OPINION

TOM G. DAVIS, Judge.

Appeal is taken from a conviction for murder. Punishment was assessed at twenty years.

Appellant contends that the trial court erred in allowing the prosecutor to use *646grand jury testimony during cross-examination of his wife.

The evidence is uncontradicted that the appellant shot the deceased on a grocery store parking lot in Houston on July 11, 1975. Appellant’s wife testified that this shooting was the conclusion of a chain of events starting six weeks earlier.

Mrs. Huff testified that in early May, 1975, the deceased had followed her around the grocery store while she shopped and later followed her to her home. Even after she had gone into her residence, the deceased continued to drive back and forth in front of her home. She testified that similar conduct by the deceased had occurred on some five other occasions.

On July 11, 1975, Mrs. Huff, with her two-year-old child and accompanied by her friend Dianne Wittsche, was again followed by the deceased from the store to her home. Mrs. Huff testified that as she exited her friend’s car the deceased grabbed her and told her to come with him. Mrs. Huff screamed and her friend honked the horn of the car in an attempt to attract the attention of the appellant, who was in the house.

The appellant testified that when he realized his wife was in distress he armed himself and went outside. The deceased was no longer present, but appellant’s wife explained what had occurred. According to the appellant’s and his wife’s testimony, the deceased then again passed the house. Mrs. Huff identified the deceased as the man who had followed her. The appellant testified that he attempted to pursue the deceased in Wittsche’s car, but was thwarted when the car would not start because of the seat belt interlock system. After some confusion and discussion, the appellant, his wife and child, with Wittsche driving, left in belated pursuit of the deceased. The stated reason for this pursuit was to return to the parking lot, hoping that the deceased had done the same, in order to get his car’s license number. The gun was in the car, placed in the passenger’s seat during the appellant’s attempt to start the car.

The foursome reached the lot to find the deceased standing beside his car. Wittsche stopped her car beside the deceased’s car. The relative location of the two cars and other buildings and objects was painstakingly diagrammed by each witness present when the shooting took place. These diagrams were not preserved and included in the record, thus these locations remain unclear to this Court. Nevertheless, the testimony is clear that the appellant got out of the car, confronted the deceased, and shot him twice.

The appellant testified that the deceased denied following his wife, and then threatened to kill the appellant. At this time Wittsche started forward in her car and the appellant grabbed his gun just as the car went out of his reach. Appellant testified that he entered the deceased’s car on the passenger side, struck the deceased with the pistol, and that the gun discharged during this scuffle. Appellant stated that he got out of the car and saw the deceased get out on the other side. Thinking that the deceased was about to retaliate, the appellant testified that he again shot the deceased.

Other witnesses present in the lot gave testimony conflicting with the appellant’s account of the shooting. A witness sitting in his truck waiting on members of his family testified that he first saw the appellant walk around his truck and then heard two shots. This witness also testified that he heard no verbal confrontation. Police who investigated the shooting testified that the body was found beside the rear fender of the deceased’s car. Investigating officers also stated that no blood or tissue was present in the car and that the passenger side door was locked, thus contradicting the appellant’s version of the shooting.

The appellant then got back in Wittsche’s car and left the scene. He turned himself in to the police the next morning.

The manager of the grocery store testified that a month prior to the shooting the appellant’s wife had complained about a man following her from the store. Another employee present at that time confirmed his story.

The wife’s testimony was material to appellant’s claim of self-defense, not only to *647show the prior conduct of the deceased toward her but also to corroborate the statement that the deceased had threatened to kill appellant. The prosecutor cross-examined her extensively on her prior testimony to the grand jury. This cross-examination centered around the occasions when the deceased had followed her and her testimony regarding the fatal night. The following excerpt was typical of the prosecutor’s use of the prior testimony:

“Q. Again, referring to State’s Exhibit 4 [grand jury testimony],1 Mrs. Huff, referring to Ricky now, did you hear Ricky say anything at that time after the first shot?

“A. No.

“MR. PRITCHARD [defense attorney]: Same objection, Your Honor.

“THE COURT: Same ruling.

“MR. PRITCHARD: Note my exception.

“Q. ‘Did you hear him say anything to the man after the second shot?’

Answer: ‘No, I didn’t hear him say nothing.’

Question: ‘What did he say to you when he got in the car?’

Answer: ‘He just told Dianne, “Go.” He didn’t say nothing to me until we got — I don’t remember nothing.’

Do you remember saying that to the Grand Jury?

“A. I don’t remember anything in the Grand Jury. It has been a year ago and I just don’t know. That man could have gotten me to say anything, because every time I opened my mouth, he was just screaming and hollering at me.”

Other portions of the grand jury testimony read to the jury during this cross-examination concerned the first time the deceased followed the witness home, the route she took to and from the store, her report of the incidents to the store manager, the days of the week that she went to the store, the events on the parking lot on the fatal night, and what she heard during the events on the parking lot.

Appellant contends that the prosecutor’s reading of the prior grand jury testimony was improper as he failed to lay the proper predicate for this impeachment. Defense counsel objected to the prosecutor’s reading of the prior testimony to the jury and objected to its use as hearsay. Defense counsel continued to object throughout the cross-examination, finally requesting a running objection. All of his objections and requests were overruled. The objections, as shown above, finally evolved into a “same objection,” followed by the trial court’s “same ruling.”

The proper predicate for impeachment by prior inconsistent statement requires that the witness first be asked if he made the contradictory statement at a certain place and time, and to a certain person. Ellingsworth v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 487 S.W.2d 108; Huffman v. State, Tex.Cr. App., 479 S.W.2d 62. If the witness denies making the contradicting statement, it can then be proved by the prior inconsistent statement. Ellingsworth v. State, supra; Thrash v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 500 S.W.2d 834. If the witness admits the prior inconsistent statement, however, the prior statement is not admissible. Wood v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 511 S.W.2d 37.

During the lengthy cross-examination of appellant’s wife, the prosecutor repeatedly failed to elicit a denial of the prior statement from the witness before reading the grand jury testimony. Often the prior testimony read by the prosecutor was consistent with the witness’ testimony at trial. On at least 14 occasions, much as in the example above, the prosecutor read the testimony to the witness and asked if she remembered making the statement, without first eliciting a denial of the prior statement. This use interjected into evidence a large portion of the grand jury testimony that was inadmissible. When an instru*648ment is read (into the record), it is introduced just as if the prosecutor had the instrument marked and introduced into evidence as an exhibit. Erwin v. State, 171 Tex.Cr.R. 323, 350 S.W.2d 199 (1961); Hellman v. State, 103 Tex.Cr.R. 603, 281 S.W. 874 (1926). See also Harden v. State, 417 S.W.2d 170, 174 (Tex.Cr.App.1967); Richardson v. State, 475 S.W.2d 932, 933 (Tex.Cr.App.1972); Killion v. State, 503 S.W.2d 765 (Tex.Cr.App.1973), and cases there cited. Newbern v. Spiro, 387 S.W.2d 769, 770 (Dallas Ct. of Civil Appeals, 1965).

We hold that the prosecutor’s reading of the grand jury testimony was improper impeachment as he failed to lay the proper predicate. Considering the importance of the wife’s testimony to the appellant’s defense, we cannot say that this impeachment was harmless. We hold that allowing the prosecutor to proceed in this use of the grand jury testimony over appellant’s repeated objection constitutes reversible error.

In the event of a retrial of this cause, we express concern regarding other issues raised in this trial. First, in Roberts v. State, 162 Tex.Cr.R. 41, 280 S.W.2d 285, this Court held that the State could not compel the defendant’s wife to testify in front of the grand jury and then use that testimony to impeach her when she is a witness on behalf of her husband.

We also note that the prosecutor stated to appellant’s wife during cross-examination that she had been offered a polygraph test. This Court’s prior decisions regarding polygraph tests render such practice highly suspect. Romero v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 493 S.W.2d 206; Lewis v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 500 S.W.2d 167; King v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 511 S.W.2d 32; Reed v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 522 S.W.2d 466; Leach v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 548 S.W.2d 383; Robinson v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 550 S.W.2d 54.

The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.

OPINION ON APPELLANT’S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW

ONION, Presiding Judge.

Appellant was convicted of murder. V.T. C.A., Penal Code, § 19.02(a)(1). The jury assessed his punishment at life imprisonment.

On appeal the appellant, inter alia, contended in his first point of error that the “trial court erred by admitting into evidence the written statement which a defense witness [Myren Nell Breeden] had given to the police.” The contention centered on the improper impeachment of the said witness. On original submission the Austin Court of Appeals sustained the contention and reversed the conviction. Subsequently the court granted the State’s motion for rehearing, withdrew its earlier opinion and substituted an unpublished opinion in lieu thereof, affirming appellant’s conviction. McGary v. State (Tex.App.—Austin, No. 3-85-197-CR—July 23, 1986). In the latter opinion the Court of Appeals found that appellant had failed to preserve for appeal the issue of improper impeachment. The court declared that “[b]y limiting his objection to the predicate laid for Breeden’s testimony, appellant has failed to preserve for appeal the issue of its admissibility. Hulin v. State, 438 S.W.2d 551 (Tex.Cr.App.1969).” It was the court’s position that appellant’s trial objection was limited to the failure to lay a proper predi*784cate for admission of Breeden’s statement to police whereas on appeal “appellant refers only to the admissibility of Breeden’s statement, not to the predicate.” Thus the objection at trial was not the same as the complaint raised on appeal, presenting nothing for review. This Court granted appellant’s petition for discretionary review to determine the correctness of such holding as the same conflicts with prior decisions of this Court. Rule 200(c)(1), Tex. Rules of App.Proc.

At trial there was no dispute that appellant McGary shot the deceased, Mitchell Shane Watkins, in the chest with a shotgun. The issue in dispute was whether the shooting was accidental or intentional. Three persons other than the appellant witnessed the shooting. Lisa Hough Watkins 1 supported the State’s theory of the case that the shooting was intentional. Lisa Watkins stated that on April 17, 1985, she had been living at Myren Breeden’s house for about two weeks, that appellant also stayed there at the request of Bree-den’s husband from whom she was separated. About noon on April 17, 1985, appellant entered the house asking for his pistol, saying he was going to kill “Shane [deceased] or Bo [Binyon], either one.” Appellant told Lisa “They ripped me off for an eight ball,” which Lisa described as meaning “approximately three and a half weight grams of methamphetamine.” Appellant then loaded a shotgun and went outside and Lisa followed. She related the deceased came walking toward the appellant asking “What are you doing?” When the men were about four feet apart appellant shot the deceased in the chest. When Lisa asked the appellant “Why, Billy?” he answered, “They’ll learn. They’ll learn.” Lisa testified she had knowledge of drug usage and sale, that she was using drugs at the time, but later tried to indicate the drugs were prescription drugs. She testified the deceased used drugs on occasion but refused to answer the question whether he sold drugs. The parties entered a stipulation as to Jerry Binyon’s testimony. The brief stipulation read to the jury reflected that Binyon, if called as a witness, would testify the deceased Watkins walked up to the appellant and put his hand around the barrel of the shotgun and was then shot by the appellant at 519 Pulliam Street, San Angelo, on April 17, 1985.2

Myren Nell Breeden testified for the defense. She related that appellant came to her house where he had been staying on the morning of the shooting, that he came into the house and got his shotgun and went back outside where the deceased Watkins and Binyon were. Breeden followed the appellant outside and testified an argument ensued. Breeden saw Binyon begin to circle behind the appellant and she yelled a warning to the appellant, that the appellant turned his head in response to her warning, at which time the shotgun went off, with the shot hitting Watkins in the chest.

On cross-examination the State established that Breeden had been using “speed” (methamphetamine) on the day in question, that she did smoke marihuana, and had been under psychiatric care four years before trial. The district attorney then called her attention to a written sworn statement given on April 17, 1985 (time) at the police station (place) to Detective Rudy Sosa (person). Breeden identified her signature on the statement and admitted giving the statement to Sosa following the shooting. She stated she could not read and that Sosa had the statement read to her by some lady, that she had initialed several places where corrections were made. When asked if she had told the jury what she had told Sosa she answered, “No, I did not ... Because I was told to keep a lot of stuff out of it.” Witness Breeden *785told the prosecutor she was telling the truth to the, jury, that she knew about the law of perjury, and she didn’t want to change her trial testimony. In answer to specific questions she admitted to the prosecutor that she told Sosa that the appellant had shot Watkins while Watkins had his hands up in the air, that Binyon was by the truck when the shot was fired, but “that wasn’t the way it happened.”

On recross-examination the district attorney offered into evidence the written statement. The record reflects:

“MR. FOHN: Okay. At this time we offer, Your Honor, for impeachment purposes States' Exhibit No. 9.

“MR. WILSON [Defense Counsel]: Your Honor, the only reason I object is because I believe the proper way is to ask her if she said something within that statement, and with specificity, and to allow her to admit or deny whether she said that. For that reason, we would object.

“THE COURT: Overrule the objection. 9 is admitted.”

The prosecutor was then permitted to read to the jury the entire statement.

Thereafter the appellant, age 38, testified in his own behalf. He was good friends with Watkins, the deceased, and had known him about five years. He had known Binyon about a year. Appellant knew each man carried a knife. On the night of April 16, 1985, appellant was at the house of a friend named Claire when the two men asked to borrow appellant’s car to collect on “some drug deals.” When they returned the car to Claire’s apartment the next morning where appellant had spent the night. Watkins and Binyon wanted to borrow $100.00 from appellant to “score an eight ball,” “to get some dope.” Appellant refused, telling them he needed the money for rent and moving which he and Breeden had planned to do that day. Appellant related Watkins became “pretty upset” and Binyon kept walking behind him with his hand in his pocket. Appellant then agreed to go to 519 Pulliam where he was living at the time and give the money to the men there. Upon arriving there appellant stated he went into the house and got a shotgun to defend himself as “they had that knife” and were in “pretty bad shape” wanting a “shot of dope.” When he went outside appellant saw Watkins kneeling, looking under the seat of appellant’s car. When asked what he was doing Watkins said he was looking for a book which had a list of the people who owed him money on drug sales. Appellant related that when Watkins got up and saw the shotgun “he just went crazy” and came towards the appellant. Appellant also saw Binyon begin to move, and heard Myren Breeden yell to him “Watch out, Billy.” As he turned to glance at Binyon appellant stated Watkins grabbed the shotgun and it discharged; that he did not voluntarily or intentionally pull the trigger; that the shotgun fired only when Watkins grabbed the shotgun. Appellant then went into the house to see that an ambulance had been called. He was arrested at the scene.

The State offered evidence that it took in excess of five pounds to depress the trigger on the shotgun in question, and it did not have a hair trigger, that the hammer had to be cocked before firing. Other evidence showed that when Detective Sosa arrived at the scene two minutes after receiving the call he found the boots had been removed from the body of the deceased and a bag of marihuana was lying nearby. The autopsy showed that the deceased was under the influence of marihuana at the time of his death. A knife was found among the deceased’s belongings after he was taken to the hospital.

Here we are confronted with a question of proper proof of inconsistent statements (self-contradiction). In 1 Ray, Texas Law of Evidence, § 687, p. 625 (Tex.Practice, 3d ed. 1980), it is written:

“The general theory of this kind of evidence is the same as that of contradiction by other witnesses, i.e., to show that the witness has a capacity for making errors. From his error on one point it may be inferred that he has erred on other matters. But the manner of establishing the specific error is different here. In the contradiction already con*786sidered the statements of other witnesses were relied on to show the error. Here the witness’ own prior statement in which he gave a contrary version, is used. Since his previous statement and his present testimony are contradictory, one of them must be erroneous. Therefore he had made an error. But, as in contradiction by other witnesses, the inference to be drawn is indefinite, i.e., merely a capacity to make errors. No specific defect is proven. It should be noted, however, that this method of impeaching the witness is stronger and more effective than the preceding method. The very fact of the two inconsistent statements shows an error, while in the other method the opposing witnesses must first be believed before the error appears.”

It is axiomatic that when impeaching a witness through the use of a prior inconsistent statement the examining attorney must follow a certain procedure to lay the predicate for introduction of the statement into evidence where that is permissible.

In Huffman v. State, 479 S.W.2d 62 (Tex.Cr.App.1973), it was held that proper predicate must be laid before prior inconsistent statements may be offered for impeachment purposes, and it must contain some details in regard to the circumstances in which the statement was made; thus it is usually necessary to specify, in the question or questions to the witness, the place, time and person to whom the statement is made.

In Huff v. State, 576 S.W.2d 645, 647 (Tex.Cr.App.1979), this Court wrote:

“The proper predicate for impeachment by prior inconsistent statement requires that the witness first be asked if he made the contradictory statement at a certain place and time, and to a certain person. Ellingsworth v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 487 S.W.2d 108; Huffman v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 479 S.W.2d 62. If the witness denies making the contradictory statement, it can then be proved by the prior inconsistent statement. Ellingsworth v. State, supra; Thrash v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 500 S.W.2d 834. If the witness admits the prior inconsistent statement, however, the prior statement is not admissible. Wood v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 511 S.W.2d 37.” See also Moore v. State, 652 S.W.2d 411, 413 (Tex.Cr.App.1983); Haynes v. State, 627 S.W.2d 710, 712-713.

In 1 Ray, Texas Law of Evidence, § 692, p. 633 (Tex.Practice, 3d ed. 1980), it is written:

“... that before a witness could be impeached by prior inconsistent statements a predicate must first be laid. This consists in asking the witness, on his cross-examination, whether he made the alleged contradictory statement. The witness is thus warned that the statement will be used against him. He is given an opportunity to deny it and prepare to disprove it, or if he admits making it, to explain the statement. This rule is recognized in almost all juris-dictions_”

As noted earlier, if the witness unqualifiedly3 admits making the prior inconsistent statements, this precludes further proof the statement such as the introduction of the statement into evidence. See Haynes, supra; Huff, supra; Kepley v. State, 320 S.W.2d 143, 145 (Tex.Cr.App.1959); 1 Ray, Texas Law of Evidence, § 695, p. 640 (Tex.Practice, 3d ed. 1980).4 The rule is explained in Wood v. State, 511 S.W.2d 37, 43 (Tex.Cr.App.1974), that “under circumstances the witness has performed the act of impeachment upon himself or herself.” Sloan v. State, 129 Tex.Cr.R. 131, 84 S.W.2d 484 (1935); Kepley, supra; Cherb v. State, 472 S.W.2d 273, 278 *787(Tex.Cr.App.1971), Judge Hurt stated in Walker v. State, 17 Tex.App. 16 (1884):

“When the contradictions are confessed, evidently there is no use or purpose for the impeaching testimony; for this work he performs upon himself.” See also 1 Ray, Texas Law of Evidence, § 695, 640 (Tex.Practice, 3d ed. 1980).

Generally, under such rule where the prior inconsistent statement is in writing,5 and the witness unequivocally admits making such statement, the instrument itself is not admissible, but the examining attorney may ask about specific sentences, remarks, or things in the prior statement. If the witness admits the remarks, etc., then the witness has impeached himself, and no portion of the written statement is admissible. If the witness admits making the written statements but upon inquiry denies portions of the statement, then the portion that contradicts the witness and only that portion may be proven for the purpose of impeachment. See and cf. Ellingsworth v. State, 487 S.W.2d 108 (Tex.Cr.App.1972) (involving examining trial testimony). The fact that a statement contains portions which might impeach a witness will not furnish the proper predicate for the admission of the entire statement. Ellingsworth, supra.

Appellant’s objection to the admission into evidence of the entire written statement of Breeden referred to the foregoing procedure and pointed out to the court that it was not being followed in the prosecutor’s attempt to impeach Breeden. The witness was not given an opportunity to admit or deny many of the statements in the written instrument.

The objection was sufficient to alert the trial court of the error complained of on appeal. The Court of Appeals, in its second panel opinion, viewed the objection solely as to the lack of a proper predicate and not an objection to the admissibility of the entire written statement. It then concluded that the complaint on appeal was as to admissibility and the objection at trial was to the lack of a predicate, the complaint and objection were not the same and nothing was presented for review on appeal.6 We are not able to follow such reasoning. When the law requires that a proper predicate be laid before certain evidence is deemed admissible in evidence, an objection to the lack of a predicate is necessarily an objection to the admissibility of the evidence in question. Further, appellant’s brief before the Court of Appeals clearly relies upon both lack of predicate and improper admission.

We conclude that the trial court erred in overruling appellant’s objection and admitting into evidence the written statement of Breeden which was then read to the jury. It is true that Breeden admitted making the prior statement. The State then properly interrogated Breeden in its *788attempt to impeach her by asking specific questions about certain portions of the written statement which she admitted making. The State then abandoned that procedure and offered the entire statement into evidence which included matters not specifically asked about and immaterial matters upon which it appears would have been improper for the prosecutor to impeach.7

We hold that the admission of the entire statement under the circumstances was error and the reading of the same to the jury was improper impeachment. Whether the shooting was intentional or accidental was a hotly disputed issue and Breeden’s testimony was important to the defense. Further, one of the prosecutors in his argument at the guilt stage of the trial, albeit without objection, did not limit the use of the statement to the purpose for which it was admitted — impeachment, but urged the jury to read the statement and compare it to the testimony of Lisa Watkins, the State’s chief witness on intentional shooting to see how similar the statement was and how it supported Lisa Watkins’ testimony. Rule 81(b)(2), Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, provides:

“(2) Criminal Cases. If the appellate record in a criminal case reveals error in the proceeding below, the appellate court shall reverse the judgment under review, unless the appellate court determines beyond a reasonable doubt that the error made no contribution to the conviction or to the punishment.”

Under such standard we cannot conclude that the improper impeachment was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See and cf. Huff, supra, at 648.

The judgments of the Court of Appeals and the trial court are reversed and the cause remanded to the trial court.

*264 OPINION ON APPELLANT’S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW

BAIRD, J.

delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by

OVERSTREET, MEYERS, MANSFIELD, PRICE, and HOLLAND, JJ.

Appellant was convicted of incest, indecency with a child, and aggravated sexual assault and sentenced to 25 years on each of the first two offenses and 45 years on the latter. Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 25.02, 21.11, 22.021. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Dixon v. State, 923 S.W.2d 161 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1996){Dixon I). This Court vacated that judgment and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals. Dixon v. State, 928 S.W.2d 564 (Tex.Cr.App.1996)(Dixon II). On remand, the Court of Appeals again affirmed. Dixon v. State, 955 S.W.2d 898 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1997)(Dixon III). We granted review of that decision to determine if the Court of Appeals erred in holding that a defense witness could be properly impeached by evidence of a pending felony, and whether that error, if any, was preserved for review.1

I.

A.

During his case-in chief, appellant called Elmer Pelfrey as a witness. At the time of his testimony, Pelfrey was under indictment for two felonies pending in the same court as the instant case. Before Pelfrey testified, his attorney, Bradford Shaw, presented the following motion:

My name is Bradford Shaw. I’m an attorney for Elmer Pelfrey. He has been charged with two felony indictments in this particular court, and I would motion the Court, at this time, to enter an order prohibiting the State’s attorneys from asking him any questions concerning his guilt in these two offenses that are currently pending, based on his Fifth Amendment rights and under Article I, Section 10 of the Texas Constitution.

That would also include asking whether or not he is charged with these offenses. As you are well aware, he is presumed to be innocent, and that the rules of evidence provide that a person may be — testimony may be impeached by the admission or the asking of a felony conviction. And in this instance, he has not been convicted. These cases are pending. We would ask the Court enter an order in accordance with my request.

The trial judge denied Pelfrey’s request based upon “bias and motive.” When the State attempted to question Pelfrey regarding his two pending charges, appellant objected and the trial judge stated, “[f]or the reasons stated previously, I will overrule the objection.”

B.

The Court of Appeals originally held appellant had failed to properly preserve error by his general objection.

Based on these facts, we find that Dixon waived his complaint about the admission of Pelfrey’s pending charges. First, to the extent Dixon is relying on the objections of another attorney to preserve his present complaint, his reliance is misplaced. See Martinez v. State, 833 S.W.2d 188, 191 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1992, pet. ref d) (a defendant who has not voiced his own personal objection or adopted that of his codefendant is foreclosed from relying on the objection of his codefendant to preserve error). There is no indication in the record that Dixon adopted or intended to *265adopt the objections urged by Pelfrey’s attorney in the hearing held immediately before Pelfrey’s testimony. Therefore, Dixon cannot use an objection that he did not advance at trial to preserve his complaint for appellate review.

Dixon I, 923 S.W.2d at 164-165.

On discretionary review, we considered the preservation issue. Dixon II, 928 S.W.2d at 564. In a unanimous decision, we held:

In his petition for discretionary review, Appellant submits that the Court of Appeals failed to recognize that under this Court’s opinions in Zillender v. State, 557 S.W.2d 515 (Tex.Cr.App.1977) and Lankston v. State, 827 S.W.2d 907 (Tex.Cr.App.1992), a general objection will preserve error if its grounds are apparent to the trial judge. He argues that because the trial court overruled the objection and ruled the impeachment proper “for the reasons stated previously,” it understood the grounds for Appellant’s objection to be the same as those previously voiced by Pelfrey’s counsel.

We agree. Since the trial court explicitly overruled Appellant’s objection for the reasons stated previously, i.e., the reason given for overruling Pelfrey’s objection, the judge was treating Appellant’s objection as an adoption of Pel-frey’s. Therefore, the Court of Appeals erred by holding that error was not preserved because counsel’s objection was too general to apprise the trial court of its grounds.

Id., 928 S.W.2d at 564-565. The judgment of the Court of Appeals was vacated and the cause remanded to that court for disposition consistent with our opinion. Id., 928 S.W.2d at 565.

On remand, (Dixon III), the Court of Appeals again determined appellant had failed to preserve error. The remand decision was based on the ruling of the trial court when appellant’s objection was made. The Court held:

Although Dixon argues on appeal that the evidence is inadmissible under Rule 612(b), neither Dixon’s nor Pelfrey’s counsel objected on that ground either during the hearing or during the State’s cross-examination of Pelfrey. Even after the trial court informed defense counsel that it would admit the evidence to show bias or motive, no objection was made to the court’s ruling on the basis of Rule 612(b). When the evidence was admitted, Dixon’s counsel made only a general objection based on Rule 608(b) grounds.

Id., 955 S.W.2d at 900.

We begin our review by determining whether appellant preserved error, if any.

II.

To preserve error for appellate review, the complaining party must make a timely, specific objection. Armstrong v. State, 718 S.W.2d 686, 699 (Tex.Cr.App.1985). The objection must be made at the earliest possible opportunity. Marini v. State, 593 S.W.2d 709 (Tex.Cr.App.1980). The complaining party must obtain an adverse ruling from the trial court. DeRusse v. State, 579 S.W.2d 224 (Tex.Cr.App.1979). Finally, the point of error on appeal must correspond to the objection made at trial. Thomas v. State, 723 S.W.2d 696 (Tex.Cr.App.1986).

In Dixon II, we determined appellant’s objection to the State’s cross-examination of Pelfrey regarding his pending charges adopted the objection lodged by Pelfrey’s attorney. Dixon II, 928 S.W.2d at 564-65. Appellant specifically objected to:

1. Asking Pelfrey any questions concerning his guilt in these two offenses that are currently pending,

2. based on Pelfrey’s Fifth Amendment rights and

3. under Article I, Section 10 of the Texas Constitution.

4. That would also include asking whether or not Pelfrey was charged with these offenses.

*2665. Pelfrey is presumed to be innocent, and

6. the rules of evidence provide that a person may be — testimony may be impeached by the admission or the asking of a felony conviction.

7. And in this instance, Pelfrey has not been convicted. These cases are pending.

Appellant’s objections were based on two distinct rules of evidence. First, by requesting the court not to go into the fact Pelfrey had been charged with two felonies, Tex.R.Crim. Evid. 608(b), wherein specific instances of conduct may not be inquired into on cross-examination, was implicated.2 The rule provides:

Specific instance of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting his credibility, other than conviction of crime as provided in Rule 609, may not be inquired into on cross-examination of the witness nor provided by extrinsic evidence.

Tex.R.Crim. Evid. 608(b).

Second, because Pelfrey had not been convicted, Tex.R.Grim. Evid. 609, which provides only for impeachment by evidence of conviction of a crime, was implicated.

From the record, it is clear the trial judge was sufficiently apprised that these were appellant’s objections. See, Dixon II, 928 S.W.2d at 564 (quoting Zillender v. State, 557 S.W.2d 515 (Tex.Cr.App.1977), and Lankston v. State, 827 S.W.2d 907 (Tex.Cr.App.1992)(a general objection will preserve error if its grounds are apparent to the trial judge Xemphasis supplied)). Appellant’s objections were timely and the trial judge overruled the objections, thus under Tex.R.App. P. 52, those objections were sufficient to preserve this issue for appellate review.3

III.

Having determined the error was preserved for appellate review, we now address the merits of the issue. The State argues the Tex.R.Crim. Evid. 612 trumps Tex.R.Crim. Evid. 608 or 609.4 The Court of Appeals, relying on two of their own decisions, held “the plain language of Rule 612(b) creates an exception to Rule 608(b) where the evidence shows bias or a motive for the witness to testify untruthfully.” Dixon III, 955 S.W.2d at 900. However, neither case is on point. The first case, Sparks v. State, 943 S.W.2d 513 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1997), dealt with the propriety of the State’s cross-examination of an expert witness with prior testimony from another trial. And, Thomas v. State, 897 S.W.2d 539 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1995), was a case of sexual assault where the defendant claimed the sex was consensual. The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction because the trial judge erred in prohibiting cross examination of the complainant regarding the jealous nature of her boyfriend. While the Court of Appeals correctly determined this was an appropriate area of cross-examination, Thomas has absolutely nothing to do with the instant case.

*267The Rules of Evidence provide specific and general directives and are meant to work in conformity. Should an inconsistency arise, it should be removed by reasonable construction.5 Simply stated, general rules are not meant to supercede specific rules. Under Tex.R.Crim. Evid. 612, the parties are allowed to question a witness regarding a bias or interest. This is a general rule because

The possible reasons that might cause a witness to be biased or interested in the outcome of a particular lawsuit are as numerous and varied as the infinite range of human emotions and motives. Some common forms of impeachment to show bias include racial prejudice, family relationship, employment, personal friendship or enmity, prior business dealings, prior “bad blood,” threats, and many others. A witness’s bias may be directed toward a particular person or it may be that he harbors a general bias against a group or class of which the opposing party is a member, (footnotes omitted) ...

Cathleen C. Herasimchuk, Texas Rules of Evidence Handbook § 618(b), p. 611-612 (3d ed.1998).6 In contrast, Rules 608(b) is a specific rule relating to “specific” instances of conduct. Similarly, Rule 609 is a specific rule which provides an exception to Rule 608(b) and provides for impeachment by evidence of a criminal conviction.

In the instant case, the trial judge overruled appellant’s objection under Tex. R.Crim. Evid. 608(b) and 609 under the guise of allowing impeachment under Tex. R.Crim. Evid. 612, to show motive or bias. However, the State’s cross-examination was merely to bring out evidence of the pending charges; the State never questioned Pelfrey regarding his possible bias or motive.7 Consequently the cross-examination was specifically prohibited by Rules 608(b) and 609.

Accordingly, we hold the Court of Appeals erred in holding the trial judge did not err in permitting the State to cross-examine Pelfry as to his pending charges. To hold otherwise would eviscerate Rules 608(b) and 609. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the case remanded to that Court for a harm analysis. Tex.R.App. P. 44.2.

WOMACK, J. delivered a dissenting opinion, joined by McCORMICK, P.J. and KELLER, J.

WOMACK, J.,

filed a dissenting opinion, in which McCORMICK, P.J., and KELLER, J., joined.

We granted the appellant’s petition for discretionary review to determine: (1) *268whether the Court of Appeals reversibly erred in holding that error raised on appeal was waived by trial counsel and (2) whether the Court of Appeals reversibly erred in holding that a defense witness could be properly impeached by evidence of a pending felony. Because I disagree with the majority that the appellant preserved error on his Texas Rule of Criminal Evidence 6121 complaint, I dissent.

On the appellant’s ground of error one, I would hold that although the appellant preserved error as to his Rule 608 and 609 claim, see Dixon v. State, 928 S.W.2d 564, 565 (Tex.Cr.App.1996), the appellant did not preserve error on the Rule 612 complaint.

The Court of Appeals held that the appellant had not preserved error because the appellant did not object to the questions about defense witness pending charges on the basis that the testimony was inadmissible under Rule 612(b). Dixon v. State, 955 S.W.2d 898, 900 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1997, pet. granted). The appellant’s objection, we held previously, Dixon, 928 S.W.2d at 565, adopted the grounds within Mr. Pelfre/s motion to prohibit the State from asking questions about the his pending charges.2 The relevant part of the motion before the trial court, and thus, the appellant’s objection, were based on Texas Rule of Criminal Evidence 608(b).3

The objection adopting the witness’s motion complained of the use of the pending charges as impeachment of the witness’s character generally, as prohibited in Rule 609(a).4 The trial court overruled the appellant’s objection “[fjor the reasons stated previously.” In response to the witness’s motion, the trial court had ruled that the testimony was admissible to show bias or motive.5

In his brief to this Court, the appellant complains that the Court of Appeals is *269placing the burden on the appellant to “except” to the trial court’s overruling his objection and also complains that the State did not establish relevance to admit evidence under Rule 612. See Chambers v. State, 866 S.W.2d 9, 26-27 (Tex.Cr.App.1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1100, 114 S.Ct. 1871, 128 L.Ed.2d 491 (1994) (stating that the burden of showing relevance is on the proponent). I disagree that the Court of Appeals’s opinion required that the appellant “except” to the trial court’s overruling his objection, and I believe that the appellant did not preserve error on his complaint that the State did not establish relevance. The appellant was free to object to the State’s inquiry into Mr. Pelfrey’s pending charges on more than one ground; he did not. Instead he adopted the grounds of the motion of the witness’s attorney. The appellant failed to preserve any Rule 612 complaint.

