2 Public Policy and Contractual Wrongs: Prohibition, Non-enforcement, and Required Contracting 2 Public Policy and Contractual Wrongs: Prohibition, Non-enforcement, and Required Contracting

2.1 Restatement Second of Contracts §§ 1-2, 178 2.1 Restatement Second of Contracts §§ 1-2, 178

Restatement Second of Contracts

 

§ 1 Contract Defined

contract is a promise or a set of promises for the breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the performance of which the law in some way recognizes as a duty.

 

Restatement  Second Contracts (Promise)

§ 2. Promise; Promisor; Promisee; Beneficiary

(1) A promise is a manifestation of intention to act or refrain from acting in a specified way, so made as to justify a promisee in understanding that a commitment has been made.

(2) The person manifesting the intention is the promisor.

(3) The person to whom the manifestation is addressed is the promisee.

(4) Where performance will benefit a person other than the promisee, that person is a beneficiary.

 

Restatement Second of Contracts  (Public Policy)

§ 178  When a Term Is Unenforceable on Grounds of Public Policy

  1. promise or other term of an agreement is unenforceable on grounds of public policy if legislation provides that it is unenforceable or the interest in its enforcement is clearly outweighed in the circumstances by a public policy against the enforcement of such terms.
  2. In weighing the interest in the enforcement of a term, account is taken of
           a) the parties' justified expectations,
           b) any forfeiture that would result if enforcement were denied, and
           c) any special public interest in the enforcement of the particular term.
  3. In weighing a public policy against enforcement of a term, account is taken of
           a) the strength of that policy as manifested by legislation or judicial decisions,
           b) the likelihood that a refusal to enforce the term will further that policy,
           c) the seriousness of any misconduct involved and the extent to which it was deliberate, and
           d) the directness of the connection between that misconduct and the term.

2.2 The illegal contract: His Excellency Abdulaziiz Bin Ibrhaim Al-Ibrahim v. Edde, 897 F. Supp. 620 (1995) 2.2 The illegal contract: His Excellency Abdulaziiz Bin Ibrhaim Al-Ibrahim v. Edde, 897 F. Supp. 620 (1995)

His Excellency Sheikh Ahdulaziz Bin Ibrahim AL-IBRAHIM, Plaintiff, v. George EDDE, Defendant.

Civ. A. No. 95-1145 PLF.

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

Sept. 8, 1995.

Elroy H. Wolff, Sidley & Austin, Washington, DC, for plaintiff.

Mark London, London & Mead, Washington, DC, for defendant.

OPINION

PAUL L. FRIEDMAN, District Judge.

George Edde has filed a counterclaim alleging that his former employer, Sheikh Ab-dulaziz Bin Ibrahim Al-Ibrahim, breached an oral contract to reimburse Mr. Edde for tax liability Edde incurred when he fraudulently claimed some of the Sheikh’s gambling winnings as his own and paid federal income taxes on those winnings. In addition to this breach of contract claim, Mr. Edde seeks restitution of the amount of money he paid to the IRS, $400,000, plus interest. He also seeks compensatory and punitive damages for fraud, alleging that the Sheikh defrauded him by falsely promising to reimburse him for those tax payments, and for the intentional infliction of emotional distress.

DISCUSSION

On a motion to dismiss, the Court operates within the factual universe described by the complaining party. This requires that the pleader’s factual allegations be taken as true and that any ambiguities be resolved in his favor. Summit Health, Ltd. v. Pinhas, 500 U.S. 322, 325, 111 S.Ct. 1842, 1844, 114 L.Ed.2d 366 (1991); Kowal v. MCI Communications Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1276 (D.C.Cir.1994); Tele-Communications of Key West, Inc. v. United States, 757 F.2d 1330, 1334-35 (D.C.Cir.1985).

According to Mr. Edde’s description of the events leading up to this contentious dispute, a promise of employment by Sheikh Al-Ibrahim lured him away from his home in California during the mid 1980’s. Mr. Edde found himself occupied as the Sheikh’s constant companion. He alleges that the Sheikh, a frequent high stakes gambler, required Mr. Edde to accompany him on numerous visits to casinos in the United States and “insisted that Mr. Edde ... claim credit for [Sheikh Al-Ibrahim’s gambling] winnings.” Counterclaim ¶ 7. Mr. Edde admits that he signed for the Sheikh’s winnings on documents that were submitted to the Internal Revenue Service. Countercl. ¶ 7. Mr. Edde asserts that he “clearly understood that his signing for the Sheikh’s gambling winnings was a condition of his employment and that if he refused to do so, he would be discharged.” Countercl. ¶ 9.

In 1991 Mr. Edde’s circumstances deteriorated. Sheikh Al-Ibrahim’s demands left Mr. Edde at the point of exhaustion, he began to have marital difficulties, and the IRS began to contact him about taxes due on the gambling winnings he had signed for. Countercl. ¶¶ 10-11. Mr. Edde gave notice of his resignation to Sheikh Al-Ibrahim because “he could no longer continue to work for him at such a pace,” and left the Sheikh’s employ in late 1991. Countercl. ¶ 13. After leaving the Sheikh, Mr. Edde began negotiations with the IRS regarding the unpaid taxes on the gambling winnings. In August 1992, Mr. Edde reached an agreement with the IRS by which he would pay past obligations, interest and penalties on the gambling winnings he had claimed as his own. Countercl. ¶ 14. Mr. Edde asserts that as a result of representations made by the Sheikh both during and after his employment, he understood that the Sheikh would reimburse him for his tax obligations. Countercl. ¶¶ 8, 12, 13. Mr. Edde never informed the IRS that the gambling winnings actually were won by and retained by Sheikh Al-Ibrahim. See Countercl. ¶¶ 11, 12, 14.

Mr. Edde seeks reimbursement for the taxes he paid and compensation for breach of contract, fraud and intentional infliction of emotional distress. He maintains that “[t]o the extent Mr. Edde may have participated in an illegal act, he was not equally in the wrong with the Sheikh. Mr. Edde’s payment of the Sheikh’s tax obligations was solely for the benefit of the Sheikh.” Countercl. ¶ 26. Sheikh Al-Ibrahim has moved to dismiss, arguing, essentially, that Mr. Edde is a dishonorable character who should not be permitted to use the federal courts to enforce an illegal contract.

The Court heard oral argument on plaintiff’s motion to dismiss the counterclaim and granted the motion on August 28,1995. This Opinion sets forth the reasons for that decision.

A Breach of Contract Claim

Generally, a contract to perform an illegal act, such as the alleged contract between Mr. Edde and Sheikh Al-Ibrahim, is void and unenforceable. See, e.g., Lewis & Queen v. N.M. Ball Sons, 48 Cal.2d 141, 308 P.2d 713, 719 (1957).1 The purpose of this rule is to prevent wrongdoers from using or abusing the legitimate judicial process to resolve disputes over their illegal undertakings. Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 306, 105 S.Ct. 2622, 2626, 86 L.Ed.2d 215 (1985). Whether an action is brought in equity or at law, “neither party to an illegal contract will be aided by the court, whether to enforce it or to set it aside. If the contract is illegal, affirmative relief against it will not be granted at law or in equity....” United States v. Farrell, 606 F.2d 1341, 1348-49 (D.C.Cir.1979) (quoting St. Louis R.R. v. Terre Haute R.R., 145 U.S. 393, 407, 12 S.Ct. 953, 957, 36 L.Ed. 748 (1892)). The rule denying recovery is “based on public policy rather than a desire to benefit or punish either party.” United States v. Farrell, 606 F.2d at 1349 (emphasis in original); see Crylon Steel Co. v. Globus, 185 F.Supp. 757, 760 (S.D.N.Y.1960) (“[w]here ... a transaction is a fraud upon the public and is contrary to public policy ... courts will leave the parties where it finds them.”)

The courts of California and Nevada have recognized two exceptions to this otherwise accepted rule that fraud or illegality renders contracts unenforceable. A party who performed under an illegal contract may recover from a breaching party only if: (1) permitting relief to the non-breaching party would promote enforcement of the underlying law that led to the invalidity of the contract, or (2) denying relief would result in a harsh forfeiture when weighed against the seriousness of the illegality or the relative culpability of the parties. See Homestead Supplies v. Executive Life Insurance Co., 81 Cal.App.3d 978, 147 Cal.Rptr. 22, 29 (1978); Magill v. Lewis, 74 Nev. 381, 333 P.2d 717, 719 (Nev.1958). Applying these principles, the Court must consider the nature and the degree of the illegality, the public policy or policies to be served by enforcing or by refusing to enforce the contract, and the relative culpability of the parties. Homestead Supplies v. Executive Life Insurance Co., 147 Cal.Rptr. at 29; Magill v. Lewis, 333 P.2d at 719; see 6A Corbin on Contracts (1962) § 1534 (1962 and 1994 Supp.).

While not denying that his conduct was illegal, Mr. Edde argues that his conduct was not terribly serious compared with that of Sheikh Al-Ibrahim. Under a comparative culpability analysis, he contends that because the Sheikh avoided his tax obligation entirely while Mr. Edde paid the IRS, the Sheikh is the real culprit in the ease. Indeed, at oral argument, counsel for Mr. Edde repeatedly argued that what Mr. Edde did was to make a “lawful payment” to the IRS. Tr. at 14. He therefore maintains that the Sheikh is the more culpable and that public policy would be served by holding the Sheikh liable in contract. He relies on Homestead Supplies and Magill v. Lewis.

Mr. Edde’s characterization of this aspect of his conduct as lawful must be rejected. A United States citizen, Mr. Edde made false statements to the Internal Revenue Service in an effort to frustrate the lawful and timely collection of taxes. The fact that Mr. Edde ultimately paid the IRS does not excuse his behavior. According to the facts alleged in his own counterclaim, he broke the law.2 To enforce the contract between Mr. Edde and Sheikh Al-Ibrahim would be to excuse Mr. Edde’s conduct, to enforce a contract that had as its purpose the commission of illegal acts, and to permit the judicial process to be used in violation of public policy. See Dent v. Ferguson, 132 U.S. 50, 66, 10 S.Ct. 13,19, 33 L.Ed. 242 (1889); Maryland v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 44 U.S. (3 How.) 534, 546, 11 L.Ed. 714 (1845); California Chicks, Inc. v. Viebrock, 254 Cal.App.2d 638, 62 Cal.Rptr. 269, 271 (1967). Mr. Edde’s breach of contract claim is dismissed.

B. Restitution

Mr. Edde contends that even if he is not entitled to damages for breach of contract, he should be permitted to maintain an action for restitution to ensure that the Sheikh is not unjustly enriched for his unlawful acts. He argues that he and the Sheikh were not equally culpable or in pari delicto (of equal fault). He asserts that he was induced, if not coerced, to take part in the illegal conduct by the influence of Sheikh Al-Ibrahim’s superior economic and bargaining position. He insists that he was not a “free agent.” See Karpinski v. Collins, 252 Cal.App.2d 711, 60 Cal.Rptr. 846 (1967); McAllister v. Drapeau, 14 Cal.2d 102, 92 P.2d 911 (1939); San Diego Prestressed Concrete Co. v. Chicago Title Ins. Corp., 92 Nev. 569, 555 P.2d 484, 487 (1976); 6A Corbin on CONTRACTS § 1537 (1967 and 1994 Supp.). Mr. Edde maintains that he is entitled to restitution because the Sheikh masterminded the tax avoidance scheme and was the only one who profited from it. See Asdourian v. Araj, 38 Cal.3d 276, 211 Cal.Rptr. 703, 712-13, 696 P.2d 95, 105 (1985) (citing Southfield v. Barrett, 13 Cal.App.3d 290, 91 Cal.Rptr. 514 (1970)). Indeed, Mr. Edde argues that as a result of this illegal scheme, his own finances were substantially depleted.

There is no mechanical rule by which to determine whether one party to an illegal contract is in pari delicto with another party to the contract. In considering the question on a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept the allegations made by the pleader. The Court therefore accepts Mr. Edde’s assertion that the Sheikh had a strong influence over him that enabled the Sheikh to make unusually burdensome demands, that the Sheikh expressed in angry terms his insistence that Mr. Edde sign for his gambling winnings, that Mr. Edde believed that signing for the winnings was a condition of his continued employment (although there is no allegation that the Sheikh threatened to fire him if he did not), and that Sheikh Al-Ibrahim was able to induce Mr. Edde’s illegal conduct because of his superior economic position in the relationship. Countercl. ¶¶ 7, 9.

If the remedy of restitution originates from the Court’s equitable powers, then the Court is guided by the principle that “he who comes to equity must come with clean hands.” Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Machinery Co., 324 U.S. 806, 814, 65 S.Ct. 993, 997, 89 L.Ed. 1381 (1945). The doors of a court of equity are traditionally closed to one who acted inequitably, in bad faith or illegally in relation to the matter as to which he seeks relief; “however improper may have been the behavior of the defendant,” the court will not be “the abettor of inequity.” Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Machinery Co., 324 U.S. at 814, 65 S.Ct. at 997 (quoting Bein v. Heath, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 228, 247, 12 L.Ed. 416 (1848)); see Blain v. The Doctor’s Co., 222 Cal.App.3d 1048, 272 Cal.Rptr. 250, 258-59 (1990); see McAdam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, 896 F.2d 750, 756-57 (3d Cir.1990) (citing Rothberg v. Rosenbloom, 808 F.2d 252, 256 n. 6 (3d Cir.1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1017, 107 S.Ct. 1895, 95 L.Ed.2d 501 (1987)).

If restitution is an action brought at law, as most courts and commentators maintain, see W. Page Keeton et al., PROSSER and Keeton on Torts § 94, at 672-75 (5th ed. 1984 and 1988 Supp.), then the Court is guided by similar principles to those that bar Mr. Edde’s breach of contract claim. In a case involving a void, unenforceable contract, restitution is available only in exceptional circumstances. The cases cited by Mr. Edde do not provide support for the proposition that the exception should be invoked in this case.

In Homestead, for instance, the Court ruled against an insurance company that agreed to accept a lower premium than the legal premium prescribed in its rate table, explaining that the company should have known of the illegality, while there was no reason to find that the insured should have known. Homestead Supplies v. Executive Life Insurance Co., 147 Cal.Rptr. at 29. By way of contrast, Mr. Edde knew that he was misleading the IRS in reporting the Sheikh’s gambling winnings as his own and he should have known that making false statements to the IRS is illegal. In Karpinski, the Court concluded that the parties were not in pari delicto because the small dairyman who had been forced to pay a bribe in order to keep his milk contract had virtually no economic alternative but to pay the bribe. Karpinski v. Collins, 60 Cal.Rptr. at 848. While Mr. Edde maintains that his participation in the illegal contract was a condition of his job, his counterclaim is very carefully drafted. It alleges only that he “clearly understood that his signing for the Sheikh’s gambling winnings was a condition of his employment and that if he refused to do so, he would be discharged.” Countercl. ¶9 (emphasis added). He does not allege that he was ever threatened with loss of employment and does not set forth any facts, only eonclusory statements, from which the Court could infer that he was truly under economic duress or that he lacked an economic alternative to working for Sheikh Al-Ibrahim. Mr. Edde’s claim for restitution is dismissed.

C. Fraud

In order to state a prima facie case of fraud under California and Nevada law, a party must allege: (1) a misrepresentation of a material fact, (2) knowledge of the falsity, (8) intent to induce reliance, (4) actual and justifiable reliance, and (5) resulting damages. Williams v. Wraxall, 33 Cal.App. 4th 120, 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 658, 664 n. 9 (1995); Blanchard v. Blanchard, 108 Nev. 908, 839 P.2d 1320, 1322 (1992). In the federal courts, the circumstances constituting an alleged fraud must be pleaded with particularity. Rule 9(b), Fed.R.Civ.P. The pleader must specify “what statements were made in what documents or in what context, the time and place of such statements, who made the statements, the manner in which the statements were misleading, and what the defendants obtained as a consequence of the statements.” In re Newbridge Networks Securities Litigation, 767 F.Supp. 275, 282 (D.D.C.1991); see Kowal v. MCI Communications Corp., 16 F.3d at 1278.

Mr. Edde alleges that the Sheikh made promises to him in order to induce him to sign for and pay the Sheikh’s taxes, that these promises were made after Mr. Edde had tendered his resignation, that these promises were false at the time they were made and were made for the purpose of inducing reliance by Mr. Edde, that Sheikh Al-Ibrahim had a motive for defrauding Mr. Edde, that Mr. Edde relied on the promises, and that Mr. Edde was damaged as a result. Countercl. ¶¶8, 12, 13, 18, 19, 22. These allegations are sufficient for the Court to draw an inference of fraud even under Rule 9(b). See Kowal v. MCI Communications Corp., 16 F.3d at 1278; Stebbins v. Keystone Ins. Co., 481 F.2d 501, 511 (D.C.Cir.1973). Whether Mr. Edde’s allegations can be proven at trial is not the issue before the Court. The allegations in the counterclaim are sufficiently pled and he has said enough to withstand a motion to dismiss.

On the other hand, fraud is an equitable remedy, and “he who comes into equity must come with clean hands.” Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Machinery Co., 324 U.S. at 814, 65 S.Ct. at 997; Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. East Bay Union of Machinists, 227 Cal.App.2d 675, 39 Cal.Rptr. 64 (1964); see Locken v. Locken, 98 Nev. 369, 650 P.2d 803, 805 (1982). Thus, “equity requires that those seeking its protection shall have acted fairly and without fraud or deceit as to the controversy in issue.” Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Machinery Co., 324 U.S. at 814-15, 65 S.Ct. at 997; see Blain v. The Doctor’s Co., 272 Cal.Rptr. at 258-59. In this case, in order to allege fraud, Mr. Edde has admitted his own involvement in serious illegal conduct. His hands are not washed clean merely because he paid money to the IRS. The very facts alleged in his counterclaim lead to the inescapable conclusion that Mr. Edde has not displayed that standard of conduct in his agreement with the Sheikh that entitles him to maintain an equitable action for fraud. That Sheikh Al-Ibrahim’s conduct may have been worse is irrelevant. McAdam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, 896 F.2d at 756-57.

D. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

The tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress was created to punish conduct “exceeding all bounds usually tolerated by a decent society, of a nature which is especially calculated to cause, and does cause, mental distress.” Agarwal v. Johnson, 25 Cal.3d 932, 160 Cal.Rptr. 141, 149-50, 603 P.2d 58, 67 (1979) (internal quotation omitted). A prima facie case requires allegations of (1) outrageous conduct by the defendant, (2) an intention by the defendant to cause, or the reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress, (3) severe emotional distress, and (4) an actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress. Christensen v. Superior Court, 54 Cal.3d 868, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 79, 100, 820 P.2d 181, 202 (1991); Star v. Rabello, 97 Nev. 124, 625 P.2d 90, 92 (1981).

There are two problems with Mr. Edde’s emotional distress claim. First, the alleged outrageous conduct is not so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized society. The fact that Mr. Edde may have suffered real distress as a result of his dealings with Sheikh Al-Ibrahim and his pursuit by the IRS does not render the Sheikh’s alleged conduct extreme and outrageous. To the extent that the Court is able to identify the conduct of which Mr. Edde complains, it appears that Mr. Edde has simply alleged a breach of contract and fraud. Indeed, when asked at oral argument which allegations in his counterclaim related to the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, counsel for Mr. Edde explained that “Sheikh [Al-Ibrahim] knew ... that Edde did not have the resources to pay these monies ... that Edde had entered into this agreement with the prospect that he would be paid back ... that Edde was suffering ... and he ignored [Mr. Edde’s pleas].” Tr. at 14. Accepting Mr. Edde’s allegations as true for purposes of this motion, the Sheikh’s conduct is not so outrageous as to meet the test announced by the courts of California and Nevada. See Cervantez v. J.C. Penney Co., 24 Cal.3d 579, 156 Cal.Rptr. 198, 206, 595 P.2d 975, 983 (1979); Star v. Rabello, 625 P.2d at 92.

Second, a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, like Mr. Edde’s other equitable claims, is barred by the defense of unclean hands. Blain v. The Doctor’s Co., 272 Cal.Rptr. at 258; see Locken v. Locken, 650 P.2d at 805. Mr. Edde’s emotional distress is directly attributable to his own knowing illegal conduct; it stems from his own illegal agreement with the Sheikh and his own misrepresentations to the IRS. Camp v. Jeffer, Mangels, Butler & Marmaro, 35 Cal.App.4th 620, 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 329, 340 (1995); Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. East Bay Union of Machinists, 39 Cal.Rptr. at 96-97. Because Mr. Edde comes before the Court with unclean hands, his claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is dismissed.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, plaintiffs motion to dismiss defendant’s counterclaim is granted. An Order Consistent with this Opinion was entered on August 28, 1995.

SO ORDERED.

1

Mr. Edde contends that under District of Columbia choice of law principles the Court should apply Nevada and/or California law in assessing the counterclaim. At oral argument, counsel for the Sheikh conceded the point, Tr. at 12, as he should have. Rymer v. Pool, 574 A.2d 283, 285-86 (D.C.1990); Moore v. Ronald Hsu Const. Co., Inc., 576 A.2d 734, 737 (D.C.1990); Hercules & Co., Ltd. v. Shama Restaurant Corp., 566 A.2d 31, 40 (D.C.1989); see Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws §§ 145, 188 (1971 and 1988 Supp.).

The District of Columbia's interest in this action is slight. Washington, D.C., is mentioned only once in the counterclaim as one of several locations where Sheikh Al-Ibrahim made promises to Mr. Edde. Countercl. ¶ 18. Most of the conduct underlying Mr. Edde’s claims is alleged to have taken place in California, Nevada or at unspecified locations; Mr. Edde’s injuries are largely alleged to have taken place in California; and Mr. Edde lives in California and the Sheikh lives outside of the United States. The Court need not resolve whether it would be more appropriate to apply California or Nevada law because the law of those two states is consistent on all the relevant issues.

2

If Mr. Edde’s allegations are accepted as true, then he attempted to evade and defraud the IRS in violation of the Internal Revenue Code. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. §§ 7201, 7202, 7203, 7206. See Countercl. ¶¶ 7-14.

2.3 Note 2.3 Note

Imagine that you are faced with the following situation.  Plaintiff A enters into a contract with Defendant B in which B promises to paint A’s house on a certain day for $1,000.  On the appointed day, B fails to paint as promised.  Plaintiff A  gets an alternative painter who charges $1500.  When Plaintiff A sues for breach of contract,  it emerges that A had failed to obtain a permit for painting from local authorities as required by state law.  A was unaware of the requirement.  Defendant B says that A should be prevented from obtaining any contractual recovery because their contract was “illegal.”  B cites His Excellency  . . .  v Edde as authority for this proposition.  Does that precedent support Defendant B ?   Or should A prevail despite the illegality?              

Consider this observation by one of the greats of contracts law scholarship, Professor Arthur Corbin:  

“There are many varieties and degrees of 'illegality.' These varieties and degrees must be taken into account in determining the juristic effect of a transaction that involves some form of illegality. It is far from correct to say that an illegal bargain is necessarily 'void,' or that the law will grant no remedy and will always leave the parties to such a bargain where it finds them. Such general statements are indeed found in great number, faithfully reprinted in long columns of digest paragraphs; they render only a wearisome disservice when repeated with no reference to the facts of the cases in which they have been made. Before granting or refusing a remedy, the courts have always considered the degree of the offense, the extent of public harm that may be involved, and the moral quality of the conduct of the parties in the light of the prevailing mores and standards of the community.” (6A Corbin on Contracts (1962) § 1534, p. 816.)

 

2.4 The non-competition clause. Valley Medical Specialists v. Farber, 982 P. 2d 1277 (1999) [After reading listen to “The Thrill is Gone” as performed by B.B. King.] 2.4 The non-competition clause. Valley Medical Specialists v. Farber, 982 P. 2d 1277 (1999) [After reading listen to “The Thrill is Gone” as performed by B.B. King.]

982 P.2d 1277

VALLEY MEDICAL SPECIALISTS, an Arizona professional corporation, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Steven S. FARBER, D.O. and Susan H. Farber, husband and wife, Defendants-Appellees.

No. CV-97-0488-PR.

Supreme Court of Arizona, En Banc.

June 18, 1999.

Lane Campbell & Nach, P.C. By: Richard N. Brandes and Renaud Cook & Drury By: LeslieAnn Haacke and Bell & O’Connor, P.C., Phoenix By: John Daniel Campbell III and David A. Joffe, Scottsdale, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Snell & Wilmer By: Lonnie J. Williams, Jr. and Bryan Cave, L.L.P. By: Mark I. Harrison, Rodney W. Ott, Phoenix, for Defendants-Appellees.

OPINION

FELDMAN, Justice.

We granted review to determine whether the restrictive covenant between Dr. Steven Farber and Valley Medical Specialists is enforceable. We hold that it is not. Public policy concerns in this case outweigh Valley Medical’s protectable interests in enforcing the agreement. We thus vacate the court of appeals’ opinion, affirm the trial court’s judgment, and remand to the court of appeals to resolve any remaining issues. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Arizona Constitution article VI, § 5(3) and A.R.S. § 12-120.24.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In 1985, Valley Medical Specialists (“VMS”), a professional corporation, hired Steven S. Farber, D.O., an internist and pulmonologist who, among other things, treated AIDS and HIV-positive patients and performed brachytherapy — a procedure that radiates the inside of the lung in lung cancer patients. Brachytherapy can only be performed at certain hospitals that have the necessary equipment. A few years after joining VMS, Dr. Farber became a shareholder and subsequently a minority officer and director. In 1991, the three directors, including Dr. Farber, entered into new stock and employment agreements. The employment agreement contained a restrictive covenant, the scope of which was amended over time.

In 1994, Dr. Farber left VMS and began practicing within the area defined by the restrictive covenant, which at that time read as follows:

The parties recognize that the duties to be rendered under the terms of this Agreement by the Employee are special, unique and of an extraordinary character. The Employee, in consideration of the compensation to be paid to him pursuant to the terms of this Agreement, expressly agrees to the following restrictive covenants:
(a) The Employee shall not, directly or indirectly:
(i) Request any present or future patients of the Employer to curtail or cancel their professional affiliation with the Employer;
(ii) Either separately, jointly, or in association with others, establish, engage in, or become interested in, as an employee, owner, partner, shareholder or otherwise, or furnish any information to, work for, or assist in any manner, anyone competing with, or who may compete with the Employer in the practice of medicine.
(in) Disclose the identity of any past, present or future patients of the Employer to any other person, firm or corporation engaged in a medical practice the same as, similar to or in general competition with the medical services provided by the Employer.
(iv) Either separately, jointly or in association with others provide medical care or medical assistance for any person or persons who were patients or [sic] Employer during the period that Employee was in the hire of Employer.
(d) The restrictive covenants set forth herein shall continue during the term of this Agreement and for a period of three (3) years after the date of termination, for any reason, of this Agreement. The restrictive covenants set forth herein shall be binding upon the Employee in that geographical area encompassed within the boundaries measured by a five (5) mile radius of any office maintained or utilized by Employer at the time of execution of the Agreement or at any time thereafter.
(e) The Employee agrees that a violation on his part of any covenant set forth in this Paragraph 17 will cause such damage to the Employer as will be irreparable and for that reason, that Employee further agrees that the Employer shall be entitled, as a matter of right, and upon notice as provided in Paragraph 20 hereof, to an injunction from any court of competent jurisdiction, restraining any further violation of said covenants by Employee, his corporation, employees, partners or agents. Such right to injunctive remedies shall be in addition to and cumulative with any other rights and remedies the Employer may have pursuant to this Agreement or law, including, specifically with regard to the covenants set forth in subparagraph 17(a) above, the recovery of liquidated damages equal to forty percent (40%) of the gross receipts received for medical services provided by the Employee, or any employee, associate, partner, or corporation of the Employee during the term of this Agreement and for a period of three (3) years after the date of termination, for any reason, of this Agreement. The Employee expressly acknowledges and agrees that the covenants and agreement contained in this Paragraph 17 are minimum and reasonable in scope and are necessary to protect the legitimate interest of the Employer and its goodwill.

(Emphasis added.)

VMS filed a complaint against Dr. Farber seeking (1) preliminary and permanent injunctions enjoining Dr. Farber from violating the restrictive covenant, (2) liquidated damages for breach of the employment agreement, and (3) damages for breach of fiduciary duty, conversion of patient files and confidential information, and intentional interference with contractual and/or business relations.

Following six days of testimony and argument, the trial court denied VMS’s request for a preliminary injunction, finding that the restrictive covenant violated public policy or, alternatively, was unenforceable because it was too broad. Specifically, the court found that: any covenant over six months would be unreasonable; the five-mile radius from each of the three VMS offices was unreasonable because it covered a total of 235 square miles; and the restriction was unreasonable because it did not provide an exception for emergency medical aid and was not limited to pulmonology.

The court of appeals reversed, concluding that a modified covenant was reasonable. Valley Med. Specialists v. Farber, 190 Ariz. 563, 950 P.2d 1184 (App.1997). The court noted that there were eight hospitals outside the restricted area where Dr. Farber could practice. Id. at 567, 950 P.2d at 1188. Although the covenant made no exceptions for emergency medicine, the court held that the severability clause permitted the trial court to modify the covenant so Dr. Farber could provide emergency services within the restricted area. Id. (citing Phoenix Orthopaedic Surgeons, Ltd. v. Peairs (“Peairs”), 164 Ariz. 54, 61, 790 P.2d 752, 759 (App.1989)). Moreover, VMS was allowed to stipulate that Dr. Farber could perform brachytherapy and treat AIDS and HIV patients within the restricted area, again even though the covenant contained no such exceptions. Valley Med. Specialists, 190 Ariz. at 567, 950 P.2d at 1188.

The court of appeals found the restriction, when so modified, reasonable as to time and place. Although non-emergency patients might be required to travel further to see Dr. Farber, they could continue to see him if they were willing to drive that far. Id. at 567-68, 950 P.2d at 1188-89. Three years was reasonable because the record contained testimony that it might take Dr. Farber’s replacement three to five years to develop his pulmonary practice referral sources to the level they were when Dr. Farber resigned. Id.

The court found that the restrictive covenant did not violate public policy, believing that courts must not unnecessarily restrict the freedom of contract. Id. at 568, 950 P.2d at 1189. Moreover, the record was void of any evidence that the availability of pulmonologists in the restricted area would be inadequate without Dr. Farber. Id.

