5, and long before the Act of 1909, it was recognized that the additions and improvements to existing works of art were subject to copyright as original works of authorship.[7] Congress would hardly have needed to provide for the copyright of derivative works, including the detailed provisions on the limit of that copyright, if it intended only to accord protection to the improvements to an original work of authorship. In my opinion, § 7 was intended to do something more: to give the original author the power [245] to sell the right to make a derivative work that upon creation and copyright would be completely independent of the original work.

II

The statutory background supports the conclusion that Congress intended the original author to be able to sell the right to make a derivative work that could be distributed for the full term of the derivative work's copyright protection. At the time of the enactment of § 7, copyright in the right to dramatize a nondramatic work was a relatively recent innovation with equivocal support. Until 1870, an author had only the right to prevent the copying or vending of his work in the identical medium.[8] The Act of 1870, which gave the author the "sole liberty of printing, reprinting, publishing, completing, copying, executing, finishing, and vending," made a limited start toward further protection, providing that "authors may reserve the right to dramatize or to translate their own works." Ch. 230, § 86, 16 Stat. 212. The identical language was carried over when the statute was revised in 1873. Rev.Stat. § 4952. The Act of 1891 was a landmark. It gave the same rights to the "author" as had the previous statutes, but provided further that "authors or their assigns shall have exclusive right to dramatize and translate any of their works for which copyright shall have been obtained under the laws of the United States." Ch. 565, § 4952, 26 Stat. 1107. The case law was in accord. Although courts were occasionally willing to enjoin abridgments as infringing, in 1853 Justice Grier wrote that a dramatization of the novel "Uncle Tom's Cabin" would not infringe [246] the author's rights in the book, see Stowe v. Thomas, 23 F.Cas. 201, 208 (No. 13,514) (CC ED Pa.1853),[9] and it was not until after the passage of the 1909 Act that this Court first held that a copy of a literary work in another form than the original could infringe the author's copyright. See Kalem Co. v. Harper Brothers, 222 U.S. 55, 32 S.Ct. 20, 56 L.Ed. 92 (1911).[10]

[247] The drafts of the copyright bill, considered by the Conferences held by the Register of Copyrights and the Librarian of Congress in 1905 and 1906,[11] had three distinctive features with respect to derivative works: They provided a limited period of protection from the creation of derivative works during which a derivative work could only be created with "the consent of the author or his assigns," Brylawski & Goldman D LXV; [12] they distinguished between the copyright term for original works of authorship and for derivative works, according the latter a shorter period of protection; [13] and, finally, they provided that derivative works produced with the consent of the original author would be considered new works entitled to copyright. Together these provisions reveal a more complicated set of theoretical premises than is commonly acknowledged. Although originality of authorship was an essential precondition of copy- [248] right, the duration of the copyright term and the extent of copyright protection rested upon the nature of the work as a whole rather than the original expression contributed by the copyright author. Moreover, the consent of the underlying author to the production of a derivative work was to be encouraged and, once given, entitled the derivative work to independence from the work upon which it was based.

The first two provisions were not included in the Copyright Act, which gave authors the right, during the full term of copyright, to create or consent to the creation of derivative works which would then enjoy their own copyright protection. But the third provision which set the conditions upon which an original author would consent and the second author would create a derivative work entitled to protection under the Copyright Act carried forward the view that the derivative copyright extended beyond the original contribution of the derivative author. Throughout the debates on the provision, the drafters of the Copyright Act evinced their understanding that the derivative copyright itself encompassed the whole derivative work. The first draft of § 7, considered by the second Conference in 1905, would have provided copyright as a new work for a derivative work "produced with the consent and authorization of the author of the original," without any restrictions on the effect of that copyright on the copyright in the original work. 2 Brylawski & Goldman, Part D, p. XXXII. By the time of the third Conference in 1906, the Register of Copyrights expressed his concern that that provision would be read too broadly, adding the proviso: "That the copyright thus secured shall not be construed to grant any exclusive right to such use of the original works, except as that may be obtained by agreement with the author or proprietor thereof." 3 id., Part E, p. LI. The implication was that, in the absence of an agreement, the author of the derivative work would have, as a matter of copyright law, a nonexclusive right "to such use of the original works."

[249] The final draft presented to Congress at the end of 1906 addressed a parallel problem that the license to use the underlying material might also detract from the rights of the underlying copyright if the derivative author did not adequately protect the material on which the copyright was subsisting. To allay this concern, the Register added the language "no such copyright shall affect the force or validity of any subsisting copyright upon the matter employed or any part thereof." 1 id., Part B, p. 15.

Two significant changes were made during the congressional hearings from 1907 through 1909, but with those exceptions the provision survived intact. First, in response to the objection that the language of § 6, codified at 17 U.S.C. § 7 (1976 ed.), in conjunction with that of § 3, codified at 17 U.S.C. § 3 (1976 ed.), would be read to give the derivative work proprietor "a new term of copyright running on this old matter of his" and, in that way, provide for perpetual copyright, 4 Brylawski & Goldman, Part J, pp. 132-138 (statement of Mr. Porterfeld); see also id., at 428, Congress limited the enforceability of the derivative copyright, adding language that publication of the dramatization would not "secure or extend copyright in such original works." § 6, 35 Stat. 1077. Second, in response to the objection that the Register's draft provision did not address with sufficient precision the possibility that failure of the derivative copyright would allow the underlying work to enter the public domain, Congress substituted the word "publication" for "copyright" in the "force or validity" clause. Congress thus made clear that it was the publication of the derivative work, not the copyright itself, that was not to "affect the force or validity of any subsisting copyright." Ibid.[14]

[250] The legislative history confirms that the copyright in derivative works not only gives the second creative product the monopoly privileges of excluding others from the unconsented use of the new work, but also allows the creator to publish his or her own work product. The authority to produce the derivative work, which includes creative contributions by both the original author and the second artist, is dependent upon the consent of the proprietor of the underlying copyright. But once that consent has been obtained, and a derivative work has been created and copyrighted in accord with that consent, "a right of property spr[ings] into existence," Edmonds v. Stern, 248 F. 897, 898 (CA2 1918), that Congress intended to protect. Publication of the derivative work does not "affect the force or validity" of the underlying copyright except to the extent that it gives effect to the consent of the original proprietor. That owner—and in this case, the owner of a renewal of the original copyright—retains full dominion and control over all other means of exploiting that work of art, including the right to authorize other derivative works. The original copyright may have relatively little value because the creative contribution of the second artist is far more significant than the original con-[251] tribution, but that just means that the rewards for creativity are being fairly allocated between the two artists whose combined efforts produced the derivative work.

III

Nothing in § 24 requires a different result. The portion of that section dealing with copyright renewals provides:

"[T]he author of such work, if still living, or the widow, widower, or children of the author, if the author be not living, . . . shall be entitled to a renewal and extension of the copyright in such work for a further term of twenty-eight years when application for such renewal and extension shall have been made to the copyright office and duly registered therein within one year prior to the expiration of the original term of copyright." 17 U.S.C. § 24 (1976 ed.).

That statute limits the renewal rights in a copyright to the specified statutory beneficiaries, "completely dissevering the title, breaking up the continuance . . . and vesting an absolutely new title eo nomine in the persons designated." White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Goff, 187 F. 247, 250 (CA1 1911). Since copyright is a creature of statute and since the statute gives the author only a contingent estate, with "the widow, widower, or children" as remaindermen, the author "ha[s] only an expectancy to assign" for the second term. Miller Music Corp. v. Charles N. Daniels, Inc., 362 U.S. 373, 375, 80 S.Ct. 792, 794, 4 L.Ed.2d 804 (1960). The original author may not sell more than he owns. He may not convey the second-term rights to print or copy the underlying work or to create additional derivative works from it. See Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Cos., 538 F.2d 14, 21 (CA2 1976); G. Ricordi & Co. v. Paramount Pictures Inc., 189 F.2d 469 (CA2), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 849, 72 S.Ct. 77, 96 L.Ed. 641 (1951).[15] Nor may the derivative author dedi-[252] cate the underlying art to the public by failing to renew his copyright. See Filmvideo Releasing Corp. v. Hastings, 668 F.2d 91, 93 (CA2 1981); Russell v. Price, 612 F.2d 1123, 1128 (CA9 1979).[16] Even if the alienation of second-term rights would be in the author's best interest, providing funds when he is most in need, the restriction on sale of the corpus is a necessary consequence of Congress' decision to provide two terms of copyright.

Neither § 24 nor any other provision of the Act, however, expressly or by implication, prevents the author from exercising any of his other statutory rights during the original term of the copyright. The author of the underlying work may contract to sell his work at a bargain price during the original term of the copyright. That agreement would be enforceable even if performance of the contract diminished the value of the copyright to the owner of the renewal interest. Similarly, the original author may create and copyright his own derivative work; the right of an assignee or legatee to receive that work by assignment or bequest should not be limited by the interests of the owners of the renewal copyright in the underlying work. Section 1 of the Act, 17 U.S.C. § 1 (1976 ed.), gives the author the right to dramatize his own work without any apparent restriction. Such use might appear, at the time or in retrospect, to be improvident and a waste of the asset. Whatever harm the proprietor of the renewal copyright might suffer, however, is a consequence of the enjoyment by the author of the rights granted him by Congress.

The result should be no different when the author exercises his right to consent to creation of a derivative work by another. By designating derivative works as "new works" [253] that are subject to copyright and accorded the two terms applicable to original works, Congress evinced its intention that the derivative copyright not lapse upon termination of the original author's interest in the underlying copyright. The continued publication of the derivative work, after the expiration of the original term of the prior work, does not infringe any of the statutory successor's rights in the renewal copyright of the original work. The author's right to sell his derivative rights is exercised when consent is conveyed and completed when the derivative work is copyrighted. At that point, prior to the end of the first term, the right to prevent publication of the derivative work is no longer one of the bundle of rights attaching to the copyright. The further agreement to permit use of the underlying material during the renewal term does not violate § 24 because at the moment consent is given and the derivative work is created and copyrighted, a new right of property comes into existence independent of the original author's copyright estate.

As an ex post matter, it might appear that the original author could have negotiated a better contract for his consent to creation of a derivative work, but Congress in § 24 was not concerned with giving an author a second chance to renegotiate his consent to the production of a derivative work.[17] It provided explicitly that, once consent was given, the derivative work was entitled as a matter of copyright law to treatment as a "new wor[k]." § 7. Ironically, by restricting the [254] author's ability to consent to creation of a derivative work with independent existence, the Court may make it practically impossible for the original author to sell his derivative rights late in the original term and to reap the financial and artistic advantage that comes with the creation of a derivative work.[18] Unless § 24 is to overwhelm § 7, the consent of the original author must be given effect whether or not it intrudes into the renewal term of the original copyright.

A putative author may sell his work to a motion picture company who will have greater use for it, by becoming an employee and making the work "for hire." The 1909 Act gave the employer the right to renew the copyright in such circumstances.[19] In addition, when an author intends that his work be used as part of a joint work, the copyright law gives the joint author common authority to exploit the underlying work and renew the copyright.[20] The Court today [255] holds, however, that the independent entrepreneur, who does not go into the company's employ and who intends to make independent use of his work, does not also have the same right to sell his consent to produce a derivative work that can be distributed and publicly performed during the full term of its copyright protection. That result is perverse and cannot have been what Congress intended.[21]

The critical flaw in the Court's analysis is its implicit endorsement of the Court of Appeals reasoning that:

" 'If Miller Music makes assignment of the full renewal rights in the underlying copyright unenforceable when the author dies before effecting renewal of the copyright, then a fortiori, an assignment of part of the rights in the underlying work, the right to produce a movie version, must also be unenforceable if the author dies before effecting renewal of the underlying copyright.' " Ante, at 215-216.

That reasoning would be valid if the sole basis for the protection of the derivative work were the contractual assignment of copyright, but Woolrich did not just assign the rights to produce a movie version the way an author would assign the publisher rights to copy and vend his work. Rather, he expressed his consent to production of a derivative work under § 7. The possession of a copyright on a properly created derivative work gives the proprietor rights superior to those of [256] a mere licensee. As Judge Friendly concluded, this position is entirely consistent with relevant policy considerations.[22]

In my opinion, a fair analysis of the entire 1909 Act, with special attention to § 7, indicates that the statute embodied the same policy choice that continues to be reflected in the 1976 Act. Section 101 of the Act provides:

"A derivative work prepared under authority of the grant before its termination may continue to be utilized under the terms of the grant after its termination, but this privilege does not extend to the preparation after the termination of other derivative works based upon the copyrighted work covered by the terminated grant." 17 U.S.C.App. § 304(c)(6)(A).

I respectfully dissent.

__________

[1] The Copyright Act of 1976 (1976 Act), 17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. (1988 ed.), codified the definition of a " 'derivative work,' " as "a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version . . . or any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted." § 101.

[2] Neither Miller Music nor Fred Fisher decided the question of when the renewal rights vest, i.e., whether the renewal rights vest upon commencement of the registration period, registration, or the date on which the original term expires and the renewal term begins. We have no occasion to address the issue here.

[3] Title 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1988 ed.) codifies the various rights a copyright holder possesses: "[T]he owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following:

"(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;

"(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;

"(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending;

"(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the copyrighted work publicly; and

"(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted work publicly."

__________

[1] Although the Court of Appeals determined the rights of the parties by looking to the 1909 Act, respondent now argues that the 1976 Act is applicable. At the time petitioners secured their copyright in the film in 1954, and respondent renewed his copyright in the short story in 1969, the Copyright Act of 1909 was in effect. There is no evidence that Congress in the Copyright Act of 1976 intended to abrogate rights created under the previous Act. I therefore take it as evident that while the cause of action under which respondent sues may have been created by the 1976 Act, the respective property rights of the parties are determined by the statutory grant under the 1909 Act. See Roth v. Pritikin, 710 F.2d 934, 938 (CA2), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 961, 104 S.Ct. 394, 78 L.Ed.2d 337 (1983); International Film Exchange, Ltd. v. Corinth Films, Inc., 621 F.Supp. 631 (SDNY 1985); Jaszi, When Works Collide: Derivative Motion Pictures, Underlying Rights, and the Public Interest, 28 UCLA L.Rev. 715, 746-747 (1981) (hereinafter Jaszi). Cf. 1 M. Nimmer & D. Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 1.11, p. 1-96 (1989) (hereinafter Nimmer) (no explicit statement of a legislative intent to apply the current Act retroactively).

[2] Section 1 of the 1909 Act, 35 Stat. 1075, provides in pertinent part:

"That any person entitled thereto, upon complying with the provisions of this Act, shall have the exclusive right:

"(a) To print, reprint, publish, copy, and vend the copyrighted work;

. . . . .

"(d) To perform or represent the copyrighted work publicly if it be a drama . . .; and to exhibit, perform, represent, produce, or reproduce it in any manner or by any method whatsoever."

In its response to this dissent, the Court completely ignores the plain language of § 1.

[3] The Court states that this reading of § 7 is "creative," has not been adopted by any Court of Appeals in the history of the 1909 Act, and has not been argued by petitioners. Ante, at 230. Although I am flattered by this comment, I must acknowledge that the credit belongs elsewhere. In their briefs to this Court, petitioners and their amici argue that § 7 created an independent but limited copyright in the entire derivative work entitled to equal treatment with original works under the renewal and duration provisions of § 24. Brief for Petitioners 14-15, 17, 21, 29-30; Brief for Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc., et al., as Amici Curiae 11, 13, 15. That was also the central argument of Judge Friendly in his opinion for the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, see Rohauer v. Killiam Shows, Inc., 551 F.2d 484, 487-488, 489-490, 493-494, cert. denied, 431 U.S. 949, 97 S.Ct. 2666, 53 L.Ed.2d 266 (1977), and Judge Thompson dissenting from the panel decision below, see Abend v. MCA, Inc., 863 F.2d 1465, 1484-1487 (CA9 1988). Indeed, Judge Friendly only addressed the equities with great reservation, 551 F.2d, at 493, after "a close reading of the language of what is now § 7." Id., at 489.

[4] The drafters of the 1909 Act were well aware of the difficulty of contacting distant authors who no longer wished to enforce their copyright rights. In § 24,

for example, Congress provided that a proprietor could secure and renew copyright on a composite work when the individual contributions were not separately registered. The provision was apparently addressed to the difficulties such proprietors had previously faced in locating and obtaining the consent of authors at the time of renewal. See H.R.Rep. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess., 15 (1909); 1 Legislative History of the 1909 Copyright Act, Part C, p. 56 (E. Brylawski & A. Goldman eds. 1976) (statement of Mr. Elder) (hereinafter Brylawski & Goldman); 5 id., Part K pp. 18-19 (statement of Mr. Putnam); id., at K77 (statement of Mr. Hale). See also Elder, Duration of Copyright, 14 Yale L.J. 417, 418 (1905). The effect of the § 7 consent requirement under the Court's reading should not only be to forbid the author of the derivative work to "employ a copyrighted work without the author's permission," ante, at 232, but also to penalize him by depriving him both of the right to use his own new material and, in theory, of the right to protect that new material against use by the public. It is most unlikely that a Congress which intended to promote the creation of literary works would have conditioned the protection of new material in an otherwise original work on "consent" of an original author who did not express the desire to protect his own work.

The Court of Appeals thought that the failure of Congress to grant an "exemption" to derivative works similar to that it granted composite works demonstrated its intention that derivative works lapse upon termination of the underlying author's copyright interest. 863 F.2d, at 1476. Section 24, however, does not exempt composite works from the renewal provision, but merely provides for their renewal by the proprietor alone when the individual contributions are not separately copyrighted. See 2 Nimmer § 9.03[B], p. 9-36. Moreover, the "author," entitled to renewal under § 24, refers back to the author of the original work and the derivative work. Congress did not need to make special provision for the derivative work in § 24 because it already did so in § 7, making it a new work "subject to copyright under the provisions of this title." 17 U.S.C. § 7 (1976 ed.).

[5] It is instructive to compare the language of § 7 to that used by Congress in 1976 to indicate that copyright in a derivative work under the new Act attached only to the new material:

"The copyright in a compilation or derivative work extends only to the material contributed by the author of such work, as distinguished from the preexisting material employed in the work, and does not imply any exclusive right in the preexisting material. The copyright in such work is independent of, and does not affect or enlarge the scope, duration, ownership, or subsistence of, any copyright protection in the preexisting material." 17 U.S.C. § 103(b) (1988 ed.).

[6] I thus agree with the Court that publication of a derivative work cannot extend the scope or duration of the copyright in the original work, ante, at 234-235, and that the underlying work's copyright term exists independently of the derivative work's term. Ante, at 231-232, 235. As much is clear from the language of § 7, which extends the copyright to the entire work, but then limits the effect of that copyright. I further agree that the original author's right to "consent" to the copyright of a derivative work terminates when the statutory term of the copyright in the underlying work expires. Ante, at 235. As I explain, infra at 251-253, that result follows from the language of § 24. I do not agree, however, that the statutory right to distribute and publicly perform a derivative work that has been copyrighted with the original author's consent during the original term of the underlying work is limited by the validity and scope of the original copyright. Ante, at 235. Section 7, in conjunction with § 24, gives the derivative author two full terms of copyright in the entire derivative work both when the original work is used with the consent of the original author and when the original work is in the public domain. My conclusion thus rests upon the language of the statute. The Court's contrary assertion, that if the right to publish the derivative work extended beyond the original term of the underlying work it would "nulli[fy] the 'force' of the copyright in the 'matter employed,' " ante, at 236, simply begs the question of the extent of the original author's statutory rights. Even after the derivative work has been copyrighted, the original author retains all of his statutory rights, including the right to consent to the creation of additional derivative works during both the original and renewal terms. Moreover, even if the derivative work did derogate from the force of the original work, the provision to which the Court apparently refers states only that "publication " of a derivative work—and not consent to its creation—shall not affect the force of the copyright in the matter employed. The Court can avoid making § 7 complete surplus (and allow it to limit the rights of both the original and the derivative author) only by distorting the plain language of that provision.

[7] See, e.g., Gray v. Russell, 10 F.Cas. 1035, 1037-1038 (No. 5,728) (CC Mass.1839); Emerson v. Davies, 8 F.Cas. 615, 618-619 (No. 4,436) (CC Mass.1845); Shook v. Rankin, 21 F.Cas. 1335, 1336 (No. 12,804) (CC N.D.Ill.1875). The Court's difficulty in explaining away the language of § 7 is not surprising. The authority upon whom it almost exclusively relies, see ante, at 223, had the same difficulty, stating at one point that "[t]he statutory text was somewhat ambiguous," 1 Nimmer, p. 3-22.2, and admitting at another that under his reading of the Copyright Act the provision was largely irrelevant. See id., at 3-29, n. 17 ("[I]t is consent referred to in Sec. 7, but which would have efficacy as a matter of contract law even without Sec. 7"). At least in the Copyright Act of 1909, however, Congress knew exactly what it was doing.

[8] The Act of 1790, passed by the First Congress, provided "the sole right and liberty of printing, reprinting, publishing and vending" the copyrighted work. § 1, 1 Stat. 124. Its successor, the Act of 1831, repeated the language that the author of a copyrighted work "shall have the sole right and liberty of printing, reprinting, publishing, and vending" the work. Ch. 16, § 1, 4 Stat. 436. Benjamin Kaplan has written that the Act of 1870 constituted an "enlargement of the monopoly to cover the conversion of a work from one to another artistic medium." An Unhurried View of Copyright 32 (1967) (hereinafter Kaplan).

[9]

"By the publication of Mrs. Stowe's book, the creations of the genius and imagination of the author have become as much public property as those of Homer or Cervantes. . . . All her conceptions and inventions may be used and abused by imitators, play-rights and poetasters [They are no longer her own—those who have purchased her book, may clothe them in English doggerel, in German or Chinese prose. Her absolute dominion and property in the creations of her genius and imagination have been voluntarily relinquished.] All that now remains is the copyright of her book; the exclusive right to print, reprint and vend it, and those only can be called infringers of her rights, or pirates of her property, who are guilty of printing, publishing, importing or vending without her license, 'copies of her book.' " Stowe v. Thomas, 23 F.Cas., at 208 (footnote omitted).

It appears that at least as late as 1902, English copyright law also did not recognize that a dramatization could infringe an author's rights in a book. See E. MacGillivray, A Treatise Upon The Law of Copyright 114 (1902); see also Reade v. Conquist, 9 C.B.N.S. 755, 142 Eng.Rep. 297 (C.P.1861); Coleman v. Wathen, 5 T.R. 245, 101 Eng.Rep. 137 (K.B.1793). Even after the passage of the Act of 1870, one American commentator flatly declared: "Even if the public recitation of a book, in which copyright exists, is not made from memory, but takes the form of a public reading, from the work itself, of the whole or portions of it, this would not amount to an infringement of the author's copyright." 2 J. Morgan, Law of Literature 700-701 (1875).

[10]

"The American cases reflect no recognition that unauthorized dramatization could infringe rights in a nondramatic work until the 1870 copyright revision provided authors with the same option to reserve dramatization rights that they were afforded with respect to translation. By then, dramatizations like other derivative works—already had enjoyed almost a century of substantial independence. During this period, courts construing federal copyright statutes were willing to extend protection to them, but were reluctant to interfere with their unauthorized production." Jaszi 783.

See also Goldstein, Derivative Rights and Derivative Works in Copyright, 30 J. Copyright Society 209, 211-215 (1983).

[11] The history of the Copyright Act of 1909 is recounted in Justice Frankfurter's opinion for the Court in Fred Fisher Music Co. v. M. Witmark & Sons, 318 U.S. 643, 652, 63 S.Ct. 773, 777, 87 L.Ed. 1055 (1943).

[12] The first draft of the copyright bill considered in 1905 provided that if the author or his assigns did not make or authorize to be made a dramatization within 10 years of the date of registration, the work could be used for dramatization by other authors. 2 Brylawski & Goldman, Part D, p. LXV. A similar provision appeared in the third draft of the bill considered by the Conference the following year, 3 id., Part E, p. XL, and in the bill submitted by the Register of Copyrights to Congress. 1 id., Part B, pp. 37-38. The provision was eventually dropped during hearings in Congress and was never adopted into law.

[13] The first draft provided identical terms for both original works of authorship and derivative works, 2 id., Part D, pp. XXXVII-XXXVIII. Successive drafts gave the copyright in the original work to the author for his life plus 50 years, but limited the copyright in a derivative work to 50 years. 3 id., Part E, pp. LIII-LIV; 1 id., Part B, pp. 34-35. The single term was rejected at a late date by Congress and the final Act eventually provided the same two-term copyright for original and derivative works. See generally B. Ringer, Renewal of Copyright (1960), reprinted as Copyright Law Revision Study No. 31, prepared for the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., 115-121 (1961).

[14] The amendment apparently emerged from dialogue between Mr. W.B. Hale, representative of the American Law Book Company, and Senator Smoot:

"Mr. Hale: 'There is another verbal criticism I should like to make in section 6 of the Kittredge bill, which also relates to compilations, abridgments, etc.'

"The Chairman [Senator Smoot]. 'I think it is the same in the other bills.'

"Mr. Hale. 'Yes; it is the same in all the bills. I heartily agree with and am in favor of that section; but in line 12, in lieu of the words "but no such copyright shall effect the force or validity," etc., I would prefer to substitute these words: "and the publication of any such new work shall not affect the copyright," etc. . . . Under the act, as it stands now, it says the copyright shall not affect it. I would like to meet the case of a new compiled work, within the meaning of this clause, that is not copyrighted, or where, by reason of some accident the copyright fails. That should not affect the original copyrights in the works that have entered into and formed a part of this new compiled work. It does not change the intent of this section in any way.' " 5, Brylawski & Goldman, Part K, p. 78.

[15] In Ricordi, the author of the derivative work not only produced a new derivative work, but also breached his covenant not to distribute the work, after the first term of the underlying copyright. As Justice WHITE has explained, "Ricordi merely held that the licensee of a copyright holder may not prepare a new derivative work based upon the copyrighted work after termination of the grant." Mills Music, Inc. v. Snyder, 469 U.S. 153, 183, n. 7, 105 S.Ct. 638, 655, n. 7, 83 L.Ed.2d 556 (1985) (dissenting opinion).

[16] The result follows as well from the "force and validity" clause of § 7.

[17] Congress was primarily concerned with the ability of the author to exploit his own work of authorship:

"Your committee, after full consideration, decided that it was distinctly to the advantage of the author to preserve the renewal period. It not infrequently happens that the author sells his copyright outright to a publisher for a comparatively small sum. If the work proves to be a great success and lives beyond the term of twenty-eight years, your committee felt that it should be the exclusive right of the author to take the renewal term, and the law should be framed as is the existing law, so that he could not be deprived of that right." H.R.Rep. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess., at 14.

