Shaniqua Tompkins, Plaintiff, v. Curtis Jackson, Defendant.

Decided on February 3, 2009

Supreme Court, New York County

Carol R. Edmead, J.

MEMORANDUM DECISION

In this unfortunate tale of a love relationship gone sour, plaintiff seeks lifetime financial support from her ex-boyfriend and the father of her child, "50 Cent," based on promises to take care of her for the rest of her life when he "made it big" in the entertainment industry.

By virtue of this decision, plaintiff's claim to half of defendant's multimillion dollar estate and future income, [set at no less than $50 million dollars] is dismissed and this saga comes to an end.

Factual Background

The parties began dating in 1995, when plaintiff was in college and defendant was recently paroled and unemployed. Defendant began living with the plaintiff on Sutphin Boulevard, Queens, New York.1 In 1996, while plaintiff was pregnant with defendant's son, Marquise, plaintiff relocated to Far Rockaway, Queens. It was at this time that the parties allegedly entered into the oral agreement that is the subject of this lawsuit.

Plaintiff testified at her deposition that in September 1996, "a month before" Marquise was born, when the parties were "in the bedroom," defendant began saying, "how much he loved me. And he said he always appreciated me sticking by him and supporting him in everything he does, and bearing with him. And that just to bear with him, [physically, financially, and mentally] because when he makes it big, he will take care of me for the rest of my life, and everything he owns will be mine, just as well as his." (EBT, pp. 179, 195-196, 232). This meant, "when he made it big or received a lucrative recording contract, he would - - I would own everything that he owned." (EBT, p. 214). According to plaintiff, defendant reiterated that "even if we weren''t going to be together, we were down for life. That no matter what, whether we're together or not, that he would always take care of me. He said he would never see me fall. . . ." (EBT, pp. 235-236). *2

In response, plaintiff told defendant that she "will support" him "until you get it together," including taking care of the children and the house, and "be[ing] there for [defendant] mentally . . . and financially. . . ." As far as the parties being "equal partners," defendant said that when "he made it big, that I would be equal partners in all of his earnings. . . . We never talked about losses. . . ." (EBT, pp. 197-199; 216-217).

Plaintiff later purchased for the defendant a diamond ring and a watch, which were "part of the makeup of him being a rapper." (EBT, pp. 249-250). In 1997 or 1998, defendant wanted to establish an entertainment company and "needed the money to incorporate it." Thus, plaintiff "thought about Hollow Point Entertainment - -and Rotten Apple Records," and "gave it [the money] to him." (EBT, pp. 251-252). Plaintiff "financially supported" defendant and their joint venture agreement, by providing him money to pay for studio time, transportation to the studio, digital audio tapes ("DATs"), reels, and tattoos on his body (EBT, pp. 200, 205, 257). Plaintiff stated that the "company would be half mine" (EBT, p. 254).2

Between the years of 1997 through 2000, the parties lived in defendant's grandmother's house, where plaintiff cooked, cleaned, laundered the parties' clothing, and purchased groceries for defendant and their son.3

In May 2000, defendant was nearly fatally shot in front of his grandmother's house.4 Plaintiff slept on a chair by defendant's side while he was hospitalized for 18 days (EBT, p. 258). Upon defendant's discharge, the parties relocated to plaintiff's mother's house in Stroudsburg, Pennsylvania, where plaintiff nursed defendant back to health over the course of five months: He couldn't do anything. . . . He [had] a metal rod in his right hip. He couldn't walk. He couldn't feed himself . . . I would have to make him food, blend the food, make him breakfast. . . . He couldn't go to the bathroom by himself. He couldn't wash himself . . . I would escort him. Put the walker in front of him, and you know, escort him to the bathroom. . . . I would have to massage his feet. That comforted him until he went to sleep. . . . I did it because I loved him, and wanted him to be happy. . . .5

(EBT, pp. 262-265).

In October 2003, the parties moved to their own apartment at Shawnee-On- Delaware, *3Pennsylvania, where they resided for the next four years.6

After defendant signed a music deal in 2003, defendant began "pay[ing] some of the bills and giving plaintiff money he earned from his tours (EBT, pp. 87-89). At some later point, defendant gave plaintiff an ATM card, a "G-Unit Touring" American Express card, and blank checks drawn against the "Rotten Apple" record company plaintiff "helped him incorporate." (EBT, pp. 90, 94, 97). As to other sources of income, plaintiff also "flipped a couple of properties" in 2004.7

In 2003, defendant purchased a mansion in Connecticut.8 The purpose of the mansion was to provide "room and board" and "a safe and secure place for him" and other artists to record music since "defendant didn't like recording at studios because people were trying to kill him." (EBT, p. 112). Plaintiff visited defendant in Connecticut on the weekends and during summers (EBT, p. 114). However, plaintiff declined defendant's invitation to move to Connecticut, as she did not want to be "left alone," further away from her family and friends while he was "always on tour." (EBT, p. 115).

Later in 2005, defendant forced plaintiff to execute a release of life story rights to the movie "Get Rich, or Die Tryin" (EBT, p. 276).9

Since defendant "always was telling [plaintiff] to purchase a house," plaintiff hired a real estate agent to begin looking for a house in New York (EBT, pp. 115, 134-135). In 2005, the parties moved to Bayside, as a "way station until [plaintiff] found a house." (EBT, pp. 117, 120).

In August or September 2006, after the agent notified plaintiff of two houses in the Dix Hills area, plaintiff and her two children "went to see the house on Sandra Drive and another house. And I told her I liked the house on Sandra Drive." (EBT, p. 134).

In December 2006, "[r]ight before the closing" and while in the Bayside apartment, defendant and plaintiff entered into an "an oral agreement." (EBT, pp. 135-136). Defendant agreed that "the house would be in [plaintiff's] name. He was going to pay for it [in] cash, it *4would have no mortgage, and it would be in my name" (EBT, p. 136). Defendant "said this to numerous people, not just me. . . ." (EBT, p. 137). This conversation came about because "as time went on, I [saw] that he wasn't honoring what he said. So I said, "Everything else is in your name, so I want the house in Dix Hills to be in my name." According to plaintiff, defendant said "You act like. . . I would never take care of you. I promised you I would always take care of you." When plaintiff responded, "Well if you feel that way, then the house in Dix Hill should be in my name," to which defendant replied, "Okay, done." All plaintiff had to do "was just show up at the closing." (EBT, pp. 138-139).

On December 19, 2006, defendant sent plaintiff an email message, stating:

Neek it realy hert me to hear you say you think I wouldn't Take care of you. . . You can have the house I'll have them put it in your name And I will give you money every month it dosent matter to me . . . .10

The night before the closing, defendant "came home" to stay in the city and asked to meet plaintiff in his hotel room "to talk"; plaintiff declined, insisting to talk after the closing. Plaintiff stated that she "went along with certain things," because she "loved him" but, she had been "fed up" with "his nonsense" of beating her and "mess[ing] around with other women."

On the day of the closing, January 5, 2007, all the parties to the closing and plaintiff appeared at the closing, except for defendant. When it came time to sign the closing documents, plaintiff "stopped the whole procedure," took defendant's representative who had power of attorney Alan Hock, out of room, insisting that the house was "supposed to be in" plaintiff's name. When she called defendant, he instructed plaintiff to, "Put Alan on the phone. I'm going to have him put the house in your name." Mr. Hock took the phone, and said "Wait a minute, Curtis. Wait, wait, wait." Then Mr. Hock went into his office, closed the door, and came out only to advise plaintiff that "we're going to do it. Don't worry about it. We'll do it. Let's just do it this way first. And then a couple of weeks after, we'll just" retransfer the house into plaintiff's name. (EBT, pp. 148-149). The closing continued, and plaintiff was given the keys.

The following day, defendant expressed to plaintiff that he "want[ed] to be with her" and wanted permission to "move into the house." Plaintiff said "okay."

Following the closing, plaintiff and her grandmother packed all of plaintiff's and defendant's belongings for the parties' move into the house in Dix Hills, New York ("the Dix Hills home").

Over the next two weeks, defendant drove Marquise and plaintiff's daughter to school every day. However, defendant moved out because plaintiff and defendant "got into a physical altercation where he hit [plaintiff]11 . . .plaintiff was upset because the house was supposed to be in [plaintiff's] name, and he - - at the last minute, at the closing, he changed his mind."

In 2008, defendant filed a petition in Family Court to establish his child support obligations and later, a petition in Housing Court to evict plaintiff from the Dix Hills home. The Family Court directed that defendant pay $6,700 in child support, which includes a housing *5allowance. The Housing Court granted defendant possession of the Dix Hills home, and issued a warrant of eviction against plaintiff.

Thereafter, plaintiff commenced the instant action seeking, inter alia, a temporary stay of her eviction, which this Court granted, and damages for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and specific performance.12 During the pendency of the stay, the Dix Hills home was destroyed by a fire (deemed suspicious by authorities), rendering the stay moot. 

Defendant's Motion

13

Defendant now seeks summary judgment, arguing that plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case for any of her claims in the complaint.

Defendant maintains that plaintiff's breach of contract claim, which is actually a claim for palimony, fails because (1) no oral contract ever existed, (2) the purported contract is barred by the Statute of Frauds and Statute of Limitations, and (3) the purported contract lacks the requisite specificity, mutual assent, and definition.

Essentially, plaintiff was defendant's girlfriend from 1996 and then "turned into my son's mom. . . . We slept together from time to time, but she was just my son's mom." (EBT, p. 185). Defendant denies having any conversation with the plaintiff wherein he agreed to take care of her for the rest of her or his life, and states that if he so intended he "would have married her." (Def. Aff., ¶¶4, 7; EBT, p. 79). Defendant admitted at his deposition that he loved plaintiff at the time their child was born (EBT, p. 79), but did not consider her his wife or did not discuss marrying her (EBT, p. 80). In any event, plaintiff did not and cannot establish that she performed under the alleged agreement (Def. Aff., ¶8). Defendant points out that he never maintained joint accounts or held jointly titled assets with plaintiff (Def. Aff., ¶28). Defendant did not advise plaintiff that he would give her any money from his record deals, any money he made as a recording artist, any sharing of his profits, or dividing his earnings (EBT, pp. 73, 92, 93). While *6touring, defendant "hardly spent any time with the plaintiff and certainly did not maintain a home for the plaintiff to clean"; instead, defendant hired a full-time caretaker and professional cleaning crews to maintain his mansion in Connecticut (Def. Aff., ¶33). Defendant also denies having lived with plaintiff in the Bayside apartment; instead, defendant lived in the Connecticut mansion since 2003, with his assistant (EBT, p. 6). Defendant also denies that plaintiff ever supported him financially, and that prior to his success, his expenses were minimal.

According to defendant, "all I wanted for her was for her to develop a career . . . I provided the plaintiff with seed money so she could invest in real estate, asking nothing in return." While in Bayside, defendant encouraged plaintiff to obtain gainful employment, and negotiated a book deal between his publishing company, G-Unit Books, for plaintiff to write a book. G-Unit Books agreed to pay plaintiff $40,000 upon signing and $40,000 upon completion, but plaintiff failed to perform her duties under this agreement, and never wrote the book. (EBT, p. 217).

Defendant also denies entering into any joint venture agreement with the plaintiff related to Rotten Apple Records, which he did not form until November 2001. Defendant also did not discuss Hollow Point with plaintiff (EBT, p. 191).

According to defendant's entertainment attorney, defendant's "overall business philosophy spurns the involvement of individual equity partners or individual investors in any way."

Defendant also denies that "plaintiff was responsible for [his] support even while [he] was recovering after [he] was shot as [he] had ample resources at that time. . . ." (Def. Aff., ¶52). Defendant also denies assaulting or coercing plaintiff into signing the release.

Moreover, defendant attests that "We" did not "agree" to anything concerning the Dix Hills home, but instead, "made it clear to the plaintiff that while I would, in fact, purchase the Dix Hills house, I would not put title in her name." (Def. Aff., ¶57). Defendant never discussed giving plaintiff the Dix Hills house (EBT, p. 235). Defendant purchased the home in Dix Hills to "create a more comfortable space" for his son, who had been sharing a bed with his 16-year-old sister (EBT, pp. 221-222). With respect to the "email," defendant did not remember sending it and was not sure that he wrote it, but the reference to the comment that plaintiff "can have the house," "[m]ost likely" referred to "Bayside." (EBT, pp. 253, 254, 259). Defendant stated that "If I was saying that at that point she was staying in Bayside, so I would have been making reference to [the] Bayside" apartment (EBT, p. 260). Defendant was "pretty sure" that he was not referring in any way to the Dix Hills house (Id.). Although defendant never intended to purchase the Bayside apartment, he "was acknowledging that . . . [she] could have the house that she's actually staying in, which is the place in Bayside because [defendant] paid the carrying cost . . . and [the cost for] all the furniture in there. That's what I was making reference to." (EBT, pp. 262, 263). He was referring to the Bayside apartment because plaintiff "expressed being uncomfortable staying there with her new boyfriend. It's uncomfortable for him. He can't comfortably come to my house." (EBT, p. 264). However, defendant later testified that "when I make mention to the actual house, either it was me speaking of the house in Bayside or the house in 2 Sandra Drive, Dix Hills between the two of those places. . . ." (EBT, p. 283).

In support of dismissal, defendant argues that the alleged oral agreement violates the Statute of Frauds as it obligated defendant to support plaintiff for the rest of her life, and its terms cannot be performed within one year or before the end of a lifetime. *7

As plaintiff testified that the oral agreement was made in her bedroom in 1996 and that it was never honored by defendant, plaintiff's cause of action sounding in breach of contract is also barred by the six-year Statute of Limitations.

In addition, it cannot be ascertained whether defendant's alleged promise "to take care of" plaintiff means that he agreed to provide plaintiff with shelter, a car, a sum certain, clothing, medical bills or to simply be there emotionally for her. Thus, his alleged promise is far too indefinite to support a contract claim. Further, plaintiff failed to indicate any actions by defendant either at the time the alleged oral contract was made or subsequent thereto, evincing his assent to the agreement. It is incredible that two then unemployed, penniless, twenty-one year olds would make such an oral contract.

Although an issue of fact exists as to whether the Book Contract required a joint effort on the part of defendant, plaintiff's claim for specific performance of the agreement to jointly write a book should be dismissed.

Likewise, plaintiff's claim for constructive trust also fails. Plaintiff is collaterally estopped from prosecuting this claim where plaintiff unsuccessfully raised constructive trust as a defense in a prior proceeding. In that proceeding, the Housing Court found that defendant is the owner of the property, that plaintiff obtained occupancy by a license from defendant, and that defendant's revocation of the license terminated her occupancy rights. Thus, plaintiff cannot relitigate the issue of constructive trust. Nor is there any evidence which would indicate either a constructive trust or agreement to convey real property. Even if plaintiff successfully argued that her non-marital relationship with defendant was a confidential one, she cannot prove that she made any transfer in reliance of a promise; she never owned the Dix Hills home and never contributed one penny to its upkeep.

Additionally, plaintiff's quantum meruit claim lacks merit. While defendant disputes that plaintiff performed any specific services for him that were outside of her own self-imposed general obligations to care for her children or that he accepted such services, plaintiff failed to submit any proof that she expected any compensation or the reasonable value of such services. And, plaintiff cannot attempt to overcome the Statute of Frauds by seeking recovery in quantum meruit. Additionally, even if defendant may have been an incidental beneficiary of defendant's household efforts, a claim does not lie in quantum meruit where plaintiff cooked and cleaned for her children and herself. That defendant realized any benefits does not mean plaintiff's efforts were expressly for defendant.

Nor can plaintiff's unjust enrichment claim survive the Statue of Frauds. While plaintiff has no proof that she expended any sums for recording time, tattoos, clothes and the like for defendant, any such expenditures were made because she valued defendant's company and found it rewarding to do while in a relationship with him. Good conscience does not dictate restitution to plaintiff.

Even if plaintiff's action is timely, any equitable relief plaintiff seeks is barred by the doctrine of laches, since plaintiff failed to raise these issues in a timely fashion.

Also, plaintiff failed to allege any misrepresentation or failure to disclose on defendant's part, any justifiable reliance on her part, or plead with any specificity, to support her claim for fraud. Further, a cause of action for fraud does not arise when the only alleged fraud relates to a purported breach of contract. *8

As to plaintiff's claim related to the alleged joint venture, the Court has already rejected such claim and denied plaintiff's request for specific performance thereof. Plaintiff did not contribute "a penny" towards the establishment of Rotten Apple Records; "At that point" defendant had $80,000 from a record deal. (Def. EBT, pp. 181-182). He admits that he "probably said something" to plaintiff about this company, but "never partnered up on any type of business or anything." (Def. EBT, pp. 182-183). In any event, plaintiff's sole allegation that the parties established Rotten Apple Records fails to establish an intent to be associated as joint venturers, or that she contributed financial resources, effort, knowledge, or skill to the creation of Rotten Apple Records or any mutual control or management of same. Nor is there any proof of an agreement to share in the profits or losses of Rotten Apple Records.

Finally, plaintiff's assault and battery claim arising from an incident in 2005 is barred by the one-year Statute of Limitations.

Plaintiff's Opposition

Plaintiff argues that an issue of fact exists as to whether the parties entered into the oral agreement. Defendant admitted that he had been working on becoming a recording artist since before 1997. Plaintiff would not have agreed to work while defendant, who was not monogamous with plaintiff, wrote music at home unless there was an agreement.

Defendant's testimony also indicates that there was no need for him to discuss the division of profits between 1996 to 2000, since the parties were still cohabitating, and because he could not secure any lucrative recording contracts. Defendant testified, "It was no reason to discuss [the sharing of profits] so far from the reality of the situation we was in. . . . After 2000, and we moved to the Poconos, it was no real - - even a thought at that point that I would actually be a success as an artist. The record company that I was actual[ly] with . . . stopped answering my phone calls" (Def. EBT, pp. 91-93).

Further, defendant testified that plaintiff performed housekeeping and domestic services, remained with him at the hospital for more than two weeks, and "helped" him during the period of his recovery. In her affidavit in opposition, plaintiff adds that she transported defendant to and from Pennsylvania and New York for physical therapy, and shopped, cleaned, and puréed food for defendant during his recovery. After his recovery, plaintiff continued to launder defendant's clothes, pay household expenses, and cook for defendant. Plaintiff's averments are supported by the affidavit of plaintiff's sister, Sufrenna Nathari.

Further, an issue of fact exists as to whether defendant lived in Bayside or in Connecticut up until 2007. The lease for the Bayside apartment was in the defendant's name. The Family Court clearly stated that he paid the rent, $2300/monthly for that apartment, and that the house in Connecticut was not purchased for defendant to live in, but was purchased in furtherance of his professional image or "faade."

In further support, plaintiff submits the affidavit of her grandmother, Naomi Ginn, wherein she attests that she would often visit the parties when they resided in Bayside, Queens; which was clean and organized. Ms. Ginn observed an entire closet of defendant's clothes, including more than 10 pairs of sneakers and jeans that she packed in preparation for the move to Dix Hills. Defendant told her that he "preferred to live in the Bayside apartment rather than a big mansion." To Ms. Ginn's knowledge, plaintiff and defendant always lived together between 1996 and 2007. Ms. Ginn's statements are also supported by plaintiff's sister. *9

As to the Dix Hills home, defendant testified at the Landlord-Tenant proceeding that he and plaintiff "had a conversation about that, you know, because she-at that point she was - this is when she was starting to really get into her boyfriend at that point and she actually wanted to have the house to herself and I was like - that I'm not obligated to give you a house." Defendant also testified at his deposition that he was unsure as to whether any closing documents concerning the Dix Hills home were prepared in plaintiff's name. The defendant also admits that the e-mail referencing the defendant putting the house in plaintiff's name could in fact refer to the Dix Hills house. The Court should note that the e-mail is dated December of 2006 and the contract of sale for the Dix Hills home is dated September of 2006. Thus, the only house the defendant could have been referring to was the one in Dix Hills. He could not have been referring to the Bayside apartment because it was leased and not his to convey. On this issue, Ms. Ginn further attests that defendant said that he "will put the house in her name." He was referring specifically to the Dix Hills property. He also stated that he always thought that he and plaintiff "would be together" and that he was going to stay there every night as a family.