Rules 608, 609, and 612 deal with the same general subject matter: impeachment of witnesses. They serve different purposes, however. Rule 608(b) deals with the witness’s character for truthfulness, and bars the use of specific acts of conduct, for that purpose, except as provided in Rule 609.

Rule 608 does not bar evidence of specific acts not resulting in conviction as an impeachment device in all instances. It proscribes such proof only when offered for a particular purpose: to establish the witness’s character for veracity so the jury may infer that he is more or less likely to be testifying truthfully. Specific acts may, however, be proved for other purposes. For example, a witness’s acts may reveal a bias toward or against one of the litigants.

1 Steven Goode et al., Texas Practice: Guide to the Texas Rules of Evidence: Civil and Criminal, § 608.1, at 574 (2d ed.1993) (footnotes omitted). In other words, specific acts may be admissible if offered for a purpose other than showing the witness’s veracity, pursuant to another rule of evidence.

Rule 612 has multiple provisions dealing with impeachment by prior inconsistent statements, rehabilitation with a prior consistent statement, and impeachment by showing bias or interest. Rule 612(b), dealing with bias or interest, is different from Rule 608 in that it does not address the witness’s general character for telling the truth.

Unlike attacks on a witness’s character, which reflect on the witness’s truthtell-ing tendencies generally, attacks concerning bias or interest relate only to the specific litigation or parties. The impeaching party must attempt to show that the witness’s attitude is such that he is likely to favor or disfavor a particular litigant’s position for reasons unrelated to the merits of the suit.

Id. § 613.6, at 651 (footnotes omitted). In this way, the Court of Appeals is incorrect in its construction of the Rules. Rule 612(b) is not an exception to Rule 608(b); the two rules deal with different instances of the use of specific conduct to impeach. Therefore, a Rule 608 or 609 objection cannot preserve a complaint about the State’s failure to establish relevance between pending charges and a witness’s bias or motive under Rule 612.

The linchpin of the Court’s opinion is that “the State never questioned Pelfrey regarding his possible bias or motive.” Ante at 267 (footnote omitted). This is certainly the key point of a Rule 612 objection. But the appellant did not object on the basis of Rule 612. The objection appellant made, adopting the grounds of the witness’s motion, was on the basis of Rules 608 and 609. To preserve error for appellate review, the complaining party must make a timely, specific objection and obtain a ruling on the objection. Tex.R.App. P. 52(a);6 Broxton v. State, 909 S.W.2d 912, 918 (Tex.Cr.App.1995). Also, the complaint on appeal must comport with the objection at trial. Broxton, 909 *270S.W.2d at 918. “An objection stating one legal theory may not be used to support a different legal theory on appeal.” Id. (citing Johnson v. State, 803 S.W.2d 272, 292 (Tex.Cr.App.1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1259, 111 S.Ct. 2914, 115 L.Ed.2d 1078 (1991)). The appellant’s first ground of error should be overruled.

Because the appellant did not preserve the complaint for appeal, the matter was not properly before the Court of Appeals. As I result I would not discuss the merits of the appellant’s complaint. Because I would affirm the appellant’s conviction, I dissent.

OPINION ON STATE’S MOTION FOR REHEARING

McCORMICK, P.J.,

delivered the opinion of the Court, in which MANSFIELD, KELLER, HOLLAND, WOMACK and KEASLER, JJ., joined.

The State has asserted five grounds in a motion for rehearing requesting the Court to reconsider its December 16, 1998, opinion on original submission.1 We granted rehearing on grounds one through three. We will sustain grounds one and two in the State’s motion for rehearing, dismiss ground three in the State’s motion for rehearing, overrule ground for review one in appellant’s discretionary review petition, dismiss as improvidently granted ground for review two in appellant’s discretionary review petition, and affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

The procedural history and facts of this case are set out in the opinion of the Court of Appeals. Dixon v. State, 955 S.W.2d 898, 899 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1997).2 The prosecution sought to impeach defense witness Pelfrey with two pending felony indictments. Id. Appellant objected under Tex.R.Crim.Evid. 608(b)3 claiming that only “final felony convictions may be used to impeach testimony.”4 The trial court permitted the impeachment under Tex. R.Crim.Evid. 612(b) to show “bias and motive.” Dixon, 955 S.W.2d at 899.

On direct appeal, appellant claimed the impeachment was improper under Rule 612(b). The Court of Appeals decided appellant’s Rule 608(b) trial objection failed to preserve his Rule 612(b) claim for appeal. Dixon, 955 S.W.2d at 900. We exercised our discretionary authority to review this decision (ground for review one). The Court of Appeals also decided the impeachment was proper under Rule 612(b). Dixon, 955 S.W.2d at 900. We exercised our discretionary authority to review this decision (ground for review two). The Court’s December 16, 1998, opinion on original submission sustained both grounds for review, reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and remanded the case there for a harm analysis.

The Court’s opinion on original submission decided appellant’s trial objection under Rule 608(b) preserved a Rule 608(b) claim for appeal.5 The Court’s opinion on original submission then decided the impeachment was improper under Rule 612(b) because the prosecution “never questioned Pelfrey regarding his possible bias or motive.” The Court’s opinion on *271original submission then decided the impeachment was also improper under Rule 608(b) — a proposition with which everyone including the trial court did not dispute. In this way the Court’s opinion on original submission managed to avoid addressing the preservation issue presented in ground for review one of appellant’s discretionary review petition.

Of greater concern is some language in the Court’s opinion on original submission which suggests an inconsistency exists between Rule 608(b) and Rule 612(b) when it comes to impeaching a witness with specific instances of conduct. This language might lead some within the bench and bar to conclude erroneously that when specific instances of conduct are used for impeachment purposes, the “specific” provisions of Rule 608(b) control over the more “general” provisions of Rule 612(b) even if the specific instances of conduct are otherwise admissible under Rule 612(b) to show bias and motive.6 The opinion of the Court of Appeals also contains some language saying Rule 612(b) is an “exception” to Rule 608(b). Dixon, 955 S.W.2d at 900.

While Tex.R.Crim.Evid. 608 and Rule 612(b) deal with the same general subject matter of impeaching witnesses, they nevertheless are distinct rules which serve different purposes. Tex.R.Crim.Evid. 608(a) says how to impeach a witness’s general character for truthfulness. Rule 608(b) expressly bars impeaching a witness’s general character for truthfulness with specific acts of conduct “other than conviction of crime as provided in” Tex. R.Crim.Evid. 609.

Rule 612(b) permits impeaching a witness by proof of “circumstances or statements” showing the witness s bias or interest in a particular case. Unlike Rule 608(b), Rule 612(b) does not expressly bar the use of specific instances of conduct to show bias or interest.

“Rule 608 does not bar evidence of specific acts not resulting in conviction as an impeachment device in all instances. It proscribes such proof only when offered for a particular purpose: to establish a witness’s character for veracity so the jury may infer that he is more or less likely to be testifying truthfully. Specific acts may, however, be proved for other purposes. For example, a witness’s acts may reveal a bias toward or against one of the litigants.”7

So Rule 612(b) is different from Rule 608. Rule 608 addresses a witness’s general character for truthfulness. Rule 612(b) addresses a witness’s trustworthiness in the particular case because of some bias or interest.

“Unlike attacks on a witness’s character, which reflect on the witness’s truthtell-ing tendencies generally, attacks concerning bias or interest relate only to specific litigation or parties. The impeaching party must attempt to show that the witness’s attitude is such that he is likely to favor or disfavor a particular litigant’s position for reasons unrelated to the merits of the suit.”8

Therefore, our opinion on original submission incorrectly suggested Rule 608(b) controls over Rule 612(b) when a party seeks to impeach a witness with specific instances of conduct to show bias or interest and the Court of Appeals also incorrectly suggested Rule 612(b) is an “excep*272tion” to Rule 608(b). These are distinct rules which serve different purposes.9

It also is noteworthy the Court’s opinion on original submission relied on a Texas Evidence treatise which the opinion on original submission apparently considered to be persuasive, learned and authoritative. Cathleen C. Herasimchuck, Texas Rules of Evidence Handbook, Section 613(b), at 611-12 (3d ed.1998). After our opinion on original submission was handed down, the author of this treatise filed an amicus curiae letter brief stating this treatise was “never intended to convey that Rule 612 is somehow a ‘general’ rule of impeachment while [Rule 608 was] more ‘specific.’” This letter brief also says the treatise states precisely the opposite of what our opinion on original submission decided.

Consistent with the foregoing discussion, the letter brief states:

“What I intended to say was that we have various means of impeachment for credibility. One of those means is by demonstrating that the witness, as a general proposition [ 10 ] (on Monday to the cleaners, on Tuesday to the bank, on Wednesday to the police, on Thursday in Court) is not a truth teller. He should not be believed whenever he opens his mouth. One way of demonstrating that general lack of credibility is by showing that he has a poor reputation in the community for truthtelling; another is that a specific character witness testifies that, in his opinion, the fact witness is not a truthteller, is not worthy of belief. These two types of general credibility impeachment are explicitly permitted under Rule 608(a). A third way of attacking the general [11] credibility of a witness and demonstrating that he is simply never to be believed on any day on any topic is to prove that he did not tell the truth on certain specific occasions, e.g. he lied to the IRS in 1985, he lied to his wife in 1997 about an extramarital affair, he lied to his boss about making personal phone calls on the company phone in 1995. Under Federal [12] Rule 608(b), -the trial judge has discretion to allow this third type of impeachment — all those little lies out on the street that paint a picture of a generally untruthful person. The drafters of the original Texas Rules of Evidence, both Civil and Criminal, considered this ‘greasy kid stuff that was all too likely to distract the jury from its proper function and take up more time than the proposition was worth. It was basically character assassination. Under [Rule 608(b) ], it is prohibited. A fourth, entirely distinct, way of showing that a person is generally [13] unworthy of belief is to prove that he has previously been convicted of a felony or certain misdemeanor offenses which presumably reflect upon his character for truthfulness. That general mode of impeachment is covered by Rule 609 with all its caveats. Each of the four major modes of impeachment for general lack of credibility is governed by the specific eviden-tiary rules and/or precedent relating to those specific modes.

“IRule 612(b) ] deals with any (sic) entirely different type of impeachment.[ 14 ] Under this mode of impeachment, the fact witness might be the Pope or George Washington, or some other witness known far and wide for his probity, general honesty and truthtelling. But, for some unique, special reason, he might have a particular reason to slant his testimony, unconsciously or con*273sciously, for or against one party. Surely, if the defendant in a criminal case were the Pope’s mother, bodyguard, banker, or favorite Archbishop, the jury is entitled to know that fact since it is a possible reason for the Pope to be a slightly less neutral observer in this case than in some other trial. For this reason, the right to impeach for bias and motive is especially significant in American jurisprudence.

“Under [Rule 612(b) ], we still follow ‘Queen Caroline’s Rule.’ That is, in Texas we are still gentlemen and require the cross-examiner to ask the witness about the facts which might give rise to the motive or bias. We must ask the Pope, ‘Isn’t it true that the defendant is your mother, bodyguard, banker or favorite Archbishop?’ But that is all. It gives him an opportunity to deny, admit, or explain the factual basis for his possible bias. If the potential bias concerns a specific event or prior statements the witness has made, then we must also tell him where and when, and, if a statement, to whom the statement was made. “Thus, [Rule 612(b) ] deals with a specific reason why a witness might slant or shade the truth in this one instance while [Rule 608(b) deals] with the witness who, it is asserted, does not tell the truth as a general proposition. The rules do not deal with the same type of impeachment and should be considered as distinct and independent.” 15

In this case appellant objected to the prosecution’s cross-examination of Pel-frey under Rule 608(b) immediately before Pelfrey was called to the stand. Dixon, 955 S.W.2d at 899. The basis of appellant’s Rule 608(b) objection was that only “final felony convictions may be used to impeach testimony.” The trial court permitted the cross-examination under Rule 612(b) to show “bias and motive” which effectively was a ruling sustaining appellant’s Rule 608(b) objection. Dixon, 955 S.W.2d at 899. Appellant made no further objection except for another general objection during the prosecution’s cross-examination of Pelfrey which the trial court overruled “for the reasons stated previously.” Dixon, 955 S.W.2d at 899. On appeal appellant claimed the trial court erred to permit the cross-examination under Rule 612(b). Dixon, 955 S.W.2d at 899.

On this record appellant failed to preserve the Rule 612(b) issue for appeal because his appellate complaint does not comport with his trial objection. See Broxton v. State, 909 S.W.2d 912, 918 (Tex.Cr.App.1995) (to preserve error for appellate review, complaint on appeal must comport with objection at trial, and an objection stating one legal theory may not be used to support a different legal theory on appeal); Tex.R.App.Proc. 52(a) (to preserve complaint for appellate review, party must, among other things, present an objection stating the specific grounds for the ruling he desires). Based on the foregoing discussion about the distinct and different purposes served by Rule 608(b) and Rule 612(b), appellant’s Rule 608(b) objection that “only final felony convictions may be used to impeach testimony” failed to articulate any kind of an objection under Rule 612(b). See Lankston v. State, 827 S.W.2d 907, 909 (Tex.Cr.App.1992) (when it seems from context that a party failed effectively to communicate his desire, then reviewing courts should not hesitate to hold that appellate complaints arising from the event have been lost).

In addition, the trial court effectively sustained appellant’s Rule 608(b) objection when it initially permitted the prosecution’s cross-examination under Rule 612(b) to show “bias and motive” and then later overruled appellant’s general objection again “for the reasons stated previously.” Dixon, 955 S.W.2d at 899. In other words, the trial court, recognizing the distinct and different purposes served by Rule 608(b) and Rule 612(b), agreed with appellant that the prosecution’s cross-examination of *274Pelfrey was impermissible under Rule 608(b). After this, appellant pursued no other objection or complaint to an adverse ruling. See Rule 52(a) (to preserve complaint for appellate review, party must, among other things, obtain a ruling on his objection); cf. Cockrell v. State, 933 S.W.2d 73, 88-89 (Tex.Cr.App.1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1173, 117 S.Ct. 1442, 137 L.Ed.2d 548 (1997) (to preserve appellate complaint about jury argument, party must pursue objection to an adverse ruling). On this record, appellant received all the relief he specifically requested when the trial court effectively sustained his Rule 608(b) objection. Cf. Cockrell, 933 S.W.2d at 88-89.

The judgments of the Court of Appeals are affirmed.

PRICE, J., filed a concurring opinion in which MEYERS and JOHNSON, JJ., joined.

PRICE, J.,

delivered a concurring opinion in which MEYERS and JOHNSON, J.J., joined.

I concur only in the judgment. I write separately to explain my reasons for doing so. After having had the opportunity to reexamine the record on rehearing, I agree with the majority’s holding that appellant failed to preserve error under Criminal Rule 612(b)1 (now Tex.R. Evid. 613). During the guilt-innocence phase of trial, appellant called Elmer Pelfry as a witness. At the time, Pelfrey was under indictment for two felonies pending in the same court as the instant case. Before Pelfrey testified, his attorney, Bradford Shaw, presented the following motion:

MR. SHAW: My name is Bradford Shaw. I’m an attorney for Elmer Pel-frey. He has been charged with two felony indictments in this particular Court, and I would motion the Court, at this time, to enter an order prohibiting the State’s attorneys from asking him any questions concerning his guilt in these two offenses that are currently pending, based on his Fifth Amendment rights and under Article 1, Section 10 of the Texas Constitution.

That would also include asking whether or not he is charged with these offenses. As you are well aware, he presumed to be innocent, and that the rules of evidence provide that a person may be — testimony may be impeached by the admission or the asking of a felony conviction. And in this instance, he has not been convicted. These cases are pending. We would ask the Court enter an order in accordance with my request.

THE COURT: I will order the State not to ask him anything factually about the charges against hem as far as guilt-innocence or anything like that. So that portion of your request is granted.

I will deny your request — I think that under bias and motive, they can go into the fact that he does have pending charges against him.

So that is the order of the court. Anything further?

Following the trial court’s ruling, appellant’s attorney then proceeded to conduct direct examination of Mr. Pelfrey. Upon cross-examination, the State attempted to question Pelfrey regarding his two pending charges. At this point, appellant’s counsel objected, stating, “I’m going to object to that Your Honor.” The Court again overruled the objection, explaining, “For the reasons stated previously, I will overrule the objection.”

Throughout this entire colloquy, neither the trial judge nor appellant ever cited any specific rules of evidence. However, a close reading of the record supports the conclusion that while appellant’s objection to evidence of “pending cases” relied upon Rules 608(b) and 609, the trial court’s deci*275sion to overrule the objection “under bias and motive” was based on Texas Criminal Evidence Rule 612 (now Tex.R. Evid. 613). Therefore, when the trial court indicated that it would allow the evidence of Pel-frey’s pending charges to show bias and motive, appellant’s counsel should have registered another objection arguing that the evidence was also inadmissible to show bias and motive. Because he did not, he failed to preserve error under Rule 612. Admittedly, this is a thin distinction, but one that is proper nonetheless.

However, due to the fact that we are affirming the Court of Appeal’s holding that appellant failed to preserve error, it is unnecessary to address the remaining grounds in the State’s motion for rehearing. Therefore, the majority’s criticisms of the December 16, 1998, opinion are unwarranted.

For the foregoing reasons I concur in the judgment of the Court.

OPINION

COCHRAN, J.,

delivered the opinion of the unanimous Court.

Appellant claims that the court of appeals erred when it held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence that the complainant in this prosecution for indecency with a child had previously made a false accusation of “rape.” 1 We agree with appellant that the *558trial judge abused her discretion in excluding some of the evidence appellant offered to demonstrate the complainant’s motive to falsely accuse him of molestation. We therefore reverse the judgment and remand this case for further proceedings in the court of appeals.

I.

The evidence at trial showed that fifteen-year-old P.H. moved to Floresville to live with her grandmother and her father — appellant—after CPS removed her from her mother’s home in June 2005. P.H. was a troubled teen-ager who had long been under CPS supervision because her mother had drug problems. By August of 2005, she was taking the mood-stabilizing drugs Prozac and Seroquel. The Seroquel made her drowsy, and she “slept hard.”

P.H. testified that, in late August, she and appellant visited a family friend, Shon-na Makuta. According to P.H., all three of them drank vodka. P.H. then took her Seroquel and fell asleep on the living-room couch with her clothes on. She said that she woke up sometime during the night to find that her pants and underwear were gone. Appellant was standing over her. P.H. got up, put her pants back on, and then went to sleep in Shonna’s bed, which was in the living room. Shonna had “passed out” and was sleeping in an upright chair next to the couch. P.H. said that she woke up a second time to find appellant in the bed, “kind of spooning me and he had his hands on my crotch.” She got up and moved back to the couch. The next morning, P.H. “told him that I know what happened and he told me that he didn’t remember and that he was drunk and he told me he was really sorry.” She didn’t tell anyone about the molestation because she knew that appellant had been drinking.

P.H. said that, about two weeks later, she was sleeping in her grandmother’s bed with her clothes on. She woke up to find appellant behind her with his hands down the front of her pants, rubbing her vagina. When he saw that P.H. was awake, he jumped up and left the room. He was fully clothed. She fell back asleep. Later that night, the same thing happened again. She got up and locked the door. The next morning, appellant asked P.H. if she had slept okay. She said that she woke up several times and that she knew what he had done. Appellant said that he thought that was what she wanted, and then he stated, “If you ever change your mind, baby girl, let me know.” About a week later, P.H. told a friend about these incidents, and that friend told school officials, who called CPS.

On cross-examination, P.H. stated that when she lived with her mother, she “pretty much” did whatever she wanted to.

It was a lot different when I moved with my dad because it was more structured. I had a curfew. I couldn’t talk on the phone very long, I had to get good grades in school. I had to go to doctor’s appointments and stuff like that.

She got angry at appellant because of these new rules. They had a lot of fights about her staying out late. P.H. told him that she didn’t like these rules, but denied *559telling him that if he didn’t leave her alone, she was going to send him back to prison. She also denied telling anyone that these sexual events didn’t happen.

After P.H.’s testimony, defense counsel requested a hearing outside the jury’s presence to revisit the trial judge’s pretrial ruling on the State’s motion in limine that excluded all evidence of P.H.’s previous sexual conduct. Appellant explained that he wanted to introduce P.H.’s medical records from a sexual-assault examination on July 6, 2005 (one month after she had come to live with appellant), in which she told the hospital nurse that Ignacio Talam-endez “sexually assaulted” her. She told the nurse that “at first it was kind of a consensual thing but I told him to stop and he kept going.” According to the medical records, appellant had taken an unwilling P.H. to the hospital for a sexual-assault examination after she had run away for two days. P.H. told the nurse, “My dad wants to prove that I had sexual intercourse vrith one of the guys that I ran away with.” The records state that she was angry with her father. Those records also show that P.H. told the nurse of prior sexual abuse — that her “uncle would put his hands on genital area, at age 13 yrs.” This is the very same conduct that P.H. accused appellant of committing.

Defense counsel stated that he had another witness (Shonna Makuta) who would say that P.H. told her, “Well, I really was with someone else that I didn’t want my dad to know about which is why I blamed Ignacio.”2 Appellant argued, as he had at the pretrial hearing, that this evidence was (1) relevant to P.H.’s truthfulness; (2) required under the Confrontation Clause; and (3) admissible under Rule 4123 to show P.H.’s motive to accuse her father because her father was trying to stop P.H.’s “wild” conduct. The trial judge stated that “the prejudicial effect outweighs the probative value” and refused to allow any impeachment with the medical records.

Appellant then made a bill of exceptions by cross-examining P.H. outside the presence of the jury. At first she denied telling the hospital nurse that the prior sexual activity was nonconsensual, but, when shown the medical records, she admitted that she had said that. She denied telling Shonna that she had had sex with Anthony, not Ignacio, the night that she ran away. The trial judge stated that her ruling was the same, barring cross-examination of P.H. and excluding the medical records.

After the jury returned, a CPS caseworker and a CPS investigator testified to statements that both P.H. and appellant had made to them. P.H. told the CPS investigator that she has never gotten along with her father because he screamed at her when disciplining her. She also stated that appellant threatened her and said that if she ever told anyone about the molestation she would go to foster care.

Shonna Makuta testified for the defense that, to her knowledge, P.H. never drank alcohol at her house. She stated that, at first, she wanted to believe P.H.’s story, but things that P.H. said made her start to doubt. Appellant’s mother also testified and said that P.H.’s behavior while living at her house was “getting very bad.” Before the alleged molestation, P.H. told her grandmother that she wanted to be eman*560cipated from both her mother and father so that she could be on her own.

At the end of the first day of testimony, the defense recalled several witnesses to make a second bill of exceptions outside the presence of the jury. First, appellant reoffered the medical records, but the trial judge said that she had previously ruled that the prejudicial effect outweighed their probative value and therefore she was receiving them only as a bill of exceptions. Next, Shonna testified that P.H. told her that she was dating a boy named Anthony and that her father was really strict about letting her see him. P.H. told her dad that Ignacio had raped her, but she had really been with Anthony. Shonna also stated that P.H. had made other allegations of people molesting her, including her uncle on her mother’s side, but she did not know whether those allegations were false. Appellant’s mother testified that P.H. told her that “every one of her mother’s boyfriends” had molested her. She did not know whether those allegations were true or not. Appellant’s mother told of an incident in which P.H. and her cousin ran away and called on a cell phone to say that they were being held by five men and that these men had knives to their throats and were raping them. Appellant’s mother called the police who started to put out an “Amber Alert,” but pulled it back when the two girls came home and said that they had just run away. Margarita Higdon, appellant’s girlfriend and the mother of his teen-aged son, testified that, when P.H. moved into her home after appellant was accused of molestation, she had to have CPS remove P.H. because school officials called and told her that she had been caught down at “the Ag. barn” lying on the ground with a boy. P.H. had also told Ms. Higdon that her uncle had molested her when she was young.

After hearing these witnesses, the trial judge said, “Any further proffer on your bill of exceptions?” Counsel replied: “Nothing more except from the defendant himself-he can testify now or tomorrow when the jury is deliberating.” The trial judge responded, “Well, it’s a little hard for you to make a bill of exception until you know what I’m going to let in and keep out.... So I think we better wait until tomorrow.” Appellant did testify the next day, but his counsel did not make any bill of exception concerning his testimony.4

The jury found appellant guilty of both counts of indecency with a child, and the trial judge sentenced him to fifteen years’ imprisonment. On appeal, appellant asserted that the trial court erred in excluding impeachment evidence of the complaint’s previous false allegations of sexual assault in violation of the Confrontation Clause. The court of appeals concluded that the excluded testimony, including the medical records, (1) was a “general” attack upon P.H.’s credibility; (2) did not establish that the prior accusations were false; and (3) did not show that the prior accusations were similar to the ones in this case.5

*561ii.

A. General Constitutional and Eviden-tiary Considerations.

The Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses includes the right to cross-examine witnesses to attack their general credibility or to show their possible bias, self-interest, or motives in testifying.6 This right is not unqualified, however; the trial judge has wide discretion in limiting the scope and extent of cross-examination.7 Generally, the right to present evidence and to cross-examine witnesses under the Sixth Amendment does not conflict with the corresponding rights under state evidentiary rules.8 Thus, most questions concerning cross-examination may be resolved by looking to the Texas Rules of Evidence. In those rare situations in which the applicable rule of evidence conflicts with a federal constitutional right, Rule 101(c) requires that the Constitution of the United States controls over the evidentiary rule.9 Rule 101(c) also states, “Where possible, inconsistency is to be removed by reasonable construction” as well as by reasonable application of the rule. Thus, compliance with the reasonable construction and application of a rule of evidence will, in most instances, avoid a constitutional question.

Trials involving sexual assault may raise particular evidentiary and constitutional concerns because the credibility of both the complainant and defendant is a central, often dispositive, issue. Sexual assault cases are frequently “he said, she *562said” trials in which the jury must reach a unanimous verdict based solely upon two diametrically different versions of an event, unaided by any physical, scientific, or other corroborative evidence. Thus, the Rules of Evidence, especially Rule 403, should be used sparingly to exclude relevant, otherwise admissible evidence that might bear upon the credibility of either the defendant or complainant in such “he said, she said” cases.10 And Texas law, as well as the federal constitution, requires great latitude when the evidence deals with a witness’s specific bias, motive, or interest to testify in a particular fashion.11

But, as the Supreme Court noted in Davis v. Alaska,12 there is an important distinction between an attack on the general credibility of a witness and a more particular attack on credibility that reveals “possible biases, prejudices, or ulterior motives of the witness as they may relate directly to issues or personalities in the case at hand.”13 Thus, under Davis, “the exposure of a witness’ motivation in testifying is a proper and important function of the constitutionally protected right of cross-examination.”14 However, as Justice Stewart noted in concurrence, the Court neither held nor suggested that the Constitution confers a right to impeach the general credibility of a witness through otherwise prohibited modes of cross-examination.15 Thus, the Davis Court did not hold that a defendant has an absolute constitutional right to impeach the general credibility of a witness in any fashion that he chooses. But the constitution is offended if the state evidentiary rule would pro*563hibit him from cross-examining a -witness concerning possible motives, bias, and prejudice to such an extent that he could not present a vital defensive theory.16

Under Rule 404(a)(3) of the Texas Rules of Evidence, a defendant may always offer evidence of a pertinent character trait — such as truthfulness — of any witness. But, under Rule 60817 the witness’s general character for truthfulness may be shown only through reputation or opinion testimony. A witness’s general character for truthfulness or credibility may not be attacked by cross-examining him (or offering extrinsic evidence) concerning specific prior instances of untruthfulness. For example, the defense may not ask the witness: Didn’t you cheat on your income tax last year? Didn’t you lie on Tuesday about having an affair with your boss? Didn’t you steal five dollars from the church collection plate last week and then lie to the priest about it? While all of those questions attack the witness’s general character for truthfulness, that mode of impeachment is specifically barred by Rule 608(b).18 Our state evidentiary rules frown on unnecessary character assassination.

However, the rules of evidence do permit a witness to be cross-examined on specific instances of conduct when they are used to establish his specific bias, self-interest, or motive for testifying. Under Rule 613(b), the opponent must first cross-examine the witness with the circumstances surrounding the bias, interest, or motive, and, if the witness denies the circumstances or the motive, the opponent may introduce extrinsic evidence to prove the motive or bias.19 Furthermore, Rule 404(b) explicitly permits the defense, as well as the prosecution, to offer evidence of other acts of misconduct to establish a person’s motive for performing some act— such as making a false allegation against the defendant.

Thus, generally speaking, the Texas Rules of Evidence permit the defendant to cross-examine a witness for his purported bias, interest, and motive without undue limitation or arbitrary prohibition. The next question, then, is whether those rules accommodate evidence of a witness’s prior, purportedly false, accusations.

*564B. The Admission of Prior False Accusation Evidence in Sexual Assaul-tive Cases.

The theory for admitting prior false accusations of rape in a sex-offense prosecution is frequently analogized to Aesop’s story of “The Boy Who Cried Wolf.” A past false accusation makes it more likely that the witness lacks credibility and thus should not be believed concerning this accusation. But in Aesop’s fable, there really was a wolf, and it killed the sheep.20 The moral of that story was “Nobody believes a liar ... even when he is telling the truth.” A criminal trial, however, is designed to find the truth about a specific incident, not to decide whether someone has lied in the past about the presence of wolves or about being raped. Prior false allegations of rape do not tend to prove or disprove any of the elements of the charged sexual offense.21

Therefore, Texas, unlike some jurisdictions,22 has not created a per se exception to Rule 608(b)’s general prohibition against impeachment with specific instances of conduct to admit evidence of the complainant’s prior false allegations of abuse or molestation.23 The inferential chain of logic that is barred by Rule 608(b) is this:

The witness lied to his employer [or did some specific act of dishonesty]

That specific conduct proves dishonest character;

Therefore, the witness is generally dishonest and should not be believed in this case.

Applied to prior false- accusations, the barred evidentiary chain is this:

Complainant made a prior false accusation;

That specific conduct proves dishonest character;

Therefore, the complainant is generally dishonest and should not be believed in this case.

This is precisely the prohibited propensity chain of logic — “Once a thief, always a thief,” “Once a liar, always a liar” — that underlies both Rules 404(b) and 608(b).24 A sexual assault complainant is not a volunteer for an exercise in character assassination.25 Several federal courts have held *565that exclusion of this evidence, offered to attack the victim’s general credibility, does not violate the Confrontation Clause.26

If, however, the cross-examiner offers evidence of a prior false accusation of sexual activity for some purpose other than a propensity attack upon the witness’s general character for truthfulness, it may well be admissible under our state evidentiary rules.

For example, in Billodeau v. State, 27 we held that the trial court should have admitted evidence that the child complainant in that aggravated sexual assault prosecution had made threats to falsely accuse two neighbors of sexual molestation. We held that such evidence supported the defensive theory that the complainant’s motive in accusing the defendant of sexual molestation was “rage and anger” when he was thwarted.28 Evidence of threats to accuse others of sexual molestation when he displayed “rage and anger” at being thwarted is some evidence of a common motive for accusing the defendant of sexual molestation. The chain of logic is as follows:

The victim makes false accusations in certain circumstances and for certain reasons;

Those circumstances and reasons are present in this case;

Therefore, the victim made a false accusation in this case.29

One might even call this modus operandi evidence admissible under Rule 404(b). Evidence of other acts or wrongs may be admissible under Rule 404(b) to prove such matters as motive, intent, scheme, or any other relevant purpose except conduct in conformity with bad character. Even “the doctrine of chances” has been invoked as a possible basis for admitting evidence of a *566victim’s prior false accusation of rape.30 Similarly, evidence of a victim’s prior sexual activity may be admissible under Rule 412, the Texas Rape Shield Law,31 when offered to establish the victim’s motive or bias against the defendant.

In sum, several different state evidentia-ry rules permit the use of prior false accusations when offered to show the witness’s bias or motive or for some other relevant, noncharacter purpose. The Confrontation Clause mandate of Davis v. Alaska is not inconsistent with Texas evidence law. Thus, compliance with a rule of evidence will, in most instances, avoid a constitutional question concerning the admissibility of such evidence. With that general framework, we turn to the present case.

III.

At his trial, appellant offered evidence of P.H.’s prior sexual conduct and her prior allegations of “rape” for three reasons: (1) it was relevant to P.H.’s truthfulness, i.e., her general credibility; (2) it was required to be admitted under the Confrontation Clause; and (3) it was admissible under Rule 412 to show P.H.’s motive to falsely accuse her father because he was too strict. We agree that some of this evidence was admissible to show P.H.’s possible motive in accusing her father of molestation.

First, we note that appellant overemphasized his reliance upon the Confrontation Clause, rather than Rule 412 (or other evidentiary rules such as Rules 613 or 404(b)), in the court of appeals.32 Thus, that court focused solely upon his Confrontation Clause argument instead of first determining whether this evidence, though barred by Rule 608(b), was admissible under other evidentiary rules to prove P.H.’s motive.33 Only if the proffered evidence is barred by all state evidentiary rules must courts turn to the federal constitution.

In this case, appellant’s defensive theory was that P.H. made up a tale of sexual molestation to get out from under the heavy hand of her father. She said she never liked him because he disciplined her too much and yelled at her while doing so. She was angry with him because he wouldn’t let her do whatever she wanted to, as she could when she lived with her mother. The jury was aware of P.H.’s motive to make a false accusation that would send appellant back to prison. Ap*567pellant was allowed to question P.H. generally about her motive to falsely accuse him.