[18] The creation of a derivative work often is in the best interests of both the original author and his statutory successors. As one commentator has noted:

"The movie Rear Window became a selling point for anthologies containing the Woolrich story. The musical play Cats no doubt sent many people who dimly remembered the Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock as the chief, if not the only oeuvre of T.S. Eliot to the bookstore for Old Possum's Book of Practical Cats."

Weinreb, Fair's Fair: A Comment on the Fair Use Doctrine, 103 Harv.L.Rev. 1137, 1147 (1990).

[19] See 17 U.S.C. § 24 (1976 ed.) ("[I]n the case of . . . any work copyrighted by . . . an employer for whom such work is made for hire, the proprietor of such copyright shall be entitled to a renewal and extension of the copyright in such work for the further term of twenty-eight years"). See also Ellingson, Copyright Exception for Derivative Works and the Scope of Utilization, 56 Ind.L.J. 1, 11 (1980-1981).

[20] See Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 161 F.2d 406 (CA2 1946); Edward B. Marks Music Corp. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 140 F.2d 266 (CA2 1944). In the "12th Street Rag" case, Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 221 F.2d 569 (CA2 1955), the Court of Appeals held that a work of music, intended originally to stand on its own as an instrumental, could become a joint work when it was later sold to a publisher who commissioned lyrics to be written for it. The decision, which would give the creator of the derivative work and the underlying author a joint interest in the derivative work, accomplishes the same result that I believe § 7 does expressly.

[21]

"The effect of the Fred Fisher [, 318 U.S. 643, 63 S.Ct. 773, 87 L.Ed. 1055 (1943),] case and other authorities is that if the author is dead when the twenty-eighth year comes round, the renewal reverts, free and clear, to his widow, children, and so forth in a fixed order of precedency; but if the author is alive in that year, the original sale holds and there is no reversion. The distinction is hard to defend and may operate in a peculiarly perverse way where on the faith of a transfer from the now-deceased author, the transferee has created a 'derivative work,' say a movie based on the original novel." Kaplan 112.

[22]

"To such extent as it may be permissible to consider policy considerations, the equities lie preponderantly in favor of the proprietor of the derivative copyright. In contrast to the situation where an assignee or licensee has done nothing more than print, publicize and distribute a copyrighted story or novel, a person who with the consent of the author has created an opera or a motion picture film will often have made contributions literary, musical and economic, as great as or greater than the original author. As pointed out in the Bricker article [Bricker, Renewal and Extension of Copyright, 29 S.Cal.L.Rev. 23, 33 (1955) ], the purchaser of derivative rights has no truly effective way to protect himself against the eventuality of the author's death before the renewal period since there is no way of telling who will be the surviving widow, children or next of kin or the executor until that date arrives. To be sure, this problem exists in equal degree with respect to assignments or licenses of underlying copyright, but in such cases there is not the countervailing consideration that large and independently copyrightable contributions will have been made by the transferee." Rohauer v. Killiam Shows, Inc., 551 F.2d 484, 493 (CA2), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 949, 97 S.Ct. 2666, 53 L.Ed.2d 266 (1977).

3.1.3.2 New York Times Co. v. Tasini 3.1.3.2 New York Times Co. v. Tasini

533 U.S. 483 (2001)

NEW YORK TIMES CO., INC., et al.
v.
TASINI et al.

No. 00-201.
United States Supreme Court.
Argued March 28, 2001.
Decided June 25, 2001.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

[486] Ginsburg, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, and Thomas, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Breyer, J., joined, post, p. 506.

Laurence H. Tribe argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Jonathan S. Massey, Bruce P. Keller, Jeffrey P. Cunard, Michael R. Potenza, Peter C. Johnson, and Thomas C. Goldstein.

Laurence Gold argued the cause for respondents Tasini et al. With him on the brief were Patricia A. Felch, Daniel W. Sherrick, Michael H. Gottesman, and Leon Dayan. [487] Emily Maruja Bass filed a brief for respondents Garson et al.[*]

Justice Ginsburg, delivered the opinion of the Court.

This copyright case concerns the rights of freelance authors and a presumptive privilege of their publishers. The litigation was initiated by six freelance authors and relates to articles they contributed to three print periodicals (two newspapers and one magazine). Under agreements with the periodicals' publishers, but without the freelancers' consent, two computer database companies placed copies of the freelancers' articles—along with all other articles from the periodicals in which the freelancers' work appeared—into three databases. Whether written by a freelancer or staff member, each article is presented to, and retrievable by, the user in isolation, clear of the context the original print publication presented.

The freelance authors' complaint alleged that their copyrights had been infringed by the inclusion of their articles in the databases. The publishers, in response, relied on the [488] privilege of reproduction and distribution accorded them by § 201(c) of the Copyright Act, which provides:

"Copyright in each separate contribution to a collective work is distinct from copyright in the collective work as a whole, and vests initially in the author of the contribution. In the absence of an express transfer of the copyright or of any rights under it, the owner of copyright in the collective work is presumed to have acquired only the privilege of reproducing and distributing the contribution as part of that particular collective work, any revision of that collective work, and any later collective work in the same series." 17 U. S. C. § 201(c).

Specifically, the publishers maintained that, as copyright owners of collective works, i. e., the original print publications, they had merely exercised "the privilege" § 201(c) accords them to "reproduc[e] and distribut[e]" the author's discretely copyrighted contribution.

In agreement with the Second Circuit, we hold that § 201(c) does not authorize the copying at issue here. The publishers are not sheltered by § 201(c), we conclude, because the databases reproduce and distribute articles standing alone and not in context, not "as part of that particular collective work" to which the author contributed, "as part of . . . any revision" thereof, or "as part of . . . any later collective work in the same series." Both the print publishers and the electronic publishers, we rule, have infringed the copyrights of the freelance authors.

I

A

Respondents Jonathan Tasini, Mary Kay Blakely, Barbara Garson, Margot Mifflin, Sonia Jaffe Robbins, and David S. Whitford are authors (Authors). Between 1990 and 1993, they wrote the 21 articles (Articles) on which this dispute centers. Tasini, Mifflin, and Blakely contributed 12 Articles to The New York Times, the daily newspaper published by [489] petitioner The New York Times Company (Times). Tasini, Garson, Robbins, and Whitford wrote eight Articles for Newsday, another New York daily paper, published by petitioner Newsday, Inc. (Newsday). Whitford also contributed one Article to Sports Illustrated, a weekly magazine published by petitioner Time, Inc. (Time). The Authors registered copyrights in each of the Articles. The Times, Newsday, and Time (Print Publishers) registered collective work copyrights in each periodical edition in which an Article originally appeared. The Print Publishers engaged the Authors as independent contractors (freelancers) under contracts that in no instance secured consent from an Author to placement of an Article in an electronic database.[1]

At the time the Articles were published, all three Print Publishers had agreements with petitioner LEXIS/NEXIS (formerly Mead Data Central Corp.), owner and operator of NEXIS, a computerized database that stores information in a text-only format. NEXIS contains articles from hundreds of journals (newspapers and periodicals) spanning many years. The Print Publishers have licensed to LEXIS/ NEXIS the text of articles appearing in the three periodicals. The licenses authorize LEXIS/NEXIS to copy and sell any portion of those texts.

Pursuant to the licensing agreements, the Print Publishers regularly provide LEXIS/NEXIS with a batch of all the articles published in each periodical edition. The Print Publisher codes each article to facilitate computerized retrieval, then transmits it in a separate file. After further coding, LEXIS/NEXIS places the article in the central discs of its database.

[490] Subscribers to NEXIS, accessing the system through a computer, may search for articles by author, subject, date, publication, headline, key term, words in text, or other criteria. Responding to a search command, NEXIS scans the database and informs the user of the number of articles meeting the user's search criteria. The user then may view, print, or download each of the articles yielded by the search. The display of each article includes the print publication (e. g., The New York Times), date (September 23, 1990), section (Magazine), initial page number (26), headline or title ("Remembering Jane"), and author (Mary Kay Blakely). Each article appears as a separate, isolated "story"—without any visible link to the other stories originally published in the same newspaper or magazine edition. NEXIS does not contain pictures or advertisements, and it does not reproduce the original print publication's formatting features such as headline size, page placement (e. g., above or below the fold for newspapers), or location of continuation pages.

The Times (but not Newsday or Time) also has licensing agreements with petitioner University Microfilms International (UMI). The agreements authorize reproduction of Times materials on two CD—ROM products, the New York Times OnDisc (NYTO) and General Periodicals OnDisc (GPO).

Like NEXIS, NYTO is a text-only system. Unlike NEXIS, NYTO, as its name suggests, contains only the Times. Pursuant to a three-way agreement, LEXIS/ NEXIS provides UMI with computer files containing each article as transmitted by the Times to LEXIS/NEXIS. Like LEXIS/NEXIS, UMI marks each article with special codes. UMI also provides an index of all the articles in NYTO. Articles appear in NYTO in essentially the same way they appear in NEXIS, i. e., with identifying information (author, title, etc.), but without original formatting or accompanying images.

[491] GPO contains articles from approximately 200 publications or sections of publications. Unlike NEXIS and NYTO, GPO is an image-based, rather than a text-based, system. The Times has licensed GPO to provide a facsimile of the Times' Sunday Book Review and Magazine. UMI "burns" images of each page of these sections onto CD—ROMs. The CD— ROMs show each article exactly as it appeared on printed pages, complete with photographs, captions, advertisements, and other surrounding materials. UMI provides an index and abstracts of all the articles in GPO.

Articles are accessed through NYTO and GPO much as they are accessed through NEXIS. The user enters a search query using similar criteria (e. g., author, headline, date). The computer program searches available indexes and abstracts, and retrieves a list of results matching the query. The user then may view each article within the search result, and may print the article or download it to a disc. The display of each article provides no links to articles appearing on other pages of the original print publications.[2]

B

On December 16, 1993, the Authors filed this civil action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. The Authors alleged that their copyrights were infringed when, as permitted and facilitated by the Print Publishers, LEXIS/NEXIS and UMI (Electronic Publishers) placed the Articles in the NEXIS, NYTO, and GPO databases (Databases). The Authors sought declaratory [492] and injunctive relief, and damages. In response to the Authors' complaint, the Print and Electronic Publishers raised the reproduction and distribution privilege accorded collective work copyright owners by 17 U. S. C. § 201(c). After discovery, both sides moved for summary judgment.

The District Court granted summary judgment for the Publishers, holding that § 201(c) shielded the Database reproductions. 972 F. Supp. 804, 806 (1997). The privilege conferred by § 201(c) is transferable, the court first concluded, and therefore could be conveyed from the original Print Publishers to the Electronic Publishers. Id., at 816. Next, the court determined, the Databases reproduced and distributed the Authors' works, in § 201(c)'s words, "as part of . . . [a] revision of that collective work" to which the Authors had first contributed. To qualify as "revisions," according to the court, works need only "preserve some significant original aspect of [collective works]—whether an original selection or an original arrangement." Id., at 821. This criterion was met, in the District Court's view, because the Databases preserved the Print Publishers' "selection of articles" by copying all of the articles originally assembled in the periodicals' daily or weekly issues. Id., at 823. The Databases "highlight[ed]" the connection between the articles and the print periodicals, the court observed, by showing for each article not only the author and periodical, but also the print publication's particular issue and page numbers. Id., at 824 ("[T]he electronic technologies not only copy the publisher defendants' complete original `selection' of articles, they tag those articles in such a way that the publisher defendants' original selection remains evident on line.").

The Authors appealed, and the Second Circuit reversed. 206 F. 3d 161 (1999). The Court of Appeals granted summary judgment for the Authors on the ground that the Databases were not among the collective works covered by § 201(c), and specifically, were not "revisions" of the periodicals in which the Articles first appeared. Id., at 167-170. Just as § 201(c) does not "permit a Publisher to sell a hard [493] copy of an Author's article directly to the public even if the Publisher also offered for individual sale all of the other articles from the particular edition," the court reasoned, so § 201(c) does not allow a Publisher to "achieve the same goal indirectly" through computer databases. Id., at 168. In the Second Circuit's view, the Databases effectively achieved this result by providing multitudes of "individually retrievable" articles. Ibid. As stated by the Court of Appeals, the Databases might fairly be described as containing "new antholog[ies] of innumerable" editions or publications, but they do not qualify as "revisions" of particular editions of periodicals in the Databases. Id., at 169. Having concluded that § 201(c) "does not permit the Publishers," acting without the author's consent, "to license individually copyrighted works for inclusion in the electronic databases," the court did not reach the question whether the § 201(c) privilege is transferable. Id., at 165, and n. 2.

We granted certiorari to determine whether the copying of the Authors' Articles in the Databases is privileged by 17 U. S. C. § 201(c). 531 U. S. 978 (2000). Like the Court of Appeals, we conclude that the § 201(c) privilege does not override the Authors' copyrights, for the Databases do not reproduce and distribute the Articles as part of a collective work privileged by § 201(c). Accordingly, and again like the Court of Appeals, we find it unnecessary to determine whether the privilege is transferable.

II

Under the Copyright Act, as amended in 1976, "[c]opyright protection subsists . . . in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression .. . from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated." 17 U. S. C. § 102(a). When, as in this case, a freelance author has contributed an article to a "collective work" such as a newspaper or magazine, see § 101 (defining "collective work"), the statute recognizes two distinct copyrighted works: "Copyright in each separate contribution to a collec[494]tive work is distinct from copyright in the collective work as a whole . . . ." § 201(c) (emphasis added). Copyright in the separate contribution "vests initially in the author of the contribution" (here, the freelancer). Ibid. Copyright in the collective work vests in the collective author (here, the newspaper or magazine publisher) and extends only to the creative material contributed by that author, not to "the preexisting material employed in the work," § 103(b). See also Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U. S. 340, 358 (1991) (copyright in "compilation"—a term that includes "collective works," 17 U. S. C. § 101—is limited to the compiler's original "selection, coordination, and arrangement").

Prior to the 1976 revision, as the courts below recognized, see 206 F. 3d, at 168; 972 F. Supp., at 815, authors risked losing their rights when they placed an article in a collective work. Pre-1976 copyright law recognized a freelance author's copyright in a published article only when the article was printed with a copyright notice in the author's name. See Copyright Act of 1909, § 18, 35 Stat. 1079. When publishers, exercising their superior bargaining power over authors, declined to print notices in each contributor's name, the author's copyright was put in jeopardy. See Kaminstein, Divisibility of Copyrights, Study No. 11, in Copyright Law Revision Studies Nos. 11-13, prepared for the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., 18 (1960). The author did not have the option to assign only the right of publication in the periodical; such a partial assignment was blocked by the doctrine of copyright "indivisibility." See id., at 11. Thus, when a copyright notice appeared only in the publisher's name, the author's work would fall into the public domain, unless the author's copyright, in its entirety, had passed to the publisher. See id., at 18. Such complete transfer might be accomplished by a contract, perhaps one with a provision, not easily enforced, for later retransfer of rights back to the author. See id., at 20-22. Or, absent a specific contract, a court might find that an author had tacitly [495] transferred the entire copyright to a publisher, in turn deemed to hold the copyright in "trust" for the author's benefit. See id., at 18-19; see generally 3 M. Nimmer & D. Nimmer, Copyright § 10.01[C][2], pp. 10-12 to 10-14 (2000).

In the 1976 revision, Congress acted to "clarify and improve [this] confused and frequently unfair legal situation with respect to rights in contributions." H. R. Rep. No. 94— 1476, p. 122 (1976) (hereinafter H. R. Rep.).[3] The 1976 Act rejected the doctrine of indivisibility, recasting the copyright as a bundle of discrete "exclusive rights," 17 U. S. C. § 106 (1994 ed. and Supp. V),[4] each of which "may be transferred [496] . . . and owned separately," § 201(d)(2).[5] Congress also provided, in § 404(a), that "a single notice applicable to the collective work as a whole is sufficient" to protect the rights of freelance contributors. And in § 201(c), Congress codified the discrete domains of "[c]opyright in each separate contribution to a collective work" and "copyright in the collective work as a whole." Together, § 404(a) and § 201(c) "preserve the author's copyright in a contribution even if the contribution does not bear a separate notice in the author's name, and without requiring any unqualified transfer of rights to the owner of the collective work." H. R. Rep. 122.

Section 201(c) both describes and circumscribes the "privilege" a publisher acquires regarding an author's contribution to a collective work:

"In the absence of an express transfer of the copyright or of any rights under it, the owner of copyright in the collective work is presumed to have acquired only the privilege of reproducing and distributing the contribution as part of that particular collective work, any revision of that collective work, and any later collective work in the same series." (Emphasis added.)

A newspaper or magazine publisher is thus privileged to reproduce or distribute an article contributed by a freelance author, absent a contract otherwise providing, only "as part of" any (or all) of three categories of collective works: (a) "that collective work" to which the author contributed her work, (b) "any revision of that collective work," or (c) "any later collective work in the same series." In accord with Congress' prescription, a "publishing company could reprint [497] a contribution from one issue in a later issue of its magazine, and could reprint an article from a 1980 edition of an encyclopedia in a 1990 revision of it; the publisher could not revise the contribution itself or include it in a new anthology or an entirely different magazine or other collective work." H. R. Rep. 122-123.

Essentially, § 201(c) adjusts a publisher's copyright in its collective work to accommodate a freelancer's copyright in her contribution. If there is demand for a freelance article standing alone or in a new collection, the Copyright Act allows the freelancer to benefit from that demand; after authorizing initial publication, the freelancer may also sell the article to others. Cf. Stewart v. Abend, 495 U. S. 207, 229 (1990) ("[w]hen an author produces a work which later commands a higher price in the market than the original bargain provided, the copyright statute [i. e., the separate renewal term of former 17 U. S. C. § 24] is designed to provide the author the power to negotiate for the realized value of the work"); id., at 230 (noting author's "inalienable termination right" under current 17 U. S. C. §§ 203, 302 (1994 ed. and Supp. V)). It would scarcely "preserve the author's copyright in a contribution" as contemplated by Congress, H. R. Rep. 122, if a newspaper or magazine publisher were permitted to reproduce or distribute copies of the author's contribution in isolation or within new collective works. See Gordon, Fine-Tuning Tasini: Privileges of Electronic Distribution and Reproduction, 66 Brooklyn L. Rev. 473, 484 (2000).[6] [498]

III

In the instant case, the Authors wrote several Articles and gave the Print Publishers permission to publish the Articles in certain newspapers and magazines. It is undisputed that the Authors hold copyrights and, therefore, exclusive rights in the Articles.[7] It is clear, moreover, that the Print and Electronic Publishers have exercised at least some rights that § 106 initially assigns exclusively to the Authors: LEXIS/NEXIS' central discs and UMI's CD—ROMs "reproduce . . . copies" of the Articles, § 106(1); UMI, by selling those CD—ROMs, and LEXIS/NEXIS, by selling copies of the Articles through the NEXIS Database, "distribute copies" of the Articles "to the public by sale," § 106(3); and the Print Publishers, through contracts licensing the production of copies in the Databases, "authorize" reproduction and distribution of the Articles, § 106.[8]

[499] Against the Authors' charge of infringement, the Publishers do not here contend the Authors entered into an agreement authorizing reproduction of the Articles in the Databases. See supra, at 489, n. 1. Nor do they assert that the copies in the Databases represent "fair use" of the Authors' Articles. See 17 U. S. C. § 107 ("fair use of a copyrighted work . . . is not an infringement"; four factors identified among those relevant to fair use determination). Instead, the Publishers rest entirely on the privilege described in § 201(c). Each discrete edition of the periodicals in which the Articles appeared is a "collective work," the Publishers agree. They contend, however, that reproduction and distribution of each Article by the Databases lie within the "privilege of reproducing and distributing the [Articles] as part of . . . [a] revision of that collective work," § 201(c). The Publishers' encompassing construction of the § 201(c) privilege is unacceptable, we conclude, for it would diminish the Authors' exclusive rights in the Articles.

In determining whether the Articles have been reproduced and distributed "as part of" a "revision" of the collective works in issue, we focus on the Articles as presented to, and perceptible by, the user of the Databases. See § 102 (copyright protection subsists in original works fixed in any medium "from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated"); see also § 101 (1994 ed., Supp. V) (definitions of "copies" and "fixed"); Haemmerli, Commentary: Tasini v. New York Times Co., 22 Colum.-VLA. J. L. & Arts 129, 142-143 (1998). In this case, the three Databases present articles to users clear of the context provided either by the original periodical editions or by any revision of those editions. The Databases first prompt users to search the universe of their contents: thousands or millions of files containing [500] individual articles from thousands of collective works (i. e., editions), either in one series (the Times, in NYTO) or in scores of series (the sundry titles in NEXIS and GPO). When the user conducts a search, each article appears as a separate item within the search result. In NEXIS and NYTO, an article appears to a user without the graphics, formatting, or other articles with which the article was initially published. In GPO, the article appears with the other materials published on the same page or pages, but without any material published on other pages of the original periodical. In either circumstance, we cannot see how the Database perceptibly reproduces and distributes the article "as part of" either the original edition or a "revision" of that edition.

One might view the articles as parts of a new compendium—namely, the entirety of works in the Database. In that compendium, each edition of each periodical represents only a miniscule fraction of the ever-expanding Database. The Database no more constitutes a "revision" of each constituent edition than a 400-page novel quoting a sonnet in passing would represent a "revision" of that poem. "Revision" denotes a new "version," and a version is, in this setting, a "distinct form of something regarded by its creator or others as one work." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1944, 2545 (1976). The massive whole of the Database is not recognizable as a new version of its every small part.

Alternatively, one could view the Articles in the Databases "as part of" no larger work at all, but simply as individual articles presented individually. That each article bears marks of its origin in a particular periodical (less vivid marks in NEXIS and NYTO, more vivid marks in GPO) suggests the article was previously part of that periodical. But the markings do not mean the article is currently reproduced or distributed as part of the periodical. The Databases' reproduction and distribution of individual Articles—simply as [501] individual Articles—would invade the core of the Authors' exclusive rights under § 106.[9]

The Publishers press an analogy between the Databases, on the one hand, and microfilm and microfiche, on the other. We find the analogy wanting. Microforms typically contain continuous photographic reproductions of a periodical in the medium of miniaturized film. Accordingly, articles appear on the microforms, writ very small, in precisely the position in which the articles appeared in the newspaper. The Times, for example, printed the beginning of Blakely's "Remembering Jane" Article on page 26 of the Magazine in the September 23, 1990, edition; the microfilm version of the Times reproduces that same Article on film in the very same position, within a film reproduction of the entire Magazine, in turn within a reproduction of the entire September 23, 1990, edition. True, the microfilm roll contains multiple editions, and the microfilm user can adjust the machine lens to focus only on the Article, to the exclusion of surrounding material. Nonetheless, the user first encounters the Article in context. In the Databases, by contrast, the Articles appear disconnected from their original context. In NEXIS and NYTO, the user sees the "Jane" Article apart even from the remainder of page 26. In GPO, the user sees the Article within the context of page 26, but clear of the context of page 25 or page 27, the rest of the Magazine, or the remainder of the day's newspaper. In short, unlike microforms, the Databases do not perceptibly reproduce articles as part of the [502] collective work to which the author contributed or as part of any "revision" thereof.[10]

Invoking the concept of "media neutrality," the Publishers urge that the "transfer of a work between media" does not "alte[r] the character of" that work for copyright purposes. Brief for Petitioners 23. That is indeed true. See 17 U. S. C. § 102(a) (copyright protection subsists in original works "fixed in any tangible medium of expression"). But unlike the conversion of newsprint to microfilm, the transfer of articles to the Databases does not represent a mere conversion of intact periodicals (or revisions of periodicals) from one medium to another. The Databases offer users individual articles, not intact periodicals. In this case, media neutrality should protect the Authors' rights in the individual Articles to the extent those Articles are now presented individually, outside the collective work context, within the Databases' new media.[11]

For the purpose at hand—determining whether the Authors' copyrights have been infringed—an analogy to an [503] imaginary library may be instructive.[12] Rather than maintaining intact editions of periodicals, the library would contain separate copies of each article. Perhaps these copies would exactly reproduce the periodical pages from which the articles derive (if the model is GPO); perhaps the copies would contain only typescript characters, but still indicate the original periodical's name and date, as well as the article's headline and page number (if the model is NEXIS or NYTO). The library would store the folders containing the articles in a file room, indexed based on diverse criteria, and containing articles from vast numbers of editions. In response to patron requests, an inhumanly speedy librarian would search the room and provide copies of the articles matching patron-specified criteria.

Viewing this strange library, one could not, consistent with ordinary English usage, characterize the articles "as part of" a "revision" of the editions in which the articles first appeared. In substance, however, the Databases differ from the file room only to the extent they aggregate articles in electronic packages (the LEXIS/NEXIS central discs or UMI CD—ROMs), while the file room stores articles in spatially separate files. The crucial fact is that the Databases, like the hypothetical library, store and retrieve articles separately within a vast domain of diverse texts. Such a storage and retrieval system effectively overrides the Authors' exclusive [504] right to control the individual reproduction and distribution of each Article, 17 U. S. C. §§ 106(1), (3). Cf. Ryan v. Carl Corp., 23 F. Supp. 2d 1146 (ND Cal. 1998) (holding copy shop in violation of § 201(c)).

The Publishers claim the protection of § 201(c) because users can manipulate the Databases to generate search results consisting entirely of articles from a particular periodical edition. By this logic, § 201(c) would cover the hypothetical library if, in response to a request, that library's expert staff assembled all of the articles from a particular periodical edition. However, the fact that a third party can manipulate a database to produce a noninfringing document does not mean the database is not infringing. Under § 201(c), the question is not whether a user can generate a revision of a collective work from a database, but whether the database itself perceptibly presents the author's contribution as part of a revision of the collective work. That result is not accomplished by these Databases.

The Publishers finally invoke Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U. S. 417 (1984). That decision, however, does not genuinely aid their argument. Sony held that the "sale of copying equipment" does not constitute contributory infringement if the equipment is "capable of substantial noninfringing uses." Id., at 442. The Publishers suggest that their Databases could be liable only under a theory of contributory infringement, based on enduser conduct, which the Authors did not plead. The Electronic Publishers, however, are not merely selling "equipment"; they are selling copies of the Articles. And, as we have explained, it is the copies themselves, without any manipulation by users, that fall outside the scope of the § 201(c) privilege.