There are also issues of fact concerning the creation of Rotten Apple Records and Hollow Point Entertainment. Plaintiff testified at her deposition that she paid the incorporation fees for both Rotten Apple Records and Hollow Point Entertainment.

Additionally, issues of fact exist as to the circumstances surrounding the execution of the Life Rights Agreement that the plaintiff entered into with Paramount Pictures. Plaintiff contends that defendant assaulted her and forced her to sign away her life rights to the production of "Get Rich or Die Tryin."

Also, an issue of fact exists as to whether defendant was obligated to cooperate with the plaintiff in writing a book about the defendant's life through her perspective. Although G-Unit Books, Inc. was the party to the contract, G-Unit Books, Inc. is owned by defendant and he would have had first-hand knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the publishing of any literary work concerning his life.

Lastly, documents demonstrate that plaintiff took a trip with defendant to Morocco.

The evidence also establishes that the domestic and homemaking services rendered by plaintiff to defendant were non-sexual in nature and separable from the parties' relationship. Thus, the Statute of Frauds does not apply to the 1996 agreement.

Nor is plaintiff's claim barred by the six-year Statute of Limitations, as plaintiff claims that the material breach of the parties' agreement occurred on or about 2005. Thus, plaintiff commenced her action within the six-year statutory time limit. Consequently, defendant's affirmative defense based upon the doctrine of laches should also be denied.

Further, plaintiff's constructive trust claim is not barred by collateral estoppel or by the alleged failure to establish a transfer made by plaintiff in reliance of a promise. At the Landord-Tenant proceeding, plaintiff's counsel raised the subject of constructive trust only within the context of informing the Housing Court that the instant action was commenced alleging constructive trust as a cause of action against defendant and that the holdover proceeding be transferred and consolidated with this instant action. All the briefs relating to that matter made no reference to constructive trust; instead, the predominating defense was that plaintiff was not a licensee.

Further, as noted by this Court, plaintiff need not have an interest in the Dix Hills *10property prior to its transfer in order to make out a claim for constructive trust. Plaintiff expended time and efforts looking for a suitable home within a one million-dollar budget as directed to by defendant. Plaintiff spent two years house shopping and even negotiated the purchase price of the Dix Hills home. Plaintiff detrimentally relied upon defendant's promise that he would place title to the Dix Hills home in her name. And, under case law, the Court should take a less restrictive view of this element of constructive trust.

Plaintiff's cause of action in quantum meruit should be upheld. Caselaw holds that "the fact that an express contract is unenforceable because of its failure to comply with the Statute of Frauds does not mean that quasi-contractual recovery for the reasonable value of services rendered is, therefore, necessarily unavailable." Plaintiff rendered domestic and homemaking services with the expectation of being compensated in the form of sharing in the fruits of defendant's success in the entertainment industry pursuant to the parties' express oral agreement.

And, because defendant benefitted from plaintiff as a result of the domestic and homemaking services she rendered at his bequest pursuant to their agreement, the claim of unjust enrichment should also be upheld.

Plaintiff established a claim for specific performance of the parties' oral joint venture agreement to establish Rotten Apple Records, in light of her payment of the incorporation fee. She also helped defendant secure a key individual from another recording company to work for Rotten Apple Records. The plaintiff paid for studio time, DATs, and food, clothing and transportation for any employee of Rotten Apple Records.

Defendant's Reply

There is no showing of a definite articulated and enforceable agreement. An oral contract between two lovers concerning their living arrangements and housekeeping responsibilities is subject to careful inspection, as those are things which are normally done as a matter of regard and affection - not for money.

In this case, plaintiff failed to set forth the basic terms necessary to provide meaning to the agreement.14 The purported "terms" of the alleged oral agreement are ambiguous, indefinite, and lacking in specificity. The contract is incapable of performance and enforcement. Defendant's simple and brief comments about writing music do not evidence the existence of a contract between the parties.

That defendant leased and paid the rent for the Bayside apartment while plaintiff was unemployed does not amount to evidence that he lived in the apartment with them.

As to the Statute of Limitations, defendant never transferred title to assets to plaintiff's name, and by her own admission, he maintained a tight control over his *11 money and gave the plaintiff money when he felt like it. Thus, any breach by defendant of the alleged oral contract occurred the day after he entered into it in September 1996, more than 11 ½ years ago.

Plaintiff's contention that defendant breached the alleged agreement is wholly arbitrary. Plaintiff provides no explanation of the alleged breach, and instead simply declares that defendant breached the agreement at some unarticulated point during 2005.

While plaintiff does not actually allege that the parties orally contracted with each other in connection with the purchase of the Dix Hills home (or any other property), any agreement for the conveyance of real property must be in writing, and since there is no written agreement any such contract would be barred by the Statute of Frauds. Further, the contract in this case, as sworn to by the plaintiff, by its terms, cannot be performed before the end of a lifetime and, as a result, the Statute of Frauds requires that the contract be in writing. Thus, even if the defendant told the plaintiff that he would put title into her name, that is not an enforceable obligation and it does not give rise to any cause of action.

Nor does plaintiff establish that she made a transfer in reliance of any promise or argue that the defendant was unjustly enriched so as to support her constructive trust claim. Plaintiff did not sign the sales contract, and never maintained any interest in the subject property. Plaintiff's claim that she shopped around for the house is strained because the only evidence the plaintiff submitted was a short email string from December 2004 concerning a house in Melville. The emails show that it was actually the defendant's personal manager, Laurie Dobbins, who was responsible for communicating with the realtor and making all necessary arrangements. That plaintiff was afforded an opportunity to look at the house she would be living in to see if she liked it does not evidence the transfer of an interest in the property nor any form of unjust enrichment on defendant's part. Nor has plaintiff detrimentally relied on any promise made by the defendant or suffered any injury, but lived cost-free for one and one-half years.

Plaintiff's unsupported allegation that she paid the incorporation fees for Rotten Apple Records and Hollow Point Entertainment, (which is irrelevant to any of the causes of action), contradicts the sworn statement and documentation establishing that defendant's entertainment attorney paid this fee in 2001.

Further, the circumstances surrounding the execution of the "Life Rights Agreement" has no bearing on any of plaintiff's causes of action. Even if plaintiff were forced to sign the agreement, that fact does not support her claim that the parties had an oral agreement.

And, whether defendant was obligated to cooperate with her to write the book is irrelevant, as there is no claim to enforce the book contract. Indeed, the very existence of a written agreement providing for specific payments to the plaintiff for services rendered contradicts any notion that the parties had an oral contract to share their income and assets equally or that all of defendant's property was supposed to be considered plaintiff's property.

Since 2002, the defendant has been touring all over the world. That plaintiff took only one trip with him to Morocco indicates that plaintiff could never prove that the parties entered a contract which called for her act as a social escort nor that plaintiff performed her obligations under any such agreement.

Analysis

It is well settled that where a defendant is the proponent of a motion for summary *12judgment, the defendant must establish that the "cause of action . . . has no merit" (CPLR § 3212[b]), sufficient to warrant the court as a matter of law to direct judgment in his or her favor (Bush v St. Claire's Hosp., 82 NY2d 738, 739 [1993]; Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851, 853 [1985]). This standard requires that the proponent of a motion for summary judgment make a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, by advancing sufficient "evidentiary proof in admissible form" to demonstrate the absence of any material issues of fact (Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851, 853 [1985]; Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562 [1980]; Silverman v Perlbinder, 307 AD2d 230, 762 NYS2d 386 [1st Dept 2003]). On a defendant's motion for summary judgment, the evidence should be liberally construed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff (Kesselman v Lever House Rest., 29 AD3d 302, 816 NYS2d 13 [1st Dept 2006] citing Goldman v Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 13 AD3d 289, 290, 788 NYS2d 25 [1st Dept 2004]).

Alternatively, to defeat a motion for summary judgment, the opposing party must show facts sufficient to require a trial of any issue of fact (CPLR §3212[b]). Thus, where the proponent of the motion makes a prima facie showing of entitlement to summary judgment, the burden shifts to the party opposing the motion to demonstrate by admissible evidence the existence of a factual issue requiring a trial of the action, or to tender an acceptable excuse for his or her failure to do so (Vermette v Kenworth Truck Co., 68 NY2d 714, 717 [1986]; Zuckerman v City of New York, supra at 560, 562; Forrest v Jewish Guild for the Blind, 309 AD2d 546, 765 NYS2d 326 [1st Dept 2003]). Like the proponent of the motion, the party opposing the motion must set forth evidentiary proof in admissible form in support of his or her claim that material triable issues of fact exist (Zuckerman, supra at 562).

The deposition testimony and documentary evidence before this Court establish that none of plaintiff's causes of action have merit. As such, plaintiff's complaint is dismissed, in its entirety, with prejudice.

Breach of Contract

According to plaintiff's affidavit, the parties entered into an express oral agreement "on or about September of 1996" wherein in exchange for plaintiff "providing the defendant homemaking and domestic services while we lived together, the defendant would devote his time to becoming a successful recording artist and share with me equally all his earnings from that success." Plaintiff's affidavit provides as follows: I agreed to continue to live with him, maintain his home, perform homemaking and domestic services for him as well as support him mentally, emotionally and financially to the best of my abilities. I also agreed to accompany him to social and other events. . . . Defendant agreed that he would vigorously pursue a professional recording career with the understanding that our combined efforts could result in the accumulation of substantial wealth and assets that we would divide and share equally.

Plaintiff admitted that she was in love with defendant when they entered into this agreement in September 1996 (EBT, p. 206), after all, "He was a corner crack dealer parolee. He didn't have anything. . . . So I was going to be with him whether he was 50 Cent, with a hundred million dollars, or Curtis Jackson, working for sanitation, making $50,000 a year. I would have been with him, because I loved him. It wasn't about him saying that he would give me everything *13he had. It's when you love a person, you don't - - it's not about the monetary. If you're a prostitute, then it's a monetary thing. We were two people in love with each other."

While statements such as these demonstrate loving devotion and loyalty, these same statements undermine plaintiff's breach of contract and quantum meruit claims for half of defendant's wealth.

"As to personal services between unmarried persons living together or unmarried persons whose actions flow out of mutual friendship and reciprocal regard, there is very little difference" (Trimmer v Van Bomel, 107 Misc 2d 201 [Sup. Ct. New York County 1980]). "An implied contract to compensate for those things which are ordinarily done by one person for another as a matter of regard and affection should not, under these well established principles, be recognized in this state" (Id.).

Such a claim in the context of a cohabiting relationship is against New York's public policy (as evidenced by the 1933 abolition of common-law marriages) Soderholm v Kosty, 177 Misc 2d 403, 676 NYS2d 850 [NY Just. Ct. 1998] citing Morone v Morone, 50 NY2d 481, 488, 429 NYS2d 592, supra ).

Suits involving "unmarried persons living together who thereafter seek financial recovery frequently run afoul of the theory that a contract founded upon an agreement to live together as man and wife will not be enforced (Civ. Rts. Law, s 80-a)" (Trimmer v Van Bomel, 107 Misc 2d 201, supra ). The Court recognizes that services rendered by one paramour for the other which are non-sexual in nature and do not arise directly from such a relationship, may be deemed separable, and form the basis for compensation (Id., citing Matter of Gordon, 8 NY2d 71, 202 NYS.2d 1; 6A Corbin on Contracts, s 1476, p. 622; 15 Williston on Contracts, §1745; Restatement of Contracts s 589). However, this is not such a case.

Here, the purported agreement was made when plaintiff and defendant were living together, albeit sporadically, as lovers, and by its terms, required the defendant to support plaintiff for the rest of his and her life, even if the parties broke up and ceased cohabitating. The services for which plaintiff seeks compensation arise out of the nature of the relationship of the parties to one another. The services involved - to devote time and attention to the defendant, to act as companion, to accompany him to social events and perform household duties - are of a nature which would ordinarily be exchanged without expectation of pay (see Trimmer v Van Bomel, supra citing Rubinsteen v Klevin, 261 F 921, Robinson v Munn, 238 NY 40, 43; Matter of Adams, 1 AD2d 259, 149 NYS2d 849, aff'd 2 NY2d 796, 159 NYS2d 698; Matter of Basten, 204 Misc 937, 126 NYS2d 459; Matter of Mulderig, 196 Misc 527, 91 NYS2d 895).

As Judge Meyer noted in Morone v Morone (50 NY2d 481, 488, 429 NYS2d 592,488, 429 NYS2d 592 [1980]): As a matter of human experience personal services will frequently be rendered by two people ..... because they value each other's company, or because they find it a convenient or rewarding thing to do. For courts to attempt through hindsight to sort out the intentions of the parties and affix jural significance to conduct carried out within an essentially private and generally noncontractual relationship runs too great a risk of error. . . . There is, therefore, substantially greater risk of emotion-laden afterthought, not to mention fraud, in attempting to ascertain by implication what services, if any, were rendered gratuitously and what compensation, if any, the parties intended to be paid.*14

Providing loving care and assistance to her boyfriend and the father of their son before and after he was shot and seriously injured, does not transform her relationship to a one founded upon contract. To conclude otherwise would transform the parties' personal, yet informal relationship to that of a marriage.

In any event, even assuming the purported oral agreement is recognized in New York, as the party seeking to enforce a contract, plaintiff bears the burden to establish that a binding agreement was made and to prove the terms of the contract (Allied Sheet Metal Works, Inc. v Kerby Saunders, Inc., 206 AD2d 166, 619 NYS2d 260 [1st Dept 1994]). This plaintiff failed to do.

Before a court will impose a contractual obligation, it must ascertain that a contract was made and that its terms are definite (Charles Hyman, Inc. v Olsen Indus., Inc., 227 AD2d 270, 642 NYS2d 306 [1st Dept 1996] citing Cobble Hill Nursing Home v Henry & Warren Corp., 74 NY2d 475, 482, 548 NYS2d 920, cert. denied 498 US 816, 111 SCt 58]). Here, it is clear that the alleged oral agreement to "take care of" plaintiff for the rest of her life, contains no specifics as to the manner in which defendant was obligated to "take care of" the plaintiff, and, assuming this included the tender of monies to plaintiff, no specifics as to the frequency and amount of payments.

Therefore, the alleged oral agreement to take care of plaintiff for the rest of her life in exchange for her promise to perform household duties and take care of the parties' children is unenforceable. And consequently, any claims based on such oral agreement, including specific performance of same, an accounting of all of defendant's assets, mandamus relief, and declaratory relief, lack merit, and are dismissed.

Quantum Meruit.

As to quantum meruit, this Court declines to recognize a right to receive compensation under an implied contract for domestic services rendered between these parties. Although there is an issue as to whether plaintiff and defendant lived together continuously throughout the period of their relationship, plaintiff maintains that she provided homemaking and cleaning services for defendant because she loved and cared for him. As the services plaintiff performed are of a nature which would ordinarily be exchanged without expectation of pay, an implied contract to compensate for such services cannot stand (see Trimmer v Van Bomel, 107 Misc 2d 201, supra ).

In any event, the Statute of Frauds precludes such oral agreement. General Obligations Law §5-701(a)(1), provides that: Every agreement, promise or undertaking is void, unless it or some note or memorandum thereof be in writing, and subscribed by the party to be charged therewith, or by his lawful agent, if such agreement, promise or undertaking:1. By its terms is not to be performed within one year from the making thereof or the performance of which is not to be completed before the end of a lifetime.

It is clear that defendant's alleged oral promise to take care of plaintiff for the rest of her life was incapable of performance before the end of the plaintiff's lifetime, and therefore, her claim is barred by the Statute of Frauds (Melwani v Jain, 281 AD2d 276, 722 NYS2d 145 [1st Dept 2001] [alleged oral agreement, under which defendants were to pay plaintiff a royalty *15during his lifetime, and then pay it to his heirs in perpetuity, was correctly held to be unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds as incapable of performance within one year or of complete performance before the end of plaintiff's lifetime; Williams v Lynch, 245 AD2d 715 [3d Dept 1997] [agreement for plaintiff to sell her own house, move into defendant's home and pay one half of the expenses associated therewith, in exchange for defendant's promise that she could have use of that home for the rest of her life barred by the Statute of Frauds]; McCoy v Edison Price, Inc., 186 AD2d 442, 588 NYS2d 566 [1st Dept 1992] [agreement which was to last for as long as defendant remained in business, was incapable of performance within one year, rendering it voidable absent a writing signed by the party to be charged]; Harrington v Murray, 169 AD2d 580, 564 NYS2d 738 [1st Dept 1991] [defendant's oral agreement to take care of former wife "for the rest of her life in the style to which she had become accustomed, in exchange for her promise to introduce and otherwise promote him socially in order to aid him in business and politics" and to provide her with a home and half of the profits resulting from her efforts, unenforceable pursuant to General Obligations Law § 5-701(a)(1)]).

As to defendant's alleged agreement to transfer title of the Dix Hills home to plaintiff, the Statute of Frauds also bars such agreement. At the time plaintiff was living in Bayside, defendant executed the sales contract for the Dix Hills home in September 2006. Defendant thereafter sent plaintiff an email indicating that she "can have the house" and that he would have "them put it in your name." At first blush, it appears that defendant intended to purchase the Dix Hills home for the plaintiff and place title to the home in plaintiff's name. However, this sole email, in the absence of any other related correspondence, is insufficient to create plaintiff's interest in the Dix Hills home, and cannot be enforced against defendant.

General Obligations Law §5-703 provides as follows: 1. An estate or interest in real property . . . cannot be created, granted, assigned, surrendered or declared, unless by act or operation of law, or by a deed or conveyance in writing, subscribed by the person creating, granting, assigning, surrendering or declaring the same, or by his lawful agent, thereunto authorized by writing.2. A contract for . . . the sale, of any real property, or an interest therein, is void unless the contract or some note or memorandum thereof, expressing the consideration, is in writing, subscribed by the party to be charged, or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized by writing.

It cannot be disputed that the alleged creation of plaintiff's alleged interest in the Dix Hills property implicates General Obligations Law § 5-703 subdivision 1, since subdivision 2 involves the sale of real property, and there is no claim that defendant promised to sell the Dix Hills home to plaintiff. Instead, plaintiff's claim in regard to the Dix Hills home centers on defendant's promise to give, or as subdivision states, grant, assign, or surrender his interest in the subject property to plaintiff. Thus, the issue is whether defendant's promise in the email constitutes a sufficient "writing," signed by defendant so as to satisfy the Statute of Frauds. Although quoted in the context of a sale of real property, the Court in Vista Developers Corp. v VFP Realty LLC (17 Misc 3d 914 [Sup. Ct. Queens County 2007]), cited John E. Theuman, J.D., Satisfaction of Statute of Frauds by E-Mail, 110 ALR5th 277, § 2, para 2, as follows regarding emails and the Statute of Frauds: *16 The explosive growth of electronic mail (or e-mail') as a method of both personal and business communication, often to the exclusion of conventional written documents, has raised the question whether e-mail messages allegedly indicating an agreement between the sender and receiver can constitute writings satisfying the requirements of the Statute of Frauds. Courts addressing this question have largely declined to state any general rule, and have instead determined on a case-by-case basis whether the particular e-mail messages asserted by a party as evidencing an agreement satisfy the elements of the applicable Statute of Frauds provision, an approach which may imply acceptance of the general proposition that e-mails can satisfy the Statute of Frauds in a proper case. Thus, at least one court has held that e-mail messages relating to a proposed sale of real property were sufficient to prevent a breach of contract action from being dismissed on Statute of Frauds grounds where the messages were collectively sufficient to show that the parties had reached an agreement as to the essential terms of a land sale contract (§ 3[a]). Other courts, in rejecting e-mail messages offered as evidence of an alleged contract, have pointed to such particular elements as the failure of those messages to state key elements of that contract such as price, quantity, or duration, the fact that they did not come from the particular party charged with breach of the alleged contract, language indicating that the messages reflecting ongoing negotiations, rather than a completed agreement, or a simple lack of clear evidence of offer and acceptance (§ 3[b])."Vista Developers Corp., [e-mail exchanges between president of prospective purchaser of real property and representative of prospective vendors did not constitute a "signed writing," for purposes of statute of frauds]).