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of review

There is some dispute over what standard of review should be applied to the trial court’s decision. Dr. Farber contends the court of appeals usurped the trial court’s discretion by applying a de novo standard. Granting or denying a preliminary injunction is within the sound discretion of the trial court, and its decision will not be reversed absent an abuse of that discretion. Financial Assocs., Inc. v. Hub Properties, Inc., 143 Ariz. 543, 545, 694 P.2d 831, 833 (App.1984). The trial judge’s factual findings are reviewed on a clearly erroneous standard. See Rule 52(a), Ariz.R.Civ.P.

VMS contends, however, that the court of appeals correctly applied a de novo standard. Mixed findings of fact and law are reviewed de novo. Indeed, some courts have held that the determination of whether a restrictive covenant is reasonable is a question of law. See, e.g., Gann v. Morris, 122 Ariz. 517, 518, 596 P.2d 43, 44 (App.1979); Raymundo v. Hammond Clinic Ass’n, 449 N.E.2d 276, 280 (Ind.1983).

It is true that the ultimate question of reasonableness is a question of law. But reasonableness is a fact-intensive inquiry that depends on weighing the totality of the circumstances. Bryceland v. Northey, 160 Ariz. 213, 217, 772 P.2d 36, 40 (App.1989) (“Each ease hinges on its own particular facts.”); Olliver/Pilcher Ins. v. Daniels, 148 Ariz. 530, 532, 715 P.2d 1218, 1220 (1986). Thus, we will give substantial deference both to the trial court’s findings of fact and its application of law to fact, reviewing the former on a clearly erroneous standard and the latter for abuse of discretion.

B. History of restrictive covenants

A brief reference to basic principles is appropriate. Historically, covenants not to compete were viewed as restraints of trade and were invalid at common law. Ohio Urology, Inc. v. Poll, 72 Ohio App.3d 446, 594 N.E.2d 1027, 1031 (1991); see generally Harlan M. Blake, Employee Agreements not to Compete, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 625 (1960); Serena L. Kafker, Golden Handcuffs: Enforceability of Noncompetition Clauses in Professional Partnership Agreements of Accountants, Physicians, and Attorneys, 31 Am. Bus. L J. 31, 33 (1993). Eventually, ancillary restraints, such as those incident to employment or partnership agreements, were enforced under the rule of reason. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 188 (hereinafter “Restatement”). Given the public interest in doctor-patient relationships, the validity of restrictive covenants between physicians was carefully examined long ago in Mandeville v. Harman:

The rule is not that a limited restraint is good, but that it may be good. It is valid when the restraint is reasonable; and the restraint is reasonable when it imposes no shackle upon the one party which is not beneficial to the other.
The authorities are uniform that such contracts are valid when the restraint they impose is reasonable, and the test to be applied, ... is this: To consider whether the restraint is such only as to afford a fair protection to the interest of the party in favor of whom it is given, and not so large as to interfere with the interest of the public. Whatever restraint is larger than the necessary protection of the party can be of no benefit to either; it can only be oppressive, and, if oppressive, it is, in the eye of the law, unreasonable and void, on the ground of public policy, as being injurious to the interests of the public.

42 N.J. Eq. 185, 7 A. 37, 38-39 (1886) (citations omitted); see also Karlin v. Weinberg, 77 N.J. 408, 390 A.2d 1161, 1165 (1978). To be enforced, the restriction must do more than simply prohibit fair competition by the employee. Bryceland, 160 Ariz. at 216, 772 P.2d at 39. In other words, a covenant not to compete is invalid unless it protects some legitimate interest beyond the employer’s desire to protect itself from competition. Amex Distrib. Co. v. Mascari, 150 Ariz. 510, 518, 724 P.2d 596, 604 (App.1986). The legitimate purpose of post-employment restraints is “to prevent competitive use, for a time, of information or relationships which pertain peculiarly to the employer and which the employee acquired in the course of the employment.” Blake, supra, 73 Harv. L. Rev. at 647. Despite the freedom to contract, the law does not favor restrictive covenants. Ohio Urology, Inc., 594 N.E.2d at 1031. This disfavor is particularly strong concerning such covenants among physicians because the practice of medicine affects the public to a much greater extent. Id. In fact, “[f]or the past 60 years, the American Medical Association (AMA) has consistently taken the position that noncompetition agreements between physicians impact negatively on patient care.” Paula Berg, Judicial Enforcement of Covenants not to Compete Between Physicians: Protecting Doctors’ Interests at Patients’ Expense, 45 Rutgers L. Rev. 1, 6 (1992).

C. Level of scrutiny — public policy considerations

We first address the level of scrutiny that should be afforded to this restrictive covenant. Dr. Farber argues that this contract is simply an employer-employee agreement and thus the restrictive covenant should be strictly construed against the employer. See Amex Distrib. Co., 150 Ariz. at 514, 724 P.2d at 600 (noting employer-employee restrictive covenants are disfavored and strictly construed against the employer). This was the approach taken by the trial court. VMS contends that this is more akin to the sale of a business; thus, the noncompete provision should not be strictly construed against it. See id. (courts more lenient in enforcing restrictive covenants connected to sale of business because of need to effectively transfer goodwill). Finding the agreement here not on all fours with either approach, the court of appeals applied a standard “somewhere between” the two. Valley Med. Specialists, 190 Ariz. at 566, 950 P.2d at 1187.

Although this agreement is between partners, it is more analogous to an employer-employee agreement than a sale of a business. See Restatement § 188 cmt. h (“A rule similar to that applicable to an employee or agent applies to a partner who makes a promise not to compete that is ancillary to the partnership agreement or to an agreement by which he disposes of his partnership interest.”). Many of the concerns present in the sale of a business are not present or are reduced where, as here, a physician leaves a medical group, even when that physician is a partner. When a business is sold, the value of that business’s goodwill usually figures significantly into the purchase price. The buyer therefore deserves some protection from competition from the former owner.' See Kafker, supra, 31 Am. Bus. L.J. at 33. A restraint accompanying the sale of a business is necessary for the buyer to get the full goodwill value for which it has paid. Blake, supra, 73 Harv. L. Rev. at 647.

It is true that in this case, unlike typical employer-employee agreements, Dr. Farber may not have been at a bargaining disadvantage, which is one of the reasons such restrictive covenants are strictly construed. See, e.g., Rash v. Toccoa Clinic Med. Assocs., 253 Ga. 322, 320 S.E.2d 170, 172-73 (1984). Unequal bargaining power may be a factor to consider when examining the hardship on the departing employee. But in cases involving the professions, public policy concerns may outweigh any protectable interest the remaining firm members may have. Thus, this ease does not turn on the hardship to Dr. Farber.

By restricting a physician’s practice of medicine, this covenant involves strong public policy implications and must be closely scrutinized. See Peairs, 164 Ariz. at 60, 790 P.2d at 758; Ohio Urology, Inc., 594 N.E.2d at 1032 (restrictive covenant in medical context “strictly construed in favor of professional mobility and access to medical care and facilities”). Although stopping short of banning restrictive covenants between physicians, the American Medical Association (“AMA”) “discourages” such covenants, finding they are not in the public interest.

The Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs discourages any agreement between physicians which restricts the right of a physician to practice medicine for a specified period of time or in a specified area upon termination of employment or a partnership or a corporate agreement. Such restrictive agreements are not in the public interest.

1989 Current Opinions of the Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, Section 9.02 (hereinafter “AMA Opinions”). In addition, the AMA recognizes that free choice of doctors is the right of every patient, and free competition among physicians is a prerequisite of optimal care and ethical practice. See AMA Opinions, Section 9.06; Ohio Urology, Inc., 594 N.E.2d at 1030.

For similar reasons, restrictive covenants are prohibited between attorneys. See Dwyer v. Jung, 133 N.J.Super. 343, 336 A.2d 498, 501 (Ct. Ch. Div.), aff'd, 137 N.J.Super. 135, 348 A.2d 208 (App.Div.1975); Cohen v. Lord, Day & Lord, 75 N.Y.2d 95, 551 N.Y.S.2d 157, 550 N.E.2d 410, 410-11 (1989). In 1969, the American Bar Association adopted a code of professional conduct that contained a disciplinary rule prohibiting restrictive covenants between attorneys. See Berg, supra, 45 Rutgers L. Rev. at 37. The ethical rules adopted by this court provide:

A lawyer shall not participate in offering or making:
(a) a partnership or employment agreement that restricts the rights of a lawyer to practice after termination of the relationship except an agreement concerning benefits upon retirement; or
(b) an agreement in which a restriction on the lawyers right to practice is part of the settlement of a controversy between private parties.

Ethical Rule (“ER”) 5.6, Arizona Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 42, Ariz.R.Sup. Ct.

Restrictive covenants between lawyers limit not only their professional autonomy but also the client’s freedom to choose a lawyer. See ER 5.6 cmt. We do not, of course, enact ethical rules for the medical profession, but given the view of the AMA to which we have previously alluded, we believe the principle behind prohibiting restrictive covenants in the legal profession is relevant.

Commercial standards may not be used to evaluate the reasonableness of lawyer restrictive covenants. Strong public policy considerations preclude their applicability. In that sense lawyer restrictions are injurious to the public interest. A client is always entitled to be represented by counsel of his own choosing. The attorney-client relationship is consensual, highly fiduciary on the part of counsel, and he may do nothing which restricts the right of the client to repose confidence in any counsel of his choice. No concept of the practice of law is more deeply rooted.

Dwyer, 336 A.2d at 500.

We therefore conclude that the doctor-patient relationship is special and entitled to unique protection. It cannot be easily or accurately compared to relationships in the commercial context. In light of the great public policy interest involved in covenants not to compete between physicians, each agreement will be strictly construed for reasonableness.1

D. Reasonableness of covenant

Reasonableness is a fact-intensive inquiry that depends on the totality of the circumstances. Bryceland, 160 Ariz. at 217, 772 P.2d at 40 (“Each case hinges on its own particular facts.”); Olliver/Pilcher Ins., 148 Ariz. at 532, 715 P.2d at 1220. A restriction is unreasonable and thus will not be enforced: (1) if the restraint is greater than necessary to protect the employer’s legitimate interest; or (2) if that interest is outweighed by the hardship to the employee and the likely injury to the public. See Restatement § 188 cmt. a.; see also Blake, supra, 73 Harv. L. Rev. at 648-49; Ferdinand S. Tinio, Annotation, Validity and Construction of Contractual Restrictions on Right of Medical Practitioner to Practice, Incident to Partnership Agreement, 62 A.L.R.3d 970, 984 (1975). Thus, in the present case, the reasonableness inquiry requires us to examine the interests of the employer, employee, patients, and public in general. See 62 A.L.R.3d at 976; see also Peairs, 164 Ariz. at 57, 790 P.2d at 755; Amex Distrib. Co., 150 Ariz. at 514, 724 P.2d at 600 (accommodating right to work, right to contract, and public’s right to competition); see generally Blake, supra. Balancing these competing interests is no easy task and no exact formula can be used. See Restatement § 188 cmt. a.

In holding this restrictive covenant enforceable, the court of appeals relied heavily on Peairs, noting the restriction here was “very similar to the one in Peairs, which restricted a doctor from practicing orthopedic medicine and surgery within a five-mile radius of each of three offices for three years.” Valley Med. Specialists, 190 Ariz. at 567, 950 P.2d at 1188. As noted, however, each case must be decided on its own unique facts. Bryceland, 160 Ariz. at 217, 772 P.2d at 40. Here, the facts are sufficiently distinguishable from Peairs to warrant different treatment. For instance, in Peairs the three offices were “clustered,” and the total restricted area was thus much smaller. 164 Ariz. at 60, 790 P.2d at 758. The Peairs restrictive covenant prevented the practice of “orthopedic medicine and surgery.” Id. at 56, 790 P.2d at 754. Here, however, the covenant prohibited Dr. Farber from providing any and all forms of “medical care,” including not only pulmonology, but emergency medicine, brachytherapy treatment, and HIV-positive and AIDS patient care. Finally, the trial court in Peairs granted the preliminary injunction, while the trial court here denied it. Because we review the grant or denial of a preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion, the trial judge’s ruling after hearing the evidence in both cases is another factor that distinguishes the two cases.

E. VMS’s protectable interest

VMS contends, and the court of appeals agreed, that it has a protectable interest in its patients and referral sources. In the commercial context, it is clear that employers have a legitimate interest in retaining their customer base. See, e.g., Bryceland, 160 Ariz. at 217, 772 P.2d at 40. “The employer’s point of view is that the company’s clientele is an asset of value which has been acquired by virtue of effort and expenditures over a period of time, and which should be protected as a form of property.” Blake, supra, 73 Harv. L. Rev. at 654. In the medical context, however, the personal relationship between doctor and patient, as well as the patient’s freedom to see a particular doctor, affects the extent of the employer’s interest. See Ohio Urology Inc., 594 N.E.2d at 1031-32. “The practice of a physician is a thing so purely personal, depending so absolutely on the confidence reposed in his personal skill and ability, that when he ceases to exist it necessarily ceases also____” Mandeville, 7 A. at 40-41 (holding medical practice’s patient base is not protectable interest); see also Berg, supra, 45 Rutgers L. Rev. at 17.

Even in the commercial context, the employer’s interest in its customer base is balanced with the employee’s right to the customers. Where the employee took an active role and brought customers with him or her to the job, courts are more reluctant to enforce restrictive covenants. Blake, supra, 73 Harv. L. Rev. at 664, 667. Dr. Farber was a pulmonologist. He did not learn his skills from VMS. Restrictive covenants are designed to protect an employer’s customer base by preventing “a skilled employee from leaving an employer and, based on his skill acquired from that employment, luring away the employer’s clients or business while the employer is vulnerable — that is — before the employer has had a chance to replace the employee with someone qualified to do the job.” Bryceland, 160 Ariz. at 217, 772 P.2d at 40. These facts support the trial judge’s conclusion that VMS’s interest in protecting its patient base was outweighed by other factors.

We agree with VMS, however, that it has a protectable interest in its referral sources. See Medical Specialists, Inc. v. Sleweon, 652 N.E.2d 517, 523 (Ind.App.1995) (“Clearly, the continued success of [a specialty] practice, which is dependent upon patient referrals, is a legitimate interest worthy of protection.”); Ballesteros v. Johnson, 812 S.W.2d 217, 223 (Mo.App.1991).

F. Scope of the restrictive covenant

The restriction cannot be greater than necessary to protect VMS’s legitimate interests. A restraint’s scope is defined by its duration and geographic area. The frequency of contact between doctors and their patients affects the permissible length of the restraint. Blake, supra, 73 Harv. L. Rev. at 659. The idea is to give the employer a reasonable amount of time to overcome the former employee’s loss, usually by hiring a replacement and giving that replacement time to establish a working relationship. Id. Even in the commercial context, “[w]hen the restraint is for the purpose of protecting customer relationships, its duration is reasonable only if it is no longer than necessary for the employer to put a new man on the job and for the new employee to have a reasonable opportunity to demonstrate his effectiveness to the customers.” Amex Distrib. Co., 150 Ariz. at 518, 724 P.2d at 604 (quoting Blake, supra, 73 Harv. L. Rev. at 677).

In this case, the trial judge found that the three-year period was an unreasonable duration because

all of the experts agree that the practice of pulmonology entails treating patients with chronic conditions which require more hospital care than office care and which requires regular contact with the treating physician at least once within each six-month period so that any provision over six months is onerous and unnecessary to protect VMS’s economic interests where virtually all of Dr. Farber’s VMS patients had an opportunity by late 1994 or early 1995 (Farber left September 12, 1994) to decide which pulmonologist ... they would consult for their ongoing treatment[.]

On this record, we cannot say this factual finding was clearly erroneous. The three-year duration is unreasonable.

The activity prohibited by the restraint also defines the covenant’s scope. The restraint must be limited to the particular speciality of the present employment. See Blake, supra, 73 Harv. L. Rev. at 676. On its face, the restriction here is not limited to internal medicine or even pulmonology. It precludes any type of practice, even in fields that do not compete with VMS. Thus, we agree with the trial judge that this restriction is too broad. Compare Peairs, 164 Ariz. at 56, 790 P.2d at 754 (upholding injunction that enforced restrictive covenant preventing doctor from practicing only orthopaedic medicine and orthopaedic surgery).

G. Public policy

The court of appeals held that the restrictive covenant does not violate public policy, pointing out that the record contains nothing to suggest there will be a lack of pulmonologists in the restricted area if Dr. Farber is precluded from practicing there. Even if we assume other pulmonologists will be available to cover Dr. Farber’s patients, we disagree with this view. It ignores the significant interests of individual patients within the restricted area. Kafker, supra, 31 Am. Bus. L.J. at 39-40. A court must evaluate the extent to which enforcing the covenant would foreclose patients from seeing the departing physician if they desire to do so. See Karlin, 390 A.2d at 1170; see also AMA Opinions, Section 9.06.

Concluding that patients’ right to see the doctor of their choice is entitled to substantial protection, VMS’s protectable interests here are comparatively minimal. See Berg, supra, 45 Rutgers L. Rev. at 15-36. The geographic scope of this covenant encompasses approximately 235 square miles, making it very difficult for Dr. Farber’s existing patients to continue treatment with him if they so desire. After six days of testimony, the trial judge concluded that this restrictive covenant was unreasonably broad and against public policy. Specifically, the judge found:

(1) the three year duration was unreasonable because pulmonology patients typically require contact with the treating physician once every six months. Thus, a restriction over six months is unnecessary to protect VMS’s economic interests. Patients would have had opportunity within approximately six months to decide which doctor to see for continuing treatment;
(2) the five mile radius was unreasonable because with the three offices, the restriction covered more than 235 square miles;
(3) the restriction was unreasonable because it did not expressly provide for an exception for emergency medical treatment;
(4) the restriction was overly broad because it is not limited to pulmonology;
(5) the covenant violates public policy because of the sensitive and personal nature of the doctor-patient relationship.

Given the facts and the principles discussed, that finding is well supported factually and legally.

H. Severance — the blue pencil rule

This contract contains a severance clause.2 The court of appeals accepted a stipulation by VMS that the restriction would not prohibit Dr. Farber from treating HIV-positive and AIDS patients or from performing brachytherapy. On its face, however, the restriction is broader than that, restricting him from providing “medical care or medical assistance for any person or persons who were patients or [sic] Employer during the period that Employee was in the hire of Employer.” Arizona courts will “blue pencil” restrictive covenants, eliminating grammatically severable, unreasonable provisions. See Amex Distrib. Co., 150 Ariz. at 514, 724 P.2d at 600; Olliver/Pilcher Ins., 148 Ariz. at 533, 715 P.2d at 1221 (“If it is clear from its terms that a contract was intended to be severable, the court can enforce the lawful part and ignore the unlawful part.”). Here, however, the modifications go further than cutting grammatically severable portions. The court of appeals, in essence, rewrote the agreement in an attempt to make it enforceable. This goes too far. “Where the severability of the agreement is not evident from the contract itself, the court cannot create a new agreement for the parties to uphold the contract.” Olliver/Pilcher Ins., 148 Ariz. at 533, 715 P.2d at 1221.

Even the blue pencil rule has its critics. For every agreement that makes its way to court, many more do not. Thus, the words of the covenant have an in terrorem effect on departing employees. See Blake, supra, 73 Harv. L. Rev. at 682-83. Employers may therefore create ominous covenants, knowing that if the words are challenged, courts will modify the agreement to make it enforceable. Id. Although we will tolerate ignoring severable portions of a covenant to make it more reasonable, we will not permit courts to add terms or rewrite provisions.

In modifying the agreement, the court of appeals cited Peairs, which indeed allowed the trial court to alter the restrictive covenant in a contract “between medical professionals whose services are necessary for the welfare of the public.” 164 Ariz. at 61, 790 P.2d at 759. We disapprove of the portion of Peairs that permits courts to rewrite and create a restrictive covenant significantly different from that created by the parties.

CONCLUSION

We hold that the restrictive covenant between Dr. Farber and VMS cannot be enforced. Valley Medical Specialists’ interest in enforcing the restriction is outweighed by the likely injury to patients and the public in general. See Restatement § 188. In so holding, we need not reach the question of the hardship imposed on Dr. Farber. The public policy implications here are enough to invalidate this particular agreement. We stop short of holding that restrictive covenants between physicians will never be enforced, but caution that such restrictions will be strictly construed. The burden is on the party wishing to enforce the covenant to demonstrate that the restraint is no greater than necessary to protect the employer’s legitimate interest, and that such interest is not outweighed by the hardship to the employee and the likely injury to the public. Here VMS has not met that burden. The restriction fails because its public policy implications outweigh the legitimate interests of VMS.

Dr. Farber listed in his petition for review several issues “presented to, but not decided by, the court of appeals.” Valley Medical Specialists’ response also contained “additional issues if the court accepts review.” None of the issues were briefed in this court. We thus remand to the court of appeals for a determination of those issues that are capable of decision and still need to be decided.

THOMAS A. ZLAKET, Chief Justice, and CHARLES E. JONES, Vice Chief Justice, FREDERICK J. MARTONE, Justice, and RUTH V. McGREGOR, Justice, concur.

1

. Dr. Farber asks us to hold restrictive covenants in the medical profession void per se as against public policy. Finding the present covenant unreasonable and thus unenforceable by injunction, we need not and do not address that contention.

2

. Since it is the agreement and desire of the parties hereto that the provisions of this Paragraph 17 be enforced to the fullest extent possible under the laws and public policies applied in each jurisdiction in which enforcement is sought, should any particular provision of this Paragraph 17 be deemed invalid or unenforceable, the same shall be deemed reformed and amended to delete herefrom that portion thus adjudicated invalid, and the deletion shall apply only with respect to the operation of said provision and, to the extent a provision of this Paragraph 17 would be deemed unenforceable by virtue of its scope, but may be made unenforceable by limitation thereof, each party agrees that this Agreement shall be reformed and amended so that the same shall be enforceable to the fullest extent permissible under the laws and public policies applied in the jurisdiction in which enforcement is sought, the parties hereto acknowledging that the covenants contained in this Paragraph 17 are an indispensable part of the transactions contemplated herein.

2.5 BERLANGIERI v. RUNNING ELK CORPORATION 2.5 BERLANGIERI v. RUNNING ELK CORPORATION

132 N.M. 332

Court of Appeals of New Mexico.

Nicholas J. BERLANGIERI and Carol Berlangieri, Plaintiffs–Appellants,

v.

RUNNING ELK CORPORATION; Second Running Elk Corporation, d/b/a The Lodge at Chama, Defendants–Appellees.

No. 21,807.

April 9, 2002.Certiorari Granted, No. 27,492, May 20, 2002. 

OPINION

ALARID, Judge.

{1} This case requires us to decide whether New Mexico courts will enforce an exculpatory agreement purporting to relieve the commercial operator of a recreational premises **72  *334 from liability for failure to exercise ordinary care to protect its patrons from risks of serious physical injury. We conclude that such exculpatory agreements are unenforceable because commercial operators of recreational premises are subject to a non-disclaimable duty to exercise ordinary care to protect patrons from foreseeable risks of physical injury or death.

BACKGROUND

{2} Defendants operate The Lodge at Chama (hereafter The Lodge). The Lodge offers guests horseback riding expeditions as well as other recreational activities. On May 29, 1996, Plaintiff, Nicholas Berlangieri, and other employees of Honeywell Corporation were guests at The Lodge. Members of the group of employees expressed an interest in a horseback riding expedition. A riding expedition was arranged for the afternoon of May 29, 1996.

{3} Prior to the riding expedition, Jeri Simms, The Lodge's manager, spoke with each participant, including Plaintiff, to determine the participant's experience and ability in horseback riding. Simms concluded that Plaintiff was a novice rider. Simms explained to each guest that due to the unpredictable nature of horses, horseback riding involves certain unavoidable risks of injury. Simms gave each guest a copy of The Lodge's “Agreement for Release and Assumption of Risk” (hereafter the Release) and asked the guest to read and sign it. The Release stated:

I acknowledge that I have been informed of, and that I am otherwise aware of, the risks involved in fishing, horseback riding, hiking and shooting the sporting clays on the lands of the THE LODGE AT CHAMA. I hereby declare that I possess sufficient skills and experience in the above mentioned activities without causing injury to myself or other guests of THE LODGE AT CHAMA.

In consideration of being permitted to participate in the above mentioned activities and otherwise use the lands of THE LODGE AT CHAMA, I agree:

To use due care while engaging in the above mentioned activities on the lands of THE LODGE AT CHAMA, including, but not limited to, each and every risk resulting from negligent acts or omissions of any other person or persons, including employees and agents of THE LODGE AT CHAMA. I further agree to exculpate and relieve THE LODGE AT CHAMA and its employees, representatives and agents from all liability for any loss, damage, or injury, whether to person or property which I may suffer while engaging in activities and/or using the lands of THE LODGE AT CHAMA all whether or not resulting from the negligent act or omission of another person or persons.

{4} As each guest signed the Release, Simms asked the guest if he or she understood the terms of the agreement. Each guest, including Plaintiff, stated that he understood. Although Plaintiff has no recollection of signing a Release, he does not dispute that his signature appears on an executed Release.

{5} In view of the inexperience of the Honeywell group, The Lodge selected gentle, easygoing horses for the trail ride. Plaintiff's horse was saddled prior to the trail ride by an experienced employee of The Lodge. This employee testified that the saddle, tack, and equipment he put on Plaintiff's horse were in good, serviceable condition and were properly positioned on the horse.

{6} During the trail ride, another guest observed Plaintiff's horse “constantly wanting to move to the head of the group and to move faster than the other horses in the group.” The trail ride otherwise proceeded without incident. At the end of the ride, as the group approached the stable, Plaintiff's horse began to gallop. One eyewitness recalled that Plaintiff appeared to rotate to the right around the horse's body, “as if he was the hand of a clock moving around the center point.” According to this witness, Plaintiff fell to the right side of the horse, his head and shoulder hitting the ground first. In the words of another witness: “It appeared to be a slow fall to the right, with [Plaintiff's] body continually facing forward. He remained upright in the sense that his back remained approximately straight.” These two witnesses stated that Plaintiff's fall was consistent with the saddle sliding, but neither witness recalled actually observing the saddle  **73  *335 shift. One member of the party recalled that approximately two minutes after the fall, Plaintiff's horse did not have a saddle. However, the employee who saddled Plaintiff's horse, and who led the trail ride, recalled that after the fall, “[t]he saddle and tack were properly positioned and in good serviceable condition” and that he removed the saddle from Plaintiff's horse after assisting Plaintiff. Gay Davenport, an experienced horse trainer and riding instructor, provided an expert opinion as to the cause of the fall. Based on the eyewitness reports of the fall, Davenport concluded that “the saddle was not properly positioned and/or the cinch was not properly tightened; or this equipment failed, causing the saddle to slide sideways off the top of the horse.”

{7} Plaintiff filed a “Complaint for Personal Injury Damages” alleging that Plaintiff had suffered severe injuries, including brain injury. Plaintiff alleged that his injuries were the result of Defendants' “negligence, carelessness, and recklessness.” Plaintiff alleged his injuries were caused by the following acts and omissions on the part of Defendants and their employees:

  1. Failure to properly install the saddle and related equipment on the horse which [Plaintiff] was riding; and/or
  2. Providing saddle, equipment, or tack which defendants and their employees knew or should have known was faulty or was improperly installed.

Plaintiff alleged that he had “incurred medical bills of several hundred thousand dollars” as well as lost income “in excess of $450,000.”

{8} Defendants moved for summary judgment arguing that they were not liable for Plaintiff's injuries because they were exculpated by the Release and because Plaintiff's injuries were the result of “equine activities,” which under the Equine Liability Act, NMSA 1978, §§ 42–13–1 to –5 (1993, as amended through 1995) could not be the basis of liability. Plaintiff argued in response that (1) the Equine Liability Act does not bar liability for personal injuries caused by faulty tack, and (2) enforcement of the Release would violate public policy as expressed in the Equine Liability Act.

{9} The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants. As to the Equine Liability Act, the district court found that “Plaintiffs have presented sufficient evidence from which a reasonable person could infer that the proximate cause of Berlangieri's fall and consequent injury was the Defendants' negligence in improperly saddling his horse, causing it to come loose and slip.” The district court reasoned that:

The Plaintiffs' allegations are that the saddle and cinch on Berlangieri's horse were improperly installed, conduct which cannot reasonably be comprehended by the phrase “equine behavior.” At best, Defendant[s] can establish that Berlangieri's fall occurred while he was riding a horse. In my view, there is no disputed question of fact that Berlangieri's injuries did not occur as a result of equine behavior even though they may have occurred during equine behavior. Thus, under the specific language of the Equine Liability Act, the Act offers no shelter for the Defendants.

{10} Turning to the Release, the district court, citing Albuquerque Tire Co. v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 102 N.M. 445, 697 P.2d 128 (1985), observed that “New Mexico consistently enforces signed waivers of liability in the same form as the one Berlangieri signed in this case.” The district court noted, and rejected, Plaintiff's argument that enforcement of the Release would violate the public policy of New Mexico as expressed in the Equine Liability Act. The district court concluded that “no overriding public policy exists sufficient to invoke the exception to the general rule that contractual agreements which shift the risk of injury are valid and enforceable in this state.”

DISCUSSION

  1. The Release

123{11} We agree with the following statements regarding the relationship of public policy to freedom of contract:

Whether a contract is against public policy is a question of law for the court to determine from all the circumstances of each case. It is clearly to the interest of the public that persons should not be unnecessarily restricted in their freedom to make  **74*336 their own contracts, and agreements therefore are not to be held void as being contrary to public policy, unless they are clearly contrary to what the legislature or judicial decision has declared to be the public policy, or they manifestly tend to injure the public in some way. On the other hand the interests of the public do require that there shall be some restrictions on the freedom of persons to enter into contracts; and if an agreement binds a party to do or not to do anything, the doing or omission of which is manifestly injurious to the public interests, the courts must declare it contrary to public policy and therefore illegal and void.

IX Cyclopedia of Law and Procedure 483–85 (William Mack & Howard P. Nash eds.1903 (footnotes omitted)).