IV

The Publishers warn that a ruling for the Authors will have "devastating" consequences. Brief for Petitioners 49. The Databases, the Publishers note, provide easy access to [505] complete newspaper texts going back decades. A ruling for the Authors, the Publishers suggest, will punch gaping holes in the electronic record of history. The Publishers' concerns are echoed by several historians, see Brief for Ken Burns et al. as Amici Curiae, but discounted by several other historians, see Brief for Ellen Schrecker et al. as Amici Curiae; Brief for Authors' Guild, Inc., Jacques Barzun et al. as Amici Curiae.

Notwithstanding the dire predictions from some quarters, see also post, at 520 (Stevens, J., dissenting), it hardly follows from today's decision that an injunction against the inclusion of these Articles in the Databases (much less all freelance articles in any databases) must issue. See 17 U. S. C. § 502(a) (court "may" enjoin infringement); Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U. S. 569, 578, n. 10 (1994) (goals of copyright law are "not always best served by automatically granting injunctive relief"). The parties (Authors and Publishers) may enter into an agreement allowing continued electronic reproduction of the Authors' works; they, and if necessary the courts and Congress, may draw on numerous models for distributing copyrighted works and remunerating authors for their distribution. See, e. g., 17 U. S. C. § 118(b); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 441 U. S. 1, 4-6, 10-12 (1979) (recounting history of blanket music licensing regimes and consent decrees governing their operation).[13] In any event, speculation about [506] future harms is no basis for this Court to shrink authorial rights Congress established in § 201(c). Agreeing with the Court of Appeals that the Publishers are liable for infringement, we leave remedial issues open for initial airing and decision in the District Court.

* * *

We conclude that the Electronic Publishers infringed the Authors' copyrights by reproducing and distributing the Articles in a manner not authorized by the Authors and not privileged by § 201(c). We further conclude that the Print Publishers infringed the Authors' copyrights by authorizing the Electronic Publishers to place the Articles in the Databases and by aiding the Electronic Publishers in that endeavor. We therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

It is so ordered.

Justice Stevens, with whom Justice Breyer joins, dissenting.

This case raises an issue of first impression concerning the meaning of the word "revision" as used in § 201(c) of the 1976 revision of the Copyright Act of 1909 (1976 Act). Ironically, the Court today seems unwilling to acknowledge that changes in a collective work far less extensive than those made to prior copyright law by the 1976 "revision" do not merit the same characterization.

To explain my disagreement with the Court's holding, I shall first identify Congress' principal goals in passing the 1976 Act's changes in the prior law with respect to collective works. I will then discuss two analytically separate questions [507] that are blended together in the Court's discussion of revisions. The first is whether the electronic versions of the collective works created by the owners of the copyright in those works (Print Publishers or publishers) are "revision[s]" of those works within the meaning of 17 U. S. C. § 201(c). In my judgment they definitely are. The second is whether the aggregation by LEXIS/NEXIS and UMI (Electronic Databases) of the revisions with other editions of the same periodical or with other periodicals within a single database changes the equation. I think it does not. Finally, I will consider the implications of broader copyright policy for the issues presented in this case.

I

As the majority correctly observes, prior to 1976, an author's decision to publish her individual article as part of a collective work was a perilous one. Although pre-1976 copyright law recognized the author's copyright in an individual article that was included within a collective work, those rights could be lost if the publisher refused to print the article with a copyright notice in the author's name. 3 M. Nimmer & D. Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 10.01[C][2], p. 10-12 (2000).

This harsh rule was, from the author's point of view, exacerbated by the pre-1976 doctrine of copyright "indivisibility," which prevented an author from assigning only limited publication rights to the publisher of a collective work while holding back all other rights to herself.[1]Ibid. The indivisibility of copyright, in combination with the danger of losing copyright protection, put significant pressure on an author seeking to preserve her copyright in the contribution to [508] transfer the entire copyright over to the publisher in trust. See Kaminstein, Divisibility of Copyrights, Study No. 11, in Copyright Law Revision Studies Nos. 11-13, prepared for the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., 18-22 (1960) (hereinafter Kaminstein).[2] Such authors were often at the mercy of publishers when they tried to reclaim their copyright. Id., at 21.[3]

The 1976 Act's extensive revisions of the copyright law had two principal goals with respect to the rights of freelance authors whose writings appeared as part of larger collective works. First, as the legislative history of § 201(c) unambiguously reveals, one of its most significant aims was to "preserve the author's copyright in a contribution even if the contribution does not bear a separate notice in the author's name, and without requiring any unqualified transfer of rights to the owner of the collective work." H. R. Rep. No. 94-1476, p. 122 (1976) (hereinafter H. R. Rep.) (discussing the purpose of § 201(c)). Indeed, § 404(a) states that "a single notice applicable to the collective work as a whole is sufficient" to protect the author's rights.

The second significant change effected by the 1976 Act clarified the scope of the privilege granted to the publisher of a collective work. While pre-1976 law had the effect of encouraging an author to transfer her entire copyright to the [509] publisher of a collective work, § 201(c) creates the opposite incentive, stating that, absent some agreement to the contrary, the publisher acquires from the author only "the privilege of reproducing and distributing the contribution as part of that particular collective work, any revision of that collective work, and any later collective work in the same series."[4] Congress intended this limitation on what the author is presumed to give away primarily to keep publishers from "revis[ing] the contribution itself or includ[ing] it in a new anthology or an entirely different magazine or other collective work. " H. R. Rep. 122-123.[5]

[510] The majority is surely correct that the 1976 Act's new approach to collective works was an attempt to "`clarify and improve the . . . confused and frequently unfair legal situation' " that existed under the prior regime. Id., at 122. It is also undoubtedly true that the drafters of the 1976 Act hoped to "enhance the author's position vis-à-vis the patron." Ante, at 495, n. 3. It does not follow, however, that Congress' efforts to "preserve the author's copyright in a contribution," H. R. Rep. 122, can only be honored by a finding in favor of the respondent authors.

Indeed, the conclusion that the petitioners' actions were lawful is fully consistent with both of Congress' principal goals for collective works in the 1976 Act. First, neither the publication of the collective works by the Print Publishers nor their transfer to the Electronic Databases had any impact on the legal status of the copyrights of the respondents' individual contributions.[6] By virtue of the 1976 Act, respondents remain the owners of the copyright in their individual works. Moreover, petitioners neither modified respondents' individual contributions nor, as I will show in Part II, published them in a "new anthology or an entirely different magazine or other collective work. " Id., at 122— 123 (emphasis added). Because I do not think it is at all obvious that the decision the majority reaches today is a result clearly intended by the 1976 Congress, I disagree with the Court's conclusion that a ruling in petitioners' favor [511] would "shrink authorial rights" that "Congress [has] established." Ante, at 506 (emphasis added).

II

Not only is petitioners' position consistent with Congress' general goals in the 1976 Act, it is also consistent with the text of § 201(c). That provision allows the publisher of a collective work to "reproduc[e] and distribut[e] the contribution as part of that particular collective work, any revision of that collective work, and any later collective work in the same series." The central question in this case, then, is whether petitioners are correct when they argue that publication of the respondents' articles in the various Electronic Databases at issue in this case is nothing more than "reproduc[tion] and distribut[ion] [of] the contribution as part of . . . revision[s] of [the original] collective work[s]" in which respondents' articles appeared. I agree with petitioners that neither the conversion of the Print Publishers' collective works from printed to electronic form, nor the transmission of those electronic versions of the collective works to the Electronic Databases, nor even the actions of the Electronic Databases once they receive those electronic versions does anything to deprive those electronic versions of their status as mere "revision[s]" of the original collective works.

A proper analysis of this case benefits from an incremental approach. Accordingly, I begin by discussing an issue the majority largely ignores: whether a collection of articles from a single edition of the New York Times (i. e., the batch of files the Print Publishers periodically send to the Electronic Databases) constitutes a "revision" of an individual edition of the paper. In other words, does a single article within such a collection exist as "part of" a "revision"? Like the majority, I believe that the crucial inquiry is whether the article appears within the "context" of the original collective work. Ante, at 502. But this question simply raises the further issue of precisely how much "context" is enough.

[512] The record indicates that what is sent from the New York Times to the Electronic Databases (with the exception of General Periodicals OnDisc (GPO)) is simply a collection of ASCII text files representing the editorial content of the New York Times for a particular day.[7] App. 73a. Each individual ASCII file contains the text of a single article as well as additional coding intended to help readers identify the context in which the article originally appeared and to facilitate database searches. Thus, for example, to the original text of an article, the New York Times adds information on the article's "headline, byline and title," "the section of the paper in which the article had originally appeared," and "the page in the paper or periodical on which the article had first appeared." Id., at 75a—76a.[8]

I see no compelling reason why a collection of files corresponding to a single edition of the New York Times, standing alone, cannot constitute a "revision" of that day's New York Times. It might be argued, as respondents appear to do, that the presentation of each article within its own electronic file makes it impossible to claim that the collection of files as a whole amounts to a "revision." Brief for Respondents Tasini et al. 34. But the conversion of the text of the overall collective work into separate electronic files should not, by itself, decide the question. After all, one of the hallmarks of copyright policy, as the majority recognizes, ante, at 502, is the principle of media neutrality. See H. R. Rep. 53.

No one doubts that the New York Times has the right to reprint its issues in Braille, in a foreign language, or in [513] microform, even though such revisions might look and feel quite different from the original. Such differences, however, would largely result from the different medium being employed. Similarly, the decision to convert the single collective work newspaper into a collection of individual ASCII files can be explained as little more than a decision that reflects the different nature of the electronic medium. Just as the paper version of the New York Times is divided into "sections" and "pages" in order to facilitate the reader's navigation and manipulation of large batches of newsprint, so too the decision to subdivide the electronic version of that collective work into individual article files facilitates the reader's use of the electronic information. The barebones nature of ASCII text would make trying to wade through a single ASCII file containing the entire content of a single edition of the New York Times an exercise in frustration.[9]

Although the Court does not separately discuss the question whether the groups of files that the New York Times sends to the Electronic Databases constitute "revision[s]," its reasoning strongly suggests that it would not accept such a characterization. The majority, for example, places significant emphasis on the differences between the various Electronic Databases and microform, a medium that admittedly qualifies as a revision under § 201(c).[10] As with the conversion of individual editions into collections of separate article files, however, many of the differences between the [514] electronic versions and microform are necessitated by the electronic medium. The Court therefore appears to back away from principles of media neutrality when it implicitly criticizes ASCII-text files for their inability to reproduce "Remembering Jane" "in the very same position, within a film reproduction of the entire Magazine, in turn within a reproduction of the entire September 23, 1990, edition." Ante, at 501.[11]

In contrast, I think that a proper respect for media neutrality suggests that the New York Times, reproduced as a collection of individual ASCII files, should be treated as a "revision" of the original edition, as long as each article explicitly refers to the original collective work and as long as substantially the rest of the collective work is, at the same time, readily accessible to the reader of the individual file. In this case, no one disputes that the first pieces of information a user sees when looking at an individual ASCII article file are the name of the publication in which the article appeared, the edition of that publication, and the location of the article within that edition. I agree with the majority that such labeling alone is insufficient to establish that the individual file exists as "part of" a revision of the original collective work. See ante, at 500-501. But such labeling is not all there is in the group of files sent to the Electronic Databases.

In addition to the labels, the batch of electronic files contains the entire editorial content of the original edition of the New York Times for that day. That is, while I might agree that a single article, standing alone, even when coded with identifying information (e. g., publication, edition date, [515] headline, etc.), should not be characterized as a "part of" a larger collective work, I would not say the same about an individual article existing as "part of" a collection of articles containing all the editorial content of that day's New York Times. This is all the more true because, as the District Court correctly noted, it is the Print Publishers' selection process, the editorial process by which the staff of the New York Times, for example, decides which articles will be included in "All the News That's Fit to Print," that is the most important creative element they contribute to the collective works they publish. 972 F. Supp. 804, 823 (SDNY 1997).[12] While such superficial features as page placement and column width are lost in ASCII format, the Print Publishers' all-important editorial selection is wholly preserved in the collection of individual article files sent to the Electronic Databases.

To see why an electronic version of the New York Times made up of a group of individual ASCII article files, standing alone, may be considered a § 201(c) revision, suppose that, instead of transmitting to NEXIS the articles making up a particular day's edition, the New York Times saves all of the individual files on a single floppy disk, labels that disk "New York Times, October 31, 2000," and sells copies of the disk to users as the electronic version of that day's New York Times. The disk reproduces the creative, editorial selection of that edition of the New York Times. The reader, after all, has at his fingertips substantially all of the relevant content of the October 31 edition of the collective work. Moreover, each individual article makes explicit reference to that selection by including tags that remind the reader that it is a part of the New York Times for October 31, 2000. Such a disk might well constitute "that particular collective work"; it would surely qualify as a "revision" of the original collective [516] work. Yet all the features identified as essential by the majority and by the respondents would still be lacking. An individual looking at one of the articles contained on the disk would still see none of the original formatting context and would still be unable to flip the page.

Once one accepts the premise that a disk containing all the files from the October 31, 2000, New York Times can constitute a "revision," there is no reason to treat any differently the same set of files, stored in a folder on the hard disk of a computer at the New York Times. Thus, at least before it is republished by the Electronic Databases, the collection of files that the New York Times transmits to them constitutes a revision, in electronic form, of a particular edition of the New York Times.

III

The next question, then, is whether anything that the Electronic Databases do to the transmitted "revision" strips it of that status. The heart of the Court's reasoning in this respect, as I understand it, is that, once received and processed by Electronic Databases, the data transmitted by the New York Times cannot be viewed as "revisions" within the meaning of § 201(c) because of the way that data is stored and made available to the public by those Databases. First, the Court points to the fact that "the three Databases present articles to users clear of the context provided either by the original periodical editions or by any revision of those editions." Ante, at 499. I have already addressed these formatting concerns. Second, and not wholly unrelated to the first point, however, the Court appears to think that the commingling of my hypothetical collection of ASCII article files from the October 31, 2000, New York Times with similar collections of files from other editions of the New York Times (or from other periodicals) within one database would deprive that collection of revision status. See ante, at 501, n. 9. Even if my imaginary floppy disk could, in isolation, be considered a revision, the majority might [517] say, that status would be lost if the floppy disk were to contain, not only the files from the October 31, 2000, New York Times, but also from the New York Times for every other day in 2000 (and other years) and from hundreds of other periodicals. I disagree.

If my hypothetical October 31, 2000, floppy disk can be a revision, I do not see why the inclusion of other editions and other periodicals is any more significant than the placement of a single edition of the New York Times in a large public library or in a bookstore. Each individual file still reminds the reader that he is viewing "part of" a particular collective work. And the entire editorial content of that work still exists at the reader's fingertips.[13]

It is true that, once the revision of the October 31, 2000, New York Times is surrounded by the additional content, it can be conceptualized as existing as part of an even larger collective work (e. g., the entire NEXIS database). See ante, at 500. The question then becomes whether this ability to conceive of a revision of a collective work as existing within a larger "collective work" changes the status of the original revision. Section 201(c)'s requirement that the article be published only as "part of . . . any revision of that collective work " does not compel any particular answer to that question. A microfilm of the New York Times for October 31, 2000, does not cease to be a revision of that individual collective work simply because it is stored on the same roll of film as other editions of the Times or on a library shelf containing hundreds of other microfilm periodicals. Nor does § 201(c) compel the counterintuitive conclusion that the microfilm version of the Times would cease to be a revision simply because its publishers might choose to sell it on rolls of film that contained a year's editions of both the New York Times and the Herald-Tribune. Similarly, the placement of [518] our hypothetical electronic revision of the October 31, 2000, New York Times within a larger electronic database does nothing to alter either the nature of our original electronic revision or the relationship between that revision and the individual articles that exist as "part of" it.

Finally, the mere fact that an individual user may either view or print copies of individual articles stored on the Electronic Databases does not change the nature of the revisions contained within those databases. The same media-specific necessities that allow the publishers to store and make available the original collective work as a collection of individual digital files make it reasonable for the Electronic Databases to enable the user to download or print only those files in which the user has a particular interest. But this is no different from microfilm. Just as nothing intrinsic in the nature of microfilm dictates to a user how much or how little of a microform edition of the New York Times she must copy, nothing intrinsic in the Electronic Databases dictates to a user how much (or how little) of a particular edition of the New York Times to view or print. It is up to the user in each instance to decide whether to employ the publisher's product in a manner that infringes either the publisher's or the author's copyright. And to the extent that the user's decision to make a copy of a particular article violates the author's copyright in that article, such infringing third-party behavior should not be attributed to the database.[14] See Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U. S. 417, 434 (1984).

IV

My reading of "revision," as encompassing products like the Electronic Databases, is not the only possible answer to [519] the complex questions presented by this case. It is, nevertheless, one that is consistent with the statutory text and entirely faithful to the statute's purposes. Respect for the policies motivating its enactment, to which I now turn, makes it wrong for the Court to reject this reading of § 201(c).

It is likely that the Congress that enacted the 1976 revision of the law of copyright did not anticipate the developments that occurred in the 1980's which gave rise to the practices challenged in this litigation. See Miller, Copyright Protection for Computer Programs, Databases, and Computer-Generated Works: Is Anything New Since CONTU?, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 977, 979 (1993) (in 1976, "Congress . . . decided to avoid grappling with technological issues that obviously required more study than the legislative process was then willing to give them").[15] Thus, in resolving ambiguities in the relevant text of the statute, we should be mindful of the policies underlying copyright law.

Macaulay wrote that copyright is "a tax on readers for the purpose of giving a bounty to writers." T. Macaulay, Speeches on Copyright 11 (A. Thorndike ed. 1915). That tax restricts the dissemination of writings, but only insofar as necessary to encourage their production, the bounty's basic objective. See U. S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 8. In other words, "[t]he primary purpose of copyright is not to reward the author, but is rather to secure `the general benefits derived by the public from the labors of authors.' " 1 M. Nimmer & D. Nimmer, Copyright § 1.03[A] (2000) (quoting Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U. S. 123, 127 (1932)); see also Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of [520] Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 281, 282 (1970) (discussing the twin goals of copyright law—protecting the reader's desire for access to ideas and providing incentives for authors to produce them). The majority's decision today unnecessarily subverts this fundamental goal of copyright law in favor of a narrow focus on "authorial rights." Ante, at 506. Although the desire to protect such rights is certainly a laudable sentiment,[16] copyright law demands that "private motivation must ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad public availability of literature, music, and the other arts." Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U. S. 151, 156 (1975) (emphasis added).

The majority discounts the effect its decision will have on the availability of comprehensive digital databases, ante, at 504-505, but I am not as confident. As petitioners' amici have persuasively argued, the difficulties of locating individual freelance authors and the potential of exposure to statutory damages may well have the effect of forcing electronic archives to purge freelance pieces from their databases.[17] "The omission of these materials from electronic collections, for any reason on a large scale or even an occasional basis, undermines the principal benefits that electronic archives offer historians—efficiency, accuracy and comprehensiveness." [18] Brief for Ken Burns et al. as Amici Curiae 13.

[521] Moreover, it is far from clear that my position even deprives authors of much of anything (with the exception of perhaps the retrospective statutory damages that may well result from their victory today).[19] Imagine, for example, that one of the contributions at issue in this case were a copyrighted version of John Keats' Ode on a Grecian Urn, published on page 29 of our hypothetical October 31, 2000, New York Times. Even under my reading of § 201(c), Keats retains valuable copyright protection. No matter how well received his ode might be, it is unlikely—although admittedly possible—that it could be marketed as a stand-alone work of art. The ode, however, would be an obvious candidate for inclusion in an anthology of works by romantic poets, in a collection of poems by the same author, or even in "a 400-page novel quoting a [poem] in passing," ante, at 500. The author's copyright would protect his right to compensation for any such use. Cf. Stewart v. Abend, 495 U. S. 207, 228 (1990) (discussing the value to authors of derivative works). Moreover, the value of the ode surely would be enhanced, not decreased, by the accessibility and readership of the October 31, 2000, edition of the New York Times. The ready availability of that edition, both at the time of its first publication and subsequently in libraries and electronic databases, would be a benefit, not an injury, to most authors. Keats would benefit from the poem's continued availability to database users, by his identification as the author of the piece, and by the database's indication of the fact that the poem first appeared in a prestigious periodical on a certain date. He would not care one whit whether the database indicated [522] the formatting context of the page on which the poem appeared. What is overwhelmingly clear is that maximizing the readership of the ode would enhance the value of his remaining copyright uses.

Nor is it clear that Keats will gain any prospective benefits from a victory in this case. As counsel for petitioners represented at oral argument, since 1995, the New York Times has required freelance authors to grant the Times "electronic rights" to articles. Tr. of Oral Arg. 7. And the inclusion of such a term has had no effect on the compensation authors receive. See ibid. This is understandable because, even if one accepts the majority's characterization of the Electronic Databases as collections of freestanding articles, demand for databases like NEXIS probably does not reflect a "demand for a freelance article standing alone," ante, at 497, to which the publishers are greedily helping themselves. Cf. Ryan v. Carl Corp., 23 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1150-1151 (ND Cal. 1998) ("[T]he value added by the publisher to a reproduced article is significant").

Instead, it seems far more likely that demand for the Electronic Databases reflects demand for a product that will provide a user with the means to quickly search through scores of complete periodicals. The comments of historian Douglas Brinkley are instructive in this respect:

"'As an historian, when I want to write a biography, if I'm going to write a biography of Bill Clinton, the first thing I would do would be to index The New York Times. I would work through [the] microfiche and get any time Bill Clinton's name ever appeared in The New York Times. I'd get a copy of that. So, you'd have boxes of files. So for each month, here's Clinton this month. . . .You then would fill that in with . . . other obvious books or articles from Foreign Affairs or Foreign Policy or The New Yorker, or the like and you'd start getting your first biography of Bill Clinton.' " Panel Discussion: The Observer's View (D. Brinkley, M. [523] Frankel, H. Sidey), White House Historical Association (Nov. 16, 2000) (C—SPAN Archives No. 160577) (quoted in Brief for Ken Burns et al. as Amici Curiae 17).

Users like Douglas Brinkley do not go to NEXIS because it contains a score of individual articles by Jonathan Tasini.[20] Rather, they go to NEXIS because it contains a comprehensive and easily searchable collection of (intact) periodicals. [524] See id., at 8 ("The efficiency, accuracy, reliability, comprehensiveness and immediacy of access offered by searchable fulltext digital archives are but a few of the benefits historians and other researchers have reaped from the advancement in the technology of information").

Because it is likely that Congress did not consider the question raised by this case when drafting § 201(c), because I think the District Court's reading of that provision is reasonable and consistent with the statute's purposes, and because the principal goals of copyright policy are better served by that reading, I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. The majority is correct that we cannot know in advance the effects of today's decision on the comprehensiveness of electronic databases. We can be fairly certain, however, that it will provide little, if any, benefit to either authors or readers.

[*] Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for Advance Publications, Inc., et al. by Charles S. Sims, Jerry S. Birenz, Harold W. Fuson, Jr., Andrew A. Merdek, Barbara W. Wall, Katherine Hatton, Barbara Cohen, and Clifford M. Sloan; for the National Geographic Society by Kenneth W. Starr, Christopher Landau, Terrence B. Adamson, and Robert G. Sugarman; for the Software & Information Industry Association et al. by Henry B. Gutman, Arthur R. Miller, and James F. Rittinger; and for Ken Burns et al. by Michael F. Clayton and Brett I. Miller.

Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Library Association et al.by Arnold P. Lutzker; for the Authors Guild, Inc., et al. by Leon Friedman; for the International Federation of Journalists by Thomas M. Peterson and Brett M. Schuman; and for Ellen Schrecker et al. by Theodore M. Lieverman.

Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the American Intellectual Property Law Association by Paul E. Lacy and Daniel W. McDonald; and for the American Society of Media Photographers, Inc., et al. by L. Donald Prutzman and Victor S. Perlman.

[1] In the District Court, Newsday and Time contended that the freelancers who wrote for their publications had entered into agreements authorizing reproduction of the Articles in the databases. The Court of Appeals ruled that Newsday's defense was waived, and rejected Time's argument on the merits. Neither petitioner presses the contention here.

[2] For example, the GPO user who retrieves Blakely's "Remembering Jane" article will see the entirety of Magazine page 26, where the article begins, and Magazine page 78, where the article continues and ends. The NYTO user who retrieves Blakely's article will see only the text of the article and its identifying information (author, headline, publication, page number, etc.). Neither the GPO retrieval nor the NYTO retrieval produces any text on page 27, page 79, or any other page. The user who wishes to see other pages may not simply "flip" to them. She must conduct a new search.

[3] Two Registers of Copyrights have observed that the 1976 revision of the Copyright Act represented "a break with a two-hundred-year-old tradition that has identified copyright more closely with the publisher than with the author." Letter from M. Peters to Rep. McGovern, reprinted in 147 Cong. Rec. E182 (Feb. 14, 2001) (hereinafter Peters Letter) (quoting Ringer, First Thoughts on the Copyright Act of 1976, 22 N. Y. L. S. L. Rev. 477, 490 (1977)). The intent to enhance the author's position vis-à-vis the patron is also evident in the 1976 Act's work-for-hire provisions. See Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U. S. 730, 742-750 (1989); see also 17 U. S. C. § 203(a)(5) (inalienable authorial right to revoke a copyright transfer). Congress' adjustment of the author/publisher balance is a permissible expression of the "economic philosophy behind the [Copyright Clause]," i. e., "the conviction that encouragement of individual effort [motivated] by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare." Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U. S. 539, 558 (1985) (quoting Mazer v. Stein, 347 U. S. 201, 219 (1954)).

[4] As amended, § 106 now provides: "Subject to sections 107 through 121, the owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following:

"(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;

"(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;

"(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending;

"(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the copyrighted work publicly;

"(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted work publicly; and

"(6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted work publicly by means of a digital audio transmission."

[5] It bears repetition here, see supra, at 493, that we neither decide nor express any view on whether the § 201(c) "privilege" may be transferred.

[6] The dissenting opinion suggests that a ruling for the Publishers today would maintain, even enhance, authors' "valuable copyright protection." Post, at 521 (opinion of Stevens, J.). We are not so certain. When the reader of an article in a periodical wishes to obtain other works by the article's author, the Databases enable that reader simply to print out the author's articles, without buying a "new anthology . . . or other collective work," H. R. Rep. 122-123. In years past, books compiling stories by journalists such as Janet Flanner and Ernie Pyle might have sold less well had the individual articles been freely and permanently available on line. In the present, print collections of reviews, commentaries, and reportage may prove less popular because of the Databases. The Register of Copyrights reports that "freelance authors have experienced significant economic loss" due to a "digital revolution that has given publishers [new] opportunities to exploit authors' works." Peters Letter E182.