Even accepting as true that the defendant transcribed and transmitted the email message to plaintiff, it is settled law that "before the power of law can be invoked to enforce a promise, it must be sufficiently certain and specific so that what was promised can be ascertained. Otherwise, a court, in intervening, would be imposing its own conception of what the parties should or might have undertaken, rather than confining itself to the implementation of a bargain to which they have mutually committed themselves. Thus, definiteness as to material matters is of the very essence in contract law (Martin Delicatessen v Schumacher, 52 NY2d 105, 109, 436 NYS2d 247 [1981]). Similarly, the promise to "give" plaintiff "the house," and place same in plaintiff's name, in and of itself, is insufficient on its face, this mere agreement to agree fails to identify the specific house to which defendant referred, or the date on which such transfer was to take place. Even though parol evidence may be considered to address any ambiguities as to the identity of the property, it is not to be used to satisfy the Statute of Frauds when, the writing itself is plainly insufficient on its face (Ashkenazi v Kelly, 157 AD2d 578, 550 NYS2d 322 [1st Dept 1990], citing Scheck v Francis, 26 NY2d 466, 311 NYS2d 841 [1970]). Further, is a well-established rule that delivery of the deed or the conveyance in writing, with intent to transfer title is required and the absence thereof will render the attempted transfer of ownership ineffective (see Goodell v Rosetti, 52 AD3d 911, 859 NYS2 770 [3d Dept 2008]).

Notably, at the time of the transmittal of the email, defendant owned several properties, and had entered into a contract to purchase the Dix Hills house. Therefore, it cannot be said the email constitutes a "conveyance in writing" of an interest in the Dix Hills home pursuant to *17General Obligations Law § 5-703 subdivision 1. The court notes that a review of two homeowners' policies related to the Dix Hills home reveals that defendant is the named insured on the policy covering the real property and structure of the Dix Hills home, while plaintiff is the named insured on the policy covering the personal property and loss of use only. (Unfortunately, the bill for the policy naming plaintiff as the insured shows that the payment for same was due by May 5, 2008, a scant three weeks before the fire, and that the policy was cancelled).

Therefore, the oral agreement to convey defendant's title interest in the Dix Hills home is unenforceable, as violative of the Statute of Frauds, and all claims related thereto are dismissed.

Constructive Trust

Although the Statute of Frauds does not constitute a defense to a constructive trust, the evidence in this case fails to establish that plaintiff is entitled to an order imposing a constructive trust over the Dix Hills home, or the proceeds from the insurance policy covering the home. To impose a constructive trust, there must be a showing of "(1) a confidential or fiduciary relation, (2) a promise, (3) a transfer in reliance thereon and (4) unjust enrichment" (McGrath v Hilding, 41 NY2d 625 [1977], citing Sharp v Kosmalski, 40 NY2d 119, 121, 386 NYS2d 72, 75 [1976]). The law of constructive trusts is not confined to reconveyance situations, and in taking "a less restrictive view," the transfer concept may extend to instances where funds, time and effort are contributed in reliance on a promise to share in the result (Hira v Bajaj, 182 AD2d 435, 582 NYS2d 197 [1st Dept 1992]).

However, here, there is no evidence that plaintiff contributed any efforts or money toward the purchase, maintenance, or improvement of the Dix Hills home. All plaintiff did was "show up" at the closing and thereafter, lived in the Dix Hills home without any documented efforts towards purchasing or improving it.

The cases to which this Court previously cited to permit plaintiff to proceed with discovery to establish her constructive trust claim are no longer applicable due to the evidence now existing in this case, where there has been no showing that plaintiff contributed any finances toward the purchase, improvement or maintenance of the real property (cf. Hira v Bajaj, 182 AD2d 435, 582 NYS2d 197 [1st Dept 1992] [plaintiff provided money towards the purchase of the subject property pursuant to defendant's agreement to hold title as plaintiff's agent]; Lester v Zimmer, 147 AD2d 340, 542 NYS2d 855 [3d Dept 1989] [plaintiff provided financial support for defendant during the period of construction of the subject property, contributed money toward the cost of materials and actually participated in building the house]; Mendel v Hewitt, 161 AD2d 849, 555 NYS2d 889 [3d Dept 1990] [plaintiff advanced $29,000 for the purchase and some $50,000 for improvements]; Artache v Goldin, 133 AD2d 596, 519 NYS2d 702 [2d Dept 1987] [in addition to domestic services, plaintiff rendered business services in accordance with the agreement; contributed more than $60,000 derived from the sale of real property that she owned and proceeds from a personal injury action, toward the parties' joint economic needs and toward the down payment for the purchase of the house, which served as the family residence]).

Plaintiff's reliance on Gottlieb v Gottlieb, 166 AD2d 413, 560 NYS2d 477 [2d Dept 1990]) is misplaced. In Gottlieb, plaintiff commenced an action to declare the rights of the parties with respect to a shareholders' agreement and to impose constructive trusts upon the decedent's interest in his business and upon his home. Plaintiff alleged that (1) she and the decedent "jointly shopped for, negotiated for and purchased the land upon which the said home *18was constructed," (2) she and the decedent "jointly planned" and "supervised" the "physical layout and construction of the said home," (3) she "contributed financially to the improvement of, maintenance and upkeep of the said home," and (4) she invested her labor and money in reliance upon the decedent's promise that he would put the deed in both of their names. The Court held that the allegations regarding plaintiff's contribution of money and work toward the purchase of the land and the construction of the home were sufficient to satisfy the "transfer in reliance" element of the constructive trust claim.

That plaintiff herein shopped for the Dix Hills home and possibly negotiated its price is plainly insufficient to bring this case within the scope of Gottlieb. Again, plaintiff did not provide any money towards the purchase of the Dix Hills home, which was paid for solely by defendant; nor was plaintiff expected or required to. Plaintiff did not financially support the defendant during the period she was in Bayside allegedly searching for this home. It does not appear that the Dix Hills home was in need of any construction; thus, it cannot be said that plaintiff contributed any finances or labor toward any construction or improvement of the Dix Hills home. Although plaintiff performed domestic services, there is no indication that plaintiff rendered any business services for the defendant.

Therefore, plaintiff's claim for constructive trust of all defendant's assets, including the Dix Hills home and the insurance proceeds, is insufficient to defeat the Statute of Frauds defense to the oral agreement to place title of the home in plaintiff's name, and is hereby dismissed.

Unjust Enrichment

This court similarly dismisses any claim sounded in "unjust enrichment." Although courts have equitable powers to create an implied contract based in equity, it must be shown that a defendant was (i) enriched; (ii) that the enrichment was at plaintiff's expense and (iii) that equity and good conscience require defendant to return the money or the property to the plaintiff (see 22A N.Y.Jur.2d, Contracts, § 518). In the instant case, it cannot be said, given the overall situation and the relationship between the parties, that defendant was enriched, or, even if he were, that equity and good conscience would require restitution to the plaintiff. The record discloses that defendant expended sums for dinners, groceries, movies, clothes for plaintiff, and the like on countless occasions. Additionally, goods, services and financial advances are often rendered between two live-in lovers, not for remuneration but because they value each other's company or because they find it caring, convenient or rewarding to so do. Given the usual "give and take" ordinarily associated with persons cohabiting with one another, and the giving and receiving by both here of love, affection, gifts and the like, it cannot be said that equity and good conscience cry out for fiscal adjustment" (Soderholm v Kosty, 177 Misc 2d 403, supra ).

That defendant may have derived benefit from plaintiff's acts does not mean that he was unjustly enriched. It is undisputed that the defendant provided ample economic benefits for the plaintiff over the years: he gave plaintiff money and gifts, shared in the payment of rent and utilities in Pennsylvania and Bayside, bought furniture for the plaintiff, paid her auto lease at times, paid the expenses for plaintiff's mother's funeral, gave the plaintiff's grandmother money so she could purchase and furnish an apartment, and paid plaintiff's Macy's credit card.

The Court notes that plaintiff and her daughter moved into the Dix Hills house for a couple of months prior to the date the defendant commenced the Family Court proceeding. The plaintiff locked in a higher standard of living for herself and her daughter (both living with the *19parties' son) than she had previously enjoyed in her Bayside apartment. Finally, as it is undisputed that the defendant has paid for everything in connection with the house, and that the plaintiff never made any financial contribution toward the purchase or maintenance of the house, it defies logic to even suggest that the defendant has been unjustly enriched.

It cannot be ignored that the Family Court Order permits plaintiff to continue receiving child support payments from the defendant and that she will continue to do so on a monthly basis for many years to come. These payments permit plaintiff to provide a home equal in value to that of the Dix Hills home, not only for Marquise, for whom defendant is solely responsible, but for plaintiff and her own daughter, without working. In other words, plaintiff and her daughter will reap the benefits of living in a home at the expense of defendant for several years to come

Joint Venture Agreement

To establish a claim of breach of a joint venture, plaintiff must sufficiently set forth facts to establish her contribution of property, skills, or control over the venture or a sharing of possible financial losses (see Langer v Dadabhoy, 44 AD3d 425, 843 NYS2d 262 [1st Dept 2007]). "An agreement to distribute the proceeds of an enterprise upon a percentage basis does not give rise to a joint venture if the enterprise does not represent a joinder of property, skills and risks (Steinbeck v Gerosa, 4 NY2d 302, 175 NYS2d 1 [1958]). "The ultimate inquiry is whether the parties have so joined their property, interests, skills and risks that for the purpose of the particular adventure their respective contributions have become as one and the commingled property and interests of the parties have thereby been made subject to each of the associates on the trust and inducement that each would act for their joint benefit. By plaintiff's own account, the parties did not discuss the sharing of losses (see Steinbeck v Gerosa, supra ). Further, there is no evidence that plaintiff contributed any skills, or had control of any aspect of any joint venture, including that of Rotten Apple Records. Therefore, plaintiff's claims for breach and specific performance of the joint venture (10th and 13th causes of action, respectively), and accounting are dismissed.

Fraud

To establish fraud, plaintiff must establish that "(1) defendant made a representation as to a material fact; (2) such representation was false; (3) defendant[ ] intended to deceive plaintiff; (4) plaintiff believed and justifiably relied upon the statement and was induced by it to engage in a certain course of conduct; and (5) as a result of such reliance plaintiff sustained pecuniary loss" (Ross v Louise Wise Services, Inc., 8 NY3d 478 [2007]; Global Minerals and Metals Corp. v Holme, 35 AD3d 93, 824 NYS2d 210 [1st Dept 2006]). There is no evidence that defendant, at the time he allegedly promised to assign the title to the Dix Hills home to the plaintiff, never intended to honor such promise. Further, a cause of action for fraud does not arise when the only alleged fraud relates to a breach of contract and here, plaintiff's claim for fraud derives from defendant's purported oral agreement to place the title of the Dix Hills home in her name.

The Court also notes that a party cannot avoid the bar of the Statute of Frauds by recharacterizing the claim as one for fraud (Santaro v Jack of Hearts Carpet Co., Inc., 6 Misc 3d 1024, 800 NYS2d 356 [Sup Ct. Onondaga County 2005] citing Gora v Drizin, 300 AD2d 139, 140 [1st Dept 2002] [oral contract claim barred by GOL § 5-703 (3) and plaintiff not permitted to avoid this bar by "recharacterizing" the claim as one for fraud]; General Obligations Law § 5-703 ). Plaintiff cannot avoid the Statute of Frauds by arguing that the alleged oral *20promise was a misrepresentation of fact and that its claim is based on fraud (Nelson Bagel Bakery Co., Inc v Moshcorn Realty Corporation, 289 AD2d 69 [1st Dept 2001]). Where a contract itself is void under the Statute of Frauds it cannot be used as a predicate for an action in fraud (Lilling v Slauenwhite, 145 AD2d 471, 472 [2nd Dept 1988], citing Dung v Parker, 52 NY 494 [1873]). "Whatever the form of the action at law may be, if the proof of a promise or contract, void by the [S]tatute [of Frauds] is essential to maintain it, there can be no recovery" (Dung v Parker, supra , at 497). Therefore, plaintiff's claim for fraud is likewise dismissed.

Assault and Battery

Plaintiff's cause of action for "assault and battery" is governed by the one-year statute of limitations of CPLR 215(3). Therefore, such claim, based on events that occurred in 2005 in connection with the signing of the release of life rights, is time-barred, and dismissed. 

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, it is hereby

ORDERED that the motion by defendant for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted, in its entirety, and the complaint is hereby dismissed. And it is further

ORDERED that all stays and/or injunctions issued herein are hereby lifted and vacated; and it is further

ORDERED that defendant serve a copy of this order with notice of entry upon plaintiff within 20 days of entry.

This constitutes the decision and order of the Court.

Dated: February 3, 2009_____________________________________

Hon. Carol Robinson Edmead, J.S.C.

In accordance with the accompanying Memorandum Decision, it is hereby

ORDERED that the motion by defendant for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted, in its entirety, and the complaint is hereby dismissed. And it is further

ORDERED that all stays and/or injunctions issued herein are hereby lifted and vacated; and it is further

ORDERED that defendant serve a copy of this order with notice of entry upon plaintiff within 20 days of entry.

This constitutes the decision and order of the Court.

1

Defendant claims that the parties lived at his grandmother's house from 1996 through 2000, with plaintiff returning to her grandmother's house from "time to time" (EBT, pp. 20, 26). Defendant denied ever living in plaintiff's apartment in Far Rockaway, but just "stayed over" (EBT, pp. 74, 75). 

2

Defendant testified that he became employed by Jam Master Jay Records, which provided him money for the "recording process." (EBT, p. 33). 

3

Defendant claims that his grandmother performed these services for him (EBT, pp. 36, 38, 57). 

4

Plaintiff states that she began working in 1997 as a court-appointed escort for victims of domestic violence, but quit after defendant's repeated confrontations with her concerning a man at her job who took an interest in her. Plaintiff later worked as a toll booth operator in 1999, until May of 2000, when defendant was shot. 

5

Defendant testified that plaintiff "helped some" and brought food to him from "time to time," and that plaintiff's mother washed his clothes (along with plaintiff) (EBT, pp. 116, 118-119, 121). 

6

Plaintiff states, after defendant's health was restored, plaintiff resumed working at brief assignments through a temporary agency and then, in 2003, as an executive assistant at the "Weekend Vibe" television show, hosted by Bryce Wilson. Plaintiff ceased working at "Weekend Vibe" because defendant "had a problem with [her] working with" the host. 

7

Defendant contends that he provided plaintiff the "seed money" to invest in real estate. 

8

Defendant testified that he received a $300,000 advance for signing a deal in 2003 and purchased a Hummer which plaintiff drove since he was touring "from city to city"; he did not give plaintiff any money from this advance (EBT, pp. 169-172). He purchased the mansion to live in, with no intent for plaintiff or their son to live there (EBT, p. 172). In 2004, defendant also purchased a home in Valley Stream, where defendant's grandmother and other family members reside (EBT, p. 191). 

9

Defendant denies forcing plaintiff to sign this release, and acknowledges that plaintiff did not receive any money from the movie deal (EBT, pp. 200, 203-204). According to plaintiff, defendant also agreed to assist plaintiff in writing "a book from [plaintiff's] perspective" and defendant "was going to tell [her] what to say" (the "Book Contract") (EBT, p. 278). It was defendant's obligation to find a writer, after which the parties would "write the book together [and] [s]plit the proceeds, along with our other hundreds of millions of dollars that we haven't split yet." (EBT, pp. 278, 282). However, defendant "reneged on his part of the deal. . . . (EBT, p. 281). 

10

For ease of reading, the Court refrained from inserting "sic" throughout this text. 

11

Plaintiff stated that defendant "would hit" her "when something didn't go his way," causing her to experience headaches and seek medical attention (EBT, 129, 133). 

12

The amended complaint lists 15 causes of action in support of plaintiff's claims for lifetime financial support and more than $50 million damages: (1) breach of oral agreement, (2) imposition of a constructive trust and an accounting, (3) partition, (4) fraud, (5) quantum meruit, (6) unjust enrichment, (7) specific performance, (8) a declaration of the parties' rights under the oral agreement, (9) a peremptory mandamus (Black's Law Dictionary, 8th Ed.), seeking an absolute and unqualified command to the defendant to do the act in question, i.e., convey the Dix 

footnote 12, cont'd. 

Hills property and insurance proceeds emanating from the destruction of said property, (10) breach of joint venture agreement regarding Rotten Apple Records, (11) fraud, (12) specific performance of the parties' oral agreement, (13) specific performance of joint venture agreement, (14) an accounting of defendant's income and investments, and (15) assault and battery. 

13

By separate motion, defendant previously moved for order of preclusion resolving all claims in favor of the defendant based on plaintiff's failure to produce discovery, or in the alternative, for an order precluding plaintiff from submitting any documentary evidence at trial in support of her claims that was not previously produced. The Court adjourned this motion, sine die, to be determined in conjunction with this summary judgment motion. Plaintiff opposed dismissal, contending that defendant received documents pursuant to this Court's April 2008 Order, failed to attempt to first resolve his discovery dispute with plaintiff concerning the Court's May 2008 Order, failed to memorialize the document demands made at plaintiff's deposition, and failed to provide discovery demanded by plaintiff. In light of the determination of the instant motion, defendant's previous motion is moot. 

14

Defendant questions, by "way of example, how much domestic service and housekeeping was the plaintiff supposed to provide? Was there a certain number of hours or were there certain tasks that the plaintiff was to complete? . . . Was plaintiff required to go on tour with the defendant and perform services for him on the road? What efforts and abilities was she required to contribute? How much money, if any, was plaintiff required to contribute and what were the remedies, penalties or arrangements in place in the event plaintiff did not fulfill her obligations? . . . Was the defendant obligated to give the plaintiff one-half (½) of everything he ever earned for any particular duration? . . . When was the defendant supposed to pay the plaintiff; how often; in what form? . . . When asked at her deposition about when she was supposed to get the money pursuant to the terms or the agreement, plaintiff answered, "that's what I was wondering" (Plaintiff EBT, p. 184)." 

Richmond

W. O. Lucy and J. C. Lucy v. A. H. Zehmer and Ida S. Zehmer.

November 22, 1954.

Record No. 4272.

Present, Eggleston, Buchanan, Miller, Smith and Whittle, JJ.

The opinion states the case.

A. S. Harrison, Jr. and Emerson D. Baugh, for the appellants.

Morton G. Goode and William Earle White, for the appellees.

Buchanan, J.,

delivered the opinion of the court.

This suit was instituted by W. O. Lucy and J. C. Lucy, complainants, against A. H. Zehmer and Ida S. Zehmer, his wife, defendants, to have specific performance of a contract by which it was alleged the Zehmers had sold to W. O. Lucy a tract of land owned by A. H. Zehmer in Dinwiddie county containing 471.6 acres, more or less, known as the Ferguson farm, for $50,000. J. C. Lucy, the other complainant, is a brother of W. O. Lucy, to whom W. O. Lucy transferred a half interest in his alleged purchase.

The instrument sought to be enforced was written by A. H. Zehmer on December 20, 1952, in these words: “We hereby agree to sell to W. O. Lucy the Ferguson Farm complete for $50,000.00, title satisfactory to buyer,” and signed by the defendants, A. H. Zehmer and Ida S. Zehmer.

The answer of A. H. Zehmer admitted that at the time mentioned W. O. Lucy offered him $50,000 cash for the farm, but that he, Zehmer, considered that the offer was made in jest; that so thinking, and both he and Lucy having had several drinks, he wrote out “the memorandum” quoted above and induced his wife to sign it; that he did not deliver the memorandum to Lucy, but that Lucy picked it up, read it, put it in his pocket, attempted to offer Zehmer $5 to bind the bargain, which Zehmer refused to accept, and realizing for the first time that Lucy was serious, Zehmer assured him that he had no intention of selling the farm and that the whole matter was a joke. Lucy left the premises insisting that he had purchased the farm.

Depositions were taken and the decree appealed from was entered holding that the complainants had failed to establish their right to specific performance, and dismissing their bill. The assignment of error is to this action of the court.