But what the jury did not know — because the trial judge excluded it — is that P.H. was particularly angry with appellant when he took her to the hospital for a sexual assault examination after she had run away from home and stayed out overnight. She told the nurse, “My dad wants to prove that I had sexual intercourse with one of the guys that I ran away with.” P.H. also told the nurse that Ignacio Ta-lamendez had “sexually assaulted” her. She said that “at first it was kind of a consensual thing but I told him to stop and he kept going.” Then, P.H. purportedly told Shonna that she had really had sex with Anthony, her boyfriend, that night. She had said that it was Ignacio because her father was really strict about letting her see Anthony. Apparently this event upset P.H. so much that she threatened to commit suicide and was admitted to the state hospital shortly thereafter. The charged offenses were alleged to have happened about a month after she was released from the state hospital.

This evidence is strong support for appellant’s theory that P.H. had a motive to falsely accuse him of sexual molestation. It also demonstrates that P.H. was not above changing her story of a consensual sexual encounter with her boyfriend into a nonconsensual one with someone else to prevent her father from learning the truth and presumably punishing her for running away and having sex with Anthony.

This evidence was admissible — unless excluded under Rule 403 — to prove P.H.’s bias against appellant and to show her purported motive in falsely accusing him.34 The Texas Rules of Evidence do not contain a specific rule allowing the admission of bias or motive evidence (maybe because the right to impeach a witness on these bases is so obvious), but Rule 613(b) presumes the right to admit such evidence because it deals with how the witness may be examined concerning bias or interest and when extrinsic evidence of that bias or interest may be admitted. Furthermore, appellant properly invoked Rule 412, which contains an explicit “motive or bias” exception to the bar against evidence of an alleged victim’s previous sexual conduct.35 *568Finally, the Confrontation Clause might well have required the admission of this evidence showing P.H.’s motive to fabricate if appellant had not been able to show that motive through other means — even if that evidence had been barred under state evidentiary rules.36 In this case, however, appellant’s general defensive theory was presented to the jury through alternate testimony.

The trial court appears to have understood that this evidence was probative to show P.H.’s motive to testify because she excluded it only under Rule 403, not some general rule barring all such evidence of motive and bias. She repeatedly stated that she was excluding this evidence because its “prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value.” Relevant evidence may be excluded under Rule 403 only if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.37 Under Rule 403, it is presumed that the probative value of relevant evidence exceeds any danger of unfair prejudice.38 The rule envisions exclusion of evidence only when there is a “clear disparity between the degree of prejudice of the offered evidence and its probative value.” 39

Because Rule 403 permits the exclusion of admittedly probative evidence, it is a remedy that should be used sparingly,40 especially in “he said, she said” sexual-molestation cases that must be resolved solely on the basis of the testimony of the complainant and the defendant.41 In this *569case, the trial judge may have used the correct balancing test, but there is nothing in the record to show that she also took into account the possible constitutional ramifications of an exclusion of all of appellant’s evidence offered to demonstrate P.H.’s motive to testify against appellant. Although there is considerable prejudice in allowing P.H. to be cross-examined about her sexual conduct with her boyfriend, her anger at appellant for requiring her to undergo a sexual assault examination, and her various statements to the nurse, this is not “unfair” prejudice because it serves the important function of explaining precisely why P.H. might be motivated to falsely accuse appellant and to accuse him of the very same conduct that she accused her uncle of doing when she was thirteen.

We conclude that the trial court abused her discretion in preventing appellant from (1) cross-examining P.H. concerning the contents of the medical records when appellant took her to the hospital to be examined for a possible sexual assault; (2) offering those records into evidence if P.H. denies their accuracy; and (3) offering Shonna’s testimony that P.H. told her that the sexual activities that night were consensual and with her boyfriend, not assaultive with Ignacio Talamendez. This evidence, relating to events occurring shortly before the two alleged sexual encounters at issue in this trial and relevant to P.H.’s animus toward appellant and her desire to get out of his house, is demonstrably more probative than prejudicial in establishing her motive to testify. There is nothing in the record that would support a finding that its prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value, much less why its probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.

The other evidence that the trial judge excluded, as noted by the court of appeals, included:

(1) The contents of P.H.’s journal.42 We agree that, because the journal was not produced and the contents are unknown, appellant failed to show that they have any relevance;

(2) The fact that P.H. told others that she had been sexually molested by her mother’s boyfriends.43 We agree that there was no showing that these accusations were, in fact, false or that they were similar to the accusation P.H. made against appellant.44 However, it is highly unlikely that she was molested by all of her mother’s boyfriends. A rational factfinder might, under Wigmore’s doctrine of chances, reasonably conclude that at least some of these accusations, if not all, were false.45

(3) The proffered testimony by P.H.’s grandmother that P.H. and her cousin lied about being held at knife point by five men who threatened to rape them, but admitted when they returned home that they had just run away.46 We agree that appellant failed to make a sufficient evidentia-ry connection or argument to establish the independent probative value of this evidence, but it, along with P.H.’s allegations about her mother’s *570boyfriends, is one more episode, under the doctrine of chances, that makes all of her allegations of sexual misconduct somewhat less likely;

(4) The evidence that P.H. was found “at the Ag. Barn lying on the ground with her boyfriend” seems to have no probative value except to show the victim’s purported promiscuity, an evidentiary use that is strictly prohibited by Rule 412. No one suggested that the school official’s report of P.H.’s activity was false or that the incident was similar to that involving appellant.47

We agree with the court of appeals that the trial judge did not abuse her discretion or rule “outside the zone of reasonable disagreement” in excluding evidence of the journals or of the “Ag. Barn” incident, but the other evidence was admissible under the doctrine of chances.48

In sum, we hold that the trial judge abused her discretion in preventing appellant from cross-examining P.H. about the hospital incident, her allegations that “all of her mother’s boyfriends had sexually molested her,” the incident about being held at knife point by five men, and her statements to Shonna concerning the purported sexual assault by Ignacio Talamen-dez to demonstrate her bias against appellant and her possible motive to testify falsely against him. Because the parties have not briefed the issue of harm on discretionary review, and the court of appeals has not yet had an opportunity to address this issue under Rule 44.2(b), we reverse the judgment and remand the case to the court of appeals for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

OPINION

COCHRAN, J.,

delivered the opinion of the Court

in which KELLER, P.J., and MEYERS, JOHNSON, and KEASLER, JJ., joined.

In this case we hold that a defendant must show some causal connection or logical relationship between a witness’s probationary status and his potential bias to testify favorably toward the State before the witness may be cross-examined with that status.1 Evidence that a witness with a juvenile record might be testifying because of a need to “curry favor” with the State or shift suspicion away from himself is constitutionally relevant and admissible under the Confrontation Clause.2 But the mere fact that a witness is on probation is not sufficient, by itself, to establish a potential bias or motive to testify. . We therefore affirm the court of appeals.3

I.

A. Trial Proceedings.

Appellant was charged with the sexual assault of W.P., a sixteen-year-old child, enhanced with a prior conviction for indecency with a child.

Before trial, appellant’s counsel told the trial judge that he wanted to cross-examine W.P. about the fact that he was on deferred-adjudication probation for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. He stated that W.P.’s “vulnerable status” was relevant to show bias and motive under Davis v. Alaska,4 The trial judge deferred his ruling because he had not yet heard any of the facts. During the trial, the judge gave the defense two more hearings outside the presence of the jury to show a plausible connection between W.P.’s “vulnerable status” and a possible bias or motive to fabricate his story, but the judge ultimately disallowed the proposed cross-examination. He concluded that W.P.’s “juvenile records” were irrelevant to show a possible motive to fabricate because the two matters were “completely separate.”

W.P. testified that he was sixteen years old in January of 2005. He worked part-time for his contractor-father, Bobby, after he was expelled from school.5 W.P. first met appellant sometime around January 8th, when his friend, James, asked appel*141lant if the boys could do some cleaning work for him. Appellant agreed and put W.P. and James to work cleaning blinds at a lady’s house. Afterwards, appellant had the boys spend the night in his apartment. James had appellant buy some “Apple Pucker” alcohol to celebrate James’s birthday. W.P. had never drunk much alcohol before, but he thought it was “cool” to sit around drinking with James and appellant. W.P. and James got drunk and threw up. Afterwards, W.P. lay down on a futon, while James stretched out on the floor. After James fell asleep, appellant put a “hardcore porno” videotape in the TV and came over to W.P. and asked if he could “help” him. W.P. didn’t know what he meant. But then appellant “kind of pulled the covers off of me and he came down and started to mess with my penis.... He eventually sucked my penis.” W.P. pushed him away, turned over, and went to sleep.

The next morning W.P. did not say anything to appellant because he “was freaked out and [he] didn’t know what to do.” He waited around for his money for washing the blinds the day before. Appellant paid W.P. for the blinds and then gave him some extra money “for what he had done and that [W.P.] should not tell James or anyone.” But that very afternoon W.P. did tell James. James made W.P. feel bad because he “was talking down on me like that I was gay and like I was wrong and I shouldn’t have done it.” W.P. was hurt by James’s reaction, so he did not tell anyone else about what had happened.

About three or four weeks later, appellant started calling and asking if W.P. could come over and let appellant watch him masturbate. At first, W.P. did not want to see appellant, but he later called and asked to borrow some money. Appellant said that if W.P. “came over there and let him watch [W.P.] masturbate that he would pay [him] some money and [he] wouldn’t have to borrow it.” W.P. figured that this was “easy money,” so he went over to appellant’s apartment. Appellant gave him oral sex, then paid him $100. This happened again one or two more times. The last time it happened — in March or April — appellant said that he would pay W.P. $200, but he only gave him $100.

On April 6th, W.P. told William, a lifelong family friend, what he and appellant had done and how appellant owed him money. At first, William didn’t believe W.P., but when he did, he was “shocked” and angry: “Oh, man, it tore me up,” but W.P. told him to “keep his cool whenever he came over” to appellant’s apartment.

W.P. spent the night of April 6th at appellant’s house, along with William, another friend, Marcus, and Jason Dennis, a friend of Marcus’s. They were all drinking and smoking marijuana.6 The four boys left around noon and walked back to W.P.’s house because he was supposed to work for his father that day. After Marcus and his friend left, W.P. and William decided to go back to appellant’s apartment to get the $100 that appellant owed him. They told W.P.’s father that appellant owed W.P. money and they were going to go get it. When the two boys did not immediately return, W.P.’s father drove over to appellant’s apartment to collect them. Appellant opened the door and *142told Bobby that W.P. was not there. Bobby then drove back home, and about ten minutes later W.P. and William returned. W.P. seemed “perplexed,” and both boys were “agitated.” W.P. said that he wanted his money from appellant, so Bobby said that he would drive him over to appellant’s apartment to “check on” the money, and then they would go to work.

William, however, had already started back to appellant’s apartment to get W.P.’s money. He was angry at appellant. W.P. told his mother that William was going to “jack” appellant for some money.7 W.P.’s mother told Bobby that William was angry and going to appellant’s to collect W.P.’s money, so all three of them drove toward appellant’s apartment and found William along the way. William got into the truck with them. Bobby stopped at appellant’s apartment complex, saw him in the parking lot, and asked him if he would have W.P.’s money later that day. Appellant said that “more than likely he would,” so Bobby said that they would come back later.

Meanwhile, W.P. whispered to his mother, telling her what he and appellant had been doing. As Bobby drove down the street, W.P.’s mother told him that she and W.P. had something to tell him. Bobby pulled into a washateria parking lot, and W.P. told his father exactly why appellant owed him the $100 and why William was angry and ready to “jack” appellant. Bobby called 911 on his cell phone, but the dispatcher told him to come to the police station to make a statement.

Officer Burke, a patrol officer, happened to be driving by the washateria, and he stopped because he saw the family arguing.8 They were relieved to see him and said that the reason they were upset was because W.P.’s father had just found out that his son had been receiving oral sex from an adult man. W.P. told him that some videotapes in Jason Dennis’s car might contain footage of the “sex acts.”9 Officer Burke radioed other officers to go to appellant’s apartment10 while he escorted W.P. and his family to the police station. They met with Debbie Rule, a 20-year veteran with the Balch Springs Police Department, who investigated crimes against children. They all gave written statements.

Finally, the State called Dr. Ellen J. Elliston, a psychologist, who testified that teen-agers who experience instability in their lives, such as the death of a family member, may be “more vulnerable to victimization.” She also stated that teen-age boys are reluctant to report sexual abuse and usually do not tell their parents about it. Further, their traumatization may affect their ability to provide details or tell a coherent version of events.

Appellant called Cheryl Anderson, a TXU Energy employee, who testified that she had been requested to search the TXU electricity records for appellant’s apartment address between December 1, 2004, and April 7, 2005. Ms. Anderson found no *143TXU service records for that apartment during that time frame. She did not know whether electricity had been stopped at that apartment or if it had ever been restored. She did not know whether TXU had records for electricity to any of the other apartments in that complex or whether other electricity companies provided service.

Appellant also presented an alibi defense for January 8, 2005, from his aunt and uncle. They both testified that they met with appellant at the uncle’s house that evening at about 8:30 p.m. to decide whether to loan him $500 to pay his apartment rent. Appellant’s aunt wrote him a check on that day for his rent, with the notation “Rent, Chris Irby, FI, December 23 through January 31.” She lent him the rent money because appellant was going to go to work for his uncle’s company and the repayment would be subtracted from his paycheck.

Phil Blackstone testified that he owned the “four-plex” building in the apartment complex where appellant lived. Appellant gave him the $500 rent check from appellant’s aunt, and he deposited it on January 13, 2005. Because appellant did not pay the February or March rent, Mr. Blackstone had him evicted on April 14th.

Final arguments by both the prosecution and defense centered on whether W.P. fabricated the entire story of a sexual relationship with appellant. The prosecutor argued that W.P. had no motive to fabricate such a self-damaging sex-for-money story.11 The defense argued that W.P. and his friends were liars who had conspired to rob appellant and, when that fell through, made up a tale of sexual exploitation. Defense counsel pointed to numerous inconsistencies and contradictions in the witnesses’ testimony and listed seven specific “lies.”12 He summed up the defense position as follows:

*144Ladies and gentlemen, you’ve been lied to repeatedly.... And the problem with the testimony that you’ve heard from [W.P.] and all of those lies is that in that same breath he told you he got sexually assaulted and none of you saw any change in his demeanor between when he was lying and we know he was lying and when he said he was sexually assaulted. He didn’t start to stutter, give you any clue that he was lying. It flowed from him like water. The lies came right along with the allegation of sexual assault.

Motive. I told you in opening I can’t tell you what the motive is. I think you heard from some bad people. I think William Flowers is a bad person. I think when you’re 19 and you have decided to tattoo your neck and hands, you’ve made a statement to the world—

The defense then compared the inconsistencies of the State’s witnesses with the consistency of appellant’s alibi witnesses:

And I don’t think you should have any doubts about the credibility of our witnesses, because unlike the State’s witnesses, when you are telling the truth it is easy to tell a coherent consistent story.

In rebuttal, the State admitted to various inconsistencies by W.P. and his friends and family: “There are going to be some differences. Does that mean they’re lying? Does that mean that there is some conspiracy against this defendant brought on by [W.P.] and his friends? No.” The prosecutor reminded the jury of the psychologist’s testimony concerning emotional problems brought on by high stress events and of how W.P. had been affected by finding his big brother after he had committed suicide.

The jury convicted appellant and, because he had a prior sex-offense conviction, the trial judge was required to sentence him to life in prison.

B. Proceedings in the Court of Appeals.

On appeal, appellant complained that the trial judge denied him his constitutional right to confrontation and cross-examination by not permitting defense counsel to cross-examine W.P. about his juvenile deferred-adjudication probation.13 The court of appeals upheld the trial judge’s ruling. It first noted that “evidence of a juvenile adjudication, outside the realm of a juvenile proceeding, is not admissible for impeachment unless required by the Texas or United States Constitutions.” 14 It then acknowledged that the confrontation clause may require the admission of such evidence “if the cross-examination is reasonably calculated to expose a motive, bias, *145or interest for the witness to testify.”15 But the mere fact that a juvenile had been placed on probation or had some other “vulnerable relationship” with the State is not enough to establish bias or prejudice; the cross-examiner must show some “causal connection” between the witness’s “vulnerable relationship” and the witness’s testimony.16 The court of appeals concluded that appellant had failed to show any such connection between W.P.’s juvenile record and his testimony at trial, thus the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in forbidding such cross-examination.17

On discretionary review in this Court, appellant argues that the court of appeals incorrectly held that Davis v. Alaska mandates a “causal connection” between the witness’s “vulnerable relationship” with the State and the potential bias or prejudice of that witness. He also asserts that our decision in Carpenter v. State,18 which had held that the proponent of the evidence of a pending charge must establish “some causal connection or logical relationship” between the pending charges and the witness’s potential bias before it is admissible,19 was “wrongly decided.”20

II.

The constitutional right of confrontation includes the right to cross-examine the witnesses and the opportunity to show that a witness is biased or that his testimony is exaggerated or unbelievable.21 Nonetheless, the trial judge retains wide latitude to impose reasonable limits on such cross-examination “based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness’ safety, or interrogation that is repetí-tive or only marginally relevant.”22 The constitutional right to cross-examine concerning the witness’s potential bias or prejudice does not include “cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.”23

Appellant relies upon Davis v. Alaska and its Texas progeny for the proposition that any witness, including a juvenile, who is on probation may be cross-examined *146about that status to show a potential bias or motive to testify for the State.24 Appellant reads these cases too broadly.

In Davis, the evidence showed that someone burglarized the Polar Bar and stole its safe, which contained over a thousand dollars in cash.25 The same day, police received a tip that a safe had been discovered 26 miles outside Anchorage near the home of Jess Straight. When questioned by the police at the scene, Mr. Straight’s stepson, Richard Green, told them that he had seen and spoken with “two Negro men standing alongside a late-model metallic blue Chevrolet sedan near where the safe was later discovered.”26 Serendipitously, Richard Green was on juvenile probation for burglarizing two cabins.27 He identified the defendant as one of the two men he had met in a photographic show-up the next day and, after the defendant’s arrest, identified him in a live line-up.28

At trial, the defendant argued that, although juvenile records were confidential under Alaska law, he should have been allowed to cross-examine Richard about his probation because Richard might (1) have felt that he was a suspect himself; and (2) have been subjected to undue pressure from police, fearing possible probation revocation.29 The trial judge refused to allow the cross-examination, but the Supreme Court held that, “[o]n these facts,” the defendant’s constitutional right to cross-examine the witnesses against him for bias and motive was violated. The Supreme Court carefully distinguished between the “introduction of evidence of a prior crime [as] a general attack on the credibility of the witness” and “[a] more particular attack on the witness’ credibility .... by means of cross-examination directed toward revealing possible biases, prejudices, or ulterior motives of the witness as they may relate directly to issues or personalities in the case at hand.”30 That is, Richard may have felt that the police would suspect him of the burglary both because he had a prior burglary adjudication and because the emptied safe was found on his family’s property. Based upon these particular facts, Richard had a possible motive to divert suspicion from himself to another. Further, the police might also have brought undue pressure upon Richard to make an identification of someone — anyone—because he was in “a vulnerable relationship” by virtue of being on probation for burglary, a fact that the investigating officers may also have known and used in questioning him. Richard’s possible motives were directly related and connected “to issues or personalities in the case at hand.”

The Supreme Court found that the state’s policy interest in protecting the confidentiality of a juvenile offender’s record could not require the defendant to *147yield his right to cross-examine a witness for a particular bias.31 But the Court carefully tailored its decision to the very specific facts before it.32 As Justice Stewart emphasized in his concurring opinion, Davis neither “holds nor suggests that the Constitution confers a right in every case to impeach the general credibility of a witness through cross-examination about his [or her] past delinquency adjudications or criminal convictions.”33 And, as we recently held in Hammer v. State, neither Davis nor the Confrontation Clause require that courts permit the use of prior juvenile acts of misconduct or adjudications for general impeachment of credibility.34

In Texas, as in most jurisdictions, juvenile criminal records and adjudications are not admissible to impeach the general credibility of a testifying witness, even though the juvenile may be on probation and is technically in a “vulnerable relationship” with the State throughout that probationary period. Rule 609(d) of the Texas Rules of Evidence explicitly prohibits their use for attacking the general credibility of the witness.35 But Rule 609(d) also contains an explicit exception that such evidence may be admissible when it is required by the United States Constitution,36 such as in the Davis scenario.

In Carpenter v. State,37 this Court held that, in the context of cross-examination of a witness with pending charges, “[f]or the evidence to be admissible, the proponent must establish some causal connection or logical relationship between the pending charges and the witness’ ‘vulnerable relationship’ or potential bias or prejudice for the State, or testimony at trial.”38 That is, a “vulnerable rela*148tionship” based on a witness’s pending charges or probationary status does not hover cloud-like in the air, ready to rain down as impeachment evidence upon any and all such witnesses. There must be some logical connection between that “vulnerable relationship” and the witness’s potential motive for testifying as he does.39 *149As Judge Meyers explained in Carpenter, this “causal connection” or logical relationship is a matter of simple relevance under Rule 401.40 Evidence that a witness is on probation, is facing pending charges, or has a prior juvenile record is not relevant for purposes of showing bias or a motive to testify absent some plausible connection between that fact and the witness’s testimony. Carpenter is a prime example of when and why a logical connection is necessary. A long line of cases hold that a witness may be cross-examined for bias concerning a pending charge because his testimony may be “given under a promise or expectation of immunity, or under the coercive effect of his detention by officers ... conducting the present prosecution.”41 But, in Carpenter, we did not follow that general rule because the pending charges were in federal court and the witness was testifying in state court. Thus, absent additional facts of some potential “deal” between state and federal authorities, there was no logical connection between the federal pending charges and the witness’s possible motive to “curry favor” with state authorities. The pending federal charge was therefore irrelevant as a possible source of bias.42 The reasoning and result in Carpenter is in accord with numerous Texas cases in which the cross-examiner failed to show a logical connection between the fact or condition that could give rise to a potential bias or motive and the exis*150tence of any bias or motive to testify.43 Appellant relies on this Court’s opinion *151in Maxwell v. State 44 for the proposition that the mere fact of probation status is always and inevitably sufficient to establish a witness’s potential bias and motive to “curry favor” with the authorities. Indeed, Maxwell could be read that broadly, but that would be inconsistent with Carpenter and our other Texas cases which require some logical relevance of the pending charge, probation or immigration status, or other alleged source of bias to the witness’s testimony.45 In Maxwell, the Court relied upon two earlier Texas cases, in which the cross-examiner had, in fact, shown a logical relationship between the witness’s pending charge, probation, or other alleged source of bias and his testimony.46 We said that Texas and Supreme Court cases “have indicated that a witness’s deferred adjudication probation status is sufficient to show a bias or interest in helping the State.”47 Some of our cases might, at first blush, have “indicated” such a possibly broad brush, but they all use qualifiers such as “may be”48 or “under certain circumstances,”49 or “under these facts.”50 And the cross-examiner must still show the relevance of the “vulnerable *152status” or other alleged source of bias to the witness’s testimony. It is not enough to say that all witnesses who may, coincidentally, be on probation, have pending charges, be in the country illegally, or have some other “vulnerable status” are automatically subject to cross-examination with that status regardless of its lack of relevance to the testimony of that witness. Thus, to the extent that Maxwell is inconsistent with Carpenter, we overrule it.51

Furthermore, Texas, like other states, has an important interest in “protecting the anonymity of juvenile offenders[.]”52 Our Family Code and Rules of Evidence explicitly protect that anonymity.53 To hold that any juvenile who happens to be on probation at the time that he also is the victim of a crime or a witness in a criminal proceeding automatically loses that privacy protection is not required by the constitution or by common sense.

In sum, Davis v. Alaska is not a blunderbuss that decimates all other evidentia-ry statutes, rules, and relevance requirements in matters of witness impeachment. It is a rapier that targets only a specific mode of impeachment — bias and motive— when the cross-examiner can show a logical connection between the evidence suggesting bias or motive and the witness’s testimony. We therefore reject appellant’s absolutist position that “[a] probationer, particularly a probationer whose guilt has not yet been adjudicated, is always in a vulnerable, relationship with the State” and that mere status is always automatically relevant to show a witness’s possible bias and motive to testify favorably for the State as inconsistent with Texas and United States Supreme Court precedent.

*153III.

Appellant also argues, as he did in the trial court, that he had shown a logical connection between W.P.’s probation status and his testimony. We therefore turn to that issue. At trial, it was appellant’s position that W.P. made up the story of sexual assault: It was a false allegation. Obviously, then, any evidence showing that W.P. had a motive to make up this story is relevant and admissible for impeachment purposes. The timing of this purportedly false allegation was crucial. If W.P. had a motive to make up the accusatory story, he had that motive at the time that he first told others about it.

When did he purportedly “make it up,” and whom did he tell? W.P. said that the first sexual encounter occurred on or about January 10, 2005, and that there were several more encounters in March and early April. The first person W.P. told was his friend James, the day after the first encounter. But James made W.P. feel bad about himself, so he did not tell anyone else for two months. The second person he told was his friend William on April 6th. The two boys were in a parking lot “just chillin’ ” at the time. According to W.P., William did not believe him at first, but when he did, it came as a “shock.” William testified that he believed W.P. “100 percent” because he would have “no reason to conjure up something like that.” The third person to whom W.P. related the story was his mother. He told her on April 7th, right after she, W.P., and his father had intercepted William on his way to demand $100 from appellant — the unpaid half of the $200 appellant had purportedly promised W.P. for their most recent sexual encounter. The fourth person W.P. told was his father, shortly after he told his mother. Finally, W.P. told the police the very same story that he had already told James, William, his mother, and his father. Thus, the motive to fabricate existed (if it did) at or before the time W.P. told James, William, his mother, and his father.

So how does the fact that W.P. was a juvenile on deferred-adjudication probation for aggravated assault provide a motive for him to make up this story? The trial judge gave appellant’s attorney three different hearings outside the presence of the jury to show a plausible connection. Appellant cited Davis and explained that, on the day that W.P. told the police about the sexual encounters, W.P. believed that he could get into trouble because William had planned to rob appellant. He elaborated:

I would state that the relevance is that the complaining witness has testified that one of the reasons he told his mother about this allegation, the first adult family member about it, was because of his fear of potentially getting in trouble over the circumstances surrounding William Flowers and any potential crime committed by William Flowers against Christopher Irby. Based on that, I believe that it is particularly relevant and there is a causal relationship.... And that he was either on bond or probation at that time, which would give him greater motivation to lie, greater motivation towards bias and to lie about the allegation given the fact that he was looking at charges ... should there have been a crime committed against Christopher Irby. And I believe the testimony bears out that that was his state of mind.54

*154But this argument is not logical. First, W.P. had already told two other people about the sexual encounters, so he did not make up the story at the time he told it to his mother. Second, W.P.’s act of telling his mother this story is totally unconnected to his later act of telling the police. Third, William had already been deterred from accosting appellant at the time W.P. told his mother this story, so any anticipated “robbery” by William had already been foiled.55 Fourth, even if William had succeeded in “robbing” appellant, appellant fails to suggest how William’s conduct would be attributable to W.P. or how a false story of W.P.’s consensual sexual encounters would exonerate or ameliorate the conduct of either of them. Fifth, if W.P. felt that he had a “vulnerable relationship” with law enforcement or the State, the very last thing that he would logically do is invite their scrutiny by filing a criminal complaint against someone else for sexual assault.56 That act would make a “vulnerable relationship” much more vulnerable.57

In this case, we agree with the trial judge and court of appeals that appellant failed to make a logical connection between W.P.’s testimony concerning his sexual encounters with appellant and his entirely separate probationary status. Thus, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in excluding this impeachment evidence because it was irrelevant. We affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.

HOLCOMB, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which WOMACK and HERVEY, JJ., joined.

PRICE, J., dissented.

*155HOLCOMB, J.,

filed a dissenting opinion, in which WOMACK and HERVEY, JJ„ joined.

I believe that we cast a dark shadow on the constitutional right of confrontation by requiring a defendant to establish the kind of “logical relationship” the majority requires before allowing cross-examination of a juvenile witness on his pending probationary record to show his possible bias or motive in testifying for the same prosecu-torial authority which also supervises his probation. The majority, in my view, misapplies Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974), which clearly held that the constitutional right to question a juvenile witness regarding his pending probationary status trumps any State interest in protecting such juvenile offenders.1 Denying the defendant any opportunity to cross-examine a critical juvenile witness regarding his possible bias stemming from his probationary relationship with the State constitutes a denial of the right to effective cross-examination.2

I. Davis v. Alaska

A. The Scope of the Holding

The majority focuses on the fact that the witness in Davis was on probation for an offense that made him a likely suspect for the offense with which Davis had been charged. But the Supreme Court stated at the very beginning of its opinion:

We granted certiorari in this case to consider whether the Confrontation Clause requires that a defendant in a criminal case be allowed to impeach the credibility of a prosecution witness by cross-examination directed at possible bias deriving from the witness’ probationary status as a juvenile delinquent when such an impeachment would conflict with a State’s asserted interest in preserving the confidentiality of juvenile adjudications of delinquency.

Id. at 309, 94 S.Ct. 1105. Thus, the issue that the Supreme Court granted in Davis was the same as the one before us, and there is nothing in Davis to suggest that the Court decided less than it had agreed to decide, limiting its decision to the bare facts of the case before it. The Court took those facts into consideration, of course. But it was careful to always refer to the facts in conjunction with the larger issue before it. These references show that the Court was concerned not only with the fact that the witness in Davis was likely to become a suspect himself for the offense with which Davis was charged, but also with the fact that the witness was on probation.3 The Court made it quite clear *156that it took a separate account of the fact that the witness was on probation, in reaching its decision.

The Supreme Court itself has interpreted Davis as I do. See, e.g., Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 106 S.Ct. 1481, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986). In recounting the Da/ois facts, the Court stated, “[t]he defense sought to suggest that Green may have slanted his account in the State’s favor either to shift suspicion away from himself or to avoid revocation of probation for failing to ‘co-operate.’ ” Id. at 683, 106 S.Ct. 1431 (emphasis added) (citing Davis, 415 U.S. at 310-11, 94 S.Ct. 1105). This “either ... or ...” language contradicts any assertion that the Davis holding is applicable only if the witness himself is likely to be suspected of the offense with which the defendant is charged. On the contrary, the Court’s language in cases following Davis makes it clear that the Davis rule applies whether the witness is likely to become a suspect or might be just trying to avoid revocation of probation. In either case, it is error to exclude the impeachment evidence when a witness’s “testimony [is] ‘crucial’ and ... there [is] a ‘real possibility' that pursuit of the excluded line of impeachment evidence would [do] ‘(serious) damage to the strength of the State’s case.’ ” Id. (quoting Davis, 415 U.S. at 319, 94 S.Ct. 1105).

The above reasoning applies with greater force in the present case in which there was no physical evidence nor any eyewitnesses to corroborate W.P.’s allegations against appellant, and we have only W.P.’s own word that appellant had made any sexual advances towards him. As such, W.P. was a “crucial witness,” Davis, 415 U.S. at 310, 94 S.Ct. 1105, and anything likely to impact his credibility was critical to the State’s case. Id. at 319, 94 S.Ct. 1105 (“Serious damage to the strength of the State’s case would have been a real possibility had petitioner been allowed to pursue this line of inquiry.”). See also Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 683, 106 S.Ct. 1431 (same). Under these circumstances, Davis mandated that the defense should have been allowed to cross-examine W.P. about his probation, that relationship with the State itself being the very source of his possible bias or motive to falsely testify against appellant in the hope of pleasing the State which supervised his own probation. See Davis, 415 U.S. at 319, 94 S.Ct. 1105 (“Whatever temporary embarrassment might result to Green or his family by disclosure of his juvenile record — if the prosecution insisted on using him to make its case — is outweighed by petitioner’s right to probe into the influence of possible bias in the testimony of a crucial identification witness.”).4

*157 B. General Impeachment

The majority discusses at some length the prohibition in most jurisdictions against impeachment of a witness’s general credibility. See Maj. Op. at 146-47. It seems to consider the cross-examination on a witness’s probation itself as impeachment of his general credibility unless the record shows that the witness was on probation for an offense similar to the one for which the defendant had been charged. But, as the Supreme Court explained:

The introduction of evidence of a prior crime is ... a general attack on the credibility of the witness. A more particular attack on the witness’ credibility is effected by means of cross-examination directed toward revealing possible biases, prejudices, or ulterior motives of the witness as they may relate directly to issues or personalities in the case at hand.

Davis, 415 U.S. at 316, 94 S.Ct. 1105 (emphasis added).

In other words, cross-examining the witness on his pending probationary record is not a general, but rather a “particular attack” in the sense that it is specifically “directed toward revealing possible biases, prejudices, or ulterior motives of the witness as they may relate directly to issues or personalities in the case at hand.” Id. (emphasis added). Thus, the focus is not on the witness’s character (the so-called propensity evidence, ie., “once a criminal, always a criminal,” so to speak), but rather on the relationship between the witness and the State, and the “possible biases, prejudices, or ulterior motives” that the witness may have by reason of that relationship in testifying for the State, because the State is also one of the “personalities [ie., a party] in the case at hand.” Id.

The Supreme Court made this point even clearer when it stated:

[P]etitioner’s counsel made it clear that he would not introduce Green’s juvenile adjudication as a general impeachment of Green’s character as a truthful person but, rather, to show specifically that at the same time Green was assisting the police in identifying petitioner he was on probation for burglary. From this petitioner would seek to show — or at least argue — that Green acted out of fear or concern of possible jeopardy to his probation.

Id. at 311, 94 S.Ct. 1105 (emphasis added).