More to the point, even if the dissent is correct that some authors, in the long run, are helped, not hurt, by Database reproductions, the fact remains that the Authors who brought the case now before us have asserted their rights under § 201(c). We may not invoke our conception of their interests to diminish those rights.

[7] The Publishers do not claim that the Articles are "work[s] made for hire." 17 U. S. C. § 201(b). As to such works, the employer or person for whom a work was prepared is treated as the author. Ibid. The Print Publishers, however, neither engaged the Authors to write the Articles as "employee[s]" nor "commissioned" the Articles through "a written instrument signed by [both parties]" indicating that the Articles shall be considered "work[s] made for hire." § 101 (1994 ed., Supp. V) (defining "work made for hire").

[8] Satisfied that the Publishers exercised rights § 106 initially assigns exclusively to the Author, we need resolve no more on that score. Thus, we do not reach an issue the Register of Copyrights has argued vigorously. The Register maintains that the Databases publicly "display" the Articles, § 106(5); because § 201(c) does not privilege "display," the Register urges, the § 201(c) privilege does not shield the Databases. See Peters Letter E182—E183.

[9] The dissenting opinion takes as its starting point "what is sent from the New York Times to the Electronic Databases." See post, at 512-516. This case, however, is not ultimately about what is sent between Publishers in an intermediate step of Database production; it is about what is presented to the general public in the Databases. See supra, at 499-500. Those Databases simply cannot bear characterization as a "revision" of any one periodical edition. We would reach the same conclusion if the Times sent intact newspapers to the Electronic Publishers.

[10] The Court of Appeals concluded NEXIS was infringing partly because that Database did "almost nothing to preserve the copyrightable aspects of the [Print] Publishers' collective works," i. e., their original "selection, coordination, and arrangement." 206 F. 3d 161, 168 (CA2 1999). We do not pass on this issue. It suffices to hold that the Databases do not contain "revisions" of the Print Publishers' works "as part of" which the Articles are reproduced and distributed.

[11] The dissenting opinion apparently concludes that, under the banner of "media neutrality," a copy of a collective work, even when considerably changed, must constitute a "revision" of that collective work so long as the changes were "necessitated by the . . . medium." Post, at 514. We lack the dissent's confidence that the current form of the Databases is entirely attributable to the nature of the electronic media, rather than the nature of the economic market served by the Databases. In any case, we see no grounding in § 201(c) for a "medium-driven" necessity defense, post, at 514, n. 11, to the Authors' infringement claims. Furthermore, it bears reminder here and throughout that these Publishers and all others can protect their interests by private contractual arrangement.

[12] The Publishers have frequently referred to their products as "electronic libraries." We need not decide whether the Databases come within the legal coverage of the term "libraries" as used in the Copyright Act. For even if the Databases are "libraries," the Copyright Act's special authorizations for libraries do not cover the Databases' reproductions. See, e. g., 17 U. S. C. § 108(a)(1) (reproduction authorized "without any purpose of direct or indirect commercial advantage"); § 108(b) (1994 ed., Supp. V) (reproduction authorized "solely for purposes of preservation and security or for deposit for research use"); § 108(c) (1994 ed., Supp. V) (reproduction "solely for the purpose of replacement of a copy or phonorecord that is damaged, deteriorating, lost, or stolen, or if the existing format in which the work is stored has become obsolete").

[13] Courts in other nations, applying their domestic copyright laws, have also concluded that Internet or CD—ROM reproduction and distribution of freelancers' works violate the copyrights of freelancers. See, e. g., Union Syndicale des Journalistes Français v. SDV Plurimédia (T. G. I., Strasbourg, Fr., Feb. 3, 1998), in Lodging of International Federation of Journalists (IFJ) as Amicus Curiae; S. C. R. L. Central Station v. Association Generale des Journalistes Professionnels de Belgique (CA, Brussels, Belg., 9e ch., Oct. 28, 1997), transl. and ed. in 22 Colum.-VLA J.L. & Arts 195 (1998); Heg v. De Volskrant B. V. (Dist. Ct., Amsterdam, Neth., Sept. 24, 1997), transl. and ed. in 22 Colum.-VLA J. L. & Arts, at 181. After the French Plurimédia decision, the journalists' union and the newspaper-defendant entered into an agreement compensating authors for the continued electronic reproduction of their works. See FR3 v. Syndicats de Journalistes (CA, Colmar, Sept. 15, 1998), in Lodging of IFJ as Amicus Curiae. In Norway, it has been reported, a similar agreement was reached. See Brief for IFJ as Amicus Curiae 18.

[1] Contractual attempts to assign such limited rights were deemed by courts to create mere licenses,such that the failure to accompany the article with an individual copyright in the author's name allowed the article to pass into the public domain. See 3 M. Nimmer & D. Nimmer, Copyright § 10.01[A], p. 10-5; § 10.01[C][2], p. 10-12 (2000).

[2] Cf. Goodis v. United Artists Television, Inc., 425 F. 2d 397 (CA2 1970) (creating a legal fiction in which the publisher to whom an author gave first publication rights was considered the legal owner of the author's copyright, which the publisher was deemed to hold in trust for the "beneficial owner," the author).

[3]

"Usually, publishers are perfectly willing to return copyright to the author, at least with respect to everything except enumerated serial or reprint rights. There have been allegations that smaller publishers sometimes believe that they are entitled to share in the subsidiary rights and refuse to reassign, or insist upon sharing part of the profits of [the] sales to motion picture, television or dramatic users. In these cases, the author must undertake the burden of proving his contract with the publisher and demonstrating his capacity to sue." Kaminstein 21.

[4] Respondents Garson and Robbins argue that the § 201(c) privilege is completely nontransferable. See Brief for Respondents Garson et al. 26— 29. The District Court properly rejected this argument, see 972 F. Supp. 804, 815-816 (SDNY 1997), which, in my view, is supported by neither the text nor the legislative history of § 201(c). Publishers obviously cannot assign their publication privilege to another publisher such that the author's work appears in a wholly different collective work, but nothing in § 201(c) clearly prohibits a publisher from merely farming out the mundane task of printing or distributing its collective work or its revision of that collective work. Because neither the majority nor the Court of Appeals has reached this issue, however, see ante, at 493; 206 F. 3d 161, 165, and n. 2 (CA2 2000), I will not address it further.

[5] As the District Court observed, representatives of authors had objected to an earlier draft of the 1976 Act that might have been read to give publishers the right to change the text of the contributions. That version gave publishers the privilege to print the individual article "`as part of that particular collective work and any revisions of it.' " 972 F. Supp., at 819. Harriet Pilpel, "a prominent author representative," expressed the following concern: "`I have but one question with reference to the wording, and that is with respect to the wording at the end of subsection (c) `. . . and any revisions of it.' If that means `any revision of the collective work' in terms of changing the contributions, or their order, or including different contributions, obviously the magazine writers and photographers would not object. But there is an implication, or at least an ambiguity, that somehow the owner of the collective work has a right to make revisions in the contributions to the collective work. This is not and should not be the law, and consequently I suggest that the wording at the end of subsection (c) be changed to make that absolutely clear.' " 1964 Revision Bill with Discussions and Comments, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 5,p. 9 (H. Comm. Print 1965), quoted in 972 F. Supp., at 819.

[6] Nor is the majority correct that, even if respondents retained copyright in their individual articles, the conclusion that petitioners could republish their collective works on the Electronic Databases would drain that copyright of value. See infra, at 521-522. Even on my view of this case, respondents retain substantial rights over their articles. Only the respondents, for example, could authorize the publication of their articles in different periodicals or in new topical anthologies wholly apart from the context of the original collective works in which their articles appeared.

[7] ASCII (American Standard Code for Information Interchange) is a standard means for storing textual data. It assigns a unique binary code for each letter of the alphabet, as well as for numbers, punctuation, and other characters. It cannot be used to convey graphical information. See C. Mackenzie, Coded Character Sets: History and Development 211-213 (1980).

[8] Substantially the same process was used by the other Print Publishers to prepare their files for electronic publication. App. 74a.

[9] An ASCII version of the October 31, 2000, New York Times, which contains 287 articles, would fill over 500 printed pages. Conversely, in the case of graphical products like GPO, the demands that memory-intensive graphics files can place on underpowered computers make it appropriate for electronic publishers to divide the larger collective work into manageably sized subfiles. The individual article is the logical unit. The GPO version of the April 7, 1996, New York Times Magazine, for example, would demand in the neighborhood of 200 megabytes of memory if stored as a single file, whereas individual article files range from 4 to 22 megabytes, depending on the length of the article.

[10] See Brief for Respondents Garson et al. 4-5, n. 3.

[11] The majority's reliance on the fact that the GPO user cannot "flip" the page to see material published on other pages, ante, at 491, n. 2, and that the text database articles "appear disconnected from their original context," ante, at 501, appears to be nothing more than a criticism of Electronic Databases' medium-driven decision to break down the periodicals it contains into smaller, less unwieldy article units. See n. 9, supra.

[12]

"The New York Times perhaps even represents the paradigm, the epitome of a publication in which selection alone reflects sufficient originality to merit copyright protection." 972 F. Supp., at 823.

[13] In NEXIS, for example, the reader can gather all the content of the October 31, 2000, New York Times by conducting the following simple search in the correct "library": "date (is 10/31/2000)."

[14] The majority finds that NEXIS infringes by "cop[ying]" and "distribut[ing]" copies of respondents' articles to the public. Perhaps it would be more accurate to say that NEXIS makes it possible for users to make and distribute copies. In any event, the Court has wisely declined to reach the question whether the Electronic Databases publicly "display" the articles within the meaning of § 106. Ante, at 498, and n. 8.

[15] See also H. R. Rep. 116. In the quarter century since the 1976 Act became law, "the databases [in existence] have grown by a factor of 39 . . . . In 1975, the 301 databases in existence contained about 52 million records. The 11,681 databases in 1999 contained nearly 12.86 billion records for a growth by a factor of 242." Williams, Highlights of the Online Database Industry and the Internet: 2000, in Proceedings of the 21st Annual National Online Meeting 1 (M. Williams ed. 2000).

[16] But see Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 281, 286-290 (1970) (criticizing the use of copyright as a means of protecting authorial rights).

[17] Indeed, today's decision in favor of authors may have the perverse consequence of encouraging publishers to demand from freelancers a complete transfer of copyright. If that turns out to be the case, we will have come full circle back to the pre-1976 situation.

[18] If the problem is as important as amici contend, congressional action may ultimately be necessary to preserve present databases in their entirety. At the least, Congress can determine the nature and scope of the problem and fashion an appropriate licensing remedy far more easily than can courts. Cf.17 U. S. C. § 108(d)(1).

[19] It is important to remember that the prospect of payment by the Print Publishers was sufficient to stimulate each petitioner to create his or her part of the collective works, presumably with full awareness of its intended inclusion in the Electronic Databases.

[20] Even assuming, as the majority does, see ante, at 497-498, n. 6, that the existence of databases like NEXIS may have some adverse effect on the market for stand-alone compilations of authors' contributions to collective works, I fail to see how, on that basis, electronic databases are any different from microform. With respect to effects on the market for stand-alone works, the only difference between the two products is the speed with which digital technology allows NEXIS users to retrieve the desired data. But the 1976 Act was not intended to bar the use of every conceivable innovation in technology that might "`giv[e] publishers [new] opportunities to exploit authors' works.' " Ante, at 498, n. 6. Copyright law is not an insurance policy for authors, but a carefully struck balance between the need to create incentives for authorship and the interests of society in the broad accessibility of ideas. See U. S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (in order to promote production, Congress should allow authors and inventors to enjoy "exclusive Right[s]," but only "for limited Times" (emphasis added)); see also supra, at 519-520. The majority's focus on authorial incentive comes at the expense of the equally important (at least from the perspective of copyright policy) public interest.

Moreover, the majority's single-minded focus on "authorial rights" appears to lead it to believe that, because some authors may benefit from its decision, that decision must be the one intended by Congress. It cites the "`economic philosophy behind the [Copyright Clause]' " as consistent with its view that Congress adjusted "the author/publisher balance" precisely to avoid the types of uses embodied in the Electronic Databases. See ante, at 495, n. 3. But, as I have already argued, see supra, at 519, there is no indication that Congress ever considered the issue presented in this case. It thus simply begs the question for the majority to argue that the right not to have a work included within the Electronic Databases is an "authorial right" that "Congress [has] established," ante, at 506 (emphasis added), or that—given Congress' failure clearly to address itself to the question—a decision allowing such inclusion would amount to "diminish[ing] " authorial "rights" on the basis of "our conception of their interests," ante, at 498, n. 6 (emphasis added).

3.1.4 Copyright History 3.1.4 Copyright History

3.2 Authorship 3.2 Authorship

3.2.1 17 USC 201 3.2.1 17 USC 201

§201. Ownership of copyright 

(a) INITIAL OWNERSHIP.—Copyright in a work protected under this title vests initially in the author or authors of the work. The authors of a joint work are coowners of copyright in the work.

(b) WORKS MADE FOR HIRE.—In the case of a work made for hire, the employer or other person for whom the work was prepared is considered the author for purposes of this title, and, unless the parties have expressly agreed otherwise in a written instrument signed by them, owns all of the rights comprised in the copyright.

(c) CONTRIBUTIONS TO COLLECTIVE WORKS.—Copyright in each separate contribution to a collective work is distinct from copyright in the collective work as a whole, and vests initially in the author of the contribution. In the absence of an express transfer of the copyright or of any rights under it, the owner of copyright in the collective work is presumed to have acquired only the privilege of reproducing and distributing the contribution as part of that particular collective work, any revision of that collective work, and any later collective work in the same series.

(d) TRANSFER OF OWNERSHIP.—

(1) The ownership of a copyright may be transferred in whole or in part by any means of conveyance or by operation of law, and may be bequeathed by will or pass as personal property by the applicable laws of intestate succession.

(2) Any of the exclusive rights comprised in a copyright, including any subdivision of any of the rights specified by section 106, may be transferred as provided by clause (1) and owned separately. The owner of any particular exclusive right is entitled, to the extent of that right, to all of the protection and remedies accorded to the copyright owner by this title.

(e) INVOLUNTARY TRANSFER.—When an individual author's ownership of a copyright, or of any of the exclusive rights under a copyright, has not previously been transferred voluntarily by that individual author, no action by any governmental body or other official or organization purporting to seize, expropriate, transfer, or exercise rights of ownership with respect to the copyright, or any of the exclusive rights under a copyright, shall be given effect under this title, except as provided under title 11.

(Pub. L. 94–553, title I, §101, Oct. 19, 1976, 90 Stat. 2568; Pub. L. 95–598, title III, §313, Nov. 6, 1978, 92 Stat. 2676.)

3.2.2 Lindsay v. The Wrecked and Abandoned Vessel R.M.S. Titanic 3.2.2 Lindsay v. The Wrecked and Abandoned Vessel R.M.S. Titanic

97 Civ. 9248 (HB)

ALEXANDER LINDSAY, Plaintiff
-against-
The Wrecked and Abandoned Vessel R.M.S. TITANIC, HER ENGINES, TACKLE, EQUIPMENT, FURNISHINGS, Located Within One Nautical Mile of a Point Located at 41°, 43'32" North Latitude and 49°, 56'49" West, and ARTIFACTS, and VIDEO Located at 17 Battery Place, New York, NY, in rem, and R.M.S. TITANIC, INC.,TITANIC VENTURES LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, OCEANIC RESEARCH AND EXPLORATION LIMITED, SUAREZ CORPORATION INDUSTRIES, INC., and DISCOVERY COMMUNICATIONS, INC., d.b.a. THE DISCOVERY CHANNEL, in personam, Defendants.[1]

United States District Court Southern District of New York.
October 13, 1999.

OPINION & ORDER

HAROLD BAER, JR., District Judge:

The plaintiff, Alexander Lindsay, commenced this lawsuit in 1997, seeking damages based upon his share of the revenues generated by the salvage operations conducted at the wreck site of the famous sunken vessel, the R.M.S. Titanic. Defendants R.M.S. Titanic, Inc. ("RMST") and Suarez Corporation Inc. ("SCI") answered and asserted counterclaims against the plaintiff for copyright infringement. The plaintiffs' amended complaint joined defendant Discovery Communications, Inc. ("DCI") and added claims of copyright infringement against RMST, SCI and DCI. Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the defendants now move [2] to dismiss the plaintiffs copyright claims alleged in the amended complaint.[2] The plaintiff crossmoves for summary judgment as to both his salvage and copyright claims. For the reasons discussed below, the defendants' motions are DENIED in part and GRANTED in part, and the Court reserves decision on the plaintiffs motion.

I. BACKGROUND

The plaintiff, a citizen of the United Kingdom and resident of the State of New York, is an independent documentary film maker engaged in the business of creating, producing, directing, and filming documentaries: (Amended Complaint ("Am. Compl.") ¶ 4.) Defendant R.M.S. Titanic, Inc. ("RMST") is a publicly traded U.S. corporation, organized under the laws of the State of Florida, which conducts business within and has its office and principal place of business in New York City. (Am. Compl. ¶ 8.) Defendant George Tulloch ("Tulloch") is a shareholder, president and member of the board of directors of RMST. (Am. Compl. ¶ 7.) Defendant Titanic Ventures Limited Partnership ("TVLP") is a limited partnership organized under the laws of Connecticut and currently doing business in the State of New York.[3] (Am. Compl. ¶ 9.) Defendant Oceanic Research and [3] Exploration Limited ("OREL") is a Delaware corporation and general partner of TVLP. Defendant Tullqch is also the president and sole shareholder of OREL (defendants RMST, Tulloc, TVLP and OREL collectively as "RMST"). Defendant Suarez Corporation, Inc. ("SCI") is an Ohio corporation doing business in the State of New York. Defendant Discovery Communications, Inc. ("DCI") is a Maryland corporation doing business as "The Discovery Channel", and is engaged in the business of making, financing and distributing documentary films. (Am. Compl. ¶ 13.)

In 1993, RMST was awarded exclusive status as salvor-in-possession of the Titanic wreck site and is therefore authorized to carry on salvage operations at the vessel's wreck site. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 8, 20.) As a condition of obtaining these rights, RMST allegedly agreed to maintain all the artifacts it recovered during the salvage operations for historical verification, scientific education, and public awareness. (Am. Compl. ¶ 22.)

In 1994, the plaintiff, under contract with a British television company, filmed and directed the British documentary film, "Explorers of the Titanic," a chronicle of RMST's third salvage expedition of the Titanic. (Am. Compl. ¶ 25.) To film this documentary, Lindsay sailed with RMST and the salvage expedition crew to the wreck site and remained at sea for approximately one month. (Am. Compl. ¶ 27.) The plaintiff alleges that during and after filming this documentary in 1994, he conceived a new film project for the Titanic wreck using high illumination lighting equipment. (Am. Compl. ¶ 28.)

The plaintiff later discussed his idea with defendant George Tulloch and, according to the plaintiff, the two agreed to work together on the venture. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 29.) In March 1995, the plaintiff traveled to New York and developed a comprehensive business plan for the new film project entitled, ''Titanic: A Memorial Tribute." (Am. Compl ¶ 30.) Tulloch allegedly informed the [4] plaintiff that he would agree to the plan — which purported to include provisions for compensating Lindsay for his work on the project — but that Tulloch would have to obtain approval from the RMST Board of Directors. (Am. Compl. ¶ 31.) The plaintiff agreed to join RMST to raise money not only for the film project, but for other aspects of the 1996 salvage operation as well. (Am. Compl. ¶ 32.)

Lindsay moved into an office at RMST in and around April 1995. Around this time, tulloch repeatedly told Lindsay that he would obtain approval from RMSTs Board of Directors for a contract for the plaintiff based upon the terms of Lindsay's film plan. (Am. Compl. ¶ 33.) The contract was to include terms of Lindsay's compensation, including sharing in the profits derived from any film, video and still photographs obtained from the 1996 salvage operation. (Am. Compl. ¶ 36.) This contract was never executed.

As part of his pre-production efforts, the plaintiff created various storyboards for the film, a series of drawings which incorporated images of the Titanic by identifying specific camera angles and shooting sequences "that reflect[ed] Plaintiff's [sic] creative inspiration and force behind his concept for shooting the Subject Work." (Am. Compl. ¶ 38.) The plaintiff also alleges that he, along with members of his film team, designed the huge underwater light towers that were later used to make the film. (Am. Compl. ¶ 43.) Lindsay also "personally constructed the light towers" and thereafter "for approximately 3-4 weeks directed, produced, and acted as the cinematographer of the Subject Work; underwater video taping of the Titanic wreck site, and otherwise participated in the 1996 salvage operation." (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 45-46.) He also directed the filming of the wreck site from on board the salvage vessel "Ocean Voyager" after leading daily planning sessions with the crew of the Nautile, the submarine used to transport the film equipment and photographers to the underwater wreck site. (Am. Compl. ¶ 47.) The purpose of these sessions was to provide the [5] photographers with "detailed instructions for positioning and utilizing the light towers." Id.)

The plaintiff now alleges that he was never fully compensated for his services and that, inter alia, the defendants are now "unlawfully profiting from the exploitation of the" film project at issue. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 57-60.)

The plaintiff originally brought this action under the Court's admiralty jurisdiction to enforce his salvage claims against defendants RMS Titanic, Inc., Titanic Ventures Limited Partners, Oceanic Research and Exploration Limited (collectively as "RMST"), and Suarez Corporation.

These defendants moved to dismiss the plaintiffs salvage claims. By order dated September 2, 1998, I denied the motion to dismiss, having found that the plaintiff had met his burden of pleading all the necessary elements for bringing a salvage claim. See Lindsay v. Titanic, No. 97 Civ. 9248, 1998 WL 557591 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 2, 1998).

RMST and SCI then answered the complaint and included counterclaims for copyright infringement arising from the plaintiff's use of certain video footage taken from the wreck during the 1996 expedition. By order dated April 9, 1999, I granted the plaintiffs motion to amend his complaint to add copyright infringement claims against RMST and SCI and to join Discovery Communications, Inc. ("DCI") d/b/a The Discovery Channel, for copyright infringement of what appears to be the same footage at issue in the defendants' counterclaims.

The plaintiffs amended complaint now includes 13 causes of action, including those based on copyright infringement, salvage claims, and state law causes of action for fraud, breach of contract, and conversion. The defendants now move pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to dismiss Lindsay's copyright claims, and the plaintiff cross-moves for summary judgment on his copyright and salvage claims.

[6] II. DISCUSSION

A. Standards for Motion to Dismiss

Dismissal of a complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is permitted "only where itappears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claim which would entitle him to relief." Scotto v. Almenas, 143 F.3d 105, 109-10 (2d Cir. 1998). "The task of the court in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is 'merely to assess the legal feasibility of the complaint not to assay the weight of the evidence which might be offered in support thereof.'" Cooper v. Parsky, 140 F.3d 433, 440 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting Ryder Energy Distribution Com. v. Merrill Lynch Commodities, Inc., 748 F.2d 774, 779 (2d Cir. 1984)). In deciding a 12(b)(6) motion, the Court must accept as true all material facts alleged in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in the nonmovant's favor. See Thomas v. City of New York, 143 F.3d 31, 36 (2d Cir. 1998).

B. Copyright Claims

Pleading Requirements

To withstand a motion to dismiss, a complaint based on copyright infringement must allege: (1) which specific original works are the subject of the copyright claim; (2) that the plaintiff owns the copyrights in those works; (3) that the copyrights have been registered in accordance with the statute; and (4) "by what acts during what time" the defendant infringed the copyright. Kelly v. L.L. Cool J., 145 F.R.D. 32, 35 (1992), aff'd, 23 F.3d 398 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 950 (1994).

Although the complaint is not a model of clarity, it meets for the most part, these standards. With regard to the first element, the complaint refers to the plaintiffs copyright interest in the "Subject Work," and — as the defendants point out — makes several different references to what [7] exactly this work constitutes (See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 28, 76, 78.)[4] However, piecing together these various allegations, and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor, it becomes clear for purposes of this motion that the "Subject Work" consists of the illuminated underwater footage that was filmed utilizing the large light towers that Lindsay helped design and construct. (See Am. Compl. ¶ 46.) Regarding the second and third elements, the plaintiff alleges that he owns these works, (Am. Compl. ¶ 55), and that they were accepted and registered with the U.S. Register of Copyrights. (Am. Compl. ¶ 78.)

As to the fourth element — how and when the defendants infringed the copyright — the plaintiff has satisfied his burden as to all the defendants except SCI. With respect to RMST, the complaint alleges that RMST "unlawfully enter[ed] into the exclusive license agreement with DCI," (Am. Compl. ¶ 62), "enered [sic] into contracts conveying video clips and still images . . . to various Titanic artifacts exhibitions throughout the world," and "RMST displays images from the Subject Work on its INTERNET web site." (Am. Compl. ¶ 63.) The complaint alleges that DCI incorporated portions of the illuminated footage into three separate documentaries that aired on certain dates in 1997. (Am. Compl.¶ 64.)

The plaintiffs' contentions against SCI, however, do not fare as well. Lindsay alleges that SCI "used plaintiff's name and likeness" to promote a 1996 cruise expedition to observe the salvage operations. (Am. Compl. ¶ 42.) In addition, the amended complaint charges that "SCI did knowingly and willfully infringe upon Plaintiff's copyright . . . by unlawfully purchasing and/or otherwise obtaining copies of the Subject Work" and has and will "exploit and profit from the Subject Work." [8] (Am. Compl. ¶ 73.) I find that these vague and conclusory allegations are, as a matter of law, insufficient withstand the instant motion. Kelly, 145 F.R.D. at 36, n.3 ("Rule 8 requires that the particular infringing acts be set out with some specificity. Broad, sweeping allegations of infringement do not comply with Rule 8."). Accordingly, the plaintiffs third cause of action as against SCI is hereby dismissed.

2. Authorship

The defendants first argue that the plaintiff cannot have any protectable right in the illuminated footage since he did not dive to the ship and thus did not himself actually photograph the wreckage. This argument, however, does not hold water.

The Copyright Act of 1976 provides that copyright ownership "vests initially in the author or authors of the work." 17 U.S.C. §201(a). Generally speaking, the author of a work is the person "who actually creates the work, that is, the person who translates an idea into a fixed, tangible expression entitled to copyright protection." Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 737 (1989) (citing 17 U.S.C. §102). In the context of film footage and photography, it makes intuitive sense that the "author" of a work is the individual or individuals who took the pictures, i.e. the photographer. However, the concept is broader than as argued by the defendants.