4{12} In the district court, Plaintiff looked solely to the Equine Liability Act, NMSA 1978, §§ 42–13–1 to –5 (1993, as amended through 1995) (hereafter the ELA), as a source of public policy offsetting the principle of freedom of contract. We agree with the district court that nothing in the ELA itself suggests that the Legislature intended the ELA to alter common-law principles governing the enforcement of exculpatory agreements. Plaintiff erroneously assumes that the ELA enacted a quid pro quo by which providers or sponsors of equine activities receive limited liability as to injuries to riders occurring as the result of equine behavior, and, in return, are subjected to non-disclaimable liability to riders whose injuries were caused by one of the circumstances set out in Section 42–13–4(C). We do not read the ELA as having enacted any such quid pro quo. Cf. Martin–Martinez v. 6001, Inc., 1998–NMCA–179, ¶¶ 5,6, 126 N.M. 319, 968 P.2d 1182(characterizing exclusivity provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act as part of the quid pro quo established by the legislative balancing interests of employers and employees). The public policy underlying the ELA is the promotion of equine activities, not the protection of riders who are injured in the course of equine activities: “It is the purpose of the legislature to encourage owners, trainers, operators and promoters to sponsor or engage in equine activities by providing that no person shall recover for injuries resulting from the risks related to the behavior of equine animals while engaged in any equine activities.” Section 42–13–2. Except as the ELA expressly limits liabilities, it leaves common-law rights and remedies intact, and, therefore, it is to the public policies informing the common law that we must look to determine whether the exculpatory agreement at issue in the present case is enforceable.

{13} The earliest statement by a New Mexico appellate court regarding the relationship of public policy to exculpatory agreements is found in Southwestern Pub. Serv. Co. v. Artesia Alfalfa Growers' Ass'n, 67 N.M. 108, 353 P.2d 62 (1960). There, our Supreme Court observed “[t]he rule is well established that a provision in a contract seeking to relieve a party to the contract from liability for his own negligence is void and unenforceable, if the provision is violative of law or contrary to some rule of public policy.” Id. Our Supreme Court went on to hold that an electric utility “cannot validly contract against its liability for negligence in the performance of a duty of public service, since such stipulation would be in contravention of public policy.” Id. at 122, 353 P.2d at 71.

{14} Subsequent cases have held that public policy does not preclude enforcement of contractual provisions exculpating an investment advisor from liability for negligence in advising an investor to enter into a prohibited transaction, State ex rel. Udall v. Colonial Penn Ins. Co.,112 N.M. 123, 812 P.2d 777 (1991); exculpating a telephone company for negligence in listing an incorrect number in a customer's yellow pages advertisement, Albuquerque Tire Co., 102 N.M. 445, 697 P.2d 128; and, exculpating a bank acting as an escrow agent for negligence in terminating escrows, Lynch v. Santa Fe Nat'l Bank, 97 N.M. 554, 627 P.2d 1247 (Ct.App.1981). However, each of these prior cases involved transactions in which the releasor faced a risk of economic loss; no reported New Mexico case has considered whether an exculpatory agreement is effective to relieve a commercial enterprise from liability for failing to exercise ordinary care to protect a patron  **75  *337from a risk of serious physical injury or death. Whether an exculpatory clause is effective to relieve a commercial enterprise from liability for failing to exercise ordinary care to protect a patron from a risk of serious physical injury or death presents a matter of first impression for New Mexico appellate courts.

5{15} Exculpatory provisions, such as the Release at issue in the present case, present us with the question of whether the policies favoring freedom of contract should prevail over the policies that inform tort law. Stanley v. Creighton Co., 911 P.2d 705, 706 (Colo.Ct.App.1996) (holding exculpatory agreement in residential lease to be violative of public policy and unenforceable against tenant). We are not convinced that the societal interests furthered by the law of negligence are proper subjects of a private agreement between contracting parties in situations where the releasee is engaged in a business that if not conducted in the exercise of ordinary care presents a risk of serious physical injury or death to the releasor.

{16} Our Supreme Court has identified the following policies furthered by the law of negligence:

Our fault system of recovery ... serves the important social functions of [1] redistributing the economic burden of loss from the injured individuals on whom it originally fell, [2] deterring conduct that society regards as unreasonable or immoral, and [3] providing a vehicle by which injured victims may obtain some degree of compensation and satisfaction for wrongs committed against them and [4] by which society may give voice and form to its condemnation of the wrongdoer.

Trujillo v. City of Albuquerque, 110 N.M. 621, 624, 798 P.2d 571, 574 (1990), rev'd on other grounds, 1998–NMSC–031, 125 N.M. 721, 965 P.2d 305. Clearly, as to the second and fourth Trujillo factors, a private agreement cannot nullify society's interest in “deterring conduct that society regards as unreasonable” or deny society the opportunity to “give voice and form to its condemnation of the wrongdoer.” Id. at 624, 798 P.2d at 574. The remaining Trujillo factors-society's interests in “redistributing the economic burden of loss” and “providing a vehicle by which injured victims may obtain some degree of compensation”-are also implicated by ostensibly private agreements purporting to release claims for negligence resulting in personal injury:

Superficially, the personal responsibility model advocated by the exculpatory agreement assumes that the person engaged in the activity bears the burdens created when he or she is injured.... Even in the case of an unmarried participant, the loss of income or ability to work can produce extreme burdens. The question then becomes, who absorbs those burdens?

....

... The answer to the question is that society absorbs these burdens. Specifically, a combination of private (i.e. friends and family) and public (i.e. the welfare system) assistance shoulders the weight.

Mario R. Arango & William R. Trueba, Jr., The Sports Chamber: Exculpatory Agreements Under Pressure, 14 U. Miami Ent. & Sports L.Rev. 1, 33 (1997). “Wholly apart from the higher humanitarian questions involved, the increased burden thus placed upon the state for charitable purposes would be, in and of itself sufficient to affect contracts of this character with a vital public interest.” Pittsburgh, C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Kinney, 95 Ohio St. 64, 115 N.E. 505, 508 (1916) (holding void as against public policy contract purporting to release employer from liability for physical injury to employee caused by employer's negligence). The effect of the Release is to require society to subsidize Defendants' negligent operation of their business. See Doe v. Miles Labs., Inc., 675 F.Supp. 1466, 1471 (D.Md.1987) (observing that in absence of tort cause of action against manufacturers of defective products “the costs or externalities are thrust upon victims or upon society through its governmental welfare programs” and that in absence of a tort cause of action society would be subsidizing polluting or defective products).

{17} Nationwide, “[e]quine activities are a popular form of recreation for an estimated thirty million people.” Terence J. Centner,  **76  *338The New Equine Liability Statutes, 62 Tenn. L.Rev. 997 (1995) (emphasis added). “Riding horses may involve greater risk of fatal injury than most other sports, such as football and hockey. A study of hospital emergency room data during 1989–90 disclosed that approximately twenty percent of the total reported 121,274 horseback-related injuries were head or neck injuries.” Id. at 998 (emphasis added and footnotes omitted). There can be no doubt that equine activities expose substantial numbers of consumers to risks of serious physical harm.

{18} Moreover, we believe that many—perhaps most—New Mexicans view participation in some sport or outdoor activity as an essential part of their lives. As cases from other jurisdiction indicate, the use of exculpatory releases by proprietors of sports and recreational facilities has become epidemic. See generally Randy J. Sutton, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Effect of Agreement Exempting Operator of Amusement Facility from Liability for Personal Injury or Death of Patron, 54 A.L.R.5th 513 (1998). Because we doubt that there is a principled basis under New Mexico law for limiting the use of exculpatory agreements to horseback riding, a decision upholding the Release in this case will affect the legal rights of participants in many other outdoor activities and sports.

We must decide the question presented to us upon the theory that we are not adjudicating for this particular plaintiff and defendant, but for all who may desire to take advantage of the principle which shall finally be established upon this question.... [W]e must fairly look, not upon the narrowest limitations which might be placed upon the effects of a decision holding such a release valid, but rather upon the possibilities for harm therefrom to the public.

Johnson v. Fargo, 98 A.D. 436, 90 N.Y.S. 725, 731 (1904) (refusing to enforce release absolving employer from liability for negligence resulting in personal injury to employee). While an individual release may not of itself constitute a matter of public interest, exculpatory agreements as a class present a matter of public interest. Dalury v. S–K–I, Ltd., 164 Vt. 329, 670 A.2d 795, 799 (1995) (invalidating disclaimer exacted by operator of ski area; observing: that “[e]ach ticket sale may be, for some purposes, a purely private transaction. But when a substantial number of such sales take place as a result of the seller's general invitation to the public to utilize the facilities and services in question, a legitimate public interest arises.”).

{19} We recognize that the clear majority of jurisdictions have upheld the type of release at issue here. In our view, these courts miss the crucial qualitative distinction between physical injury or death and damage to property or other purely economic interests. We agree with the Virginia Supreme Court that cases upholding exculpatory agreements in cases involving property damage are not controlling in cases involving releases of liability for negligence resulting in personal injury. Hiett v. Lake Barcroft Cmty. Ass'n, 244 Va. 191, 418 S.E.2d 894 (1992)(distinguishing between physical injury and property damage; holding release exculpating sponsor of triathalon void as against public policy); Maucher v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. Co., 100 Neb. 237, 159 N.W. 422 (1916) (holding exculpatory provision void as against public policy; observing that “this was not a contract for the transportation of a mere piece of inanimate freight. It was a contract for the transportation of a person in whose life and safety the state has an interest.”); see also NMSA 1978, § 55–2–719(3) (1961) (“Limitation of consequential damages for injury to the person in the case of consumer goods is prima facie unconscionable but limitation of damages where the loss is commercial is not.”); Restatement (Third) of Torts: Prod. Liab. § 18 (1997) (“Disclaimers and limitations of remedies by product sellers or other distributors, waivers by product purchasers, and other similar contractual exculpations, oral or written, do not bar or reduce otherwise valid products-liability claims against sellers or other distributors of new products for harm to persons.”).

6{20} The fact that a recreational activity involves some inherent risk of physical injury does not justify relieving the operators of recreational facilities of a duty of care to protect patrons against unreasonable and unnecessary **77  *339 risks. See Dalury, 670 A.2d at 800(refusing to enforce release relieving operator of ski resort for negligence in maintaining its premises; distinguishing between inherent risks of sport and risks that are “neither an inherent risk nor an obvious and necessary one in the sport of skiing”); Stephen D. Sugarman, Assumption of Risk, 31 Val. U.L.Rev. 833, 837–38 (1997) (citing baseball stadium as example of “no breach” case in which defendant has not acted unreasonably in exposing plaintiff to known risk because complete elimination of risk would be incompatible with enjoyment of game of baseball). We remain confident that jurors are capable of distinguishing between risks of injury that cannot be eliminated without depriving a sport or recreational activity of its essential character and unnecessary risks that arise as the result of the proprietor's failure to exercise due care for its patrons. See UJI 13–1603 NMRA 2002 (“What constitutes ‘ordinary care’ varies with the nature of what is being done.”).

7{21} We do not mean to suggest that courts should disregard a plaintiff's own role in deciding to engage in a particular activity. “Increasingly, risky recreational activities such as skydiving, rock climbing, and hang gliding are a socially acceptable means of exercising self-affirming autonomy and experiencing the sense of self-mastery that voluntary risk taking can provide.” Donald P. Judges, Of Rocks and Hard Places: The Value of Risk Choice, 42 Emory L.J. 1, 27 (1993). A plaintiff who engages in an activity that he knows or should know is beyond his or her capabilities is subject to the defense of his or her own comparative fault.

8{22} To summarize, we hold that the Release is unenforceable. Public policy imposes on commercial operators of recreational or sports facilities a non-disclaimable duty to exercise due care to avoid risks of physical injury to consumers. Our holding should not be understood as altering settled law enforcing releases in certain commercial settings where the releasor is subject solely to a risk of property damage or other purely economic loss.

  1. The Equine Liability Act

{23} The ELA provides as follows:

  1. No person, corporation or partnership is liable for personal injuries to or for the death of a rider that may occur as a result of the behavior of equine animals while engaged in any equine activities.

....

  1. Nothing in the [ELA] ... shall be construed to prevent or limit the liability of the operator, owner, trainer or promoter of an equine activity who:

(1) provided the equipment or tack, and knew or should have known that the equipment or tack was faulty and an injury was the proximate result of the faulty condition of the equipment or tack[.]

Section 42–13–4(A),(C). Equine activities include “riding an equine belonging to another.” Section 42–13–3(B)(4). “[The] behavior of equine animals” includes “the propensity of an equine animal to ... bolt ... [or] be unpredictable.” Section 42–13–3(C).

{24} We read Section 42–13–4(A) to create a broad grant of immunity from liability for negligence conditioned upon two circumstances: (1) the plaintiff-rider was injured while engaged in equine activities, and (2) the plaintiff's injuries were a result of equine behavior. We interpret the words “were a result of” to include the concept of proximate cause. As we read Section 42–13–4(A), equine behavior need not be the sole proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries; a defendant obtains the benefit of the ELA's grant of immunity where equine behavior was merely one of several concurring causes of the plaintiff's injuries. See UJI 13–305 NMRA 2002 (“[Proximate cause] need not be the only cause, nor the last nor nearest cause.”).

{25} Under Section 42–13–4(C)(1), a plaintiff may overcome the ELA's grant of immunity by establishing that (1) the defendant provided equipment or tack; (2) the equipment or tack was provided in a “faulty condition”; and (3) his injuries were “the proximate result” of the faulty condition of the equipment or tack. We recognize that in Section 42–13–4(C)(1), the Legislature refers to “the proximate result,” while in  **78  *340 Section 42–13–4(A), the Legislature refers to “ a result.” the legislature's employment of the definite article “the,” rather than the indefinite article “a,” in Section 42–13–4(C)(1) suggests that the Legislature may have intended the exception provided by Section 42–13–4(C) (1) to apply only where faulty equipment is the sole proximate cause of a rider's injuries. This interpretation would significantly limit plaintiffs' recourse to Section 42–13–4(C)(1) to overcome the ELA's grant of immunity. The difficulty with this interpretation is that if faulty tack or equipment is the sole proximate cause of a rider's injury, then equine behavior is necessarily excluded as a proximate cause of the rider's injury. This interpretation results in the anomalous situation in which the exception applies only where the general rule is inapplicable.

9{26} We conclude that a more sensible reading of Section 42–13–4(C)(1) is to treat the proximate cause element as paralleling that of Section 42–13–4(A). Thus, we hold that the exception provided by Section 42–13–4(C)(1) applies even if the faulty condition of equipment or tack was not the exclusive proximate cause of the rider's injuries.

10{27} Lastly, we consider whether physically sound equipment or tack can be considered to be in a “faulty condition” because it has been improperly applied to or positioned on a horse. We find the terms “faulty” and “faulty condition” to be reasonably susceptible to an interpretation extending them to situations in which the fault consists of applying or positioning the equipment or tack in an unsafe manner. The ELA sacrifices the common-law rights of a class of plaintiffs-many of whom can be expected to have suffered serious physical injury as the result of the unreasonable conduct of the protected class of defendants-in order to promote equine activities. Because we view the ELA as special interest legislation and not as remedial legislation designed to correct a shortcoming in the common law, we construe ambiguous language in the ELA in favor of Plaintiff's important common-law right to recover damages for personal injury and against limited liability. Accordingly, we hold that faulty equipment or tack includes physically sound equipment or tack that has been improperly applied or positioned in an unsafe manner.

11{28} Applying these principles, we reach the following conclusions about the present case. Evidence that Plaintiff's horse bolted as it approached the stable at the end of the horseback riding expedition would permit a reasonable jury to conclude that Plaintiff's injuries occurred during equine activity and were the result of equine behavior. If this were the only evidence before the district court, it properly could have granted Defendants' motion for summary judgment. The record, however, contains additional evidence. The affidavits of the two eyewitnesses to the accident describe the peculiar manner in which Plaintiff fell from his horse. One witness recalled observing Plaintiff's horse without a saddle approximately two minutes after the accident. The record also included a photograph showing another participant in the trail ride sitting on his horse. Based on these eyewitness accounts and the position of the saddle as shown in the photo of the other horse, Plaintiff's expert witness stated in her affidavit that improper positioning of the saddle too far to the rear of the horse or a failure of the saddle itself caused the saddle to slip sideways off the horse. The evidence was sufficient to support reasonable inferences that Plaintiff's injuries were the proximate result of improper saddling of Plaintiff's horse and that the employee who saddled the horse knew or should have known of the faulty positioning of the tack. This evidence creates genuine issues of material fact as to the applicability of Section 42–13–4(C)(1). We therefore affirm the district court's denial of summary judgment as to Defendants' ELA affirmative defense.

{29} We note that Defendants have requested a jury trial. To assist the parties and the district court on remand in applying our holding, we offer the following observations about jury instructions.

{30} First, the jury should be provided with instructions setting out relevant definitions contained in Section 42–13–3. The definitional instructions need not include alternatives that are not at issue. For example, in  **79  *341 the present case, there is no need to clutter the instructions with references to llamas, ponies, mules, donkeys, or hinnies. Second, the jury should be provided with instructions that enable it to make the findings required by the ELA. We also encourage the use of special interrogatories along the following lines:

Question No. 1. Did Plaintiff's injuries occur while Plaintiff was engaged in “equine activities”?

Answer: ______ (Yes or No)

If your answer is “No” proceed to Question No. [*]. Do not answer Question Nos. 2 through 5.

If your answer is “Yes,” proceed to Question No. 2.

Question No. 2. Was “equine behavior” a proximate cause of Plaintiff's injuries and damages?

Answer: ______ (Yes or No)

If your answer is “No” proceed to Question No. [*]. Do not answer Question Nos. 3 through 5.

If your answer is “Yes,” proceed to Question No. 3.

Question No. 3. Did Defendants provide Plaintiff with faulty tack or equipment?

Answer: ______ (Yes or No)

If your answer is “No,” you are not to answer further questions. Your foreperson must sign this special verdict, which will be your verdict for Defendants and against Plaintiffs, and you will all return to open court.

If your answer is “Yes,” then you must proceed to Question No. 4.

Question No. 4. Did Defendants know or have reason to know that they had provided Plaintiff with faulty tack or equipment?

Answer: ______ (Yes or No)

If your answer is “No,” you are not to answer further questions. Your foreperson must sign this special verdict, which will be your verdict for Defendants and against Plaintiffs, and you will all return to open court.

If your answer is “Yes,” then you must proceed to Question No. 5.

Question No. 5. Was the faulty tack or equipment provided by Defendants a proximate cause of Plaintiff's injuries and damages?

Answer: ______ (Yes or No)

If your answer is “No,” you are not to answer further questions. Your foreperson must sign this special verdict, which will be your verdict for Defendants and against Plaintiffs, and you will all return to open court.

If your answer is “Yes,” then you must proceed to Question No. [*].

“Question No. [*]” will be the first instruction on comparative fault. See UJI 13–2220 NMRA 2002, Directions for Use (setting out options available to trial court in instructing jury on comparative fault). The instructions relating to ELA issues should be grouped together and should immediately precede the instructions on comparative fault and damages.

CONCLUSION

{31} The order of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants is reversed and this case is remanded for further proceedings leading to trial on the merits.

{32} IT IS SO ORDERED.

I CONCUR: CELIA FOY CASTILLO, Judge and JONATHAN B. SUTIN, Judge (dissenting).

 

 

Dissent

Hide all concurrence and dissent visual indicators. 

 

 

 

 

SUTIN, Judge (dissenting).

{33} I respectfully dissent.

  1. Word Usage

{34} For convenience, I refer to one providing an opportunity to engage in recreational activity as an “operator”; an exculpatory contract clause by which an operator disclaims or absolves itself from liability for negligence that causes personal injury or death as a “release”; and an individual who chooses to engage in recreational activity as a “recreation seeker.”

**80  *342 II. Introductory Observations

{35} The majority holds that public policy imposes on operators a non-disclaimable duty of due care. This means no release is enforceable. Some risk of harm is inherent in most recreational activities. The level of that inherent risk varies depending on the particular activity. Recreation seekers face an enhanced level of risk of harm if the operator is negligent. Recreation is certainly beneficial to our mental and physical well-being. We can, of course, engage in recreational activities on our own. But some recreational activities can reasonably be pursued only when an operator provides or sponsors the activity.

{36} In the legal landscape on which we tread, concepts of individual freedom and independence clash with those advanced for full societal protection for people injured as a result of another's fault. Contract policy faces tort policy. Our historical acceptance in law of express assumption of risk is questioned in the face of resulting personal injury. All this, although the goal of both recreation seeker and operator is the exercise of due care by both.

{37} I disfavor the bold jump made by the majority without the issue having been tried below; without the issue having been placed before us by the parties; without the benefit of amicus curiae; without a better explanation of why we should depart from widespread, entrenched law; and without a better understanding of why the policies and law are not better addressed in our Legislature. The issue needs analysis and discussion in the nature of that which preceded and accompanied the groundbreaking cases of Mazetti v. Armour & Co., 75 Wash. 622, 135 P. 633 (1913), MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916), and Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).

III. What Invalidating All Releases Covers and Affects

{38} The sole issue raised in the district court and on appeal is whether the New Mexico Equine Liability Act, NMSA 1978, §§ 42–13–1 to –5 (1993, as amended through 1995), expresses a public policy that is violated by the release signed by Plaintiff. Even allowing a leap over this limited issue, the next issue in line is whether the specific release can be enforced as written and under the circumstances of this case, not that reached by the majority declaring all releases in the entire commercial recreation industry to be per se against public policy and unenforceable.

{39} The majority's all-inclusive determination spreads through the entire spectrum of the recreation provider industry, from small individual operators to high revenue corporate operators. Its determination covers every “commercial” shoestring as well as large scale individuals and organizations providing or sponsoring horseback riding, hunting, scuba diving, river rafting, backpacking (with or without pack horses), walking, swimming, running, bicycling, bungee-jumping, hang gliding, mountaineering, snowmobiling, indoor and outdoor rock climbing, weight training, parachuting, cross-country skiing, downhill skiing, flying, and race car driving. It covers resort, ranch, and health club operators who provide any recreational activity. It covers individuals and organizations who teach, train, and instruct in safety, as well as individuals and organizations who provide the means to engage in a recreational activity. The majority makes no distinction as to level of risk of harm. It makes no distinction as to conduct comprising the lack of ordinary care.

{40} The majority opinion does not define “commercial.” The holding is presumably meant to apply to operators engaged in commerce, which includes non-profit entities. If by “commerce” the majority means for-profit operators only, the majority nowhere explains why a distinction should be made between non-profit and for-profit operators. If the fault-based public policy asserted by the majority is as strong as the majority contends, such a distinction, if intended, is unwarranted.

  1. The Status of the Law

{41} The majority joins a very small and static minority. The majority recognizes that “the clear majority of jurisdictions have  **81*343 upheld the type of release at issue here.” Majority Opinion ¶¶ 19. The growth of the common law throughout the country has resulted in the widespread general rule that releases are enforceable. Few jurisdictions, and no recent legal commentary that I have seen, have bought into the absolute, end of the spectrum view taken by the majority as a solution to the concerns about releases. Rather, settled exceptions to the general rule have evolved over time.

{42} Exceptions were carved out when a release violated law or public policy. Public policy exceptions have been applied to releases protecting employers, manufacturers and suppliers in strict products liability, innkeepers, warehousemen, public utilities, common carriers, banks, and hospitals. An exception exists when a state legislature has enacted legislation regulating safety and allocating responsibility with respect to a particular activity. But the general rule nevertheless remains the rule and it has been, and can continue to be, applied on a case-by-case basis. The majority replaces the general rule with a general rule that no operator release is valid, likely setting us on a course of carving out exceptions on a case-by-case basis to this new general rule.

{43} The American Law Institute had every opportunity to significantly change Section 496B (allowing express assumption of risk) in the Second Restatement when it adopted Section 2 in the Third Restatement. Section 496B read: “A plaintiff who by contract or otherwise expressly agrees to accept a risk of harm arising from the defendant's negligent or reckless conduct cannot recover for such harm, unless the agreement is invalid as contrary to public policy.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 496B (1964). Recently amended, the Restatement now reads:

When permitted by contract law, substantive law governing the claim, and applicable rules of construction, a contract between the plaintiff and another person absolving the person from liability for future harm bars the plaintiff's recovery from that person for the harm. Unlike a plaintiff's negligence, a valid contractual limitation on liability does not provide an occasion for the factfinder to assign a percentage of responsibility to any party or other person.

Restatement (Third) of Torts § 2 (1999). Comment b to this section reads:

Rationale and effect. In appropriate situations, the parties to a transaction should be able to agree which of them should bear the risk of injury, even when the injury is caused by a party's legally culpable conduct. That policy is not altered or undermined by the adoption of comparative responsibility. Consequently, a valid contractual limitation on liability, within its terms, creates an absolute bar to a plaintiff's recovery from the other party to the contract.

Id., cmt. b. We view “[t]he Restatement of Torts [to be] persuasive authority entitled to great weight.” Moore v. Burn Constr. Co., 98 N.M. 190, 193, 646 P.2d 1254, 1257 (Ct.App.1982). Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 195(2), (3) (1979) reads:

(2) A term exempting a party from tort liability for harm caused negligently is unenforceable on grounds of public policy if

(a) the term exempts an employer from liability to an employee for injury in the course of his employment;

(b) the term exempts one charged with a duty of public service from liability to one to whom that duty is owed for compensation for breach of that duty, or

(c) the other party is similarly a member of a class protected against the class to which the first party belongs.

(3) A term exempting a seller of a product from his special tort liability for physical harm to a user or consumer is unenforceable on grounds of public policy unless the term is fairly bargained for and is consistent with the policy underlying that liability.

Comment a (rationale) to the Restatement (Second) of Contracts reads: “The law of torts imposes standards of conduct for the protection of others against unreasonable risk of harm.... [A] party to a contract can ordinarily exempt himself from liability for harm caused by his failure to observe the standard of reasonable care imposed by the  **82  *344 law of negligence.” Id., cmt. a (citations omitted).

{44} A recent American Law Reports (ALR) annotation, which appears to be the broadest annotation on releases, concludes:

A release signed by a patron exempting the owner or operator of [a] ... facility from liability may be enforceable provided that the form and language of the release are in a form which is conspicuous, legible, and recognizable by a reasonable person as a release from liability.

Randy J. Sutton, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Effect of Agreement Exempting Operator of Amusement Facility From Liability for Personal Injury or Death of Patron, 54 A.L.R.5th 513 (1998). This ALR also states:

In general, courts have enforced exculpatory agreements between proprietors ... and their patrons, so long as there is no statutory prohibition against such clauses, the facility is not providing an essential or public service, and there is not a great deal of disparity in bargaining power between the sellers and buyers ... as is the case in so-called adhesion contracts.

Id.

{45} American Jurisprudence's recent Proof of Facts on “Avoiding the Effect of a Recreational Activity Liability Release” states “[r]eleases of liability in favor of a recreational activity operator are generally enforceable, as it is proper for a participant and the operator to expressly agree in advance that the operator will not be liable for its negligence.” 33 Am.Jur.3d Proof of Facts § 421 (1995).

{46} Current law review article authors recommend that various issues relating to releases be addressed and reforms be implemented, but none among the many I reviewed recommends completely scuttling the traditional general rule. See, e.g., Mario R. Arango & William R. Trueba, Jr., The Sports Chamber: Exculpatory Agreements Under Pressure, 14 U. Miami Ent. & Sports L.Rev. 1 (1997).

{47} The bulk of the case law today enforces operator releases, subject to exceptions. See, e.g., Brooks v. Timberline, 127 F.3d 1273, 1274–75 (10th Cir.1997) (applying Colorado law, snowmobiling); Street v. Darwin Ranch, Inc., 75 F.Supp.2d 1296, 1299 (D.Wyo.1999)(horseback riding); Moore v. Hartley Motors, Inc., 36 P.3d 628, 631–32 (Alaska 2001) (all-terrain vehicle); Jones v. Dressel, 623 P.2d 370, 375–76 (Colo.1981) (en banc ) (parachute jumping); Lee v. Sun Valley Co., 107 Idaho 976, 695 P.2d 361, 363 (1984) (horseback riding); Cormier v. Cent. Mass. Chapter of the Nat'l Safety Council, 416 Mass. 286, 620 N.E.2d 784, 786 (1993) (motorcycle safety course); Moss v. Fortune, 207 Tenn. 426, 340 S.W.2d 902, 903–04 (1960) (horseback riding); Murphy v. N. Am. River Runners, Inc., 186 W.Va. 310, 412 S.E.2d 504, 508–09 (1991) (whitewater rafting); Milligan v. Big Valley Corp., 754 P.2d 1063, 1066 (Wyo.1988) (ski racing at resort); Williams v. Cox Enters., Inc., 159 Ga.App. 333, 283 S.E.2d 367, 369 (1981); Marshall v. Blue Springs Corp., 641 N.E.2d 92, 95 (Ind.Ct.App.1994) (scuba diver slip and fall on dock); Dombrowski v. City of Omer, 199 Mich.App. 705, 502 N.W.2d 707, 709 (1993) (crossing river while hanging from rope stretched across river); Swartzentruber v. Wee-K Corp., 117 Ohio App.3d 420, 690 N.E.2d 941, 945 (1997) (horseback riding); Mann v. Wetter, 100 Or.App. 184, 785 P.2d 1064, 1066 (1990) (in banc ) (scuba diving); Boyce v. West, 71 Wash.App. 657, 862 P.2d 592, 596 (1993)(scuba diving).

{48} The majority relies on four cases that invalidate releases. One was decided in 1904, another in 1916. One of these involved an employer-employee relationship, the other the railroad transportation of freight. Majority Opinion ¶¶ 18, 19. The two other cases involved operator releases and were premises liability oriented. In Dalury v. S–K–I, Ltd., 164 Vt. 329, 670 A.2d 795 (1995), a skier collided with a metal pole on a ski run. Dalury does not outlaw, on a blanket basis, all releases in the recreation industry. The court in Daluryrecognized the wisdom considering various factors “as relevant considerations” in determining the validity of a release. Id. at 798. Further, Dalury concludes that the proper formula is a “ ‘determination of what constitutes the public interest [while] considering the totality **83  *345 of circumstances of any given case against the backdrop of current societal expectations.’ ” Id. (quoting Wolf v. Ford,335 Md. 525, 644 A.2d 522, 527 (1994) (discussing the various factors set out in the widely-cited case Tunkl v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal.,60 Cal.2d 92, 32 Cal.Rptr. 33, 383 P.2d 441 (1963) (in bank ))).