W. O. Lucy, a lumberman and farmer, thus testified in substance: He had known Zehmer for fifteen or twenty years and had been familiar with the Ferguson farm for ten years. Seven or eight years ago he had offered Zehmer $20,000 for the farm which Zehmer had accepted, but the agreement was verbal and Zehmer backed out. On the night of December 20, 1952, around eight o’clock, he took an employee to McKenney, where Zehmer lived and operated a restaurant, filling station and motor court. While there he decided to see Zehmer and again try to buy the Ferguson farm. He entered the restaurant and talked to Mrs. Zehmer until Zehmer came in. He asked Zehmer if he had sold the Ferguson farm. Zehmer replied that he had not. Lucy said, “I bet you wouldn’t take $50,000.00 for that place.” Zehmer replied, “Yes, I would too; you wouldn’t give fifty.” Lucy said he would and told Zehmer to write up an agreement to that effect. Zehmer took a restaurant check and wrote on the back of it, “I do hereby agree to sell to W. O. Lucy the Ferguson Farm for $50,000 complete.” Lucy told him he had better change it to “We” because Mrs. Zehmer would have to sign it too. Zehmer then tore up what he had written, wrote the agreement quoted above and asked Mrs. Zehmer, who was at the other end of the counter ten or twelve feet away, to sign it. Mrs. Zehmer said she would for $50,000 and signed it. Zehmer brought it back and gave it to Lucy, who offered him $5 which Zehmer refused, saying, “You don’t need to give me any money, you got the agreement there signed by both of us.”

The discussion leading to the signing of the agreement, said Lucy, lasted thirty or forty minutes, during which Zehmer seemed to doubt that Lucy could raise $50,000. Lucy suggested the provision for having the title examined and Zehmer made the suggestion that he would sell it “complete, everything there,” and stated that all he had on the farm was three heifers.

Lucy took a partly filled bottle of whiskey into the restaurant with him for the purpose of giving Zehmer a drink if he wanted it. Zehmer did, and he and Lucy had one or two drinks together. Lucy said that while he felt the drinks he took he was not intoxicated, and from the way Zehmer handled the transaction he did not think he was either.

December 20 was on Saturday. Next day Lucy telephoned to J. C. Lucy and arranged with the latter to take a half interest in the purchase and pay half of the consideration. On Monday he engaged an attorney to examine the title. The attorney reported favorably on December 31 and on January 2 Lucy wrote Zehmer stating that the title was satisfactory, that he was ready to pay the purchase price in cash and asking when Zehmer would be ready to close the deal. Zehmer replied by letter, mailed on January 13, asserting that he had never agreed or intended to sell.

Mr. and Mrs. Zehmer were called by the complainants as adverse witnesses. Zehmer testified in substance as follows:

He bought this farm more than ten years ago for $11,000. He had had twenty-five offers, more or less, to buy it, including several from Lucy, who had never offered any specific sum of money. He had given them all the same answer, that he was not interested in selling it. On this Saturday night before Christmas it looked like everybody and his brother came by there to have a drink. He took a good many drinks during the afternoon and had a pint of his own. When he entered the restaurant around eight-thirty Lucy was there and he could see that he was “pretty high.” He said to Lucy, “Boy, you got some good liquor, drinking, ain’t you?” Lucy then offered him a drink. “I was already high as a Georgia pine, and didn’t have any more better sense than to pour another great big slug out and gulp it down, and he took one too.”

After they had talked a while Lucy asked whether he still had the Ferguson farm. He replied that he had not sold it and Lucy said, “I bet you wouldn’t take $5.0,000.00 for it.” Zehmer asked him if he would give $50,000 and Lucy said yes. Zehmer replied, “You haven’t got $50,000 in cash.” Lucy said he did and Zehmer replied that he did not believe it. They argued “pro and con for a long time,” mainly about “whether he had $50,000 in cash that he could put up right then and buy that farm.”

Finally, said Zehmer, Lucy told him if he didn’t believe he had $50,00,0, “you sign that piece of paper here and say you will take $50,000.00 for the farm.” He, Zehmer, “just grabbed the back off of a guest check there” and wrote on the back of it. At that point in his testimony Zehmer asked to see what he had written to “see if I recognize my own handwriting.” He examined the paper and exclaimed, “Great balls of fire, I got ‘Firgerson’ for Ferguson. I have got satisfactory spelled wrong. I don’t recognize that writing if I would see it, wouldn’t know it was mine.”

After Zehmer had, as he described it, “scribbled this thing off,” Lucy said, “Get your wife to sign it.” Zehmer walked over to where she was and she at first refused to sign but did so after he told her that he “was just needling him [Lucy], and didn’t mean a thing in the world, that I was not selling the farm.” Zehmer then “took it back over there and I was still looking at the dern thing. I had the drink right there by my hand, and I reached over to get a drink, and he said, ‘Let me see it.’ He reached and picked it up, and when I looked back again he had it in his pocket and he dropped a five dollar bill over there, and he said, ‘Here is five dollars payment on it.’ I said, ‘Hell no, that is beer and liquor talking. I am not going to sell you the farm. I have told you that too many times before.’ ”

Mrs. Zehmer testified that when Lucy came into the restaurant he looked as if he had had a drink. When Zehmer came in he took a drink out of a bottle that Lucy handed him. She went back to help the waitress who was getting things ready for next day. Lucy and Zehmer were talking but she did not pay too much attention to what they were saying. She heard Lucy ask Zehmer if he had sold the Ferguson farm, and Zehmer replied that he had not and did not want to sell it. Lucy said, “I bet you wouldn’t take $50,000 cash for that farm,” and Zehmer replied, “You haven’t got $50,000 cash.” Lucy said, “I can get it.” Zehmer said he might form a company and get it, “but you haven’t got $50,000.00 cash to pay me tonight.” Lucy asked him if he would put it in writing that he would sell him this farm. Zehmer then wrote on the back of a pad, “I agree to sell the Ferguson Place to W. O. Lucy for $50,000.00 cash.” Lucy said, “All right, get your wife to sign it.” Zehmer came back to where she was standing and said, “You want to put your name to this?” She said “No,” but he said in an undertone, “It is nothing but a joke,” and she signed it.

She said that only one paper was written and it said: “I hereby agree to sell,” but the “I” had been changed to “We”. However, she said she read what she signed and was then asked, “When you read We hereby agree to sell to W. O. Lucy,’ what did you interpret that to mean, that particular phrase?” She said she thought that was a cash sale that night; but she also said that when she read that part about “title satisfactory to buyer” she understood that if the title was good Lucy would pay $50,000 but if the title was bad he would have a right to reject it, and that that was her understanding at the time she signed her name.

On examination by her own counsel she said that her husband laid this piece of paper down after it was signed; that Lucy said to let him see it, took it, folded it and put it in his wallet, then said to Zehmer, “Let me give you $5.00,” but Zehmer said, “No, this is liquor talking. I don’t want to sell the farm, I have told you that I want my son to have it. This is all a joke.” Lucy then said at least twice, “Zehmer, you have sold your farm,” wheeled around and started for the door. He paused at the door and said, “I will bring you $50,000.00 tomorrow. No, tomorrow is Sunday. I will bring it to you Monday.” She said you could tell definitely that he was drinking and she said to her husband, “You should have taken him home,” but he said, “Well, I am just about as bad off as he is.”

The waitress referred to by Mrs. Zehmer testified that when Lucy first came in “he was mouthy.” When Zehmer came in they were laughing and joking and she thought they took a drink or two. She was sweeping and cleaning up for next day. She said she heard Lucy tell Zehmer, “I will give you so much for the farm,” and Zehmer said, “You haven’t got that much.” Lucy answered, “Oh, yes, I will give you that much.” Then “they jotted down something on paper and Mr. Lucy reached over and took it, said let me see it.” He looked at it, put it in his pocket and in about a minute he left. She was asked whether she saw Lucy offer Zehmer any money and replied, “He had five dollars laying up there, they didn’t take it.” She said Zehmer told Lucy he didn’t want his money “because he didn’t have enough money to pay for his property, and wasn’t going to sell his farm.” Both of them appeared to be drinking right much, she said.

She repeated on cross-examination that she was busy and paying no attention to what was going on. She was some distance away and did not see either of them sign the paper. She was asked whether she saw Zehmer put the agreement down on the table in front of Lucy, and her answer was this: “Time he got through writing whatever it was on the paper, Mr. Lucy reached over and said, ‘Let’s see it.’ He took it and put it in his pocket,” before showing it to Mrs. Zehmer. Her version was that Lucy kept raising his offer until it got to $50,000.

The defendants insist that the evidence was ample to support their contention that the writing sought to be enforced was prepared as a bluff or dare to force Lucy to admit that he did not have $50,000; that the whole matter was a joke; that the writing was not delivered to Lucy and no binding contract was ever made between the parties.

It is an unusual, if not bizarre, defense. When made to the writing admittedly prepared by one of the defendants and signed by both, clear evidence is required to sustain it.

In his testimony Zehmer claimed that he “was high as a Georgia pine,” and that the transaction “was just a bunch of two doggoned drunks bluffing to see who could talk the biggest and say the most.” That claim is inconsistent with his attempt to testify in great detail as to what was said and what was done. It is contradicted by other evidence as to the condition of both parties, and rendered of no weight by the testimony of his wife that when Lucy left the restaurant she suggested that Zehmer drive him home. The record is convincing that Zehmer was not intoxicated to the extent of being unable to comprehend the nature and consequences of the instrument he executed, and hence that instrument is not to be invalidated on that ground. 17 C. J. S., Contracts, § 133 b., p. 483; Taliaferro v. Emery, 124 Va. 674, 98 S. E. 627. It was in fact conceded by defendants’ counsel in oral argument that under the evidence Zehmer was not too drunk to make a valid contract.

The evidence is convincing also that Zehmer wrote two agreements, the first one beginning “I hereby agree to sell.” Zehmer first said he could not remember about that, then that “I don’t think I wrote but one out.” Mrs. Zehmer said that what he wrote was “I hereby agree,” but that the “I” was changed to “We” after that night. The agreement that was written and signed is in the record and indicates no such change. Neither are the mistakes in spelling that Zehmer sought to point out readily apparent.

The appearance of the contract, the fact that it was under discussion for forty minutes or more before it was signed; Lucy’s objection to the first draft because it was written in the singular, and he wanted Mrs. Zehmer to sign it also; the rewriting to meet that objection and the signing by Mrs. Zehmer; the discussion of what was to be included in the sale, the provision for the examination of the title, the completeness of the instrument that was executed, the taking possession of it by Lucy with no request or suggestion by either of the defendants that he give it back, are facts which furnish persuasive evidence that the execution of the contract was a serious business transaction rather than a casual, jesting matter as defendants now contend.

On Sunday, the day after the instrument was signed on Saturday night, there was a social gathering in a home in the town of McKenney at which there were general comments that the sale had been made. Mrs. Zehmer testified that on that occasion as she passed by a group of people, including Lucy, who were talking about the transaction, $50,000 was mentioned, whereupon she stepped up and said, “Well, with the high-price whiskey you were drinking last night you should have paid more. That was cheap.” Lucy testified that at that time Zehmer told him that he did not want to “stick” him or hold him to the agreement because he, Lucy, was too tight and didn’t know what he was doing, to which Lucy replied that he was not too tight; that he had been stuck before and was going through with it. Zehmer’s version was that he said to Lucy: “I am not trying to claim it wasn’t a deal on account of the fact the price was too low. If I had wanted to sell $50,000.00 would be a good price, in fact I think you would get stuck at $50,00.0.00.” A disinterested witness testified that what Zehmer said to Lucy was that “he was going to let him up off the deal, because he thought he was too tight, didn’t know what he was doing. Lucy said something to the effect that ‘I have been stuck before and I will go through with it.’ ”

If it be assumed, contrary to what we think the evidence shows, that Zehmer was jesting about selling his farm to Lucy and that the transaction was intended by him to be a joke, nevertheless the evidence shows that Lucy did not so understand it but considered it to be a serious business transaction and the contract to be binding on the Zehmers as well as on himself. The very next day he arranged with his brother to put up half the money and take a half interest in the land. The day after that he employed an attorney to examine the title. The next night, Tuesday, he was back at Zehmer’s place and there Zehmer told him for the first time, Lucy said, that he wasn’t going to sell and he told Zehmer, “You know you sold that place fair and square.” After receiving the report from his attorney that the title was good he wrote to Zehmer that he was ready to close the deal.

Not only did Lucy actually believe, but the evidence shows he was warranted in believing, that the contract represented a serious business transaction and a good faith sale and purchase of the farm.

In the field of contracts, as generally elsewhere, “We must look to the outward expression of a person as manifesting his intention rather than to his secret and unexpressed intention. ‘The law imputes to a person an intention corresponding to the reasonable meaning of his words and acts.’ ” First Nat. Bank v. Roanoke Oil Co., 169 Va. 99, 114, 192 S. E. 764, 770.

At no time prior to the execution of the contract had Zehmer indicated to Lucy by word or act that he was not in earnest about selling the farm. They had argued about it and discussed its terms, as Zehmer admitted, for a long time. Lucy testified that if there was any jesting it was about paying $50,000 that night. The contract and the evidence show that he was not expected to pay the money that night. Zehmer said that after the writing was signed he laid it down on the counter in front of Lucy. Lucy said Zehmer handed it to him. In any event there had been what appeared to be a good faith offer and a good faith acceptance, followed by the execution and apparent delivery of a written contract. Both said that Lucy put the writing in his pocket and then offered Zehmer $5 to seal the bargain. Not until then, even under the defendants’ evidence, was anything said or done to indicate that the matter was a joke. Both of the Zehmers testified that when Zehmer asked his wife to sign he whispered that it was a joke so Lucy wouldn’t hear and that it was not intended that he should hear.

The mental assent of the parties is not requisite for the formation of a contract. If the words or other acts of one of the parties have but one reasonable meaning, his undisclosed intention is immaterial except when an unreasonable meaning which he attaches to his manifestations is known to the other party. Restatement of the Law of Contracts, Vol. I, § 71, p. 74.

"The law therefore, judges of an agreement between two persons exclusively from those expressions of their intentions which are communicated between them. Clark on Contracts, 4 ed., § 3, p. 4.

An agreement or mutual assent is of course essential to a valid contract but the law imputes to a person an intention corresponding to the reasonable meaning of his words and acts. If his words and acts, judged by a reasonable standard, manifest an intention to agree, it is immaterial what may be the. real but unexpressed state of his mind. 17 C. J. S., Contracts, § 32, p. 361; 12 Am. Jur., Contracts, § 19, p. 515.

So a person cannot set up that he was merely jesting when his conduct and words would warrant a reasonable person in believing that he intended a real agreement, 17 C. J. S., Contracts, § 47, p. 390; Clark on Contracts, 4 ed., § 27, at p. 54.

Whether the writing signed by the defendants and now sought to be enforced by the complainants was the result of a serious offer by Lucy and a serious acceptance by the defendants, or was a serious offer by Lucy and an acceptance in secret jest by the defendants, in either event it constituted a binding contract of sale between the parties.

Defendants contend further, however, that even though a contract was made, equity should decline to enforce it under the circumstances. These circumstances have been set forth in detail above. They disclose some drinking by the two parties but not to an extent that they were unable to understand fully what they were doing. There was no fraud, no misrepresentation, no sharp practice and no dealing between unequal parties. The farm had been bought for $11,000 and was assessed for taxation at $6,300. The purchase price was $50,000. Zehmer admitted that it was a good price. There is in fact present in this case none of the grounds usually urged against specific performance.

Specific performance, it is true, is not a matter of absolute or arbitrary right, but is addressed to the reasonable and sound discretion of the court. First Nat. Bank v. Roanoke Oil Co., supra, 169 Va. at p. 116, 192 S. E. at p. 771. But it is likewise true that the discretion which may be exercised is not an arbitrary or capricious one, but one which is controlled by the established doctrines and settled principles of equity; and, generally, where a contract is in its nature and circumstances unobjectionable, it is as much a matter of course for courts of equity to decree a specific performance of it as it is for a court of law to give damages for a breach of it. Bond v. Crawford, 193 Va. 437, 444, 69 S. E. (2d) 470, 475.

The complainants are entitled to have specific performance of the contracts sued on. The decree appealed from is therefore reversed and the cause is remanded for the entry of a proper decree requiring the defendants to perform the contract in accordance with the prayer of the bill.

Reversed and remanded.

Dustin S. KOLODZIEJ, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. James Cheney MASON, J. Cheney Mason, P.A., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 14-10644.

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

Dec. 18, 2014.

William David George, Connelly Baker Wotring, LLP, Houston, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Lisabeth Fryer, Lisabeth Fryer, P.A., Winter Park, FL, Louis K. Bonham, Law Office of Osha Lian, LLP, Austin, TX, Thomas K. Equels, Equels Law Finn, Orlando, FL, Brian Kent Wunder, Law Office of Osha Liang, LLP, Houston, TX, for Defendants-Appellees.

Before WILSON and ROSENBAUM, Circuit Judges, and SCHLESINGER,* District Judge.

*

Honorable Harvey E. Schlesinger, United States District Judge for the Middle District of Florida, silting by designation.

WILSON, Circuit Judge:

This case involves a law student’s efforts to form a contract by accepting a “million-dollar challenge” that a lawyer extended on national television while representing a client accused of murder. Since we find that the challenge did not give rise to an enforceable unilateral contract, we hold that the district court properly entered summary judgment for the lawyer and his law firm, Defendants-Appellees James Cheney Mason (Mason) and J. Cheney Mason, P.A., with regard to the breach-of-contract claim brought by the law student, Plaintiff-Appellant Dustin S. Kolodziej.

I.

The current dispute — whether Mason formed a unilateral contract with Kolodkiej — arose from comments Mason made while representing criminal defendant Nelson Serrano, who stood accused of murdering his former business partner as well as the son, daughter, and son-in-law of a third business partner. During Serrano’s highly publicized capital murder trial, Mason participated in an interview with NBC News in which he focused on the seeming implausibility of the prosecution’s theory of the case. Indeed, his client ostensibly had an alibi — on the day of the murders, Serrano claimed to be on a business trip in an entirely different state, several hundred miles away from the scene of the crimes in central Florida. Hotel surveillance video confirmed that Serrano was at a La Quinta Inn (La Quinta) in Atlanta, Georgia, several hours before and after the murders occurred in Bartow, Florida.

However, the prosecution maintained that Serrano committed the murders in an approximately ten-hour span between the times that he was seen on the security camera. According to the prosecution, after being recorded by the hotel security camera in the early afternoon, Serrano slipped out of the hotel and, traveling under several aliases, flew from Atlanta to Orlando, where he rented a car, drove to Bartow, Florida, and committed the murders. From there, Serrano allegedly drove to the Tampa International Airport, flew back to Atlanta, and drove from the Atlanta International Airport to the La Quinta, to make an appearance on the hotel’s security footage once again that evening.

Mason argued that it was impossible for his client to have committed the murders in accordance with this timeline; for instance, for the last leg of the journey, Serrano would have had to get off a flight in Atlanta’s busy airport, travel to the La Quinta several miles away, and arrive in that hotel lobby in only twenty-eight minutes. After extensively describing the delays that would take place to render that twenty-eight-minute timeline even more unlikely,1 Mason stated, “I challenge anybody to show me, and guess what? Did they bring in any evidence to say that somebody made that route, did so? State’s burden of proof. If they can do it, I’ll challenge ’em. I’ll pay them a million dollars if they can do it.”

NBC did not broadcast Mason’s original interview during Serrano’s trial. At the conclusion of'the trial, the jury returned a guilty verdict in Serrano’s case. Thereafter, in December 2006, NBC featured an edited version of Mason’s interview in a national broadcast of its “Dateline” television program. The edited version removed much of the surrounding commentary, including Mason’s references to the State’s burden of proof, and Mason’s statement aired as, “I challenge anybody to show me — I’ll pay them a million dollars if they can do it.”

Enter Kolodziej, then a law student at the South Texas College of Law, who had been following the Serrano case. Kolodziej saw the edited version of Mason’s interview and understood the statement as a serious challenge, open to anyone, to “make it off the plane and back to the hotel within [twenty-eight] minutes” — that is, in the prosecution’s timeline — in return for one million dollars.