For over 100 years, the Supreme Court has recognized that photographs may receive copyright protection in ''so far as they are representatives of original intellectual conceptions of the author" Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S . 53, 58 (1884). An individual claiming to be an author for copyright purposes must show "the existence of those facts of originality, of intellectual production, of thought, and conception." Feist Publications. Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Company Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 346-347 (1991) (citing Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 59-60). [9] Some elements of originality in a photograph includes "posing the subjects, lighting, angle, selection of film and camera, evoking the desired expression, and almost any variant involved." Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 307 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 934 (1992). Taken as true, the plaintiffs allegations meet this standard. Lindsay's alleged storyboards and the specific directions he provided to the film crew regarding the use of the lightowers and the angles from which to shoot the wreck all indicate that the final footage would indeed be the product of Lindsay's "original intellectual conceptions."

The fact that Lindsay did not literally perform the filming, i.e. by diving to the wreck and operating the cameras, will not defeat his claims of having "authored" the illuminated footage. The plaintiff alleges that as part of his pre-production efforts, he created so-called "storyboards," a series of drawings which incorporated images of the Titanic by identifying specific camera angles and shooting sequences. (Am. Compl. ¶ 38.) During the expedition itself, Lindsay claims to have been "the director, producer and cinematographer" of the underwater footage. (Am. Compl. ¶ 46.) As part of this role, Lindsay alleges that he directed daily planning sessions with the film crew to provide them with "detailed instructions for positioning and utilizing the light towers." (Am. Compl. ¶ 47.) Moreover, the plaintiff actually "directed the filming" of the Titanic from on board the Ocean Voyager, the salvage vessel that held the crew and equipment. (Am. Compl. ¶ 47) Finally, Lindsay screened the footage at the end of each day to "confirm that he had obtained the images he wanted." (Am. Compl. ¶ 48.)

All else being equal, where a plaintiff alleges that he exercised such a high degree of control over a film operation — including the type and amount of lighting used, the specific camera angles to be employed, and other detail-intensive artistic elements of a film — such that the final product [10] duplicates his conceptions and visions of what the film should look like, the plaintiff may be said "author" within the meaning of the Copyright Act.

Indeed, the instant case is analogous to Andrien v. Southern Ocean County Chamber of Commerce, 927 F.2d 132 (3d Cir. 1991). There, the Third Circuit recognized that "a party can be considered an author when his or her expression of an idea is transposed by mechanical or rote transcription into tangible form under the authority of the party." Id. at 135. The plaintiff in Andrien had received a copyright for a map of Long Beach Island, New Jersey which was created from a compilation of pre-existing maps and the plaintiffs personal survey of the island. To transform his concepts and the information he had gathered into the final map, the plaintiff hired a printing company to print the map in final form. The plaintiff testified that the maps were made by the printer "with me at her elbow practically" and that he spent time each day at the print shop during the weeks the map was made, directing the map's preparation in specific detail. In reversing the lower court's granting of summary judgment against the plaintiff, the court noted that the printers had not "intellectually modified or technically enhanced the concept articulated by Andrien," nor did they "change the substance of Andrien's original expression." Id. at 135. See also Lakedreams v. Taylor 932 F.2d 1103, 1108 (5th Cir. 1991) (noting that authors may be entitled to copyright protection even if they do not ''perform with their own hands the mechanical tasks of putting the material into the form distributed to the public"). It is too early to tell whether the allegations of the plaintiff here satisfy the copyright laws, but crediting his story as I must, dismissal is unwarranted at this stage of the litigation.

The defendants argue that Geshwind v. Garrick, 734 F.Supp. 644 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), vacated in part, 738 F.Supp. 792 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), affd, 927 F.2d 594 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 811-[11]-1991), mandates dismissal. That case, however, is inapposite. The plaintiff there, a producer of computer graphics animation and special effects, had contracted to produce a 15-second animation piece. The plaintiff hired Digital, a computer graphics company to, in essence, produce the animated piece. The court in Geshwind found that Digital, by its employee, was the "author" within the meaning of the Copyright Act. In ruling that the plaintiff was not an "author," Judge Patterson found that the plaintiff there had made only minimal contributions to the final product and had only some, if any, of his "suggestions" incorporated into the final product. Id. at 650. This is in stark contrast to the case at bar where Lindsay alleges that his contributions — not suggestions — were anything but minimal, and he describes himself as the driving force behind the final film product at issue here.

3. Joint-Authorship

In the alternative, the defendants argue that Lindsay is, at best, a joint author of the underwater footage with RMST. This contention is based on the notion that Christian Petron, the main photographer of the film, was at least a joint-author of the footage with the plaintiff. Since Petron's participation was accomplished under the auspices of a work for hire agreement with RMST, the defendants' argument continues, any rights to authorship Petron may have received via his filming were conferred upon RMST. As a joint author with the plaintiff then, RMST cannot be liable for copyright infringement since each co-author acquires an undivided interest in the entire work and has the right to use the work as he or she pleases. Thomson v. Larson, 147 F .3d 195; 199 (2d Cir. 1998); Weissman v. Freeman, 868 F.2d 1313, 1318 (2d Cir.) ("[A]n action for infringement between joint owners will not lie because an individual cannot infringe his own copyright."), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 883 (1989). Similarly, any copyright claim against DCI would fail since RMST, as a joint author, has the right to license the joint work to third parties. Thomson, 147 F.3d at 199.

[12] A "joint work" under the Copyright Act is one "prepared by two or more authors with the Intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole." 17 U.S.C. §101. To prove co-authorship status, it must be shown by the individual claiming co-authorship status that each of the putative co-authors (1) fully intended to be co-authors, and (2) made independently copyrightable contributions to the work. Thomson, 147 F.3d at 200 (citing Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500, 507-508 (2d Cir. 1991)).

Drawing all inferences in favor of Lindsay, I conclude that no such status existed in the case at bar. With regard to the intent prong of the analysis, "[a]n important indicator of authorship is a contributor's decision making authority over what changes are made and what is included in a work." Id. at 202-3 (citing Erickson v. Trinity Theatre. Inc., 13 F.3d 1061, 1071-72 (7th Cir. 1994) (actor's suggestions of text did not support a claim of co-authorship where the sole author determined whether and where such suggestions were included in the work)). In other words, where one contributor retains a so-called "veto" authority over what is included in a work, such control is a strong indicator that he or she does not intend to be co-authors with the other contributor. According to the pleadings, the plaintiff exercised virtually total control over the content of the film as "the director, producer and cinematographer" of the production. (Am. Compl. ¶ 46.) Additionally, he briefed the photographers with regards to, inter alia, the specific camera angles they were to employ, (Am. Compl. ¶ 47), and Lindsay screened the film each day to make sure the proper footage was obtained. (Am. Compl. ¶ 48.) Based on these allegations, and implicit in the notion that the film crew was simply "following directions,"[5] Lindsay retained what appeared to be exclusive authority [13] over what was included in the footage. Assuming as I must at this stage of the litigation that this is true, it can hardly be said that the plaintiff intended Petron — or any other contributor — to be a coauthor. Accordingly, the claims by RMST that it — by virtue of Petron's role as a photographer under a work-for-hire agreement — was a joint-author within the meaning of the Copyright Act must fail.

4. Accounting

Lindsay's fifth cause of action seeks an accounting by DCI, SCI, and RMST of moneys these defendants received from their unauthorized use of the copyrighted footage at issue. Regardless of whether this Court — or a jury — ultimately finds that Lindsay and RMST are joint authors, with respect to DCI, the plaintiffs complaint here sinks under its own weight.

The duty to provide an accounting from profits obtained runs only between co-owners of a copyright. Margo v. Weiss, No. 96 Civ. 3842, 1998 WL 2558, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 5, 1998) ("[T]he duty to account for profits presupposes a relationship as co-owners of the copyright. . . ."); cf. Thomson, 147 F.3d at 199 ("[E]ach joint author has the right to use or to license the work as he or she wishes, subject only to the obligation to account to the other joint owner for any profits that are made.") (emphasis added); Kaplan v. Vincent, 937 F.Supp. 307, 316 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) ("[E]ach author maintains the right to use or license the work, subject only to an accounting to the other co-owner.") (emphasis added). Because DCI is only a licensee of a putative joint owner of the copyright at issue here, Lindsay's claim for an accounting fails as a matter of law and must be [14] dismissed.[6]

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, the defendants' motions are DENIED in part and GRANTED in part such that the plaintiffs cause of action for copyright infringement against SCI is dismissed, as is Lindsay's cause of action for an accounting with respect to DCI and SCI only. The plaintiffs remaining copyright-based claims[7] and other causes of action have survived this motion.[8] The current pre-trial scheduling order remains in place, and the case is on the January 2000 trailing trial calendar.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 12, 1999

New York, New York

[1] Prior to the issuance of this opinion, the plaintiff dismissed from the case defendant Ben Suarez, in his individual capacity as president of Suarez Corporation, Inc., pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1) of the Fed. R. Civ. P.

[2] Although the Court has reviewed the voluminous supplementary submissions provided with and after the filing of these motions, I am excluding this virtual sea of materials and decline to convert the defendants' motions to dismiss to motions for summary judgment. Accordingly, I base my ruling on these motions solely on the pleadings. See Amaker v. Weiner, 179 F.3d 48, 51-52 (2d Cir. 1999) (finding that the inclusion of affidavits or exhibits with a motion to dismiss does not require conversion to a motion for summary judgment provided the court does not rely on such submissions in deciding the motion to dismiss). In any event, a cursory review of the documents submitted with these motions reveals that the factual waters of this case are sufficiently muddied so as to warrant denial of summary judgment at this juncture as well.

[3] In May 1993, RMST acquired all the assets and assumed the liabilities of TVLP, a limited partnership that was formed in 1987 for purposes of exploring the Titanic wreck site. (Am. Compl. ¶ 19.)

[4] Lindsay defines the "Subject Work" as: "a new film project for the Titanic wreck using high illumination lighting equipment" (Am. Compl. ¶ 28); "the documentary film Titanic: In a New Light" (Am. Compl., 76); and "the illuminated underwater video footage." (Am. Compl. ¶ 78.)

[5] Along these lines, Lindsay's alleged control over the filming rendered the film crew's role to one of no more than "rote or mechanical transcription that [did] not require intellectual modification," Andrien, 927 F.2d at 135, a contribution that would not be independently copyrightable. Id.; Thomson, 147 F.3d at 200. RMST's claims of joint-authorship would thus fail on this prong as well.

[6] Because the plaintiff fails to state a cognizable copyright claim against defendant SCI, as discussed herein, count five is also dismissed as to defendant SCI.

[7] These causes of action are as follows: declaration of copyright ownership; copyright infringement by RMST; copyright infringement by DCI; and an accounting, with respect to RMST only.

[8] These causes of action, not at issue in the instant motions to dismiss, inculude: breach of contract; breach of implied covenant of good faith; quantum meruit; conversion; "money lent"; fraud; fraudulent misrepresentation; declaration of co-salvor status; and common law fraud and deceit.

3.2.3 Aalmuhammed v. Lee 3.2.3 Aalmuhammed v. Lee

202 F.3d 1227 (2000)

Jefri AALMUHAMMED, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Spike LEE; Forty Acres and a Mule Filmworks, Inc.; By any Means Necessary Cinema, Inc.; Warner Brothers, a division of Time-Warner Entertainment LP; Victor Company of Japan Limited; Largo International N.V.; Largo Entertainment, Inc.; JCV Entertainment, Inc., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 99-55224.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted April 19, 1999.[1]
Filed February 4, 2000.

 

[1228] [1229] Philip H. Stillman and Stephen S. Lux, Flynn, Sheridan, Tabb & Stillman, Del Mar, California, for the plaintiff-appellant.

Bruce Isaacs, Karen Brodkin & Jason A. Forge, Wyman, Isaacs, Blumenthal, & Lynne, Los Angeles, California, for the defendants-appellees.

Bruce P. Vann, Kelly, Lytton, Mintz & Vann, Los Angeles, California, for the defendants-appellees.

Before: CANBY, NOONAN, and KLEINFELD, Circuit Judges.

KLEINFELD, Circuit Judge:

This is a copyright case involving a claim of coauthorship of the movie Malcolm X. We reject the "joint work" claim but remand for further proceedings on a quantum meruit claim.

I. FACTS

In 1991, Warner Brothers contracted with Spike Lee and his production companies to make the movie Malcolm X, to be based on the book, The Autobiography of Malcolm X. Lee co-wrote the screenplay, directed, and co-produced the movie, which starred Denzel Washington as Malcolm X. Washington asked Jefri Aalmuhammed to assist him in his preparation for the starring role because Aalmuhammed knew a great deal about Malcolm X and Islam. Aalmuhammed, a devout Muslim, was particularly knowledgeable about the life of Malcolm X, having previously written, directed, and produced a documentary film about Malcolm X.

Aalmuhammed joined Washington on the movie set. The movie was filmed in the New York metropolitan area and Egypt. Aalmuhammed presented evidence that his involvement in making the movie was very extensive. He reviewed the shooting script for Spike Lee and Denzel [1230] Washington and suggested extensive script revisions. Some of his script revisions were included in the released version of the film; others were filmed but not included in the released version. Most of the revisions Aalmuhammed made were to ensure the religious and historical accuracy and authenticity of scenes depicting Malcolm X's religious conversion and pilgrimage to Mecca.

Aalmuhammed submitted evidence that he directed Denzel Washington and other actors while on the set, created at least two entire scenes with new characters, translated Arabic into English for subtitles, supplied his own voice for voice-overs, selected the proper prayers and religious practices for the characters, and edited parts of the movie during post production. Washington testified in his deposition that Aalmuhammed's contribution to the movie was "great" because he "helped to rewrite, to make more authentic." Once production ended, Aalmuhammed met with numerous Islamic organizations to persuade them that the movie was an accurate depiction of Malcolm X's life.

Aalmuhammed never had a written contract with Warner Brothers, Lee, or Lee's production companies, but he expected Lee to compensate him for his work. He did not intend to work and bear his expenses in New York and Egypt gratuitously. Aalmuhammed ultimately received a check for $25,000 from Lee, which he cashed, and a check for $100,000 from Washington, which he did not cash.

During the summer before Malcolm X's November 1992 release, Aalmuhammed asked for a writing credit as a co-writer of the film, but was turned down. When the film was released, it credited Aalmuhammed only as an "Islamic Technical Consultant," far down the list. In November 1995, Aalmuhammed applied for a copyright with the U.S. Copyright Office, claiming he was a co-creator, co-writer, and co-director of the movie. The Copyright Office issued him a "Certificate of Registration," but advised him in a letter that his "claims conflict with previous registrations" of the film.

On November 17, 1995, Aalmuhammed filed a complaint against Spike Lee, his production companies, and Warner Brothers, (collectively "Lee"), as well as Largo International, N.V., and Largo Entertainment, Inc. (collectively "Largo"), and Victor Company of Japan and JVC Entertainment, Inc. (collectively "Victor"). The suit sought declaratory relief and an accounting under the Copyright Act. In addition, the complaint alleged breach of implied contract, quantum meruit, and unjust enrichment, and federal (Lanham Act) and state unfair competition claims. The district court dismissed some of the claims under Rule 12(b)(6) and the rest on summary judgment.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Copyright claim

Aalmuhammed claimed that the movie Malcolm X was a "joint work" of which he was an author, thus making him a co-owner of the copyright.[2] He sought a declaratory judgment to that effect, and an accounting for profits. He is not claiming copyright merely in what he wrote or contributed, but rather in the whole work, as a co-author of a "joint work."[3] The district court granted defendants summary judgment against Mr. Aalmuhammed's copyright claims. We review de novo.[4]

Defendants argue that Aalmuhammed's claim that he is one of the authors of a joint work is barred by the applicable statute of limitations. A claim of authorship of a joint work must be brought within three years of when it accrues.[5] Because creation rather than infringement [1231] is the gravamen of an authorship claim, the claim accrues on account of creation, not subsequent infringement, and is barred three years from "plain and express repudiation" of authorship.[6]

The movie credits plainly and expressly repudiated authorship, by listing Aalmuhammed far below the more prominent names, as an "Islamic technical consultant." That repudiation, though, was less than three years before the lawsuit was filed. The record leaves open a genuine issue of fact as to whether authorship was repudiated before that. Aalmuhammed testified in his deposition that he discussed with an executive producer at Warner Brothers his claim to credit as one of the screenwriters more than three years before he filed suit. Defendants argue that this discussion was an express repudiation that bars the claim. It was not. Aalmuhammed testified that the producer told him "there is nothing I can do for you," but "[h]e said we would discuss it further at some point." A trier of fact could construe that communication as leaving the question of authorship open for further discussion. That leaves a genuine issue of fact as to whether the claim is barred by limitations, so we must determine whether there is a genuine issue of fact as to whether Aalmuhammed was an author of a "joint work."

Aalmuhammed argues that he established a genuine issue of fact as to whether he was an author of a "joint work," Malcolm X. The Copyright Act does not define "author," but it does define "joint work":

A "joint work" is a work prepared by two or more authors with the intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole.[7]

"When interpreting a statute, we look first to the language."[8] The statutory language establishes that for a work to be a "joint work" there must be (1) a copyrightable work, (2) two or more "authors," and (3) the authors must intend their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole. A "joint work" in this circuit "requires each author to make an independently copyrightable contribution" to the disputed work.[9]Malcolm X is a copyrightable work, and it is undisputed that the movie was intended by everyone involved with it to be a unitary whole. It is also undisputed that Aalmuhammed made substantial and valuable contributions to the movie, including technical help, such as speaking Arabic to the persons in charge of the mosque in Egypt, scholarly and creative help, such as teaching the actors how to pray properly as Muslims, and script changes to add verisimilitude to the religious aspects of the movie. Speaking Arabic to persons in charge of the mosque, however, does not result in a copyrightable contribution to the motion picture. Coaching of actors, to be copyrightable, must be turned into an expression in a form subject to copyright.[10] The same may be said for many of Aalmuhammed's other activities. Aalmuhammed has, however, submitted evidence that he rewrote several specific passages of dialogue that appeared in Malcolm X, and that he wrote scenes relating to Malcolm X's Hajj pilgrimage that were enacted in the movie. If Aalmuhammed's evidence is accepted, as it must be on summary judgment, these items would have been independently copyrightable. [1232] Aalmuhammed, therefore, has presented a genuine issue of fact as to whether he made a copyrightable contribution. All persons involved intended that Aalmuhammed's contributions would be merged into interdependent parts of the movie as a unitary whole. Aalmuhammed maintains that he has shown a genuine issue of fact for each element of a "joint work."

But there is another element to a "joint work." A "joint work" includes "two or more authors."[11] Aalmuhammed established that he contributed substantially to the film, but not that he was one of its "authors." We hold that authorship is required under the statutory definition of a joint work, and that authorship is not the same thing as making a valuable and copyrightable contribution. We recognize that a contributor of an expression may be deemed to be the "author" of that expression for purposes of determining whether it is independently copyrightable. The issue we deal with is a different and larger one: is the contributor an author of the joint work within the meaning of 17 U.S.C. § 101.

By statutory definition, a "joint work" requires "two or more authors."[12] The word "author" is taken from the traditional activity of one person sitting at a desk with a pen and writing something for publication. It is relatively easy to apply the word "author" to a novel. It is also easy to apply the word to two people who work together in a fairly traditional pen-and-ink way, like, perhaps, Gilbert and Sullivan. In the song, "I Am the Very Model of a Modern Major General," Gilbert's words and Sullivan's tune are inseparable, and anyone who has heard the song knows that it owes its existence to both men, Sir William Gilbert and Sir Arthur Sullivan, as its creative originator. But as the number of contributors grows and the work itself becomes less the product of one or two individuals who create it without much help, the word is harder to apply.

Who, in the absence of contract, can be considered an author of a movie? The word is traditionally used to mean the originator or the person who causes something to come into being, or even the first cause, as when Chaucer refers to the "Author of Nature." For a movie, that might be the producer who raises the money. Eisenstein thought the author of a movie was the editor. The "auteur" theory suggests that it might be the director, at least if the director is able to impose his artistic judgments on the film. Traditionally, by analogy to books, the author was regarded as the person who writes the screenplay, but often a movie reflects the work of many screenwriters. Grenier suggests that the person with creative control tends to be the person in whose name the money is raised, perhaps a star, perhaps the director, perhaps the producer, with control gravitating to the star as the financial investment in scenes already shot grows.[13] Where the visual aspect of the movie is especially important, the chief cinematographer might be regarded as the author. And for, say, a Disney animated movie like "The Jungle Book," it might perhaps be the animators and the composers of the music.

The Supreme Court dealt with the problem of defining "author" in new media in Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony.[14] The question there was, who is the author of a photograph: the person who sets it up and snaps the shutter, or the person who makes the lithograph from it. Oscar Wilde, the person whose picture was at issue, doubtless offered some creative advice as well. The Court decided that the photographer was the author, quoting various English authorities: "the person who has superintended the arrangement, who has actually formed the picture by [1233] putting the persons in position, and arranging the place where the people are to be—the man who is the effective cause of that"; "`author' involves originating, making, producing, as the inventive or master mind, the thing which is to be protected"; "the man who really represents, creates, or gives effect to the idea, fancy, or imagination."[15] The Court said that an "author," in the sense that the Founding Fathers used the term in the Constitution,[16] was "`he to whom anything owes its origin; originator; maker; one who completes a work of science or literature.'"[17]

Answering a different question, what is a copyrightable "work," as opposed to who is the "author," the Supreme Court held in Feist Publications that "some minimal level of creativity" or "originality" suffices.[18] But that measure of a "work" would be too broad and indeterminate to be useful if applied to determine who are "authors" of a movie. So many people might qualify as an "author" if the question were limited to whether they made a substantial creative contribution that that test would not distinguish one from another. Everyone from the producer and director to casting director, costumer, hairstylist, and "best boy" gets listed in the movie credits because all of their creative contributions really do matter. It is striking in Malcolm X how much the person who controlled the hue of the lighting contributed, yet no one would use the word "author" to denote that individual's relationship to the movie. A creative contribution does not suffice to establish authorship of the movie.

Burrow-Giles, in defining "author," requires more than a minimal creative or original contribution to the work.[19]Burrow-Giles is still good law, and was recently reaffirmed in Feist Publications.[20]Burrow-Giles and Feist Publications answer two distinct questions; who is an author, and what is a copyrightable work.[21]Burrow-Giles defines author as the person to whom the work owes its origin and who superintended the whole work, the "master mind."[22] In a movie this definition, in the absence of a contract to the contrary, would generally limit authorship to someone at the top of the screen credits, sometimes the producer, sometimes the director, possibly the star, or the screenwriter—someone who has artistic control. After all, in Burrow-Giles the lithographer made a substantial copyrightable creative contribution, and so did the person who posed, Oscar Wilde, but the Court held that the photographer was the author.[23]

The Second and Seventh Circuits have likewise concluded that contribution of independently copyrightable material to a work intended to be an inseparable whole will not suffice to establish authorship of a joint work.[24] Although the Second and Seventh Circuits do not base their decisions on the word "authors" in the statute, [1234] the practical results they reach are consistent with ours. These circuits have held that a person claiming to be an author of a joint work must prove that both parties intended each other to be joint authors.[25] In determining whether the parties have the intent to be joint authors, the Second Circuit looks at who has decision making authority, how the parties bill themselves, and other evidence.[26]

In Thomson v. Larson, an off-Broadway playwright had created a modern version of La Boheme, and had been adamant throughout its creation on being the sole author.[27] He hired a drama professor for "dramaturgical assistance and research," agreeing to credit her as "dramaturg" but not author, but saying nothing about "joint work" or copyright.[28] The playwright tragically died immediately after the final dress rehearsal, just before his play became the tremendous Broadway hit, Rent.[29] The dramaturg then sued his estate for a declaratory judgment that she was an author of Rent as a "joint work," and for an accounting.[30] The Second Circuit noted that the dramaturg had no decision making authority, had neither sought nor was billed as a co-author, and that the defendant entered into contracts as the sole author.[31] On this reasoning, the Second Circuit held that there was no intent to be joint authors by the putative parties and therefore it was not a joint work.[32]

Considering Burrow-Giles, the recent cases on joint works[33] (especially the thoughtful opinion in Thomson v. Larson[34] ), and the Gilbert and Sullivan example, several factors suggest themselves as among the criteria for joint authorship, in the absence of contract. First, an author "superintend[s]"[35] the work by exercising control.[36] This will likely be a person "who has actually formed the picture by putting the persons in position, and arranging the place where the people are to be-the man who is the effective cause of that,"[37] or "the inventive or master mind" who "creates, or gives effect to the idea."[38] Second, putative coauthors make objective manifestations of a shared intent to be coauthors, as by denoting the authorship of The Pirates of Penzance as "Gilbert and Sullivan."[39] We say objective manifestations because, were the mutual intent to be determined by subjective intent, it could become an instrument of fraud, were one coauthor to hide from the other an intention to take sole credit for the work. Third, the audience appeal of the work turns on both contributions and "the share of each in its success cannot be appraised."[40] Control in many cases will be the most important factor. [1235] The best objective manifestation of a shared intent, of course, is a contract saying that the parties intend to be or not to be co-authors. In the absence of a contract, the inquiry must of necessity focus on the facts. The factors articulated in this decision and the Second and Seventh Circuit decisions cannot be reduced to a rigid formula, because the creative relationships to which they apply vary too much. Different people do creative work together in different ways, and even among the same people working together the relationship may change over time as the work proceeds.

Aalmuhammed did not at any time have superintendence of the work.[41] Warner Brothers and Spike Lee controlled it. Aalmuhammed was not the person "who has actually formed the picture by putting the persons in position, and arranging the place ...."[42] Spike Lee was, so far as we can tell from the record. Aalmuhammed, like Larson's dramaturg, could make extremely helpful recommendations, but Spike Lee was not bound to accept any of them, and the work would not benefit in the slightest unless Spike Lee chose to accept them. Aalmuhammed lacked control over the work, and absence of control is strong evidence of the absence of co-authorship.

Also, neither Aalmuhammed, nor Spike Lee, nor Warner Brothers, made any objective manifestations of an intent to be coauthors. Warner Brothers required Spike Lee to sign a "work for hire" agreement, so that even Lee would not be a co-author and co-owner with Warner Brothers. It would be illogical to conclude that Warner Brothers, while not wanting to permit Lee to own the copyright, intended to share ownership with individuals like Aalmuhammed who worked under Lee's control, especially ones who at the time had made known no claim to the role of co-author. No one, including Aalmuhammed, made any indication to anyone prior to litigation that Aalmuhammed was intended to be a co-author and co-owner.

