Proximate Causation: People v. Rideout

Questions of proximate causation typically arise when something unusual or unexpected happens between the defendant's act and the bad result, raising the question of whether it is fair to hold the defendant responsible for the bad result. As the Velazquez court noted, a defendant who is an actual cause may still not be a proximate cause if:

[1] the prohibited result of the defendant's conduct is beyond the scope of any fair assessment of the danger created by the defendant's conduct, or [2] it would otherwise be unjust, based on fairness and policy considerations, to hold the defendant criminally responsible for the prohibited result.

If actual causation is a question of science, proximate causation is a question of fairness, policy, and judgment. As we study proximate causation, we'll learn about a variety of tests that courts have used to answer the fairness question. Keep in mind that these "tests" are not formal doctrines, but rather arguments designed to get at the underlying policy question: should the defendant be criminally responsible?

As you read Rideout, consider the following questions: 

1. What crime was Rideout charged with? What is the issue on appeal?

2. What did Rideout do (i.e., what was his conduct)? Was he an actual cause of Keiser’s death? Were there other causes of Keiser’s death? Must Rideout be the sole cause of Keiser’s death to be considered a proximate cause?

3. In your view, should those other intervening causes break the chain of causation that extends from Rideout’s conduct to Keiser’s death? Put differently, should Rideout be criminally responsible for Keiser’s death? Why or why not?

4. In the court’s view, what concept is the “lynchpin” of proximate cause analysis?

5. What are the six possible factors identified by the court as relevant to proximate cause analysis in general? Do you agree with the court’s analysis of “apparent safety” and “voluntary human intervention”?

6. What was the result in Rideout? What do you think happened on remand?

7. Consider the distinction between “coincidental and responsive intervening causes” explained in the note following Rideout. How would that distinction apply in Rideout?

8. What is the MPC standard for proximate cause? How would that apply in Rideout?