Kolodziej subsequently ordered and studied the transcript of the edited interview, interpreting it as an offer to form a unilateral contract — an offer he decided to accept by performing the challenge. In December 2007, Kolodziej recorded himself retracing Serrano’s alleged route, traveling from a flight at the Atlanta airport to what he believed was the former location of the now-defunct La Quinta within twenty-eight minutes. Kolodziej then sent Mason a copy of the recording of his journey and a letter stating that Kolodziej had performed the challenge and requested payment. Mason responded with a letter in which he refused payment and denied that he made a serious offer in the interview. Kolodziej again demanded payment, and Mason again refused.

Considering Mason’s refusal to pay a breach of contract, Kolodziej sued Mason and Mason’s law firm, J. Cheney Mason, P.A., in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas. Although the court dismissed the case for lack of personal jurisdiction, it was then that Kolodziej discovered the existence of Mason’s unedited interview with NBC and learned that Dateline had independently edited the interview before it aired.2 Kolodziej subsequently filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia. That suit was transferred to the Middle District of Florida, where Mason moved for summary judgment.

The district court granted summary judgment on two grounds: first, Kolodziej was unaware of the unedited Mason inter- . view at the time he attempted to perform the challenge, and thus he could not accept an offer he did not know existed; second, the challenge in the unedited interview was unambiguously directed to the prosecution only, and thus Kolodziej could not accept an offer not open to him. The district court declined to address the arguments that Mason’s challenge was not a serious offer and that, in any event, Kolodziej did not adequately perform the challenge. This appeal ensued.

II.

Sitting in diversity, the district court properly applied Florida law to Kolodziej’s breach-of-contract claim; in considering Kolodziej’s appeal, we too look to the substantive law of the State of Florida. See Allison v. Vintage Sports Plaques, 136 F.3d 1443, 1445 (11th Cir.1998) (citing Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938)).

We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Iraola & CIA, S.A. v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 325 F.3d 1274, 1283 (11th Cir.2003). A grant of summary judgment may be upheld on any basis supported by the record. Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1117 (11th Cir.1993).

III.

The case before us involves the potential creation of an oral, unilateral contract.3 Under Florida law, the question of whether a valid contract exists is a threshold question of law that may be properly decided by the court. See Acumen Constr., Inc. v. Neher, 616 So.2d 98, 99 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1993); accord Leonard v. Pepsico, Inc., 88 F.Supp.2d 116, 122 (S.D.N.Y.1999), aff'd 210 F.3d 88 (2d Cir.2000) (per curiam).

“To prove the existence of a contract, a plaintiff must plead: (1) offer; (2) acceptance; (3) consideration; and (4) sufficient specification of the essential terms.” Vega v. T-Mobile USA Inc., 564 F.3d 1256, 1272 (11th Cir.2009) (citing St. Joe Corp. v. McIver, 875 So.2d 375, 381 (Fla.2004)). An oral contract is subject to all basic requirements of contract law, St. Joe Corp., 875 So.2d at 381, and mutual assent is a prerequisite for the formation of any contract, see Gibson v. Courtois, 539 So.2d 459, 460 (Fla.1989) (“Mutual assent is an absolute condition precedent to the formation of the contract.”); Jacksonville Port Auth. v. W.R. Johnson Enters. Inc., 624 So.2d 313, 315 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1993) (“In order to create a contract it is essential that there be reciprocal assent to a certain and definite proposition.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Barroso v. Respiratory Care Servs., Inc., 518 So.2d 373, 376 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1987) (noting that mutual or reciprocal assent must be proven to establish an oral contract).

Mutual assent is not necessarily an independent “element” unto itself; rather, we evaluate the existence of assent by analyzing the parties’ agreement process in terms of offer and acceptance.4 See Newman v. Schiff, 778 F.2d 460, 465 (8th Cir.1985). A valid contract — premised on the parties’ requisite willingness to contract — may be “manifested through written or spoken words, or inferred in whole or in part from the parties’ conduct.” L & H Constr. Co. v. Circle Redmont, Inc., 55 So.3d 630, 634 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). We use “an objective test ... to determine whether a contract is enforceable.” See Robbie v. City of Miami, 469 So.2d 1384, 1385 (Fla.1985); see also Leonard, 88 F.Supp.2d at 128 (noting that the determination of whether a party made an offer to enter into a contract requires “the [c]ourt to determine how a reasonable, objective person would have understood” the potential offeror’s communication).

IV.

We do not find that Mason’s statements were such that a reasonable, objective person would have understood them to be an invitation to contract, regardless of whether we look to the unedited interview or the edited television broadcast seen by Kolodziej. Neither the content of Mason’s statements, nor the circumstances in which he made them, nor the conduct of the parties reflects the assent necessary to establish an actionable offer — which is, of course, essential to the creation of a contract.

As a threshold matter, the “spoken words” of Mason’s purported challenge do not indicate a willingness to enter into a contract. See L & H Constr. Co., 55 So.3d at 634. Even removed from its surrounding context, the edited sentence that Kolodziej claims creates Mason’s obligation to pay (that is, “I challenge anybody to show me — I’ll pay them a million dollars if they can do it”) appears colloquial. The exaggerated amount of “a million dollars” — the common choice of movie villains and schoolyard wagerers alike — indicates that this was hyperbole. As the district court noted, “courts have viewed such indicia of jest or hyperbole as providing a reason for an individual to doubt that an ‘offer’ was serious.” See Kolodziej v. Mason, 996 F.Supp.2d 1237, 1252 (M.D.Fla.2014) (discussing, in dicta, a laughter-eliciting joke made by Mason’s co-counsel during the interview). Thus, the very content of Mason’s spoken words “would have given any reasonable person pause, considering all of the attendant circumstances in this case.” See id.

Those attendant circumstances are further notable when we place Mason’s statements in context. As Judge Learned Hand once noted, “the circumstances in which the words are used is always relevant and usually indispensable.” N.Y. Trust Co. v. Island Oil & Transp. Corp., 34 F.2d 655, 656 (2d Cir.1929); see Lefkowitz v. Great Minneapolis Surplus Store, Inc., 251 Minn. 188, 86 N.W.2d 689, 691 (1957) (noting that the existence of an-offer “depends on the legal intention of the parties and the surrounding circumstances”). Here, Mason made the comments in the course of representing a criminal defendant accused of quadruple homicide and did so during an interview solely related to that representation. Such circumstances would lead a reasonable person to question whether the requisite assent and actionable offer giving rise to contractual liability existed. Certainly, Mason’s statements' — -made as a defense attorney in response to the prosecution’s theory against his client — were far more likely to be a descriptive illustration of what that attorney saw as serious holes in the prosecution’s theory instead of a serious offer to enter into a contract.

Nor can a valid contract be “inferred in whole or in part from the parties’ conduct” in this case. See L & H Constr. Co., 55 So.3d at 634 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Commerce P’ship 8098 LP v. Equity Contracting Co., 695 So.2d 383, 385 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1997), as modified on clarification (June 4, 1997) (noting that contracts that have not been' “put into promissory words with sufficient clarity” may still be enforceable, but they “rest upon the assent of the parties” (internal quotation marks omitted)). By way of comparison, consider Lucy v. Zehmer, 196 Va. 493, 84 S.E.2d 516 (1954), the classic case describing and applying what we now know as the objective standard of assent.5 That court held that statements allegedly made “in jest” could result in an offer binding the parties to a contract, since “the law imputes to a person an intention corresponding to the reasonable meaning of his words and acts.” Id. at 522. Therefore, “a person cannot set up that he was merely jesting when his conduct and words would warrant a reasonable person in believing that he intended a real agreement.” Id.

In so holding, the Lucy court considered that the offeror wrote, prepared, and executed a writing for sale; the parties engaged in extensive, serious discussion prior to preparing the writing; the offeror prepared a second written agreement, having changed the content of the writing in response to the offeree’s request; the offeror had his wife separately sign the writing; and the offeror allowed the offeree to leave with the signed writing without ever indicating that it was in jest. Id. at 519-22. Given that these “words and acts, judged by a reasonable standard, manifest[ed] an intention to agree,” the offeror’s “unexpressed state of ... mind” was immaterial. Id. at 522. Under the objective standard of assent, the Lucy court found that the parties had formed a contract. See id.

Applying the objective standard here leads us to the real million-dollar question: “What did the party say and do?” See Newman, 778 F.2d at 464. Here, it is what both parties did not say and did not do that clearly distinguishes this case from those cases where an enforceable contract was formed. Mason did not engage in any discussion regarding his statements to NBC with Kolodziej, and, prior to Kolodziej demanding payment, there was no contact or communication between the parties.6 Mason neither eon-firmed that he made an offer nor asserted that the offer was serious.7 Mason did not have the payment set aside in escrow;8 nor had he ever declared that he had money set aside in case someone proved him wrong.9 Mason had not made his career out of the contention that the prosecution’s case was implausible;10 nor did he make the statements in a commercial context for the “obvious purpose of advertising or promoting [his] goods or business.” 11 He did not create or promote the-video that included his statement, nor did he increase the amount at issue.12 He did not, nor did the show include, any information to contact Mason about the challenge.13 Simply put, Mason’s conduct lacks any indicia of assent to contract.14

In fact, none of Mason’s surrounding commentary — either in the unedited original interview or in the edited television broadcast — gave the slightest indication that his statement was anything other than a figure of speech. In the course of representing his client, Mason merely used a rhetorical expression to raise questions as to the prosecution’s case. We could just as easily substitute a comparable idiom such as “I’ll eat my hat” or “I’ll be a monkey’s uncle” into Mason’s interview in the place of “I’ll pay them a million dollars,” and the outcome would be the same. We would not be inclined to make him either consume his headwear or assume a simian relationship were he to be proven wrong; nor will we make him pay one million dollars here.15

Additionally, an enforceable contract requires mutual assent as to sufficiently definite essential terms. See Tiara Condo. Ass’n v. Marsh & McLennan Cos., 607 F.3d 742, 746 (11th Cir.2010), certified question answered, 110 So.3d 399 (Fla.2013) (“Under Florida law, a claim for breach of an oral contract arises only when the parties mutually assented to a certain and definite proposition and left no essential terms open.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Holloway v. Gutman, 707 So.2d 356, 357 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1998) (‘Whether a contract is oral or written, it is essential that the parties mutually agree upon the material terms.”). Here, even the proper starting and ending points for Mason’s purported challenge were unspecified and indefinite; Kolodziej had to speculate and decide for himself what constituted the essential terms of the challenge. For instance, in the prosecution’s theory of the case, Serrano, using an alias, was seated in the coach section of an aircraft loaded with over one hundred other passengers. Kolodziej, however, purchased a front.row aisle seat in first class and started the twenty-eight-minute countdown from that prime location. Comparably, Kolodziej did not finish his performance in the La Quin-ta lobby; rather, Kolodziej ended the challenge at an EconoLodge, which, based on anecdotal information, he believed was the former location of the La Quinta in which Serrano stayed.

We highlight these differences not to comment as to whether Kolodziej adequately performed the challenge — which the parties dispute for a multitude of additional reasons — but instead to illustrate the lack of definiteness and specificity in any purported offer (and absence of mutual assent thereto). It is challenging to point to anything Mason said or did that evinces a “display of willingness to enter into a contract on specified terms, made in a way that would lead a reasonable person to understand that an acceptance, having been sought, will result in a binding contract.” See Black’s Law Dictionary 1189 (9th ed.2009) (defining “offer” in contract law); see also Tiara Condo. Ass’n, 607 F.3d at 746. Therefore, we conclude that Mason did not manifest the requisite willingness to contract through his words or conduct, and no amount of subsequent effort by Kolodziej could turn Mason’s statements into an actionable offer.

In further illustration of the lack of assent to contract in this case, we question whether even Kolodziej’s conduct — his “acceptance” — manifested assent to any perceived offer. Under the objective standard of assent, we do not look into the subjective minds of the parties; the law imputes an intention that corresponds with the reasonable meaning of a party’s words and acts. See Lucy, 84 S.E.2d at 522. We thus find it troublesome that, in all this time — ordering the transcript, studying it, purchasing tickets, recording himself making the trip — Kolodziej never made any effort to contact Mason to confirm the existence of an offer, to ensure any such offer was still valid after Serrano’s conviction, or to address the details and terms of the challenge.16 However, we will not attribute bad intent when inexperience may suffice. Kolodziej may have learned in his contracts class that acceptance by performance results in an immediate, binding contract and that notice may not be necessary, but he apparently did not consider the absolute necessity of first having a specific, definite offer and the basic requirement of mutual assent. We simply are driven to ask, as Mason did in his response letter: ‘Why did you not just call?” Perhaps a jurist’s interpretation of an old aphorism provides the answer: “If, as Alexander Pope wrote, ‘a little learning is a dangerous thing,’ then a little learning in law is particularly perilous.”17

V.

Finally, summary judgment was procedurally appropriate in this case. Mason’s spoken words, the circumstances in which those words were said, and the parties’ conduct are all undisputed, and we find “no genuine issue as to whether the parties’ conduct implied a contractual understanding.” See Bourque v. F.D.I.C., 42 F.3d 704, 708 (1st Cir.1994) (internal quotation marks omitted) (affirming district court’s grant of summary judgment when the “words and actions that allegedly formed a contract” are “so clear themselves that reasonable people could not differ over their meaning”); Acumen Constr., Inc., 616 So.2d at 99.

As the district court noted, “ ‘It is basic contract law that one cannot suppose, believe, suspect, imagine or hope that an offer has been made.’ ” Kolodziej, 996 F.Supp.2d at 1251 (quoting Trefsgar v. Contributors to Pa. Hosp., No. CIV.A. 97-488, 1997 WL 214803, at *3 (E.D.Pa. Apr. 23, 1997)); see Lucy, 84 S.E.2d at 522 (“[T]he law imputes to a person an intention corresponding to the reasonable meaning of his words and acts.”). No reasonable person and no reasonable juror would think, absent any other indicia of seriousness, that Mason manifested willingness to enter into a contract in either the unedited interview or the edited broadcast relied upon by Kolodziej. Accordingly, Kolodziej cannot establish the basic requirements for contract formation. With no assent, there is no actionable offer; with no offer, there is no enforceable contract. See Gibson, 539 So.2d at 460 (“Absent mutual assent, neither the contract nor any of its provisions come into existence.”). Thus, Kolodziej’s breach-of-eon-tract claim was appropriately dismissed on summary judgment.18

VI.

Just as people are free to contract, they are also free from contract, and we find it neither prudent nor permissible to impose contractual liability for offhand remarks or grandstanding. Nor would it be advisable to scrutinize a defense attorney’s hyperbolic commentary for a hidden contractual agenda, particularly when that commentary concerns the substantial protections in place for criminal defendants. Having considered the content of Mason’s statements, the context in which they were made, and the conduct of the parties, we do not find it reasonable to conclude that Mason assented to enter into a contract with anyone for one million dollars. We affirm the district court’s judgment in favor of Mason and J. Cheney Mason, P.A.

AFFIRMED.

1

For example, Mason noted that, "in Atlanta, depending on which concourse you’re landing in, you're going to have to wait to get off the airplane.... You got people boxed in — the lady with the kids in the carriage. Or people getting down their bags. Or the fat one can’t get down the aisle. I mean, whatever the story is, you’ve got delays in getting off the airplane.... Then you have to go from whatever gate you are, ... to catch the subway train to the terminal. Wait for that. Wait while it stops in the meantime. People getting on and off. Get to that. Go up again, the escalators. Get to where you're in the terminal, out the terminal to ground transportation. And from there to be on the videotape in 28 minutes.”

2

The parties do not dispute that Mason was not involved in any of the editing or broadcast decisions made by the network; that he did not see the program when it aired; and that he was not even aware that Dateline edited his interview until Kolodziej contacted him to demand payment.

3

While most contracts are bilateral, with promises exchanged between two parties, a unilateral contract is, as the name implies, one-sided-one party promises to do some thing (for example,- pay money) in exchange for performance (an act, forbearance, or conduct producing a certain result). See Ballou v. Campbell, 179 So.2d 228, 229-30 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1965).

As the parties note, unilateral contract law is a rarely litigated issue, and this particular subset of unilateral contracts is rarer still, involving the public offer of payment (a reward) for disproving a particular claim. See, e.g., Rosenthal v. Al Packer Ford, Inc., 36 Md.App. 349, 374 A.2d 377, 380 (1977) (describing "the 'I'll pay you if you prove me wrong’ category”); but see Hon. Michael M. Baylson, et al., 7 Bus. & Com. Litig. Fed. Cts. § 78:11 n. 15 (3d ed.) (noting that, although modern courts continue to use the term unilateral contract, some scholarly sources support that the "dichotomy between bilateral and unilateral plays a less important role in contemporary analysis of contracts” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

4

The scholarly definitions of an offer reflect this concept by including the integral component of assent. See, e.g., Corbin on Contracts § 1.11 (revised ed.1993) (defining an offer as "an expression by one party of assent to certain definite terms, provided that the other party involved in the bargaining transaction will. likewise express assent to the same terms”); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 24 (1981) ("An offer is the manifestation of willingness to enter into a bargain, so made as to justify another person in understanding that his assent to that bargain is invited and will conclude it.”).

5

See, e.g., Keith A. Rowley, You Asked for It, You Got It ... Toy Yoda: Practical Jokes, Prizes, and Contract Law, 3 Nev. L.J. 526, 527 & n. 7 (2003) (characterizing Lucy v. Zehmer as "[t]he case best known to contemporary American attorneys, judges, and law professors” for the objective assent standard and collecting the plethora of contracts casebooks in which Lucy appears as a principal case).

6

Cf. Lucy, 84 S.E.2d at 520-21 (describing the parties' extensive discussion prior to and during the creation of the contract).

7

Compare with Barnes v. Treece, where, after seeing news reports that Treece stated he would "put a hundred thousand dollars to anyone to find a crooked board,” Barnes telephoned Treece and asked if his earlier statement had been made seriously. 15 Wash.App. 437, 549 P.2d 1152, 1154 (1976). Treece “assured Barnes that the statement had been made seriously [and] advised Barnes that the statement was firm.” Id. Thus, the trial court found that "Treece’s statements before the gambling commission and reiterated to Barnes personally on the telephone constituted a valid offer for a unilateral contract.” Id.; see also Newman, 778 F.2d at 463, 466 (finding that the confirmative statement, "I did make an offer,” was pertinent to the question of whether a rebroadcast of an offer also constituted an offer).

8

In the seminal case of Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co., which found that an advertisement can constitute an offer to form a unilateral contract, the same advertisement promising the reward included the statement: “1000£ is deposited with the Alliance Bank, Regent Street, shewing our sincerity in the matter.” (1892) 2 Q.B. 484, 484-85, aff'd, (1893) 1 Q.B. 256 (Eng.); see also Barnes, 549 P.2d at 1154 ("[Treece] informed Barnes that the $100,000 was safely being held in escrow.”).

9

Cf. James v. Turilli, 473 S.W.2d 757, 761 (Mo.Ct.App.1971). In James, Turilli stated before a nationwide television audience that Jesse James didn’t die in 1882 and that Turilli "would pay Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00) to anyone ... who could prove [him] wrong.” Id. at 759 (internal quotation marks omitted). In finding that this constituted an offer, the court noted that, in addition to other evidence, Turilli had previously said that he had a "certified check of ten thousand dollars” to be collected upon proof that Jesse James had actually died in 1882. Id. at 761.

10

In Newman, a “self-styled 'tax rebel,' ” who "made a career and substantial profits out of his tax protest activities” and "promoted his books by appearing on over five hundred radio and television programs,” 778 F.2d at 461-62, made a valid, time-limited offer when, in a live television appearance, he stated, “If anybody calls this show ... and cites any section of this Code that says an individual is required to file a tax return, I will pay them $100,000,” id. at 462 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also James, 473 S.W.2d at 761 (noting that "[Turilli] had virtually made a career out of his contention Jesse W. James was not killed in 1882”).

11

Rosenthal, 374 A.2d at 379. Here, any promotional benefit that Mason might have received by appearing in the interview was incidental, not the “obvious purpose.” Rather, his televised appearance and his statements were on behalf of his client and went to the implausibility of the prosecution's case against his client. Further, even a commercial advertisement will generally constitute an offer only when it is “clear, definite, and explicit, and leaves nothing open for negotiation.” See Lefkowitz, 86 N.W.2d at 691.