Aalmuhammed offered no evidence that he was the "inventive or master mind" of the movie. He was the author of another less widely known documentary about Malcolm X, but was not the master of this one. What Aalmuhammed's evidence showed, and all it showed, was that, subject to Spike Lee's authority to accept them, he made very valuable contributions to the movie. That is not enough for co-authorship of a joint work.

The Constitution establishes the social policy that our construction of the statutory term "authors" carries out. The Founding Fathers gave Congress the power to give authors copyrights in order "[t]o promote the progress of Science and useful arts."[43] Progress would be retarded rather than promoted, if an author could not consult with others and adopt their useful suggestions without sacrificing sole ownership of the work. Too open a definition of author would compel authors to insulate themselves and maintain ignorance of the contributions others might make. Spike Lee could not consult a scholarly Muslim to make a movie about a religious conversion to Islam, and the arts would be the poorer for that.

The broader construction that Aalmuhammed proposes would extend joint authorship to many "overreaching contributors,"[44] like the dramaturg in Thomson, and deny sole authors "exclusive authorship status simply because another person render[ed] some form of assistance."[45] Claimjumping by research assistants, editors, and former spouses, lovers and friends would endanger authors who talked with people about what they were [1236] doing, if creative copyrightable contribution were all that authorship required.

Aalmuhammed also argues that issuance of a copyright registration certificate to him establishes a prima facie case for ownership. A prima facie case could not in any event prevent summary judgment in the presence of all the evidence rebutting his claim of ownership. "The presumptive validity of the certificate may be rebutted and defeated on summary judgment."[46] The Copyright Office stated in its response to Aalmuhammed's application for copyright (during the pendency of this litigation) that his claims "conflict with previous registration claims," and therefore the Copyright Office had "several questions" for him. One of the questions dealt with the "intent" of "other authors," i.e., Warner Brothers. The evidence discussed above establishes without genuine issue that the answers to these questions were that Warner Brothers did not intend to share ownership with Aalmuhammed.

Because the record before the district court established no genuine issue of fact as to Aalmuhammed's co-authorship of Malcolm X as a joint work, the district court correctly granted summary judgment dismissing his claims for declaratory judgment and an accounting resting on co-authorship.

B. Quantum meruit

Aalmuhammed alleged in his complaint that defendants accepted his services, knowing that they were not being provided gratuitously, yet paid him neither the fair value of his services nor even his full expenses. He wrote script material, particularly for the important Islamic religious scenes, arranged with the Egyptians in charge of the mosque for the movie to be shot inside (Aalmuhammed is a Muslim and was the only Arabic-speaking person in the production crew), taught the actors how to pray as Muslims and directed the prayer scenes, and talked to Islamic authorities after the movie was made to assure their support when it was exhibited. These services were very important. The movie would be a dark tale of hate, but for the redemptive, uplifting Islamic religious scenes.

All the services were performed in New York and in Egypt (where the Hajj scenes were shot). Aalmuhammed's fifth, sixth and seventh claims articulated this claim variously as quasicontract, quantum meruit, and unjust enrichment. These claims are different from Aalmuhammed's claim to authorship of a joint work. Even though he was not an author, it is undisputed that he made a substantial contribution to the film. It may be that the producer or director, seeing that Aalmuhammed was performing valuable and substantial services and expending substantial amounts for travel and lodging, in the apparent expectation of reimbursement, had a duty to sign him up as an employee or independent contractor, obtain his acknowledgment that he was working gratuitously or perhaps for Denzel Washington, or eject him from the set.[47] We need not decide that, because the question on review is limited to which state's statute of limitations applies.

The defendants moved to dismiss these claims for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), on the ground that the claims were barred by California's two year statute of limitations. Aalmuhammed argued that New York's six year statute of limitations applied. The district court granted the motion to dismiss, applying California's shorter statute.

The parties agree that the district court correctly used law of the forum, California, [1237] as the source of its rule for choice of law. The applicable rule required, in this case, that "the court must apply the law of the state whose interest would be more impaired if its law were not applied."[48]

Defendants argue that only California had an interest in the application of its statute of limitations, not New York. Their theory is that the defendant corporations have their principal places of business in California, Aalmuhammed resided in neither state (he lives in Florida, though he spent the months of shooting time in New York and Egypt), and Aalmuhammed filed his lawsuit in California.

The defense argument is unpersuasive. The question is which state's interest would suffer more by the application of the other's law.[49] The strength of the interest is also a factor, however.[50] California's interest in protecting its residents from stale claims arising from work done outside the state is a weak one: "[t]he residence of the parties is not the determining factor in a choice of law analysis."[51] New York's interest in governing the remedies available to parties working in new York is far more significant.[52] New York's connection with Aalmuhammed's claim is considerably more substantial, immediate and concrete than California's. We conclude that New York would suffer more damage to its interest if California law were applied than would California if New York law were applied.

Because New York has the stronger interest and would suffer more damage than California if its law were not applied, New York's six year statute of limitations governs. The claims were brought within six years of when they accrued. We therefore vacate the dismissal of Aalmuhammed's implied contract, quantum meruit, and unjust enrichment claims and remand them for further proceedings.

C. Unfair competition

Aalmuhammed claimed that defendants passed off his scriptwriting, directing and other work as that of other persons, in violation of the Lanham Act[53] and the California statute prohibiting unfair competition.[54] The dismissal was under Rule 12(b)(6), for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, so we review de novo,[55] on the basis of allegations in the complaint.[56]

We have held that, at least in some circumstances, failure to give appropriate credit for a film is "reverse palming off" actionable under the Lanham Act.[57] And we have held that "actions pursuant to California Business and Professions Code § 17200 are substantially congruent to claims made under the Lanham Act."[58] Defendants argue that not enough of Aalmuhammed's proposed script was used verbatim to amount to a violation. But this argument goes to the evidence, not the complaint, so it cannot sustain the 12(b)(6) dismissal. The complaint alleged that Aalmuhammed "substantially rewrote and expanded the dialogue for various entire [1238] scenes" and otherwise alleged extensive and substantial use of his work in the final movie. We need not determine whether Aalmuhammed established a genuine issue of fact regarding unfair competition, because the claim never got as far as summary judgment in the district court. We reverse the dismissal of these two claims.

D. Conduct abroad

The district court dismissed Aalmuhammed's claims against the Largo defendants under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. The dismissal was based on our decision in Subafilms, that acts of copyright infringement that occur wholly outside of the United States are not actionable under the U.S. Copyright Act.[59]

The complaint does not say whether the Largo defendants' conduct occurred outside the United States. Defendants argue that it does, by referring to them as "the film's foreign distributors." But it also says that their principal place of business is in California. These allegations leave room for proof that the conduct that the Largo defendants engaged in took place within California, even though it had consequences abroad. We cannot tell from the complaint whether foreign distributors do their work in foreign countries, or do it by fax, phone, and email from California. We therefore reverse the dismissal based on extraterritoriality of the claims against the Largo defendants.

AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED and REMANDED in part. Each party to bear its own costs.

[1] The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2). This dispute was originally submitted and argued on May 5, 1998 as 97-55403. However, on October 29, 1998, that appeal was dismissed for want of jurisdiction. The District Court had entered a judgment that stated "The Court may amend or amplify this order with a more specific statement of the grounds for its decision." National Distrib. Agency v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 117 F.3d 432 (9th Cir.1997), held that the identical language prevented review because "the court left open the possibility that the court might change its ruling," so no final judgment was entered. On December 10, 1998, the District Court amended its order by removing that one sentence, thus making its order final. The parties then appealed the District Court's decision again. On April 19, 1999, this court granted appellant's motion to submit the case without oral argument, to take judicial notice of the briefs and excerpts filed in 97-55403, and to allow filing of letter briefs supplementing the earlier briefs.

[2] 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 201(a).

[3] Cf. Thomson v. Larson, 147 F.3d 195, 206 (2nd Cir.1998).

[4] See Covey v. Hollydale Mobilehome Estates, 116 F.3d 830, 834 (9th Cir.1997), amended by, 125 F.3d 1281 (1997).

[5] See 17 U.S.C. § 507(b); Zuill v. Shanahan, 80 F.3d 1366, 1371 (9th Cir.1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1090, 117 S.Ct. 763, 136 L.Ed.2d 710 (1997).

[6] Zuill, 80 F.3d at 1371.

[7] 17 U.S.C. § 101.

[8] Richardson v. United States, 526 U.S. 813, 119 S.Ct. 1707, 1710, 143 L.Ed.2d 985 (1999).

[9] Ashton-Tate Corp. v. Ross, 916 F.2d 516, 521 (9th Cir.1990).

[10] See Ashton-Tate Corp. v. Ross, 916 F.2d 516, 521 (9th Cir.1990).

[11] 17 U.S.C. § 101.

[12] 17 U.S.C. § 101.

[13] See Richard Grenier, Capturing the Culture, 206-07 (1991).

[14] Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 61, 4 S.Ct. 279, 28 L.Ed. 349 (1884).

[15] Id. at 61, 4 S.Ct. 279 (quoting Nottage v. Jackson, 11 Q.B.D. 627 (1883)).

[16] U.S. Const. Art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.

[17] Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 58, 4 S.Ct. 279 (quoting Worcester).

[18] Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 345, 111 S.Ct. 1282, 113 L.Ed.2d 358 (1991).

[19] Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58, 4 S.Ct. 279, 28 L.Ed. 349 (1883).

[20] Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 346, 111 S.Ct. 1282, 113 L.Ed.2d 358 (1991).

[21] See Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 4 S.Ct. 279, 28 L.Ed. 349 (1884); Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 111 S.Ct. 1282, 113 L.Ed.2d 358 (1991).

[22] Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 61, 4 S.Ct. 279 (quoting Nottage v. Jackson, 11 Q.B.D. 627 (1883)).

[23] Id. at 61, 4 S.Ct. 279.

[24] Thomson v. Larson, 147 F.3d 195, (2nd Cir. 1998); Erickson v. Trinity Theatre, Inc., 13 F.3d 1061 (7th Cir.1994); Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500 (2d Cir.1991).

[25] Thomson, 147 F.3d at 202-05.

[26] Id.

[27] Id. at 197.

[28] Id.

[29] Id. at 198.

[30] Id.

[31] Id. at 202-04.

[32] Id. at 202-24.

[33] See Thomson v. Larson, 147 F.3d 195, (2nd Cir.1998); Erickson v. Trinity Theatre, Inc., 13 F.3d 1061 (7th Cir.1994); Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500 (2nd Cir.1991).

[34] Thomson v. Larson, 147 F.3d 195 (2nd Cir.1998).

[35] Burrow-Giles v. Sarony, 111 U.S. at 61, 4 S.Ct. 279 (quoting Nottage v. Jackson, 11 Q.B. div. 627 (1883)).

[36] Thomson, 147 F.3d at 202.

[37] Burrow-Giles v. Sarony, 111 U.S. at 61, 4 S.Ct. 279 (quoting Nottage v. Jackson, 11 Q.B. Div. 627 (1883)).

[38] Id.

[39] Cf. Thomson v. Larson, 147 F.3d 195, 202 (2nd Cir.1998).

[40] Edward B. Marks Music Corp. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., Inc., 140 F.2d 266, 267 (2nd Cir. 1944) (Hand, J.) modified by, 140 F.2d 268 (1944).

[41] See Burrow-Giles v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 61, 4 S.Ct. 279, 28 L.Ed. 349 (1883).

[42] Id.

[43] U.S. Const. Art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.

[44] Thomson, 147 F.3d at 200 (internal quotations omitted).

[45] Id. at 202 (citing Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500, 504 (1991)).

[46] S.O.S., Inc. v. Payday, Inc., 886 F.2d 1081, 1086 (9th Cir.1989).

[47] See 2 George E. Palmer, Law of Restitution § 10.11, at 463 (1978) ("When the plaintiff voluntarily submits an idea to the defendant which the defendant uses to his economic advantage, without any express agreement to pay the plaintiff for such use, ... the plaintiff will be able [in some circumstances] to recover the reasonable value of the use of the idea in a contract action.").

[48] Waggoner v. Snow, Becker, Kroll, Klaris & Krauss, 991 F.2d 1501, 1507 (9th Cir.1993) (citing Ledesma v. Jack Stewart Produce, Inc., 816 F.2d 482, 484 (9th Cir.1987)).

[49] Waggoner v. Snow, Becker, Kroll, Klaris & Krauss, 991 F.2d 1501, 1507 (9th Cir.1993) (citing Ledesma v. Jack Stewart Produce, Inc., 816 F.2d 482, 484 (9th Cir.1987)).

[50] Id.

[51] Id.

[52] See Rosenthal v. Fonda, 862 F.2d 1398, 1403 (9th Cir.1988).

[53] 15 U.S.C. §§ 1117, 1125.

[54] Cal. Bus. & Prof.Code § 17203.

[55] See Cohen v. Stratosphere Corp., 115 F.3d 695, 700 (9th Cir.1997).

[56] See Campanelli v. Bockrath, 100 F.3d 1476, 1479 (9th Cir.1996).

[57] Smith v. Montoro, 648 F.2d 602, 607 (9th Cir.1981); See also Lamothe v. Atlantic Recording Corp., 847 F.2d 1403, 1406-07 (9th Cir.1988).

[58] Cleary v. News Corp., 30 F.3d 1255, 1262-63 (9th Cir.1994).

[59] See Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Communications, 24 F.3d 1088, 1095-96 (9th Cir. 1994) (en banc).

 

3.2.4 Community For Creative Non-Violence et el. v. Reid 3.2.4 Community For Creative Non-Violence et el. v. Reid

490 U.S. 730 (1989)

COMMUNITY FOR CREATIVE NON-VIOLENCE ET AL.
v.
REID

No. 88-293.

Supreme Court of United States.

Argued March 29, 1989
Decided June 5, 1989

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

[732] Robert Alan Garrett argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Terri A. Southwick and L. Barrett Boss.

Joshua Kaufman argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Jeffrey B. O'Toole.

Lawrence S. Robbins argued the cause for the Register of Copyrights as amicus curiae urging affirmance. With him on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Bryson, Deputy Solicitor General Merrill, and Ralph Oman.[*]

JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court.

In this case, an artist and the organization that hired him to produce a sculpture contest the ownership of the copyright in that work. To resolve this dispute, we must construe the "work made for hire" provisions of the Copyright Act of 1976 (Act or 1976 Act), 17 U. S. C. §§ 101 and 201(b), and in particular, the provision in § 101, which defines as a "work made for hire" a "work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employment" (hereinafter § 101(1)).

[733] I

Petitioners are the Community for Creative Non-Violence (CCNV), a nonprofit unincorporated association dedicated to eliminating homelessness in America, and Mitch Snyder, a member and trustee of CCNV. In the fall of 1985, CCNV decided to participate in the annual Christmastime Pageant of Peace in Washington, D. C., by sponsoring a display to dramatize the plight of the homeless. As the District Court recounted:

"Snyder and fellow CCNV members conceived the idea for the nature of the display: a sculpture of a modern Nativity scene in which, in lieu of the traditional Holy Family, the two adult figures and the infant would appear as contemporary homeless people huddled on a streetside steam grate. The family was to be black (most of the homeless in Washington being black); the figures were to be life-sized, and the steam grate would be positioned atop a platform 'pedestal,' or base, within which special-effects equipment would be enclosed to emit simulated 'steam' through the grid to swirl about the figures. They also settled upon a title for the work — 'Third World America' — and a legend for the pedestal: 'and still there is no room at the inn.'" 652 F. Supp. 1453, 1454 (DC 1987).

Snyder made inquiries to locate an artist to produce the sculpture. He was referred to respondent James Earl Reid, a Baltimore, Maryland, sculptor. In the course of two telephone calls, Reid agreed to sculpt the three human figures. CCNV agreed to make the steam grate and pedestal for the statue. Reid proposed that the work be cast in bronze, at a total cost of approximately $100,000 and taking six to eight months to complete. Snyder rejected that proposal because CCNV did not have sufficient funds, and because the statue had to be completed by December 12 to be included in the pageant. Reid then suggested, and Snyder agreed, that the [734] sculpture would be made of a material known as "Design Cast 62," a synthetic substance that could meet CCNV's monetary and time constraints, could be tinted to resemble bronze, and could withstand the elements. The parties agreed that the project would cost no more than $15,000, not including Reid's services, which he offered to donate. The parties did not sign a written agreement. Neither party mentioned copyright.

After Reid received an advance of $3,000, he made several sketches of figures in various poses. At Snyder's request, Reid sent CCNV a sketch of a proposed sculpture showing the family in a crechelike setting: the mother seated, cradling a baby in her lap; the father standing behind her, bending over her shoulder to touch the baby's foot. Reid testified that Snyder asked for the sketch to use in raising funds for the sculpture. Snyder testified that it was also for his approval. Reid sought a black family to serve as a model for the sculpture. Upon Snyder's suggestion, Reid visited a family living at CCNV's Washington shelter but decided that only their newly born child was a suitable model. While Reid was in Washington, Snyder took him to see homeless people living on the streets. Snyder pointed out that they tended to recline on steam grates, rather than sit or stand, in order to warm their bodies. From that time on, Reid's sketches contained only reclining figures.

Throughout November and the first two weeks of December 1985, Reid worked exclusively on the statue, assisted at various times by a dozen different people who were paid with funds provided in installments by CCNV. On a number of occasions, CCNV members visited Reid to check on his progress and to coordinate CCNV's construction of the base. CCNV rejected Reid's proposal to use suitcases or shopping bags to hold the family's personal belongings, insisting instead on a shopping cart. Reid and CCNV members did not discuss copyright ownership on any of these visits.

[735] On December 24, 1985, 12 days after the agreed-upon date, Reid delivered the completed statue to Washington. There it was joined to the steam grate and pedestal prepared by CCNV and placed on display near the site of the pageant. Snyder paid Reid the final installment of the $15,000. The statue remained on display for a month. In late January 1986, CCNV members returned it to Reid's studio in Baltimore for minor repairs. Several weeks later, Snyder began making plans to take the statue on a tour of several cities to raise money for the homeless. Reid objected, contending that the Design Cast 62 material was not strong enough to withstand the ambitious itinerary. He urged CCNV to cast the statue in bronze at a cost of $35,000, or to create a master mold at a cost of $5,000. Snyder declined to spend more of CCNV's money on the project.

In March 1986, Snyder asked Reid to return the sculpture. Reid refused. He then filed a certificate of copyright registration for "Third World America" in his name and announced plans to take the sculpture on a more modest tour than the one CCNV had proposed. Snyder, acting in his capacity as CCNV's trustee, immediately filed a competing certificate of copyright registration.

Snyder and CCNV then commenced this action against Reid and his photographer, Ronald Purtee,[1] seeking return of the sculpture and a determination of copyright ownership. The District Court granted a preliminary injunction, ordering the sculpture's return. After a 2-day bench trial, the District Court declared that "Third World America" was a "work made for hire" under § 101 of the Copyright Act and that Snyder, as trustee for CCNV, was the exclusive owner of the copyright in the sculpture. 652 F. Supp., at 1457. The court reasoned that Reid had been an "employee" of CCNV within the meaning of § 101(1) because CCNV was the motivating force in the statue's production. Snyder and [736] other CCNV members, the court explained, "conceived the idea of a contemporary Nativity scene to contrast with the national celebration of the season," and "directed enough of [Reid's] effort to assure that, in the end, he had produced what they, not he, wanted." Id., at 1456.

The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that Reid owned the copyright because "Third World America" was not a work for hire. 270 U. S. App. D. C. 26, 35, 846 F. 2d 1485, 1494 (1988). Adopting what it termed the "literal interpretation" of the Act as articulated by the Fifth Circuit in Easter Seal Society for Crippled Children & Adults of Louisiana, Inc. v. Playboy Enterprises, 815 F. 2d 323, 329 (1987), cert. denied, 485 U. S. 981 (1988), the court read § 101 as creating "a simple dichotomy in fact between employees and independent contractors." 270 U. S. App. D. C., at 33, 846 F. 2d, at 1492. Because, under agency law, Reid was an independent contractor, the court concluded that the work was not "prepared by an employee" under § 101(1). Id., at 35, 846 F. 2d, at 1494. Nor was the sculpture a "work made for hire" under the second subsection of § 101 (hereinafter § 101(2)): sculpture is not one of the nine categories of works enumerated in that subsection, and the parties had not agreed in writing that the sculpture would be a work for hire. Ibid. The court suggested that the sculpture nevertheless may have been jointly authored by CCNV and Reid, id., at 36, 846 F. 2d, at 1495, and remanded for a determination whether the sculpture is indeed a joint work under the Act, id., at 39-40, 846 F. 2d, at 1498-1499.

We granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the Courts of Appeals over the proper construction of the "work made for hire" provisions of the Act.[2] 488 U. S. 940 (1988). We now affirm.

[737] II

A

The Copyright Act of 1976 provides that copyright ownership "vests initially in the author or authors of the work." 17 U. S. C. § 201(a). As a general rule, the author is the party who actually creates the work, that is, the person who translates an idea into a fixed, tangible expression entitled to copyright protection. § 102. The Act carves out an important exception, however, for "works made for hire."[3] If the work is for hire, "the employer or other person for whom the work was prepared is considered the author" and owns the copyright, unless there is a written agreement to the contrary. § 201(b). Classifying a work as "made for hire" determines not only the initial ownership of its copyright, but also the copyright's duration, § 302(c), and the owners' renewal rights, § 304(a), termination rights, § 203(a), and right to import certain goods bearing the copyright, § 601(b)(1). See 1 M. Nimmer & D. Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 5.03 [A], pp. 5-10 (1988). The contours of the work for hire doctrine therefore carry profound significance for freelance creators — including artists, writers, photographers, designers, composers, and computer programmers — and for the publishing, advertising, music, and other industries which commission their works.[4]

[738] Section 101 of the 1976 Act provides that a work is "for hire" under two sets of circumstances:

"(1) a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employment; or
(2) a work specially ordered or commissioned for use as a contribution to a collective work, as a part of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, as a translation, as a supplementary work, as a compilation, as an instructional text, as a test, as answer material for a test, or as an atlas, if the parties expressly agree in a written instrument signed by them that the work shall be considered a work made for hire."[5]

Petitioners do not claim that the statue satisfies the terms of § 101(2). Quite clearly, it does not. Sculpture does not fit within any of the nine categories of "specially ordered or commissioned" works enumerated in that subsection, and no written agreement between the parties establishes "Third World America" as a work for hire.

The dispositive inquiry in this case therefore is whether "Third World America" is "a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employment" under § 101(1). The Act does not define these terms. In the absence of such guidance, four interpretations have emerged. The first holds that a work is prepared by an employee whenever the hiring party[6] retains the right to control the product. See Peregrine v. Lauren Corp., 601 F. Supp. 828, 829 (Colo. 1985); Clarkstown v. Reeder, 566 F. Supp. 137, 142 (SDNY [739] 1983). Petitioners take this view. Brief for Petitioners 15; Tr. of Oral Arg. 12. A second, and closely related, view is that a work is prepared by an employee under § 101(1) when the hiring party has actually wielded control with respect to the creation of a particular work. This approach was formulated by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Aldon Accessories Ltd. v. Spiegel, Inc., 738 F. 2d 548, cert. denied, 469 U. S. 982 (1984), and adopted by the Fourth Circuit, Brunswick Beacon, Inc. v. Schock-Hopchas Publishing Co., 810 F. 2d 410 (1987), the Seventh Circuit, Evans Newton, Inc. v. Chicago Systems Software, 793 F. 2d 889, cert. denied, 479 U. S. 949 (1986), and, at times, by petitioners, Brief for Petitioners 17. A third view is that the term "employee" within § 101(1) carries its common-law agency law meaning. This view was endorsed by the Fifth Circuit in Easter Seal Society for Crippled Children & Adults of Louisiana, Inc. v. Playboy Enterprises, 815 F. 2d 323 (1987), and by the Court of Appeals below. Finally, respondent and numerous amici curiae contend that the term "employee" only refers to "formal, salaried" employees. See, e. g., Brief for Respondent 23-24; Brief for Register of Copyrights as Amicus Curiae 7. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently adopted this view. See Dumas v. Gommerman, 865 F. 2d 1093 (1989).

The starting point for our interpretation of a statute is always its language. Consumer Product Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U. S. 102, 108 (1980). The Act nowhere defines the terms "employee" or "scope of employment." It is, however, well established that "[w]here Congress uses terms that have accumulated settled meaning under . . . the common law, a court must infer, unless the statute otherwise dictates, that Congress means to incorporate the established meaning of these terms." NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 453 U. S. 322, 329 (1981); see also Perrin v. United States, 444 U. S. 37, 42 (1979). In the past, when Congress has used the term "employee" without defining it, [740] we have concluded that Congress intended to describe the conventional master-servant relationship as understood by common-law agency doctrine. See, e. g., Kelley v. Southern Pacific Co., 419 U. S. 318, 322-323 (1974); Baker v. Texas & Pacific R. Co., 359 U. S. 227, 228 (1959) (per curiam); Robinson v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 237 U. S. 84, 94 (1915). Nothing in the text of the work for hire provisions indicates that Congress used the words "employee" and "employment" to describe anything other than " 'the conventional relation of employer and employe.' " Kelley, supra, at 323, quoting Robinson, supra, at 94; cf. NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U. S. 111, 124-132 (1944) (rejecting agency law conception of employee for purposes of the National Labor Relations Act where structure and context of statute indicated broader definition). On the contrary, Congress' intent to incorporate the agency law definition is suggested by § 101(1)'s use of the term, "scope of employment," a widely used term of art in agency law. See Restatement (Second) of Agency § 228 (1958) (hereinafter Restatement).

In past cases of statutory interpretation, when we have concluded that Congress intended terms such as "employee," "employer," and "scope of employment" to be understood in light of agency law, we have relied on the general common law of agency, rather than on the law of any particular State, to give meaning to these terms. See, e. g., Kelley, 419 U. S., at 323-324, and n. 5; id., at 332 (Stewart, J., concurring in judgment); Ward v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 362 U. S. 396, 400 (1960); Baker, supra, at 228. This practice reflects the fact that "federal statutes are generally intended to have uniform nationwide application." Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, ante, at 43. Establishment of a federal rule of agency, rather than reliance on state agency law, is particularly appropriate here given the Act's express objective of creating national, uniform copyright law by broadly pre-empting state statutory and common-law copyright regulation. See 17 U. S. C. § 301(a). We thus [741] agree with the Court of Appeals that the term "employee" should be understood in light of the general common law of agency.