As the Court added, “[t]he partiality of a witness is subject to exploration at trial, and is ‘always relevant as discrediting the witness and affecting the weight of his testimony.’” Id. at 316, 94 S.Ct. 1105 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). This partiality, once again, stems from the relationship between the witness and the State, having in effect nothing to do with the particular basis of that relationship, ie., the nature of the offense for which the witness is on probation. Rather, it is the relationship itself which raises questions about the witness’s possible partiality to the State and his possibly questionable motives in testifying for that State; and, according to the Supreme Court, it has always “recognized that the exposure of a witness’ motivation in testifying is a proper and important function of the constitutionally protected right of cross-examination.” Id. (citation omitted).

*158 C. Protection of Juvenile records

The majority states,

Texas, like other states, has an important interest in “protecting the anonymity of juvenile offenders[.]” Our Family Code and Rules of Evidence explicitly protect that anonymity. To hold that any juvenile who happens to be on probation at the time that he also is the victim of a crime or a witness in a criminal proceeding automatically loses that privacy protection is not required by the constitution or by common sense.

Maj. Op. at 152 (citations omitted). I agree and respect that a juvenile’s prior juvenile adjudication ordinarily should not be used to attack the juvenile’s credibility in either a civil or criminal trial. Because the complainant in this case was on deferred probation, he could not be impeached with the offense for which he was on probation, since there was no final conviction. Also, the details of that offense could not be revealed. But the Rules of Evidence specifically provide an exception to the above rules in cases where evidence of juvenile adjudications is “required to be admitted by the Constitution of the United States or Texas.” See Tex.R. Evid. 609(d). The exception in the present case is mandated by the Supreme Court’s decision in Davis v. Alaska. In fact, the majority’s argument, in the above quote, is quite similar to the one that was offered by the State in Davis. See 415 U.S. at 319, 94 S.Ct. 1105 (“[t]he claim is made that the State has an important interest in protecting the anonymity of juvenile offenders and that this interest outweighs any competing interest this petitioner might have in cross-examining Green about his being on probation.”). But the Supreme Court summarily dismissed that claim, stating:

[Petitioner sought to introduce evidence of Green’s probation for the purpose of suggesting that Green was biased and, therefore, that his testimony was either not to be believed in his identification of petitioner or at least very carefully considered in that light. Serious damage to the strength of the State’s case would have been a real possibility had petitioner been allowed to pursue this line of inquiry. In this setting we conclude that the right of confrontation is paramount to the State’s policy of protecting a juvenile offender. Whatever temporary embarrassment might result to Green or his family by disclosure of his juvenile record — if the prosecution insisted on using him to make its case — is outweighed by petitioner’s right to probe into the influence of possible bias in the testimony of a crucial identification witness.

Id. The same situation exists in the case before us. Appellant “sought to introduce evidence of [W.P.’s] probation for the purpose of suggesting that [W.P.] was biased and, therefore, that his testimony was either not to be believed ... or at least very carefully considered in that light.” Id. “Serious damage to the strength of the State’s case would have been a real possibility had [appellant] been allowed to pursue this line of inquiry.” Id. “In this setting,” as the Supreme Court concluded, “the right of confrontation is paramount to the State’s policy of protecting a juvenile offender.” Id.

As the Court further emphasized,

The State’s policy interest in protecting the confidentiality of a juvenile offender’s record cannot require yielding of so vital a constitutional right as the effective cross-examination for bias of an adverse witness. The State could have protected Green from exposure of his juvenile adjudication in these circumstances by refraining from using him to make out its case; the State cannot, consistent with the right of confronta*159tion, require the petitioner to bear the full burden of vindicating the State’s interest in the secrecy of juvenile criminal records.

Id. at 320, 94 S.Ct. 1105. Again, the same is true in the present case. In fact, this reasoning applies with even greater force in this case. Davis was convicted of burglary and grand larceny. Id. There were numerous lines of investigation available to the police, which could have provided the State with the necessary evidence, short of using Green’s testimony, to prosecute Davis. But, given the nature of the allegations in the present case, WJP.’s testimony was the only possible evidence that the State could have obtained to prosecute appellant. The bottom line is that appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment based on the testimony of this one witness. Thus, W.P. was, if anything, an even more “crucial witness” for the State than Green was in Davis. Id. at 310, 94 S.Ct. 1105. As such, his credibility was even more critical than that of Green; and appellant was, therefore, entitled to at least as much latitude in his cross-examination of W.P. about W.P.’s possible source of bias as Davis was provided by the Supreme Court under the protection of the Confrontation Clause.

D. The Defense Theory

The majority discusses at length the merits of the defense theory. See Maj. Op., Section III, at 153-54. According to the Supreme Court, however, it is within the jury’s exclusive province to determine the credibility of the purported defense:

We cannot speculate as to whether the jury, as sole judge of the credibility of a witness, would have accepted [the defense’s] line of reasoning had counsel been permitted to fully present it. But we do conclude that the jurors were entitled to have the benefit of the defense theory before them so that they could make an informed judgment as to the weight to place on Green’s testimony which provided “a crucial link in the proof ... of petitioner’s act.” Douglas v. Alabama, [380 U.S. 415, 419, 85 S.Ct. 1074, 13 L.Ed.2d 934 (1965)]. The accuracy and truthfulness of Green’s testimony were key elements in the State’s case against petitioner. The claim of bias which the defense sought to develop was admissible to afford a basis for an inference of undue pressure because of Green’s vulnerable status as a probationer, cf. Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687 [51 S.Ct. 218, 75 L.Ed. 624] (1931), as well as of Green’s possible concern that he might be a suspect in the investigation.

415 U.S. at 317-18, 94 S.Ct. 1105 (footnote omitted).5

In the present case, appellant was completely denied an opportunity to present to the jury his defense theory based on W.P.’s probationary record. As the above quote shows, it was for the jury — not the *160trial judge, nor this Court — to evaluate the merits of that theory. This reasoning is perfectly in line with the Davis Court’s holding that the defendant is allowed to cross-examine a “crucial witness” about his probationary record because of the relationship such probation establishes between him and the State, which in turn raises a question about his partiality in testifying for the State which also supervises him as a probationer. The jury, and only the jury, then takes that relationship into consideration, as it would take any other element of a witness’s credibility, in deciding how much weight to give to that witness’s testimony. Thus, according to the Supreme Court, the Confrontation Clause entitles the defendant an opportunity to present his defense theory directly to the jury under such circumstances.

Moreover, as the above quote shows, Davis did not require that appellant’s defense theory should be so persuasive that we could be sure it would have been accepted by the jury. See id. at 317, 94 S.Ct. 1105. It required only that the trial court give appellant an opportunity to fully present his theory, and to present it directly to the jury itself, who could then “make an informed judgment as to the weight to place on” the testimony of the witness in question, in light of that theory. Id. As the majority admits, there were “numerous inconsistencies and contradictions in the witnesses’ testimony.” Maj. Op. at 143. Given that most of the State’s own witnesses contradicted W.P.’s account of events in which they had themselves participated, and given that the jury itself had difficulty believing W.P.’s story,6 there was “a real possibility” that the State’s ease might have suffered “[s]erious damage” had appellant been allowed to “pursue [ ]his line of inquiry.” 415 U.S. at 319, 94 S.Ct. 1105. It was, therefore, a violation of appellant’s confrontation right to completely prevent him from cross-examining the one critical witness against him on a subject that he so desperately sought to examine throughout the trial, to help him answer that one critical question which the State repeatedly asked during its closing arguments, and that the majority in the present case likewise emphasizes in its opinion: why would W.P. lie anyway? In other words, appellant had the right to answer that one critical question which no doubt sealed his fate.

In the present case, we know W.P. was placed on adult deferred probation (about which the jury never learned) for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. This occurred shortly before he made the initial outcry accusing appellant of the offense at issue in this case. The jury heard evidence relating to W.P.’s use of alcohol and controlled substances at appellant’s house, all of which in possible violation of his adult probation. Under these circumstances, appellant should have been allowed to cross-examine W.P. to show how the State was treating these violations to establish W.P.’s possible bias or even motive to make the initial accusation against appellant.

II. The Posi-Davis Texas Progeny

The majority states that there must be “some logical relationship” between a wit*161ness’s “ ‘vulnerable relationship’ ” with the State by virtue of his probation, and that “witness’s potential motive for testifying as he does” for the State. Maj. Op. at 148. But we have stated in the past that such a logical relationship stems from the very fact that the witness is testifying for the same entity, the State, which also supervises his probation. See, e.g., Woods v. Texas, 152 S.W.3d 105 (Tex.Crim.App.2004):

The proponent of evidence to show bias must show that the evidence is relevant. The proponent does this by demonstrating that a nexus, or logical connection, exists between the witness’s testimony and the witness’s potential motive to testify in favor of the other party. We have found a nexus when a witness has been indicted or is serving a period of community supervision. In such cases, the witness is placed in a vulnerable position and may have a motive to testify in favor of the State.

Id. at 111 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).

A. Carpenter

The majority states that “[e]vidence that a witness is on probation, is facing pending charges, or has a prior juvenile record is not relevant for purposes of showing bias or a motive to testify absent some plausible connection between that fact and the witness’s testimony.” Maj. Op. at 149. The majority relies on Carpenter v. State, 979 S.W.2d 633 (Tex.Crim.App.1998), as “a prime example of when and why a logical connection is necessary.” Id. But Carpenter is clearly distinguishable from the present case.

In Carpenter, the defense sought to cross-examine the State’s witness regarding federal conspiracy charges then pending against him. 979 S.W.2d at 633-34. The majority held that, “[f]or the evidence to be admissible, the proponent must establish some causal connection or logical relationship between the pending charges and the witness’ ‘vulnerable relationship’ or potential bias or prejudice for the State, or testimony at trial.” Id. at 634. But the “causal connection” that the majority mentioned, and failed to find, in Carpenter was the fact that Carpenter sought to impeach the witness’s credibility at a State trial with the federal charges then pending against that witness. As the Court stated:

Appellant has not established a causal connection or logical relationship between the pending federal charges and the witness’ testimony at trial. Appellant does not argue, and the record does not demonstrate, why prosecution by the federal government for theft and conspiracy to possess and distribute controlled substances would tend to show that the witness’ testimony in this unrelated state prosecution for tampering with government documents might be biased.

Id. at 635 (emphasis added). In other words, there was no “causal connection” between the charges against the witness and his testimony at trial because it was the federal government, and not the State for whom he was testifying, that was going to prosecute him on the impending charges. Thus, he was in a “vulnerable relationship” with the federal government, but not with the State. The federal government stood to gain nothing from, and he in turn stood to gain nothing from'the federal government for, his testimony for the State.7

*162A simple example illustrates the point. If John slaps his sister, Suzy, and Suzy threatens to tell their parents, John cannot hope to appease her by bringing some ice cream for his other sister, Mary. But he might persuade Suzy not to tell their parents by promising to bring some ice cream for her if she did not tell. Substitute John for the witness, Suzy for the federal government, and Mary for the State, and we have the Carpenter scenario.

In short, there was no realistic basis to attack the witness’s testimony for one prosecutorial authority because of the impending charges against him from the other. As the concurrence explained, “appellant’s right to cross-examine a State’s witness concerning pending charges against the witness is implicated only where the pending charges have been brought by the same prosecutorial authority (or, perhaps, another nonfederal prosecutorial authority in Texas) which is prosecuting appellant.” See id. at 635 (Mansfield, J., concurring) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Thus, the holding in Carpenter was grounded primarily on the fact that there were two separate prosecutorial authorities at work in that case. That is simply not the case before us.

B. Carroll

The majority asserts that “Judge Keller’s dissent in [Carroll v. State, 916 S.W.2d 494 (Tex.Crim.App.1996)] laid the groundwork for the Court’s reasoning in Carpenter.” Maj. Op. at 149 n. 42. But, while the Carpenter Court repeatedly referred to the Carroll majority, it did not even mention the Carroll dissent. Moreover, there is nothing in Carpenter to indicate that we limited the Carroll decision in any way. If anything, it was Judge Meyers’ concurrence in Carroll that laid the groundwork for his majority opinion in Carpenter. He wrote separately in Carroll only to make the following comment:

In this case the charges pending against the State’s witness originated in the same jurisdiction and were brought by the identical authorities as those for which the appellant stands accused. I therefore agree with the decision of our lead opinion to allow the defendant to use these charges for impeachment on cross-examination of this witness. However, in future contexts, should these charges emanate from another jurisdiction or authority, I would hold that release of the information to the jury is subject to a discretionary ruling of the trial court under Rule 403 of the Texas Rules of Criminal Evidence.

916 S.W.2d at 501 (Meyers, J., concurring) (emphasis added). Carpenter involved precisely the scenario of the two different prosecutorial authorities that Judge Meyers had mentioned in his concurrence in Carroll; and he reaffirmed the position he had taken in Carroll as he authored the majority opinion in Carpenter, affirming the court of appeals’ holding that Carpen*163ter had been properly excluded from cross-examining the State’s witness about pending charges from one prosecutorial authority when testifying for an altogether different prosecutorial authority.

C. Maxwell

The majority seeks to overrule Maxwell v. State, 48 S.W.3d 196 (Tex.Crim.App.2001), “to the extent that [it]is inconsistent with Carpenter.” See Maj. Op. at 152. But a careful examination of Maxwell shows that Carpenter was not even applicable to that case, which is probably why this Court did not even mention Carpenter in Maxwell.

In Maxwell, appellant was charged with aggravated robbery. At trial, he wanted to introduce evidence that Tiger, a key witness for the State, was on deferred adjudication probation for possession of a controlled substance. Appellant also wanted to introduce evidence that Tiger had been convicted of another crime during the course of that probation. The State objected, and the trial court did not allow any of the above evidence to be admitted before the jury. We granted appellant’s petition to consider whether “ ‘the trial court committed reversible error in failing to permit appellant to impeach a key state witness by showing that at the time of trial he was serving deferred adjudication probation.’” 48 S.W.3d at 197. After examining several Supreme Court cases, including Davis, as well as cases from our own Court, we concluded that “[b]oth prior and later opinions from this Court and the Supreme Court have indicated that a witness’s deferred adjudication probation status is sufficient to show a bias or interest in helping the State.” Id. at 199-200 (citations omitted). We therefore held that “a defendant is permitted to cross-examine a State’s witness on the status of his deferred adjudication probation in order to show a potential motive, bias or interest to testify for the State.” Id. at 200.

In light of the above, it is clear to see that Carpenter was distinguishable from Maxwell for the same reason that it is distinguishable from the present case— because it involved two separate prosecu-torial authorities: the State for which the witness sought to testify, and the federal government which had filed the charges pending against that witness. Thus, Carpenter fails to support the majority’s asserted justification for overruling Maxwell, i e., that Maxwell should be overruled because it is inconsistent with Carpenter.

The majority would like to overrule Maxwell because it clearly held that the fact that the witness is on probation is itself “sufficient” to allow the defense to cross-examine the witness about that probation. Id. But other decisions from this Court have reached the same conclusion. See, e.g., Woods, 152 S.W.3d at 111 (“We have found a nexus when a witness has been indicted or is serving a period of community supervision. In such cases, the witness is placed in a vulnerable position and may have a motive to testify in favor of the State.”); Carroll, 916 S.W.2d at 500-01 (“A defendant is permitted to elicit any fact from a witness intended to demonstrate that witness’ vulnerable relationship with the state”; “it is possible, even absent an agreement, that [the witness] believed his testimony in this case would be of later benefit”; “appellant did not try to cross-examine [the witness] about a specific instance of conduct.... Rather, appellant attempted to inform the jury that [the witness] had a vulnerable relationship with the State at the time of his testimony.”). Thus, this Court would have to overrule, not only Maxwell, but also Woods, Carroll, Carpenter itself, and all the cases that have followed these decisions.

*164Finally, the majority cites that portion of Callins v. State, 780 S.W.2d 176, 196 (Tex.Crim.App.1989) (op. on reh’g), see Maj. Op. at 150-51 n. 43, that Maxwell implicitly overruled by disapproving of a case specifically because of its reliance on that particular portion of Callins. See 48 S.W.3d at 198. Callins is the only case cited by the majority that even comes close to supporting its position. Thus, by overruling Maxwell and relying on Callins for support, the majority in effect seeks to reinstate the portion of Callins that was overruled by Maxwell. While Maxwell relied on at least two Supreme Court decisions (Davis and Alford) and at least three Texas cases (Evans, Carroll, and Moreno), Callins cited only Davis, barely discussed its application, and merely noted Evans as a “Cf.” See Callins, 780 S.W.2d at 196. Thus, the majority in the present case seeks to overrule Maxwell—which, in my view, was a thoroughly researched, well-reasoned, almost-a-decade-old decision, devoted exclusively to the issue presently before us — and reinstate Callins, which does not even discuss that issue to any appreciable length. In my view, this does not constitute sound and stable jurisprudence.

For all of the above reasons, I respectfully dissent.

OPINION

Johnson, J.,

delivered the opinion of the unanimous Court.

A jury convicted appellant of two counts of aggravated robbery. The jury then assessed punishment at seventy-five years’ incarceration for each count. The trial *168court entered judgment accordingly. On appeal, the court of appeals overruled appellant’s sole point of error and affirmed the trial court’s judgment. Meadows v. State, 2014 WL 84207, 2014 Tex.App. LEXIS 289, No. 02-12-00643-CR (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2014) (not designated for publication). We sustain appellant’s grounds for review and remand the cause to the court of appeals for reconsideration under the correct standard.

Facts

Appellant was convicted of robbing two named employees of a local restaurant before the establishment opened for business that day. Appellant testified at the guilt phase. We quote from the opinion of the court of appeals.

Prior to cross-examination and outside of the jury’s presence, the State announced its intent to question Meadows about his convictions for theft by receiving and grand larceny in the early 1990s [fn] and his 1996 conviction for theft of property $20,000 to $100,000; his two 1998 misdemeanor “assault on female” convictions and his 2007 failure-to-identify conviction as crimes involving moral turpitude; and his 2009 assault-family violence conviction to impeach Meadows’s statement during his direct examination that he would never harm anybody. When Meadows objected that the prior felony convictions exceeded the ten-year time limit, the State responded that the ten-year test did not apply when there were intervening crimes of moral turpitude. The trial court acknowledged that most of the convictions were beyond ten years but found “that in the interest of justice, the probative value of the conviction[s] and supported by the specific facts and circumstances outweighs the prejudicial effect.” The trial court agreed that the assault-family violence conviction could be used because Meadows had opened the door by suggesting that he would never hurt anyone.

[fn.] In 1990, Meadows was convicted [in Colorado] of theft by receiving. He received probation for his [Wyoming] grand-larceny conviction, but his probation was revoked in 1991.

Id. at *1, 2014 Tex.App. LEXIS 289 at * *1-2.

Court of Appeals Opinion

On direct appeal, appellant claimed that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the state to cross-examine him about felony convictions that were more than ten years old and about a misdemean- or conviction that was not a crime of moral turpitude. The court of appeals noted that “[w]hether to admit remote convictions lies within the trial court’s discretion and depends on the facts and circumstances of each case.” Id. at *1, 2014 Tex.App. LEXIS 289 at *3 (citing Jackson v. State, 50 S.W.3d 579, 591 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2001, pet. ref'd)). It declined appellant’s invitation to revisit Jackson regarding the “tacking” of felony convictions that are out-of-date under Rule 609.1 Id. at *1, 2014 Tex.App. LEXIS 289 at *4. Using the standard found in Rule 609(a) instead of the more restrictive Rule 609(b), the court of appeals also noted that, under the tacking doctrine, a trial court must determine whether the probative value of the convictions outweighs, rather than “substantially” outweighs, their prejudicial effect and accordingly overruled appellant’s complaint about the trial court’s application of the balancing test. Id. at *2, 2014 Tex.App. LEXIS 289 at * *4-5. The court of *169appeals also discussed the factors considered in weighing the probative value of a prior conviction against its prejudicial effect and concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in its determination that the prior convictions’ probative value outweighed their prejudicial effect. Id. at *2, 2014 Tex.App. LEXIS 289 at * *5-7.

We granted appellant’s two grounds for review.

1. The court of appeals committed error in misconstruing Tex.R.Evid[.] 609(b) by engrafting onto Tex.R.Evid. 609(b) the common law doctrine known as “tacking” to treat convictions older than 10 years as though they were more recent than 10 years although there is no provision contained in Rule 609 to allow such a result. Accordingly the court failed to properly analyze the ground of error brought forth by Appellant.

2. The Court of Appeals has, in its application of the common law doctrine, rewritten the plain language of rule 609 to create, as the court in Hankins said, a third category of cases not recognized by the rule, cases that have been transformed to a more recent vintage, without applying all the factors required by the rule, and the “substantially outweighed” standard that is specifically required by the rule.

Appellant asks, “In short, does the common law doctrine of Tacking survive the promulgation of the rules of evidence?” Appellant’s brief at 3.

Argument

Appellant argues that

[t]he court of appeals erred in ruling that the trial court committed no error or abuse of discretion by allowing into evidence remote convictions when the court failed to follow Tex.R.Evid[.] 609(b) but relied instead o[n] the common law doctrine of Tacking to treat remote convictions as recent convictions in determining whether they were admissible.

Appellant’s brief at 7. He asserts that the court of appeals “erred in relying on the common-law tacking doctrine to hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting into evidence Appellant’s convictions that were remote in time.” Appellant’s brief at 8. Noting the “outweighs its prejudicial effect” language of Rule 609(a), which the court of appeals used in its analysis, versus the “substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect” language of Rule 609(b), appellant argues that the court of appeals used the wrong rule and its attendant language in conducting its analysis. He suggests that, had it used the proper rule and language, it would have reversed the trial court’s ruling.

The state acknowledges that the trial court’s review of convictions that are more than ten years old should be conducted under the standard of Rule 609(b) and agrees that the court of appeals incorrectly used the “outweighs” test under Rule 609(a) rather than the more rigorous “substantially outweighs” test of Rule 609(b), but it also asserts that the court of appeals nevertheless reached the correct result when it concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the remote convictions. The state maintains that, even using the balancing test of Rule 609(b), the remote convictions were admissible.

Analysis

The parties agree that the court of appeals applied Rule 609 incorrectly. We hold that the unambiguous plain language of the rule supplants the common-law tacking doctrine.

*170Under the tacking doctrine, a conviction that is more than ten years old can be tacked onto a more recent conviction for remoteness purposes, which then alters the legal standard governing its admission. See Jones-Jackson v. State, 443 S.W.3d 400, 403 (Tex.App.-Eastland 2014, no pet.). Under the tacking doctrine, if a defendant has one or more prior convictions that are more than ten years old and also has more recent convictions for felonies or misdemeanors involving moral turpitude, such intervening convictions remove the taint of remoteness from the prior conviction and make a conviction older than ten years admissible. Jackson v. State, 11 S.W.3d 336, 339 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, pet. ref'd); Hernandez v. State, 976 S.W.2d 753, 755 (Tex.App.Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. ref'd).

In McClendon v. State, 509 S.W.2d 851, 853-54 (Tex.Crim.App.1974) (op. on rehr’g.), we observed that typically, “where a prior felony conviction has been used for impeachment, it has been held remote if the time of one’s discharge from such conviction is more than ten years.” We also noted that the ten-year rule is not always followed, as each case must rest upon its own circumstances. Id. at 854. We ultimately held:

If more than ten years have elapsed since the discharge date of a prior conviction and if the witness has not been reformed, proof of such prior conviction may be shown for impeachment purposes.

Id. In Crisp v. State, 470 S.W.2d 58, 59-60 (Tex.Crim.App.1971), we indicated that whether a prior conviction was too remote to impair the defendant’s credibility was not to be arbitrarily determined by the lapse of time alone, but rather that the intervening conduct of the accused was pertinent and could be used in determining whether proof of the prior conviction was admissible or too remote. Thus, regardless of the time element, the facts of each case were to be considered in determining remoteness. Id.

However, we have recognized that, since September 1, 1986, the admissibility of prior convictions for witness impeachment purposes has been governed by Rule 609. Ex parte Menchaca, 854 S.W.2d 128, 130 (Tex.Crim.App.1993). On March 1, 1998, the Rules of Evidence replaced the Rules of Criminal Evidence, and since that date we have been bound by Tex.R. Evid. 609, which is substantially identical to former Tex.R.Crim. Evid. 609(a) and (b).

In unambiguous plain language, Rule 609(a) provides that witness credibility may be attacked by admitting evidence that the witness previously has been convicted of a felony or crime of moral turpitude if the trial court determines that the probative value of admitting the evidence simply outweighs its prejudicial effect. In equally unambiguous plain language, Rule 609(b) limits Rule 609(a) by providing that evidence of a prior conviction is inadmissible if more than ten years has elapsed since the later of the date of conviction or release of the witness from the confinement imposed for that conviction “unless the court determines, in the interests of justice, that the probative value of the conviction supported by specific facts and circumstances substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect.” Tex.R. Evid. 609. In deciding whether, in the interests of justice, the probative value of a remote conviction substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect, a court may consider all relevant specific facts and circumstances, including whether intervening convictions dilute the prejudice of that remote conviction.

“In construing a court rule, we attempt to effectuate the plain language of *171the rule unless there are countervailing considerations.” Bruton v. State, 428 S.W.3d 865, 873 (Tex.Crim.App.2014) (citing Nava v. State, 415 S.W.3d 289, 306 (Tex.Crim.App.2013)). Both parties agree that the text of the rule has an unambiguous and plain meaning, and we see no countervailing considerations.2 The state recognizes and “agrees with the thorough analysis detailed in Leyba v. State, 416 S.W.3d 563 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th] Dist. 2013, pet. ref'd),” and the conclusion in that opinion that “Rule 609 had supplanted the common-law exception and that under the rule’s plain meaning, tacking is no longer permitted.” State’s brief at 3. Appellant is in agreement with the state as to the thorough analysis reflected in Leyba. Appellant’s brief at 27.

Leyba recognized that Rule 609 represented a departure from its predecessor, Tex.Code Crim. Proc. art. 38.29, which contained no express prohibition on impeaching witnesses with evidence of convictions that were too remote. Leyba, 416 S.W.3d at 566. Common-law rulings filled in for the old statute’s silence, and the tacking doctrine arose thereafter. Id. at 566-68. But, as discussed above, the adoption of the unambiguous plain language of the Rule 609 has supplanted the common-law tacking doctrine.

Appellant’s grounds for review question the propriety of the court of appeals’s application of Rule 609 in addressing his claim about the admissibility of evidence of his remote prior convictions in cross-examining him at trial. The state concedes that the court of appeals “utilized the ‘outweighs’ test under Rule 609(a) rather than the more rigorous ‘substantially outweighs’ test of Rule 609(b)” when it “found the trial court had not abused its discretion in admitting the remote convictions.” State’s brief at 3. The state recognizes that “[a] remand to conduct a [Rule] 609(b) analysis would be proper since [Rule] 609(b) is the correct theory of law applicable to the case.” State’s brief at 4, fn.5. We agree.

The court of appeals conducted its analysis using the general “outweighs” standard found in Rule 609(a) rather that the correct “substantially outweighs” test of Rule 609(b). It should have the opportunity to reconsider appellant’s claim under the correct standard.

Conclusion

We sustain appellant’s grounds for review. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand to that court for further action consistent with this opinion.

OPINION

MEYERS, J.,

delivered the unanimous opinion of the Court.

Appellant was convicted in December 1999 of capital murder. Tex. Pen.Code Ann. § 19.03(a) (Vernon 1994). Pursuant to the jury’s answers to the special issues set forth in Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 87.071 sections 2(b) and 2(e), the trial judge sentenced appellant to death. Art. 37.071 § 2(g).1 Direct appeal to this Court is automatic. Art. 37.071 § 2(h). Appellant raises three points of error but does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence at either stage of trial. Thus, only those facts essential to answer appellant’s points will be set out. We affirm.

In all of his points of error, appellant complains that the trial court erred in allowing the prosecutor to ask a defense punishment witness, over objection, “did you know” questions about specific criminal acts which had not been proven before the jury. Appellant contends this violated his right to confront the witnesses against him as granted by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and his right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. Appellant also asserts that this error affected his substantial rights. In particular, appellant complains that the error affected his “substantial right to confront the witnesses against him” and “the substantial right to have the State ... meet its burden of proof on future dangerousness.”

The record reveals that during the punishment phase of trial, appellant called Reverend Rogers Delaney to testify about his interactions with appellant and about appellant’s character in general. On cross-examination, the prosecutor established that Delaney had been personally involved in appellant’s life and had attempted to ensure that appellant learn right from wrong and become a productive member of society. The prosecutor then asked Delaney a series of questions designed to determine his familiarity with appellant’s past violent behavior.2 Delaney responded that he was not aware of any of the incidents to which the prosecutor referred. Appellant did not object to any of these questions.

The prosecutor next asked Delaney if he knew that appellant had driven a stolen car to the scene where he committed the capital murder. After Delaney answered this question and the prosecutor began asking a new question, defense counsel asked to approach the bench and objected:

[DEFENSE COUNSEL:] This might be a delayed objection, but I’d like to object to any reference to a stolen car to the capital murder case. There’s been no evidence—

THE COURT: I understand that. I understand that. But there’s nothing wrong with him asking this witness if he’s heard about it.

*349[DEFENSE COUNSEL:] But the manner in which the questions is [sic] phrased presupposes that the witness— not this witness obviously has not heard anything about the testimony [sic]. Neither has the jury. It’s sort of like asking, “When did you stop beating your wife,” which presupposes that you ever beat your wife. And there’s been no evidence—

The trial court overruled the objection.

On re-cross, the prosecutor asked Delaney a number of questions designed to determine his familiarity with appellant’s behavior while in jail. Specifically, the prosecutor asked Delaney whether he knew that while in jail, appellant had been charged with extortion in November of 1998. Appellant objected to this question:

[DEFENSE COUNSEL:] We’re way outside the scope now of either cross-examination — direct, cross, redirect, we’re way outside. This was not an alleged criminal act. And this witness obviously would have no way of having any information relative to that. He’s already testified that—

THE COURT: I understand.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL:] And that’s different from posing a question, now we’re saying we have another crime allegedly.

[THE COURT:] That he was charged with. I understand. I understand. And I wish there was a rule that said that the first direct and the cross and the redirect and the recross and the re-re and the re-re that would refine it. But we don’t have a rule like that. So, at any rate as I understand your objection, it’s overruled, sir.

The prosecutor resumed questioning Delaney regarding additional incidents of extortion for which appellant was charged with while he was in jail. Appellant once again objected:

[DEFENSE COUNSEL:] At this point I think we’re badgering the witness. He’s already testified that he has no knowledge about anything other than his limited involvement and the scope of his — I think the State at this time is badgering this man. And he doesn’t deserve that.

The trial court overruled appellant’s objection. Without further objections, the prosecutor finished asking Delaney a series of “did you know” questions concerning more charges that had been filed against appellant while he was in jail.

Appellant has failed to preserve error for appellate review. To preserve error for appellate review, the complaining party must make a specific objection and obtain a ruling on the objection. Broxton v. State, 909 S.W.2d 912, 918 (Tex.Crim.App.1995). In addition, the objection must be made at the earliest possible opportunity. Turner v. State, 805 S.W.2d 423, 431 (Tex.Crim.App.1991), cert. denied 502 U.S. 870, 112 S.Ct. 202, 116 L.Ed.2d 162 (1991). Finally, the point of error on appeal must comport with the objection made at trial. Thomas v. State, 723 S.W.2d 696, 700 (Tex.Crim.App.1986).

Appellant first complains of the “did you know” question posed by the prosecutor about the stolen vehicle. At trial, appellant objected on the grounds that no evidence had been introduced to support the facts asserted by the prosecutor. Not only did appellant fail to make a timely objection, but the objection raised on appeal differs from that which was lodged at trial. As such, appellant failed to preserve error regarding this question.

Appellant likewise failed to make the proper objections to the other “did you know” questions regarding the specific acts allegedly committed by appellant *350while he was in jail. Appellant first objected on the ground that the question on re-cross was outside the scope of the redirect and then because he felt the prosecutor was badgering the witness. At no time did appellant object on the grounds he now raises on appeal.

Even if appellant had preserved error, his claim would be without merit. A witness who testifies to a defendant’s good character may be cross-examined to test the witness’s awareness of relevant “specific instances of conduct.” Drone v. State, 906 S.W.2d 608, 616 (Tex.App.Austin 1995, pet. ref'd); Tex.R. Evid. 405(a).3 Character may be proved by either opinion or reputation testimony. "While reputation witnesses are generally asked “have you heard” questions, opinion witnesses are asked “did you know” questions.4 See Reynolds v. State, 848 S.W.2d 785, 788 (Tex.App.Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, pet. ref'd). In the present case, appellant called Delaney to testify as a character witness. On direct examination, Delaney testified that he was surprised to learn that appellant had just been convicted of capital murder and had a prior criminal history. Moreover, he testified that during the times that he was with appellant, appellant exhibited exceptional behavior. In addition, on re-direct, when asked by appellant’s attorney whether in spite of all the things he was asked by the State during cross-examination regarding specific instances of appellant’s conduct appellant was still the kind of person with whom he wished to associate, he replied, “Geno is far above in my mind what I have heard going on here.”

Because Delaney testified as to his opinion of appellant, the State was entitled to test his knowledge about specific instances of conduct involving appellant by asking a series of “did you know questions.” See id. Appellant claims, however, that it was improper for the trial court to allow the State to ask Delaney “did you know” questions about specific criminal acts over objection since the acts had not been proven before the jury.