{49} The other, Hiett v. Lake Barcroft Cmty. Ass'n, 244 Va. 191, 418 S.E.2d 894 (1992), involved a triathlon sponsored by a community association where the participant hit his head on a rock when starting the swim portion of the event. Hiett simply followed a sleeping 1890 precedent that had not been modified or altered. Id. at 897. The 1890 precedent did not involve recreational activity, but rather an agreement between a railroad company and its employee that specified the railroad would not be liable for injuries or death sustained by its employees occurring from any cause whatsoever. Id. at 896.

{50} The overwhelming case law today and for years on end has refused to hold releases per se invalid. See, e.g., Marshall, 641 N.E.2d at 95 (“[I]t is not against public policy to enter into an agreement which exculpates one from the consequences of his own negligence.”); Cormier, 620 N.E.2d at 786 (holding the allocation of risk by agreement is not against public policy); Dombrowski, 502 N.W.2d at 709(“[I]t is not contrary to this state's public policy for a party to contract against liability for damages caused by ordinary negligence.”); Swartzentruber, 690 N.E.2d at 945 (holding exculpatory contracts that bar an action in negligence are not per se void as against public policy).

  1. Rationale and Policy

{51} The driving force behind the majority's holding is that as long as releases are enforceable the public must ultimately pick up the tab for the harm and at the same time subsidize an operator's negligence. Majority Opinion ¶ 16. From information obtained from a law review article, the majority states equine activities involve thirty million people and result in tens of thousands of head and neck injuries. Majority Opinion ¶ 17. But we have no idea how many equine related injuries are due to the behavior of equine animals for which operators are immune under New Mexico's Equine Liability Act. See § 42–13–4(A). The majority perceives an “epidemic” use of releases. Majority Opinion ¶ 18. But we have before us no study of the use of releases in the New Mexico recreation industry, the number of people in New Mexico affected by the use of releases, and the extent of injuries received due to New Mexico operator negligence.

{52} Nor have we any information on the extent to which a recreation seeker's own health insurance will pay for medical expenses from a recreational activity injury. Since the majority is not concerned with releases barring liability for economic damages, the risk-taker's loss of wages should be irrelevant. This leaves damages for pain and suffering, which is not necessarily on the public's tab. Also missing is any analysis of economic considerations such as cost of operator insurance, risk of business failure due to higher pricing in order to pay for operator insurance, and overall effect on the New Mexico economy. Further, we should not assume that operators are any less likely with a release than with insurance coverage to concentrate on the use of ordinary care.

{53} No credence is given to the extent New Mexico citizens value recreational activity and seek adventure, competition, and independence, and to the physical and mental health achieved through such activity, regardless of releases. If the existence or not of releases makes a difference, recreation seekers might prefer the availability of more activities with releases than fewer without releases. The majority does not recognize the citizen's choice to knowingly and voluntarily engage in recreational activities of their choosing and to assume the risk of and responsibility for the harm that may result.

{54} Granted, past views about “freedom of contract” and of assumption of risk have sometimes given way to policies underlying our fault system of recovery. From careful and studied analyses of law and economics, and based on contemporary community standards of morality and right conduct, courts may deem it appropriate to dramatically change the course of the law as occurred, for  **84  *346example, with the adoption of strict products liability. But the general rule permitting releases based on express assumption of risk, while appropriately limited by well-developed exceptions, has not outlived all beneficial life when applied to the recreation industry. The court can still effectively apply public policy and contract validity analyses as each case arises. I see no pressing need to replace the traditional and long-accepted analysis with a blanket outlawing of releases as malum in se.

{55} A vehicle has just driven over New Mexico's express assumption of risk doctrine rendering the doctrine road kill. It has done so by holding “the policies that inform tort law” to be a copyright that cannot be infringed by contract. The day before the filing of the majority's decision express assumption of risk was alive. See Thompson v. Ruidoso–Sunland, Inc., 105 N.M. 487, 492, 734 P.2d 267, 272 (Ct.App.1987) (indicating the concept of express assumption of risk still exists in New Mexico). Releases relating to negligence were, and apparently still are, valid when only economic damages are at stake. See State ex rel. Udall v. Colonial Penn Ins. Co., 112 N.M. 123, 126, 812 P.2d 777, 780 (1991) (implicitly validating release as to negligence in professional services contract and affirming the “countervailing public policy consideration—the freedom to contract”); Omni Aviation Managers, Inc. v. Buckley, 97 N.M. 477, 479, 641 P.2d 508, 510 (1982) (stating “an ordinary bailee ... may limit or disclaim his liability for his own negligence by so providing in the contract of bailment”); Lynch v. Santa Fe Nat'l Bank, 97 N.M. 554, 556, 560, 627 P.2d 1247, 1249, 1253 (Ct.App.1981) (upholding release in escrow agreement against liability for negligence in terminating escrows). Lynch actually relied in its analysis on the widely followed if not leading Tunkl case, which involved the validity of a release asserted by a hospital to bar damages for personal injury.

{56} The majority places negligence in recreational activity in the same category as strict products liability presumably based in part on underlying rationale that the cost of injury to consumers of services, just as with the consumers of products, should be borne by the industry through the purchase of insurance. This thinking, of course, can apply to every business in every industry. The majority has chosen the recreation provider industry. While one of the underlying bases for negligence liability may be “the important social functions of redistributing the economic burden of loss from injured individuals on whom it originally fell,” Trujillo v. City of Albuquerque, 110 N.M. 621, 624, 798 P.2d 571, 574 (1990), rev'd on other grounds, 1998–NMSC–031, 125 N.M. 721, 965 P.2d 305, I disagree with the majority's view that this, like the area of strict products liability, see Henningsen, 161 A.2d at 94–95 and Restatement (Third) of Torts, Products Liability, § 18 (1997), provides a basis on which to automatically refuse to enforce any release in the entire recreation provider industry. Strict liability is distinct from negligence. Breach is imputed as a matter of law; breach is not based on foreseeability. See Saiz v. Belen Sch. Dist., 113 N.M. 387, 402, 827 P.2d 102, 117 (1992). A defective product line presents a considerably different risk to the public in New Mexico than an operator's employee who may fail on occasion to exercise due care. Recreational services in New Mexico are not of the same significance and proportion as products which, when manufactured, are of a “nature of a thing ... such that it is reasonably certain to place life and limb in peril when negligently made, [becoming] a thing of danger,” MacPherson, 111 N.E. at 1053, thereby requiring this Court to completely undo express assumption of risk and have negligence doctrine fettered only by comparative negligence law.

{57} The majority places public policy exclusively within existing tort law ignoring public policy in contract law. Yet “every law is an expression of a state's public policy.” Reagan v. McGee Drilling Corp., 1997–NMCA–014, ¶ 9, 123 N.M. 68, 933 P.2d 867 (1997). The majority says the policies that “inform” our fault system of recovery should prevail over policies that “inform” the contract law of assumption of risk. Yet one can validly argue “exculpatory provisions should be enforced by society because the person releasing another from the consequence of his own negligence, has promised to do so.” Donald E. Lowrey, Shielding Against Future **85  *347Negligence Liability: The Role of Exculpatory Contract Provisions in Personal Injury Actions, 12 W. St. L.Rev. 819, 834 (1985). “Releases, being contractual in nature, are governed by the laws of contracts generally, as well as any specific legislative acts prescribing the manner by which such agreements may be validated.” Ratzlaff v. Seven Bar Flying Serv., Inc., 98 N.M. 159, 162, 646 P.2d 586, 589 (Ct.App.1982). The public policy that the majority places in second position is the preservation of contract and express assumption of risk permitting adults to knowingly and voluntarily contract in a manner in which risks are understood and assumed and a right to sue thereby given up. The concept of “freedom to contract” has not by any means been eliminated in New Mexico. See Colonial Penn Ins. Co., 112 N.M. at 126, 130, 812 P.2d at 780, 784 (affirming New Mexico public policy of freedom to contract); see also, e.g., Adams v. Roark,686 S.W.2d 73, 75 (Tenn.1985) (stating “the case law and announced public policy of Tennessee favors freedom to contract against liability for negligence”).

{58} Several states have enacted legislation pursuant to which the courts have invalidated releases as violative of the state's public policy as set by that state's legislature. See, e.g., Lee, 695 P.2d at 363; Murphy, 412 S.E.2d at 508–09; Milligan, 754 P.2d at 1066. Our Legislature has entered the arena by declaring certain agreements to indemnify for one's own negligence to be against public policy and void. See NMSA 1978, §§ 56–7–1 (1971), –2 (1999); see also Guitard v. Gulf Oil Co., 100 N.M. 358, 361–62, 670 P.2d 969, 972–73 (Ct.App.1983) (analyzing validity of agreement to indemnify a party for its own negligence under Section 56–7–2(A) and holding indemnification agreement void and unenforceable under statute as to liability for indemnitee's percentage of negligence).

{59} If our Legislature wants to modify the common law to invalidate operator releases in a particular recreational activity or across the board, it presumably can. If the Legislature wants to regulate recreational activity, set safety standards for operators, and establish a public safety policy to which releases would be antithetical, the Legislature can enact such legislation. Note that the Legislature has enacted laws regarding liability in the equine and ski industries. See The New Mexico Ski Safety Act, NMSA 1978, §§ 24–15–1 to –14 (1969, as amended through 1997), and the Equine Liability Act, §§ 42–13–1 to –5. Note, too, our Supreme Court has placed in the realm of the Legislature the issue whether the common law rule that there is no duty to wear seat belts should be overturned with a common law duty to do so, the failure of which would subject a plaintiff to the application of the comparative negligence doctrine. Thomas v. Henson, 102 N.M. 326, 327, 695 P.2d 476, 477 (1985); Norwest Bank New Mexico, N.A. v. Chrysler Corp., 1999–NMCA–070, ¶¶ 25, 28, 127 N.M. 397, 981 P.2d 1215.

{60} The majority opinion finds its primary legitimacy in language quoted from Trujillo, 110 N.M. at 624, 798 P.2d at 574. Majority Opinion ¶ 16. The language says our fault system of recovery serves certain important social functions. Trujillo was a car accident case in which the plaintiff attacked the Tort Claims Act liability cap. Id. at 623, 798 P.2d at 573. The Trujillo Court's museful statement about the tort system was in the context of the Legislature-imposed cap on damages and the level of scrutiny to employ in determining the constitutionality of the legislation. Id. at 624–25, 798 P.2d at 574–75. Interestingly, the Trujillo Court mentions “[t]he debate over the policy question of whether the tort system is the best mechanism for performing the functions currently allocated to it,” and stated “[i]t is entirely appropriate that policy choices flowing from such debate take place in the legislative sphere.” Id. Trujillo, its context, and its language quoted by the majority, should not instruct the outcome here. Words expressed in one context grafted for use as the bedrock rationale in a completely different context requires a more reasoned application than that found in the majority opinion. Trujillo 's language does not provide a basis for the majority's holding.

{61} Absent violation of a public policy set by the Legislature or the existence of a recognized exception, the enforceability of a release ought to be measured on a case-by- **86  *348 case basis considering the circumstances of the case as a whole. Courts should examine whether a release contains clearly expressed, conspicuous language by which the recreation seeker (1) will understand the risks of injury or death; (2) will understand that he is releasing and giving up the right to sue the operator for damages for personal injuries received as a result of the operator's and its employee's negligence in providing the recreational activity, including faulty advice or instruction, improperly maintained or secured equipment, and dangerous premises; (3) is unequivocally told that by signing the release he nevertheless agrees to assume the risk of harm and the financial cost accompanying the harm and agrees not to sue or otherwise look to the operator for any type of damages, including medical expenses and economic damages such as lost wages, as well as damages for pain and suffering; and (4) is unequivocally told he should not and cannot rely on or expect any liability insurance to cover injuries that he may suffer due to the operator's negligence. These requirements constitute fair notice and fair play.

{62} At the same time, releases are not favored and courts should strictly construe releases against the party seeking to enforce them. See, e.g., Bothell v. Two Point Acres, Inc., 192 Ariz. 313, 965 P.2d 47, 51 (App.1998); Swartzentruber, 690 N.E.2d at 945 (holding releases “are not per se void as against public policy,” but “are not particularly favored in the law” and are to be strictly construed). This is particularly true in examining the legal validity of a release. The traditional, longstanding contract concepts of unconscionability, adhesion, oppression or coercion, misrepresentation, fair notice, and violation of public policy should continue to play an important role in that scrutiny. Included, too, should be appropriate concerns about the opportunity given to the recreation seeker to read the release and discuss the release and any safety concerns with the operator; the clarity of the scope of the release; the extent of the notice of the physical and legal risks the patron is assuming; and the reasonable and objective expectation from reading the release that the operator is under no obligation to exercise ordinary care in regard to any aspect of the activity. In considering the circumstances, the factors such as those in Tunkl, which are set out in Lynch, can be considered. See Lynch, 97 N.M. at 558–59, 627 P.2d at 1251–52.

{63} Fair and adequate notice and warning by the operator must go hand in hand with the recreation seeker's assumption of risk. Both ends must be examined: What and how clearly the operator tells the recreation seeker about physical and legal risks and whether that goes as far as it should, and the extent to which the recreation seeker has a reasonable opportunity to read the release and make an informed and unequivocally expressed decision to assume such risks.

{64} Courts will forever be tested when someone receives a devastating injury, and perhaps by its holding the majority hopes to avoid having to face each such test. However, the general rule, properly defined and applied, permits a reasonable balance of risk assumption and tort/fault interests.

  1. The Statutory Construction

{65} I cannot join in the majority's engagement in statutory construction to resolve what it sees as an “anomolous situation” relating to proximate cause, and as a lack of clarity in the meaning of “faulty condition,” in the Equine Liability Act. See Majority Opinion ¶¶ 23–27. These statutory construction issues were not raised below or on appeal. Furthermore, the analyses and holdings are not essential to the majority's affirmance of the district court's denial of Defendants' motion for summary judgment.

{66} The district court held as a matter of law that Plaintiff's injury did not occur as a result of equine behavior. The court therefore denied Defendants' motion for summary judgment under the Equine Liability Act. Defendants sought Rule 12–201(C) review in this Court on the ground that none of the exceptions to immunity applied because the undisputed evidence showed the injury resulted from equine behavior only. Plaintiff responded, arguing that material issues of fact existed as to Defendants' negligence, and also that Defendants failed to provide sufficient evidence for a jury determination of  **87  *349 whether the injury resulted from equine behavior.

{67} Contrary to the district court's determination that the injury did not result from equine behavior, and also contrary to Defendants' contention that the injury resulted solely from equine behavior, the majority has determined that an issue of fact exists regarding whether the injury resulted from equine behavior. Majority Opinion ¶ 28. This ruling, and the ruling that an issue of fact exists as to operator negligence, are enough to affirm the district court's denial of Defendants' motion for summary judgment.

{68} The statutory construction issues of proximate cause and faulty condition not having been raised or addressed below or on appeal, and the issues not being necessary for any of the majority's holdings on appeal, the issues should lay at rest until the circumstances arise for district court adjudication and presentation of the specific issues on appeal to this Court.

VII. The Instructions

{69} Because the issues that are the subject matter of the jury instructions the majority suggests on remand, Majority Opinion ¶ 30, are those not raised or addressed below or on appeal, I respectfully think we should, under the circumstances, leave the first draft of the instructions to the parties and the district court.

VIII. The Issue of the Equine Liability Act as Expressing Public Policy

{70} The majority does pause to say that the Equine Liability Act does not express a public policy making the release in this case unenforceable. I agree with that statement, and I would affirm the district court's summary judgment. Of course, the majority's ultimate holding makes this issue irrelevant. That is why the majority understandably devotes but a paragraph to rationale, Majority Opinion ¶ 12, and why I devote only one paragraph to my agreement with the majority on the issue.

  1. Conclusion

{71} For the reasons set forth above, I respectfully dissent.

2.6 John Smith and Jamie Lannister 2.6 John Smith and Jamie Lannister

John Smith is a fifty year old impoverished widower who resides in the State of Ames.  He is keenly aware of his nil prospects for upward socio-economic mobility.  He wants a better life for his two children, Ellen and Mike.  John recently encountered a mysterious man named Jamie Lannister.   Jamie is a billionaire who has thoroughly indulged his yearning for travel, luxury goods, and opulent housing.  Recently upon reading Henry Mayer’s wonderful biography of the abolitionist William Lloyd Garrison, John began to think, perversely,  about what it would be like to own a slave.  Somehow, John and Jamie got into a conversation when the former served the latter some coffee one morning at the Oliver Wendell Holmes coffee shop.  Near the end of their conversation, John and Jamie both expressed interest in the following deal:  John would promise to become Jamie’s “slave”– meaning that John would be obligated to follow Jamie’s directions for the remainder of his life.  John would be accessible to Jamie twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, to perform unquestionably any doable task demanded of him.  In return, Jamie would issue a check for ten million dollars to John’s two children (five million each) payable up front. 

Before concluding the arrangement, John and Jamie thought it best to consult with others.     

Initially, John’s children resisted the deal.  But soon John talked them into accepting it.  “Selling myself knowing that doing so will enable you to live a better life will bring me great pleasure,” he told them.  

Jamie Lannister’s lawyer, however,  told him that under no circumstances should he proceed.  Asked why, the lawyer referred to a United States statute that punishes the subjugation of anyone in America to involuntary servitude (18 U.S.C. Chapter 1584: “Whoever knowingly and willfully holds to involuntary servitude or sells into any condition of involuntary servitude, any other person for any term, or brings within the United States any person so held, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.”)   He also referred to the Thirteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution which provides the constitutional authorization for that statute: “Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.” Jamie maintained that he would not be enslaving John by force.  Far from it, “John would be enslaving himself by contract, knowingly and voluntarily.  He would be making a great deal for himself and his family.  I bet there are many poor schmucks who would love to get in on this.”   The lawyer acknowledged that there was a difference between the two contexts, a distinction that might save Jamie from prosecution.  Still, the lawyer advised against carrying through with the deal, arguing that no court would enforce the terms of the agreement in the event that John changed his mind.  In the end, John and Jamie decided to forgo the deal.  Both felt disappointed.  (Question: why not allow a person to sell himself or herself into lifetime servitude? As we shall see, the legal system allows individuals to agree under coercive circumstances to deals that some observers condemn as unconscionable. See Brady v. United States at 9.1.4)  

2.7 Breach of Promise to Marry 2.7 Breach of Promise to Marry

2.7.1 Gilbert v. Barkes, 987 S.W. 2d 772 (1999). [After reading listen to “I Will Survive” as performed by Gloria Gaynor.] 2.7.1 Gilbert v. Barkes, 987 S.W. 2d 772 (1999). [After reading listen to “I Will Survive” as performed by Gloria Gaynor.]

Alvin D. GILBERT, Appellant, v. Suzanne BARKES, Appellee.

No. 97-SC-463-DG.

Supreme Court of Kentucky.

March 25, 1999.

Edmund P. Karem, Scott E. Karem, Louisville, for Appellant.

Katie Marie Brophy, Louisville, for Appellee.

STEPHENS, Justice.

The issue we decide on this appeal is whether the claim of breach of promise to marry is still a viable legal cause of action in Kentucky. Recently, the Jefferson Circuit Court granted summary judgment to appellant dismissing a claim brought under this cause of action. Thereafter, the Kentucky Court of Appeals overruled the circuit court and reinstated the claim.

In reversing the Jefferson Circuit Court, the appellate panel expressed its disagreement with our previous decisions on this issue. However, the Court of Appeals correctly noted that under SCR 1.030(8)(a) and Special Fund v. Francis, Ky., 708 S.W.2d 641, 642 (1986), it lacked the authority to overrule a precedent established by this Court.

The facts which give rise to this action are as follows. Ms. Suzanne Barkes, appellee, and Dr. Alvin Gilbert, appellant, entered into a relationship beginning in January of 1989 which continued until June of 1994. Ms. Barkes claims that in September of 1990, Dr. Gilbert proposed marriage to her and that in December of 1990, she accepted. Ms. Barkes submits that she received an engagement ring from Dr. Gilbert. In reliance upon her impending marriage and at Dr. Gilbert’s insistence, Ms. Barkes claims that she took early retirement in 1992. Subsequently, Ms. Barkes sold her home in January of 1993 and moved into Dr. Gilbert’s home. Sometime in 1994, the parties’ relationship began to deteriorate and Ms. Barkes left Dr. Gilbert’s home.

In June of 1994 Ms. Barkes filed an action for Breach of Promise to Marry (BPM). Following Ms. Barkes’ deposition, Dr. Gilbert filed a motion for summary judgment, which the trial court granted. Ms. Barkes appealed the decision of the trial court. As noted, the Kentucky Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and remanded the case for trial. Upon proper motion, we granted discretionary review. We now reverse the Court of Appeals.

I. HISTORY OF ACTION FOR BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY.

The right of an individual to sue for Breach of Promise to Marry is a common law hybrid of tort and contract. Homer H. Clark, Jr., The Law of Domestic Relations in the United States, 1 (2d ed.1987). Its origin; however, goes back to canon law, which only enforced such a breach through specific performance of the promise. W.J. Broekelbank, The Nature of the Promise to Marry, 41 Ill.L.Rev. 1, 3 (1946); Harter F. Wright, The Action for Breach of the Marriage Promise, 10 Va.L.Rev. 361, 364 (1924). Through time such harsh measures were no longer enforced. The common law has since adopted the action.

In the fifteenth century, English courts embraced the action, primarily because the basis of marriage was largely viewed as a property transaction. Clark, supra, at 2; G.M. Tevelyan, English Social History 313 (1942); W. Goodsell, A History of Marriage and the Family 328-31 (1934). However, in those early times, the aggrieved party was only able to recover monies expended on a deceitful promise to marry. Clark, supra, at 1. In the seventeenth century, the need to prove deceit was eliminated from the cause of action. Clark, supra, at 1; Broekelbank, supra, at 3-4.

Following the lead of England, the American colonies adopted the action. Wright, supra, at 366. The action found a receptive audience in this country eventually becoming more popular in America than in England. Michael Grossberg, Governing the Hearth: Law and Family in Nineteenth-Century America, 37 (1985). However, by the end of the last century commentators became highly critical of the BPM action and favored restricting or eliminating it. McCormick, Handbook on the Law of Damages, 403-04 & n. 56 (1935); Wright, supra, at 371-75.

Today, the concept of marriage is generally no longer perceived as an economic transaction. Rather is regarded as a union of two persons borne out of love and affection, rather than a device by which property is exchanged. Clark, supra, at 3; Jeffrey Kobar, Note, Heartbalm Statutes and Deceit Actions, 83 Mieh.L.Rev. 1770, 1778 (1985).

The elements of the BPM action are predicated upon contract principles with the exception of damages, which has its roots in tort. Scharringhaus v. Hazen, 269 Ky. 425, 107 S.W.2d 329, 336 (1937). Case authority with respect to the elements is quite old. First, there must be mutual promises to marry one another. Burnham v. Cornwell, 55 Ky. (16 B.Mon.) 284, 286, 63 Am.Dec. 529 (1855). Furthermore, an offer and acceptance of the promise must be proven for an action to lie. Burks v. Shain, 5 Ky. (2 Bibb) 341, 342, 5 Am.Dec. 616 (1811). The offer, however, need not be formal. “Any expression ... of readiness to be married is sufficient.” Elmore v. Haddix, Ky., 254 Ky. 292, 71 S.W.2d 620, 622 (1934) (citing 9 C .J. 336). In addition, the contract to marry must be free from fraud based on the presumptions of innocence and purity of each promising party when entering into the agreement. Barrett v. Vander-Meulen, Ky., 264 Ky. 441, 94 S.W.2d 983, 985 (1936).

When the contract to marry has been breached, the injured party must suffer some form of damages. Because the issue of damages stems from tort principles, the amount is not limited to what is recoverable in the typical contract action for a breach of promise. Scharringhaus v. Hazen, Ky., 269 Ky. 425, 107 S.W.2d 329, 336 (1937). Three general classes of damages have emerged from this action: compensatory damages relating to the loss of the marriage, aggravated damages for seduction under promise of marriage, and punitive damages for malicious conduct. Stanard v. Bolin, 88 Wash.2d 614, 617-19, 565 P.2d 94, 96 (1977). See also Annotation: Measure and Elements for Breach of Contract to Marry, 73 A.L.R.2d 553 (1960). In Kentucky, this Court laid down an exhaustive list of factors to consider when estimating damages:

[I]t is proper to consider anxiety of mind produced by the breach; loss of time and expenses incurred in preparation for the marriage; advantages which might have accrued to plaintiff from the marriage; the loss of a permanent home and advantageous establishment; plaintiffs loss of employment in consequence of the engagement or loss of health in consequence of the breach; the length of the engagement; the depth of plaintiffs devotion to defendant; defendant’s conduct and treatment of plaintiff in his whole intercourse with her; injury to plaintiffs reputation or future prospects of marriage; plaintiffs loss of other opportunities of marriage by reason of her engagement to defendant; plaintiffs lack of independent means; her altered social condition in relation to her home and family, due to defendant’s conduct; and the fact that she was living unhappily at the time of the alleged promise.

Scharringhaus at 336 citing, 9 C. J. 372.

The last ease in which this Court issued a ruling on the breach of promise to marry action was in the 1937 Scharringhaus case.

II. SHOULD THE CAUSE OF ACTION FOR BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY BE ABOLISHED FROM KENTUCKY COMMON LAW?

In deciding whether to modify the common law, this Court must weigh the benefits versus the burdens of the proposed change. We shall examine the rationale for removing the BPM action from the common law and then we shall discuss the reasons why it should be retained.

The primary argument in favor of abolition of the BPM action is that society’s view of marriage and women have changed dramatically since this cause of action was adopted. While technically either a man or a woman could bring the cause of action in question, this Court is unaware of a man ever asserting such claim before the courts of the Commonwealth. The cases which interpret this cause of action make clear the party who is sought to be protected:

A promise to marry is not infrequently one of the base and wicked tricks of the wily seducer to accomplish his purposes by overcoming that resistance which female virtue makes to his unholy designs.

Scharringhaus v. Hazen, 269 Ky. 425, 107 S.W.2d 329, 336 (1937) (citing Goodall v. Thurman, 38 Tenn. 209, 1 Head 209 (Tenn. Dec. Term 1858). This language reflects the sexism and paternalism that pervade this cause of action. While one could certainly debate whether equality has been achieved between women and men in our society, it is certainly beyond issue that women today possess far more economic, legal and political rights than did their predecessors. Accordingly, we must examine the utility of the BPM action in the context of the present day, not in the era in which it was created.

Our review of the actions taken by other jurisdictions indicates that twenty-eight states have legislatively or judicially abolished the Breach of Promise to Marry action.1 The work of various commentators on this issue demonstrates criticism starting late in the last century and continuing up to the present.2

“Although marriages are still contracted for material advantages, it is now popularly believed that the choice of a spouse should be the result of that complex experience called love.” Clark, supra, at 3. The public policy of the Commonwealth undoubtedly calls for this Court to uphold marriage vows; however, “we see no benefit in discouraging or penalizing persons who realize, before making these vows, that for whatever reason, they are unprepared to take such an important step.” Jackson v. Brown, 904 P.2d 685, 687 (Utah 1995) (emphasis in original).

Given these arguments in favor of abolition as well as the support offered by other jurisdictions and commentators, we now turn to the arguments in favor of its retention. There are two primary arguments in favor of retaining the BPM action. The first is that the General Assembly has implicitly adopted it by placing a statute of limitations upon the period in which such an action can be brought. KRS 413.140(l)(c). The second is that the doctrine of stare decisis compels this Court to retain the action since it is a longstanding remedy and there is no sound reason to eliminate it because it still serves the useful purpose of remedying injury to those who are left standing at the altar.

We find no merit in the first argument that the General Assembly affirms a common law cause of action, such as BPM, by placing a statute of limitations upon it. No legislative approval or disapproval of this court-created claim is indicated by such proceedings. Rather, KRS 413.140(l)(c) merely restricts the time span in which such a claim can be brought before the Court of Justice. It is well established that the legislature has the power to limit the time in which a common law action can be brought. Saylor v. Hall, Ky., 497 S.W.2d 218, 223 (1973). At the same time; however, this Court is entitled to find that a common law cause of action should no longer be maintained. D & W Auto Supply v. Department of Revenue, Ky., 602 S.W.2d 420, 424 (1980). Accordingly, the fact that the legislature has limited the time in which a BPM action must be brought is of no significance and has no relevance to this case.

The second argument is equally as unpersuasive. Stare decisis is a doctrine which has real meaning to this Court. “When a court of institutional review announces a principle of law to apply to a general set of facts, the doctrine of stare decisis requires the court, in the absence of ‘sound reasons to the contrary’ to adhere to that same principle in future cases where there is a similar factual pattern.” Williams v. Wilson, Ky., 972 S.W.2d 260, 269 (1998) (Stephens, C.J., concurring) (quoting Hilen v. Hays, Ky., 673 S.W.2d 713, 717 (1984)). However, when this Court finds a common law cause of action to be anomalous, unworkable or contrary to public policy, it will abolish the action. D & W Auto Supply v. Department of Revenue, Ky., 602 S.W.2d 420, 424 (1980).

We believe the cause of action for breach of promise to marry has become an anachronism that has out-lived its usefulness and should be removed from the common law of the Commonwealth. “It is a barbarous remedy, outgrown by advancing civilization and, like other outgrown relics of a barbarous age, it must go.” Wright, supra, at 382. As when this Court abolished the action for intentional interference with the marital relation in Hoye v. Hoye, Ky., 824 S.W.2d 422, 425 (1992), we “have the power as an appellate court to resolve the question of whether to abolish” the action for BPM. Craft v. Commonwealth, Ky., 343 S.W.2d 150 (1961). Accordingly, the action for Breach of Promise to Marry is no longer a valid cause of action before the courts of the Commonwealth.