12

Compare with Augstein v. Leslie, where, in YouTube videos, news articles, and online postings on social media, Leslie stated he would pay a reward to anyone who returned his stolen laptop, gradually increasing the sum to one million dollars. No. 11 Civ. 7512, 2012 WL 4928914, *2-3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 17, 2012). Given the increase in the offer amount, the value of the property lost, and Leslie’s postings, the court found that “Leslie's videos and other activities together [were] best characterized as an offer for a reward.” Id. at *2.

13

Cf. Newman, 778 F.2d at 462. During Schiff’s live interview on national television program, wherein Schiff made statements constituting an offer, "[t]he words 'Night-watch Phone-In’ and the telephone number [for the show] were flashed on the screen periodically during Schiff’s appearance. In addition, [the interviewer] repeated the telephone number and encouraged viewers to call and speak directly with Schiff on the air.” Id.

14

Correspondingly, in Leonard v. Pepsico, Inc., Pepsi’s advertisement of a Harrier Fighter jet for 7,000,000 "Pepsi Points” did not result in a valid offer or enforceable contract because “no reasonable, objective person would have understood the commercial to make a serious offer.” 88 F.Supp.2d at 130-31.

15

However, unenforceable is not quite the same as “unlitigable,” since some people might still take such a challenge literally. For example, Donald Trump recently sued Bill Maher for breach of contract after Maher stated on national television that he would offer five million dollars to Trump, donatablé to the charity of Trump's choice, if Trump proved that he was not the spawn of an orangutan. See Compl., Trump v. Maher, No. BC499537 (Cal. Sup. Ct. filed Feb. 4, 2013), available at http://pmcdeadline2.files. wordpress.com/2013/02/trump-maher_ 130205003242.pdf. Trump claimed to accept this offer by providing a copy of his birth certificate as proof of his non-orangutan origin, filing suit when Maher did not respond to his demand for payment. Trump later voluntarily dismissed the suit.

16

This is additionally problematic considering the timeline of events. The murders took place in 1997; the interview, trial, conviction, sentencing, and broadcast of the edited interview all occurred in 2006. Yet Kolodziej claims to have accepted Mason's "offer” by attempting the challenge in 2007, a year after the trial had concluded and the sentence had been returned. These factors raise serious doubts as to whether Kolodziej could even accept the purported offer, given that offers must be accepted within a reasonable time and Mason’s client had already been convicted. See 1 Williston on Contracts § 5:7 (4th ed.) (observing that, although offers of reward generally do not lapse for a substantial length of time, the reasonable-time analysis requires "taking into account the circumstances surrounding any particular offer”). A reasonable person would have had, at a minimum, hesitations as to whether any actionable offer had lapsed.

17

Chief Judge Gilbert in Ginn v. Farley, 43 Md.App. 229, 403 A.2d 858, 859 (1979) (quoting Alexander Pope, An Essay on Criticism, Part II, line 15 (n.p. 1711)).

18

Because we find that Mason's statements in these circumstances do not constitute an enforceable contractual offer, regardless of which version of the statements is considered, we need not address Kolodziej's additional arguments with regard to the district court's reasoning. See Fitzpatrick, 2 F.3d at 1117 (providing that we may affirm on the basis of any adequate ground, "regardless of whether it is the one on which the district court relied”); see also Bourque, 42 F.3d at 708 ("[E]ven if the language of purported assent is susceptible of more than one reasonable interpretation, summary judgment is nevertheless appropriate if none of those interpretations would support the nonmovant's legal argument.”).

MICHAEL M. NORMILE and WAWIE KURNIAWAN v. HAZEL ELIZABETH MILLER LAWRENCE J. SEGAL v. HAZEL ELIZABETH MILLER

No. 487PA83

(Filed 27 February 1985)

Parker Whedon, for plaintiff-appellants.

Levine & Levine, by Miles S. Levine, for plaintiff-appellee.

FRYE, Justice.

Defendant Hazel Miller owned real estate located in Charlotte, North Carolina. On 4 August 1980, the property was listed for sale with a local realtor, Gladys Hawkins. On that same day, Richard Byer, a real estate broker with the realty firm Gallery of Homes, showed the property to the prospective purchasers, Plaintiffs Normile and Kurniawan. Afterwards, Byer helped plaintiffs prepare a written offer to purchase the property. A Gallery of Homes form, entitled “Deposit Receipt AND CONTRACT for Purchase and Sale of Real Estate,” containing blanks for the insertion of terms pertinent to the purchasers’ offer, was completed in quadruplicate and signed by Normile and Kurniawan. One specific standard provision in Paragraph 9 included a blank that was filled in with the time and date to read as follows: “OFFER & Closing DATE: Time is of the essence, therefore this offer must be accepted on or before 5:00 p.m. Aug. 5th 1980. A signed copy shall be promptly returned to the purchaser.”

Byer took the offer to purchase form to Gladys Hawkins, who presented it to defendant. Later that evening, Gladys Hawkins returned the executed form to Byer. It had been signed under seal by defendant, with several changes in the terms having been made thereon and initialed by defendant. The primary changes made by defendant were an increase in the earnest money deposit ($100 to $500); an increase in the down payment due at closing ($875 to $1,000); a decrease in the unpaid principal of the existing mortgage amount ($18,525 to $18,000); a decrease in the term of the loan from seller (25 years to 20 years); and a purchaser qualification contingency added in the outer margin of the form.

That same evening, Byer presented defendant’s counteroffer to Plaintiff Normile. Byer testified in his deposition that Normile did not have $500 for the earnest money deposit, one of the requirements of defendant’s counteroffer. Also, Byer stated that Normile did not “want to go 25 [sic] years because he wanted lower payments.” Byer was under the impression at this point that Normile thought he had first option on the property and that “nobody else could put an offer in on it and buy it while he had this counteroffer, so he was going to wait awhile before he decided what to do with it.” Normile, however, neither accepted nor rejected the counteroffer at this point, according to Byer. When this meeting closed, Byer left the pink copy of the offer to purchase form containing defendant’s counteroffer with Normile. Byer stated that he thought that Normile had rejected the counteroffer at this point.

At approximately 12:30 a.m. on 5 August, Byer went to the home of Plaintiff Segal, who signed an offer to purchase with terms very similar to those contained in defendant’s counteroffer to Plaintiffs Normile and Kurniawan. This offer was accepted, without change, by defendant. Later that same day, at approximately 2:00 p.m., Byer informed Plaintiff Normile that defendant had revoked her counteroffer by commenting to Normile, “[Y]ou snooze, you lose; the property has been sold.” Prior to 5:00 p.m. on that same day, Normile and Kurniawan initialed the offer to purchase form containing defendant’s counteroffer and delivered the form to the Gallery of Homes’ office, along with the earnest money deposit of $500.

Separate actions were filed by plaintiff-appellants and -appellee seeking specific performance. Plaintiff Segal’s motion for consolidation of the trials was granted. Defendant, in her answer, recognized the validity of the contract between her and Plaintiff Segal. However, because of the action for specific performance commenced by Plaintiffs Normile and Kurniawan, defendant contended that she was unable to legally convey title to Plaintiff Segal. Both plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff Segal’s motion for summary judgment was granted by the trial court, and defendant was ordered to specifically perform the contract to convey the property to Segal. Plaintiffs Normile and Kurniawan appealed to the Court of Appeals from the trial court’s denial of their motion for summary judgment. That court unanimously affirmed the trial court’s actions. Discretionary review was allowed by this Court on petition of Plaintiffs Normile and Kurniawan.

I.

The first issue on this appeal is whether a time limit within which an offer must be accepted that is contained in a prospective purchaser’s written offer to purchase real property becomes a term of the seller’s subsequent counteroffer, transforming the counteroffer into an option contract or irrevocable offer for the time stated if signed under seal. We conclude that it does not.

Plaintiff-appellants argue that the counteroffer made by Defendant Miller to plaintiff-appellants became a binding and irrevocable option to purchase within the time for acceptance contained in their original offer to purchase. Essentially, plaintiff-appellants argue that the Court of Appeals was incorrect in holding that defendant’s counteroffer was not an irrevocable option because the “promise to hold the offer open until 5:00 p.m., 5 August 1980, was not supported by consideration, . . .” Normile, 63 N.C. App. at 694, 306 S.E. 2d at 150.

As a preliminary matter, it is obvious that the thrust of both the Court of Appeals’ and plaintiff-appellants’ arguments center around their analysis of whether or not the counteroffer from Defendant Miller to plaintiff-appellants constituted a binding and enforceable option contract for the period of time for acceptance stated and contained in plaintiff-appellants’ original offer to purchase form. This basic proposition seems to be premised upon the inaccurate notion that Defendant Miller’s “counteroffer provided that the offer would remain open until 5:00 p.m. on 5 August 1980 . . . .” Normile, 63 N.C. App. at 693, 306 S.E. 2d at 149. This same misconception is reflected in plaintiff-appellants’ brief where they state, without citing any legal authority:

It is basic that when one party makes another a written offer which the offeree changes in some respects, signs and returns, the offer becomes a counteroffer by the original offeree to the original offeror, which consists of the altered provisions and all of the unaltered provisions of the original offer. Thus, since the time limitation for acceptance was not altered, one of the provisions of the counteroffer was that the time for its acceptance would terminate at 5:00 p.m. August 5, 1980.

The counteroffer, being under seal, constituted a binding option to sell, irrevocable during the stated time limitation for its acceptance, and enforceable by specific performance upon its acceptance. (Emphasis added.)

We do not agree that defendant’s counteroffer to plaintiff-appellants subsumed all the provisions of the original offer from the prospective purchasers. To effectively explain this conclusion, we begin with a brief description of how a typical sale of real estate is consummated. The broker, whose primary duty is to secure a ready, willing, and able buyer for the seller’s property, generally initiates a potential sale by procuring the prospective purchaser’s signature on an offer to purchase instrument. J. Webster, North Carolina Real Estate for Brokers and Salesmen, § 8.03 (1974). “An ‘offer to purchase’ is simply an offer by a purchaser to buy property, . . .” J. Webster, supra, § 8.03. This instrument contains the prospective purchaser’s “offer” of the terms he wishes to propose to the seller. Id.

Usually, this offer to purchase is a printed form with blanks that are filled in and completed by the broker. Among the various clauses contained in such an instrument, it is not uncommon for the form to contain “a clause stipulating that the seller must accept the offer and approve the sale within a certain specified period of time, . . . The inclusion of a date within which the seller must accept simply indicates that the offer will automatically expire at the termination of the named period if the seller does not accept before then.” Id. § 8.10. Such a clause is contained in Paragraph 9 of the offer to purchase form in the case sub judice.

In the instant case, the offerors, plaintiff-appellants, submitted their offer to purchase defendant’s property. This offer contained a Paragraph 9, requiring that “this offer must be accepted on or before 5:00 p.m. Aug. 5th 1980.” Thus the offeree’s, defendant-seller’s, power of acceptance was controlled by the duration of time for acceptance of the offer. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 35 (1981). “The offeror is the creator of the power, and before it leaves his hands, he may fashion it to his will ... if he names a specific period for its existence, the offeree can accept only during this period.” Corbin, Offer and Acceptance, and Some of the Resulting Legal Relations, 26 Yale L. J. 169, at 183 (1917); see Restatement, supra, § 41; S. Williston, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts § 53 (1957).

This offer to purchase remains only an offer until the seller accepts it on the terms contained in the original offer by the prospective purchaser. J. Webster, supra, § 8.10. If the seller does accept the terms in the purchaser’s offer, he denotes this by signing the offer to purchase at the bottom, thus forming a valid, binding, and irrevocable purchase contract between the seller and purchaser. However, if the seller purports to accept but changes or modifies the terms of the offer, he makes what is generally referred to as a qualified or conditional acceptance. Richardson v. Greensboro Warehouse & Storage Co., 223 N.C. 344, 26 S.E. 2d 897 (1943); Wilson v. W. M. Storey Lumber Co., 180 N.C. 271, 104 S.E. 531 (1920); 17 Am. Jur. 2d Contracts § 62 (1964). “The effect of such an acceptance so conditioned is to make a new counter-proposal upon which the parties have not yet agreed, but which is open for acceptance or rejection.” (Citations omitted.) Richardson, 223 N.C. at 347, 26 S.E. 2d at 899. Such a reply from the seller is actually a counteroffer and a rejection of the buyer’s offer. J. Webster, supra, § 8.10.

These basic principles of contract law are recognized not only in real estate transactions but in bargaining situations generally. It is axiomatic that a valid contract between two parties can only exist when the parties “assent to the same thing in the same sense, and their minds meet as to all terms.” Goeckel v. Stokely, 236 N.C. 604, 607, 73 S.E. 2d 618, 620 (1952). This assent, or meeting of the minds, requires an offer and acceptance in the exact terms and that the acceptance must be communicated to the offeror. Dodds v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 205 N.C. 153, 170 S.E. 652 (1933). Goeckel, 236 N.C. 604, 73 S.E. 2d 618. “If the terms of the offer are changed or any new ones added by the acceptance, there is no meeting of the minds and, consequently, no contract.” G. Thompson, supra, § 4452. This counteroffer amounts to a rejection of the original offer. S. Williston, supra, § 51. “The reason is that the counteroffer is interpreted as being in effect the statement by the offeree not only that he will enter into the transaction on the terms stated in his counteroffer, but also by implication that he will not assent to the terms of the original offer.” Id. § 36.

The question then becomes, did defendant-seller accept plaintiff-appellants’ offer prior to the expiration of the time limit contained within the offer? We conclude that she did not. The offeree, defendant-seller, changed the original offer in several material respects, most notably in the terms regarding payment of the purchase price. S. Williston, supra, § 77 (any alteration in the method of payment creates a conditional acceptance). This qualified acceptance was in reality a rejection of the plaintiff-appellants original offer because it was coupled with certain modifications or changes that were not contained in the original offer. G. Thompson, supra, § 4452. Additionally, defendant-seller’s conditional acceptance amounted to a counteroffer to plaintiff-appellants. “A counter-offer is an offer made by an offeree to his offeror relating to the same matter as the original offer and proposing a substituted bargain differing from that proposed by the original offer.” Restatement, supra, § 39. Between plaintiff-appellants and defendant-seller there was no meeting of the minds, since the parties failed to assent to the same thing in the same sense.

In substance, defendant’s conditional acceptance modifying the original offer did not manifest any intent to accept the terms of the original offer, including the time-for-acceptance provision, unless and until the original offeror accepted the terms included in defendant’s counteroffer. The offeree, by failing to unconditionally assent to the terms of the original offer and instead qualifying his acceptance with terms of his own, in effect says to the original offeror, “I will accept your offer; provided you [agree to my proposed terms].” Rucker v. Sanders, 182 N.C. 607, 609, 109 S.E. 857, 858 (1921). Thus, the time-for-acceptance provision contained in plaintiff-appellants’ original offer did not become part of the terms of the counteroffer. And, of course, if they had accepted the counteroffer from defendant, a binding purchase contract, which would have included the terms of the original offer and counteroffer, would have resulted. J. Webster, supra, § 8.03.

Plaintiff-appellants further argue that the Court of Appeals should not have looked behind the seal to determine that there was no actual consideration given by plaintiff-appellants, thus rendering the offer revocable prior to 5:00 p.m., August 5. Having previously determined that the terms of defendant’s counteroffer did not include the time-for-acceptance provision contained in the original offer, it is unnecessary to address plaintiff-appellants’ primary argument that defendant’s signature under seal is sufficient consideration to support an option contract and render it irrevocable for the stated period of time. Without addressing this precise issue, we do wish to make certain observations collateral to this argument about the nature of an option contract to further demonstrate why defendant’s counteroffer was not an irrevocable option.

It is generally recognized that “[a]n ‘option’ is a contract by which the owner agrees to give another the exclusive right to buy property at a fixed price within a specified time.” 8A G. Thompson, Commentaries on the Modern Law of Real Property, § 4443 (1963); Sandlin v. Weaver, 240 N.C. 703, 83 S.E. 2d 806 (1954). In effect, an owner of property agrees to hold his offer open for a specified period of time. G. Thompson, supra, § 4443. This option contract must also be supported by valuable consideration. Id. Disregarding the issue of consideration, it is more significant that defendant’s counteroffer did not contain any promise or agreement that her counteroffer would remain open for a specified period of time.

Several of the cases cited by plaintiff-appellants are useful in illustrating how a seller expressly agrees to hold his offer open. For instance, in Ward v. Albertson, 165 N.C. 218, 81 S.E. 168 (1914), this Court stated, “An option, in the proper sense, is a contract by which the owner of property agrees with another that he shall have the right to purchase the same at a fixed price within a certain time.” Id. at 222-23, 81 S.E. at 169. In that case, defendant-seller had agreed in writing as follows: “. . . I agree that if [prospective purchaser] pays me nine hundred and ninety-five dollars prior to January 1, 1913, to convey to him all the timber and trees . . . .” Id. at 219, 81 S.E. at 168. Similarly, in Thomason v. Bescher, 176 N.C. 622, 97 S.E. 654 (1918), defendant-seller agreed in writing: “. . . we, J. C. and W. M. Bescher, do hereby contract and agree with said [prospective purchaser] to sell and convey ... all that certain tract ... at his or their request on or before the 18th day of August, 1917 . . .” Id. at 624, 97 S.E. at 654. And finally, in Kidd v. Early, 289 N.C. 343, 222 S.E. 2d 392 (1976), defendant-sellers agreed in writing: “. . . we C. F. Early and Bessie D. Early, hereby irrevocably agree to convey to [prospective purchasers] upon demand by him within 30 days from the date hereof, ... a certain tract or parcel of land . . . .” Id. at 346, 222 S.E. 2d at 396.

In each of these three cases, this Court recognized that the sellers had given the prospective purchasers a contractual option to purchase the seller’s property. In the present case we find no comparable language within defendant-seller’s counteroffer manifesting any similar agreement. There is no language indicating that defendant-seller in any way agreed to sell or convey her real property to plaintiff-appellants at their request within a specified period of time. There is, however, language contained within the prospective purchasers’ offer to purchase that does state, “DESCRIPTION: I/we Michael M. Normile and Wawie Kurniawan hereby agree to purchase from the sellers, . . .” and “this offer must be accepted on or before 5:00 p.m. Aug. 5th 1980.” (Emphasis added.) Nowhere is there companion language to the effect that Defendant Miller “hereby agrees to sell or convey to the purchasers” if they accept by a certain date.

Therefore, regardless of whether or not the seal imported the necessary consideration, we conclude that defendant-seller made no promise or agreement to hold her offer open. Thus, a necessary ingredient to the creation of an option contract, ie., a promise to hold an offer open for a specified time, is not present. Accordingly, we hold that defendant’s counteroffer was not transformed into an irrevocable offer for the time limit contained in the original offer because the defendant’s conditional acceptance did not include the time-for-acceptance provision as part of its terms and because defendant did not make any promise to hold her counteroffer open for any stated time.

II.

The foregoing preliminary analysis of both the Court of Appeals’ opinion and plaintiff-appellants’ argument in their brief prefaces what we consider to be decisive of the ultimate issue to be resolved. Basic contract principles effectively and logically answer the primary issue in this appeal. That is, if a seller rejects a prospective purchaser’s offer to purchase but makes a counteroffer that is not accepted by the prospective purchaser, does the prospective purchaser have the power to accept after he receives notice that the counteroffer had been revoked? The answer is no. The net effect of defendant-seller’s counteroffer and rejection is twofold. First, plaintiff-appellants’ original offer was rejected and ceased to exist. S. Williston, supra, § 51. Secondly, the counteroffer by the offeree requires the original offeror, plaintiff-appellants, to either accept or reject. Benya v. Stevens & Thompson Paper Co., Inc., 143 Vt. 521, 468 A. 2d 929 (1983).