The right of a party to cross-examine a character witness on specific instances of conduct is subject to certain limitations. See Lancaster v. State, 754 S.W.2d 493, 496 (Tex.App.Dallas 1988, pet, *351ref'd). First, the incidents inquired about must be relevant to the character traits at issue. Id. Second, the alleged bad act must have a basis in fact. Id. Before the questions are asked, the foundation for inquiring into the specific instances of conduct should be laid outside the jury’s presence so that the judge will have an opportunity to rule on the propriety of asking them. See United States v. Nixon, 777 F.2d 958, 970 (5th Circ.1985);5 Reynolds, 848 S.W.2d at 788. Specific instances should not, however, be proven before the jury. See Nixon, 777 F.2d. at 970. The rationale behind this rule is explained in the Commentary to Federal Rule of Evidence 405 in the federal code:6

While a party may cross-examine a character witness with relevant specific acts, the party may not prove that these acts occurred, if the only purpose is to test the character witness. Rule 405(a) states that “inquiry is allowable” into relevant specific instances of conduct. This language does not permit extrinsic proof of the conduct. The rationale is that the probative value of extrinsic proof of such a collateral matter is substantially outweighed by the risk of prejudice, confusion, and delay that the proof would present; after all, the bad act is only probative in these circumstances to test the character witness. It is not worth it, under the circumstances, to prove to the jury that this act really occurred.

In the present case the State was asking the questions for the purpose of testing Delaney’s familiarity with appellant. As such, not only was the State not required to prove to the jury that the acts actually occurred, but it would have been improper for the State to attempt to do so. Appellant’s claim is therefore without merit.

We overrule appellant’s points of error. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

OPINION

McCORMICK, P.J.,

delivered the opinion of the Court,

in which MANSFIELD, KELLER, HOLLAND and WOMACK, JJ., joined.

Appellant was convicted in December 1995 of a capital murder committed in October 1994. V.T.C.A, Penal Code, Section 19.03(a)(2). Pursuant to the jury’s answers to the statutory punishment issues set forth in Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 37.071, Sections 2(b) and 2(e), the trial judge *285sentenced appellant to death.1 Article 37.071, Section 2(g). Direct appeal is automatic. Article 37.071, Section 2(h). We will affirm.

Appellant raises twelve points of error. He raises challenges to the sufficiency of the mitigation evidence. However, for the reasons put forth under those points, we need not set out a comprehensive recitation of the facts. Hence, only those facts necessary to address appellant’s points will be included. Appellant’s points will be addressed in the order in which he raises them on appeal.

Appellant advances in his first point of error that the trial court erred in failing to suppress the evidence seized from the hotel room following his arrest.2 Specifically, appellant asserts not that his arrest was illegal, but that the State failed to carry its burden at the suppression hearing to show that it was lawful. Because of this, appellant contends that the evidence should be suppressed notwithstanding the fact that he signed a consent to search form.

The record reveals that several credit cards were stolen from the victim. Upon investigation, the police began to suspect appellant. Furthermore, outstanding warrants for other crimes not related to the capital murder charge already existed for appellant’s arrest. In pursuing the investigation of the capital murder, officers were led to a Holiday Inn where a room had been secured by one of the stolen cards. The police knocked on the door of the room and appellant answered. According to officers’ testimony at the suppression hearing, the police arrested appellant pursuant to the outstánd-ing warrants and quickly conducted a protective search of the room. Within five minutes of entry, appellant was presented with a consent to search form which .he signed.3

At the motion to suppress hearing, appellant admitted on cross-examination that he knew what the consent to search form was,4 he signed it “knowingly and voluntarily,” and he knew that he could have refused to sign it. Appellant further admitted that he knew a warrant was out for his arrest on an assault charge and that police officers “had a lawful right to arrest” him on that charge. Given this testimony, we hold that the trial judge acted within her discretion in overruling appellant’s motion to suppress. See Baker v. State, 956 S.W.2d 19 (Tex.Cr.App.1997). Point of error one is overruled.

In his second point of error, appellant asserts that the trial court erred in “failing to provide funds with which to employ an expert witness.” Specifically, appellant claims he was entitled to funds to hire a particular psychologist, Dr. Theodore Blau, to rebut the testimony of State’s witness, psychologist Dr. Allan Brantley, of the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI’s) Behavioral Sciences Unit. To properly address this point of error, we must briefly set out the facts underlying the claim.

The record reflects that appellant filed a motion on November 1, 1995, requesting the appointment of psychiatrist Mitchell Young and psychologist Ed Friedman. The trial court granted this request, but limited the funds available to $6,000.00. According to Dr. Young’s letter to defense counsel, psychologist David Hopkinson would also be helping with the case.5 On November 22, 1995, appellant filed two additional motions requesting the appointment of “expert assistance." Each of these motions specifically asked for the appointment of psychologist Dr. Theodore Blau. Appellant urged his motion be granted because Blau was needed to respond to State’s expert, FBI Special Agent Dr. Allan Brantley, who was going to use a *286“threat assessment technique” (apparently similar to a future dangerousness analysis) and “compare the defendant to profiles of certain serial killers and discuss [appellant’s] similarity to such individuals.” Blau was apparently needed to show why such testimony was not “scientifically validated” and should, therefore, be held inadmissible. No affidavits or other evidence of need were included with the motion.

In considering the motion prior to trial, the trial judge asked appellant whether, if she granted his motion and appointed Blau, Blau was going to listen to Brantley’s testimony. Appellant responded that he did not think so. The judge also asked appellant why one of the psychologists or the psychiatrist that had already been appointed could not rebut Brantley’s testimony. Appellant responded that Brantley’s testimony was not psychological in nature, but instead was based upon a forensic analysis. Appellant asserted that Blau was necessary because he was one of the people who developed the techniques about which Brantley would be testifying and he was the only non-FBI person counsel was aware of who utilized them. The judge overruled his request.

Prior to Brantley’s testimony • at punishment, the trial court held a hearing pursuant to Texas Rules of Criminal Evidence 702-705 to determine Brantley’s qualifications and the bases for his testimony. Brantley told the judge that he was going to render an opinion on appellant’s probability for being a future danger and that he was going to base that opinion upon crime scene photographs, investigative reports, interviews, autopsy photographs, school records, work records, and “everything that [he] could get [his] hands on.” Brantley stated that he was not testifying from a psychological perspective per se, but rather from his experience in the criminal justice field. Brantley also told the judge that he did not intend to use the “profiling” technique of which appellant complained. Appellant challenged Brantley’s testimony asserting that it was based on novel methodology and was cumulative because the State had established the same information through the cross-examination of appellant’s experts. The judge held the testimony admissible. After Brantley’s testimony, appellant re-urged his motion to be allowed to hire Dr. Blau. However, the judge also overruled this request.

In Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 105 S.Ct. 1087, 84 L.Ed.2d 53 (1985), the United States Supreme Court explained that due process requires access to the raw materials integral to the building of an effective defense. Id. at 77, 105 S.Ct. 1087. In other words, the State must provide a defendant with the basic tools to present his defense within our adversarial system. Id. While the Ake case dealt with the appointment of a psychiatrist, it is now without question that Ake requires the appointment of an expert regardless of his field of expertise. Rey v. State, 897 S.W.2d 333, 338 (Tex.Cr.App.1995). As we set out in Rey:

“There is no principled way to distinguish between psychiatric and nonpsychiatric experts. The question in each case must be not what field of expert knowledge is involved, but rather how important the scientific issue is in the case, and how much help a defense expert could have given.” 897 S.W.2d at 338.

Hence, the nature of an expert’s field and the importance and complexity of the issue will bear directly upon whether the appointment of an expert will be helpful. Id. The type of expert is also relevant to the determination of whether the trial was fundamentally unfair without the expert’s assistance. Id.

However, this does not mean that the State must “purchase for an indigent defendant all the assistance that his wealthier counterparts might buy.” Ake, supra. Nor does it mean that a defendant has a constitutional right to choose an expert of his personal liking. Ake, supra; Cantu v. State, 939 S.W.2d 627, 638-639 (Tex.Cr.App.1997). Rather, the purpose of the appointment is to level the playing field; to give a defendant access to a competent expert who can assist in the evaluation, preparation, and presentation of the defense. See Rey, 897 S.W.2d at 337.

In implementing this right to receive an expert, the burden is on the defendant to make a sufficient threshold showing *287of the need for the expert’s assistance. Rey, 897 S.W.2d at 339. In the instant case, it is not entirely clear exactly what type of expert appellant was seeking. The State’s expert, Brantley, told the court that he was going to testify on the issue of appellant’s future dangerousness, obviously a significant factor at trial. Furthermore, he specifically stated that he was not going to utilize the complained-of “profiling” technique, but instead was going to evaluate the evidence and make an assessment from that material. Whether from a psychological perspective or a criminal justice one, Brantley’s actual testimony was akin to the testimony of a forensic psychologist.

Appellant asserted he needed Blau (a psychologist) to discount Brantley’s testimony concerning the “profiling” technique because he had helped to develop the technique.6 However, Brantley specifically indicated he was not going to utilize the technique. Even if Brantley had used the technique, it is unclear whether or not any of appellant’s other experts were versed in the use of “profiling” and, therefore, could have rendered competent assistance. The fact that appellant requested a third psychologist and not some criminal justice or other forensic expert weighs against his being able to show need for this particular expert. Given the facts and the testimony presented, we cannot say that the trial judge was outside of the zone of reasonable disagreement in refusing to appoint Blau. See Rey, supra. Appellant’s second point of error is overruled.

In point of error three, appellant posits that the trial court erred in allowing Brantley to testify “without first holding a Rule 702 hearing to determine whether Brantley’s theories were sufficiently reliable to be admissible.” In his fourth point, he contends that the trial court erred in admitting Brantley’s testimony. The testimony at trial reveals the following exchange:

“THE COURT: Can I look at that; and then the other thing you want a hearing on—

“[DEFENSE COUNSEL:] Allen [sic] Brantley’s qualifications to testify under rule 701, 702 and 705.

“THE COURT: Okay. We’ll do that after we break.

“So we’ll play the tape, break, do the hearing and you can put on Brantley.”

The record further shows, prior to Brantley’s testimony before the jury, the judge did hear from both attorneys and Brantley concerning Brantley’s qualifications to testify and the basis of his testimony. There is no indication in the record that appellant was prohibited from calling witnesses for this “hearing,” nor did appellant make any complaint that this was not a sufficient hearing for purposes of qualifying the witness and establishing the basis of his testimony. Appellant’s third point of error is not supported by the record and is, therefore, overruled.

With regard to point of error four, appellant claims that: 1) Brantley’s testimony was based upon novel scientific theory and was, therefore, unreliable, and 2) the testimony was further not admissible because it did not assist the jury by providing any specialized knowledge. Appellant’s allegations correspond with the trial court’s task in assessing the admissibility of evidence under Rule 702. Pursuant to Rule 702, the trial court must determine whether the scientific evidence offered is sufficiently reliable and relevant to help the jury in reaching accurate results. Hartman v. State, 946 S.W.2d 60, 62 (Tex.Cr.App.1997).7 The admission of such scientific evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial court and its decision regarding such will not be set aside absent an abuse of that discretion. Clark v. State, 881 S.W.2d 682, 698 (Tex.Cr.App.1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1156, 115 S.Ct. 1114, 130 L.Ed.2d 1078 (1995).

To be considered reliable, evidence must have its basis in sound scientific methodology. Id. Evidence that is not reli*288able is not helpful to the jury because it frustrates rather then promotes intelligent evaluation of the facts. Jordan v. State, 928 S.W.2d 550, 554 (Tex.Cr.App.1996). With respect to the relevance consideration, expert testimony must “assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.” Jordan, 928 S.W.2d at 555. Expert testimony that does not relate to a fact in issue is not helpful. Id.

The thrust of appellant’s argument seems to concentrate on Brantley’s use of the “profiling” technique. Appellant claims that this technique is not grounded in sound scientific theory and, therefore, should not have been admitted. However, during the hearing on Brantley’s qualifications, the witness expressly stated that he would “not offer testimony about a profile.” Because the witness did not offer the complained-of testimony, the majority of appellant’s argument is moot. Alternatively, appellant argues that the witness’s testimony was not relevant because it offered no expertise outside of the jury’s own capabilities and it was cumulative “because [the prosecution has] established [the same information] by cross examination of the three psychologists [the defense] put on. All three said yes in free society he’s dangerous.”

In Clark, 881 S.W.2d at 698, we reaffirmed that psychological and psychiatric testimony is admissible during the punishment phase of a capital trial. However, the proponent of the evidence still has the burden to show that the witness possesses the requisite expertise required by Rule 702 and that the witness’s testimony will assist the fact-finder. Appellant does not attack Brantley’s qualifications as an “expert,” therefore, the only remaining question is whether the trial judge could have reasonably determined that his testimony would be of benefit to the fact-finder.

An appellant’s potential for being a future danger is a question of fact which the jury must answer. See Article 37.071, Section 2(b). Furthermore, this Court has previously recognized that testimony from mental health experts is relevant to that issue. McBride v. State, 862 S.W.2d 600, 608 (Tex.Cr.App.1993), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1246, 114 S.Ct. 2765, 129 L.Ed.2d 879 (1994).

In the instant case, Brantley testified that prior to becoming a special agent with the FBI, he had worked as a psychologist in a maximum security prison for about six years. Among other duties, Brantley stated that he was responsible for assessing and evaluating the adult male felon population for potential dangerousness or future threat to the community should they be released on parole. Brantley told the jury that he reviewed “hundreds” of such cases during his time in that position.

After leaving that post, Brantley became the senior psychologist and Mental Health Director for a three prison unit complex where he continued to perform future threat evaluations in addition to supervising other psychologists. Brantley further stated that he had taught “criminal psychology” at the FBI Academy for a number of years. Finally, Brantley told the jury that, before developing an opinion of appellant’s future dangerousness in the instant case, he reviewed the investigative reports, crime scene photos, autopsy photos, witness statements, and appellant’s school and personnel records, among other information.8

Given Brantley’s specialized education and experience, and the effort he took to “fit” his evaluation to this particular ease, we cannot say that the trial judge abused her discretion in determining that Brantléy’s testimony would be helpful to the jury.9 See Clark and McBride, both supra. Point of error four is overruled.

In his fifth point of error, appellant complains that the trial court erred in allowing the victim’s brother to testify at the punishment stage of trial about the impact *289his sister’s death in the instant offense had on their family. Specifically, the witness testified to the relationship the victim had with him and his family. He told the jury that his sister had been the planner and coordinator for all of the holidays the family celebrated. He also related how their father had been diagnosed with cancer before the victim’s death, how the victim had helped to take care of him, and how their father quit fighting the disease after the victim was killed. Appellant did not cross-examine the witness.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion to admit this evidence under this Court’s majority decision in Mosley v. State, 983 S.W.2d 249 (Tex.Cr.App.1998) (op. on reh’g). Point of error five is overruled.

Appellant complains in points of error six through nine about issues relating to the requirement that, if sentenced to life in prison, he must spend at least forty years in jail before becoming eligible for parole. See Article 42.18, Section 8(b)(2). Specifically, appellant asserts in his sixth point of error that the trial court erred in not submitting an instruction to the jury informing them that he would have to spend at least forty years in prison if sentenced to life. In his seventh point, appellant avers that he should have been allowed to voir dire the jury on this issue. And finally, in his eighth and ninth points of error, appellant complains that his expert witnesses should have been allowed to testify that appellant’s threat of being a future danger would be substantially reduced given the required minimum incarceration time.

Appellant contends these issues are controlled by the United States Supreme Court case of Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 114 S.Ct. 2187, 129 L.Ed.2d 133 (1994). He concedes that this Court has already decided the issues against him. However, he “respectfully disagrees with this Court’s reasoning” and urges us to consider his argument.

In Smith v. State, 898 S.W.2d 838 (Tex.Cr.App.1995)(plurality opinion), cert. denied; 516 U.S. 843, 116 S.Ct. 131, 133 L.Ed.2d 80 (1995), this Court engaged in a comprehensive discussion of Simmons as it relates to the law in Texas. We reiterated that parole is traditionally not a matter for jury consideration in a Texas capital murder trial. And, thus, it is not error for a trial court to refuse to admit testimony concerning parole. See Jones v. State, 843 S.W.2d 487, 495 (Tex.Cr.App.1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1035, 113 S.Ct. 1858, 123 L.Ed.2d 479 (1993). Further, we “absolutely reject[ed]” the premise that Simmons has been extended to parole eligible defendants. Smith, 898 S.W.2d at 848. As such, we hold that the requested instruction, voir dire, and testimony which is the subject of these points were appropriately refused by the trial court. Smith, supra; Shannon v. State, 942 S.W.2d 591, 594 (Tex.Cr.App.1996); Broxton v. State, 909 S.W.2d 912, 918-919 (Tex.Cr.App.1995). Points six through nine are overruled.

Appellant asserts in his tenth point of error that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the jury’s negative finding to the mitigation issue. Similarly, in his eleventh point of error, he challenges the factual sufficiency of the mitigation evidence. Appellant notes his awareness that this Court has consistently refused to address such points. However, he advances that such review is mandated under due process.

We have previously held that the sufficiency of mitigation evidence is not reviewable by this Court. Lawton v. State, 913 S.W.2d 542, 557 (Tex.Cr.App.1995), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 826, 117 S.Ct. 88, 136 L.Ed.2d 44 (1996). We have also previously held that such a review is not constitutionally required. McFarland v. State, 928 S.W.2d 482, 499 (Tex.Cr.App.1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1119, 117 S.Ct. 966, 136 L.Ed.2d 851 (1997). We decline to readdress the issue here. Points of error ten and eleven are overruled.

Appellant attests in his final point of error that the trial court erred in allowing the State to introduce evidence that two Harris County Sheriffs Office Supervisors who wrote positively of appellant were fired because of criminal convictions. During the punishment stage of trial, the State called Ruben Diaz to testify. Diaz, a lieutenant in the Harris County Sheriffs Department, told *290the jury that he served as appellant’s immediate supervisor at one point in time. As a result of this relationship, Diaz testified that he formed the opinion that appellant had a bad reputation.

While cross-examining Diaz, defense counsel introduced appellant’s Harris County personnel file. Discussing the contents of this file with Diaz, defense counsel revealed to the jury several documents generated by appellant’s past supervisors and colleagues chronicling his career as a peace officer. Among these were documents from deputies G. Poindexter and B. Mathis. Poindexter had conducted a check of appellant’s references when appellant submitted an employment application to the Sheriffs Department and placed documents in appellant’s file indicating that the people he had contacted spoke positively of appellant. Mathis had been one of appellant’s superiors in the early 1980’s and had given him several positive evaluations.10

On the State’s redirect of Diaz, the prosecutor elicited testimony that Poindexter and Mathis had both been fired from the sheriffs department after being convicted of criminal offenses. It is this testimony of which appellant now complains.

The State responds that the complained-of statements were admissible under Tex.R.Crim.Evid. 806. Rule 806 states in pertinent part:

“When a hearsay statement, ..., has been admitted in evidence, the credibility of the declarant may be attacked, ..., by any evidence which would be admissible for those purposes if declarant had testified as a witness. Evidence of a statement or conduct by the declarant at any time, offered to impeach the declarant, is not subject to any requirement that he may have been afforded an opportunity to deny or explain. If the party against whom a hearsay statement has been admitted calls the declarant as a witness, the party is entitled to examine him on the statement as if under cross-examination.”

While the State did not complain of the admission of appellant’s personnel file and its contents, the trial judge could have reasonably concluded that the documents contained within the file were hearsay. In other words, the judge could have determined that the documents were statements, other than ones made by the declarant while testifying at trial, which had been offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matters asserted within. See Tex.R.Crim.Evid. 801(d).

Because we conclude the statements qualified as hearsay, the credibility of each declar-ant could then be attacked pursuant to the dictates of Rule 806. If the declarants had testified as witnesses, the State would have been allowed to impeach their credibility with a felony conviction or the conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude.11 See Tex. R.Crim.Evid. 609(a). Hence, this same impeachment evidence could be used pursuant to Rule 806. Furthermore, the trial judge apparently engaged in the proper balancing test required under Rule 609(a) as evidenced by the fact that she made the State refrain from mentioning the specific crime of which each person was convicted. Given this, we cannot say that the trial judge abused her discretion in allowing the impeachment testimony. Point of error twelve is .overruled.

Finding no reversible error, we affirm the conviction and sentence of the trial court.

MEYERS, J., filed a concurring opinion.

MANSFIELD, J., filed a concurring opinion.

KELLER, J., filed a concurring opinion joined by HOLLAND and WOMACK, JJ.

*291BAIRD, J., filed a concurring and dissenting opinion joined by OVERSTREET and PRICE, JJ.

MEYERS, Judge,

concurring.

The majority either assumes the trial court had the foresight to consider factors this Court would, more than two years later, recognize as important in assessing admissibility of victim related evidence at punishment in a capital murder case or undertakes the appropriate consideration of such factors itself in a kind of silent de novo review to which no one is privy. In either case, I decline to join them.

At the time of appellant’s trial admissibility of victim related evidence at punishment was, at the very most, questionable.1 Mosley v. State, 983 S.W.2d at 262 (Tex.Crim.App.1998)(recognizing “[o]ur jurisprudence in this area has been somewhat inconsistent and confusing”). A majority of the Court in Mosley rendered the issue no longer questionable, holding, “[b]oth victim impact and victim character evidence are admissible-” Id. at 262. But the Court nevertheless placed admissibility within a specific context and purpose:

“Both victim impact and victim character evidence are admissible, in the context of the mitigation special issue, to show the uniqueness of the victim, the harm caused by the defendant, and as rebuttal to the defendant’s mitigating evidence.”

Id. (emphasis added). Further, such evidence has no relevance to the issue on future dangerousness: “[sjuch evidence is patently irrelevant ... to a determination of future dangerousness.” Id. at 263. Trial courts were given considerable direction in assessing admissibility of victim related evidence under Rule 403:

Rule 403 limits the admissibility of such evidence when the evidence predominantly encourages comparisons based upon the greater or lesser worth or morality of the victim. When the focus of the evidence shifts from humanizing the victim and illustrating the harm caused by the defendant to measuring the worth of the victim compared to other members of society then the State exceeds the bounds of permissible testimony. We recognize that this standard does not draw a bright and easy line for determining when evidence concerning the victim is admissible and when it is not. Trial judges should exercise their sound discretion in permitting some evidence about the victim’s character and the impact on others’ lives while limiting the amount and scope of such testimony. Considerations in determining whether testimony should be excluded under Rule 403 should include the nature of the testimony, the relationship between the witness and the victim, the amount of testimony to be introduced, and the availability of other testimony relating to victim impact and character. And, mitigating evidence introduced by the defendant may also be considered in evaluating whether the State may subsequently offer victim-related testimony.

Id. at 262.

The trial court in the instant case ruled the evidence admissible without the benefit of the guidance offered by the majority in Mosley, over two years later. How can it be assumed the court took such factors into account? The majority dismisses appellant’s complaint about the admissibility of the victim related evidence, stating only “[t]he trial court did not abuse its discretion to admit this evidence under this Court’s majority decision in Mosley.” Majority opinion at 289. There is no indication from the majority’s opinion whether the admissibility of the victim related evidence was evaluated, by the trial court or by this Court, according to the considerations set out by the majority in Mosley. Perhaps it is the defendant’s burden to request such analysis.2 The majority *292does not say. It may be that the only binding value to the Court’s opinion in Mosley is its bottom line holding. Other pearls of wisdom offered the bench and bar in that case are non-binding dicta which needn’t be bothered with. I refuse to join the majority’s so-called application of Mosley.

After reviewing the record, absent a waiver of the mitigation issue by appellant, and considering factors discussed in Mosley which bear on admissibility under Rule 403,1 would at least agree the victim’s brother’s testimony was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt as to the issue of future dangerousness3 and to the mitigation issue.4

With these comments, I concur in the judgment of the Court.

MANSFIELD, J.,

delivered the concurring opinion.

I agree with the majority that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in not providing appellant with the funds to retain an expert, psychologist Theodore Blau. However, for the reasons stated herein, I believe, assuming, arguendo, that if it did err, the error was clearly harmless under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 44.2 or under its predecessor, Rule 81(b)(2).

In Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 105 S.Ct. 1087, 84 L.Ed.2d 53 (1985), the Supreme Court held an indigent defendant has a due process right to state-funded expert assistance where the defendant makes a preliminary showing the issue for which he seeks said expert assistance is likely to be a significant factor at trial.1 In Ake, unlike the present case, the defendant was not provided with any expert assistance on either the issue of insanity (there was considerable evidence he may well have been insane) or on the issue of future dangerousness (the only evidence of future dangerousness presented at the punishment phase was the unrebutted testimony from the guilt phase of the State’s psychiatric witness).

The present case could hardly be more dissimilar to Ake. First, the State presented considerable non-psychiatric evidence at the punishment phase, including graphic testimony as to appellant’s propensity for violent behavior. This evidence included the following:

(a) evidence appellant was fired in January of 1993 from his position as a Harris *293County deputy sheriff after he was convicted of assaulting his ex-wife and girlfriend.

(b) testimony of Cheryl Stanley, married to appellant from 1971 to 1981, describing several assaults made by appellant against her and their daughter. One of the assaults resulted in several of Stanley’s ribs being broken and another involved appellant holding a gun to her head.

(c) Lola Atkinson, who married appellant in 1989, testified as to appellant’s violent temper and described instances when he pulled a gun on her and broke furniture. She testified that after they separated, he broke down the door, stole her money, and broke the windows in her car. She testified she reported the last incident to the Sheriffs Department.

(d) Brenda Lockridge, who started dating appellant in October 1992, testified appellant had a bad temper and, on one occasion, choked her and pulled a gun on her. Then, three weeks later, he went into a rage, destroyed items in his apartment, held her hostage and threatened to kill her with a pair of scissors. Lockridge testified, after twelve hours, she escaped and called the police. This incident led to appellant’s arrest and conviction for assault.

(e) Hilda Garcia testified she met appellant in 1993 and moved in with him in March 1994. On one occasion she said he slapped her and chipped her tooth. On another occasion he destroyed some of her property and hit her in the breasts.

(f) Karen James, a teller at Guardian Savings and Loan, testified appellant entered the bank on October 14, 1994, pulled a gun and demanded money. After she gave him the money he shot her twice in the head.

(g) Loan Khuu testified appellant, on October 28, 1994, entered the bridal salon where she worked, pulled a gun and demanded all the money. After she gave him the money, appellant forced her into a back room and forced her at gunpoint and knife point to perform oral sex on him. He tied her up and left.

Appellant presented evidence at the punishment hearing including testimony from Cheryl Stanley and several police officers, all of whom testified he was a good police officer and was very devoted to his job. Appellant also presented the testimony of two psychologists, Freichman and Hopkinson, and a psychiatrist, Young. These three experts testified appellant suffered from a borderline personality disorder. They testified appellant was unable to control his anger but the structure he had in his life while a police officer “held him together.” Dr. Young opined the structure provided by prison life would likely prevent him from committing future acts of violence, especially if appellant had no contact with women. The complainant in the instant case is a woman.2

The State then presented the testimony of FBI agent Brantley. Before joining the FBI, Brantley was employed as a psychologist by a maximum security prison where he evaluated the future dangerousness of the inmate population. Brantley testified he studied the crime scene, autopsy photographs, the offense report and appellant’s school and work records. He also interviewed Karen James, Loan Khuu and one of the appellant’s girlfriends and visited the crime scene. He did not interview appellant. Based on his review of the case, Brantley opined appellant posed a future danger to society. He opined further that appellant, if confined, would likely prey on weaker male inmates.

The defendant in Ake was provided with no expert assistance at the punishment phase; the only evidence presented on the issue of future dangerousness was testimony at the guilt phase by State experts that, in their opinion, Ake would be a future danger. Ake’s indigency rendered him unable to present evidence favorable to him on the key issue of future dangerousness, clearly a violation of his federal constitutional right to due process.

In the present case, appellant was provided three expert witnesses, all of whom testified on his behalf at punishment. There was considerable expert testimony appellant would not be a future danger if confined in *294the environment of the penitentiary. Even if one assumes, arguendo, appellant should have been provided funds to retain Dr. Blau as an expert witness so as to potentially rebut Brantley’s testimony,3 in light of the extensive expert assistance he was provided, the failure of the court to do so, in my opinion, would not be error of a magnitude requiring reversal, assuming it was error at all.

Furthermore, several witnesses testified as to the commission of many violent acts committed against women by appellant over a more than twenty-year period of time. These acts included violent assaults resulting in significant injuries, destruction of property, aggravated robberies, aggravated sexual assaults and attempted murder. These acts show appellant has been dangerous to society for many years and a rational jury could conclude he would continue to be so in the future. The facts of the instant offense, a vicious capital murder by stabbing with evidence of aggravated sexual assault, are evidence of appellant’s dangerousness. Under the standards set forth by this Court in Keeton v. State, 724 S.W.2d 58, 61 (Tex.Crim.App.1987) and Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126 (Tex.Crim.App.1996), the evidence is more than factually sufficient to support the jury’s affirmative answer to the future dangerousness special issue. Indeed, it is hard to imagine any rational jury, given this evidence, could find appellant would not be a future danger to society.

In light of all the evidence presented at the punishment phase, it is my opinion that the failure of the trial court, if one assumes this was error, to provide funds to retain Dr. Blau did not have a significant influence on the jury’s affirmative answer as to the first special issue. It is also my opinion that, even if one assumes this failure was error of a constitutional dimension, any such error did not contribute, beyond a reasonable doubt, to the jury’s punishment verdict. See Tex. R.App. Proe. 44.2(a) and 44.2(b). See also, Kotteakos v. U.S., 328 U.S. 750, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 1253, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946); King v. State, 953 S.W.2d 266, 271 (Tex.Crim.App.1997).

Because I agree the trial court did not err in failing to provide appellant with funds to retain Theodore Blau, I join the opinion of the Court.

KELLER, Judge,

concurring.

I join the majority opinion. Even if one assumed arguendo, however, that appellant adequately presented his claim during the hearing held on the motion to appoint an expert, I would hold that appellant has failed to show that he was deprived of due process as a result of the trial court’s refusal to hire Dr. Theodore Blau as a defense expert at state expense.

I.

In his motion for expert assistance, appellant contended that the State intended to call Dr. Alan Brantley for the purpose of using a forensic profiling technique to show that appellant posed a future danger to society. Appellant claimed that he needed Blau’s testimony to show that the technique was not scientifically valid and was not intended for use outside of the investigatory context. Appellant explained that Blau had helped the FBI develop the technique in question and was therefore in a unique position to give relevant testimony concerning its reliability. In a supplemental motion appellant also contended that he needed Blau’s assistance to help defense counsel prepare for cross-examination and to provide direct testimony.

At the hearing on appellant’s motions, the trial court asked if Blau was going to listen to Brantley’s testimony. Defense counsel replied, “I don’t think so” and stated that he could take notes and give them to Blau. The trial court then asked why appellant’s psychiatrist and psychologist could not rebut Brantley’s testimony. A psychiatrist, Dr. Mitchell Young, and two psychologists, Edward Friechman and David Hopkinson, had been retained on appellant’s behalf. As the *295majority points out, defense counsel contended that these experts could not provide the desired testimony because Brantley’s testimony was forensic in nature rather than psychological.

Before Brantley testified, appellant objected to Brantley’s testimony, characterizing it as “novel.” The State contended that the evidence was not novel, but merely involved the opinions of a psychologist based upon experience and training in dealing with violent offenders. Appellant contended that the testimony was novel because the witness relied upon methodology.

Responding to appellant’s concerns, Brant-ley denied that he would rely upon profiling techniques. Brantley explained that profiling involved forming a behavior composite for an unknown offender and that the technique was inapplicable where the offender was known. Brantley stated that he would rely primarily upon appellant’s past behavior as a predictor of his future dangerousness.

During his testimony, Brantley expressed an opinion, based upon his training and experience and his consideration of a variety of factors, that appellant posed a future danger:

Q. Based upon your education and your background and experience and specialized training you formed an opinion as to the— based upon the Debra McCormick case, Karen James case, the Loan Khuu case, have you formed an opinion whether — an opinion regarding the future probabilities of dangerousness of this particular defendant?

A. Yes I have.

Q. What is your opinion about the likelihood or the probability of him continuing to be a violent person?

A. Well, in my opinion based upon the totality of everything that I had access to and everything I reviewed and all the people I talked to it’s my opinion that the probability of the offender here, Mr. Griffith, engaging in future acts of violence consistent with his past behavior is quite high.

In reaching his conclusion, Brantley relied not only upon forensic evidence (the crime scene, autopsy) but also upon a variety of other kinds of evidence, including witness interviews, personnel records, school records, investigative reports, and an interview with a former girlfriend. Brantley never claimed, during his testimony before the jury, that his assessment of appellant’s future dangerousness was based upon a scientific technique or a particular methodology.

Later, appellant filed a bill of exceptions, providing a description of the testimony Blau would have provided at trial:

Dr. Blau assisted the Behavioral Sciences Unit of the FBI in developing its offender profile. The process or technique was not developed to assist prosecutors in the prediction of dangerousness for known criminals but to study unsolved crimes in order to provide the behavioral and personality characteristics of unidentified offenders. The process involves an analysis of the nature of the offense and the manner in which it was committed. The data are compared with characteristics of known personality types, from which a description of the offender is developed. This profiling is most productive where the same offender demonstrates repeated patterns of the same crime. The purpose of profiling is to catch a criminal, not predict future dangerousness. Very few efforts have been made to validate the quality of the psychological profiles. At its present stage of development, it is more of an art form than a science, relying, as it does, heavily on intuition, rather than quantifiable measurement. While it is useful, it is a difficult and unreliable procedure. In terms of detecting and locating the offender, it has been successful in approximately 45% of the cases and of some assistance in 70% of the cases.1

II.