This Court wishes to make clear that it in no way prohibits other remedies, such as claims for breach of contract and intentional infliction of emotional distress, should a party be able to make such a case. As the Supreme Court of Utah noted in Jackson v. Brown, 904 P.2d 685, 687 (1995), any direct “economic losses suffered because of ... [the defendant’s] promise to marry [the plaintiff] (such as normal expenses attendant to a wedding) may be recoverable under a theory of ... breach of contract_[I]f a proper case is made out, emotional damages resulting from [the defendant’s] actions may be remedied by an action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Accordingly, no fundamental remedy is lost to this or any other plaintiff by our decision that a breach of promise to marry no longer has any legal significance.” Id.

While we are removing a cause of action from the common law, we are not eradicating the ability of a party to seek a remedy for such a wrong, but rather we are modifying the form that remedy may take. Accordingly, our jural rights doctrine, enunciated in Ludwig v. Johnson, 243 Ky. 533, 49 S.W.2d 347 (1932), is not implicated in this matter. Williams v. Wilson, Ky., 972 S.W.2d 260, 271 (1998) (Cooper, J., dissenting) (stating that modification of a jural right is permissible as long as the right itself is not abolished). Since we have merely modified the means by which certain wrongs may be remedied, we have no need to address the jural rights doctrine in this case as our action here today does not abolish a common law right existing at the adoption of the 1891 Kentucky Constitution.3

III. APPLICATION OF LAW TO THE FACTS OF THIS CASE.

For several reasons, Ms. Barkes is precluded from recovery from Dr. Gilbert under any contractual theory. First, there were none of the “normal expenses attendant to a wedding” such as a bridal dress, down payment on a reception hall or the like. Ms. Barkes’ economic claims were only for the sale of her house and taking early retirement. Neither of these damages are the type of direct wedding-related economic out-of-pocket expenses that are recoverable. Since only direct economic losses of this type can be recovered and there is no proof of any such losses in this case, no recovery is possible. Second, since no wedding date was ever actually set, there is no way Ms. Barkes could recover under any contractual theory because she cannot otherwise affirmatively demonstrate the parties’ final and serious intent to enter into marriage. Accordingly, since both of these conditions would have to be met before Ms. Barkes could state a viable contract claim, there is no way that she could maintain any sort of contract action against Dr. Gilbert.

Under the principles of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (IIED), Ms. Barkes is similarly precluded because the record demonstrates that she falls short of proving the elements of this claim. The tort of IIED, or outrage, was adopted by this Court in Craft v. Rice, Ky., 671 S.W.2d 247, 251 (1984), because “[t]here is a right to be free of emotional distress arising from conduct by another.” Id. To make out a claim of IIED, the following elements must be proved: (1) the wrongdoer’s conduct must be intentional or reckless; (2) the conduct must be outrageous and intolerable in that it offends against generally accepted standards of decency and morality; (3) there must be a causal connection between the wrongdoer’s conduct and the emotional distress; and (4) the emotional distress must be severe. Kroger Co. v. Willgruber, Ky., 920 S.W.2d 61, 67 (1996); Craft, 671 S.W.2d at 249.

In examining the four elements of IIED as applied to the instant facts, we believe that the second and third elements require no further clarification. However, we have concluded that the first and fourth elements require a more detailed discussion.

With regard to the first element, that the conduct be intentional or reckless, a wrongdoer who intentionally causes severe emotional distress to another by making a promise to marry and then breaking that promise obviously satisfies this element. However, since IIED can also be caused by reckless behavior, it is important to discuss precisely how such conduct must be evaluated. Recklessness in this context requires that the wrongdoer’s actions reflect a lack of consideration well in excess of the thoughtlessness that would be evident in most engagements which are broken off. To meet the necessary recklessness threshold, the wrongdoer must engage in conduct which demonstrates total disregard for the other party. The plaintiff must prove conduct that is so insensitive and irresponsible as to rise to the level of being deemed virtually intentional. It must be the conduct which any normal and prudent person would know was likely to cause extreme emotional distress.

With respect to the fourth element, there is a fairly high level of emotional distress any time any engagement is broken off. To meet the element of severe emotional distress; however, substantially more than mere sorrow is required. From the record, it is clear that Ms. Barkes has not alleged facts which could even begin to support a claim for IIED.

CONCLUSION

The ideas which predominated in the era that begat the cause of action for Breach of Promise to Marry no longer command the allegiance of the Citizens of the Commonwealth. Accordingly, this Court must act to keep the Common Law of Kentucky in step with its citizens. For the reasons stated above we no longer believe that this cause of action should be a part of our common law. When we find our common law to be anomalous, unworkable or contrary to public policy, we are bound to modify it. D & W Auto Supply v. Department of Revenue, Ky., 602 S.W.2d 420, 424 (1980). That is what we have done in this matter. We wish to stress that no fundamental right had been impaired by this Court. Rather we have simply modified the methods by which relief for violation of those rights may be recovered by the injured parties. We reverse the Kentucky Court of Appeals and reinstate the trial court’s order dismissing this claim.

LAMBERT, C.J., JOHNSTONE and STUMBO, JJ., concur.

COOPER, J., dissents in a separate dissenting opinion.

GRAVES and WINTERSHEIMER, JJ., join this dissenting opinion.

1

Alabama (Ala.Code § 6-3-330 (1975)); California (Cal.Civ.Code § 43.5 (Deering 1998)); Colorado (Colo.Rev.Stat. § 13-20-202 (1997)); Connecticut (Conn.Gen.Stat.Ann. § 52-572b (West 1991)); Delaware (Del.Code Ann. tit. 10 § 3924 (1996)); District of Columbia (D.C.Code Ann. § 16-923 (1998)); Florida (Fla.Stat.Ann. § 771.01 (West 1991)); Indiana (Ind.Code Ann. § 34-12-2-1 (Michie 1998)); Maine (Me.Rev. Stat.Ann. tit. 14, § 854 (West 1980)); Maryland (Md.Code Ann., Cts. & Jud.Proc. § 5 — 801(1997)) and (Md.Code Ann., Fam.Law § 3-102 (1997)); Massachusetts (Mass.Gen.Laws Ann. Ch. 207, § 47A (West 1987)); Michigan (Mich.Comp.Laws Ann. § 600.2901 (West 1998)); Minnesota (Minn. Stat.Ann. § 553.03 (West 1998)); Montana (Mont.Code Ann. § 27-1-602 (1997)); Nevada (Nev.Rev.Stat. § 41.380 (1995)); New Hampshire (N.H.Rev.Stat.Ann § 508:11 (1997)); New Jersey (N.J.Stat.Ann. § 2A:23-1 (West 1987)); New York (N.Y.Civ. Rights Law § 80-a (McKinney 1992)); North Dakota (N.D.Cent.Code § 14-02-06 (1997)); Ohio (Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 2305.29 (Anderson 1997)); Pennsylvania (23 Pa.Cons.Stat.Ann. § 1902 (West 1998)); Utah (Jackson v. Brown, 904 P.2d 685 (Utah 1995)); Vermont (Vt.Stat.Ann. tit. 15, § 1001 (1997)); Virginia (Va.Code Ann. § 8.01-220 (Michie 1997)); West Virginia (W.Va.Code § 56-3-2a (1997)); Wisconsin (Wis.Stat.Ann. § 768.01 (West 1993)); Wyoming (Wyo.Stat.Ann. § 1-23-101 (Michie 1977)).

2

Note, Domestic Relations: Avoid of Anti-Heart-halm Legislation by the Action of Fraud, 8 Hasting LJ. 210 (1957); Comment, California Reopens the ‘Heartbalm’ Action, 9 Stan.L.Rev. 406 (1957); Recent Cases, Breach of Promise — Statute Outlawing Breach-of-Promise Suits Does not Bar Action Based on Fraudulent Promise to Marry; 70 Harv.L.Rev. 1098, 1099 (1957); WJ. Brockel-bank, The Nature of the Promise to Marry — A Study in Comparative Law, 41 Ill.L.Rev. 1, 199 (1946); Feinsinger, Legislative Attack on Heart Balm, 33 Mich.L.Rev. 983 (1935); Brown, Breach of Promise Suits, 77 U.Pa.L.Rev. 474 (1929); Wright, The Action for Breach of Promise of Marriage, 10 Va.L.Rev. 361 (1924); White, Breach of Promise of Marriage, 10 L.Q.Rev. 135 (1894).

3

We wish to distinguish this case from Williams v. Wilson, Ky., 972 S.W.2d 260 (1998), in which this Court struck down part of KRS 411.184. We struck that law because it did not simply modify an existing jural right, but rather it impaired the right by changing the common law standard of proof. Under KRS 411.184, recovery was made substantially harder by raising the standard of proof. Accordingly, KRS 411.184 impaired a fundamental right in an impermissible fashion. Our action today does not impair any right, but simply modifies the means by which those rights may be accessed.

COOPER, Justice,

dissenting.

Having successfully purged the common law of the tort of alienation of affections in Hoye v. Hoye, Ky., 824 S.W.2d 422 (1992), the majority of this Court now consigns to oblivion yet another ancient tort, the breach of promise to marry. While I claim no affection for either of these musty causes of action, I do defend this Court’s obligation to apply the law with some degree of consistency, including the application of constitutional principles to ourselves the same as we apply them to the General Assembly. In Williams v. Wilson, Ky., 972 S.W.2d 260 (1998), a majority of this Court reiterated the constitutional myth that common law causes of action which existed prior to the adoption of the present Constitution are “jural rights” which cannot be abolished. Like the cause of action for alienation of affections, the cause of action for breach of promise to marry falls into that category. Burnham v. Cornwell, 55 Ky. 284, (16 B. Mon. 284) (1855); Burks v. Shain, 5 Ky. (2 Bibb) 341 (1811). Far be it from me to defend the jural rights doctrine. Williams v. Wilson, supra, at 269-76 (dissenting opinion). However, if a pre-1891 cause of action is cloaked with constitutional protection, it is protected as well from an act of this Court as it is from an act of the legislature. Id. at 274.

I am aware that some advocates of the jural rights doctrine now assert that it applies only to “rights of action for damages for death or injuries caused by negligence.” See Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. Government Employees Ins. Co., Ky., 635 S.W.2d 475, 478, n. 7 (1982), overruled on other grounds, Perkins v. Northeastern Log Homes, Ky., 808 S.W.2d 809 (1991), narrowing the scope previously established in Happy v. Erwin, Ky., 330 S.W.2d 412, 413 (1959). However, the jural right protected in Williams v. Wilson, supra, was the right to punitive damages, which are awarded not as damages to compensate for death or injuries, but to punish and deter wrongdoing. Id. at 273 (dissenting opinion), citing Hensley v. Paul Miller Ford, Inc., Ky., 508 S.W.2d 759, 762-63 (1974) and Ashland Dry Goods Co. v. Wages, 302 Ky. 577, 195 S.W.2d 312, 315 (1946). See also Kentucky Utilities Co. v. Jackson County R.E.C.C., Ky., 438 S.W.2d 788, 790 (1968), deeming a cause of action for indemnity to be a jural right, and Meyers v. Chapman Printing Co., Ky., 840 S.W.2d 814, 820 (1992), declaring that the protections contained in the Civil Rights Act are jural rights.

The majority opinion asserts that today’s decision does not implicate the jural rights doctrine at all, because “we are not eradicating the ability of a party to seek a remedy for such a wrong, but rather we are modifying the form that remedy may take.” (op. at 776.) In Williams v. Wilson, supra, the jural rights doctrine was extended past protection against the abolition of a common law right of action to protection against any impairment thereof. (The statute at issue in Williams did not abolish punitive damages, but only set standards to guide the jury in determining whether to award such damages and how much to award.) Regardless, the majority opinion states that “the action for Breach of Promise to Marry is no longer a valid cause of action before the courts of the Commonwealth.” (op. at 776.) That language can lead to but one conclusion: the cause of action for breach of promise to marry has thereby been abolished.

GRAVES and WINTERSHEIMER, JJ., join this dissent.

2.7.2 Note 2.7.2 Note

The Kentucky judges charge that “sexism” pervades the cause of action for breach of promise to marry and maintain that anti-sexism propels their decision to abolish that form of lawsuit.  Is it at all relevant that the Kentucky Supreme Court at the time of Gilbert was constituted predominantly by men?  (Be careful here.  The cultural-gender politics are tricky.  A key early campaigner against the breach of promise to marry lawsuit was Roberta West Nicholson, the third woman elected to the Indiana General Assembly and a pioneering organizer of the first birth control clinic in Indianapolis). 

The breach of promise to marry lawsuit provides a jilted party – in the caselaw almost always a woman – with some means of holding to account a cad who may have cruelly led her on, disappointing reasonable expectations of matrimony.  Why is it “sexist” to arm a party with a cause of action against another whose breach of promise may have caused grievous harm ? 

The court says that “it is certainly beyond issue that women today possess far more economic, legal, and political rights than did their predecessors.”    Does the court offer an explanation for why that change in circumstance supports the judicial abolition of the breach of promise to marry lawsuit?   The court concludes that “the cause of action for breach of promise to marry has become an anachronism that has out-lived its usefulness and should be removed from the common law.”  Does the court offer a theory in support of that conclusion? 

The court says that it sees “no benefit in discouraging or penalizing persons who realize before [taking marriage vows] that for whatever reason they are unprepared to take such an important step.”  How would you respond to that concern if you were arguing to retain the breach of m promise to marry cause of action?        

Opponents of breach of promise to marry argue that it is simply too easy for someone to claim mistakenly or fraudulently that another promised marriage when actually no such promise was made.   If fear of mistake or fraud is the concern, what reforms short of abolition could address that concern? 

Opponents of breach of promise to marry argue that the prospect of unbounded damages, sounding more in torts than contracts, left up almost wholly to impressionable juries, invite exploitation by “gold-diggers.”  If excessive damages is the concern, what reform short of abolition could address that concern? 

The Kentucky court seems to distinguish between breach of promise to marry and a conventional suit for breach of contract.  The court maintains that in a conventional suit for breach of contract, the defendant is entitled to judgment because “since no wedding date was ever actually set  . . . [the plaintiff] cannot otherwise affirmatively demonstrate the parties’ final and serious intent to enter into marriage.”  Do you agree? 

The court also maintains that the plaintiff is entitled to no recovery because she suffered no “direct wedding-related economic out of pocket expenses .”  Should the alleged damages be seen as too remote from the wedding to be compensable?  We shall discuss damages later.  For now simply note that to recover in a contracts action a plaintiff must show that she or he has actually suffered a compensable loss.   One can, however,  prevail in a contracts action and recover only nominal damages. 

2.8 The Problem of Surrogacy 2.8 The Problem of Surrogacy

2.8.1 The Problem of Surrogacy: Matter of Baby M, 537 A. 2d 1227 (1988). 2.8.1 The Problem of Surrogacy: Matter of Baby M, 537 A. 2d 1227 (1988).

109 N.J. 396 (1988)
537 A.2d 1227

IN THE MATTER OF BABY M, A PSEUDONYM FOR AN ACTUAL PERSON.

The Supreme Court of New Jersey.

Argued September 14, 1987.
Decided February 3, 1988.

Harold J. Cassidy and Alan J. Karcher argued the cause for appellants, Mary Beth and Richard Whitehead (Cassidy, Foss & San Filippo, attorneys; Harold J. Cassidy, Alan J. Karcher, Robert W. Ruggieri, Randolph H. Wolf, and Louis N. Rainone, on the briefs).

Gary N. Skoloff argued the cause for respondents, William and Elizabeth Stern (Skoloff & Wolfe, attorneys; Gary N. Skoloff, Francis W. Donahue, and Edward J. O'Donnell, on the brief).

Lorraine A. Abraham, Guardian ad litem, argued the cause pro se (Lorraine A. Abraham, attorney; Lorraine A. Abraham and Steven T. Kearns, on the brief).

Annette M. Tobia submitted a brief on behalf of amicus curiae Dr. Betsy P. Aigen, (Spivak & Tobia, attorneys).

George B. Gelman submitted a brief on behalf of amicus curiae American Adoption Congress (Gelman & McNish, attorneys).

Steven N. Taieb and Steven F. McDowell, a member of the Wisconsin bar, submitted a brief on behalf of amicus curiae Catholic League for Religious and Civil Rights.

Steven P. Weissman submitted a brief on behalf of amicus curiae Communications Workers of America, AFL-CIO.

John R. Holsinger, Merrill O'Brien, Mary Sue Henifin, and John H. Hall, and Terry E. Thornton, members of the New York bar, submitted a brief on behalf of amicus curiae Concerned United Birthparents, Inc. (Ellenport & Holsinger, attorneys).

David H. Dugan, III, and Joy R. Jowdy, a member of the Texas bar, submitted a brief on behalf of amici curiae Concerned Women for America, Eagle Forum, National Legal Foundation, Family Research Council of America, United Families Foundation, and Judicial Reform Project.

Alfred F. Russo and Andrew C. Kimbrell, a member of the Pennsylvania bar, and Edward Lee Rogers, a member of the District of Columbia bar, submitted a brief on behalf of amici curiae The Foundation on Economic Trends, Jeremy Rifkin, Betty Friedan, Gloria Steinem, Gena Corea, Barbara Katz-Rothman, Lois Gould, Marilyn French, Hazel Henderson, Grace Paley, Evelyn Fox Keller, Shelly Mindin, Rita Arditti, Dr. Janice Raymond, Dr. Michelle Harrison, Dr. W.D. White, Sybil Shainwald, Mary Daly, Cathleen Lahay, Karen Malpede, Phylis Chesler, Kristen Golden, Letty Cottin Pogrebin, and Ynestra King (Russo & Casey, attorneys).

Louis E. Della Torre, Jr., submitted a brief on behalf of amicus curiae The Gruter Institute for Law and Behavioral Research, Inc. (Schumann, Hession, Kennelly & Dorment, attorneys).

Kathleen E. Kitson, Sharon F. Liebhaber, and Myra Sun, a member of the Washington bar, submitted a brief on behalf of amici curiae Hudson County Legal Services Corporation and National Center on Women and Family Law, Inc. (Timothy K. Madden, Director, Hudson County Legal Services Corporation, attorney).

Priscilla Read Chenoweth submitted a brief on behalf of amici curiae Committee for Mother and Child Rights, Inc. and Origins.

Herbert D. Hinkle submitted a brief on behalf of amicus curiae National Association of Surrogate Mothers.

Joseph M. Nardi, Jr., and Edward F. Canfield, a member of the District of Columbia bar, submitted a brief on behalf of amicus curiae The National Committee for Adoption, Inc. (Lario, Nardi & Gleaner, attorneys).

Charlotte Rosin, pro se, submitted a letter in lieu of brief on behalf of amicus curiae National Infertility Network Exchange.

William F. Bolan, Jr., submitted a brief on behalf of amicus curiae New Jersey Catholic Conference.

Paul J. McCurrie and Cyril C. Means, Jr., a member of the Michigan bar, with whom Priscilla Read Chenoweth and Cathleen M. Halko were on the brief, submitted a brief on behalf of amici curiae Odyssey Institute International, Inc., Odyssey Institute of Connecticut, Inc., Florence Fisher, Judianne Densen-Gerber, Senator Connie Binsfeld, and Angela Holder.

Merrilee A. Scilla, pro se, submitted a letter in lieu of brief on behalf of amicus curiae RESOLVE of Central New Jersey.

Jerrold N. Kaminsky submitted a brief on behalf of amicus curiae RESOLVE, Inc.

Richard J. Traynor and John W. Whitehead, a member of the Virginia bar, and David A. French, a member of the Michigan bar, submitted a brief on behalf of amicus curiae The Rutherford Institute (Traynor and Hogan, attorneys).

Nadine Taub submitted a brief on behalf of amici curiae Women's Rights Litigation Clinic at Rutgers Law School, The New York State Coalition on Women's Legislative Issues, and the National Emergency Civil Liberties Committee.

Table of Contents     

Introduction 410

I.Facts 411

II.Invalidity and Unenforceability of Surrogacy Contract 421

A. Conflict with Statutory Provisions 423

B. Public Policy Considerations 434

III. Termination 444

IV. Constitutional Issues 447

V. Custody 452

VI. Visitation 463

Conclusion 468

The opinion of the Court was delivered by WILENTZ, C.J.

In this matter the Court is asked to determine the validity of a contract that purports to provide a new way of bringing children into a family. For a fee of $10,000, a woman agrees to be artificially inseminated with the semen of another woman's husband; she is to conceive a child, carry it to term, and after its birth surrender it to the natural father and his wife. The intent of the contract is that the child's natural mother will thereafter be forever separated from her child. The wife is to adopt the child, and she and the natural father are to be [411] regarded as its parents for all purposes. The contract providing for this is called a "surrogacy contract," the natural mother inappropriately called the "surrogate mother."

We invalidate the surrogacy contract because it conflicts with the law and public policy of this State. While we recognize the depth of the yearning of infertile couples to have their own children, we find the payment of money to a "surrogate" mother illegal, perhaps criminal, and potentially degrading to women. Although in this case we grant custody to the natural father, the evidence having clearly proved such custody to be in the best interests of the infant, we void both the termination of the surrogate mother's parental rights and the adoption of the child by the wife/stepparent. We thus restore the "surrogate" as the mother of the child. We remand the issue of the natural mother's visitation rights to the trial court, since that issue was not reached below and the record before us is not sufficient to permit us to decide it de novo.

We find no offense to our present laws where a woman voluntarily and without payment agrees to act as a "surrogate" mother, provided that she is not subject to a binding agreement to surrender her child. Moreover, our holding today does not preclude the Legislature from altering the current statutory scheme, within constitutional limits, so as to permit surrogacy contracts. Under current law, however, the surrogacy agreement before us is illegal and invalid.

I.

FACTS

In February 1985, William Stern and Mary Beth Whitehead entered into a surrogacy contract. It recited that Stern's wife, Elizabeth, was infertile, that they wanted a child, and that Mrs. Whitehead was willing to provide that child as the mother with Mr. Stern as the father.

The contract provided that through artificial insemination using Mr. Stern's sperm, Mrs. Whitehead would become pregnant, carry the child to term, bear it, deliver it to the Sterns, and thereafter do whatever was necessary to terminate her maternal rights so that Mrs. Stern could thereafter adopt the child. Mrs. Whitehead's husband, Richard,[1] was also a party to the contract; Mrs. Stern was not. Mr. Whitehead promised to do all acts necessary to rebut the presumption of paternity under the Parentage Act. N.J.S.A. 9:17-43a(1), -44a. Although Mrs. Stern was not a party to the surrogacy agreement, the contract gave her sole custody of the child in the event of Mr. Stern's death. Mrs. Stern's status as a nonparty to the surrogate parenting agreement presumably was to avoid the application of the baby-selling statute to this arrangement. N.J.S.A. 9:3-54.

Mr. Stern, on his part, agreed to attempt the artificial insemination and to pay Mrs. Whitehead $10,000 after the child's birth, on its delivery to him. In a separate contract, Mr. Stern agreed to pay $7,500 to the Infertility Center of New York ("ICNY"). The Center's advertising campaigns solicit surrogate mothers and encourage infertile couples to consider surrogacy. ICNY arranged for the surrogacy contract by bringing the parties together, explaining the process to them, furnishing the contractual form,[2] and providing legal counsel.

The history of the parties' involvement in this arrangement suggests their good faith. William and Elizabeth Stern were married in July 1974, having met at the University of Michigan, where both were Ph.D. candidates. Due to financial considerations and Mrs. Stern's pursuit of a medical degree and residency, they decided to defer starting a family until 1981. Before then, however, Mrs. Stern learned that she might have multiple sclerosis and that the disease in some cases renders pregnancy a serious health risk. Her anxiety appears to have exceeded the actual risk, which current medical authorities assess as minimal. Nonetheless that anxiety was evidently quite real, Mrs. Stern fearing that pregnancy might precipitate blindness, paraplegia, or other forms of debilitation. Based on the perceived risk, the Sterns decided to forego having their own children. The decision had special significance for Mr. Stern. Most of his family had been destroyed in the Holocaust. As the family's only survivor, he very much wanted to continue his bloodline.

Initially the Sterns considered adoption, but were discouraged by the substantial delay apparently involved and by the potential problem they saw arising from their age and their differing religious backgrounds. They were most eager for some other means to start a family.

The paths of Mrs. Whitehead and the Sterns to surrogacy were similar. Both responded to advertising by ICNY. The Sterns' response, following their inquiries into adoption, was the result of their long-standing decision to have a child. Mrs. Whitehead's response apparently resulted from her sympathy with family members and others who could have no children (she stated that she wanted to give another couple the "gift of life"); she also wanted the $10,000 to help her family.

Both parties, undoubtedly because of their own self-interest, were less sensitive to the implications of the transaction than they might otherwise have been. Mrs. Whitehead, for instance, appears not to have been concerned about whether the Sterns would make good parents for her child; the Sterns, on their part, while conscious of the obvious possibility that surrendering the child might cause grief to Mrs. Whitehead, overcame their qualms because of their desire for a child. At any rate, both the Sterns and Mrs. Whitehead were committed to the arrangement; both thought it right and constructive.

Mrs. Whitehead had reached her decision concerning surrogacy before the Sterns, and had actually been involved as a potential surrogate mother with another couple. After numerous unsuccessful artificial inseminations, that effort was abandoned. Thereafter, the Sterns learned of the Infertility Center, the possibilities of surrogacy, and of Mary Beth Whitehead. The two couples met to discuss the surrogacy arrangement and decided to go forward. On February 6, 1985, Mr. Stern and Mr. and Mrs. Whitehead executed the surrogate parenting agreement. After several artificial inseminations over a period of months, Mrs. Whitehead became pregnant. The pregnancy was uneventful and on March 27, 1986, Baby M was born.

Not wishing anyone at the hospital to be aware of the surrogacy arrangement, Mr. and Mrs. Whitehead appeared to all as the proud parents of a healthy female child. Her birth certificate indicated her name to be Sara Elizabeth Whitehead and her father to be Richard Whitehead. In accordance with Mrs. Whitehead's request, the Sterns visited the hospital unobtrusively to see the newborn child.

Mrs. Whitehead realized, almost from the moment of birth, that she could not part with this child. She had felt a bond with it even during pregnancy. Some indication of the attachment was conveyed to the Sterns at the hospital when they told Mrs. Whitehead what they were going to name the baby. She apparently broke into tears and indicated that she did not know if she could give up the child. She talked about how the baby looked like her other daughter, and made it clear that she was experiencing great difficulty with the decision.

Nonetheless, Mrs. Whitehead was, for the moment, true to her word. Despite powerful inclinations to the contrary, she turned her child over to the Sterns on March 30 at the Whiteheads' home.

The Sterns were thrilled with their new child. They had planned extensively for its arrival, far beyond the practical furnishing of a room for her. It was a time of joyful celebration — not just for them but for their friends as well. The Sterns looked forward to raising their daughter, whom they named Melissa. While aware by then that Mrs. Whitehead was undergoing an emotional crisis, they were as yet not cognizant of the depth of that crisis and its implications for their newly-enlarged family.

Later in the evening of March 30, Mrs. Whitehead became deeply disturbed, disconsolate, stricken with unbearable sadness. She had to have her child. She could not eat, sleep, or concentrate on anything other than her need for her baby. The next day she went to the Sterns' home and told them how much she was suffering.

The depth of Mrs. Whitehead's despair surprised and frightened the Sterns. She told them that she could not live without her baby, that she must have her, even if only for one week, that thereafter she would surrender her child. The Sterns, concerned that Mrs. Whitehead might indeed commit suicide, not wanting under any circumstances to risk that, and in any event believing that Mrs. Whitehead would keep her word, turned the child over to her. It was not until four months later, after a series of attempts to regain possession of the child, that Melissa was returned to the Sterns, having been forcibly removed from the home where she was then living with Mr. and Mrs. Whitehead, the home in Florida owned by Mary Beth Whitehead's parents.

The struggle over Baby M began when it became apparent that Mrs. Whitehead could not return the child to Mr. Stern. Due to Mrs. Whitehead's refusal to relinquish the baby, Mr. Stern filed a complaint seeking enforcement of the surrogacy contract. He alleged, accurately, that Mrs. Whitehead had not only refused to comply with the surrogacy contract but had threatened to flee from New Jersey with the child in order to avoid even the possibility of his obtaining custody. The court papers asserted that if Mrs. Whitehead were to be given notice of the application for an order requiring her to relinquish custody, she would, prior to the hearing, leave the state with the baby. And that is precisely what she did. After the order was entered, ex parte, the process server, aided by the police, in the presence of the Sterns, entered Mrs. Whitehead's home to execute the order. Mr. Whitehead fled with the child, who had been handed to him through a window while those who came to enforce the order were thrown off balance by a dispute over the child's current name.

The Whiteheads immediately fled to Florida with Baby M. They stayed initially with Mrs. Whitehead's parents, where one of Mrs. Whitehead's children had been living. For the next three months, the Whiteheads and Melissa lived at roughly twenty different hotels, motels, and homes in order to avoid apprehension. From time to time Mrs. Whitehead would call Mr. Stern to discuss the matter; the conversations, recorded by Mr. Stern on advice of counsel, show an escalating dispute about rights, morality, and power, accompanied by threats of Mrs. Whitehead to kill herself, to kill the child, and falsely to accuse Mr. Stern of sexually molesting Mrs. Whitehead's other daughter.

Eventually the Sterns discovered where the Whiteheads were staying, commenced supplementary proceedings in Florida, and obtained an order requiring the Whiteheads to turn over the child. Police in Florida enforced the order, forcibly removing the child from her grandparents' home. She was soon thereafter brought to New Jersey and turned over to the Sterns. The prior order of the court, issued ex parte, awarding custody of the child to the Sterns pendente lite, was reaffirmed by the trial court after consideration of the certified representations of the parties (both represented by counsel) concerning the unusual sequence of events that had unfolded. Pending final judgment, Mrs. Whitehead was awarded limited visitation with Baby M.

The Sterns' complaint, in addition to seeking possession and ultimately custody of the child, sought enforcement of the surrogacy contract. Pursuant to the contract, it asked that the child be permanently placed in their custody, that Mrs. Whitehead's parental rights be terminated, and that Mrs. Stern be allowed to adopt the child, i.e., that, for all purposes, Melissa become the Sterns' child.