Accordingly, the next question is did plaintiff-appellants, the original offerors, accept or reject defendant-seller’s counteroffer? Plaintiff-appellants in their brief seem to answer this question when they state, “At the time Byer presented the counteroffer to Normile, Normile neither accepted nor rejected it . . . .” Therefore, plaintiff-appellants did not manifest any intent to agree to or accept the terms contained in defendant’s counteroffer. Normile instead advised Byer that he, though mistakenly, had an option on the property and that it was off the market for the duration of the time limitation contained in his original offer. As was stated by Justice Bobbitt in Howell v. Smith, 258 N.C. 150, 128 S.E. 2d 144 (1962): “ ‘The question whether a contract has been made must be determined from a consideration of the expressed intention of the parties — that is from a consideration of their words and acts.’ ” Id. at 153, 128 S.E. 2d at 146. Although Normile’s mistaken belief that he had an option is unfortunate, he still failed to express to Byer his agreement to or rejection of the counteroffer made by defendant-seller.

A recent decision by the Supreme Court of Vermont based on similar facts is instructive to this Court in reaching its decision in the present case. In Benya v. Stevens & Thompson Paper Co., Inc., 143 Vt. 521, 468 A. 2d 929 (1983), a real estate broker, at plaintiff-buyer’s request, prepared an offer to purchase property of defendant-seller. Defendant, when presented with plaintiff’s offer, made several modifications, which included changes in the terms regarding the deposit, cash at closing, interest rate, and payment terms. These changes were initialed by defendant, and the offer to purchase was mailed back for plaintiffs consideration. Plaintiff did not agree with some of the modifications and advised his attorney to execute a new offer to purchase, a third proposal. Defendant did not execute or respond to the terms contained in the second offer from plaintiff, since he had sold the property to a second purchaser in the interim. The trial court concluded that the first offer to purchase, having been signed by both the parties, constituted a valid contract. However, the Vermont Supreme Court disagreed.

The court, after citing the law relevant to offer and acceptance, determined that defendant’s alteration of the terms contained in plaintiffs original offer to purchase did not constitute an acceptance but a counteroffer. After concluding that the counteroffer required that the original offeror either accept or reject it, the court stated, “The offeror’s acceptance of the offeree’s counteroffer may be accomplished either expressly or by conduct.” (Citations omitted.) Id. at 523, 468 A. 2d at 931. After examining the record, the court concluded “that plaintiff never accepted, either expressly or otherwise, defendant’s counteroffer.” Id. The court was of the opinion that plaintiffs decision to draft a third proposal after receiving defendant’s counteroffer was not evidence of plaintiffs acceptance of such counteroffer. Furthermore, defendant did not express his assent to this third proposal. Therefore, there was no contract based upon that document either.

Plaintiff-appellants in the instant case, as plaintiff in Benya, did not accept, either expressly or by conduct, defendant’s counteroffer. In addition to disagreeing with the change in payment terms, Normile stated to Byer that “he was going to wait awhile before he decided what to do with [the counteroffer].” Neither did plaintiffs explicitly reject defendant’s counteroffer. Instead, plaintiff-appellants in this case chose to operate under the impression, though mistaken, that they had an option to purchase and that the property was “off the market.” Absent either an acceptance or rejection, there was no meeting of the minds or mutual assent between the parties, a fortiori, there was no contract. Horton v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 255 N.C. 675, 122 S.E. 2d 716 (1961); Goeckel, 236 N.C. 604, 73 S.E. 2d 618 (1952).

It is evident from the record that after plaintiff-appellants failed to accept defendant’s counteroffer, there was a second purchaser, Plaintiff-appellee Segal, who submitted an offer to defendant that was accepted. This offer and acceptance between the latter parties, together with consideration in the form of an earnest money deposit from plaintiff-appellee, ripened into a valid and binding purchase contract.

By entering into the contract with Plaintiff-appellee Segal, defendant manifested her intention to revoke her previous counteroffer to plaintiff-appellants. “It is a fundamental tenet of the common law that an offer is generally freely revocable and can be countermanded by the offeror at any time before it has been accepted by the offeree.” E. Farnsworth, Contracts, § 3.17 (1982); Restatement, supra, § 42. The revocation of an offer terminates it, and the offeree has no power to revive the offer by any subsequent attempts to accept. G. Thompson, supra, § 4452.

Generally, notice of the offeror’s revocation must be communicated to the offeree to effectively terminate the offeree’s power to accept the offer. It is enough that the offeree receives reliable information, even indirectly, “that the offeror had taken definite action inconsistent with an intention to make the contract.” E. Farnsworth, supra, § 3.17 (the author cites Dickinson v. Dodds, 2 Ch. Div. 463 (1876), a notorious English case, to support this proposition); Restatement, supra, § 43.

In this case, plaintiff-appellants received notice of the offeror’s revocation of the counteroffer in the afternoon of August 5, when Byer saw Normile and told him, “[Y]ou snooze, you lose; the property has been sold.” Later that afternoon, plaintiff-appellants initialed the counteroffer and delivered it to the Gallery of Homes, along with their earnest money deposit of $500. These subsequent attempts by plaintiff-appellants to accept defendant’s revoked counteroffer were fruitless, however, since their power of acceptance had been effectively terminated by the offeror’s revocation. Restatement, supra, § 36. Since defendant’s counteroffer could not be revived, the practical effect of plaintiff-appellants’ initialing defendant’s counteroffer and leaving it at the broker’s office before 5:00 p.m. on August 5 was to resubmit a new offer. This offer was not accepted by defendant since she had already contracted to sell her property by entering into a valid, binding, and irrevocable purchase contract with Plaintiff-appellee Segal.

For the reasons stated herein, the decision of the Court of Appeals is

Modified and affirmed.

Justice VAUGHN did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.

Edgar C. WALKER et al., Appellants, v. Clarence M. KEITH, Appellee.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

June 26, 1964.

Rehearing Denied Oct. 16, 1964.

G. D. Milliken, Jr., Marshall Funk, Bowling Green, for appellants.

Joe B. Orr, Bell, Orr & Reynolds, Bowling Green, for appellee.

CLAY, Commissioner.

In this declaratory judgment proceeding the plaintiff appellee sought an adjudication that he had effectively exercised an option to extend a lease, and a further determination of the amount of rent to be paid. The relief prayed was granted by the Chancellor. The principal issue is whether the option provision in the lease fixed the rent with sufficient certainty to constitute an enforceable contract between the parties.

In July 1951 appellants, the lessors, leased a small lot to appellee, the lessee, for a 10-year term at a rent of $100 per month. The lessee was given an option to extend the lease for an additional 10-year term, under the same terms and conditions except as to rental. The renewal option provided:

“rental will be fixed in such amount as shall actually be agreed upon by the lessors and the lessee with the monthly rental fixed on the comparative basis of rental values as of the date of the renewal with rental values at this time reflected by the comparative business conditions of the two periods.”

The lessee gave the proper notice to renew but the parties were unable to agree upon the rent. Preliminary court proceedings finally culminated in this lawsuit. Based upon the verdict of an advisory jury, the Chancellor fixed the new rent at $125 per month.

The question before us is whether the quoted provision is so indefinite and uncertain that the parties cannot be held to have agreed upon this essential rental term of the lease. There have been many cases from other jurisdictions passing on somewhat similar lease provisions and the decisions are in hopeless conflict. We have no authoritative Kentucky decision.

At the outset two observations may be made. One is that rental in the ordinary lease is a very uncomplicated item. It involves the number of dollars the lessee will pay. It, or a method of ascertaining it, can be so easily fixed with certainty. From the standpoint of stability in business transactions, it should be so fixed.

Secondly, as an original proposition, uncomplicated by subtle rules of law, the provision we have quoted, on its face, is ambiguous and indefinite. The language used is equivocal. It neither fixes the rent nor furnishes a positive key to its establishment. The terminology is not only confusing but inherently unworkable as a formula.

The above observations should resolve the issue. Unfortunately it is not that simple. Many courts have become intrigued with the possible import of similar language and have interpolated into it' a. binding obligation. The lease renewal option has been treated as something different from an ordinary contract. The law has become woefully complicated. For this reason we consider it necessary and proper to examine this question in depth.

The following basic principles of law are generally accepted:

“It is a necessary requirement in the nature of things that an agreement in order to be binding must be sufficiently definite to enable a court to give it an exact meaning.” Williston on Contracts (3rd Ed.) Vol. 1, section 37 (page 107).

“Like other contracts or agreements for a lease, the provision for a renewal must be certain in order to render it binding and enforceable. Indefiniteness, vagueness, and uncertainty in the terms of such a provision will render it void unless the parties, by their subsequent conduct or acts supplement the covenant and thus remove an alleged uncertainty. The certainty that is required is such as will enable a court to determine what has been agreed upon.” 32 Am.Jur., Landlord and Tenant, section 958 (page 806).

“The terms of an extension or renewal, under an option therefor in a lease, may be left for future determination by a prescribed method, as by future arbitration or appraisal; but merely leaving the terms for future ascertainment, without providing a method for their determination, renders the agreement unenforceable for uncertainty.” 51 C.J.S. Landlord and Tenant 56b (2), page 597.

“A renewal covenant in a lease which leaves the renewal rental to be fixed by future agreement between the parties has generally been held unenforceable and void for uncertainty and indefiniteness. Also, as a general rule, provisions for renewal rental dependent upon future valuation of premises without indicating when or how such valuation should be made have been held void for uncertainty and indefiniteness.” 32 Am. Jur., Landlord and Tenant, section 965 (page 810).

Many decisions supporting these principles may be found in 30 A.L.R. 572 ; 68 A.L.R. 157; 166 A.L.R. 1237.

The degree of certainty is the controlling consideration. An example of an' appropriate method by which a non-fixed rental could be determined appears in Jackson v. Pepper Gasoline Co., 280 Ky. 226, 133 S.W.2d 91, 126 A.L.R. 1370. The lessee, who operated an automobile service station, agreed to pay “an amount equal to one cent per gallon of gasoline delivered to said station”. Observing that the parties had created a definite objective standard by which the rent could with certainty be computed, the court upheld the lease as against the contention that it was lacking in mutuality. (The Chancellor cited this case as authoritative on the issue before us, but we do not believe it is. Appellee apparently agrees because he does not even cite the case in his brief.)

On the face of the rent provision, the parties had not agreed upon a rent figure. They left the amount to future determination. If they had agreed upon a specific method of making the determination, such as by computation, the application of a formula, or the decision of an arbitrator, they could be said to have agreed upon whatever rent figure emerged from utilization of the method. This was not done.

It will be observed the rent provision expresses two ideas. The first is that the parties agree to agree. The second is that the future agreement will be based on a comparative adjustment in the light of “business conditions”. We will examine separately these two concepts and then consider them as a whole.

The lease purports to fix the rent at such an amount as shall “actually he agreed upon”. It should be obvious that an agreement to agree cannot constitute a binding contract. Williston on Contracts (3rd Ed.) Vol. 1, section 45 (page 149); Johnson v. Lowery, Ky., 270 S.W.2d 943; National Bank of Kentucky v. Louisville Trust Co., 6 Cir., 67 F.2d 97.

Slade v. City of Lexington, 141 Ky. 214, 132 S.W. 404, 32 L.R.A., N.S., 201, has been cited as adopting a contrary view. Certain language in that opinion would seem to justify such contention. However, that case involved very unusual features and some of the broad language used was unnecessary to the decision. The parties (being a legislatively created public service corporation and a municipality) had agreed to renew a contract “upon terms as mutually agreed upon”. When the time came for renewal, both parties agreed upon new terms. Thus the contract in this respect was executed. Since the parties had actually complied with all of its provisions, it was properly held valid and binding as of its inception. No question was raised with respect to the enforceability of the contract as between the parties thereto, which is the issue before us. If this case may be construed to hold that an agreement to agree, standing alone, constitutes a binding contract, we believe it unsound.

As said in Williston on Contracts (3rd Ed.) Vol. 1, section 45 (page 149) :

“Although a promise may be sufficiently definite when it contains an option given to the promisor, yet if an essential element is reserved for the future agreement of both parties, the promise gives rise to no legal obligation until such future agreement. Since either party, by the very terms of the agreement, may refuse to agree to anything the other party will agree to, it is impossible for the law to fix any obligation to such a promise.”

We accept this because it is both sensible and basic to the enforcement of a written contract. We applied it in Johnson v. Lowery, Ky., 270 S.W.2d 943, page 946, wherein we said:

“To be enforceable and valid, a contract to enter into a future covenant must specify all material and essential terms and leave nothing to be agreed upon as a result of future negotiations.”

This proposition is not universally accepted as it pertains to renewal options in a lease. Hall v. Weatherford, 32 Ariz. 370, 259 P. 282, 56 A.L.R. 903; Rainwater v. Hobeika, 208 S.C. 433, 38 S.E.2d 495, 166 A.L.R. 1228. We have examined the reasons set forth in those opinions- and do not find them convincing. The view is taken that the renewal option is for the benefit of the lessee; that the parties intended something; and that the lessee should not be deprived of his right to enforce his contract. This reasoning seems to overlook the fact that a party must have an enforceable contract before he has a right 'to enforce it. We wonder if these courts would enforce an original lease in which the rent was not fixed, but agreed to be agreed upon.

Surely there are some limits to to what equity can or should undertake to compel parties in their private affairs to do what the court thinks they should have done. See Slayter v. Pasley, Or., 199 Or. 616, 264 P.2d 444, 449; and dissenting opinion of Judge Weygandt in Moss v. Olson, 148 Ohio 625, 76 N.E.2d 875. In any event, we are not persuaded that renewal options in leases are of such an exceptional character as to justify emasculation of one of the basic rules of contract law. An agreement to agree simply does not fix an enforceable obligation.

As noted, however, the language of the renewal option incorporated a secondary stipulation. Reference was made to “comparative business conditions” which were to play some part in adjusting the new-rental. It is contended this provides the necessary certainty, and we will examine a leading case which lends support to the argument.

In Edwards v. Tobin, 132 Or. 38, 284 P. 562, 68 A.L.R. 152, the court upheld and enforced a lease agreement which provided that the rent should he “determined” at the time of renewal, “said rental to he a reasonable rental under the then existing conditions”. (Our emphasis) Significance was attached to the last quoted language, the court reasoning that since the parties had agreed upon a reasonable rent, the court would hold the parties to the agreement by fixing it.

All rents tend to be reasonable. When parties are trying to reach an agreement, however, their ideas or claims of reasonableness may widely differ. In addition, they have a right to bargain. They cannot he said to be in agreement about what is a reasonable rent until they specify a figure or an exact method of determining it. The term “reasonable rent” is itself indefinite and uncertain. Would an original lease for a “reasonable rent” be enforceable by either party? The very purpose of a rental stipulation is to remove this item from an abstract area.

It is true courts often must imply such terms in a contract as “reasonable time” or “reasonable price”. This is done when the parties fail to deal with such matters in an otherwise enforceable contract. Here the parties were undertaking to fix the terms rather than leave them to implication. Our problem is not what the law would imply if the contract did not purport to cover the subject matter, but whether the parties, in removing this material term from the field of implication, have fixed their mutual obligations.

We are seeking what the agreement actually was. When dealing with such a specific item as rent, to be payable in dollars, the area of possible agreement is quite limited. If the parties did not agree upon such an unequivocal item or upon a definite method of ascertaining it, then there is a clear case of nonagreement. The court, in fixing an obligation under a non-agreement, is not enforcing the contract but is binding the parties to something they were patently unable to agree to when writing the contract.

The opinion in the Tobin case, which purportedly was justifying the enforcement of a contractual obligation between the lessor and lessee, shows on its face the court was doing something entirely different. This question was posed in the opinion: “What logical reason is there for equity to refuse to act when the parties themselves fail to agree on the rental?” (Our emphasis) The obvious logical answer is that even equity cannot enforce as a contract a nonagreement. No distortion of words can hide the fact that when the court admits the parties “fail to agree,” then the contract it enforces is one it makes for the parties.

It has been suggested that rent is not a material term of a lease. It is said in the Tobin case: “The method of determining the rent pertains more to form than to substance. It was not the essence of the contract, but was merely incidental and ancillary thereto.” . This seems rather startling. Nothing could be more vital in a lease than the amount of rent. It is the price the lessee agrees to pay and the lessor agrees to accept for the use of the premises. Would a contract to buy a building at a “reasonable price” be enforceable? Would the method of determining the price be a matter of “form” and “incidental and ancillary” to the transaction ? In truth it lies at the heart of it. This seems to us as no more than a grammatical means of sweeping the problem under the rug. It will not do to say that the establishment of the rent agreed upon is not of the essence of a lease contract.

We have examined the Tobin case at length because it exemplifies lines of reasoning adopted 'by some courts to dredge certainty from uncertainty. Other courts balk at the process. The majority of cases, passing upon the question of whether a renewal option providing that the future rent shall be dependent upon or proportionate to the valuation of the property at the time of renewal, hold that such provision is not sufficiently certain to constitute an enforceable agreement. See cases cited in 30 A.L.R. 579 and 68 A.L.R. 159. The valuation of property and the ascertainment of “comparative business conditions,” which we have under consideration, involve similar uncertainties.

A case construing language closely approximating that in the lease before us is Beal v. Dill, 173 Kan. 879, 252 P.2d 931. The option to extend the lease provided: “said rental shall be subject to reasonable adjustment, up or down, depending upon general business conditions then existing.” The Kansas Supreme Court, purporting to follow what it deemed the “majority rule” (and citing numerous authorities), held this language was too indefinite to be enforceable.

The opposite conclusion on similar language was reached in Greene v. Leeper, 193 Tenn. 153, 245 S.W.2d 181. The option provided for: “a rental to be agreed on according to business conditions at that time.” The court, declaring that “rental can be determined with reasonable certainty by disinterested parties,” adjudged this was an enforceable provision. The court indicated in the opinion that real estate experts would have no difficulty in fixing the rental agreed upon. The trouble is the parties did not agree to leave the matter to disinterested parties or real estate experts, and it is a false assumption that there will be no differences of opinion.

A similar renewal option was enforced in Fuller v. Michigan National Bank, 342 Mich. 92, 68 N.W.2d 771. In that case the language was “at a rent to be agreed upon, dependent on then existing conditions”. The court treated the problem as one involving an ambiguity. Synonyms for the word “ambiguous” are: indeterminate, indefinite, unsettled. This dubiosity is of course what makes it clear the parties had failed to reach an agreement.

We do not think our problem can be solved by determining which is the “majority” rule and which is the “minority” rule. We are inclined, however, to adhere to a sound basic principle of contract law unless there are impelling reasons to depart from it, particularly so when the practical problems involved in such departure are so manifest. Let us briefly examine those practical problems.

What the law requires is an adequate key to a mutual agreement. If “comparative business conditions” afforded sufficient certainty, we might possibly surmount the obstacle of the unenforceable agreement to agree. This term, however is very broad indeed. Did the parties have in mind local conditions, national conditions, or conditions affecting the lessee’s particular business?

That a controversy, rather than a mutual agreement, exists on this very question is established in this case. One of the substantial issues on appeal is whether the Chancellor properly admitted in evidence the consumer price index of the United States Labor Department. At the trial the lessor was attempting to prove the change in local conditions and the lessee sought to prove changes in national conditions. Their minds to this day have never met on a criterion to determine the rent. It is pure fiction to say the court, in deciding upon some figure, is enforcing something the parties agreed to.

One aspect of this problem seems to have been overlooked by courts which have extended themselves to fix the rent and enforce the contract. This is the Statute of Frauds. The purpose of requiring a writing to evidence an agreement is to assure certainty of the essential terms thereof and to avoid controversy and litigation. See 49 Am.Jur., Statute of Frauds, section 313 (page 629); section 353 (page 663); section 354 (page 664). This very case is living proof of the difficulties encountered when a court undertakes to supply a missing essential term of a contract.

In the first place, when the parties failed to enter into a new agreement as the renewal option provided, their rights were no longer fixed by the contract. The determination of what they were was automatically shifted to the courtroom. There the court must determine the scope of relevant evidence to establish that certainty which obviously cannot be culled from the contract. Thereupon extensive proof must be taken concerning business conditions, valuations of property, and reasonable rentals. Serious controversies develop concerning the admissibility of evidence on the issue of whether “business conditions” referred to in the lease are those on the local or national level, or are those particularly affecting the lessee’s business. An advisory jury is impanelled to express its opinion as to the proper rental figure. The judge then must decide whether the jury verdict conforms to the proof and to his concept of equity. On appeal the appellate court must examine alleged errors in the trial. Assuming some error in the trial (which appears likely on this record), the case may be reversed and the whole process begun anew. All of this time we are piously clinging to a concept that the contract itself fixed the rent with some degree of certainty.

