Purpose: This Chapter explores what nations can do in the face of cyberthreats in light of the fact that (as we learned in chapters 3-5) traditional law enforcement strategies are not terribly effective, and war is not a realistic tool except in the face of all but the most extreme cyberthreats. In particular, we discuss two strategies: deterrence and international agreements. (This chapter assumes a thorough understanding of chapters 3-5.) Concepts Covered: Deterrence, International Agreements

Purpose: In this context, deterrence means unilateral threats and actions that one nation can take to dissuade another from engaging in undesirable cyber operations. (The concept is much more complex than this. For a flavor, see this Wikipedia entry.) Deterrence can take many forms. For example, the threat of unilateral criminal sanctions can be a form of deterrence; but for reasons discussed in chapter 4, it is not a terribly effective one. Threatened military responses can also be a form of deterrence. Indeed, it was in the context of nuclear weapons that the concept of deterrence has received its most thorough analysis in the international realm. This chapter examines several types of deterrence and studies the general challenges that the cyber realm presents to any form of deterrence.

Purpose: This section further explains international agreements, as many scholars believe that all unilateral legal and deterrence strategies are doomed to failure in the cyber realm, and that only through mutual restraint fostered by international agreements can cyberthreats be contained.