The trial took thirty-two days over a period of more than two months. It included numerous interlocutory appeals and attempted interlocutory appeals. There were twenty-three witnesses to the facts recited above and fifteen expert witnesses, eleven testifying on the issue of custody and four on the subject of Mrs. Stern's multiple sclerosis; the bulk of the testimony was devoted to determining the parenting arrangement most compatible with the child's best interests. Soon after the conclusion of the trial, the trial court announced its opinion from the bench. 217 N.J. Super. 313 (1987). It held that the surrogacy contract was valid; ordered that Mrs. Whitehead's parental rights be terminated and that sole custody of the child be granted to Mr. Stern; and, after hearing brief testimony from Mrs. Stern, immediately entered an order allowing the adoption of Melissa by Mrs. Stern, all in accordance with the surrogacy contract. Pending the outcome of the appeal, we granted a continuation of visitation to Mrs. Whitehead, although slightly more limited than the visitation allowed during the trial.

Although clearly expressing its view that the surrogacy contract was valid, the trial court devoted the major portion of its opinion to the question of the baby's best interests. The inconsistency is apparent. The surrogacy contract calls for the surrender of the child to the Sterns, permanent and sole custody in the Sterns, and termination of Mrs. Whitehead's parental rights, all without qualification, all regardless of any evaluation of the best interests of the child. As a matter of fact the contract recites (even before the child was conceived) that it is in the best interests of the child to be placed with Mr. Stern. In effect, the trial court awarded custody to Mr. Stern, the natural father, based on the same kind of evidence and analysis as might be expected had no surrogacy contract existed. Its rationalization, however, was that while the surrogacy contract was valid, specific performance would not be granted unless that remedy was in the best interests of the child. The factual issues confronted and decided by the trial court were the same as if Mr. Stern and Mrs. Whitehead had had the child out of wedlock, intended or unintended, and then disagreed about custody. The trial court's awareness of the irrelevance of the contract in the court's determination of custody is suggested by its remark that beyond the question of the child's best interests, "[a]ll other concerns raised by counsel constitute commentary." 217 N.J. Super. at 323.

On the question of best interests — and we agree, but for different reasons, that custody was the critical issue — the court's analysis of the testimony was perceptive, demonstrating both its understanding of the case and its considerable experience in these matters. We agree substantially with both its analysis and conclusions on the matter of custody.

The court's review and analysis of the surrogacy contract, however, is not at all in accord with ours. The trial court concluded that the various statutes governing this matter, including those concerning adoption, termination of parental rights, and payment of money in connection with adoptions, do not apply to surrogacy contracts. Id. at 372-73. It reasoned that because the Legislature did not have surrogacy contracts in mind when it passed those laws, those laws were therefore irrelevant. Ibid. Thus, assuming it was writing on a clean slate, the trial court analyzed the interests involved and the power of the court to accommodate them. It then held that surrogacy contracts are valid and should be enforced, id. at 388, and furthermore that Mr. Stern's rights under the surrogacy contract were constitutionally protected. Id. at 385-88.

Mrs. Whitehead appealed. This Court granted direct certification. 107 N.J. 140 (1987). The briefs of the parties on appeal were joined by numerous briefs filed by amici expressing various interests and views on surrogacy and on this case. We have found many of them helpful in resolving the issues before us.

Mrs. Whitehead contends that the surrogacy contract, for a variety of reasons, is invalid. She contends that it conflicts with public policy since it guarantees that the child will not have the nurturing of both natural parents — presumably New Jersey's goal for families. She further argues that it deprives the mother of her constitutional right to the companionship of her child, and that it conflicts with statutes concerning termination of parental rights and adoption. With the contract thus void, Mrs. Whitehead claims primary custody (with visitation rights in Mr. Stern) both on a best interests basis (stressing the "tender years" doctrine) as well as on the policy basis of discouraging surrogacy contracts. She maintains that even if custody would ordinarily go to Mr. Stern, here it should be awarded to Mrs. Whitehead to deter future surrogacy arrangements.

In a brief filed after oral argument, counsel for Mrs. Whitehead suggests that the standard for determining best interests where the infant resulted from a surrogacy contract is that the child should be placed with the mother absent a showing of unfitness. All parties agree that no expert testified that Mary Beth Whitehead was unfit as a mother; the trial court expressly found that she was not "unfit," that, on the contrary, "she is a good mother for and to her older children," 217 N.J. Super. at 397; and no one now claims anything to the contrary.

One of the repeated themes put forth by Mrs. Whitehead is that the court's initial ex parte order granting custody to the Sterns during the trial was a substantial factor in the ultimate "best interests" determination. That initial order, claimed to be erroneous by Mrs. Whitehead, not only established Melissa as part of the Stern family, but brought enormous pressure on Mrs. Whitehead. The order brought the weight of the state behind the Sterns' attempt, ultimately successful, to gain possession of the child. The resulting pressure, Mrs. Whitehead contends, caused her to act in ways that were atypical of her ordinary behavior when not under stress, and to act in ways that were thought to be inimical to the child's best interests in that they demonstrated a failure of character, maturity, and consistency. She claims that any mother who truly loved her child might so respond and that it is doubly unfair to judge her on the basis of her reaction to an extreme situation rarely faced by any mother, where that situation was itself caused by an erroneous order of the court. Therefore, according to Mrs. Whitehead, the erroneous ex parte order precipitated a series of events that proved instrumental in the final result.[3]

The Sterns claim that the surrogacy contract is valid and should be enforced, largely for the reasons given by the trial court. They claim a constitutional right of privacy, which includes the right of procreation, and the right of consenting adults to deal with matters of reproduction as they see fit. As for the child's best interests, their position is factual: given all of the circumstances, the child is better off in their custody with no residual parental rights reserved for Mrs. Whitehead.

Of considerable interest in this clash of views is the position of the child's guardian ad litem, wisely appointed by the court at the outset of the litigation. As the child's representative, her role in the litigation, as she viewed it, was solely to protect the child's best interests. She therefore took no position on the validity of the surrogacy contract, and instead devoted her energies to obtaining expert testimony uninfluenced by any interest other than the child's. We agree with the guardian's perception of her role in this litigation. She appropriately refrained from taking any position that might have appeared to compromise her role as the child's advocate. She first took the position, based on her experts' testimony, that the Sterns should have primary custody, and that while Mrs. Whitehead's parental rights should not be terminated, no visitation should be allowed for five years. As a result of subsequent developments, mentioned infra, her view has changed. She now recommends that no visitation be allowed at least until Baby M reaches maturity.

Although some of the experts' opinions touched on visitation, the major issue they addressed was whether custody should be reposed in the Sterns or in the Whiteheads. The trial court, consistent in this respect with its view that the surrogacy contract was valid, did not deal at all with the question of visitation. Having concluded that the best interests of the child called for custody in the Sterns, the trial court enforced the operative provisions of the surrogacy contract, terminated Mrs. Whitehead's parental rights, and granted an adoption to Mrs. Stern. Explicit in the ruling was the conclusion that the best interests determination removed whatever impediment might have existed in enforcing the surrogacy contract. This Court, therefore, is without guidance from the trial court on the visitation issue, an issue of considerable importance in any event, and especially important in view of our determination that the surrogacy contract is invalid.

II.

INVALIDITY AND UNENFORCEABILITY OF SURROGACY CONTRACT

We have concluded that this surrogacy contract is invalid. Our conclusion has two bases: direct conflict with existing statutes and conflict with the public policies of this State, as expressed in its statutory and decisional law.

One of the surrogacy contract's basic purposes, to achieve the adoption of a child through private placement, though permitted in New Jersey "is very much disfavored." Sees v. Baber, 74 N.J. 201, 217 (1977). Its use of money for this purpose — and we have no doubt whatsoever that the money is being paid to obtain an adoption and not, as the Sterns argue, for the personal services of Mary Beth Whitehead — is illegal and perhaps criminal. N.J.S.A. 9:3-54. In addition to the inducement of money, there is the coercion of contract: the natural mother's irrevocable agreement, prior to birth, even prior to conception, to surrender the child to the adoptive couple. Such an agreement is totally unenforceable in private placement adoption. Sees, 74 N.J. at 212-14. Even where the adoption is through an approved agency, the formal agreement to surrender occurs only after birth (as we read N.J.S.A. 9:2-16 and -17, and similar statutes), and then, by regulation, only after the birth mother has been offered counseling. N.J.A.C. 10:121A-5.4(c). Integral to these invalid provisions of the surrogacy contract is the related agreement, equally invalid, on the part of the natural mother to cooperate with, and not to contest, proceedings to terminate her parental rights, as well as her contractual concession, in aid of the adoption, that the child's best interests would be served by awarding custody to the natural father and his wife — all of this before she has even conceived, and, in some cases, before she has the slightest idea of what the natural father and adoptive mother are like.

The foregoing provisions not only directly conflict with New Jersey statutes, but also offend long-established State policies. These critical terms, which are at the heart of the contract, are invalid and unenforceable; the conclusion therefore follows, without more, that the entire contract is unenforceable.

A. Conflict with Statutory Provisions

The surrogacy contract conflicts with: (1) laws prohibiting the use of money in connection with adoptions; (2) laws requiring proof of parental unfitness or abandonment before termination of parental rights is ordered or an adoption is granted; and (3) laws that make surrender of custody and consent to adoption revocable in private placement adoptions.

(1) Our law prohibits paying or accepting money in connection with any placement of a child for adoption. N.J.S.A. 9:3-54a. Violation is a high misdemeanor. N.J.S.A. 9:3-54c. Excepted are fees of an approved agency (which must be a non-profit entity, N.J.S.A. 9:3-38a) and certain expenses in connection with childbirth. N.J.S.A. 9:3-54b.[4]

Considerable care was taken in this case to structure the surrogacy arrangement so as not to violate this prohibition. The arrangement was structured as follows: the adopting parent, Mrs. Stern, was not a party to the surrogacy contract; the money paid to Mrs. Whitehead was stated to be for her services — not for the adoption; the sole purpose of the contract was stated as being that "of giving a child to William Stern, its natural and biological father"; the money was purported to be [424] "compensation for services and expenses and in no way ... a fee for termination of parental rights or a payment in exchange for consent to surrender a child for adoption"; the fee to the Infertility Center ($7,500) was stated to be for legal representation, advice, administrative work, and other "services." Nevertheless, it seems clear that the money was paid and accepted in connection with an adoption.

The Infertility Center's major role was first as a "finder" of the surrogate mother whose child was to be adopted, and second as the arranger of all proceedings that led to the adoption. Its role as adoption finder is demonstrated by the provision requiring Mr. Stern to pay another $7,500 if he uses Mary Beth Whitehead again as a surrogate, and by ICNY's agreement to "coordinate arrangements for the adoption of the child by the wife." The surrogacy agreement requires Mrs. Whitehead to surrender Baby M for the purposes of adoption. The agreement notes that Mr. and Mrs. Stern wanted to have a child, and provides that the child be "placed" with Mrs. Stern in the event Mr. Stern dies before the child is born. The payment of the $10,000 occurs only on surrender of custody of the child and "completion of the duties and obligations" of Mrs. Whitehead, including termination of her parental rights to facilitate adoption by Mrs. Stern. As for the contention that the Sterns are paying only for services and not for an adoption, we need note only that they would pay nothing in the event the child died before the fourth month of pregnancy, and only $1,000 if the child were stillborn, even though the "services" had been fully rendered. Additionally, one of Mrs. Whitehead's estimated costs, to be assumed by Mr. Stern, was an "Adoption Fee," presumably for Mrs. Whitehead's incidental costs in connection with the adoption.

Mr. Stern knew he was paying for the adoption of a child; Mrs. Whitehead knew she was accepting money so that a child might be adopted; the Infertility Center knew that it was being paid for assisting in the adoption of a child. The actions of all three worked to frustrate the goals of the statute. It strains credulity to claim that these arrangements, touted by those in the surrogacy business as an attractive alternative to the usual route leading to an adoption, really amount to something other than a private placement adoption for money.

The prohibition of our statute is strong. Violation constitutes a high misdemeanor, N.J.S.A. 9:3-54c, a third-degree crime, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-1b, carrying a penalty of three to five years imprisonment. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6a(3). The evils inherent in baby-bartering are loathsome for a myriad of reasons. The child is sold without regard for whether the purchasers will be suitable parents. N. Baker, Baby Selling: The Scandal of Black Market Adoption 7 (1978). The natural mother does not receive the benefit of counseling and guidance to assist her in making a decision that may affect her for a lifetime. In fact, the monetary incentive to sell her child may, depending on her financial circumstances, make her decision less voluntary. Id. at 44. Furthermore, the adoptive parents[5] may not be fully informed of the natural parents' medical history.

Baby-selling potentially results in the exploitation of all parties involved. Ibid. Conversely, adoption statutes seek to further humanitarian goals, foremost among them the best interests of the child. H. Witmer, E. Herzog, E. Weinstein, & M. Sullivan, Independent Adoptions: A Follow-Up Study 32 (1967). The negative consequences of baby-buying are potentially present in the surrogacy context, especially the potential for placing and adopting a child without regard to the interest of the child or the natural mother.

(2) The termination of Mrs. Whitehead's parental rights, called for by the surrogacy contract and actually ordered by the court, 217 N.J. Super. at 399-400, fails to comply with the stringent requirements of New Jersey law. Our law, recognizing the finality of any termination of parental rights, provides for such termination only where there has been a voluntary surrender of a child to an approved agency or to the Division of Youth and Family Services ("DYFS"), accompanied by a formal document acknowledging termination of parental rights, N.J.S.A. 9:2-16, -17; N.J.S.A. 9:3-41; N.J.S.A. 30:4C-23, or where there has been a showing of parental abandonment or unfitness. A termination may ordinarily take one of three forms: an action by an approved agency, an action by DYFS, or an action in connection with a private placement adoption. The three are governed by separate statutes, but the standards for termination are substantially the same, except that whereas a written surrender is effective when made to an approved agency or to DYFS, there is no provision for it in the private placement context. See N.J.S.A. 9:2-14; N.J.S.A. 30:4C-23.

N.J.S.A. 9:2-18 to -20 governs an action by an approved agency to terminate parental rights. Such an action, whether or not in conjunction with a pending adoption, may proceed on proof of written surrender, N.J.S.A. 9:2-16, -17, "forsaken parental obligation," or other specific grounds such as death or insanity, N.J.S.A. 9:2-19. Where the parent has not executed a formal consent, termination requires a showing of "forsaken parental obligation," i.e., "willful and continuous neglect or failure to perform the natural and regular obligations of care and support of a child." N.J.S.A. 9:2-13(d). See also N.J.S.A. 9:3-46a, -47c.

Where DYFS is the agency seeking termination, the requirements are similarly stringent, although at first glance they do not appear to be so. DYFS can, as can any approved agency, accept a formal voluntary surrender or writing having the effect of termination and giving DYFS the right to place the child for adoption. N.J.S.A. 30:4C-23. Absent such formal written surrender and consent, similar to that given to approved agencies, DYFS can terminate parental rights in an action for guardianship by proving that "the best interests of such child require that he be placed under proper guardianship." N.J.S.A. 30:4C-20. Despite this "best interests" language, however, this Court has recently held in New Jersey Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. A.W., 103 N.J. 591 (1986), that in order for DYFS to terminate parental rights it must prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that "[t]he child's health and development have been or will be seriously impaired by the parental relationship," id. at 604, that "[t]he parents are unable or unwilling to eliminate the harm and delaying permanent placement will add to the harm," id. at 605, that "[t]he court has considered alternatives to termination," id. at 608, and that "[t]he termination of parental rights will not do more harm than good," id. at 610. This interpretation of the statutory language requires a most substantial showing of harm to the child if the parental relationship were to continue, far exceeding anything that a "best interests" test connotes.

In order to terminate parental rights under the private placement adoption statute, there must be a finding of "intentional abandonment or a very substantial neglect of parental duties without a reasonable expectation of a reversal of that conduct in the future." N.J.S.A. 9:3-48c(1). This requirement is similar to that of the prior law (i.e., "forsaken parental obligations," L. 1953, c. 264, § 2(d) (codified at N.J.S.A. 9:3-18(d) (repealed))), and to that of the law providing for termination through actions by approved agencies, N.J.S.A. 9:2-13(d). See also In re Adoption by J.J.P., 175 N.J. Super. 420, 427 (App. Div. 1980) (noting that the language of the termination provision in the present statute, N.J.S.A. 9:3-48c(1), derives from this Court's construction of the prior statute in In re Adoption of Children by D., 61 N.J. 89, 94-95 (1972)).

In Sees v. Baber, 74 N.J. 201 (1977) we distinguished the requirements for terminating parental rights in a private placement adoption from those required in an approved agency adoption. We stated that in an unregulated private placement, "neither consent nor voluntary surrender is singled out as a statutory factor in terminating parental rights." Id. at 213. Sees established that without proof that parental obligations had been forsaken, there would be no termination in a private placement setting.

As the trial court recognized, without a valid termination there can be no adoption. In re Adoption of Children by D., supra, 61 N.J. at 95. This requirement applies to all adoptions, whether they be private placements, ibid., or agency adoptions, N.J.S.A. 9:3-46a, -47c.

Our statutes, and the cases interpreting them, leave no doubt that where there has been no written surrender to an approved agency or to DYFS, termination of parental rights will not be granted in this state absent a very strong showing of abandonment or neglect. See, e.g., Sorentino v. Family & Children's Soc'y of Elizabeth, 74 N.J. 313 (1977) (Sorentino II); Sees v. Baber, 74 N.J. 201 (1977); Sorentino v. Family & Children's Soc'y of Elizabeth, 72 N.J. 127 (1976) (Sorentino I); In re Adoption of Children by D., supra, 61 N.J. 89. That showing is required in every context in which termination of parental rights is sought, be it an action by an approved agency, an action by DYFS, or a private placement adoption proceeding, even where the petitioning adoptive parent is, as here, a stepparent. While the statutes make certain procedural allowances when stepparents are involved, N.J.S.A. 9:3-48a(2), -48a(4), -48c(4), the substantive requirement for terminating the natural parents' rights is not relaxed one iota. N.J.S.A. 9:3-48c(1); In re Adoption of Children by D., supra, 61 N.J. at 94-95; In re Adoption by J.J.P., supra, 175 N.J. Super. at 426-28; In re N., 96 N.J. Super. 415, 423-27 (App.Div. 1967). It is clear that a "best interests" determination is never sufficient to terminate parental rights; the statutory criteria must be proved.[6]

In this case a termination of parental rights was obtained not by proving the statutory prerequisites but by claiming the benefit of contractual provisions. From all that has been stated above, it is clear that a contractual agreement to abandon one's parental rights, or not to contest a termination action, will not be enforced in our courts. The Legislature would not have so carefully, so consistently, and so substantially restricted termination of parental rights if it had intended to allow termination to be achieved by one short sentence in a contract.

Since the termination was invalid,[7] it follows, as noted above, that adoption of Melissa by Mrs. Stern could not properly be granted.

(3) The provision in the surrogacy contract stating that Mary Beth Whitehead agrees to "surrender custody ... and terminate all parental rights" contains no clause giving her a right to rescind. It is intended to be an irrevocable consent to surrender the child for adoption — in other words, an irrevocable commitment by Mrs. Whitehead to turn Baby M over to the Sterns and thereafter to allow termination of her parental rights. The trial court required a "best interests" showing as a condition to granting specific performance of the surrogacy contract. 217 N.J. Super. at 399-400. Having decided the "best interests" issue in favor of the Sterns, that court's order included, among other things, specific performance of this agreement to surrender custody and terminate all parental rights.

Mrs. Whitehead, shortly after the child's birth, had attempted to revoke her consent and surrender by refusing, after the Sterns had allowed her to have the child "just for one week," to return Baby M to them. The trial court's award of specific performance therefore reflects its view that the consent to surrender the child was irrevocable. We accept the trial court's construction of the contract; indeed it appears quite clear that this was the parties' intent. Such a provision, however, making irrevocable the natural mother's consent to surrender custody of her child in a private placement adoption, clearly conflicts with New Jersey law.

Our analysis commences with the statute providing for surrender of custody to an approved agency and termination of parental rights on the suit of that agency. The two basic provisions of the statute are N.J.S.A. 9:2-14 and 9:2-16. The former provides explicitly that

[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law or by order or judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction or by testamentary disposition, no surrender of the custody of a child shall be valid in this state unless made to an approved agency pursuant to the provisions of this act....

There is no exception "provided by law," and it is not clear that there could be any "order or judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction" validating a surrender of custody as a basis for adoption when that surrender was not in conformance with the statute. Requirements for a voluntary surrender to an approved agency are set forth in N.J.S.A. 9:2-16. This section allows an approved agency to take a voluntary surrender of custody from the parent of a child but provides stringent requirements as a condition to its validity. The surrender must be in writing, must be in such form as is required for the recording of a deed, and, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 9:2-17, must be such as to declare that the person executing the same desires to relinquish the custody of the child, acknowledge the termination of parental rights as to such custody in favor of the approved agency, and acknowledge full understanding of the effect of such surrender as provided by this act.

If the foregoing requirements are met, the consent, the voluntary surrender of custody

shall be valid whether or not the person giving same is a minor and shall be irrevocable except at the discretion of the approved agency taking such surrender or upon order or judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction, setting aside such surrender upon proof of fraud, duress, or misrepresentation. [N.J.S.A. 9:2-16.]

The importance of that irrevocability is that the surrender itself gives the agency the power to obtain termination of parental rights — in other words, permanent separation of the parent from the child, leading in the ordinary case to an adoption. N.J.S.A. 9:2-18 to -20.

This statutory pattern, providing for a surrender in writing and for termination of parental rights by an approved agency, is generally followed in connection with adoption proceedings and proceedings by DYFS to obtain permanent custody of a child. Our adoption statute repeats the requirements necessary to accomplish an irrevocable surrender to an approved agency in both form and substance. N.J.S.A. 9:3-41a. It provides that the surrender "shall be valid and binding without regard to the age of the person executing the surrender," ibid.; and although the word "irrevocable" is not used, that seems clearly to be the intent of the provision. The statute speaks of such surrender as constituting "relinquishment of such person's parental rights in or guardianship or custody of the child named therein and consent by such person to adoption of the child." Ibid. (emphasis supplied). We emphasize "named therein," for we construe the statute to allow a surrender only after the birth of the child. The formal consent to surrender enables the approved agency to terminate parental rights.

Similarly, DYFS is empowered to "take voluntary surrenders and releases of custody and consents to adoption[s]" from parents, which surrenders, releases, or consents "when properly acknowledged ... shall be valid and binding irrespective of the age of the person giving the same, and shall be irrevocable except at the discretion of the Bureau of Childrens Services [currently DYFS] or upon order of a court of competent jurisdiction." N.J.S.A. 30:4C-23. Such consent to surrender of the custody of the child would presumably lead to an adoption placement by DYFS. See N.J.S.A. 30:4C-20.

It is clear that the Legislature so carefully circumscribed all aspects of a consent to surrender custody — its form and substance, its manner of execution, and the agency or agencies to which it may be made — in order to provide the basis for irrevocability. It seems most unlikely that the Legislature intended that a consent not complying with these requirements would also be irrevocable, especially where, as here, that consent falls radically short of compliance. Not only do the form and substance of the consent in the surrogacy contract fail to meet statutory requirements, but the surrender of custody is made to a private party. It is not made, as the statute requires, either to an approved agency or to DYFS.

These strict prerequisites to irrevocability constitute a recognition of the most serious consequences that flow from such consents: termination of parental rights, the permanent separation of parent from child, and the ultimate adoption of the child. See Sees v. Baber, supra, 74 N.J. at 217. Because of those consequences, the Legislature severely limited the circumstances under which such consent would be irrevocable. The legislative goal is furthered by regulations requiring approved agencies, prior to accepting irrevocable consents, to provide advice and counseling to women, making it more likely that they fully understand and appreciate the consequences of their acts. N.J.A.C. 10:121A-5.4(c).

Contractual surrender of parental rights is not provided for in our statutes as now written. Indeed, in the Parentage Act, N.J.S.A. 9:17-38 to -59, there is a specific provision invalidating any agreement "between an alleged or presumed father and the mother of the child" to bar an action brought for the purpose of determining paternity "[r]egardless of [the contract's] terms." N.J.S.A. 9:17-45. Even a settlement agreement concerning parentage reached in a judicially-mandated consent conference is not valid unless the proposed settlement is approved beforehand by the court. N.J.S.A. 9:17-48c and d. There is no doubt that a contractual provision purporting to constitute an irrevocable agreement to surrender custody of a child for adoption is invalid.

In Sees v. Baber, supra, 74 N.J. 201, we noted that a natural mother's consent to surrender her child and to its subsequent adoption was no longer required by the statute in private placement adoptions. After tracing the statutory history from the time when such a consent had been an essential prerequisite to adoption, we concluded that such a consent was now neither necessary nor sufficient for the purpose of terminating parental rights. Id. at 213. The consent to surrender custody in that case was in writing, had been executed prior to physical surrender of the infant, and had been explained to the mother by an attorney. The trial court found that the consent to surrender of custody in that private placement adoption was knowing, voluntary, and deliberate. Id. at 216. The physical surrender of the child took place four days after its birth. Two days thereafter the natural mother changed her mind, and asked that the adoptive couple give her baby back to her. We held that she was entitled to the baby's return. The effect of our holding in that case necessarily encompassed our conclusion that "in an unsupervised private placement, since there is no statutory obligation to consent, there can be no legal barrier to its retraction." Id. at 215. The only possible relevance of consent in these matters, we noted, was that it might bear on whether there had been an abandonment of the child, or a forsaking of parental obligations. Id. at 216. Otherwise, consent in a private placement adoption is not only revocable but, when revoked early enough, irrelevant. Id. at 213-15.

The provision in the surrogacy contract whereby the mother irrevocably agrees to surrender custody of her child and to terminate her parental rights conflicts with the settled interpretation of New Jersey statutory law.[8] There is only one irrevocable consent, and that is the one explicitly provided for by statute: a consent to surrender of custody and a placement with an approved agency or with DYFS. The provision in the surrogacy contract, agreed to before conception, requiring the natural mother to surrender custody of the child without any right of revocation is one more indication of the essential nature of this transaction: the creation of a contractual system of termination and adoption designed to circumvent our statutes.

B. Public Policy Considerations

The surrogacy contract's invalidity, resulting from its direct conflict with the above statutory provisions, is further underlined when its goals and means are measured against New Jersey's public policy. The contract's basic premise, that the natural parents can decide in advance of birth which one is to have custody of the child, bears no relationship to the settled law that the child's best interests shall determine custody. See Fantony v. Fantony, 21 N.J. 525, 536-37 (1956); see also Sheehan v. Sheehan, 38 N.J. Super. 120, 125 (App.Div. 1955) [435] ("Whatever the agreement of the parents, the ultimate determination of custody lies with the court in the exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction as parens patriae."). The fact that the trial court remedied that aspect of the contract through the "best interests" phase does not make the contractual provision any less offensive to the public policy of this State.

The surrogacy contract guarantees permanent separation of the child from one of its natural parents. Our policy, however, has long been that to the extent possible, children should remain with and be brought up by both of their natural parents. That was the first stated purpose of the previous adoption act, L. 1953, c. 264, § 1, codified at N.J.S.A. 9:3-17 (repealed): "it is necessary and desirable (a) to protect the child from unnecessary separation from his natural parents...." While not so stated in the present adoption law, this purpose remains part of the public policy of this State. See, e.g., Wilke v. Culp, 196 N.J. Super. 487, 496 (App.Div. 1984), certif. den., 99 N.J. 243 (1985); In re Adoption by J.J.P., supra, 175 N.J. Super. at 426. This is not simply some theoretical ideal that in practice has no meaning. The impact of failure to follow that policy is nowhere better shown than in the results of this surrogacy contract. A child, instead of starting off its life with as much peace and security as possible, finds itself immediately in a tug-of-war between contending mother and father.[9]

The surrogacy contract violates the policy of this State that the rights of natural parents are equal concerning their child, the father's right no greater than the mother's. "The parent and child relationship extends equally to every child and to every parent, regardless of the marital status of the parents." N.J.S.A. 9:17-40. As the Assembly Judiciary Committee noted in its statement to the bill, this section establishes "the principle that regardless of the marital status of the parents, all children and all parents have equal rights with respect to each other." Statement to Senate No. 888, Assembly Judiciary, Law, Public Safety and Defense Committee (1983) (emphasis supplied). The whole purpose and effect of the surrogacy contract was to give the father the exclusive right to the child by destroying the rights of the mother.

The policies expressed in our comprehensive laws governing consent to the surrender of a child, discussed supra at 429-434, stand in stark contrast to the surrogacy contract and what it implies. Here there is no counseling, independent or otherwise, of the natural mother, no evaluation, no warning.

The only legal advice Mary Beth Whitehead received regarding the surrogacy contract was provided in connection with the contract that she previously entered into with another couple. Mrs. Whitehead's lawyer was referred to her by the Infertility Center, with which he had an agreement to act as counsel for surrogate candidates. His services consisted of spending one hour going through the contract with the Whiteheads, section by section, and answering their questions. Mrs. Whitehead received no further legal advice prior to signing the contract with the Sterns.

Mrs. Whitehead was examined and psychologically evaluated, but if it was for her benefit, the record does not disclose that fact. The Sterns regarded the evaluation as important, particularly in connection with the question of whether she would change her mind. Yet they never asked to see it, and were content with the assumption that the Infertility Center had made an evaluation and had concluded that there was no danger that the surrogate mother would change her mind. From Mrs. Whitehead's point of view, all that she learned from the evaluation was that "she had passed." It is apparent that the profit motive got the better of the Infertility Center. Although the evaluation was made, it was not put to any use, and understandably so, for the psychologist warned that Mrs. Whitehead demonstrated certain traits that might make surrender of the child difficult and that there should be further inquiry into this issue in connection with her surrogacy. To inquire further, however, might have jeopardized the Infertility Center's fee. The record indicates that neither Mrs. Whitehead nor the Sterns were ever told of this fact, a fact that might have ended their surrogacy arrangement.

Under the contract, the natural mother is irrevocably committed before she knows the strength of her bond with her child. She never makes a totally voluntary, informed decision, for quite clearly any decision prior to the baby's birth is, in the most important sense, uninformed, and any decision after that, compelled by a pre-existing contractual commitment, the threat of a lawsuit, and the inducement of a $10,000 payment, is less than totally voluntary. Her interests are of little concern to those who controlled this transaction.

Although the interest of the natural father and adoptive mother is certainly the predominant interest, realistically the only interest served, even they are left with less than what public policy requires. They know little about the natural mother, her genetic makeup, and her psychological and medical history. Moreover, not even a superficial attempt is made to determine their awareness of their responsibilities as parents.