We realize that litigation is oft times inevitable and courts should not shrink from the solution of difficult problems. On the other hand, courts should not expend their powers to establish contract rights which the parties, with an opportunity to do so, have failed to define. As said in Morrison v. Rossingnol, 5 Cal. 64, quoted in 30 A.L.R. at page 579:

“A court of equity is always chary of its power to decree specific performance, and will withhold the exercise of its jurisdiction in that respect, unless there is such a degree of certainty in the terms of the contract as will enable it at one view to do complete equity.”

That cannot be done in this case.

Stipulations such as the one before us have been the source of interminable litigation. Courts are called upon not to enforce an agreement or to determine what the agreement was, but to write their own concept of what would constitute a proper one. Why this paternalistic task should be undertaken is difficult to understand when the parties could so easily provide any number of workable methods by which rents could be adjusted. As a practical matter, courts sometimes must assert their right not to be imposed upon. This thought was thus summed up in Slayter v. Pasley, Or., 264 P.2d 444, page 449:

“We should be hesitant about completing an apparently legally incomplete agreement made between persons sui juris enjoying freedom of contract and dealing at arms’ length by arbitrarily interpolating into it our concept of the parties’ intent merely to validate what would otherwise be an invalid instrument, lest we inadvertently commit them to an ostensible agreement which, in fact, is contrary to the deliberate design of all of them. It is a dangerous doctrine when examined in the light of reason. Judicial paternalism of this character should be as obnoxious to courts as is legislation by judicial fiat. Both import a quality of jural ego and superiority not consonant with long-accepted ideas of legistic propriety under a democratic form of government. If, however, we follow the urgings of the lessee in the instant matter, we will thereby establish a precedent which will open the door to repeated opportunities to do that which, in principle, courts should not do and, in any event, are not adequately equipped to do.”

We think the basic principle of contract law that requires substantial certainty as to the material terms upon which the minds of the parties have met is a sound one and should be adhered to. A renewal option stands on the same footing as any other contract right. Rent is a material term of a lease. If the parties do not fix it with reasonable certainty, it is not the business of courts to do so.

The renewal provision before us was fatally defective in failing to specify either an agreed rental or an agreed method by which it could be fixed with certainty. Because of the lack of agreement, the lessee’s option right was illusory. The Chancellor erred in undertaking to enforce it.

The judgment is reversed.

BROWN MACHINE, DIVISION of JOHN BROWN, INC., a Delaware Corp., Plaintiff-Respondent, v. HERCULES, INC., Defendant-Appellant.

No. 54442.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District.

April 11, 1989.

Motion for Rehearing and/or Transfer to Supreme Court Denied May 9, 1989.

Application to Transfer Denied June 13, 1989.

Gerre Strehlman Langton, St. Louis, for defendant-appellant.

Louis Joseph Basso, St. Louis, for plaintiff-respondent.

STEPHAN, Judge.

Hercules Inc. (“Hercules”) appeals from the judgment of the trial court awarding respondent Brown Machine $157,911.55 plus interest after a jury verdict in favor of Brown Machine in its action against Hercules for indemnification. We reverse.

In early 1976 Brown Machine had sold appellant Hercules a T-100 trim press. The trim press was a piece of equipment apparently used in manufacturing Cool Whip bowls. The initial sales negotiations between the two companies for the trim press began in October 1975. Bruce Boardman, an engineer at Hercules, asked Jim Ryan, Brown Machine’s district sales manager, to send Hercules a quote for a trim press. On November 7, 1975, Brown Machine submitted its original proposal No. 51054 for the model T-100 trim press to Hercules. The proposal set out sixteen numbered paragraphs describing the machine to be sold. Attached to the proposal was a printed form of fifteen paragraphs in boilerplate style captioned “TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF SALE”. The eighth paragraph provided as follows:

8. LIABILITY: The purchaser agrees to pay in behalf of BROWN all sums which BROWN becomes legally obligated to pay because of bodily injury or property damage caused by or resulting from the use or misuse of the IOS [item of sale], including reasonable attorneys fees and legal expenses. The purchaser agrees to indemnify and hold BROWN harmless from all actions, claims, or demands arising out of or in any way connected with the IOS, its operation, use or misuse, or the design construction or composition of any product made or handled by the IOS, including all such actions, claims, or demands based in whole or in part on the default or negligence of BROWN.

Tim Wilson, Hercules’ purchasing agent, reviewed the proposal submitted by Brown Machine. On January 7, 1976, he telephoned Jim Ryan at Brown Machine. Mr. Ryan’s call report reflected that Hercules had prepared its purchase order No. 03361 in response to Brown Machine’s proposal but that Hercules had objected to the payment term requiring a twenty percent deposit be paid with the order. After talking with Mr. Fassett, Brown Machine’s product manager, Mr. Ryan told Mr. Wilson that Brown Machine could not waive the deposit and that an invoice for payment would be forwarded to Hercules.

Mr. Fassett issued a work order that day giving the shop instructions concerning the trim press equipment, followed by a written order the next day. The written order noted that “customer gave verbal P.O. [purchase order] for this stock machine. Will issue revision when formal purchase order received.”

On January 19, 1976, Brown Machine received Hercules’ written purchase order No. 03361 dated January 6, 1976. The order was for a “Brown T-100 Trimpress in accordance with Brown Machine quote #51054. All specifications cited within quote except item #6.1.1 which should read: ‘Reverse trim’ instead of ‘Standard regular forward trim.’ ” In a blue box on the bottom left of the purchase order form in bold print appeared “THIS ORDER EXPRESSLY LIMITS ACCEPTANCE TO THE TERMS STATED HEREIN INCLUDING THOSE PRINTED ON THE REVERSE SIDE. ANY ADDITIONAL OR DIFFERENT TERMS PROPOSED BY THE SELLER ARE REJECTED UNLESS EXPRESSLY AGREED TO IN WRITING.” The reverse side of Hercules’ purchase order, captioned “TERMS AND CONDITIONS” contained sixteen boilerplate paragraphs, the last of which provided:

16. OTHER TERMS: No oral agreement or other understanding shall in any way modify this order, or the terms or the conditions hereof. Seller’s action in (a) accepting this order, (b) delivering material; or (c) performing services called for hereunder shall constitute an acceptance of the above terms and conditions.

The purchase order contained no indemnity provision.

Brown Machine received two copies of the purchase order. One had been stamped “Vendor’s Copy” at the bottom; the other was marked “ACKNOWLEDGMENT”, with a space labeled “accepted by” for signature by Brown Machine. Brown Machine did not return this prepared acknowledgment to Hercules.

The next day, on January 20, 1976, Mr. Fassett issued his second machine order to the shop revising his description to reflect that Brown Machine had received Hercules’ formal purchase order and that the machine was no longer inventoried as a Brown stock item. On January 21, 1976, Brown Machine sent Hercules an invoice requesting payment of $4,882.00, the twenty percent deposit for the trim press.

Rather than returning the acknowledgment of the purchase order prepared by Hercules, Mr. Fassett of Brown Machine sent Hercules an “ORDER ACKNOWLEDGEMENT” dated February 5, 1976. This letter stated as follows:

Below in detail are the specifications covering the equipment ordered, and the equipment will be manufactured to meet these specifications. If these specifications and terms and conditions of Sale are not in accordance with your understanding, please ADVISE US WITHIN SEVEN (7) DAYS OF RECEIPT OF THIS ACKNOWLEDGEMENT. If we do not hear from you within this period of time, we are proceeding with the construction of the equipment as per these specifications and terms as being agreed; and any changes occurring later may result in additional charges.

ONE T-100 TRIM PRESS AS FOLLOWS ...

The paragraphs following set out the same sixteen specifications contained in Brown Machine’s original proposal. Paragraph 6.1.1 of the specifications again provided for “Standard-regular forward trim”. Page four of the acknowledgment contained the same “TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF SALE” which had accompanied Brown Machine’s earlier proposal of November 7, 1975, including paragraph eight on liability and indemnity. Only two minor changes had been penned in on page four, neither of which has any bearing on the issues presented for appeal.

Hercules responded with a letter on February 9, 1976, to Mr. Fassett that “This is to advise you that Provision 6.1 of your order acknowledgement dated 2/5/76 should read ‘Reverse Trim' instead of ‘Standard-regular forward trim.’ All other specifications are correct.” On February 16, 1976, Mr. Fassett confirmed the change in provision 6.1.1 and informed the shop that same day of the requested modification to be made.

Hercules never paid the twenty percent deposit. Brown Machine sent Hercules an invoice dated April 14, 1976, requesting final payment of the total purchase price. Brown eventually shipped the trim press to Hercules and Hercules paid the agreed-upon purchase price.

Sometime later, James Miller, an employee of Hercules, and his wife sued Brown Machine because of injuries he sustained while operating the trim press at Hercules’ plant in Union, Missouri. Brown Machine demanded that Hercules defend the Miller lawsuit, but Hercules refused. Brown Machine eventually settled the Millers’ lawsuit. Brown Machine later initiated this action against Hercules for indemnification of the settlement amount paid the Millers. Brown Machine claimed a condition of the original sales contract for the trim press required Hercules to indemnify Brown Machine for any claims arising from operation or misuse of the trim press.

Hercules’ four points on appeal challenge the submissibility of Brown Machine’s case, the verdict director given by Brown Machine, admission of certain allegedly prejudicial testimony and, finally, an instructional error. The dispositive issue on appeal is whether the parties had agreed to an indemnification provision in their contract for the sale of the T-100 trim press.

Hercules’ first point disputes Brown Machine’s contention that its initial proposal on November 7, 1975, constitutes the offer and that Hercules verbally accepted the offer by the telephone call on January 7, 1976, followed by its written purchase order dated January 6, 1976, which Brown Machine received January 19, 1976.

Article two of the Uniform Commercial Code governs transactions involving the sale of goods. U.C.C. § 2-102 (1977). Because the term “offer” is not defined in the code, the common law definition remains relevant. U.C.C. § 1-103. An offer is made when the offer leads the offeree to reasonably believe that an offer has been made. Gilbert & Bennett Manufacturing Co. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 445 F.Supp. 537, 545[3] (D.Mass.1977). Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 24 (1981) defines “offer” as “the manifestation of willingness to enter into a bargain, so made as to justify another person in understanding that his assent to that bargain is invited and will conclude it.”

The general rule is that a price quotation is not an offer, but rather is an invitation to enter into negotiations or a mere suggestion to induce offers by others. Maurice Electrical Supply Co. v. Anderson Safeway Guard Rail Corp., 632 F.Supp. 1082, 1087[3] (D.D.C.1986); USEMCO, Inc. v. Marbro Co., 60 Md.App. 351, 483 A.2d 88, 93[1] (1984). However, price quotes, if detailed enough, can amount to an offer creating the power of acceptance; to do so, it must reasonably appear from the price quote that assent to the quote is all that is needed to ripen the offer into a contract. Quaker State Mushroom Co. v. Dominick’s Finer Foods, Inc., 635 F.Supp. 1281, 1284[3] (N.D.Ill.1986); see Boese-Hilburn Co. v. Dean Machinery Co., 616 S.W.2d 520, 524-25 (Mo.App.1981).

In this case Hercules could not have reasonably believed that Brown Machine’s quotation was intended to be an offer, but rather an offer to enter into negotiations for the trim press. The cover letter accompanying the proposal mentioned that Brown Machine’s sales representative would contact Hercules “to discuss this quote” and that the quotation was submitted for Hercules “approval.” The sale price as quoted also included the notation “We have included a mechanical ejector (item 9.1.2) because we understand this unit may be used for development of many items that would require this option. However, if you decide this is not necessary $2,575.00 could be deducted from the above price for a total of $21,835.00.” Most importantly, paragraph three of the terms and conditions of sale attached to the proposal expressly provided: “No order, sale, agreement for sale, accepted proposal, offer to sell and/or contract of sale shall be binding upon BROWN unless accepted by BROWN ... on BROWN standard ‘Order Acknowlegment’ [sic] form.” Thus, because the quotation reasonably appeared to be an offer to enter into negotiations for the sale of a trim press with a mechanical ejector for $24,410.00 with acceptance conditioned upon Brown’s order acknowledgment form, no firm offer existed. Accord, Quaker State Mushroom, Inc., 635 F.Supp. at 1285. Brown’s price quote was merely a proposal, not an offer, because of its provision that Hercules’ acceptance was not binding upon Brown until Brown acknowledged the acceptance.

Even if we were to accept Brown Machine’s characterization of its proposal as an offer, the quotation by its own terms and conditions expired thirty days after its issuance (“All quoted prices are subject to change without notice except those written proposals which shall expire without notice ... thirty (30) calendar days from date issued ...”). Hercules’ written purchase order was dated January 6, 1976, and their telephone conversation of January 7, 1976, were both well beyond the expiration of the quote. Thus, even if the quotation were construed as an offer, there was no timely acceptance. See Gilbert & Bennett, 445 F.Supp. at 545[4].

If the acceptance of a price quotation, sufficiently detailed to constitute an offer, is not binding on the seller because the time within which it could have been accepted has lapsed, the purchase order, not the price quotation, is treated as the offer since the purchase order did not create an enforceable contract. McCarty v. Verson Allsteel Press Co., 89 Ill.App.3d 498, 44 Ill.Dec. 570, 411 N.E.2d at 936, 943[5] (1980). Thus, we believe Hercules’ purchase order constitutes the offer. As a general rule, orders are considered as offers to purchase. Aaron E. Levine & Co. v. Calkraft Paper Co., 429 F.Supp. 1039, 1048[15] (E.D.Mich.1976).

The question then arises whether Brown Machine’s acknowledgment containing the indemnity provision constitutes a counter offer or an acceptance of Hercules’ offer with additional or different terms. Section 400.2-207, RSMo 1986, which mirrors § 2-207 of the Uniform Commercial Code provides the workable rule of law addressing the problem of the. discrepancies in the independently drafted documents exchanged between the two parties.1 Section 400.2-207 provides as follows:

(1) A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a written confirmation which is sent within a reasonable time operates as an acceptance even though it states terms additional to or different from those offered or agreed upon, unless acceptance is expressly made conditional on assent to the additional or different terms.

(2) The additional terms are to be construed as proposals for addition to the contract. Between merchants such terms become part of the contract unless:

(a) the offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the offer;

(b) they materially alter it; or

(c) notification of objection to them has already been given or is given within a reasonable time after notice of them is received.

(3) Conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of a contract is sufficient to establish a contract for sale although the writings of the parties do not otherwise establish a contract. In such cases the terms of the particular contract consist of those terms on which the writings of the parties agree, together with any supplementary terms incorporated under any other provision of this act.

Under subsection (1) an offeree’s response to an offer operates as a valid acceptance of the offer even though it contains terms additional to, or different from, the terms of the offer unless the “acceptance is expressly made conditional” on the offeror’s assent to the additional or different terms. Where the offeree’s acceptance is made “expressly conditional” on the offeror’s assent, the response operates not as an acceptance but as a counter offer which must be accepted by the original offeror. Falcon Tankers, Inc. v. Litton Systems, Inc., 355 A.2d 898, 906[7] (Del.Super.1976). Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 59 (1981) expresses it succinctly: “[A]n offeree’s reply which purports to accept an offer but makes acceptance conditional on the offeror’s assent to terms not contained in the original offer is effective as a counteroffer rather than acceptance.”

The general view held by the majority of states is that, to convert an acceptance to a counter offer under UCC § 2-207(1), the conditional nature of the acceptance must be clearly expressed in a manner sufficient to notify the offeror that the offeree is unwilling to proceed with the transaction unless the additional or different terms are included in the contract. See Annot. “What Constitutes Acceptance ‘Expressly Made Conditional’ Converting it to Rejection and Counteroffer under UCC § 2-207(1)”, 22 ALR 4th 939, 948-49 (1983) and cases cited therein. The conditional assent provision has been construed narrowly to apply only to an acceptance which clearly shows that the offeree is unwilling to proceed absent assent to the additional or different terms. Id.; see Challenge Machinery Co. v. Mattison Machine Works, 138 Mich.App. 15, 359 N.W.2d 232, 235[3] (1984) citing Idaho Power Co. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 596 F.2d 924 (9th Cir.1979); Dorton v. Collins & Aikman Corp., 453 F.2d 1161 (6th Cir.1972).

We find nothing in Brown Machine’s acknowledgment of February 5, 1976, which reflects its unwillingness to proceed unless it obtained Hercules’ assent to the additional and different terms in Brown Machine’s acknowledgment, that is, page four of the acknowledgment styled “TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF SALE” which contained the indemnity provision. Brown Machine’s acknowledgment was not “expressly made conditional” on Hercules’ assent to the additional or different terms as provided for under § 2-207(1). Acceptance will be considered a counteroffer only if the acceptance is expressly made conditional on assent to the additional terms. Clifford-Jacobs Forging Co. v. Capital Engineering & Mfg. Co., 107 Ill.App.3d 29, 62 Ill.Dec. 785, 787, 437 N.E.2d 22, 24 (1982). We conclude Brown Machine’s acknowledgment did not operate as a counter offer within the scope of § 2-207(1).

Having determined that Brown Machine’s order acknowledgment is not a counter offer, we believe that Brown Machine’s acknowledgment operates as acceptance with additional or different terms from the offer, since the purchase order contained no indemnity provision. Under § 2-207(2), additional terms become a part of the contract between merchants unless (a) the offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the offer; (b) they materially alter it; or (c) notification of objection to them has already been given or is given within a reasonable time after notice of them is given. Hercules’ purchase order here expressly limited acceptance to the terms of its offer. Given such an express limitation, the additional terms, including the indemnification provision, failed to become part of the contract between the parties.

We can conclude Hercules intended the indemnity provision to become a part of the parties’ contract only if Hercules, as offeror, expressly assented to the additional terms, and, thus, effectively waived its condition that acceptance be limited to the terms of its offer, the purchase order. While the text of § 2-207 does not incorporate such a provision, Official Comment 3 to § 2-207 states: “Whether or not additional or different terms will become part of the agreement depends upon the provisions of subsection (2). If they are such as materially to alter the original bargain, they will not be included unless expressly agreed to by the other party.” The indemnification provision was clearly a material alteration to the parties’ agreement.

The evidence does not establish that Hercules expressly assented to the additional terms contained in Brown Machine’s order acknowledgment. Brown Machine’s order acknowledgment of February 5, 1976, indicated that “[i]f these specifications and terms and conditions of Sale are not in accordance with your understanding, please ADVISE US WITHIN SEVEN (7) DAYS OF RECEIPT OF THIS ACKNOWLEDGEMENT.” Hercules replied by letter four days later advising Brown Machine that provision 6.1.1 should provide for reverse trim instead of standard regular forward trim, followed by “all other specifications are correct.” Hercules’ use of the term “specifications” is unambiguous and clearly refers only to the protocol for the machine’s manufacture. Nothing in its response can be construed as express assent to Brown Machine’s additional “terms and conditions of sale.” Express assent under § 2-207(2) cannot be presumed by silence or mere failure to object. N & D Fashions, Inc. v. DHJ Industries, Inc., 548 F.2d 722, 726-27[5] (8th Cir.1977).

We believe it is clear as a matter of law that the indemnification clause cannot be held to be part of the contract agreed upon by the parties. The judgment of the trial court is reversed. We need not address the remaining points raised by Hercules.

REVERSED.

SMITH, P.J., and SATZ, J., concur.

1

Respondent's contention that a choice of law issue arises is without merit since § 2-207 of the Uniform Commercial Code has been enacted in nearly identical terms in Delaware, Michigan, Missouri, and Wisconsin, all the states with possible nexus to this case. Cf. U.C.C. § 2-207 with Del.Code Ann. tit. 6 § 2-207 (1974); Mich. Comp.Laws Ann. § 440.2207 (1967); § 400.2-207 RSMo (1986); Wis.Stat.Ann. § 402.207 (West 1964 and Supp.1988).