In contrast, neither test proposed by petitioners is consistent with the text of the Act. The exclusive focus of the right to control the product test on the relationship between the hiring party and the product clashes with the language of § 101(1), which focuses on the relationship between the hired and hiring parties. The right to control the product test also would distort the meaning of the ensuing subsection, § 101(2). Section 101 plainly creates two distinct ways in which a work can be deemed for hire: one for works prepared by employees, the other for those specially ordered or commissioned works which fall within one of the nine enumerated categories and are the subject of a written agreement. The right to control the product test ignores this dichotomy by transforming into a work for hire under § 101(1) any "specially ordered or commissioned" work that is subject to the supervision and control of the hiring party. Because a party who hires a "specially ordered or commissioned" work by definition has a right to specify the characteristics of the product desired, at the time the commission is accepted, and frequently until it is completed, the right to control the product test would mean that many works that could satisfy § 101(2) would already have been deemed works for hire under § 101(1). Petitioners' interpretation is particularly hard to square with § 101(2)'s enumeration of the nine specific categories of specially ordered or commissioned works eligible to be works for hire, e. g., "a contribution to a collective work," "a part of a motion picture," and "answer material for a test." The unifying feature of these works is that they are usually prepared at the instance, direction, and risk of a publisher or producer.[7] By their very nature, therefore, these types of [742] works would be works by an employee under petitioners' right to control the product test.

The actual control test, articulated by the Second Circuit in Aldon Accessories, fares only marginally better when measured against the language and structure of § 101. Under this test, independent contractors who are so controlled and supervised in the creation of a particular work are deemed "employees" under § 101(1). Thus work for hire status under § 101(1) depends on a hiring party's actual control of, rather than right to control, the product. Aldon Accessories, 738 F. 2d, at 552. Under the actual control test, a work for hire could arise under § 101(2), but not under § 101(1), where a party commissions, but does not actually control, a product which falls into one of the nine enumerated categories. Nonetheless, we agree with the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit that "[t]here is simply no way to milk the 'actual control' test of Aldon Accessories from the language of the statute." Easter Seal Society, 815 F. 2d, at 334. Section 101 clearly delineates between works prepared by an employee and commissioned works. Sound though other distinctions might be as a matter of copyright policy, there is no statutory support for an additional dichotomy between commissioned works that are actually controlled and supervised by the hiring party and those that are not.

We therefore conclude that the language and structure of § 101 of the Act do not support either the right to control the product or the actual control approaches.[8] The structure of [743] § 101 indicates that a work for hire can arise through one of two mutually exclusive means, one for employees and one for independent contractors, and ordinary cannons of statutory interpretation indicate that the classification of a particular hired party should be made with reference to agency law.

This reading of the undefined statutory terms finds considerable support in the Act's legislative history. Cf. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U. S. 303, 315 (1980). The Act, which almost completely revised existing copyright law, was the product of two decades of negotiation by representatives of creators and copyright-using industries, supervised by the Copyright Office and, to a lesser extent, by Congress. See Mills Music, Inc. v. Snyder, 469 U. S. 153, 159 (1985); Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72 Cornell L. Rev. 857, 862 (1987). Despite the lengthy history of negotiation and compromise which ultimately produced the Act, two things remained constant. First, interested parties and Congress at all times viewed works by employees and commissioned works by independent contractors as separate entities. Second, in using the term "employee," the parties and Congress meant to refer to a hired party in a conventional employment relationship. These factors militate in favor of the reading we have found appropriate.

In 1955, when Congress decided to overhaul copyright law, the existing work for hire provision was § 62 of the 1909 Copyright Act, 17 U. S. C. § 26 (1976 ed.) (1909 Act). It provided that "the word 'author' shall include an employer in [744] the case of works made for hire."[9] Because the 1909 Act did not define "employer" or "works made for hire," the task of shaping these terms fell to the courts. They concluded that the work for hire doctrine codified in § 62 referred only to works made by employees in the regular course of their employment. As for commissioned works, the courts generally presumed that the commissioned party had impliedly agreed to convey the copyright, along with the work itself, to the hiring party. See, e. g., Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 221 F. 2d 569, 570, rev'd, 223 F. 2d 252 (CA2 1955); Yardley v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 108 F. 2d 28, 31 (CA2 1939), cert. denied, 309 U. S. 686 (1940).[10]

In 1961, the Copyright Office's first legislative proposal retained the distinction between works by employees and works by independent contractors. See Report of the Register of Copyrights on the General Revision of the U. S. Copyright Law, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., Copyright Law Revision 86-87 (H. R. Judiciary Comm. Print 1961). After numerous meetings with representatives of the affected parties, the Copyright Office issued a preliminary draft bill in 1963. Adopting the Register's recommendation, it defined "work [745] made for hire" as "a work prepared by an employee within the scope of the duties of his employment, but not including a work made on special order or commission." Preliminary Draft for Revised U. S. Copyright Law and Discussions and Comments on the Draft, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., Copyright Law Revision, Part 3, p. 15, n. 11 (H. R. Judiciary Comm. Print 1964) (hereinafter Preliminary Draft).

In response to objections by book publishers that the preliminary draft bill limited the work for hire doctrine to "employees,"[11] the 1964 revision bill expanded the scope of the work for hire classification to reach, for the first time, commissioned works. The bill's language, proposed initially by representatives of the publishing industry, retained the definition of work for hire insofar as it referred to "employees," but added a separate clause covering commissioned works, without regard to the subject matter, "if the parties so agree in writing." S. 3008, H. R. 11947, H. R. 12354, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., § 54 (1964), reproduced in 1964 Revision Bill with Discussions and Comments, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., Copyright Law Revision, pt. 5, p. 31 (H. R. Judiciary Comm. Print 1965). Those representing authors objected that the added provision would allow publishers to use their superior bargaining position to force authors to sign work for hire agreements, [746] thereby relinquishing all copyright rights as a condition of getting their books published. See Supplementary Report, at 67.

In 1965, the competing interests reached a historic compromise, which was embodied in a joint memorandum submitted to Congress and the Copyright Office,[12] incorporated into the 1965 revision bill, and ultimately enacted in the same form and nearly the same terms 11 years later, as § 101 of the 1976 Act. The compromise retained as subsection (1) the language referring to "a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his employment." However, in exchange for concessions from publishers on provisions relating to the termination of transfer rights, the authors consented to a second subsection which classified four categories of commissioned works as works for hire if the parties expressly so agreed in writing: works for use "as a contribution to a collective work, as a part of a motion picture, as a translation, or as supplementary work." S. 1006, H. R. 4347, H. R. 5680, H. R. 6835, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., § 101 (1965). The interested parties selected these categories because they concluded that these commissioned works, although not prepared by employees and thus not covered by the first subsection, nevertheless should be treated as works for hire because they were ordinarily prepared "at the instance, direction, and risk of a publisher or producer." Supplementary Report, at 67. The Supplementary Report emphasized that only the "four special cases specifically mentioned" could qualify as works made for hire; "[o]ther works made on special order or commission would not come within the definition." Id., at 67-68.

[747] In 1966, the House Committee on the Judiciary endorsed this compromise in the first legislative Report on the revision bills. See H. R. Rep. No. 2237, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 114, 116 (1966). Retaining the distinction between works by employees and commissioned works, the House Committee focused instead on "how to draw a statutory line between those works written on special order or commission that should be considered as works made for hire, and those that should not." Id., at 115. The House Committee added four other enumerated categories of commissioned works that could be treated as works for hire: compilations, instructional texts, tests, and atlases. Id., at 116. With the single addition of "answer material for a test," the 1976 Act, as enacted, contained the same definition of works made for hire as did the 1966 revision bill, and had the same structure and nearly the same terms as the 1966 bill.[13] Indeed, much of the language of the 1976 House and Senate Reports was borrowed from the Reports accompanying the earlier drafts. See, e. g., H. R. Rep. No. 94-1476, p. 121 (1976); S. Rep. No. 94-473, p. 105 (1975).

Thus, the legislative history of the Act is significant for several reasons. First, the enactment of the 1965 compromise with only minor modifications demonstrates that Congress intended to provide two mutually exclusive ways for works to acquire work for hire status: one for employees and [748] the other for independent contractors. Second, the legislative history underscores the clear import of the statutory language: only enumerated categories of commissioned works may be accorded work for hire status. The hiring party's right to control the product simply is not determinative. See Note, The Creative Commissioner: Commissioned Works Under the Copyright Act of 1976, 62 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 373, 388 (1987). Indeed, importing a test based on a hiring party's right to control, or actual control of, a product would unravel the " 'carefully worked out compromise aimed at balancing legitimate interests on both sides.' " H. R. Rep. No. 2237, supra, at 114, quoting Supplemental Report, at 66.[14]

We do not find convincing petitioners' contrary interpretation of the history of the Act. They contend that Congress, in enacting the Act, meant to incorporate a line of cases decided under the 1909 Act holding that an employment relationship exists sufficient to give the hiring party copyright ownership whenever that party has the right to control or supervise the artist's work. See, e. g., Siegel v. National Periodical Publications, Inc., 508 F. 2d 909, 914 (CA2 1974); Picture Music, Inc. v. Bourne, Inc., 457 F. 2d 1213, 1216 (CA2), cert. denied, 409 U. S. 997 (1972); Scherr v. Universal Match Corp., 417 F. 2d 497, 500 (CA2 1969), cert. denied, 397 U. S. 936 (1970); Brattleboro Publishing Co. v. Winmill Publishing Corp., 369 F. 2d 565, 567-568 (CA2 1966). In support of this position, petitioners note: "Nowhere in the 1976 Act or in the Act's legislative history does Congress state that it intended to jettison the control standard or otherwise to reject the pre-Act judicial approach to identifying a [749] work for hire employment relationship." Brief for Petitioners 20, citing Aldon Accessories, 738 F. 2d, at 552.

We are unpersuaded. Ordinarily, "Congress' silence is just that — silence." Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U. S. 678, 686 (1987). Petitioners' reliance on legislative silence is particularly misplaced here because the text and structure of § 101 counsel otherwise. See Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U. S. 171, 178 (1987); Harrison v. PPG Industries, Inc., 446 U. S. 578, 592 (1980).[15] Furthermore, the structure of the work for hire provisions was fully developed in 1965, and the text was agreed upon in essentially final form by 1966. At that time, however, the courts had applied the work for hire doctrine under the 1909 Act exclusively to traditional employees. Indeed, it was not until after the 1965 compromise was forged and adopted by Congress[16] that a federal court for the first time applied the work for hire doctrine to commissioned works. See, e. g., Brattleboro Publishing Co., supra, at 567-568. Congress certainly could not have "jettisoned" a line of cases that had not yet been decided.

Finally, petitioners' construction of the work for hire provisions would impede Congress' paramount goal in revising the 1976 Act of enhancing predictability and certainty of copyright ownership. See H. R. Rep. No. 94-1476, supra, at 129. In a "copyright marketplace," the parties negotiate with an expectation that one of them will own the copyright in the completed work. Dumas, 865 F. 2d, at 1104-1105, [750] n. 18. With that expectation, the parties at the outset can settle on relevant contractual terms, such as the price for the work and the ownership of reproduction rights.

To the extent that petitioners endorse an actual control test,[17] CCNV's construction of the work for hire provisions prevents such planning. Because that test turns on whether the hiring party has closely monitored the production process, the parties would not know until late in the process, if not until the work is completed, whether a work will ultimately fall within § 101(1). Under petitioners' approach, therefore, parties would have to predict in advance whether the hiring party will sufficiently control a given work to make it the author. "If they guess incorrectly, their reliance on 'work for hire' or an assignment may give them a copyright interest that they did not bargain for." Easter Seal Society, 815 F. 2d, at 333; accord, Dumas, supra, at 1103. This understanding of the work for hire provisions clearly thwarts Congress' goal of ensuring predictability through advance planning. Moreover, petitioners' interpretation "leaves the door open for hiring parties, who have failed to get a full assignment of copyright rights from independent contractors falling outside the subdivision (2) guidelines, to unilaterally obtain work-made-for-hire rights years after the work has been completed as long as they directed or supervised the work, a standard that is hard not to meet when one is a hiring party." Hamilton, Commissioned Works as Works Made for Hire Under the 1976 Copyright Act: Misinterpretation and Injustice, 135 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1281, 1304 (1987).

In sum, we must reject petitioners' argument. Transforming a commissioned work into a work by an employee on the basis of the hiring party's right to control, or actual control of, the work is inconsistent with the language, structure, and legislative history of the work for hire provisions. To [751] determine whether a work is for hire under the Act, a court first should ascertain, using principles of general common law of agency, whether the work was prepared by an employee or an independent contractor. After making this determination, the court can apply the appropriate subsection of § 101.

B

We turn, finally, to an application of § 101 to Reid's production of "Third World America." In determining whether a hired party is an employee under the general common law of agency, we consider the hiring party's right to control the manner and means by which the product is accomplished.[18] Among the other factors relevant to this inquiry are the skill required;[19] the source of the instrumentalities and tools;[20] the location of the work;[21] the duration of the relationship between the parties;[22] whether the hiring party has the right to assign additional projects to the hired party;[23] the extent of the hired party's discretion over when and how long to work;[24] the method of payment;[25] the hired party's role in hiring and [752] paying assistants;[26] whether the work is part of the regular business of the hiring party;[27] whether the hiring party is in business;[28] the provision of employee benefits;[29] and the tax treatment of the hired party.[30] See Restatement § 220(2) (setting forth a nonexhaustive list of factors relevant to determining whether a hired party is an employee).[31] No one of these factors is determinative. See Ward, 362 U. S., at 400; Hilton Int'l Co. v. NLRB, 690 F. 2d 318, 321 (CA2 1982).

Examining the circumstances of this case in light of these factors, we agree with the Court of Appeals that Reid was not an employee of CCNV but an independent contractor. 270 U. S. App. D. C., at 35, n. 11, 846 F. 2d, at 1494, n. 11. True, CCNV members directed enough of Reid's work to ensure that he produced a sculpture that met their specifications. 652 F. Supp., at 1456. But the extent of control the hiring party exercises over the details of the product is not dispositive. Indeed, all the other circumstances weigh heavily against finding an employment relationship. Reid is a sculptor, a skilled occupation. Reid supplied his own tools. He worked in his own studio in Baltimore, making daily supervision of his activities from Washington practicably impossible. Reid was retained for less than two months, a relatively [753] short period of time. During and after this time, CCNV had no right to assign additional projects to Reid. Apart from the deadline for completing the sculpture, Reid had absolute freedom to decide when and how long to work. CCNV paid Reid $15,000, a sum dependent on "completion of a specific job, a method by which independent contractors are often compensated." Holt v. Winpisinger, 258 U. S. App. D. C. 343, 351, 811 F. 2d 1532, 1540 (1987). Reid had total discretion in hiring and paying assistants. "Creating sculptures was hardly 'regular business' for CCNV." 270 U. S. App. D. C., at 35, n. 11, 846 F. 2d, at 1494, n. 11. Indeed, CCNV is not a business at all. Finally, CCNV did not pay payroll or Social Security taxes, provide any employee benefits, or contribute to unemployment insurance or workers' compensation funds.

Because Reid was an independent contractor, whether "Third World America" is a work for hire depends on whether it satisfies the terms of § 101(2). This petitioners concede it cannot do. Thus, CCNV is not the author of "Third World America" by virtue of the work for hire provisions of the Act. However, as the Court of Appeals made clear, CCNV nevertheless may be a joint author of the sculpture if, on remand, the District Court determines that CCNV and Reid prepared the work "with the intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole." 17 U. S. C. § 101.[32] In that case, CCNV and Reid would be co-owners of the copyright in the work. See § 201(a).

For the aforestated reasons, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.

It is so ordered.

[*] Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Computer and Business Equipment Manufacturers Association et al. by Richard Dannay and Morton David Goldberg; for Intellectual Property Owners, Inc., by Donald W. Banner and Herbert C. Wamsley; and for Magazine Publishers of America, Inc., by Slade R. Metcalf and Victor A. Kovner.

Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Society of Magazine Photographers et al. by Charles D. Ossola; for The Professional Photographers of America, Inc., by David Ladd, David E. Leibowitz, Bruce G. Joseph, and Thomas W. Kirby; and for Volunteer Lawyers for the Arts, Inc., et al. by Irwin Karp.

Arthur J. Levine and William L. LaFuze filed a brief for the American Intellectual Property Law Association as amicus curiae.

[1] Purtee was named as a defendant but never appeared or claimed any interest in the statue.

[2] Compare Easter Seal Society for Crippled Children & Adults of Louisiana, Inc. v. Playboy Enterprises, 815 F. 2d 323 (CA5 1987), (agency law determines who is an employee under § 101), cert. denied, 485 U. S. 981 (1988), with Brunswick Beacon, Inc. v. Schock-Hopchas Publishing Co., 810 F. 2d 410 (CA4 1987) (supervision and control standard determines who is an employee under § 101); Evans Newton, Inc. v. Chicago Systems Software, 793 F. 2d 889 (CA7) (same), cert. denied, 479 U. S. 949 (1986); and Aldon Accessories Ltd. v. Spiegel, Inc., 738 F. 2d 548 (CA2) (same), cert. denied, 469 U. S. 982 (1984). See also Dumas v. Gommerman, 865 F. 2d 1093 (CA9 1989) (a multifactor formal, salaried employee test determines who is an employee under § 101).

[3] We use the phrase "work for hire" interchangeably with the more cumbersome statutory phrase "work made for hire."

[4] As of 1955, approximately 40 percent of all copyright registrations were for works for hire, according to a Copyright Office study. See Varmer, Works Made for Hire and On Commission, in Studies Prepared for the Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Study No. 13, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., 139, n. 49 (Comm. Print 1960) (hereinafter Varmer, Works Made for Hire). The Copyright Office does not keep more recent statistics on the number of work for hire registrations.

[5] Section 101 of the Act defines each of the nine categories of "specially ordered or commissioned" works.

[6] By "hiring party," we mean to refer to the party who claims ownership of the copyright by virtue of the work for hire doctrine.

[7] See Supplementary Report of the Register of Copyrights on the General Revision of the U. S. Copyright Law: 1965 Revision Bill, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., Copyright Law Revision, pt. 6, pp. 66-67 (H. R. Judiciary Comm. Print 1965) (hereinafter Supplementary Report); Hardy, Copyright Law's Concept of Employment — What Congress Really Intended, 35 J. Copr. Soc. USA 210, 244-245 (1988).

[8] We also reject the suggestion of respondent and amici that the § 101(1) term "employee" refers only to formal, salaried employees. While there is some support for such a definition in the legislative history, see Varmer, Works Made for Hire 130; n. 11, infra, the language of § 101(1) cannot support it. The Act does not say "formal" or "salaried" employee, but simply "employee." Moreover, respondent and those amici who endorse a formal, salaried employee test do not agree upon the content of this test. Compare, e. g., Brief for Respondent 37 (hired party who is on payroll is an employee within § 101(1) with Tr. of Oral Arg. 31 (hired party who receives a salary or commissions regularly is an employee within § 101(1)); and Brief for Volunteer Lawyers for the Arts, Inc., et al. as Amici Curiae 4 (hired party who receives a salary and is treated as an employee for Social Security and tax purposes is an employee within § 101(1)). Even the one Court of Appeals to adopt what it termed a formal, salaried employee test in fact embraced an approach incorporating numerous factors drawn from the agency law definition of employee which we endorse. See Dumas, 865 F. 2d, at 1104.

[9] The concept of works made for hire first arose in controversies over copyright ownership involving works produced by persons whom all parties agreed were employees. See, e. g., Colliery Engineer Co. v. United Correspondence Schools Co., 94 F. 152 (CC SDNY 1899); Little v. Gould, 15 F. Cas. 612 (No. 8,395) (CC NDNY 1852). This Court first took note of the work for hire doctrine in Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U. S. 239, 248 (1903), where we found that an employer owned the copyright to advertisements that had been created by an employee in the course of his employment. Bleistein did not, however, purport to define "employee."

[10] See Varmer, Works Made for Hire 130; Fidlow, The "Works Made for Hire" Doctrine and the Employee/Independent Contractor Dichotomy: The Need for Congressional Clarification, 10 Hastings Comm. Ent. L. J. 591, 600-601 (1988). Indeed, the Varmer study, which was commissioned by Congress as part of the revision process, itself contained separate subsections labeled "Works Made for Hire" and "Works Made on Commission." It nowhere indicated that the two categories might overlap or that commissioned works could be made by an employee.

[11] See, e. g., Preliminary Draft, at 259 (statement of Horace S. Manges, Joint Committee of the American Book Publishers Council and the American Textbook Publishers Institute) ("There would be a necessity of putting people on the payroll whom the employers wouldn't want to put on the payroll, and where the employees would prefer to work as independent contractors"); id., at 272 (statement of Saul N. Rittenberg, MGM) ("[T]he present draft has given more emphasis to formalism than necessary. If I commission a work from a man, ordering a work specially for my purposes, and I pay for it, what difference does it make whether I put him under an employment contract or establish an independent contractor relationship?"); id., at 260 (statement of John R. Peterson, American Bar Association) ("I don't think there is any valid philosophical or economic difference between the situation in which you have a man on a continuing basis of orders which justifies placing him on your payroll, and the situation in which you give him a particular order for a particular job").

[12] The parties to the joint memorandum included representatives of the major competing interests involved in the copyright revision process: publishers and authors, composers, and lyricists. See Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on H. R. 4347, 5680, 6831, 6835 before Subcommittee No. 3 of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, p. 134 (1965).

[13] An attempt to add "photographic or other portrait[s]," S. Rep. No. 94-473, p. 4 (1975), to the list of commissioned works eligible for work for hire status failed after the Register of Copyrights objected:

"The addition of portraits to the list of commissioned works that can be made into 'works made for hire' by agreement of the parties is difficult to justify. Artists and photographers are among the most vulnerable and poorly protected of all the beneficiaries of the copyright law, and it seems clear that, like serious composers and choreographers, they were not intended to be treated as 'employees' under the carefully negotiated definition in section 101." Second Supplementary Report of the Register of Copyrights on the General Revision of the U. S. Copyright Law: 1975 Revision Bill, Chapter XI, pp. 12-13.

[14] Strict adherence to the language and structure of the Act is particularly appropriate where, as here, a statute is the result of a series of carefully crafted compromises. See Rodriguez v. Compass Shipping Co., 451 U. S. 596, 617 (1981); United States v. Sisson, 399 U. S. 267, 291, 298 (1970).

[15] In framing other provisions of the Act, Congress indicated when it intended to incorporate existing case law. See, e. g., H. R. Rep. No. 94-1476, p. 121 (1976) ("There is . . . no need for a specific statutory provision concerning the rights and duties of the coowners [sic] of a work; court-made law on this point is left undisturbed"); S. Rep. No. 94-473, supra, at 104 (same).

[16] Over the course of the copyright revision process, Congress frequently endorsed a negotiated compromise which years later in 1976 it formally enacted with only minor revisions. See Mills Music, Inc. v. Snyder, 469 U. S. 153, 160-161 (1985).

[17] Petitioners concede that, as a practical matter, it is often difficult to demonstrate the existence of a right to control without evidence of the actual exercise of that right. See Murray v. Gelderman, 566 F. 2d 1307, 1310-1311 (CA5 1978).

[18] See, e. g., Hilton Int'l Co. v. NLRB, 690 F. 2d 318, 320 (CA2 1982); NLRB v. Maine Caterers, Inc., 654 F. 2d 131, 133 (CA1 1981), cert denied, 455 U. S. 940 (1982); Restatement § 220(1).

[19] See, e. g., Bartels v. Birmingham, 332 U. S. 126, 132 (1947); Hilton Int'l Co., supra, at 320; NLRB v. A. Duie Pyle, Inc., 606 F. 2d 379, 382 (CA3 1979); Restatement § 220(2)(d).

[20] See, e. g., NLRB v. United Ins. Co. of America, 390 U. S. 254, 258 (1968); United States v. Silk, 331 U. S. 704, 717, 718 (1947); Dumas, 865 F. 2d, at 1105; Restatement § 220(2)(e).

[21] See, e. g., United Ins. Co., supra, at 258; Dumas, supra, at 1105; Darden v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 796 F. 2d 701, 705 (CA4 1986); Restatement § 220(2)(e).

[22] See, e. g., United Ins. Co., supra, at 259; Bartels, supra, at 132; Restatement § 220(2)(f).

[23] See, e. g., Dumas, supra, at 1105.

[24] See, e. g., United Ins. Co., supra, at 258; Short v. Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Fund, 729 F. 2d 567, 574 (CA8 1984).

[25] See, e. g., Dumas, supra, at 1105; Darden, supra, at 705; Holt v. Winpisinger, 258 U. S. App. D. C. 343, 351, 811 F. 2d 1532, 1540 (1987); Restatement § 220(2)(g).

[26] See, e. g., Bartels, supra, at 132; Silk, supra, at 719; Darden, supra, at 705; Short, supra, at 574.

[27] See, e. g., United Ins. Co., supra, at 259; Silk, supra, at 718; Dumas, supra, at 1105; Hilton Int'l Co., supra, at 321; Restatement § 220(2)(h).

[28] See, e. g., Restatement § 220(2)(j).

[29] See, e. g., United Ins. Co., supra, at 259; Dumas, supra, at 1105; Short, supra, at 574.

[30] See, e. g., Dumas, supra, at 1105.

[31] In determining whether a hired party is an employee under the general common law of agency, we have traditionally looked for guidance to the Restatement of Agency. See, e. g., Kelley v. Southern Pacific Co., 419 U. S. 318, 323-324, and n. 5 (1974); id., at 332 (Stewart, J., concurring in judgment); Ward v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 362 U. S. 396, 400 (1960); Baker v. Texas & Pacific R. Co., 359 U. S. 227, 228 (1959).

[32] Neither CCNV nor Reid sought review of the Court of Appeals' remand order. We therefore have no occasion to pass judgment on the applicability of the Act's joint authorship provisions to this case.

3.2.5 Avtec Systems, Inc. v. Peiffer, 3.2.5 Avtec Systems, Inc. v. Peiffer,

21 F.3d 568
1994 Copr.L.Dec. P 27,242, 9
Indiv.Empl.Rts.Cas. (BNA) 532,
30 U.S.P.Q.2d 1365

AVTEC SYSTEMS, INCORPORATED, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Jeffrey G. PEIFFER; Kisak-Kisak, Incorporated; Paul F.
Kisak, Defendants-Appellees.
AVTEC SYSTEMS, INCORPORATED, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Jeffrey G. PEIFFER; Kisak-Kisak, Incorporated, Defendants-Appellants,
and
Paul F. Kisak, Defendant.

Nos. 92-2521, 92-2607.
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
 Argued June 7, 1993.
Decided April 6, 1994.

[569] ARGUED: John P. Corrado, Michael Lee Zupan, Hazel & Thomas, Alexandria, VA, for appellant. Douglas James Cole, Taylor, Newsome, Tinkham, Lefevere & Cole, Fairfax, VA, for appellees. ON BRIEF: William S. Taylor, Tommye Jolly-Tinkham, Taylor, Newsome, Tinkham, Lefevere & Cole, Fairfax, VA, for appellees.