Worst of all, however, is the contract's total disregard of the best interests of the child. There is not the slightest suggestion that any inquiry will be made at any time to determine the fitness of the Sterns as custodial parents, of Mrs. Stern as an adoptive parent, their superiority to Mrs. Whitehead, or the effect on the child of not living with her natural mother.

This is the sale of a child, or, at the very least, the sale of a mother's right to her child, the only mitigating factor being that one of the purchasers is the father. Almost every evil that prompted the prohibition on the payment of money in connection with adoptions exists here.

The differences between an adoption and a surrogacy contract should be noted, since it is asserted that the use of money in connection with surrogacy does not pose the risks found where money buys an adoption. Katz, "Surrogate Motherhood and the Baby-Selling Laws," 20 Colum.J.L. & Soc.Probs. 1 (1986).

First, and perhaps most important, all parties concede that it is unlikely that surrogacy will survive without money. Despite the alleged selfless motivation of surrogate mothers, if there is no payment, there will be no surrogates, or very few. That conclusion contrasts with adoption; for obvious reasons, there remains a steady supply, albeit insufficient, despite the prohibitions against payment. The adoption itself, relieving the natural mother of the financial burden of supporting an infant, is in some sense the equivalent of payment.

Second, the use of money in adoptions does not produce the problem — conception occurs, and usually the birth itself, before illicit funds are offered. With surrogacy, the "problem," if one views it as such, consisting of the purchase of a woman's procreative capacity, at the risk of her life, is caused by and originates with the offer of money.

Third, with the law prohibiting the use of money in connection with adoptions, the built-in financial pressure of the unwanted pregnancy and the consequent support obligation do not lead the mother to the highest paying, ill-suited, adoptive parents. She is just as well-off surrendering the child to an approved agency. In surrogacy, the highest bidders will presumably become the adoptive parents regardless of suitability, so long as payment of money is permitted.

Fourth, the mother's consent to surrender her child in adoptions is revocable, even after surrender of the child, unless it be to an approved agency, where by regulation there are protections against an ill-advised surrender. In surrogacy, consent occurs so early that no amount of advice would satisfy the potential mother's need, yet the consent is irrevocable.

The main difference, that the unwanted pregnancy is unintended while the situation of the surrogate mother is voluntary and intended, is really not significant. Initially, it produces stronger reactions of sympathy for the mother whose pregnancy was unwanted than for the surrogate mother, who "went into this with her eyes wide open." On reflection, however, it appears that the essential evil is the same, taking advantage of a woman's circumstances (the unwanted pregnancy or the need for money) in order to take away her child, the difference being one of degree.

In the scheme contemplated by the surrogacy contract in this case, a middle man, propelled by profit, promotes the sale. Whatever idealism may have motivated any of the participants, the profit motive predominates, permeates, and ultimately governs the transaction. The demand for children is great and the supply small. The availability of contraception, abortion, and the greater willingness of single mothers to bring up their children has led to a shortage of babies offered for adoption. See N. Baker, Baby Selling: The Scandal of Black Market Adoption, supra; Adoption and Foster Care, 1975: Hearings on Baby Selling Before the Subcomm. On Children and Youth of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 94th Cong.1st Sess. 6 (1975) (Statement of Joseph H. Reid, Executive Director, Child Welfare League of America, Inc.). The situation is ripe for the entry of the middleman who will bring some equilibrium into the market by increasing the supply through the use of money.

Intimated, but disputed, is the assertion that surrogacy will be used for the benefit of the rich at the expense of the poor. See, e.g., Radin, "Market Inalienability," 100 Harv.L.Rev. 1849, 1930 (1987). In response it is noted that the Sterns are not rich and the Whiteheads not poor. Nevertheless, it is clear to us that it is unlikely that surrogate mothers will be as proportionately numerous among those women in the top twenty percent income bracket as among those in the bottom twenty percent. Ibid. Put differently, we doubt that infertile couples in the low-income bracket will find upper income surrogates.

In any event, even in this case one should not pretend that disparate wealth does not play a part simply because the contrast is not the dramatic "rich versus poor." At the time of trial, the Whiteheads' net assets were probably negative — Mrs. Whitehead's own sister was foreclosing on a second mortgage. Their income derived from Mr. Whitehead's labors. Mrs. Whitehead is a homemaker, having previously held part-time jobs. The Sterns are both professionals, she a medical doctor, he a biochemist. Their combined income when both were working was about $89,500 a year and their assets sufficient to pay for the surrogacy contract arrangements.

The point is made that Mrs. Whitehead agreed to the surrogacy arrangement, supposedly fully understanding the consequences. Putting aside the issue of how compelling her need for money may have been, and how significant her understanding of the consequences, we suggest that her consent is irrelevant. There are, in a civilized society, some things that money cannot buy. In America, we decided long ago that merely because conduct purchased by money was "voluntary" did not mean that it was good or beyond regulation and prohibition. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 57 S.Ct. 578, 81 L.Ed. 703 (1937). Employers can no longer buy labor at the lowest price they can bargain for, even though that labor is "voluntary," 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1982), or buy women's labor for less money than paid to men for the same job, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d), or purchase the agreement of children to perform oppressive labor, 29 U.S.C. § 212, or purchase the agreement of workers to subject themselves to unsafe or unhealthful working conditions, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651 to 678. (Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970). There are, in short, values that society deems more important than granting to wealth whatever it can buy, be it labor, love, or life. Whether this principle recommends prohibition of surrogacy, which presumably sometimes results in great satisfaction to all of the parties, is not for us to say. We note here only that, under existing law, the fact that Mrs. Whitehead "agreed" to the arrangement is not dispositive.

The long-term effects of surrogacy contracts are not known, but feared — the impact on the child who learns her life was bought, that she is the offspring of someone who gave birth to her only to obtain money; the impact on the natural mother as the full weight of her isolation is felt along with the full reality of the sale of her body and her child; the impact on the natural father and adoptive mother once they realize the consequences of their conduct. Literature in related areas suggests these are substantial considerations, although, given the newness of surrogacy, there is little information. See N. Baker, Baby Selling: The Scandal of Black Market Adoption, supra; Adoption and Foster Care, 1975: Hearings on Baby Selling Before the Subcomm. on Children and Youth of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 94th Cong. 1st Sess. (1975).

The surrogacy contract is based on, principles that are directly contrary to the objectives of our laws.[10] It guarantees the separation of a child from its mother; it looks to adoption regardless of suitability; it totally ignores the child; it takes the child from the mother regardless of her wishes and her maternal fitness; and it does all of this, it accomplishes all of its goals, through the use of money.

Beyond that is the potential degradation of some women that may result from this arrangement. In many cases, of course, surrogacy may bring satisfaction, not only to the infertile couple, but to the surrogate mother herself. The fact, however, that many women may not perceive surrogacy negatively but rather see it as an opportunity does not diminish its potential for devastation to other women.

In sum, the harmful consequences of this surrogacy arrangement appear to us all too palpable. In New Jersey the surrogate mother's agreement to sell her child is void.[11] Its irrevocability infects the entire contract, as does the money that purports to buy it.

III.

TERMINATION

We have already noted that under our laws termination of parental rights cannot be based on contract, but may be granted only on proof of the statutory requirements. That conclusion was one of the bases for invalidating the surrogacy contract. Although excluding the contract as a basis for parental termination, we did not explicitly deal with the question of whether the statutory bases for termination existed. We do so here.

As noted before, if termination of Mrs. Whitehead's parental rights is justified, Mrs. Whitehead will have no further claim either to custody or to visitation, and adoption by Mrs. Stern may proceed pursuant to the private placement adoption statute, N.J.S.A. 9:3-48. If termination is not justified, Mrs. Whitehead remains the legal mother, and even if not entitled to custody, she would ordinarily be expected to have some rights of visitation. Wilke v. Culp, supra, 196 N.J. Super. at 496.

As was discussed, supra at 425-429, the proper bases for termination are found in the statute relating to proceedings by approved agencies for a termination of parental rights, N.J.S.A. 9:2-18, the statute allowing for termination leading to a private placement adoption, N.J.S.A. 9:3-48c(1), and the statute authorizing a termination pursuant to an action by DYFS, N.J.S.A. 30:4C-20. The statutory descriptions of the conditions required to terminate parental rights differ; their interpretation in case law, however, tends to equate them. Compare New Jersey Div. of Youth and Family Servs. v. A.W., supra, 103 N.J. at 601-11 (attempted termination by DYFS) with In re Adoption by J.J.P., supra, 175 N.J. Super. at 426-28 (attempted termination in connection with private placement adoption).

Nothing in this record justifies a finding that would allow a court to terminate Mary Beth Whitehead's parental rights under the statutory standard. It is not simply that obviously there was no "intentional abandonment or very substantial neglect of parental duties without a reasonable expectation of reversal of that conduct in the future," N.J.S.A. 9:3-48c(1), quite the contrary, but furthermore that the trial court never found Mrs. Whitehead an unfit mother and indeed affirmatively stated that Mary Beth Whitehead had been a good mother to her other children. 217 N.J. Super. at 397.

Although the question of best interests of the child is dispositive of the custody issue in a dispute between natural parents, it does not govern the question of termination. It has long been decided that the mere fact that a child would be better off with one set of parents than with another is an insufficient basis for terminating the natural parent's rights. See New Jersey Div. of Youth and Family Servs. v. A.W., supra, 103 N.J. at 603; In re Adoption of Children by D., supra, 61 N.J. at 97-98; In re Adoption by J.J.P., supra, 175 N.J. Super. at 428. Furthermore, it is equally well settled that surrender of a child and a consent to adoption through private placement do not alone warrant termination. See Sees v. Baber, supra, 74 N.J. 201. It must be noted, despite some language to the contrary, that the interests of the child are not the only interests involved when termination issues are raised. The parent's rights, both constitutional and statutory, have their own independent vitality. See New Jersey Div. of Youth and Family Servs. v. A.W., supra, 103 N.J. at 601.

Although the statutes are clear, they are not applied rigidly on all occasions. The statutory standard, strictly construed, appears harsh where the natural parents, having surrendered [446] their child for adoption through private placement, change their minds and seek the return of their child and where the issue comes before the court with the adoptive parents having had custody for years, and having assumed it quite innocently.

These added dimensions in Sees v. Baber, supra, 74 N.J. 201, failed to persuade this Court to vary the termination requirements. The natural parent in that case changed her mind two days after surrendering the child, sought his return unequivocally, and so advised the adoptive parents. Since she was clearly fit, and clearly had not abandoned the child in the statutory sense, termination was denied, despite the fact that the adoptive parents had had custody of the child for about a year, and the mother had never had custody at all.

A significant variation on these facts, however, occurred in Sorentino II, supra, 74 N.J. 313. The surrender there was not through private placement but through an approved agency. Although the consent to surrender was held invalid due to coercion by the agency, the natural parents failed to initiate the lawsuit to reclaim the child for over a year after relinquishment. By the time this Court reached the issue of whether the natural parents' rights could be terminated, the adoptive parents had had custody for three years. These circumstances ultimately persuaded this Court to permit termination of the natural parents' rights and to allow a subsequent adoption. The unique facts of Sorentino II were found to amount to a forsaking of parental obligations. Id. at 322.

The present case is distinguishable from Sorentino II. Mary Beth Whitehead had custody of Baby M for four months before the child was taken away. Her initial surrender of Baby M was pursuant to a contract that we have declared illegal and unenforceable. The Sterns knew almost from the very day that they took Baby M that their rights were being challenged by the natural mother. In short, the factors that persuaded this Court to terminate the parental rights in Sorentino II are not found here.

There is simply no basis, either in the statute or in the peculiar facts of that limited class of case typified by Sorentino II, to warrant termination of Mrs. Whitehead's parental rights. We therefore conclude that the natural mother is entitled to retain her rights as a mother.

IV.

CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES

Both parties argue that the Constitutions — state and federal — mandate approval of their basic claims. The source of their constitutional arguments is essentially the same: the right of privacy, the right to procreate, the right to the companionship of one's child, those rights flowing either directly from the fourteenth amendment or by its incorporation of the Bill of Rights, or from the ninth amendment, or through the penumbra surrounding all of the Bill of Rights. They are the rights of personal intimacy, of marriage, of sex, of family, of procreation. Whatever their source, it is clear that they are fundamental rights protected by both the federal and state Constitutions. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 103 S.Ct. 2985, 77 L.Ed.2d 614 (1983); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 98 S.Ct. 673, 54 L.Ed.2d 618 (1978); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 98 S.Ct. 549, 54 L.Ed.2d 511 (1978); Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 97 S.Ct. 2010, 52 L.Ed.2d 675 (1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S.Ct. 705, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 14 L.Ed.2d 510 (1965); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 62 S.Ct. 1110, 86 L.Ed. 1655 (1942); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 43 S.Ct. 625, 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923). The right asserted by the Sterns is the right of procreation; that asserted by Mary Beth Whitehead is the right to the companionship of her child. We find that the right of procreation does not extend as far as claimed by the Sterns. As for the right asserted by Mrs. Whitehead,[12] since we uphold it on other grounds (i.e., we have restored her as mother and recognized her right, limited by the child's best interests, to her companionship), we need not decide that constitutional issue, and for reasons set forth below, we should not.

The right to procreate, as protected by the Constitution, has been ruled on directly only once by the United States Supreme Court. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, supra, 316 U.S. 535, 62 S.Ct. 1110, 86 L.Ed. 1655 (forced sterilization of habitual criminals violates equal protection clause of fourteenth amendment). Although Griswold v. Connecticut, supra, 381 U.S. 479, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 14 L.Ed.2d 510, is obviously of a similar class, strictly speaking it involves the right not to procreate. The right to procreate very simply is the right to have natural children, whether through sexual intercourse or artificial insemination. It is no more than that. Mr. Stern has not been deprived of that right. Through artificial insemination of Mrs. Whitehead, Baby M is his child. The custody, care, companionship, and nurturing that follow birth are not parts of the right to procreation; they are rights that may also be constitutionally protected, but that involve many considerations other than the right of procreation. To assert that Mr. Stern's right of procreation gives him the right to the custody of Baby M would be to assert that Mrs. Whitehead's right of procreation does not give her the right to the custody of Baby M; it would be to assert that the constitutional right of procreation includes within it a constitutionally protected contractual right to destroy someone else's right of procreation.

We conclude that the right of procreation is best understood and protected if confined to its essentials, and that when dealing with rights concerning the resulting child, different interests come into play. There is nothing in our culture or society that even begins to suggest a fundamental right on the part of the father to the custody of the child as part of his right to procreate when opposed by the claim of the mother to the same child. We therefore disagree with the trial court: there is no constitutional basis whatsoever requiring that Mr. Stern's claim to the custody of Baby M be sustained. Our conclusion may thus be understood as illustrating that a person's rights of privacy and self-determination are qualified by the effect on innocent third persons of the exercise of those rights.[13]

Mr. Stern also contends that he has been denied equal protection of the laws by the State's statute granting full parental rights to a husband in relation to the child produced, with his consent, by the union of his wife with a sperm donor. N.J.S.A. 9:17-44. The claim really is that of Mrs. Stern. It is that she is in precisely the same position as the husband in the statute: she is presumably infertile, as is the husband in the statute; her spouse by agreement with a third party procreates with the understanding that the child will be the couple's child. The alleged unequal protection is that the understanding is honored in the statute when the husband is the infertile party, but no similar understanding is honored when it is the wife who is infertile.

It is quite obvious that the situations are not parallel. A sperm donor simply cannot be equated with a surrogate mother. The State has more than a sufficient basis to distinguish the two situations — even if the only difference is between the time it takes to provide sperm for artificial insemination and the time invested in a nine-month pregnancy — so as to justify automatically divesting the sperm donor of his parental rights without automatically divesting a surrogate mother. Some basis for an equal protection argument might exist if Mary Beth Whitehead had contributed her egg to be implanted, fertilized or otherwise, in Mrs. Stern, resulting in the latter's pregnancy. That is not the case here, however.

Mrs. Whitehead, on the other hand, asserts a claim that falls within the scope of a recognized fundamental interest protected by the Constitution. As a mother, she claims the right to the companionship of her child. This is a fundamental interest, constitutionally protected. Furthermore, it was taken away from her by the action of the court below. Whether that action under these circumstances would constitute a constitutional deprivation, however, we need not and do not decide. By virtue of our decision Mrs. Whitehead's constitutional complaint — that her parental rights have been unconstitutionally terminated — is moot. We have decided that both the statutes and public policy of this state require that that termination be voided and that her parental rights be restored. It therefore becomes unnecessary to decide whether that same result would be required by virtue of the federal or state Constitutions. See Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 341, 346-48, 56 S.Ct. 466, 482-83, 80 L.Ed. 688, 707, 710-12 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring). Refraining from deciding such constitutional issues avoids further complexities involving the full extent of a parent's right of companionship,[14] or questions involving the fourteenth amendment.[15]

Having held the contract invalid and having found no other grounds for the termination of Mrs. Whitehead's parental rights, we find that nothing remains of her constitutional claim. It seems obvious to us that since custody and visitation encompass practically all of what we call "parental rights," a total denial of both would be the equivalent of termination of parental rights. Franz v. United States, 707 F.2d 582, 602 (D.C. Cir.1983). That, however, as will be seen below, has not occurred here. We express no opinion on whether a prolonged suspension of visitation would constitute a termination of parental rights, or whether, assuming it would, a showing of unfitness would be required.[16]

V.

CUSTODY

Having decided that the surrogacy contract is illegal and unenforceable, we now must decide the custody question without regard to the provisions of the surrogacy contract that would give Mr. Stern sole and permanent custody. (That does not mean that the existence of the contract and the circumstances under which it was entered may not be considered to the extent deemed relevant to the child's best interests.) With the surrogacy contract disposed of, the legal framework becomes a dispute between two couples over the custody of a child produced by the artificial insemination of one couple's wife by the other's husband. Under the Parentage Act the claims of the natural father and the natural mother are entitled to equal weight, i.e., one is not preferred over the other solely because he or she is the father or the mother. N.J.S.A. 9:17-40.[17] The applicable rule given these circumstances is clear: the child's best interests determine custody.

We note again that the trial court's reasons for determining what were the child's best interests were somewhat different from ours. It concluded that the surrogacy contract was valid, but that it could not grant specific performance unless to do so was in the child's best interests. The approach was that of a Chancery judge, unwilling to give extraordinary remedies unless they well served the most important interests, in this case, the interests of the child. While substantively indistinguishable from our approach to the question of best interests, the purpose of the inquiry was not the usual purpose of determining custody, but of determining a contractual remedy.

We are not concerned at this point with the question of termination of parental rights, either those of Mrs. Whitehead or of Mr. Stern. As noted in various places in this opinion, such termination, in the absence of abandonment or a valid surrender, generally depends on a showing that the particular parent is unfit. The question of custody in this case, as in practically all cases, assumes the fitness of both parents, and no serious contention is made in this case that either is unfit. The issue here is which life would be better for Baby M, one with primary custody in the Whiteheads or one with primary custody in the Sterns.

The circumstances of this custody dispute are unusual and they have provoked some unusual contentions. The Whiteheads claim that even if the child's best interests would be served by our awarding custody to the Sterns, we should not do so, since that will encourage surrogacy contracts — contracts claimed by the Whiteheads, and we agree, to be violative of important legislatively-stated public policies. Their position is that in order that surrogacy contracts be deterred, custody should remain in the surrogate mother unless she is unfit, regardless of the best interests of the child. We disagree. Our declaration that this surrogacy contract is unenforceable and illegal is sufficient to deter similar agreements. We need not sacrifice the child's interests in order to make that point sharper. Cf. In re Adoption of Child by I.T. and K.T., 164 N.J. Super. 476, 484-86 (App.Div. 1978) (adoptive parents' participation in illegal placement does not mandate denial of adoption); In the Matter of the Adoption of Child by N.P. and F.P., 165 N.J. Super. 591 (Law Div. 1979) (use of unapproved intermediaries and the payment of money in connection with adoption is insufficient to establish that the would-be adoptive parents are unfit or that adoption would not be in child's best interests).

The Whiteheads also contend that the award of custody to the Sterns pendente lite was erroneous and that the error should not be allowed to affect the final custody decision. As noted above, at the very commencement of this action the court issued an ex parte order requiring Mrs. Whitehead to turn over the baby to the Sterns; Mrs. Whitehead did not comply but rather took the child to Florida. Thereafter, a similar order was enforced by the Florida authorities resulting in the transfer of possession of Baby M to the Sterns. The Sterns retained custody of the child throughout the litigation. The Whiteheads' point, assuming the pendente award of custody was erroneous, is that most of the factors arguing for awarding permanent custody to the Sterns resulted from that initial pendente lite order. Some of Mrs. Whitehead's alleged character failings, as testified to by experts and concurred in by the trial court, were demonstrated by her actions brought on by the custody crisis. For instance, in order to demonstrate her impulsiveness, those experts stressed the Whiteheads' flight to Florida with Baby M; to show her willingness to use her children for her own aims, they noted the telephone threats to kill Baby M and to accuse Mr. Stern of sexual abuse of her daughter; in order to show Mrs. Whitehead's manipulativeness, they pointed to her threat to kill herself; and in order to show her unsettled family life, they noted the innumerable moves from one hotel or motel to another in Florida. Furthermore, the argument continues, one of the most important factors, whether mentioned or not, in favor of custody in the Sterns is their continuing custody during the litigation, now having lasted for one-and-a-half [456] years. The Whiteheads' conclusion is that had the trial court not given initial custody to the Sterns during the litigation, Mrs. Whitehead not only would have demonstrated her perfectly acceptable personality — the general tenor of the opinion of experts was that her personality problems surfaced primarily in crises — but would also have been able to prove better her parental skills along with an even stronger bond than may now exist between her and Baby M. Had she not been limited to custody for four months, she could have proved all of these things much more persuasively through almost two years of custody.

The argument has considerable force. It is of course possible that the trial court was wrong in its initial award of custody. It is also possible that such error, if that is what it was, may have affected the outcome. We disagree with the premise, however, that in determining custody a court should decide what the child's best interests would be if some hypothetical state of facts had existed. Rather, we must look to what those best interests are, today, even if some of the facts may have resulted in part from legal error. The child's interests come first: we will not punish it for judicial errors, assuming any were made. See Wist v. Wist, 101 N.J. 509, 513-14 (1986); see also In re J.R. Guardianship, 174 N.J. Super. 211 (App.Div.), certif. den., 85 N.J. 102 (1980) (although not explicitly mentioned, natural mother's loss of parental rights based substantially on failures of DYFS to arrange visitation with her child). The custody decision must be based on all circumstances, on everything that actually has occurred, on everything that is relevant to the child's best interests. Those circumstances include the trip to Florida, the telephone calls and threats, the substantial period of successful custody with the Sterns, and all other relevant circumstances. We will discuss the question of the correctness of the trial court's initial orders below, but for purposes of determining Baby M's best interests, the correctness of those initial orders has lost relevance.

There were eleven experts who testified concerning the child's best interests, either directly or in connection with matters related to that issue. Our reading of the record persuades us that the trial court's decision awarding custody to the Sterns (technically to Mr. Stern) should be affirmed since "its findings... could reasonably have been reached on sufficient credible evidence present in the record." Beck v. Beck, 86 N.J. 480, 496 (1981) (quoting State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 161 (1964)); see Palermo v. Palermo, 164 N.J. Super. 492, 498 (App.Div. 1978) (noting that family court judge was experienced in dealing with such matters and had opportunity to observe parties and become immersed in details of case). More than that, on this record we find little room for any different conclusion. The trial court's treatment of this issue, 217 N.J. Super. at 391-400, is both comprehensive and, in most respects, perceptive. We agree substantially with its analysis with but few exceptions that, although important, do not change our ultimate views.

Our custody conclusion is based on strongly persuasive testimony contrasting both the family life of the Whiteheads and the Sterns and the personalities and characters of the individuals. The stability of the Whitehead family life was doubtful at the time of trial. Their finances were in serious trouble (foreclosure by Mrs. Whitehead's sister on a second mortgage was in process). Mr. Whitehead's employment, though relatively steady, was always at risk because of his alcoholism, a condition that he seems not to have been able to confront effectively. Mrs. Whitehead had not worked for quite some time, her last two employments having been part-time. One of the Whiteheads' positive attributes was their ability to bring up two children, and apparently well, even in so vulnerable a household. Yet substantial question was raised even about that aspect of their home life. The expert testimony contained criticism of Mrs. Whitehead's handling of her son's educational difficulties. Certain of the experts noted that Mrs. Whitehead perceived herself as omnipotent and omniscient concerning her children. She knew what they were thinking, what they wanted, and she spoke for them. As to Melissa, Mrs. Whitehead expressed the view that she alone knew what that child's cries and sounds meant. Her inconsistent stories about various things engendered grave doubts about her ability to explain honestly and sensitively to Baby M — and at the right time — the nature of her origin. Although faith in professional counseling is not a sine qua non of parenting, several experts believed that Mrs. Whitehead's contempt for professional help, especially professional psychological help, coincided with her feelings of omnipotence in a way that could be devastating to a child who most likely will need such help. In short, while love and affection there would be, Baby M's life with the Whiteheads promised to be too closely controlled by Mrs. Whitehead. The prospects for wholesome, independent psychological growth and development would be at serious risk.

The Sterns have no other children, but all indications are that their household and their personalities promise a much more likely foundation for Melissa to grow and thrive. There is a track record of sorts — during the one-and-a-half years of custody Baby M has done very well, and the relationship between both Mr. and Mrs. Stern and the baby has become very strong. The household is stable, and likely to remain so. Their finances are more than adequate, their circle of friends supportive, and their marriage happy. Most important, they are loving, giving, nurturing, and open-minded people. They have demonstrated the wish and ability to nurture and protect Melissa, yet at the same time to encourage her independence. Their lack of experience is more than made up for by a willingness to learn and to listen, a willingness that is enhanced by their professional training, especially Mrs. Stern's experience as a pediatrician. They are honest; they can recognize error, deal with it, and learn from it. They will try to determine rationally the best way to cope with problems in their relationship with Melissa. When the time comes to tell her about her origins, they will probably have found a means of doing so that accords with the best interests of Baby M. All in all, Melissa's future appears solid, happy, and promising with them.

Based on all of this we have concluded, independent of the trial court's identical conclusion, that Melissa's best interests call for custody in the Sterns. Our above-mentioned disagreements with the trial court do not, as we have noted, in any way diminish our concurrence with its conclusions. We feel, however, that those disagreements are important enough to be stated. They are disagreements about the evaluation of conduct. They also may provide some insight about the potential consequences of surrogacy.

It seems to us that given her predicament, Mrs. Whitehead was rather harshly judged — both by the trial court and by some of the experts. She was guilty of a breach of contract, and indeed, she did break a very important promise, but we think it is expecting something well beyond normal human capabilities to suggest that this mother should have parted with her newly born infant without a struggle. Other than survival, what stronger force is there? We do not know of, and cannot conceive of, any other case where a perfectly fit mother was expected to surrender her newly born infant, perhaps forever, and was then told she was a bad mother because she did not. We know of no authority suggesting that the moral quality of her act in those circumstances should be judged by referring to a contract made before she became pregnant. We do not countenance, and would never countenance, violating a court order as Mrs. Whitehead did, even a court order that is wrong; but her resistance to an order that she surrender her infant, possibly forever, merits a measure of understanding. We do not find it so clear that her efforts to keep her infant, when measured against the Sterns' efforts to take her away, make one, rather than the other, the wrongdoer. The Sterns suffered, but so did she. And if we go beyond suffering to an evaluation of the human stakes involved in the struggle, how much weight should be given to her nine months of pregnancy, the labor of childbirth, the risk to her life, compared to the payment of money, the anticipation of a child and the donation of sperm?

There has emerged a portrait of Mrs. Whitehead, exposing her children to the media, engaging in negotiations to sell a book, granting interviews that seemed helpful to her, whether hurtful to Baby M or not, that suggests a selfish, grasping woman ready to sacrifice the interests of Baby M and her other children for fame and wealth. That portrait is a half-truth, for while it may accurately reflect what ultimately occurred, its implication, that this is what Mary Beth Whitehead wanted, is totally inaccurate, at least insofar as the record before us is concerned. There is not one word in that record to support a claim that had she been allowed to continue her possession of her newly born infant, Mrs. Whitehead would have ever been heard of again; not one word in the record suggests that her change of mind and her subsequent fight for her child was motivated by anything other than love — whatever complex underlying psychological motivations may have existed.

We have a further concern regarding the trial court's emphasis on the Sterns' interest in Melissa's education as compared to the Whiteheads'. That this difference is a legitimate factor to be considered we have no doubt. But it should not be overlooked that a best-interests test is designed to create not a new member of the intelligentsia but rather a well-integrated person who might reasonably be expected to be happy with life. "Best interests" does not contain within it any idealized lifestyle; the question boils down to a judgment, consisting of many factors, about the likely future happiness of a human being. Fantony v. Fantony, supra, 21 N.J. at 536. Stability, love, family happiness, tolerance, and, ultimately, support of independence — all rank much higher in predicting future happiness than the likelihood of a college education. We do not mean to suggest that the trial court would disagree. We simply want to dispel any possible misunderstanding on the issue.

Even allowing for these differences, the facts, the experts' opinions, and the trial court's analysis of both argue strongly in favor of custody in the Sterns. Mary Beth Whitehead's family life, into which Baby M would be placed, was anything but secure — the quality Melissa needs most. And today it may be even less so.[18] Furthermore, the evidence and expert opinion based on it reveal personality characteristics, mentioned above, that might threaten the child's best development. The Sterns promise a secure home, with an understanding relationship that allows nurturing and independent growth to develop together. Although there is no substitute for reading the entire record, including the review of every word of each experts' testimony and reports, a summary of their conclusions is revealing. Six experts testified for Mrs. Whitehead: one favored joint custody, clearly unwarranted in this case; one simply rebutted an opposing expert's claim that Mary Beth Whitehead had a recognized personality disorder; one testified to the adverse impact of separation on Mrs. Whitehead; one testified about the evils of adoption and, to him, the probable analogous evils of surrogacy; one spoke only on the question of whether Mrs. Whitehead's consent in the surrogacy agreement was "informed consent"; and one spelled out the strong bond between mother and child. None of them unequivocally stated, or even necessarily implied, an opinion that custody in the Whiteheads was in the best interests of Melissa — the ultimate issue. The Sterns' experts, both well qualified — as were the Whiteheads' — concluded that the best interests of Melissa required custody in Mr. Stern. Most convincingly, the three experts chosen by the court-appointed guardian ad litem of Baby M, each clearly free of all bias and interest, unanimously and persuasively recommended custody in the Sterns.