We have held that, to be entitled to a state-appointed expert, a defendant must show that the proffered expertise relates to *296an issue that is “likely to be a significant factor” at trial. Rey v. State, 897 S.W.2d 333, 339 (Tex.Crim.App.1995)(citing and quoting Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 74, 82-83, 86, 105 S.Ct. 1087, 84 L.Ed.2d 53 (1985)). The “likely to be a significant factor” language necessarily inquires about the showing made to the trial court by a defendant before trial. An important question, though, is whether Ake confers due process protection upon a defendant when the events at trial show that he did not in fact need the proffered expertise even though, at an earlier point in time, such expertise may have appeared to be necessary. I would answer that question “no.”

In Ake, as in many other cases, the Supreme Court recognized that due process is grounded on the notion of “fundamental fairness.” 470 U.S. at 76, 105 S.Ct. 1087. Fundamental fairness requires that a defendant have a “meaningful access to justice.” Id. at 77, 105 S.Ct. 1087. A defendant who did not need the expert witness has not been deprived of a meaningful access to justice and hence, has not been deprived of due process. In evaluating the due process claim in Ake, the Supreme Court did not limit its analysis to the events preceding the defendant’s request for expert assistance but considered subsequent events transpiring at trial. See Id. at 86-87, 105 S.Ct. 1087. Moreover, a majority of this Court has characterized Ake error as “structural,” and therefore, not subject to a harm analysis. We found this type of error to be structural because it is “one which eliminates a basic tool of an adequate defense.” Rey, 897 S.W.2d at 345. But refusing to appoint an expert does not in fact eliminate a basic tool of an adequate defense if the defendant did not in fact need the expert. And the defendant has not established his deprivation of an adequate defense when the stated purpose for which the expert was sought is shown to be irrelevant in light of events occurring at trial.

III.

Appellant claims that he needed to hire Blau for two reasons: (1) to provide testimony relating to the theory of forensic profiling, and (2) to assist defense counsel in cross-examining Brantley. Neither of these reasons is implicated in the case at hand.

Reason (1) is not implicated because Brantley provided no testimony concerning the profiling technique. That technique relies solely upon forensic evidence to extrapolate the characteristics of an unknown offender. But Brantley did not rely solely upon forensic evidence and he did not attempt to extrapolate the characteristics of an unknown offender. In reaching his conclusions Brantley relied not only upon forensic evidence but also upon many nonforensic sources, and those sources (e.g. witnesses, girlfriend, and school and personnel records) were familiar with appellant. Moreover, Brantley did not claim to rely upon any scientific technique or methodology (the alleged basis for claiming that his testimony was “novel”). Instead, he relied upon his training and extensive experience in the area of criminal psychology to formulate his opinions. Hence, testimony from Blau concerning the inapplicability of the technique would have been irrelevant because Brantley did not rely upon the technique. Instead, Brant-ley formed an opinion based upon a holistic review of the evidence relating to appellant, and Brantley evaluated that evidence by using his training and experience.

Even though Brantley was an expert in the profiling technique, he did not testify about that technique during this trial. At the hearing on the admissibility of Brantley’s testimony, the trial court commented, “I don’t think there’s anything novel about it.” The court was correct.

As for reason (2), assistance with cross-examination, appellant has failed to show that he needed or could have benefitted from such assistance. Because Brantley relied upon his training and experience rather than upon the profiling technique or any specific methodology, Blau’s expertise regarding the technique would not have assisted defense counsel during cross-examination. Moreover, given the nature of the future dangerousness issue, and the nature of Brantley’s testimony, it would appear unlikely that any expert assistance would increase the effectiveness of cross-examination. Another expert might, based upon his own training and *297experience, disagree with Brantley’s conclusions, but such disagreement, while useful as testimony, would not provide any basis for cross-examination.

Because appellant has not shown that Blau was needed for any relevant purpose during the trial, appellant’s due process claim must fail. With these comments, I join the majority opinion.

HOLLAND and WOMACK, JJ., join.

BAIRD, Judge,

concurring and dissenting.

I agree there was no error at the guilt phase of appellant’s trial. Accordingly, I concur in the decision to affirm the conviction. However, the trial judge erred, at the punishment phase, in denying appellant’s request for funds to employ an expert witness to assist appellant in challenging and cross-examining the State’s punishment expert. Accordingly, I would sustain the second point of error, reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for a new punishment hearing. Because the majority does not, I dissent.

I.

Dr. Allen Brantley worked for the Behavioral Sciences Unit of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and was hired by the State to testify at the punishment phase of trial that appellant would constitute a future danger to society. Specifically, the State intended to use Brantley to perform what he termed a “threat analysis” or “threat assessment technique” which would “compare the defendant to profiles of certain serial killers and discuss [appellant’s] similarity to such individuals.” The intended purpose of this technique was to help law enforcement identify unknown offenders through a system of profiling.1

Appellant filed two motions requesting funds to employ Dr. Theodore Blau, a psychologist. Attached to the first motion was a copy of Brantley’s testimony in another capital murder case. The testimony was provided to show the trial judge why Blau was necessary to assist in understanding and rebutting Brantley’s methodology. The second motion provided the trial judge with a copy of Blau’s resume and his fee agreement.

At the hearing on these motions, the judge asked defense counsel why the two psychologists already retained by appellant, Dr. Young and Dr. Freedman, could not provide the assistance appellant needed to rebut Brantley. Defense counsel explained that books written by former FBI analysts said the threat analysis technique was primarily forensic and not psychological. In fact, it is undisputed the technique was developed as an investigative tool to assist police with identification of suspects when the actual identity of an offender was unknown, and as a predictor of what suspects might do next in the context of serial crimes.

Moreover, Young and Freedman were retained to evaluate appellant for two isolated and very specific psychological problems. Young, who had significant experience evaluating and treating men who abuse their spouses, as well as experience working in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, was appointed, at appellant’s request, specifically to “... test and evaluate the [defendant with a view to explaining the etiology of [defendant's abuse of women.” Likewise, because appellant’s life seemed to “unravel” after he was suspended from the police force, Freedman, who specializes in evaluations of police officers, “especially those whose lives deteriorate after separation from law enforcement,” was appointed at appellant’s request to evaluate the psychological impact of appellant’s suspension from the police force. Since the Court appointed Young and Freedman because the scope of their expertise was narrow and specific to appellant’s problems, and because Brantley was hired by the State to *298testify on a technique that was forensic and not psychological in nature, it is clear neither Young, nor Freedman, were in a position to assist appellant in rebutting Brantley’s testimony.

Furthermore, appellant made a strong showing in both of his motions and at the hearing on these motions that Blau could prove Brantley’s “threat analysis” or “threat assessment technique” was not scientifically validated and had never been subjected to peer review on the question of reliability. Critically, appellant established that Blau was in a unique position to provide this information because he helped the FBI develop the threat analysis technique for its intended junction and could provide valuable insight into the methodology. Appellant insisted that if appointed, Blau would provide the court with proof that Brantley’s testimony is inadmissible and “... that no federal court has ever accepted or admitted the testimony of Dr. Brantley and his colleagues.” Further, “[h]e will also testify that no scientific study that has ever analyzed this threat assessment technique has ever found it reliable. He will set forth in detail why this technique is not scientifically validated and therefore, not reliable.” Additionally, appellant told the judge that, as a practical matter, Blau’s “assistance is necessary because he can access and provide copies of all of the scientific studies that have examined this issue.”

Even though appellant believed Blau would convince the judge that Brantley’s testimony was inadmissible, he argued that, in the event Brantley’s testimony was admitted, given the complex nature of the technique, the defense will need the expert assistance of Blau to effectively cross-examine Brantley as well as to testify as to the methodology of the technique. The motions to appoint Blau were denied.

Brantley testified for the State at the punishment phase at which time appellant objected again to Brantley’s methodology as novel and not scientifically validated, unreliable, not relevant because it is repetitive of evidence already before the jury, not capable of assisting the jury, and consequently inadmissible. These objections were overruled. Appellant also filed a written bill of exceptions detailing what Blau would have testified to and how he would have helped appellant challenge and cross-examine Brantley’s testimony.

II.

In Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 105 S.Ct. 1087, 84 L.Ed.2d 53 (1985), the United States Supreme Court held that due process entitles an indigent defendant to the appointment of a competent expert who can assist in the evaluation, preparation, and presentation of the defense when the defendant makes a preliminary showing that the issue for which he seeks expert assistance is “likely to be a significant factor at trial.” Williams v. State, 958 S.W.2d 186, 192 (Tex.Cr.App.1997); Rey v. State, 897 S.W.2d 333, 339 (Tex.Cr.App.1995); and, DeFreece v. State, 848 S.W.2d 150 (Tex.Cr.App.1993). This holding is premised upon the notion that an indigent is entitled to “meaningful access to justice” which means he should have “access to the raw materials integral to the building of an effective defense” thus ensuring “a proper functioning of the adversary process.” Williams, 958 S.W.2d at 192. The Supreme Court explained while “... the court has not held that a State must purchase for the indigent defendant all the assistance that his wealthier counterpart might buy, it has often reaffirmed that fundamental fairness entitles indigent defendants to ‘an adequate opportunity to present their claims fairly within the adversary system,’ and we have required that such tools be provided to. those defendants who cannot afford to pay for them.” Ake, 470 U.S. 68, 77, 105 S.Ct. 1087, 1093, 84 L.Ed.2d 53 (1985).

The Ake Court held because the State had a psychiatrist to testify as to Ake’s future dangerousness, the trial judge erred in denying Ake the means of presenting evidence to rebut the State’s expert by not appointing Ake a psychiatrist. In Williams, we stated that “[wjhile the Ake case dealt with the appointment of a psychiatrist, it is now without question that Ake requires the appointment of an expert regardless of his field of expertise.” 958 S.W.2d at 192. See also, Rey, 897 S.W.2d at 338.

*299Similarly, Brantley was offered by the State as an expert who would allegedly provide “scientific” analysis of appellant’s future dangerousness. What makes appellant’s case even more compelling than Ake is the fact that the State’s expert planned to establish appellant’s future dangerousness not on accepted psychiatric testimony, but on a novel technique, developed for a different purpose than its intended use in appellant’s case. We explained in Rey:

There is no principled way to distinguish between psychiatric and non-psychiatric experts. The question in each case must be not what field of expert knowledge is involved, but rather how important the scientific issue is in the ease, and how much help a defense expert could have given.

897 S.W.2d at 338 (citing Little v. Armontrout, 835 F.2d 1240, 1243 (8th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1210, 108 S.Ct. 2857, 101 L.Ed.2d 894 (1988)). Thus, the decision whether the appointment of an expert would be helpful, or whether the trial was fundamentally unfair without the expert’s assistance is dependant on the nature of an expert’s field and the importance and complexity of the issue. Williams, 958 S.W.2d at 192; and, Rey, 897 S.W.2d at 338.

In this light, it is clear the trial judge should have granted appellant’s Ake motions. First, it does not matter that Blau was not a psychiatrist because, as explained supra, Ake has been interpreted to require the appointment of an expert regardless of his field of expertise. Rey, 897 S.W.2d at 338. Second, in regard to the criteria explained in Rey, it is unquestionable the issue of future dangerousness is of utmost importance during the punishment phase of a capital murder trial, and thus an issue deserving of expert assistance.2 The third factor, which appellant documented well, was the complexity of the issue for which he needed expert assistance. Indeed, appellant explained he needed Blau specifically, because he, along with Brantley, developed the very technique at issue and could prove Brantley’s testimony was not scientifically validated, had never been subject to peer review as to reliability, that no study reviewing the technique has ever found it to be reliable, that it was created for a purpose not the same as its intended use in the present case, and, that it had never been relied on, or even admitted in federal court.

*300Because the trial judge erred in denying appellant’s motion requesting funds to employ Blau, this case should be remanded to the trial court for a new punishment hearing. TexCode Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 44.29(c). Because the majority does not, I dissent.

OVERSTREET and PRICE, JJ., join this opinion.

OPINION

Opinion by

REBECCA SIMMONS, Justice.

On September 2, 2005, a jury found Appellant Maria Del Carmen Hernandez guilty of the offense of capital murder and assessed punishment at life imprisonment in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. On appeal, Hernandez claims the trial court erred in: (1) admitting an out-of-court statement in violation of appellant’s right of confrontation and (2) allowing the prosecutor to question appellant regarding a popular country song. Because we fail to find any reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Factual BackgRound

Appellant Maria Del Carmen Hernandez became friends with Cassandra Leffew and Dolores Rodriguez while all three were living at the Bexar County Battered Women’s Shelter. Leffew left the shelter in June 2004 and invited Hernandez and her three children to live in her home. Hernandez moved into Leffew’s home with Leffew and her four children. When Rodriguez left the shelter, she returned to her home in south Bexar County. After Hernandez’s move, Robert Fernandez, the father of Hernandez’s youngest son and the man with whom Hernandez had an “on again off again” relationship, reunited with Hernandez and moved into Leffew’s residence with Hernandez.

On July 24, 2004, Leffew, Hernandez, and Fernandez took their combined seven children swimming at the apartment complex of Leffew’s boyfriend. The children swam with Hernandez and Fernandez while Leffew remained in the apartment with her boyfriend. When Fernandez went to the apartment with his son and Leffew’s one and a half year old daughter, Leffew accused Fernandez of abusing her daughter, claiming the child had a boot-shaped bruise on her back and the expression of a sexual assault victim. Fernandez denied the claims. Although Leffew approached Hernandez with her concerns, Hernandez refused to believe such claims and encouraged Leffew to take the child to the doctor. The child, however, was not taken for medical treatment. Despite the accusations, the following evening, Leffew, Hernandez, and Fernandez took all seven children to visit Dolores Rodriguez.

While at Rodriguez’s home, Leffew offered Fernandez a drink into which she *9had crushed numerous prescription drugs with the hope that Fernandez would “start talking” and “volunteer a confession.” To her dismay, Fernandez maintained his innocence and never confessed to harming the child in any manner. Fernandez eventually passed out from the alcohol and medication. Hernandez asserts that she argued with Leffew objecting to the further drugging of Fernandez, but she was ordered to stay in the other room. Subsequently, Fernandez’s hands and feet were tied and he was placed in the trunk of Leffew’s car. The three women left, with Fernandez bound in the trunk, and Rodriguez driving. Hernandez’s children were left in the care of Leffew’s brother and Pablo Barros Bermandino.

After driving around for some period of time with Fernandez still tied up in the trunk, Leffew suffered a panic attack, requiring Hernandez to stop at the Texan Ice House and call an ambulance. The ambulance arrived after approximately 20 or 30 minutes. Hernandez claims that during the time they were waiting for the ambulance, she tried to obtain help from a bartender but was unable to communicate in Spanish. Hernandez further alleges her attempts to check on Fernandez were stopped by Rodriguez. After Leffew refused transport by the EMS, the women drove Leffew home where she remained.

Rodriguez and Hernandez drove back to Rodriguez’s house with Fernandez still tied up in the trunk. When they arrived, Rodriguez instructed Hernandez to place trash bags over Fernandez’s head and to smother him. Hernandez claims that she refused to do so. Allegedly, Rodriguez then took the bags and covered Fernandez’s head. When Fernandez fought back, Hernandez claimed she tried to help him but Rodriguez pushed her away and used panty hose to secure the bag tightly around his neck. Rodriguez then departed with Fernandez in the trunk leaving Hernandez at the house with the children. Hernandez admits that she later called Fernandez’s aunt, Roxanne Fernandez, claiming that she and Fernandez argued whereupon Fernandez left on foot and she was unable to find him. Hernandez returned to Leffew’s home the following day. Fernandez’s body was discovered in a ditch in rural Bexar County on July 26, 2004.

Hernandez was charged with capital murder and a jury convicted and sentenced her to life imprisonment in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice.

Out-of-Court Statement

During its case in chief, the defense called two inmates to testify regarding statements made by Leffew, both of which tended to implicate Leffew and exonerate, at least to some degree, Hernandez. Although the State argued that the defense would be “opening the door” to Leffew’s written statement taken by Detective Damiani, there was no hearsay objection to the testimony by the State.

The first inmate, Veronica Molina, testified that Leffew talked regularly about what happened and apparently felt no remorse about any of her actions. Leffew never explained why, but repeatedly stated that she had never liked Fernandez and that she gave him alcohol and pills because “they talk better when they’re drunk.” Leffew told Molina that Hernandez had tried to stop her and Rodriguez from harming Fernandez and Leffew threatened Hernandez if she interfered or if she said anything. Leffew also offered that she and Rodriguez even had a plan to fraudulently purchase an insurance policy on Fernandez and collect the money. Finally, Leffew described Hernandez as young and naive and that she would do *10whatever she was told to do, which included remaining silent. Molina also testified about her conversations with Hernandez, describing how Hernandez professed her love for Fernandez. Hernandez told Molina that she tried to stop Leffew and Rodriguez on the night of the murder, but that Leffew had threatened her kids and that was why she kept quiet.

The second inmate, Maria Renteria, also testified that Leffew talked freely about the murder. Leffew explained that she and Rodriguez drugged Fernandez’s drink, but that after their first attempt failed, they added more drugs. Leffew said she wanted to lock Hernandez in the other room because she kept trying to help Fernandez, but the doors at her residence did not lock. Finally, Renteria explained that Leffew could not believe Hernandez brought Fernandez into Leffew’s home, knowing that he was a child molester and that he had served time for molesting children in the past.

In an attempt to rebut these statements, the State recalled Detective Damiani to read portions of the statement taken from Leffew (the “statement”). Outside the presence of the jury, the State argued that Leffew’s prior inconsistent statement given to Damiani was being offered to impeach the hearsay statement of Leffew as testified to by the inmates. The defense, on the other hand, argued that the statement could not be a prior inconsistent statement because Leffew did not testify at trial about her statements to the inmates. The State explained, “that’s the problem, Judge. They put somebody on to say what Cassandra [Leffew] said and they put it on to the jury wanting them to believe it’s true. So there’s a prior inconsistent statement.” The trial court gave the jury both oral and written limiting instructions and allowed Damiani to read the following portions of Leffew’s statement:

I finally got sick myself because I was so upset. I ended up throwing up all over myself. I had to take a shower. As I was finishing my shower, I heard Maria say, “He’s waking up,” I told Maria that I had more — I had more Ati-van — Ativan in my purse.

When I got out of the bath, after taking my shower, Maria told me that she had used some other pills that Dolores had around. I don’t know what they were. After that, Dolores and Maria carried Robert to my Chevrolet Lumina and put him in the trunk. I was not strong enough to help.

Once he was in the trunk of the car, I had Dolores drive me to a gas station at FM something going back towards 410 to go to my house from Dolores’. Anyway, we stopped so that I could get some Aspirin. I needed Aspirin because I was sick and shaking all over. Also it thins my blood to help me avoid another stroke.

When I got to the gas station, I called my husband and told him I was sick. He told me to come home. That’s why I’m — I’m sure he’s still alive. After— After that, Dolores and Maria left with Robert in the trunk. The time was between 10:30 p.m. and 11:00 p.m.

About an hour-and-a-half to two hours later, I got a phone call from Maria. Maria told me, “I finished it girl.” I asked her what she meant by — by “finished it” and she said, “It’s done.”

I said, “Come on. You mean, he’s dead?” And Maria said, ‘Yeah, dead.” I asked her if — if she was sure that he was dead and Maria said that she was very sure. Maria told me that she had — had killed him with her own hands. She told me that she put a plastic bag on his head to smother him, but that he *11kept fighting and ripping the bag and that he wouldn’t die and that he didn’t want to die.

Maria told me that when — that—that she then took some panty hose from the trunk of the car and put them around his neck while he was face-down and put a foot on the back of his head and pulled the panty hose until he wasn’t breathing any more. She told me that after Robert was dead, she threw him into a ditch, where no one would find him. Maria said it was somewhere near the Bexar— Bexar County/Atascosa County line.

The plastic bags and panty hose were mine and had been in the trunk. I never imagined Maria would use those items to Mil Robert. In fact, I never imagined that she would Mil Robert at all. That’s not what was supposed to happen.

I just wanted to beat him up and drop him off somewhere. I have not been able to eat or sleep since this happened. All I’ve been able to do is cry. It was not my intention to kill Robert, and he was still alive when I last saw — last time I saw him. I have no idea if Dolores was present when Robert was killed.

The trial court allowed the testimony with a limiting instruction.1

A. Standard of Review

Normally, an appellate court reviews a trial court’s decision to include or exclude evidence under an abuse of discretion standard. See Green v. State, 934 S.W.2d 92, 101-02 (Tex.Crim.App.1996). However, we review a constitutional legal ruling de novo. Wall v. State, 184 S.W.3d 730, 742 (Tex.Crim.App.2006).

B. Texas Rule of Evidence 806

In all prosecutions, the accused has a right, guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, “to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” U.S. Const. amends. VI, XIV; Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 n. 9, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004). In Crawford, the *12Supreme Court held that the Confrontation Clause bars the admission of an out-of-court testimonial statement made by a witness who does not testify unless the witness is unavailable to testify and the defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness. Id. at 68, 124 S.Ct. 1354. Therefore, to trigger the protections afforded by the Confrontation Clause, an out-of-court statement must be made by an absent witness and be testimonial in nature. Id. Here, because Leffew invoked her Fifth Amendment right not to testify, there is no dispute that Leffew was not available for cross-examination.

The State claims Crawford does not bar the use of testimonial statements for purposes other than establishing the truth of the matter asserted. As such, the State argues that portion of Leffew’s statement admitted before the jury was not a violation of the defendant’s right of confrontation because the statement was used only to impeach the credibility of Leffew and thus was not used for the truth of the matter asserted. We agree.

The State relies on Rules 806 and 613 as the means by which to allow impeachment of a witness with a prior inconsistent statement.

Rule 806 states:

When a hearsay statement, or a statement defined in Rule 801(e)(2)(C), (D), or (E), ... has been admitted in evidence, the credibility of the declarant may be attacked, and if attacked may be supported by any evidence which would be admissible for those purposes if de-clarant had testified as a witness. Evidence of a statement or conduct by the declarant at any time, offered to impeach the declarant, is not subject to any requirement that the declarant may have been afforded an opportunity to deny or explain. If the party against whom a hearsay statement has been admitted calls the declarant as a witness, the party is entitled to examine the de-clarant on the statement as if under cross-examination.

Tex.R. Evid. 806.

In effect, Rule 806 allows the impeachment of a non-testifying hearsay de-clarant by eliciting statements from a testifying witness. In part, the triggering event under Rule 806 is the introduction of a hearsay statement. Id. In this case, the introduction of Leffew’s statements to Molina and Renteria triggered Rule 806. The State then was allowed to make use of Rule 806, in combination with Rule 613(a), in order to impeach Leffew. If Leffew had testified at trial, either party would have been permitted to impeach her credibility with any prior statements that were inconsistent with her trial testimony. See Tex.R. Evid 613. Rule 613(a) requires a party first give the witness the opportunity to explain or deny the inconsistent statement. Although the purpose of Rule 613 is to provide fairness for the party unable to cross-examine the declarant of a hearsay statement, Rule 806 explicitly waives this requirement. See Tex.R. Evid. 806. See Marcel v. State, 64 S.W.3d 677, 679 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet. denied).

Hernandez, on the other hand, claims that she did not waive her constitutional rights by introducing Molina’s and Renteria’s hearsay statements. Yet, so long as a statement is not presented for the truth of the matter asserted, the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights are not transgressed. United States v. Barone, 913 F.2d 46, 49 (2d Cir.1990). Nothing in Crawford is to the contrary. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59 n. 9, 124 S.Ct. 1354 (stating “[t]he [Confrontation] Clause also does not bar the use of testimonial statements for purposes other than establishing *13the truth of the matter asserted”). Therefore, under Rule 806, Damiani’s testimony regarding Leffew’s statement was admissible as evidence of a prior inconsistent statement.

Hernandez further asserts that even if Leffew’s written statement was offered as impeachment evidence, the jury could not help but consider the evidence for its substance. Essentially, Hernandez’s arguments focus on Leffew’s statement being offered for the truth of the matter asserted. Although the State specifically offered, and the trial court admitted Leffew’s written statement for impeachment only and not for the truth of the matter asserted, the Court of Criminal Appeals acknowledged in Head v. State, 4 S.W.3d 258, 261-62 (Tex.Crim.App.1999) (en banc), “[wjhether the disputed testimony violates the hearsay prohibition necessarily turns on how strongly the content of the out-of-court statement can be inferred from the context.” In other words, the appellate court must look beyond the admission of the evidence for impeachment and determine “whether the strength of the inference produces an ‘inescapable conclusion’ that the evidence is being offered to prove the substance of an out-of-court statement.” Id. at 266. We do not believe the evidence reaches this level.

Prior to any controverted testimony, the trial court instructed the jury that they were to consider Leffew’s written statement for impeachment purposes only and not as substantive evidence of Hernandez’s guilt. A similar instruction was included in the jury charge. Moreover, during closing argument, the State neither argued nor alluded to Leffew’s written statement as substantive evidence. Despite her allegations, the record does not support Hernandez’s position that the statement was necessarily understood by the jury as substantive evidence. Because the evidence was properly admitted under Rule 806, and we presume the jury follows the instructions given to them by the trial court, we are unable to conclude that the statement was utilized for any purpose other than as impeachment evidence. Abdnor v. State, 871 S.W.2d 726, 740 (Tex.Crim.App.1994) (en banc) (noting that when a limiting instruction is given, there is a presumption that the jury will properly consider the evidence). Accordingly, Hernandez’s Sixth Amendment right of confrontation was not transgressed and we overrule Hernandez’s first point of error.

PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT

During cross-examination, the State questioned Hernandez regarding a popular country song about the demise of an abusive spouse entitled “Goodbye Earl” recorded by the Dixie Chicks. Hernandez alleges the prosecutor’s questions were suggestive of Hernandez’s intent and plan, specifically “[tjhey decided Robert had to die, just like Earl.” In doing so, Hernandez argues the prosecutor relied on her own, unsubstantiated testimony as to the song’s lyrics and relevance. Although defense counsel did lodge an objection at the beginning of the State’s cross-examination based on relevance, the State argues that the defense failed to properly object with regard to prosecutorial misconduct and thereby failed to preserve error.

An appellate court reviews allegations of prosecutorial misconduct on a case by case basis. Stahl v. State, 749 S.W.2d 826, 830 (Tex.Crim.App.1988) (en banc). The review is not limited to only the facts of each case, but also the probable effect on the jurors’ minds. Hodge v. State, 488 S.W.2d 779, 781-82 (Tex.Crim.App.1973). Courts have held a prosecutor’s conduct inappropriate where the prosecutor’s actions deliberately violate an express court order, and where misconduct is “so blatant *14as to border on being contumacious.” Stahl, 749 S.W.2d at 831. To trigger reversal, the question must be obviously harmful to the defendant. Ransom v. State, 789 S.W.2d 572, 585 (Tex.Crim.App.1989) (en banc); Gonzales v. State, 685 S.W.2d 47, 49 (Tex.Crim.App.1985) (appellate courts rarely reverse a conviction due to an improper prosecutorial question). Additionally, it must be of “such a character so as to suggest the impermissibility of withdrawing the impression produced.” Huffman v. State, 746 S.W.2d 212, 218 (Tex.Crim.App.1988) (en banc).

To preserve error for prosecutorial misconduct, the appellant must: (1) make a timely and specific objection; (2) request an instruction to disregard the matter improperly placed before the jury; and (3) move for mistrial. See Tex.R.App. P. 33.1; Cook v. State, 858 S.W.2d 467, 473 (Tex.Crim.App.1993) (en banc). See also Huffman, 746 S.W.2d at 218 (defendant must object that the prosecutor’s question was “clearly calculated to inflame the minds of the jury and [was] of such a character so as to suggest the impermissibility of withdrawing the impression produced”). Although defense counsel did make a timely objection, there was no request for an instruction, nor did he move for a mistrial. Thus, in accordance with Tex.R.App. P. 33.1, Hernandez failed to preserve the error for appeal.

Assuming, arguendo, defense counsel properly preserved error, a prosecutor is traditionally given great leeway in posing questions and making reasonable deductions from the evidence. Gaddis v. State, 753 S.W.2d 396, 398 (Tex.Crim.App.1988). Although the analogy to a song may not have been a direct deduction from the evidence, there is nothing to suggest that the prosecutor’s line of questioning was clearly calculated to inflame the minds of the jury or that it was of such a character so as to suggest the impermissibility of withdrawing the impression produced. A prompt instruction to disregard will generally cure an error associated with an improper question and answer. Ovalle v. State, 13 S.W.3d 774, 783 (Tex.Crim.App.2000) (en banc). Having reviewed the record, we do not believe the testimony was so inflammatory or of such a character that, had Hernandez requested an instruction to disregard, the instruction would not have cured any prejudicial effect.

Because Hernandez failed to preserve error, or alternatively, the prosecutor’s statements were not so egregious that they could not have been cured by an instruction from the trial court, we overrule Hernandez’s second point of error.

Conclusion

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

OPINION

KELLER, Judge.

At a trial beginning in August 1992, a jury convicted the appellant of committing, on or about June 13, 1990, the capital murder (murder during the course of aggravated sexual assault) of Gracie P.1 The jury answered the punishment issues in the State’s favor, and appellant was sentenced to death. Direct appeal to this Court is automatic under Article 37.071(h)(1990).2 Appellant raises fourteen points of error on appeal. We will affirm.

1. Sufficiency of the evidence

a. Corroboration of accomplice testimony

In point of error twelve, appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to corroborate the testimony of Delton Dowthitt, appellant’s sixteen-year-old son and accomplice to the capital murder. Delton testified at trial that he and his father picked up Gracie, age sixteen, and her younger sister Tiffany, age nine, for the ostensible purpose of driving them to their home. Instead, appellant stopped his pickup truck on a deserted road. Delton testified that he talked with Gracie outside while appellant remained inside the truck alone with Tiffany. At some point, appellant exited the vehicle and approached Delton. Appellant said that he had made a mistake and both of the girls would have to die. According to Delton, appellant used his knife to make a cut on Gracie’s throat, snatched a beer bottle, and used the beer bottle to sexually assault her. Gracie was still alive during those events. Later, appellant killed Gracie by cutting her throat a second time. Meanwhile, Delton strangled Tiffany to death.

Appellant argues that Delton’s testimony was not sufficiently corroborated. Because Delton was clearly an accomplice as a matter of law, his testimony must be corroborated by other evidence tending to connect appellant to the offense. Article 38.14.3 No precise rule can be formulated as to the amount of evidence required to corroborate. Gill v. State, 873 S.W.2d 45, 48 (Tex.Crim.App.1994). The non-accomplice evidence does not need to be in itself sufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Gill, 873 S.W.2d at 48. Munoz v. State, 853 S.W.2d 558, 559 (Tex.Crim.App.1993). Cox v. State, 830 S.W.2d 609, 611 (Tex.Crim.App.1992). Nor must the non-accomplice evidence directly link the accused to the commission of the offense. Gill, 873 S.W.2d at 48. Munoz, 853 S.W.2d at 559. Cox, 830 S.W.2d at 611. While the accused’s mere presence in the company of the accomplice before, dining, and after the commission of the offense is insufficient by itself to corroborate accomplice testimony, evidence of such presence, coupled with other suspicious circumstances, may tend to connect the accused to the offense. Gill, 873 S.W.2d at 49. Cox, 830 S.W.2d at 611. Even apparently insignificant incriminating circumstances may sometimes afford satisfactory evidence of corroboration. Munoz, 853 S.W.2d at 559.

The non-accomplice corroborating evidence consisted of the following:

(1) Appellant admitted that he was present during the commission of the crime although he denied guilt of the offense. Other witnesses saw appellant and Del-ton together in the evening before and after the murders.

(2) Non-accomplice witnesses testified that appellant had blood spatters on his shirt. A state expert testified that a person who inflicted the type of wound *250the victim suffered would have blood spatters on his clothing.

(3) A glass beer bottle was found on appellant’s business premises. The bottle had the victim’s blood on it and a fingerprint belonging to appellant. An expert testified that the injuries suffered by Gracie were consistent with those which would have been inflicted by a beer bottle such as the one found.

(4) Appellant admitted to his aunt that he “did it” and he made Delton “do it” although he never specified what “it” was.

(5) Appellant asked one of his daughters for forgiveness for an unspecified event on June 13, 1990 (alleged date of the murders).

(6) Appellant’s daughters and sister testified that he habitually carried a knife. One of the daughters recognized the murder weapon as a knife carried by appellant. This daughter further stated that the knife was distinctive because of ridges on its top.

The evidence shows not only appellant’s presence during the commission of the crime but numerous other circumstances connecting appellant to the offense. Delton’s testimony was sufficiently corroborated. Point of error twelve is overruled.

b. Underlying offense

In point of error nine, appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to show that the murder occurred during the course of an aggravated sexual assault. He argues that the evidence shows, instead, “sexual assault during the course of a murder” because appellant formed the intent to murder Gracie before he decided to sexually assault her. Appellant relies upon Garrett v. State, 573 S.W.2d 543 (Tex.Crim.App.1978), which established the felony murder merger rule.

Initially, we note that Garrett is inapplicable to a capital murder prosecution. Fearance v. State, 771 S.W.2d 486, 492-493 (Tex.Crim.App.1988). See also Muniz v. State, 851 S.W.2d 238, 243-249 (Tex.Crim.App.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 837, 114 S.Ct. 116, 126 L.Ed.2d 82 (1993)(merger doctrine rejected in context of aggravated sexual assault as underlying offense for capital murder).

Moreover, appellant’s logic is flawed. Even if appellant formed the intent to murder before he formed the intent to commit aggravated sexual assault, the murder itself could still have occurred “during the course of’ the aggravated sexual assault. The evidence in the present case shows that appellant used a beer bottle to sexually assault Gracie while she was still alive and delivered the fatal injury shortly thereafter. This situation is distinguished from instances in which the intent to commit the alleged underlying offense forms after the murder is complete. The latter situation is most commonly illustrated by the “afterthought theft” scenario. See Moody v. State, 827 S.W.2d 875, 892 (Tex.Crim.App.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 839, 113 S.Ct. 119, 121 L.Ed.2d 75 (1992). Ibanez v. State, 749 S.W.2d 804, 807 (Tex.Crim.App.1986). Under the “afterthought theft” scenario, the murderer decides to commit a theft only after the murder, committed for reasons unrelated to theft, is already complete. See authorities above. Under that scenario, the offender is not guilty of capital murder but of ordinary murder and theft.