Before ERVIN, Chief Judge, PHILLIPS, Circuit Judge, and GEORGE ROSS ANDERSON, Jr., United States District Judge for the District of South Carolina, sitting by designation.

Affirmed in part, vacated in part and remanded by published opinion. Judge PHILLIPS wrote the opinion, in which Chief Judge ERVIN and District Judge GEORGE ROSS ANDERSON, Jr., joined.

OPINION

PHILLIPS, Circuit Judge:

In these consolidated appeals, we consider a number of copyright and state-law claims arising from the parties' failure to memorialize their intentions regarding ownership of a computer program. We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings.

I

The facts, as described by the district court, Avtec Systems, Inc. v. Peiffer, 805 F.Supp. 1312, 1315-17 (E.D.Va.1992), are as follows. Avtec Systems, Inc. (Avtec) markets space-related computer services and products to the federal government. Its services include computerized simulations of satellite orbital patterns. Jeffrey G. Peiffer began working part-time for Avtec while in college and became the company's fifth full-time employee upon his graduation in 1984. During his career with Avtec, his job description included "implement[ing] computer simulation" and, specifically, simulating "satellite orbits." J.A. 232-33.

In 1984, Avtec purchased a Macintosh computer at Peiffer's suggestion. After Peiffer demonstrated the computer's abilities to Avtec President Ronald Hirsch and other employees, it became apparent that the company's orbital simulations would be enhanced in several respects by using a Macintosh. It is disputed whether that idea originated with Peiffer alone or in discussions with other Avtec personnel; it also is disputed whether Avtec authorized Peiffer to begin developing a computer program for that purpose ("the Program") as he did in 1985. Peiffer demonstrated the Program--called "the .309 version"--to Hirsch and others at Avtec that same year, and again during his 1988 performance  [570] appraisal as evidence of his initiative on the job.

At that point, Hirsch and another Avtec employee suggested several modifications to enhance the Program's utility as a marketing tool for the company. Peiffer charged time to an Avtec account for making those enhancements. Peiffer also received a $5,000 bonus in early 1989 for helping to land a contract by demonstrating the Program as a unique Avtec service. He performed similar demonstrations for other clients as well. Later that year, Avtec issued a written policy, of which Peiffer was aware, binding employees to duties of confidentiality and nondisclosure respecting the company's proprietary information and trade secrets.

In early 1990, another Avtec employee found some bugs in the Program. After Peiffer fixed them, that other employee presented the corrected version to a client. In 1991, Avtec labeled the Program as a trademark and advertised it as unique to Avtec. J.A. 331. At no time before his eventual departure from Avtec did Peiffer represent to his employer or to its potential clients that he had an ownership interest in the Program.

In 1992, however, when Peiffer was asked to demonstrate the Program to NASA as part of a contract bid, he used the old, uncorrected .309 version without informing anyone at Avtec or NASA of that fact. Peiffer concedes that Avtec did not win that contract in part because he showed the outdated version. Shortly there after, when Peiffer was again asked to demonstrate the program, he refused and said that he didn't have a copy of it at the office.

Unbeknownst to Avtec, Peiffer had met Paul F. Kisak early in 1989 and granted Kisak's company, Kisak-Kisak, Inc. (KKI) an exclusive license to market the Program. Sales generated $197,000 in gross revenues for KKI, of which Peiffer received approximately half.

Avtec registered for a copyright in the .309 version of the Program on March 27, 1992. Six days later, Avtec commenced this action against Peiffer, Kisak, and KKI (collectively, "defendants") charging copyright infringement, misappropriation of trade secrets, and breach of fiduciary duty.[1] Avtec also sought imposition of a constructive trust. On April 9, Peiffer registered his copyright claim in the .309 version, which he called MacOrbit, and another copyright claim in the 2.05 version, which he called the Orbit Program and identified as derivative of the .309 version. J.A. 1924-25. Defendants then counterclaimed for copyright infringement.

After a three-day bench trial, the court found that Peiffer owned copyright in the later version of the Program, reasoning that he had not created it within the scope of his employment as is required by 17 U.S.C.A. Sec. 201(b) (West 1977 & Supp.1993) in order for copyright to vest in an employer. Avtec, 805 F.Supp. at 1317-19. On that basis, the court denied Avtec relief on Count I and--pursuant to defendants' counterclaim--ordered Avtec to withdraw its registration of copyright.[2] Id. at 1319, 1323.

Avtec prevailed on its state-law claims, however. The court held that, through its contributions to and use of the .309 version, Avtec had a trade secret in the use of that version as a demonstration and marketing device similar to "shop rights" that may arise in an employee's patented invention. The court also found that Peiffer and KKI had misappropriated that trade secret.[3] Id. at 1320-21. Upon finding additionally that Peiffer breached fiduciary duties owed to Avtec, the court imposed a constructive trust. The terms required Peiffer and KKI: (1) to grant Avtec a perpetual license (as long as defendants had a copyright interest) to use the Program "for the same purposes as a purchaser might lawfully utilize it"; (2) to pay Avtec 15% of gross revenues received from the Program in perpetuity from March [571] 1, 1989; and (3) to give Avtec all current and forthcoming versions, enhancements, and upgrades of the Program before making them commercially available. Id. at 1322-23.

Avtec's appeal and the defendants' cross-appeal from unfavorable portions of the judgment followed and were consolidated for hearing and disposition in this court.

We discuss in order the issue of copyright ownership as it bears upon the conflicting claims of copyright infringement in Avtec's principal claim and the defendants' counterclaim, the disposition of Avtec's pendent state law claims for misappropriation of trade secrets and breach of fiduciary duty, and the imposition of a constructive trust in favor of Avtec.

To recover on its copyright claim, Avtec had to show that it owned a valid copyright in the Program and that defendants encroached upon one of the exclusive rights it conferred. 17 U.S.C. Sec. 501(a); Trandes Corp. v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 996 F.2d 655, 660 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 443, 126 L.Ed.2d 377 (1993). Those rights include the control of reproduction, distribution, and performance or display of the original, as well as the production of derivative works.[4] 17 U.S.C. Sec. 106.

These rights presumptively vest in the author--the one who translates an original idea into a fixed, tangible means of expression.[5] Id. Sec. 102(a). The presumption of authorial ownership falls, however, if the work is made "for hire," such as one "prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employment." Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 737-38, 109 S.Ct. 2166, 2171, 104 L.Ed.2d 811 (1989) (quoting 17 U.S.C. Secs. 101(1), 201(b)). Under those circumstances, copyright vests in the employer for whom the work was prepared. Id. at 737, 109 S.Ct. at 2171. This exception is overridden only by a clear writing reserving authorship rights to the employee, 17 U.S.C. Sec. 201(b), which concededly did not exist in this case.

It is essentially undisputed that Peiffer was Avtec's employee at the time of the Program's inception. The contested issue throughout has been whether Peiffer created the Program within the scope of his employment. Reid instructs that common-law agency principles govern resolution of that question. 490 U.S. at 739-40, 109 S.Ct. at 2172-73 (citing Restatement (Second) of Agency Sec. 228 (1958)). As expressed in Section 228 of the Restatement, the key principle is that a servant's conduct is within the scope of employment "only if: (a) it is of the kind he is employed to perform; (b) it occurs substantially within the authorized time and space limits; [and] (c) it is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the master."

We agree with the district court that creation of the Program was "of the kind" of work Peiffer was employed to perform. See 805 F.Supp. at 1318. When that element of the Restatement test is met, courts have tended not to grant employees authorship rights solely on the basis that the work was done at home on off-hours. See Miller v. CP Chems., Inc., 808 F.Supp. 1238, 1242-44 (D.S.C.1992) (computer program prepared at home during off-hours, without direction or extra compensation from employer held work-for-hire), appeal dismissed, No. 93-1045 (4th Cir. April 13, 1993); Marshall v. Miles Lab., Inc., 647 F.Supp. 1326, 1330 (N.D.Ind.1986) (same, regarding article written for publication in scientific journal); In [572] re Simplified Info. Sys., Inc., 89 B.R. 538, 542 (W.D.Pa.1988) (same, regarding computer software).

On the other hand, copyright does not vest in the employer solely because "the subject matter of the work ... bears upon or arises out of the employee's activities for his employer." Melville B. Nimmer, 1 Nimmer on Copyright Sec. 5.03[B][b][i] at 5-28 (1993) ("Nimmer "). Thus, Avtec had to show that Peiffer was at least "appreciabl[y]" motivated by a desire to further its corporate goals in order to satisfy the third element of the work-for-hire test. Restatement (Second) of Agency Sec. 236 cmt. b; id. Sec. 235 (act falls beyond scope of employment if "done with no intention" to serve master) (emphasis added).

The district court found that Peiffer had not developed version 2.05 of the Program "within Avtec authorized time and space limits ... [and] was [not] motivated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve Avtec." 805 F.Supp. at 1318-19. On this basis, the court held that copyright vested in Peiffer, not in Avtec, and accordingly rendered judgment in favor of defendants on Avtec's claim and on their counterclaim.

Avtec contends that the district court should have applied the scope-of-employment test more flexibly in light of its finding on the pendent state-law claims that Peiffer breached duties that he owed to Avtec as its employee.[6] See id. at 1316-17. Defendants rightly question whether the outcome of pendent state-law claims may drive the analysis of the federal claim upon which jurisdiction is based. But we conclude that the court did err, however, by injecting into the analysis of copyright ownership an element contemplated neither by the Restatement's scope-of-employment test nor by the law of copyright generally--i.e., the court's preliminary finding that the .309 version of the Program differed materially from the 2.05 version in terms of the use to which it was put in the marketplace.

To reiterate, copyright protects not original ideas but their incarnation in a tangible means of expression. See generally Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 111 S.Ct. 1282, 113 L.Ed.2d 358 (1991). It appears undisputed that the original expression at issue here is embodied in the source code for the .309 version of the Program.[7] The commercial use to which that work is put does not alter the owner's exclusive rights to copy it and to prepare derivative works based upon it.[8] Cf. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 218, 74 S.Ct. 460, 471, 98 L.Ed. 630 (1954) (exclusive rights undiminished regardless of the "intended ... or [actual] use in industry" to which the work is put); Rogers v. Koons, 751 F.Supp. 474, 477 (S.D.N.Y.1990), aff'd, 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 365, 121 L.Ed.2d 278 (1992).

Instead of focusing upon the question whether the .309 version was created within the scope of Peiffer's employment, however, the district court made a preliminary finding that Avtec used the original version solely as "a demonstration and marketing device," while the later 2.05 version was a " 'stand-alone' software package that could be marketed commercially," which Avtec neither  [573] could nor would have developed.[9] 805 F.Supp. at 1316. Relying on this utilitarian distinction between two versions of the program, the court expressly confined its decision on the question of copyright ownership to "the current 2.05 version" of the Program. Id. at 1318-19. Finding dispositive the facts that Peiffer worked on the Program at home, on his own equipment and time, as a "personal hobby, and not to satisfy specific work obligations for Avtec," the court reasoned that "while Peiffer allowed earlier versions of the Orbit Program to be used by Avtec for various client demonstrations, Avtec did not ... persuade the Court that Peiffer's development of the 2.05 version ... was actuated by his desire to serve Avtec" and held that Avtec could not "claim complete or joint ownership of the 2.05 version." Id. at 1319 (emphases added).

Defendants urge us to extend this express language to encompass the .309 version as well, arguing that such a finding is implicit in the court's order that Avtec withdraw its registration of copyright in that version. We do not believe the implication is possible; several factors weaken it. The first, of course, is the court's deliberately exclusive focus upon the 2.05 version in its express references to Peiffer's copyright ownership. The court did describe him as "the .309 version's creator," Id. at 1320, but that passing reference occurs in its discussion of Avtec's trade secret claim--in which consideration of Peiffer's copyright interest is, as we discuss below, notably absent, and in which the court found that Avtec had a significant interest in the "use" of the .309 version. Moreover, the court held that "Peiffer owns the version of the Orbit Program for which he made copyright application," id. at 1323, when he had in fact applied for copyright in both versions.

These factors call into question both the court's assessment of the evidence before it and its application of the law to the facts of the case. Anticipating our de novo review of the legal component of the scope-of-employment issue, the parties emphasize conflicting evidence supporting their respective positions on that issue. Avtec points to evidence that it authorized Peiffer to work on the project at home during off-hours and contends that Peiffer's resulting behavior compels the inference that he intended the work, at least in part, to contribute to Avtec's successful pursuit of its business objectives.[10] Defendants counter with the evidence relied upon by the district court that Peiffer developed the Program as a hobby and that Avtec failed to exercise significant control or supervision over the project.[11]

As indicated, we have concluded that the district court's resolution of the scope-of-employment issue was flawed by a misapprehension of the controlling legal principles. We are not in a position to resolve that heavily fact-laden issue in the first instance; among other reasons, credibility could be decisive. Though we regret the necessity,  [574] we must instead vacate those portions of the judgment respecting the claim and counterclaim for copyright infringement and remand those claims for reconsideration, in light of this opinion, of the dispositive common issue whether the original Program was created within the scope of Peiffer's employment. If upon that reconsideration the court again concludes that it was not so created, the court should of course again give judgment in favor of defendants on Avtec's copyright claim, and must of course then also reconsider the effect of such a finding upon defendants' counterclaim for copyright infringement.[12] Should the court conclude instead that Peiffer created the .309 version within the scope of his employment with Avtec, it must then determine whether defendants infringed the copyright (for example, by preparing unauthorized derivative works[13]); whether Kisak and KKI are liable for such infringement; and any statutory remedies that may be warranted by wrongful copying of protected material.[14] 17 U.S.C. Secs. 502-505.

II

On their cross-appeal from the judgment against them on Avtec's claim for misappropriation of trade secrets, the defendants raise two major issues. Apparently for the first time on appeal, they contend that the trade secrets claim is preempted by the federal provision of a cause of action for copyright infringement. See generally Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 84 S.Ct. 784, 11 L.Ed.2d 661 (1964). Because Avtec did not treat the issue as waived, and because we find it necessary to vacate the judgment and remand for reconsideration of the trade secrets claim, we note that the defense must fail under this circuit's recent decision in Trandes Corp., 996 F.2d at 660.

The Trandes court considered whether the Copyright Act preempted an action brought under Maryland's trade secrets statute which, like the Virginia law at issue here, closely tracks the Uniform Trade Secrets Act. Compare Md.Com.Law II Code Ann. Sec. 11-1201(e) (1990 & Supp.1993) with Va.Code Ann. Sec. 59.1-336 (Michie 1992) and UTSA (reprinted in 2 R. Milgrim, Trade Secrets app. A (1991)). We rejected the preemption defense on the basis that recovery for trade secret misappropriation requires proof of breach of confidence--an element of proof additional to those necessary for recovery in an action for copyright infringement. Trandes, 996 F.2d at 659-60; H.R.Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 132 (1978) reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N 5659, 5748 (anticipating no preemption of actions to enforce "[t]he evolving common law rights of ... trade secrets ... as long as the cause[ ] of action contain[s] elements, such as ... a breach of trust or confidentiality, that are different in kind from copyright infringement."). The same result follows here.

Defendants argue alternatively that the trade secrets claim fails on the merits. In Virginia, a trade secret is information such as "a formula, pattern, compilation, program, [575] device, method, technique, or process" that has independent economic value due to its secrecy and that is subject to reasonable attempts to keep it secret. Va.Code Ann. Sec. 59.1-336. Misappropriation is the improper acquisition or disclosure of a trade secret by one who "knew or had reason to know" that acquisition occurred "under circumstances giving rise to a duty" to maintain confidentiality. Id. Thus, the hallmark of a trade secret is not its novelty but its secrecy. Dionne v. Southeast Foam Converting, 240 Va. 297, 397 S.E.2d 110, 113 (1990).

The court found that Avtec had an interest--described variously as a "trade secret," a "license," and a "right" akin to the equitable "shop rights" of patent law--in the "use of the .309 version ... as a demonstration and marketing device." 805 F.Supp. at 1320. There is no difficulty in finding the existence of a trade secret in the source or object codes to computer programs where question of copyright ownership is not in issue, Trandes, 996 F.2d at 662, or, even more clearly, where the owner of the alleged trade secret also owns copyright in the material sought to be protected.[15] E.g., Computer Assocs. Int'l., Inc., 982 F.2d at 715-16, 720. Of course, a plaintiff "may not obtain a double recovery where the damages for copyright infringement and trade secret misappropriation are coextensive." Id. at 720.

But defendants rightly question a judgment that, in effect, imposes liability upon a copyright owner for "misappropriating" his own work.[16] As discussed above, the court made no express finding that Peiffer owns copyright in the .309 version of the Program, and that question has been remanded for resolution by the district court. Expressing no opinion upon it, we do note a critical consequence of a ruling upon it in Peiffer's favor in regard to Avtec's trade secret claim. It would mean that from the moment of the Program's inception, Peiffer has owned the exclusive right to license performances of the original and of any derivative works. And as discussed above, absent a written agreement regarding Avtec's use of the Program, any use license held by Avtec would be implied and therefore nonexclusive. See n. 12, supra. Avtec offers no authority, and we have found none, for the proposition that the alleged "owner" of a trade secret, Dionne v. Southeast Foam Converting & Packaging, Inc., 240 Va. 297, 397 S.E.2d 110, 113 (1990), could maintain the secrecy of material that is subject under federal law to publication at the will of another. We do not believe that a nonexclusive use license in copyrighted material can support the reasonable expectation or right of secrecy necessary to predicate a claim that the identical material is a trade secret protectible under Virginia law.[17] See Restatement (First) of Torts Sec. 757 cmt. b (1939) (trade secret must have "a substantial element of secrecy ... so that, except by the use of improper means, there would be difficulty in acquiring the information"; one factor in determining trade secrecy is the ease or difficulty with which the information could be properly acquired by others) (emphasis added).

For the above reasons, we must vacate the portion of the judgment in favor of Avtec on its trade-secret claim, and remand it for reconsideration in light of this opinion. [576]

III

Peiffer argues that the district court erred as a matter of law in concluding that he bore any fiduciary duties toward Avtec and that he breached those duties. We have considered his arguments, and reject them. "A fiduciary relationship exists in all cases when special confidence has been reposed in one who in equity and good conscience is bound to act in good faith and with due regard for the interests of the one reposing the confidence." H-B Ltd. Partnership v. Wimmer, 220 Va. 176, 257 S.E.2d 770, 773 (1979). Employees owe their employers the duty to "be candid ... and [to] withhold no information which would be useful to the employer in the protection and pursuit of its interests." Community Counselling Serv., Inc. v. Reilly, 317 F.2d 239, 244 (4th Cir.1963). The district court rightly found that Peiffer breached those duties through his nondisclosure of his business relationship with Avtec's competitor KKI and by demonstrating the outdated version of the Program to Avtec's detriment and without its knowledge.

IV

In view of our disposition of the various claims, the remedial portion of the district court's judgment, including the constructive trust it imposed, must be vacated, with appropriate remedy to abide results on remand. If the court were to conclude that Avtec does hold copyright in the .309 version and all derivatives, any infringement of its exclusive rights may be remedied as provided under the statute. 17 U.S.C. Secs. 502-505. Specifically, Avtec would be entitled to all revenues generated through the infringement, and not merely a percentage of profits as was awarded under the constructive trust, and Avtec need only show, as it has, defendants' gross profits from the Program. Id. Sec. 504(b). If Avtec were to prevail on the reconsidered trade secret claim, the court should award such damages, not coextensive with any awarded for copyright infringement as could be shown. Computer Assocs. Int'l., Inc., 982 F.2d at 720.

Conversely, if the court finds against Avtec on the issue of copyright ownership, its damages would be limited to those flowing from the breach of fiduciary duty whose finding by the district court we have affirmed, while the defendants' recovery on their counterclaim would be limited to such statutory damages as they could prove entitlement to.

V

To summarize. We vacate those portions of the judgment which pertain to Avtec's claim and the defendants' counterclaim for copyright infringement, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We vacate that portion of the judgment finding defendants liable to Avtec on the latter's claim for misappropriation of trade secrets, and remand that claim for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We affirm that portion of the judgment determining that Peiffer breached fiduciary duties owed to Avtec. We vacate the entire remedial portion of the judgment to abide the determination of liability on the various claims upon remand.

SO ORDERED.

[1] A claim for misappropriation of business opportunity was later withdrawn.

[2] The court found that defendants-counterclaimants failed to prove damages from the "alleged" violation of Peiffer's copyright, and denied all parties costs and fees. 805 F.Supp. at 1323.

[3] Kisak had by then been dismissed as a defendant from all but the copyright infringement claim.

[4] A "derivative work" is a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a translation ... or any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications which, as a whole, represent an original work of authorship, is a "derivative work."

To "perform" a work means to recite [or] render ... it, either directly or by means of any device or process....

17 U.S.C. Sec. 101.

[5] The protected material in this case consists of the Program's source and object codes. Human beings write source codes, but computers can't read them until they are mechanically translated by compiling programs into object codes, which tell computers how to process data. Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 698 (2d Cir.1992). The parties have not raised, and we do not address, the issue of the potentially separate copyrightability of any screen displays arising from the Program's operation. See id. at 703.

[6] Because Avtec does not raise the issue, we do not address the court's rejection of the alternative contention that Avtec's copyright in the Program arose from its joint authorship of the work with Peiffer. See 805 F.Supp. at 1319.

[7] Thus, we reject as meritless defendants' contention that Avtec seeks copyright on ideas, not expression. See Appellee Br. 27-28.

[8] Certain types of noncommercial use may, of course, provide a "fair use" defense to a claim of copyright infringement, 17 U.S.C. Sec. 107, but there is no contention that the defense is applicable in this case.

We also note, for clarity's sake, a matter addressed by neither party: Publication of works prior to March 1, 1989 without notice of copyright ownership risks forfeiture of the Copyright Act's protections. 17 U.S.C. Secs. 401, 405; Michael D. Scott, Scott on Computer Law Sec. 3.37 (1991). Publication occurs upon "the distribution of copies ... by sale or other transfer of ownership" and by "offering to distribute copies ... for purposes of further distribution, public performance, or public display." 17 U.S.C. Sec. 101. "A public performance or display of a work does not of itself constitute publication," however, id., and it is generally agreed that "publication does not include the distribution of copies under an obligation of confidence." Scott Sec. 3.37 at 3-134.

[9] The court's analysis illustrates the tension between copyright law's competing policies of rewarding individual initiative and creativity versus promoting broad public access to original works, Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156, 95 S.Ct. 2040, 2044, 45 L.Ed.2d 84 (1975), and implies an intention to resolve that conflict, at least with respect to computer programs having a relatively short market life, in favor of broad access. See Matthew R. Harris, Note, Copyright, Computer Software, and Work Made for Hire, 89 Mich.L.Rev. 661 (1990).

To the extent that any functional difference between the versions resulted from revisions of the original, the matter properly is addressed through derivative-works analysis undertaken after resolution of the copyright-ownership issue. See generally Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 110 S.Ct. 1750, 109 L.Ed.2d 184 (1990).

[10] It is uncontested that Peiffer invoked the .309 version to show his initiative at Avtec; that he made changes suggested by Avtec managers; that he demonstrated the Program at their request; that he was rewarded for doing so with a sizeable cash bonus; that he modified the Program at the suggestion and with the aid of other Avtec employees, billing the time to a specified Avtec account on at least one occasion; and that he failed at any relevant time to allege any proprietary interest in the Program. See 805 F.Supp. at 1315-16.

[11] The district court rightly questioned the extent to which an employer's control over a work remains a dispositive factor in "work for hire" analysis following the Supreme Court's qualified rejection of such analyses in Reid, 490 U.S. at 738-39, 109 S.Ct. at 2171-72. See 805 F.Supp. at 1318.

[12] As to that possibility, we offer these observations for such guidance as they may provide the court upon any reconsideration of the counterclaim. While, as the district court properly found, assuming Peiffer owned copyright, any infringement that occurred caused defendants no actual damage, Appellee Br. 47, defendants rightly contend that 17 U.S.C. Sec. 504(c) mandates consideration of statutory damages in lieu of actual damages, with modifications for instances of "innocent infringement." On this issue, we note that the court found implied in Peiffer's conduct a grant to Avtec of a limited use license in the Program. 805 F.Supp. at 1320. Expressing no view on the factual basis for that holding, which is not now in issue, we further note that such an implied license is necessarily nonexclusive and revocable absent consideration. See MacLean Assocs., Inc. v. Wm. M. Mercer-Meidinger-Hansen, Inc., 952 F.2d 769, 778-79 (3d Cir.1991); 3 Nimmer Sec. 10.02[B]. Thus, while an implied license may fail to vest a proprietary interest in the licensee that is enforceable against other licensees, it may provide a defense--properly pled by Avtec, J.A. 85--to the counterclaim. See MacLean Assoc., 952 F.2d at 779.

[13] Peiffer and KKI concede that "all versions of the Orbit Program" are "to some extent" derivative of the original .309 version, Appellee Br. 29. See Stewart, 495 U.S. at 223-24, 234-36, 110 S.Ct. at 1761-62, 1767-68.

[14] The parties concede that it is within the district court's discretion to award or deny attorneys' fees as part of the costs of the action. 17 U.S.C. Sec. 505.

[15] Although Avtec alleged in its complaint that defendants misappropriated its trade secrets in "the Program," in its client lists, and in its marketing techniques, J.A. 22-23, on appeal it focuses argument exclusively on the alleged trade secret in the Program, Appellant Reply Br. 21-26, and we confine our decision accordingly.

[16] With respect to whether copyright ownership may provide a defense to a claim for misappropriation of trade secrets, the defense cannot be overcome by invoking patent-law "shop rights." Congress expressly declined to incorporate such rights into copyright law. See 1 Nimmer Sec. 5.03[C] (citing H.Rep. No. 1476, supra, at 121, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5736-37).

[17] We reject defendants' argument that, even if Avtec had a trade secret, secrecy was lost when the company demonstrated the Program to clients. Trandes, 996 F.2d at 663-64. We do not address the alternative contention that Avtec failed to take reasonable steps to protect the secrecy of the source code because we anticipate reconsideration of the evidence on remand, noting only a tension between the district court's finding that Avtec did take such precautions, 805 F.Supp. at 1320, and the court's prior observation that "[t]he evidence is far from convincing that Avtec ever continuously possessed the software." Id. at 1319.

3.3 The Boundary between Copyright and the Public Domain 3.3 The Boundary between Copyright and the Public Domain