Some comment is required on the initial ex parte order awarding custody pendente lite to the Sterns (and the continuation of that order after a plenary hearing). The issue, although irrelevant to our disposition of this case, may recur; and when it does, it can be of crucial importance. When father and mother are separated and disagree, at birth, on custody, only in an extreme, truly rare, case should the child be taken from its mother pendente lite, i.e., only in the most unusual case should the child be taken from its mother before the dispute is finally determined by the court on its merits. The probable bond between mother and child, and the child's need, not just the mother's, to strengthen that bond, along with the likelihood, in most cases, of a significantly lesser, if any, bond with the father — all counsel against temporary custody in the father. A substantial showing that the mother's continued custody would threaten the child's health or welfare would seem to be required.

In this case, the trial court, believing that the surrogacy contract might be valid, and faced with the probable flight from the jurisdiction by Mrs. Whitehead and the baby if any notice were served, ordered, ex parte, an immediate transfer of possession of the child, i.e., it ordered that custody be transferred immediately to Mr. Stern, rather than order Mrs. Whitehead not to leave the State. We have ruled, however, that the surrogacy contract is unenforceable and illegal. It provides no basis for either an ex parte, a plenary, an interlocutory, or a final order requiring a mother to surrender custody to a father. Any application by the natural father in a surrogacy dispute for custody pending the outcome of the litigation will henceforth require proof of unfitness, of danger to the child, or the like, of so high a quality and persuasiveness as to make it unlikely that such application will succeed. Absent the required showing, all that a court should do is list the matter for argument on notice to the mother. Even her threats to flee should not suffice to warrant any other relief unless her unfitness is clearly shown. At most, it should result in an order enjoining such flight. The erroneous transfer of custody, as we view it, represents a greater risk to the child than removal to a foreign jurisdiction, unless parental unfitness is clearly proved. Furthermore, we deem it likely that, advised of the law and knowing that her custody cannot seriously be challenged at this stage of the litigation, surrogate mothers will obey any court order to remain in the jurisdiction.

VI.

VISITATION

The trial court's decision to terminate Mrs. Whitehead's parental rights precluded it from making any determination on visitation. 217 N.J. Super. at 399, 408. Our reversal of the trial court's order, however, requires delineation of Mrs. Whitehead's rights to visitation. It is apparent to us that this factually sensitive issue, which was never addressed below, should not be determined de novo by this Court. We therefore remand the visitation issue to the trial court for an abbreviated hearing and determination as set forth below.[19]

For the benefit of all concerned, especially the child, we would prefer to end these proceedings now, once and for all. It is clear to us, however, that it would be unjust to do so and contrary to precedent.

The fact that the trial court did not address visitation is only one reason for remand. The ultimate question is whether, despite the absence of the trial court's guidance, the record before us is sufficient to allow an appellate court to make this essentially factual determination. We can think of no issue that is more dependent on a trial court's factual findings and evaluation than visitation.

When we examine the record on visitation, the only testimony explicitly dealing with the issue came from the guardian ad litem's experts. Examination of this testimony in light of the complete record, however, reveals that it was an insignificant part of their opinions. The parties, those with a real stake in the dispute, offered no testimony on the issue. The cause for this insufficiency of guidance on the visitation issue was unquestionably the parties' concentration on other, then seemingly much more important, questions: custody, termination of parental rights, and the validity of the surrogacy contract.

Even if we were willing to rely solely on the opinions of the guardian ad litem's experts, their testimony was not fully developed because the issue was not the focus of the litigation. Moreover, the guardian's experts concentrated on determining "best interests" as it related to custody and to termination of parental rights. Their observations about visitation, both in quality and quantity, were really derivative of their views about custody and termination. The guardian's experts were concerned that given Mrs. Whitehead's determination to have custody, visitation might be used to undermine the Sterns' parental authority and thereby jeopardize the stability and security so badly needed by this child. Two of the experts recommended suspension of visitation for five years and the other suspension for an undefined period. None of them fully considered the factors that have led our courts ordinarily to grant visitation in other contexts, with no suspension, even where the non-custodial parent was less than a paragon of virtue. See, e.g., Wilke v. Culp, supra, 196 N.J. Super. at 496; In re Adoption by J.J.P., supra, 175 N.J. Super. at 430. Based on the opinions of her experts, the guardian ad litem recommended suspension of Mrs. Whitehead's visitation rights for five years, with a reevaluation at that time. The basis for that recommendation, whether one regards it as the right or the wrong conclusion, was apparently bolstered when it was learned that Mrs. Whitehead had become pregnant, divorced Richard Whitehead, and then married the father of her new child-to-be. Without any further expert testimony, the guardian ad litem revised her position. She now argues that instead of five years, visitation should be suspended until Melissa reaches majority. This radical change in the guardian ad litem's position reinforces our belief that further consideration must be given to this issue.

The foregoing does not fully describe the extent to which this record leaves us uninformed on the visitation issue. No one, with one exception, included a word about visitation in the final briefs before the trial court. The exception was Mrs. Whitehead's parents who argued for their own visitation. This claim was denied by the trial court and is not now before us. The oral summations of counsel before the trial court were almost equally bereft of even a reference to the visitation issue. Mrs. Whitehead's counsel did not mention visitation. The Sterns' counsel referred to the guardian ad litem's expert testimony about visitation, not to argue for or against visitation but only to support his argument in favor of termination of Mrs. Whitehead's parental rights. The guardian ad litem did argue the visitation issue, devoting a minimal portion of her summation to it. Only the grandparents dealt with visitation, but with their visitation, not with the issue of Mrs. Whitehead's visitation. Finally, on appeal before this Court the record on visitation is inadequate — especially when compared to the treatment of other issues.

We join those who want this litigation to end for the benefit of this child. To spare this two-year-old another sixty to ninety days of litigation, however, at the risk of wrongly deciding this matter, which has life-long consequences for the child and the parties, would be unwise.

We also note the following for the trial court's consideration: First, this is not a divorce case where visitation is almost invariably granted to the non-custodial spouse. To some extent the facts here resemble cases where the non-custodial spouse has had practically no relationship with the child, see Wilke v. Culp, supra, 196 N.J. Super. 487; but it only "resembles" those cases. In the instant case, Mrs. Whitehead spent the first four months of this child's life as her mother and has regularly visited the child since then. Second, she is not only the natural mother, but also the legal mother, and is not to be penalized one iota because of the surrogacy contract. Mrs. Whitehead, as the mother (indeed, as a mother who nurtured her child for its first four months — unquestionably a relevant consideration), is entitled to have her own interest in visitation considered. Visitation cannot be determined without considering the parents' interests along with those of the child.

In all of this, the trial court should recall the touchstones of visitation: that it is desirable for the child to have contact with both parents; that besides the child's interests, the parents' interests also must be considered; but that when all is said and done, the best interests of the child are paramount.

We have decided that Mrs. Whitehead is entitled to visitation at some point, and that question is not open to the trial court on this remand. The trial court will determine what kind of visitation shall be granted to her, with or without conditions, and when and under what circumstances it should commence. It also should be noted that the guardian's recommendation of a five-year delay is most unusual — one might argue that it begins to border on termination. Nevertheless, if the circumstances as further developed by appropriate proofs or as reconsidered on remand clearly call for that suspension under applicable legal principles of visitation, it should be so ordered.

In order that the matter be determined as expeditiously as possible, we grant to the trial court the broadest powers to reach its determination. A decision shall be rendered in no more than ninety days from the date of this opinion.

The trial court shall, after reviewing the transcripts and other material, determine in its discretion whether further evidence is needed and through what witnesses it shall be presented. The trial court should consider limiting the witnesses to the experts who testified and to Mr. and Mrs. Stern and Mr. and Mrs. Whitehead, using its own judgment in deciding which of them, if any, shall be called on to give further evidence. The trial court, in its discretion, may either hear testimony or receive verified written submissions, relaxing the Rules of Evidence to the extent compatible with reliable fact-finding and desirable for an expeditious decision.[20] Many significant facts bearing on visitation have already been adduced. Although additional evidence may be important, we believe that fairness does not necessarily require that it be produced with all of the procedural safeguards implicit in the Evidence Rules. When it comes to custody matters, application of rules, including those concerning evidence, must on some occasions be flexible, New Jersey Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. S.S., 185 N.J. Super. 3 (App.Div.), certif. den., 91 N.J. 572 (1982), especially in view of the child's interests in this unique situation.

Any party wishing to appeal from the trial court's judgment on visitation shall file a notice of appeal within ten days thereafter, the Court hereby reducing the ordinary time to appeal pursuant to Rule 2:12-2. Any such appeal is hereby certified to this Court.

Any further proceedings in this matter, or related thereto, if made by application to the trial court shall be made to the judge to whom the matter is assigned on remand. That direction applies to applications related to this matter in any way: whether made before, during, or after proceedings on remand, and regardless of the nature of the application. Any applications for appellate review shall be made directly to this Court.

We would expect that after the visitation issue is determined the trial court, in connection with any other applications in the future, will attempt to assure that this case is treated like any other so that this child may be spared any further damaging publicity.

While probably unlikely, we do not deem it unthinkable that, the major issues having been resolved, the parties' undoubted love for this child might result in a good faith attempt to work out the visitation themselves, in the best interests of their child.

CONCLUSION

This case affords some insight into a new reproductive arrangement: the artificial insemination of a surrogate mother. The unfortunate events that have unfolded illustrate that its unregulated use can bring suffering to all involved. Potential victims include the surrogate mother and her family, the natural father and his wife, and most importantly, the child. Although surrogacy has apparently provided positive results for some infertile couples, it can also, as this case demonstrates, cause suffering to participants, here essentially innocent and well-intended.

We have found that our present laws do not permit the surrogacy contract used in this case. Nowhere, however, do we find any legal prohibition against surrogacy when the surrogate mother volunteers, without any payment, to act as a surrogate and is given the right to change her mind and to assert her parental rights. Moreover, the Legislature remains free to deal with this most sensitive issue as it sees fit, subject only to constitutional constraints.

If the Legislature decides to address surrogacy, consideration of this case will highlight many of its potential harms. We do not underestimate the difficulties of legislating on this subject. In addition to the inevitable confrontation with the ethical and moral issues involved, there is the question of the wisdom and effectiveness of regulating a matter so private, yet of such public interest. Legislative consideration of surrogacy may also provide the opportunity to begin to focus on the overall implications of the new reproductive biotechnology — in vitro fertilization, preservation of sperm and eggs, embryo implantation and the like. The problem is how to enjoy the benefits of the technology — especially for infertile couples — while minimizing the risk of abuse. The problem can be addressed only when society decides what its values and objectives are in this troubling, yet promising, area.

The judgment is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

For affirmance in part, reversal in part and remandment — Chief Justice WILENTZ and Justices CLIFFORD, HANDLER, POLLOCK, O'HERN, GARIBALDI and STEIN — 7.

Opposed — None.

[1] Subsequent to the trial court proceedings, Mr. and Mrs. Whitehead were divorced, and soon thereafter Mrs. Whitehead remarried. Nevertheless, in the course of this opinion we will make reference almost exclusively to the facts as they existed at the time of trial, the facts on which the decision we now review was reached. We note moreover that Mr. Whitehead remains a party to this dispute. For these reasons, we continue to refer to appellants as Mr. and Mrs. Whitehead.

[2] The Stern-Whitehead contract (the "surrogacy contract") and the Stern-ICNY contract are reproduced below as Appendices A and B respectively. Other ancillary agreements and their attachments are omitted.

[3] Another argument advanced by Mrs. Whitehead is that the surrogacy agreement violates state wage regulations, N.J.S.A. 34:11-4.7, and the Minimum Wage Standard Act, N.J.S.A. 34:11-56a to -56a30. Given our disposition of the matter, we need not reach those issues.

[4] N.J.S.A.9:3-54 reads as follows:

a. No person, firm, partnership, corporation, association or agency shall make, offer to make or assist or participate in any placement for adoption and in connection therewith

(1) Pay, give or agree to give any money or any valuable consideration, or assume or discharge any financial obligation; or

(2) Take, receive, accept or agree to accept any money or any valuable consideration.

b. The prohibition of subsection a. shall not apply to the fees or services of any approved agency in connection with a placement for adoption, nor shall such prohibition apply to the payment or reimbursement of medical, hospital or other similar expenses incurred in connection with the birth or any illness of the child, or to the acceptance of such reimbursement by a parent of the child.

c. Any person, firm, partnership, corporation, association or agency violating this section shall be guilty of a high misdemeanor.

[5] Of course, here there are no "adoptive parents," but rather the natural father and his wife, the only adoptive parent. As noted, however, many of the dangers of using money in connection with adoption may exist in surrogacy situations.

[6] Counsel for the Sterns argues that the Parentage Act empowers the court to terminate parental rights solely on the basis of the child's best interests. He cites N.J.S.A.9:17-53c, which reads, in pertinent part, as follows:

The judgment or order may contain any other provision directed against the appropriate party to the proceeding concerning the duty of support, the custody and guardianship of the child, visitation privileges with the child, the furnishing of bond or other security for the payment of the judgment, the repayment of any public assistance grant, or any other matter in the best interests of the child. [Emphasis supplied].

We do not interpret this section as in any way altering or diluting the statutory prerequisites to termination discussed above. Termination of parental rights differs qualitatively from the matters to which this section is expressly directed, and, in any event, we have no doubt that if the Legislature had intended a substantive change in the standards governing an area of such gravity, it would have said so explicitly.

[7] We conclude not only that the surrogacy contract is an insufficient basis for termination, but that no statutory or other basis for termination existed. See infra at 444-447.

[8] The surrogacy situation, of course, differs from the situation in Sees, in that here there is no "adoptive couple," but rather the natural father and the stepmother, who is the would-be adoptive mother. This difference, however, does not go to the basis of the Sees holding. In both cases, the determinative aspect is the vulnerability of the natural mother who decides to surrender her child in the absence of institutional safeguards.

[9] And the impact on the natural parents, Mr. Stern and Mrs. Whitehead, is severe and dramatic. The depth of their conflict about Baby M, about custody, visitation, about the goodness or badness of each of them, comes through in their telephone conversations, in which each tried to persuade the other to give up the child. The potential adverse consequences of surrogacy are poignantly captured here — Mrs. Whitehead threatening to kill herself and the baby, Mr. Stern begging her not to, each blaming the other. The dashed hopes of the Sterns, the agony of Mrs. Whitehead, their suffering, their hatred — all were caused by the unraveling of this arrangement.

[10] We note the argument of the Sterns that the sperm donor section of our Parentage Act, N.J.S.A. 9:17-38 to -59, implies a legislative policy that would lead to approval of this surrogacy contract. Where a married woman is artificially inseminated by another with her husband's consent, the Parentage Act creates a parent-child relationship between the husband and the resulting child. N.J.S.A. 9:17-44. The Parentage Act's silence, however, with respect to surrogacy, rather than supporting, defeats any contention that surrogacy should receive treatment parallel to the sperm donor artificial insemination situation. In the latter case the statute expressly transfers parental rights from the biological father, i.e., the sperm donor, to the mother's husband. Ibid.Our Legislature could not possibly have intended any other arrangement to have the consequence of transferring parental rights without legislative authorization when it had concluded that legislation was necessary to accomplish that result in the sperm donor artificial insemination context.

This sperm donor provision suggests an argument not raised by the parties, namely, that the attempted creation of a parent-child relationship through the surrogacy contract has been preempted by the Legislature. The Legislature has explicitly recognized the parent-child relationship between a child and its natural parents, married and unmarried, N.J.S.A. 9:17-38 to -59, between adoptive parents and their adopted child, N.J.S.A. 9:3-37 to -56, and between a husband and his wife's child pursuant to the sperm donor provision, N.J.S.A. 9:17-44. It has not recognized any others — specifically, it has never legally equated the stepparent-stepchild relationship with the parent-child relationship, and certainly it has never recognized any concept of adoption by contract. It can be contended with some force that the Legislature's statutory coverage of the creation of the parent-child relationship evinces an intent to reserve to itself the power to define what is and is not a parent-child relationship. We need not, and do not, decide this question, however.

[11] Michigan courts have also found that these arrangements conflict with various aspects of their law. See Doe v. Kelley, 106 Mich. App. 169, 307 N.W.2d 438 (1981), cert. den., 459 U.S. 1183, 103 S.Ct. 834, 74 L.Ed.2d 1027 (1983) (application of sections of Michigan Adoption Law prohibiting the exchange of money to surrogacy is constitutional); Syrkowski v. Appleyard, 122 Mich. App. 506, 333 N.W.2d 90 (1983) (court held it lacked jurisdiction to issue an "order of filiation" because surrogacy arrangements were not governed by Michigan's Paternity Act), rev'd, 420 Mich. 367, 362 N.W.2d 211 (1985) (court decided Paternity Act should be applied but did not reach the merits of the claim).

Most recently, a Michigan trial court in a matter similar to the case at bar held that surrogacy contracts are void as contrary to public policy and therefore are unenforceable. The court expressed concern for the potential exploitation of children resulting from surrogacy arrangements that involve the payment of money. The court also concluded that insofar as the surrogacy contract may be characterized as one for personal services, the thirteenth amendment should bar specific performance. Yates v. Keane, Nos. 9758, 9772, slip op. (Mich.Cir.Ct. Jan. 21, 1988).

The Supreme Court of Kentucky has taken a somewhat different approach to surrogate arrangements. In Surrogate Parenting Assocs. v. Commonwealth ex. rel. Armstrong, 704 S.W.2d 209 (Ky. 1986), the court held that the "fundamental differences" between surrogate arrangements and baby-selling placed the surrogate parenting agreement beyond the reach of Kentucky's baby-selling statute. Id. at 211. The rationale for this determination was that unlike the normal adoption situation, the surrogacy agreement is entered into before conception and is not directed at avoiding the consequences of an unwanted pregnancy. Id. at 211-12.

Concomitant with this pro-surrogacy conclusion, however, the court held that a "surrogate" mother has the right to void the contract if she changes her mind during pregnancy or immediately after birth. Id. at 212-13. The court relied on statutes providing that consent to adoption or to the termination of parental rights prior to five days after the birth of the child is invalid, and concluded that consent before conception must also be unenforceable. Id. at 212-13.

The adoption phase of an uncontested surrogacy arrangement was analyzed in Matter of Adoption of Baby Girl, L.J., 132 Misc.2d 972, 505 N.Y.S.2d 813 (Sur. 1986). Although the court expressed strong moral and ethical reservations about surrogacy arrangements, it approved the adoption because it was in the best interests of the child. Id. at 815. The court went on to find that surrogate parenting agreements are not void, but are voidable if they are not in accordance with the state's adoption statutes. Id. at 817. The court then upheld the payment of money in connection with the surrogacy arrangement on the ground that the New York Legislature did not contemplate surrogacy when the baby-selling statute was passed. Id. at 818. Despite the court's ethical and moral problems with surrogate arrangements, it concluded that the Legislature was the appropriate forum to address the legality of surrogacy arrangements. Ibid.

In contrast to the law in the United States, the law in the United Kingdom concerning surrogate parenting is fairly well-settled. Parliament passed the Surrogacy Arrangements Act, 1985, ch. 49, which made initiating or taking part in any negotiations with a view to making or arranging a surrogacy contract a criminal offense. The criminal sanction, however, does not apply to the "surrogate" mother or to the natural father, but rather applies to other persons engaged in arranging surrogacy contracts on a commercial basis. Since 1978, English courts have held surrogacy agreements unenforceable as against public policy, such agreements being deemed arrangements for the purchase and sale of children. A. v. C., [1985] F.L.R. 445, 449 (Fam. & C.A. 1978). It should be noted, however, that certain surrogacy arrangements, i.e., those arranged without brokers and revocable by the natural mother, are not prohibited under current law in the United Kingdom.

[12] Opponents of surrogacy have also put forth arguments based on the thirteenth amendment, as well as the Peonage Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1994 (1982). We need not address these arguments because we have already held the contract unenforceable on the basis of state law.

[13] As a general rule, a person should be accorded the right to make decisions affecting his or her own body, health, and life, unless that choice adversely affects others. Thus, the United States Supreme Court, while recognizing the right of women to control their own bodies, has rejected the view that the federal constitution vests a pregnant woman with an absolute right to terminate her pregnancy. Instead, the Court declared that the right was "not absolute" so that "at some point the state interests as to protection of health, medical standards, and prenatal life, become dominant." Roe v. Wade, supra, 410 U.S. at 155, 93 S.Ct. at 728, 35 L.Ed.2d at 178. The balance struck in Roe v. Wade recognizes increasing rights in the fetus and correlative restrictions on the mother as the pregnancy progresses. Similarly, in the termination-of-treatment cases, courts generally have viewed a patient's right to terminate or refuse life-sustaining treatment as constrained by other considerations including the rights of innocent third parties, such as the patient's children. Matter of Farrell, 108 N.J. 335, 352 (1987); Matter of Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 353 (1985). Consistent with that approach, this Court has directed a mother to submit to a life-saving blood transfusion to protect the interests of her unborn infant, even though the mother's religious scruples led her to oppose the transfusion. Raleigh-Fitkin Paul Morgan Hosp. v. Anderson, 42 N.J. 421, 423 (1964); see also Application of President & Directors of Georgetown College, 331 F.2d 1000, 1008 (D.C. Cir.), cert. den., 377 U.S. 978, 84 S.Ct. 1883, 12 L.Ed.2d 746 (1964) (ordering blood transfusion because of mother's "responsibility to the community to care for her infant").

In the present case, the parties' right to procreate by methods of their own choosing cannot be enforced without consideration of the state's interest in protecting the resulting child, just as the right to the companionship of one's child cannot be enforced without consideration of that crucial state interest.

[14] This fundamental right is not absolute. The parent-child biological relationship, by itself, does not create a protected interest in the absence of a demonstrated commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood; a natural parent who does not come forward and seek a role in the child's life has no constitutionally protected relationship. Lehr v. Robertson, supra, 463 U.S. at 258-62, 103 S.Ct. at 2991-93, 77 L.Ed.2d at 624-27; Quilloin v. Walcott, supra, 434 U.S. at 254-55, 98 S.Ct. at 554, 54 L.Ed.2d at 519-20. The right is not absolute in another sense, for it is also well settled that if the state's interest is sufficient the right may be regulated, restricted, and on occasion terminated. See Santosky v. Kramer, supra, 455 U.S. 745, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599.

[15] Were we to find such a constitutional determination necessary, we would be faced with the question of whether it was state action — essential in triggering the fourteenth amendment — that deprived her of that right i.e., whether the judicial decision enforcing the surrogacy contract should be considered "state action" within the scope of the fourteenth amendment. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 68 S.Ct. 836, 92 L.Ed. 1161 (1948); Cherminsky, "Rethinking State Action," 80 Nw.U.L.Rev. 503 (1985).

[16] If the Legislature were to enact a statute providing for enforcement of surrogacy agreements, the validity of such a statute might depend on the strength of the state interest in making it more likely that infertile couples will be able to adopt children. As a value, it is obvious that the interest is strong; but if, as plaintiffs assert, ten to fifteen percent of all couples are infertile, the interest is of enormous strength. This figure is given both by counsel for the Sterns and by the trial court, 217 N.J. Super.at 331. We have been unable to find reliable confirmation of this statistic, however, and we are not confident of its accuracy. We note that at least one source asserts that in 1982, the rate of married couples who were both childless and infertile was only 5.8%. B. Wattenberg, The Birth Dearth 125 (1987).

On such quantitative differences, constitutional validity can depend, where the statute in question is justified as serving a compelling state interest. The quality of the interference with the parents' right of companionship bears on these issues: if a statute, like the surrogacy contract before us, made the consent given prior to conception irrevocable, it might be regarded as a greater interference with the fundamental right than a statute that gave that effect only to a consent executed, for instance, more than six months after the child's birth. There is an entire spectrum of circumstances that strengthen and weaken the fundamental right involved, and a similar spectrum of state interests that justify or do not justify particular restrictions on that right. We do not believe it would be wise for this Court to attempt to identify various combinations of circumstances and interests, and attempt to indicate which combinations might and which might not constitutionally permit termination of parental rights.

We will say this much, however: a parent's fundamental right to the companionship of one's child can be significantly eroded by that parent's consent to the surrender of that child. That surrender, if voluntarily and knowingly made, may reduce the strength of that fundamental right to the point where a statute awarding custody and all parental rights to an adoptive couple, especially one that includes a parent of the child, would be valid.

[17] At common law the rights of women were so fragile that the husband generally had the paramount right to the custody of children upon separation or divorce. State v. Baird, 21 N.J. Eq. 384, 388 (E. & A. 1869). In 1860 a statute concerning separation provided that children "within the age of seven years" be placed with the mother "unless said mother shall be of such character and habits as to render her an improper guardian." L. 1860, c. 167. The inequities of the common-law rule and the 1860 statute were redressed by an 1871 statute, providing that "the rights of both parents, in the absence of misconduct, shall be held to be equal." L. 1871, c. 48, § 6 (currently codified at N.J.S.A. 9:2-4). Under this statute the father's superior right to the children was abolished and the mother's right to custody of children of tender years was also eliminated. Under the 1871 statute, "the happiness and welfare of the children" were to determine custody, L. 1871, c. 48, § 6, a rule that remains law to this day. N.J.S.A.9:2-4.

Despite this statute, however, the "tender years" doctrine persisted. See, e.g., Esposito v. Esposito, 41 N.J. 143, 145 (1963); Dixon v. Dixon, 71 N.J. Eq. 281, 282 (E. & A. 1906); M.P. v. S.P., 169 N.J. Super. 425, 435 (App.Div. 1979). This presumption persisted primarily because of the prevailing view that a young child's best interests necessitated a mother's care. Both the development of case law and the Parentage Act, N.J.S.A. 9:17-40, however, provide for equality in custody claims. In Beck v. Beck, 86 N.J. 480, 488 (1981), we stated that it would be inappropriate "to establish a presumption ... in favor of any particular custody determination," as any such presumption may "serve as a disincentive for the meticulous fact-finding required in custody cases." This does not mean that a mother who has had custody of her child for three, four, or five months does not have a particularly strong claim arising out of the unquestionable bond that exists at that point between the child and its mother; in other words, equality does not mean that all of the considerations underlying the "tender years" doctrine have been abolished.

[18]Subsequent to trial, and by the time of oral argument, Mr. and Mrs. Whitehead had separated, and the representation was that there was no likelihood of change. Thereafter Mrs. Whitehead became pregnant by another man, divorced Mr. Whitehead, and remarried the other man. Both children are living with Mrs. Whitehead and her new husband. Both the former and present husband continue to assert the desire to have whatever parental relationship with Melissa that the law allows, Mrs. Whitehead continuing to maintain her claim for custody.

We refer to this development only because it suggests less stability in the Whiteheads' lives. It does not necessarily suggest that Mrs. Whitehead's conduct renders her any less a fit parent. In any event, this new development has not affected our decision.

[19] As we have done in similar situations, we order that this matter be referred on remand to a different trial judge by the vicinage assignment judge. The original trial judge's potential "commitment to its findings," New Jersey Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. A.W., supra, 103 N.J. at 617, and the extent to which a judge "has already engaged in weighing the evidence," In re Guardianship of R., 155 N.J. Super. 186, 195 (App.Div. 1977), persuade us to make that change. On remand the trial court will consider developments subsequent to the original trial court's opinion, including Mrs. Whitehead's divorce, pregnancy, and remarriage.

[20] Ordinarily relaxation of the Rules of Evidence depends on specific authority, either within the Rules or in statutes. See N.J.Rules of Evidence, Comment 2 to Evid.R. 2(2), 72-76 (1987). There are numerous examples, however, of relaxation of these Rules in judicial proceedings for reasons peculiar to the case at hand. We regard the circumstances of the visitation aspect of this case as most unusual. In addition to the ordinary risks to the stability of an infant caused by prolonging this type of litigation, here there are risks from publicity that we simply cannot quantify. We have no doubt that these circumstances justify any sensible means of abbreviating the remand hearing.

2.8.2 Note 2.8.2 Note

Note the large number of amicus curiae briefs submitted to the Supreme Court of New Jersey.  Clearly this case had attracted a lot of attention and was seen as highly consequential.   

The New Jersey Supreme Court holds  the surrogacy agreement  in question invalid as against public policy.  It thus reverses the trial court which had ordered enforcement of the agreement (which required among other things the termination of Mrs. Whitehead’s maternal rights).  The New Jersey Supreme Court says that the contract provisions “directly conflict” with state statutes.   Is there a “direct” conflict?   Was the trial judge incompetent or negligent?  Did  New Jersey statutes expressly prohibit surrogacy contracts? 

The Court views the deal as “a contractual system of termination and adoption designed to circumvent [the state’s ] statutes.”  Imagine an appeal to a higher court and that at oral argument a judge asks you, the attorney for the Sterns, whether the contract was “designed to circumvent the state’s statutes?”  What would you say on behalf of your client?  

In striking down the surrogacy agreement, was the New Jersey Supreme Court appropriately interpreting that state’s law of contracts?  Or was that court displaying moral panic in the face of new technology that it perceived as a threat to familiar notions of nature, family, and gender roles? 

Did the New Jersey Supreme Court protect and advance the status of women in its Baby M ruling, as it believed itself to be doing ?  Or did the Court inadvertently undercut women’s claim to contractual autonomy?  

The Court proclaims that “There are in a civilized society some things that money cannot buy.”   Ok.  But so what?  What, precisely, is the “thing” being bought here that the court finds to be so reprehensible? The surrogate’s egg?  The use of the surrogate’s body to develop that egg?  The exchange of the egg and the body labor for money?  What is bad about any of those exchanges?        

Is there a significant difference between the arrangements that gave rise to the Baby M case and, by contrast, the happy scenario at 1.4 involving the Dukes and Terri Johnson?  Would the Baby M ruling invalidate the contract between Terri Johnson and the Dukes?