Because the victim in the present case was still alive, the aggravated sexual assault could not have been an “afterthought” but was intertwined with the murder. Although not directly addressing appellant’s argument, we have previously held that a murder may be in the course of an aggravated sexual assault even though the sexual assault is completed before the murder commences. Lincecum v. State, 736 S.W.2d 673, 680 (Tex.Crim.App.1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1061, 108 S.Ct. 2835, 100 L.Ed.2d 936 (1988). Wooldridge v. State, 653 S.W.2d 811, 816 (Tex.Crim.App.1983). Because appellant intended to murder Gracie at the time he sexually assaulted her, and he completed the murder shortly after the sexual assault, appellant’s conduct is sufficient to establish murder during the course of aggravated sexual assault. Point of error nine is overruled.

2. Voir dire

In point of error one, appellant claims that the prosecution improperly used the *251hypothetical of aiding suicide to illustrate a circumstance in which probation might be an acceptable punishment for murder. He argues that the hypothetical is not an example of murder at all because the example used by the State involves a person who merely supplies the victim with the means to commit suicide without actually participating in the commission of the suicide. He claims that the hypothetical thus constitutes a misstatement of the law used to qualify jurors on the range of punishment.

We need not address the merits of this allegation because any error would be harmless. Because appellant was convicted of capital murder, any erroneous or misleading hypotheticals to prospective jurors about punishment for the lesser-included offense of murder made no contribution to appellant’s conviction or punishment. Jones v. State, 843 S.W.2d 487, 498 (Tex.Crim.App.1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1035, 113 S.Ct. 1858, 123 L.Ed.2d 479 (1993). Point of error one is overruled.

In point of error two, appellant argues that the trial court erred by denying his challenge for cause of an allegedly pro-death penalty venireman. But, appellant was granted an additional peremptory strike, which he never used. To preserve error concerning the denial of a challenge for cause, the appellant must exhaust all peremptory challenges, ask for more, be refused, and point out an objectionable juror who was seated. Garcia v. State, 887 S.W.2d 846, 852 (Tex.Crim.App.1994). Green v. State, 840 S.W.2d 394, 402 (Tex.Crim.App.1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1020, 113 S.Ct. 1819, 123 L.Ed.2d 449 (1993). Harris v. State, 790 S.W.2d 568, 581 (Tex.Crim.App.1989). Appellant has failed to preserve error. Point of error two is overruled.

In point of error three, appellant argues that the trial court erred by overruling his motion to postpone the exercise of peremptory challenges until the completion of voir dire. Appellant claims that his rights to due process and effective assistance of counsel were violated. We have previously held that there is no due process or equal protection violation for refusing to permit retrospective strikes in capital cases. Janecka v. State, 739 S.W.2d 813, 833-834 (Tex.Crim.App.1987).

As for the effective assistance of counsel claim, appellant does not distinguish it from his due process argument. For both claims, he merely argues that he does not have the benefit of looking at the venire as a group so that he may exclude the most undesirable veniremen. This argument is similar to the one made by the defendant in Janec-ka. Id. As we explained in Janecka, a capital defendant has several advantages in voir dire: he is permitted to examine the veniremen in great detail in isolation and he does not have to exercise a peremptory strike until the State has first decided whether to do so. Id. at 834. The minor disadvantage suffered by not having the benefit of viewing the group as a whole is not of sufficient magnitude to prevent counsel from intelligently exercising peremptory challenges. Point of error three is overruled.

In point of error four, appellant complains that the trial court erred by overruling appellant’s motion to supplement the venire panel. Only 122 of the 275 veniremen summoned actually showed up for jury service. Appellant asked the trial court to attach the remaining veniremen and make them show up for voir dire. He argues that the trial court’s refusal to do so violates his right to a “broad cross-section” of the community represented in the venire.

The statute for attaching veniremen, Article 35.01, is directory, not mandatory, and in the absence of governmental misconduct in summoning the venire, the failure to grant attachments is not reversible error unless appellant shows injury. Jackson v. State, 745 S.W.2d 4, 17 (Tex.Crim.App.), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1241, 108 S.Ct. 2916, 101 L.Ed.2d 947 (1988). Hernandez v. State, 643 S.W.2d 397, 400 (Tex.Crim.App.1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1144, 103 S.Ct. 3128, 77 L.Ed.2d 1379 (1983). Porter v. State, 623 S.W.2d 374, 376-377 (Tex.Crim.App.1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 965, 102 S.Ct. 2046, 72 L.Ed.2d 491 (1982).

While there is a constitutional right to a “cross-section” of the community in the *252venire, this right relates to the relative composition of the panel, not the number of veniremen who show up. The complaining party must show an “identifiable class” excluded from the venire. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 525-526, 95 S.Ct. 692, 695-696, 42 L.Ed.2d 690 (1975). Appellant has not shown how he was denied a “cross-section” nor has he alleged any other injury. Point of error four is overruled.

3. Oral and written statements

At trial, appellant moved to suppress both oral and written statements on various grounds. The trial court denied the motion. The trial court also refused appellant’s request to' limit the method of conveying the contents of tape-recorded oral statements to playback of the recordings themselves. In points of error five through eight, appellant challenges these rulings. He complains about the admission into evidence of portions of the videotaped oral statements and his third written statement to the police. We find that the evidence was properly admitted, but even if there were error, it would be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Because there are several factual and legal issues common to all four of these points of error, we have consolidated the points in several sections to discuss the common issues. We shall address the facts, the issue of custody, the merits of each individual point of error, and the question of harm in that order.

a. The facts

The following facts relate to the State’s acquisition of appellant’s statements: At 9:00 a.m. on June 20,1990, appellant came to the sheriffs office to give a written statement. At that time, law enforcement officials only suspected appellant’s son of the crime. Appellant finished and signed the statement at 11:00 a.m. and left for lunch. There were no Miranda warnings on the statement. Appellant returned at 1:00 p.m. and asked to change his earlier statement because it contained a false alibi. Detective Hidalgo interrogated appellant sporadically until 6:00 p.m., when appellant’s second written statement was signed. There were no Miranda warnings on the second statement.

The police suggested that appellant take a polygraph test due to the inconsistencies between the two statements. Appellant agreed, and the test began at 7:00 p.m. The polygraph examination was recorded on videotape (Video # 1). At the beginning of the polygraph examination, the examiner (Hendricks) told appellant that he was not a suspect but that procedure required the reading of certain warnings. At that point, Hendricks read Miranda warnings. Near the beginning of the examination, appellant stated that he was exhausted. Hendricks explained that it was important to sit and discuss the issues, and the polygraph examination continued. At the end of the polygraph examination (about 11:00 p.m.), Hendricks told appellant that he had not told the complete truth about everything. Hendricks said “I’m going to step out here and talk to Detective Hidalgo for just a minute. We’ll be back in and we’ll visit some more.” Appellant then asked, “So, um, ask him if there is any way I can talk to my wife. I know y’all are going to keep me in here.” Hendricks responded but his response was inaudible. At this point the first video ended.

The second video began with Hidalgo telling Appellant “I’ll go get your wife here in just a second.” Hidalgo began intensive questioning of appellant (“kinesic interview” technique). At one point, appellant stated “Man, I am exhausted. All — ” Hidalgo responded, “I know, I know. Listen to me. Look at me. Look at me. Look at me and tell me that you’re not lying to me.” The interrogation continued. Soon, Hidalgo threatened to bring in the polygraph operator: “You know that. Now, if Kelly [Hendricks] was to come back here and ask you — ”. Appellant replied, “But I don’t want to do nothing else right now.” Hidalgo testified that appellant was pointing to the polygraph machine when he made that statement.

Somewhere around midnight, appellant claimed to have chest pains. Appellant stated “I want to talk to my wife.” This request was apparently ignored and an officer stated “Dennis, listen, this is one of our medics from the jail.” Appellant replied that he felt bet*253ter now. His blood pressure was taken and found to be 126/80 (well within normal). Appellant was offered some cinnamon rolls to eat. Appellant declined. The law enforcement officials informed appellant that that was all they could offer. Appellant declined again.

Shortly before 1:00 a.m., Hidalgo told appellant “You were there, though, weren’t you?” Appellant denied being present during the crime, and the interrogation continued. Soon, the following colloquy occurred:

HIDALGO: Why — why is it that there is something about seeing them that’s bothering you so much? Tell me, Dennis. Tell, me. So I can do something.

APPELLANT: No, I really can’t say no more right now. I—

HIDALGO: Yes, you can.

APPELLANT: No. My head is splitting—

HIDALGO: You’re going to survive. I’m [sic] tell you. You’re going to survive no matter how bad it is, you’re going to survive. I guarantee you.

APPELLANT: I need some rest. I really do.

HIDALGO: You’ve got to be — It’s got to come out. It’s going to kill you if it doesn’t.

APPELLANT: It’s not going to help when it does.

HIDALGO: Yes, it will. Yes, it will. Please.

APPELLANT: ‘Cause I’m already in it and ain’t nothing going to help.

HIDALGO: I’m begging. I’m — yes, it will. It will help you. I guarantee it will help you, but you’ve got to tell me the truth. That’s what I’ve been trying to tell you all along. I can’t do nothing for you if you don’t tell me the truth. We’re not here to ruin people’s lives. We’re here to try to piece them back together again. That’s the whole purpose I live ... .to do this job.

APPELLANT: Man, I believe you. You’re a good man.

HIDALGO: You’ve got to trust me. You’ve go to trust me when I’m telling you that I want to....

APPELLANT: But I am honestly so exhausted and — my head hurts so bad and I don’t think—

HIDALGO: Do you think mine doesn’t?

APPELLANT: I’m sure yours does, too.

Detective Hidalgo continued to press appellant for the truth. Hidalgo told appellant that the truth would “eat at” appellant if it did not come out. Hidalgo asked if the victims were already dead when appéllant arrived. Appellant replied, “Somebody told you I was at the bowling alley, right?” Hi-dalgo answered that everybody saw appellant at the bowling alley, and, with Hendricks joining in, continued to press appellant for the truth. Hendricks told appellant that he was “playing against a stacked deck.” Shortly thereafter, the following colloquy occurred:

APPELLANT: Man, I didn’t do nothing.

HIDALGO: But you were there, not soon after it happened, weren’t you? You weren’t far away.

HENDRICKS: He was there the whole time.

APPELLANT: I was there the whole time, [emphasis added]

HIDALGO: You know what’s bugging me. Look at me. Do you know what’s bothering you? What’s bothering you is that you couldn’t do anything to stop it, could you?

HENDRICKS: It got out of control too fast.

HIDALGO: It got out of control too fast and it was all over before you even thought to try to stop it.

HENDRICKS: You knew what was happening was wrong, and you couldn’t stop it.

APPELLANT: All right, man. I’m going to tell you you’re right, but I can’t say more than that. I need to rest.

Appellant’s admission to being present during the murders occurred around 1:00 a.m. The interrogation continued. Appellant gave the details of what he observed at the crime scene, but he did not admit to participation in the murder.

Later in the interview, appellant stated that “I have already convicted myself now, and it doesn’t really matter.” When asked *254what he meant by that statement, appellant backed away from those words and continued to maintain his innocence. This particular statement by appellant and Hidalgo’s followup inquiries were not related to the jury. At nearly 1:30, Hidalgo stated, “Okay? Now, you do .realize, and you knew this going in, that you’re not going home tonight. You know that.” Appellant replied, ‘Yeah. I’ve known that for a long time.” Appellant asked, “Did my wife go home?” He was told that she had.

After the interview ended, appellant was taken to Hidalgo’s office where they began working on appellant’s third written statement. The interrogation during this period of time was not electronically recorded, but no oral statements from this interrogation were admitted into evidence at trial. The written statement essentially repeated the facts disclosed during the videotaped oral sessions: appellant did not admit to committing the murders but admitted that he was present during the crime and gave the details of his observations. No Miranda warnings were given until the statement was completely written, but Miranda warnings were given three times before appellant signed the third statement. After he signed the statement, appellant was booked and taken to jail. Appellant had signed the third written statement at approximately 3:55 a.m.

During the entire period of time, appellant never asked to leave. When, during the hearing on the motion to suppress evidence, the prosecutor asked, “And you never chose to exercise your right to remain silent, did you, Mr. Dowthitt?”, appellant replied, “No, ma'am.” Although appellant had nothing to eat. during this time, he was permitted to drink coffee and smoke as much as he desired. Appellant was also given restroom breaks. Every time he went to the restroom, appellant was accompanied by a law enforcement official. The explanation given was that everyone is so accompanied because people get lost at the Sheriffs office.

An arrest warrant was not procured until sometime during the afternoon of June 21.

b. Custody

The point at which custody attached is relevant to the resolution of all four of appellant’s points of error relating to his oral and written statements.4 A person is in “custody” only if, under the circumstances, a reasonable person would believe that his freedom of movement was restrained to the degree associated with a formal arrest. Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318-, 114 S.Ct. 1526, 1528-1530, 128 L.Ed.2d 293, 298-299 (1994). The “reasonable person” standard presupposes an innocent person. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 438, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 2388, 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991) (emphasis in original). Moreover, the subjective intent of law enforcement officials to arrest is irrelevant unless that intent is somehow communicated or otherwise manifested to the suspect, Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 1530, 128 L.Ed.2d at 300. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 n. 6, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 1877 n. 6, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980)(opinion of Stewart, J.). See also Dancy v. State, 728 S.W.2d 772, 778 (Tex.Crim.App.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 975, 108 S.Ct. 485, 98 L.Ed.2d 484 (1987).

In the past, we have recognized four factors relevant to determining custody:

(1) Probable cause to arrest,

(2) Subjective intent of the police,

(3) Focus of the investigation, and

(4) Subjective belief of the defendant.

Meek v. State, 790 S.W.2d 618, 621 & 622 (Tex.Crim.App.1990). Under Stansbury, factors two and four have become irrelevant except to the extent that they may be manifested in the words or actions of law enforcement officials; the custody determination is based entirely upon objective circumstances. 511 U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 1528-1529, 128 L.Ed.2d at 298.

*255The determination of custody must be made on an ad hoc basis, after considering all of the (objective) circumstances. Shiflet v. State, 732 S.W.2d 622, 629 (Tex.Crim.App.1985). Stationhouse questioning does not, in and of itself, constitute custody. California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1124-1125, 103 S.Ct. 3517, 3519-3520, 77 L.Ed.2d 1275 (1983.) Oregon v. Mathiarson, 429 U.S. 492, 495, 97 S.Ct. 711, 714, 50 L.Ed.2d 714 (1977). Dancy, 728 S.W.2d at 778. See also Russell v. State, 717 S.W.2d 7, 11 (Tex.Crim.App.1986). Further, custody does not occur merely because the suspect submits to and fails a polygraph test. Shiflet, 732 S.W.2d at 631. Stone v. State, 583 S.W.2d 410, 413 (Tex.Crim.App.1979). However, the mere fact that an interrogation begins as noncustodial does not prevent custody from arising later; police conduct during the encounter may cause a consensual inquiry to escalate into custodial interrogation. Ussery v. State, 651 S.W.2d 767, 770 (Tex.Crim.App.1983).

We have outlined at least four general situations which may constitute custody: (1) when the suspect is physically deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way, (2) when a law enforcement officer tells the suspect that he cannot leave, (3) when law enforcement officers create a situation that would lead a reasonable person to believe that his freedom of movement has been significantly restricted, and (4) when there is probable cause to arrest and law enforcement officers do not tell the suspect that he is free to leave. Shiflet, 732 S.W.2d at 629. Concerning the first through third situations, Stansbury indicates that the restriction upon freedom of movement must amount to the degree associated with an arrest as opposed to an investigative detention. Concerning the fourth situation, Stansbury dictates that the officers’ knowledge of probable cause be manifested to the suspect. Such manifestation could occur if information substantiating probable cause is related by the officers to the suspect or by the suspect to the officers. Moreover, given our emphasis on probable cause as a “factor” in other cases, situation four does not automatically establish custody; rather, custody is established if the manifestation of probable cause, combined with other circumstances, would lead a reasonable person to believe that he is under restraint to the degree associated with an arrest.

The United States Supreme Court has twice addressed the question of “custody” in the context of a stationhouse interrogation. In Beheler, the suspect voluntarily accompanied the police to the station, talked for less than 30 minutes, and was permitted to return home. 463 U.S. at 1122, 103 S.Ct. at 3518-19. The Court held that this interview was not custodial. Id. at 1125,103 S.Ct. at 3520. In Mathiason, the suspect came voluntarily to the police station, was immediately informed that he was not under arrest, participated in a 30 minute interview, and left the police station without hindrance. 429 U.S. at 493-494, 97 S.Ct. at 713. The Court likewise held that interview to be non-eustodial. Id. at 495, 97 S.Ct. at 714.

This Court has also addressed the station-house interrogation scenario. In Meek, the suspect came to the fire station (arson investigation) voluntarily at a time of his own choosing, was allowed to step outside the building and go unaccompanied to his car during the interviews, and was allowed to leave unhindered after the statements were taken. Id. 790 S.W.2d at 622. The time at the station lasted a few hours. Id. at 620. This Court held that the case was very similar to Mathiason and that the defendant was not in custody. Meek, 790 S.W.2d at 621-622.

In Turner v. State, 685 S.W.2d 38 (Tex.Crim.App.1985), police contacted a former employee of a bakery shop in connection with a murder investigation of a baker at the shop. Id. at 40. The former employee was not at that time a suspect but was merely asked to accompany the police to the station to look at some photos. Id. The police began by asking him when he was employed and why he had quit. Id. During the conversation, the former employee mentioned that he had been stationed in Korea and had brought back a pair of nice boots which had a brand name of “Tong” something. Id. at 41. As soon as the former employee said this, the officer became suspicious because he remembered boots found in a garbage can carrying *256the name “Tong Young.” Id. At that point, the officer left his office, spoke to his partner, came back, advised the former employee of his Miranda rights, and obtained initialed waivers on a confession form. The former employee then made a three page confession to the crime. Id. This Court held that the former employee was not in custody at least until the officer realized the likelihood of the person’s involvement after he mentioned the Korean boots. Id. at 43.

In Dancy, a Fourth Amendment case, a similar custody issue arose. The suspect voluntarily accompanied officers to the police station. 728 S.W.2d at 775. He answered questions posed by law enforcement officials, gave hair samples, and permitted officers to take his shoes to run print comparisons. Id. The interview at the station lasted about thirty-eight minutes. Id. at 778. Subsequently, the suspect was arrested at the station. Id. at 776. We held under those facts that the suspect was not in custody during the interview. Id. at 778-779.

In the present case, Detective Hidal-go told appellant around 1:30 a.m. that he was not going to be permitted to leave. This express assertion itself amounted to an arrest. The closer question, however, is whether, under the circumstances of the interrogation, appellant was in custody at an earlier point in time. We believe that he was.

Like the former employee in Turner, appellant was not a suspect when he came to the police station but became a suspect as the interview progressed. Another similarity to the cases discussed above is that appellant voluntarily appeared at the stationhouse.

But, this case also presents striking differences. The length of time in which interrogation took place in the case at bar dwarfs the amount of time in the cases cited above. About fifteen hours passed from the time appellant returned to the police station after lunch until he signed the third written statement at 3:55 a.m. Approximately twelve hours passed between the time appellant returned to the station and the time he first admitted that he was present during the commission of the murders. Even counting from the point at which the polygraph operator assured appellant that he was not a suspect (7:00 p.m.) leaves six hours of interrogation until appellant admitted his presence during the crime. The long time period involved, while not itself dispositive, is an important factor in determining whether custody occurred before the formal arrest.

Moreover, law enforcement agents apparently ignored two requests by appellant to see his wife. While these actions may have merely been oversights, as Hidalgo and appellant became caught up in conversation (and later in addressing a potential medical emergency), they also constitute circumstances to be considered. The fact that appellant was accompanied during restroom breaks, although given an innocuous explanation, is also to be considered. While appellant had been told that he was not a suspect at 7:00 p.m., by the beginning of Hidalgo’s post-polygraph questioning, it was apparent that appellant had become a suspect. On the other hand, appellant never expressed a desire to leave, and he was not told that he could not leave until around 1:30 a.m.

However, at approximately 1:00 a.m. a significant additional circumstance occurred— appellant admitted that he was present during the murder. After that admission, especially in light of appellant’s earlier evasions and inconsistencies, the police had probable cause to arrest. This fact distinguishes the present case from all of the above-cited cases. The idea that a crucial admission could turn a noncustodial encounter into a custodial one was the very issue left open in Turner (custody may have occurred after the former employee mentioned the boots, which linked him to the crime). Moreover, appellant’s admission in the present case is much more obviously damaging than the defendant’s admission in Turner. The present case is more like Ruth v. State, 645 S.W.2d 432 (Tex.Crim.App.1979), where a pivotal admission established custody. In Ruth, the suspect had accompanied the victim to the hospital after the victim had been shot. Police officers encountered the suspect at the hospital and asked what happened. The suspect replied, “I had rather not say.” One of the officers then said, “We have got a boy out here shot. I need to find out what happened *257to him.” After a little hesitation, the suspect began relating what happened saying, “The best of my knowledge, I shot him but it was an accident.” Id. at 434. The officer continued to question the suspect about where he got the gun but the suspect refused to answer. This refusal was admitted into evidence. This Court reversed, holding that the suspect was in custody from the moment he admitted to the shooting, and any subsequent statements were governed by Miranda. Id. at 436.

While appellant did not admit to committing the offenses, his admission that he was present during the murders was incriminating, and a reasonable person would have realized the incriminating nature of the admission.5 Given the length of the interrogation, the existence of factors involving the exercise of police control over appellant (accompanying appellant at restroom breaks, ignoring requests to see his wife), and appellant’s damaging admission establishing probable cause to arrest, we believe that “custody” began after appellant admitted to his presence during the murders.

c. Scrupulously honored rights?

In point of error five, appellant claims that his videotaped oral statements and his third written statement were illegally obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). He contends that, while in custody, he invoked his right to remain silent and that his invocation was not scrupulously honored. Essentially, he argues that Detective Hidalgo continued to question appellant even after he attempted to cut off questioning.

If a statement is governed by Miranda (i.e. the suspect is in custody), then a failure to cut off questioning after a suspect invokes his right to remain silent violates his rights and renders any subsequently obtained statements inadmissible. Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 96 S.Ct. 321,46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975). Sterling v. State, 830 S.W.2d 114, 116 (Tex.Crim.App.1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1035, 113 S.Ct. 816, 121 L.Ed.2d 688 (1992). A law enforcement officer may not continue to question the suspect until the officer succeeds in persuading the suspect to change his mind and talk. Hearne v. State, 534 S.W.2d 703 (Tex.Crim.App.1976). But, an officer need not stop his questioning unless the suspect’s invocation of rights is unambiguous, and the officer is not required to clarify ambiguous remarks. Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 114 S.Ct. 2350, 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994). See also Dinkins v. State, 894 S.W.2d 330, 350 (Tex.Crim.App.1995) and Coleman v. Singletary, 30 F.3d 1420, 1424 (11th Cir.1994).

In the present case, the only statement that might qualify as an invocation of the right to remain silent was the one appellant made after he admitted that he was present during the murders: “I can’t say more than that. I need to rest.” This statement is not an unambiguous invocation of the right to remain silent. Appellant’s statement merely indicates that he believed he was physically unable to continue — not that he desired to quit. Further, even if we examined other statements made before appellant was in custody, those statements also suffer the same ambiguity. Finally, at the motion to suppress hearing appellant testified that he did not exercise his right to remain silent. Under these circumstances, appellant’s invocation of his right to remain silent was ambiguous, and Hidalgo did not violate appellant’s rights by continuing the interrogation.

d. Inadequate warnings?

In point of error six, appellant argues that he was not adequately warned of his rights under Miranda and Article 38.22. He concedes that Hendricks gave the proper warnings before conducting the polygraph examination. Although appellant’s point of error is somewhat ambiguous, he appears to be advancing the contention he made at trial that *258Detective Hidalgo’s questioning constituted a separate interrogation and required another set of warnings.6

We can find nothing in federal case law that requires the person conducting the interrogation to be the same person who gives the Miranda warnings. However, Article 38.22 § 2(a) does contain a requirement that certain warnings must be given either by a magistrate or “from the person to whom the statement is made.” We have held that this requirement is satisfied so long as the officer taking the confession was present when the warnings were given. Lugo-Lugo v. State, 650 S.W.2d 72, 82-83 (Tex.Crim.App.1983). Moon v. State, 607 S.W.2d 569, 572 (Tex.Crim.App.1980). Malay v. State, 582 S.W.2d 125, 129 (Tex.Crim.App.1979). At trial, the parties disputed whether or not Hidalgo was present when Hendricks gave the warnings. Assuming arguendo that Hidalgo was not present, we nevertheless resolve appellant’s Article 38.22 claim against him.

First, we address his claim in the context of the videotaped oral statements. We hold that the language in Article 38.22 § 2(a), requiring warnings to be given by the person “to whom the statement is made,” does not apply to oral statements but applies only to written statements. In reaching this conclusion, we follow the rules of statutory construction. When a statute is clear and unambiguous, we apply the plain meaning of its words. Boykin v. State, 818 S.W.2d 782, 785-786 & 786 n. 4 (Tex.Crim.App.1991). In determining plain meaning, “[w]ords and phrases shall be read in context and construed according to the rules of grammar and usage.” TEX. GOV’T CODE § 311.011(a).7 In addition, we presume that “the entire statute is intended to be effective.” TEX. GOVT CODE § 311.021(2). Every word in a statute has been used for a purpose and each word, phrase, clause, and sentence should be given effect if reasonably possible. Morter v. State, 551 S.W.2d 715, 718 (Tex.Crim.App.1977), quoting Eddins-Walcher Butane Co. v. Calvert, 156 Tex. 587, 591, 298 S.W.2d 93, 96 (1957).

By its terms, § 2 applies solely to written statements. Oral statements are governed by § 3 of the Article, and § 3 does not contain the language in question. While § 3 requires that the warnings contained in § 2(a) be given, it does not require that all provisions of § 2(a) be met. See Article 38.22 § 3(a)(2). § 3 contains its own unique safeguards for an accused. See Article 38.22 § 3(a)(l)-(5) & (c). Most significantly, the oral statement must be electronically recorded and the warnings must be contained in the recording. Article 38.22 § 3(a)(1) & (2).

Moreover, § 3 duplicates the “knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily” language found in § 2. Compare § 2(b) and § 3(a)(2). The only language in § 2 that is not expressly duplicated or incorporated into § 3 is the language in the text of § 2(a) proper concerning who provides the warnings. If the legislature intended for all of the § 2 requirements to apply to oral statements governed by § 3, it could have simply incorporated § 2 wholesale into § 3. It did not. Thus, the language in § 2(a) concerning who may give the warnings does not apply to oral statements, which are governed by § 3.

As for appellant’s third written statement, he made the statement to Detective Hidalgo, and Hidalgo gave the appropriate warnings before appellant signed the statement. Appellant contends that warnings should have been given before Hidalgo began the unrecorded interrogation leading to the written statement. Appellant concedes that we have already decided this claim against him. Because a written statement is not “obtained” (because it is not admissible) until it is signed, giving the required warnings before the accused signs the statement meets the statutory requirements. Allridge *259 v. State, 762 S.W.2d 146, 167-158 (Tex.Crim.App.1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1040, 109 S.Ct. 1176, 108 L.Ed.2d 288 (1989). Appellant argues that Allridge does not take into account the fact that oral statements may be admissible for impeachment and under certain limited circumstances found in Article 38.22 § 3(c). He claims that what is spoken before the signing ceremony is important. But, appellant’s logic does not hold because oral statements meeting those conditions would be admissible even under appellant’s interpretation of the statute (assuming the federal constitutional requirements in Miranda are met). They would not, however, be written statements. Appellant’s argument for abandoning Allridge is not persuasive. The warnings given in the present case were both constitutionally and statutorily adequate.

e. Illegal arrest?

In point of error seven, appellant contends that his videotaped oral statements and his third written statement were the products of an illegal warrantless arrest in violation of Texas statute. We analyze the issue in light of an arrest occurring after appellant’s admission to being present during the murders.8 Appellant argues that his arrest did not fall within one of the warrantless arrest exceptions found in Article 14 and that the taint of the illegality was not sufficiently attenuated.

The only potentially applicable war-rantless arrest exception is the felony/escape rule found in Article 14.04.9 We have held that Article 14.04 must be strictly construed in the suspect’s favor. Dejarnette v. State, 732 S.W.2d 346, 349 (Tex.Crim.App.1987). One requirement of the statute is that the law enforcement officer must have “some evidence amounting to satisfactory proof ... that the defendant was about to escape.” Dejarnette, 732 S.W.2d at 351 (ellipse added). The escape requirement is obviously met where the suspect has previously fled or otherwise evidences an intention to flee. Fearance, 771 S.W.2d at 510. See also Allridge v. State, 850 S.W.2d 471, 492 (Tex.Crim.App.1991), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 831, 114 S.Ct. 101, 126 L.Ed.2d 68 (1993). In interpreting ambiguous behavior by a suspect, “it is important to keep in mind the ‘temporal proximity’ of the actions of [the] suspect both to the commission of the crime, and to the suspect’s discovery of the police investigation of him.” Allridge, 850 S.W.2d at 491. But, satisfactory proof of escape is not established by the mere fact that a suspect travels from one place to another. Stanton v. State, 743 S.W.2d 233, 236 (Tex.Crim.App.1988)(driving away from home).

Moreover, we have emphasized that the escape requirement is not met merely because the police confront the suspect with their suspicions. Dejarnette, 732 S.W.2d at 352. Discovery of pursuit is but a factor in the overall picture, and the police/suspect confrontation is not sufficient in itself to constitute satisfactory proof of escape. Id. When the proof of imminent escape consists solely of observations by law enforcement personnel, we have generally required that those observations include evidence of some act by the suspect tending to show an intent to escape. In Bell v. State, 724 S.W.2d 780 (Tex.Crim.App.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1046, 107 S.Ct. 910, 93 L.Ed.2d 860 (1987), we held that the escape requirement was not met where a suspect had been warned earlier in the day that the police were looking for him but was nevertheless drinking at a bar at 12:30 a.m. Id. at 787. The fact that the bar was going to close at 1:00 a.m., and the police did not know where to find the suspect after *260the bar closed, was not enough to show satisfactory proof of imminent escape. Id.

One week elapsed between the commission of the crime and the interrogation of appellant. There was no evidence of imminent escape apart from the observations of law enforcement officials. Therefore, in order for the arrest to be legal, law enforcement officials must have observed some act or acts by appellant indicating an intent to escape which, combined with other circumstances, constituted satisfactory proof that escape was imminent.

After examining the record, we can find no act by appellant indicating an intent to escape. Appellant voluntarily appeared at the police station in the morning and after lunch. He remained at the station for questioning for six hours and then agreed to submit to a polygraph examination, which lasted another four hours. After the polygraph examination, he continued to participate in the police interrogation despite the lateness of the hour. In fact, appellant appears to have exhibited extraordinary patience with the police investigation. The officers did not have satisfactory proof of escape.

An exception to our general requirement of an act by the suspect indicating an intent to escape is found in West v. State, 720 S.W.2d 511 (Tex.Crim.App.1986) (plurality opinion), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1072, 107 S.Ct. 2470, 95 L.Ed.2d 878 (1987). In West, police officers were called to the scene of a murder after witnesses had reported hearing loud noises in an apartment complex. Id. at 512. After discovering the victim’s body, one of the officers talked with the witnesses. Id. After hearing the loud noises, the witnesses had seen a man, whose clothes were wet with blood, exit the victim’s apartment. Id. Another person believed she recognized the man described by the witnesses and led the police to his apartment. Id. at 512-513. The police knocked on the door, which was opened by the suspect’s companion. Id. at 513. The police saw the suspect, eight feet away, wearing only a pair of shorts. Id. After ascertaining that the suspect matched the description given by the witnesses, the police arrested him. Id. We held that the warrantless arrest was proper under Article 14.04, despite the absence of any act by the suspect tending to show an intent to escape, because of the narrow circumstances present:

We hold that where, as in the instant case, officers who reasonably believe that further investigation of an offense may be necessary in order to justify the issuance of a warrant, and where those officers undertake that investigation lawfully and without impinging upon reasonable expectations of privacy, and where that investigation leads to the receipt of information which in combination with their other information constitutes probable cause to arrest the suspect, but that information is obtained in the presence of the suspect under circumstances which would lead the officers reasonably to believe that the suspect would take flight if given the opportunity to do so, the officers are authorized by Article 14 to arrest the suspect without first procuring a warrant.

Id. at 518.

In West the lack of an act by the suspect indicating intent to escape was excused because of the circumstances under which probable cause to arrest arose. The inference of intent to escape was reasonable, despite the lack of an overt act by the suspect.

In the present case, as in West, officers undertook their investigation lawfully, the investigation led to receipt of information establishing probable cáuse to arrest, and the information was obtained in the presence of the suspect. Were those the only requirements of West, appellant’s arrest would have been justified. But West also requires that the circumstances be such that they would lead the officers reasonably to believe that the suspect would take flight if given the opportunity to do so.

The evidence in this case shows not just the lack of an overt act by appellant indicating intent to escape, but acts that contradict such an intent. Unless we are to hold that a warrantless arrest is justified under Art. 14.04 whenever probable cause to arrest develops in the presence of a suspect, we cannot disregard circumstances that negate an intent to escape. Given the particular circumstances present in this ease, the police *261could not reasonably “believe that the suspect would take flight if given the opportunity to do so.” Hence, Article 14.04 was not met, and appellant’s arrest was illegal.

Our inquiry does not end here: even though the arrest was illegal, appellant’s statements were still admissible if the taint between the arrest and the evidence was sufficiently attenuated. For illegal arrests under state law, Texas applies the four-factor attenuation test found in Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603-604, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 2261-2262, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975):

(1) whether Miranda warnings were given,

(2) the temporal proximity of the arrest and the confession

(3) the presence of intervening circumstances, and

(4) the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct.

Bell, 724 S.W.2d at 788. Self v. State, 709 S.W.2d 662, 666 (Tex.Crim.App.1986).

In Brown, the Supreme Court concluded that there was not sufficient attenuation of the taint. The suspect’s first statement was obtained within two hours after arrest, and the second statement was clearly a result of the first statement. Id. at 604, 95 S.Ct. at 2262. The Court held that the illegality had a purposefulness. “The arrest in both design and execution, was investigatory.” Id. The manner in which the arrest was effected gave the appearance of having been calculated to cause surprise, fright, and confusion. Id.

This Court has decided two cases addressing the attenuation question in the context of illegal warrantless arrests under state law. The cases, Bell (first confession) and Self, appear to involve indistinguishable fact situations but reach divergent results. In both cases, Miranda warnings were given repeatedly. Bell, 12A S.W.2d at 788. Self, 709 S.W.2d at 666. The arrest preceded interrogation, and the temporal proximity between the arrest and the confession was close— between one and one-half to three hours. Bell. Self. There were no significant intervening circumstances. Bell, 724 S.W.2d at 788-789. Self, 709 S.W.2d at 666-667. Likewise, in both cases, we found that the conduct was not purposeful and flagrant (the arrests were not calculated to cause surprise, fright and confusion), and in fact, the arresting officers had probable cause — the illegality was not constitutional in nature but stemmed solely from state statutory grounds. Bell, 724 S.W.2d at 790. Self 709 S.W.2d at 667-668.

But, while the cases appear to be identical in all relevant respects, they reach different results: Self found that the taint was sufficiently attenuated while Bell held that it was not. One court of appeals even concluded that Bell had.implicitly overruled Self. Stanton v. State, 750 S.W.2d 375, 378 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1988). That conclusion, however, is belied by our holding in Brick v. State, 738 S.W.2d 676 (Tex.Crim.App.1987), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 818, 111 S.Ct. 63, 112 L.Ed.2d 38 (1990), where we cited both Bell and Self, and explained that “if the illegality, if any, rests alone upon the violation of the statute, this may well influence ... the assessment of the purposefulness and flagrancy of the police conduct, and, all other factors weighing equally, could ultimately tip the balance.” Brick, 738 S.W.2d at 681 (ellipse added).10 The differing decisions in these cases may simply underscore that the fact situation confronted posed a “close question.” See Self, 709 S.W.2d at 668.

We need not resolve the conflict between Bell and Self because the present case compares favorably to both. In the present case, as in Bell and Self, Miranda warnings were given, the proximity between arrest and confession was close, and there were no intervening circumstances. But, the fourth prong, the purpose and flagrancy of the *262conduct, weighs more heavily in favor of the State here than in Bell and Self. In those cases, the interrogation was custodial when it began. By contrast, the interrogation in the present case began as noncustodial. Moreover, appellant initiated the encounter by returning after lunch to correct his false alibi. The suspicion that appellant was hiding something grew gradually during the interrogation as time passed. Law enforcement agents understandably wanted to continue investigating as they were confronted initially with inconsistencies between appellant’s first and second statements and later with the results of the polygraph examination, tending to show that appellant’s answers were deceptive. The immediate event triggering custody was not police conduct but appellant’s crucial admission, which, when combined with the other circumstances of the interrogation, would lead a reasonable person to believe he was no longer free to leave but was under arrest. This is a moment in time that could have slipped by easily during the interrogation, and to some extent, there was a continuity between the noncustodial and custodial portions of the interrogation that would have been interrupted by an attempt to secure a warrant. Permitting this moment to slip by is more easily understood in the present case than it would have been if the interrogation had begun after an illegal arrest.

Further, in Bell and Self, the suspects were expressly arrested before the interrogations. But in the present case, the custodial portions of the videotaped oral statements admitted into evidence at trial occurred before appellant was expressly informed of his custody status. And, after appellant admitted he was present during the murders, Hidalgo and Hendricks made encouraging statements, expressing a belief in appellant’s innocence of the crime. Even if these statements were psychological manipulation, instead of exploiting appellant’s custody status, these statements involved distancing appellant from his custody status — the officers attempted to maintain a noncustodial atmosphere. Instead of attempting to surprise, frighten, and confuse, as the officers did in Brown, the detectives in the present case were attempting to do the opposite — to assure and mollify.

Finally, the custodial statements appeared to flow as much from appellant’s precustodial admission to being present at the murders as from his custody status. Appellant’s oral explanations and his later written statement about the details of his observations during the crimes were a natural outgrowth of his precustodial admission. In Bell, we noted that a custodial confession may sometimes be motivated by a precustodial event, such as a visit to a minister. 724 S.W.2d at 788 n. 4. While a motivating precustodial event may not technically be an “intervening circumstance” as it does not come between the arrest and the statement, it is similar in that such an event is a circumstance apart from the arrest. The custodial statements in the present case resulted from a legally obtained, noncustodial admission. Under the circumstances, we find the taint between the arrest and appellant’s custodial statements to be sufficiently attenuated.

f. Videotape versus testimony

In point of error eight, appellant complains that the trial court erred by refusing to limit the presentation of his recorded oral statements to playback of the videotapes. At trial, appellant objected to playing the videotapes because they showed the polygraph machine. Appellant further objected that Article 38.22 precluded the use of any method of proving the oral statements other than the recording. In essence, appellant attempted to exclude the oral conversations altogether by placing the trial court in a “Catch 22” situation: the video cannot be admitted because it shows the polygraph machine, but the statements can only be admitted through the video.

Appellant’s “Catch 22” argument fails. Article 38.22 does not restrict the method of admitting oral statements of the accused into evidence to the electronic recordings that are made. The statute merely requires that an electronic recording be made and that the recording be preserved until appeals are exhausted. See Article *26338.22 § 3(a)(1) & (b). Moreover, appellant failed to advance an alternative that would have avoided the supposed “Catch 22,” e.g., playing the audio portion of the tape without the video (placing a blanket over the television screen would have accomplished this purpose).

g. Harmless error

Even if there were error in the admission of appellant’s statements into evidence, any such error would be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). Tex.R.App.P. 81(b)(2). Miranda and Article 38.22 apply only to custodial interrogation. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. at 1612. Article 38.22 § 5. The admission by appellant that he was present during the murders was noncustodial. This admission was a crucial, damaging piece of evidence against appellant. The remainder of the oral interview with Hidalgo merely developed the details of what appellant observed while he was present. Compared to appellant’s admission that he was there, the details of what occurred while he was there appear to have little incriminating value. At most, inconsistencies between the details given by appellant and the forensic evidence might reflect on appellant’s credibility. However, appellant’s credibility was already severely damaged by the inconsistencies between his first and second written statements (false alibi), along with the inconsistencies between those statements and his admission that he was present during the crime. Likewise, appellant’s third written statement was merely cumulative of the details given during the videotaped oral statements. Appellant never admitted to committing the murders. The only arguable example of such an admission, appellant’s statement that he had “convicted” himself, was never presented to the jury-

Moreover, the physical evidence strongly connects appellant to the murders without regard to any inconsistencies in his statements. Appellant’s fingerprint was found on a beer bottle that had the victim’s blood on it, and the murder weapon was a distinctive knife carried by appellant. Points of error five through eight are overruled.

4. Prior consistent statement a. Admissibility

In point of error eleven, appellant claims that the trial court erred by admitting into evidence a prior consistent statement made by Delton. Delton testified in the case pursuant to a plea agreement. The agreement required that Delton testify “truthfiilly” against his father. In exchange, Delton pled guilty to one murder charge, received a 45-year sentence, and the second murder charge, was dismissed.

Delton testified that appellant killed Grade. During cross-examination, defense counsel questioned Delton about the details of the plea agreement. Defense counsel specifically asked Delton if the agreement called for him to testify “truthfully” and that “truthfully” meant against his father. Subsequently, the State introduced the testimony of Jimmy Jones, Delton’s attorney. Jones testified that, before a plea bargain existed, Delton told him in confidence that appellant killed Gracie. Appellant argues that Delton’s statement to his attorney was not admissible because it was made after the motive to fabricate arose. We disagree.

Under Tex.R.Crim. Ev. 801(e)(1)(B), the prior consistent statement of a witness is admissible to rebut an express or implied charge of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive if the statement was made before the motive to fabricate arose. Moody v. State, 827 S.W.2d at 894 n. 11. Houghton v. State, 805 S.W.2d 405, 408 (Tex.Crim.App.1990). In Moody, the alleged improper influence/motive was that the mother prodded her daughter into lying about being sexually assaulted by the defendant. 827 S.W.2d at 894 n. 11. The State introduced statements made by the daughter to her father before she had informed her mother of the allegations, so that her statements to her father were made before the motive (her mother’s urgings) to fabricate arose. Id.

In the present case, a motive for Delton to fabricate arose at the time of and by the fact of the plea bargain. This mo*264tive — the opportunity to secure a favorable plea bargain — was explored in questioning by defense counsel. Because Delton’s prior consistent statement occurred before the plea bargain, it was made before the motive arose in accordance with Rule 801(e)(1)(B). While appellant suggests that a motive to fabricate may also have arisen because of the fact that appellant was criminally charged, in order to satisfy Rule 801(e)(1)(B) it is not necessary that a prior consistent statement have been made before all motives to fabricate arose. The rule requires merely that the witness’ prior consistent statement be offered “to rebut an express or implied charge against him of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive.” In this ease, cross-examination raised an implied charge that Delton fabricated his testimony specifically because of the plea bargain. Evidence of the prior statement rebutted that particular charge. Point of error eleven is overruled.

b. Limiting instruction

In point of error ten, appellant claims that the trial court erred by refusing to grant a mistrial after giving a limiting instruction concerning the prior consistent statements related by Jones. Appellant and the State agreed to an instruction that Jones’ testimony should not be considered for the truth of the matters asserted. The following occurred immediately prior to Jones’ testimony:

COURT: All right. This testimony is relating to statements, alleged statements that are consistent with the young Dow-thitt’s in-court statements as an aid, if it does aid you, in passing on whether or not the in-eourt statement is true or false.

DEFENSE: Judge, I object to that respectfully, with all due consideration to the Court, but that is specifically what they are not to consider it for.

COURT: How do you want ...

DEFENSE: The testimony of Mr. Jones with regards to prior consistent statements of Delton Dowthitt can be admitted for the limited purpose of showing that he made such statements and specifically cannot be considered as any evidence with regards to the truth contained in those statements.

COURT: Very well. You are so instructed. You may proceed.

Appellant then requested a mistrial, which was denied.

Appellant claims that the first instruction was so poisonous and incorrect that the corrected instruction did not cure the error. Appellant also claims that the trial court never gave a correct limiting instruction.

Appellant appears to be under the impression that the trial court’s original instruction called for the jury to evaluate the truth of the prior consistent statements — the exact opposite of what the limiting instruction was supposed to say. Appellant is simply mistaken. The trial court’s original instruction told the jury that the prior consistent statements were an aid “in passing on whether or not the in-court statement is true or false.” That is a correct (though perhaps not complete) statement of the law. The trial court never said that the out-of-court statements should be judged for their own truth or falsity.

Appellant was perhaps entitled to a clearer and more complete limiting instruction. But, appellant requested a more complete instruction and the trial court granted it. Under those circumstances the instruction cures the error unless the error is of such a character as to suggest the impossibility of withdrawing the erroneous impression. Moore v. State, 882 S.W.2d 844, 847 (Tex.Crim.App.1994). In Hughes v. State, 878 S.W.2d 142, 157 (Tex.Crim.App.1992), a prosecutor made an erroneous statement that it was “wrong for the defense attorneys to put the victim on trial.” The trial judge erroneously overruled the instruction. The prosecutor, in a possible attempt to “apologize,” stated that the attorneys did nothing wrong, “It’s their job. It doesn’t mean it’s the right thing to do.” This time, the trial court sustained the objection and instructed the jury to “disregard the last remark of the prosecutor and not to consider it for any purpose whatsoever.” Id. We held that the record supported the inference that the trial court realized its error in overruling the objection to the first remark and that the instruction on the second remark also cured the trial court’s error in *265overruling the objection to the first remark. Id.

In the present case, the trial court “corrected” its instruction in response to defense counsel’s objection, curing any error. Because the first instruction was not affirmatively incorrect, but merely (possibly) incomplete, it was not of such a character, as to suggest the impossibility of withdrawing an erroneous impression. As for the claim that the trial court never gave a correct instruction, it gave the exact instruction requested by appellant. While we can see nothing erroneous about appellant’s requested instruction, even if the instruction were incorrect, appellant had the opportunity to request a correct instruction and cannot now complain. The party opposing admission of evidence has the burden, where the evidence is offered and admitted for a limited purpose, of requesting a correct limiting instruction. Webb v. State, 760 S.W.2d 263, 275 (Tex.Crim.App. 1988), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 910, 109 S.Ct. 3202, 105 L.Ed.2d 709 (1989). Point of error ten is overruled.

5. Alleged intimidation of defense witness

In points of error thirteen and fourteen, appellant claims that the State intimidated a defense witness into refusing to testify in violation of due process, the right to a fair trial, and the compulsory process of witnesses.11 Appellant specifically complains that state investigators frightened David Tipps, a potential defense witness, with threats of perjury. Tipps had given a statement to defense counsel that Delton admitted to committing the offense alone. According to Tipps’ statement, Delton said he killed the girls because he was mad at Gracie for being pregnant.

An investigator for the prosecutor’s office and Detective Hidalgo visited Tipps in jail, where Tipps was being held on a motion to revoke probation. The investigator introduced himself as an investigator for the prosecutor’s office and Hidalgo was introduced as an investigator for the Sheriffs office. At first, Tipps believed that he was in trouble, but he was assured that the two men were not there for anything he had done but were investigating the Dowthitt case. According to the prosecutor’s investigator, the topic of perjury was mentioned only once, and this was done by the investigator himself. The investigator told Tipps that if he were telling the truth, there was no problem. But, if they found out that Tipps had lied and were able to prove that he lied, then they would try to pursue perjury charges against him. Tipps also told the investigators that he was afraid of being labeled a “snitch.” At trial, Tipps invoked his Fifth Amendment rights and refused to answer questions. The trial court ordered Tipps to testify. Tipps refused and was held in contempt. After being held in contempt, Tipps said “thank you” and continued to refuse to testify.

In analyzing whether appellant’s rights were violated, three cases are instructive. In Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. 95, 93 S.Ct. 351, 34 L.Ed.2d 330 (1972), the Supreme Court addressed a situation in which a trial judge threatened the only defense witness with penalties of perjury as the witness got on the stand right before the witness was to testify. The trial court admonished the witness as follows:

Now you have been called down as a witness in this case by the Defendant. It is the Court’s duty to admonish you that you don’t have to testify, that anything you say can and will be used against you. If you take the witness stand and lie under oath, the Court will personally see that your case goes to the grand jury and you will be indicted for perjury and the likelihood [sic] is that you would get convicted of perjury and that it would be stacked onto what you have already got, so that is the matter you have to make up your mind on. If you get on the witness stand and lie, it is probably going to mean several years and at least more time that you are going to have to *266serve. It will also be held against you in the penitentiary when you’re up for parole and the Court wants you to thoroughly understand the chances you’re taking by getting on that witness stand under oath. You may tell the truth and if you do, that is all right, but if you lie you can get into real trouble. The court wants you to know that. You don’t owe anybody anything to testify and it must be done freely and voluntarily and with the thorough understanding that you know the hazard you are taking.

Id. at 95-96, 93 S.Ct. at 352. The defendant’s counsel then objected to these comments on the ground that the judge was exerting on the mind of the witness such duress that the witness could not freely and voluntarily decide whether or not to testify on the defendant’s behalf thereby depriving defendant of his defense by coercing the only defense witness into refusing to testify. Id. at 96, 93 S.Ct. at 352-353. None of the witnesses for the State had been given this admonishment. Id. Defense counsel then indicated that he was nonetheless going to ask the witness to take the stand, and the judge interrupted: “Counsel, you can state the facts, nobody is going to dispute it. Let him decline to testify.” Id. he witness then refused to testify and he was excused by the court. Id. The defendant’s motion for mistrial was overruled. Id. The Supreme Court held that the trial judge’s remarks violated the defendant’s due process rights. The Court stated that the fact that the witness had appeared in court to testify, refusing to do so only after the judge’s warning, strongly suggested that the judge’s comments were the cause of the witness’ refusal. Id. at 97, 93 S.Ct. at 353. The Court further stated that the trial judge had gratuitously singled out this witness for a lengthy admonition on the dangers of perjury. Id. The Court stated that the judge had implied that he expected the witness to lie, and went on to assure the witness that if he lied, he would be prosecuted for perjury, the conviction added to his present sentence, and the result would be to impair his chances for parole. Id. The Court held that while some of the threats may have been beyond the power of this judge to carry out, the great disparity of posture between presiding judge and witness in these circumstances, coupled with the unnecessarily strong terms used by the judge, could well have exerted such duress on the witness’ mind as to preclude him from making a free and voluntary choice whether or not to testify. Id. at 98, 93 S.Ct. at 353-354.

In a different case, Webb v. State, 503 S.W.2d 799 (Tex.Crim.App.1974), this Court confronted another “perjury threat” situation after the Supreme Court’s decision. A 15-year-old witness denied the truthfulness of a prior statement. The court admonished her that she could be prosecuted for not telling the truth. .The witness continued to testify. Id. at 801. No objection was lodged to the trial court’s remarks. Id. We held that no reversible error was shown.

In Davis v. State, 831 S.W.2d 426 (Tex.App.—Austin 1992, pet. ref'd), a witness gave exculpatory testimony on behalf of the defendant. Later that day, the prosecutor asked an officer to contact the witness and have her call his office. When the witness arrived at the prosecutor’s office, the prosecutor told her there was a conflict between her testimony and that of other witnesses; that if he could not resolve this conflict he would present the matter to the grand jury; and that if the officers had lied he would indict them, or “the reverse if she had not told the truth.” He also told her that he had “already put one person in jail for lying on the stand last year.” He then asked her if she might have been mistaken about her testimony. She said she had been mistaken. The prosecutor recalled her the next day and she recanted her earlier testimony. The prosecutor’s line of questioning made it appear that she had initiated the contact leading to her recanting her testimony. In a hearing on motion for mistrial outside the presence of the jury, the prosecutor testified in conformance with the above information. The witness was called back to the stand, told by the trial court that she now had judicial immunity from prosecution for perjury and assured her that she was not going to jail. The witness then stated that she had changed her story because she was intimidated by the threats made by the prosecutor and she was so distraught about the matter that she was suffering physically. *267 Id. at 486. The trial court denied the motion for mistrial but instructed the jury to disregard the second round of the witness’ testimony. Id. at 437. The court of appeals held that the mistrial should have been granted. The court held that while it was not per se improper to advise prospective witnesses of the penalties for testifying falsely, warnings of the penalties of peijury cannot be emphasized to the point where they threaten and intimidate a witness into refusing to testify. Id. at 437-438. The court of appeals held that the prosecutor’s actions went far beyond a cautious and judicious warning. Id. at 438. It was outside the supervision of the trial court in the intimidating environment of the prosecutor’s office, and the tenor of the prosecutor’s comments were more threatening than necessary, especially the comment about “putting one person in jail,” which seemed designed to intimidate. Id. at 438. Further, it was shown that the witness did in fact change her testimony as a result of the prosecutor’s actions. Id. Finally, the prosecutor’s procurement of the intimidation-based second round of testimony constituted the knowing use of perjured testimony — itself a due process violation. Id. at 439. The trial court’s instruction did not cure the error because the instruction to disregard the second round of testimony might also have led the jury to conclude that the witness was not credible and to disregard all of her testimony, including that which was exculpatory for the defendant. Id. at 439.

The present case falls somewhere in between Webb v. Texas and Davis, on the one hand, and Webb v. State on the other. As in Webb v. Texas and Davis, the interview took place in a setting favorable to the authorities and possibly conducive to intimidation — the jailhouse. Moreover, the investigator did tell the witness that he would go after him for perjury (if he were lying and that could be proven) rather than making a more abstract “you could be prosecuted for perjury” statement. Further, the witness was in a precarious position because of the pendency of his parole revocation proceedings. And finally, as in Webb v. Texas, the witness in the present case refused to testify.

But, the present case also contains factors that distinguish it from Webb v. Texas and Davis. The investigator possessed less apparent power than the judge or the prosecutor in the former cases. Unlike the prosecutor in Davis, the investigator did not brag about his power to carry through his threats. Unlike the judge in Webb v. Texas, the investigator did not convey the impression that he would know whether or not Tipps was lying. In fact, the investigator admitted that he was limited by what he could prove. Moreover, the investigator’s warning appears to be significantly shorter and less threatening than the warnings in Webb v. Texas and Davis.

Perhaps more importantly, Tipps expressed fears of being called a “snitch;” so, his reason for refusing to testify may not have been based on a fear of prosecution for peijuiy. Unlike Webb v. Texas, Tipps did not come to the courthouse expecting to testify, and unlike Davis, he did not say that his refusal to testify was a result of perjury threats. In fact, the trial judge ordered him to testify and upon refusal held him in contempt. If Tipps were concerned about jail time, the contempt threat should have been an incentive to testify. But, his responses indicate that being held in contempt did not bother him. This lack of concern tends to support the “snitch” explanation as more accurate. We believe that the facts of the present case sufficiently distinguish it from Webb v. Texas and Davis. Points of error thirteen and fourteen are overruled.

The judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.

CLINTON and OVERSTREET, JJ., concur in the result.

BAIRD, J.,

concurs with a note: The seventh point of error contends the oral and written statements were the product of an illegal arrest and the majority agrees. Ante, 931 S.W.2d at 261. The majority then holds the taint of the illegality was sufficiently attenuated. Ante, 931 S.W.2d at 263. I disagree for the reasons stated in Bell v. State, 724 S.W.2d 780 (Tex.Cr.App.1986). Nevertheless, I would find the error harmless for the reasons stated in Boyle v. State, 820 S.W.2d 122, 149 (Tex.Cr.App.1989) (Op’n *268on Reh’g)(Baird, Overstreet and Maloney, JJ., concurring). For these reasons, I join only the judgment of the Court.

MALONEY, Judge,

concurring.

I concur in the disposition of points of error six and seven, and otherwise join the opinion of the Court. In his sixth point of error, appellant complains that he did not receive adequate warnings pursuant to Tex. Code Grim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.22, § 3 prior to making his videotaped oral statements. In resolving this point, the majority discusses whether § 3 requires warnings to be given by the individual “to whom the statement is made.” This epistle is unnecessary to the disposition of this point of error for two reasons. First, as the majority notes in footnote six, the record supports the trial court’s finding that appellant’s polygraph examination and Hidalgo’s questioning of. appellant constituted a single, continuous interrogation. In view of this finding, the warnings administered prior to the polygraph examination, a fact which is undisputed, also extended to the videotaped oral statements. Second, appellant does not argue in his brief that his statement was taken in violation of § 3 because the warnings were not given by the individual “to whom the statement is made.” Review of the statement of facts reveal that such an objection was lacking in the trial court as well. I would overrule this point of error by concluding that the record supports the trial court’s finding that the warnings appellant received prior to the polygraph examination extended to Hidalgo’s interview of appellant.

In point of error seven, appellant alleges that his videotaped oral statements and his third written statement were taken in violation of Texas law because they were the products of an illegal warrantless arrest. I agree with the majority’s determination that the arrest was illegal. I further agree with the majority that the error was harmless. In addition to holding the error harmless, however, the majority finds that appellant’s statements were admissible because “the taint between the arrest and appellant’s custodial statements [was] sufficiently attenuated.” Majority op. at 262. Discussion of the attenuation doctrine is unnecessary because appellant’s incriminating statement was made before the illegal arrest. Nonetheless, the majority relies upon Bell v. State, 724 S.W.2d 780, 788 n. 4, for the proposition that “a custodial confession may sometimes be motivated by a precustodial event, ...,” which in this case was appellant’s preeustodial admission to being present at the murder scene. Majority op. at 262. The majority’s reliance on Bell is unpersuasive. The statement in Bell is a quote from Justice Stevens’ concurring opinion in Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 220, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 2260-2261, 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979) in the context of a discussion of the vagaries of the “temporal proximity” factor. Bell, 724 S.W.2d at 788. The only place this language is found in our caselaw appears in footnote four in Bell addressing the same issue.

For the foregoing reasons, I concur only with points of error six and seven, and otherwise join the opinion of the Court.

*799 OPINION

COCHRAN, J.,

delivered the opinion of the unanimous Court.

Appellant was charged with sexual assault and indecency with a child for having consensual sexual relations with Nailah, a minor. Appellant did not deny having such a relationship, but his defense was that Nailah was at least seventeen years old at the time. The trial court admitted, over appellant’s objection, several out-of-court statements made by Nailah to two different witnesses as prior consistent statements under Tex.R. Evid. 801(e)(1)(B). After appellant was convicted, he appealed and claimed that the trial court erred in admitting these statements. The court of appeals agreed.1 We granted review to clarify that, under Rule 803(e)(1)(B), a charge of recent fabrication or improper motive may be subtly implied through tone, tenor, and demeanor during the entirety of the cross-examination; such an attack may not be immediately apparent from the specific wording of the questions asked, but becomes obvious only during the attorney’s final argument.2 We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence as a prior consistent statement.

I.

Nailah, who was twenty-seven at the time of trial, testified that she was born on October 12, 1977. When she was twelve and in middle school, she joined the adult choir at her church. Her grandfather was an elder in that church and her grandmother was a district missionary. Tina Hammons, who was related to Nailah’s family, was the state choir director. Nai-lah met appellant, Tina’s husband, through her choir activities. Appellant, who was in his late 20’s or early 30’s at the time, became her counselor. He counseled her by phone.

Nailah testified that she was almost fifteen when she started high school at Business Careers High School, a magnet school for the gifted. She talked with appellant every week or two on the phone for five to fifteen minutes, but shortly after starting high school, he would call more frequently. Nailah was self-conscious because she was “hairy,” but appellant said “not to worry, that later on in life, [she] would find out that that was sexy and that a lot of men liked that.” Nailah testified that appellant would tell her things like “how pretty I was and how smart I was and how special I was. How special I was to him.”

Appellant told Nailah that he wanted to pick her up at school and take her out to lunch to celebrate her 15th birthday in October of her freshman year. She signed out from school for a dentist appointment and was supposed to meet him in the school parking lot, but she did not go. She stayed inside with her best friend, Yvonne Sanders, who was a sophomore. She told *800Yvonne that she was supposed to go out for lunch with her counselor, but she didn’t feel “good” about it, so she did not want to go. The two girls just stood and looked at appellant sitting in his car in the parking lot. She had told Yvonne bits and pieces about her relationship with appellant, but “I didn’t give her intimate details because I didn’t have any Mends so I didn’t know, really, if I could tell anybody. So I just kind of told her that there was an older man I thought liked me.”

Appellant made arrangements to see her again about a week later. This time Nai-lah went out for lunch with him. They went to the Hampton Inn on 1-35. Appellant said that he had gotten a room there for an earlier business meeting and to take a shower and freshen up. She wanted to stay in the car, but appellant talked her into going to the motel room with him. He went into the bathroom and then came back out clad only in a towel and asked Nailah to give him a massage with lotion. She did. Things progressed, and eventually he penetrated her, first with his finger, then with his penis. It hurt, and she tried to resist. Then they each took a shower, and he drove her back to school.

Appellant called Nailah about a month or two later and asked her to go out for lunch again. This time they went to the Scotsman’s Inn on 1-35, and appellant repeated his prior conduct. Nailah hadn’t told anybody because, she said, “I was scared. I was ashamed. I was confused.” According to Nailah, their third act of intercourse took place at a Motel 6 in early 1993, while Nailah was still a freshman in high school. This time appellant’s car wouldn’t start when they were ready to leave; appellant was “panicky,” and Nailah “freaked” out. He called a cab for her to get back to school.

The only person that Nailah told about these sexual interludes was Yvonne. She told Yvonne the details when the girls had a “sleep-over” at Nailah’s house sometime after Christmas during Nailah’s freshman year. The next fall, right after her 16th birthday, Nailah transferred to Judson High School because her mother became pregnant and did not want Nailah going to school so far away. Yvonne was still at Business Careers.

The fourth time appellant picked her up at school, this time from Judson High School, he took her to a “really nasty” motel, and she refused to get out of the car. The fifth time, they went to the Ruby Inn, and Nailah told appellant that she had a boyfriend. Appellant was a little upset and told her, “I’m the only person that loves you and so you better not be having sex with anyone else.” They had their usual sexual activity, but appellant was rough and angry, “real rude, real obnoxious.” This was their last encounter.

Nailah eventually told her mother about the liaison with appellant in mid-1997, when she was nineteen. There was a meeting with Nailah, her mother and father, her grandparents, appellant and his wife. Nailah told everyone that it started when she was a freshman at Business Careers High School. Appellant said it was true, and he cried. Nailah and her family decided to have another meeting with appellant and his wife, which was held at the church with Bishop Iglehart and several elders in attendance. Appellant again admitted the sexual affair; he apologized to his wife and the bishop. The elders told Nailah that the church would handle the matter, so neither she nor her family reported it to the police.

Around 2002, Nailah received a bag of clothes containing a T-shirt that had appellant’s name on it as the vice-president of the youth department. Nailah then realized that appellant was still pastoring children, so she filed a police report. She also *801filed a civil lawsuit against the church and appellant, but it was dismissed shortly before the criminal trial because the statute of limitations had run.

Appellant’s attorney cross-examined Nailah vigorously concerning her memory of dates, the specific motels she and appellant had gone to at which times, and her age during which year of high school. Both became confused. Appellant’s attorney also cross-examined Nailah about how she had given different dates during her deposition in the civil lawsuit. Nailah said that she was incorrect in her former testimony because her lawyer had suggested those dates and he was wrong.

Bishop Iglehart testified next and stated that he had received a letter from Nailah in 1997, so “[w]e did a preliminary investigation, we ascertained that the facts were reasonably sure and correct, and then we began to set up a deliberation.” The elders convened a meeting in January or February of 1998. Bishop Iglehart questioned Nailah about the allegations she had made in her letter and she provided detailed and explicit information. The trial prosecutor then asked Bishop Iglehart the following question:

Prosecutor: All right. And was it made clear to you during that time what her age was during the time — during the time that she says she was having sex — or Duane Hammons was having sex with her?

Defense: I’ll object to that as calling for hearsay.

Prosecutor: Judge, at this time we’d ask that it be allowed as a prior consistent statement. The defense has clearly questioned the credibility of Nailah and has suggested that she is confused about her age. This comes in as nonhearsay under 801 and [a] prior consistent statement by the witness.

Defense: I don’t think she laid the predicate for that, Judge.

Prosecutor: The only predicate is that he did the initial questioning.

Court: Okay. I’ll overrule the objection. You can answer.

The prosecutor continued her questioning:

Q: The question was, when Nailah spoke to you-all at the meeting, was she clear about her age when [appellant] started having sex with her?

A: She was clear.

Q: Okay. And was she at that — when she talked to you about that, was it clear to you whether she was over 17 or under 17?

A: At the time we had that meeting, the only reason we were there was because she was under 17 at that time.

[Defense objection to hearsay. The trial court overruled the objection, but allowed a running objection.]

Q: All right. Bishop, you said that if she had been over 17 there wouldn’t have been a reason to have a meeting. Why do you say that?

A: Because that [sic] if she had been considered an adult, there would have been nothing that we would have been able to do about it.

According to Bishop Iglehart, appellant “confessed that he did it.”

Yvonne also testified and confirmed that she and Nailah had been best friends when Nailah was a freshman at Business Careers. Nailah always dressed like she was going to church and did not have many friends. In fact, Yvonne was her only friend. The prosecutor then asked Yvonne if Nailah had spoken to her about an older man. Yvonne said, ‘Tes, she did.” The prosecutor continued, “[C]an you tell me what [Nailah] would tell you in the begin*802ning about this older man?” Appellant’s attorney objected on the basis of hearsay. The prosecutor responded,

Judge, under 801 he has questioned this victim’s credibility on several issues, and that is a prior consistent statement; therefore, not hearsay. We would ask that the Court admit it.

The trial court overruled the objection, and Yvonne said that Nailah told her “bits and pieces” about her relationship with an older man in her church all throughout her freshman year, though she never mentioned the man’s name. After appellant made a running objection to hearsay, Yvonne elaborated on Nailah’s disclosures to her. She said that one rainy day in October, Nailah was outside in the little lunch area circle, looking like she wanted to cry. Yvonne asked her what the matter was, and Nailah told her that “he” was coming to get her. “And I was like, Who’s coming to get you? And she was like, The guy that I was telling you about.... But I don’t want to go.” Yvonne remembered the two of them looking across the parking lot where a dark car was parked. Yvonne didn’t see the man, but she told Nailah that she didn’t have to go if she didn’t want to. Yvonne didn’t remember exactly what happened after that, but she did know that Nailah didn’t go with the man.

Yvonne testified that she found out more about the man when she spent the night at Nailah’s home some time after Christmas break. Nailah told her “detail, point-to-point things.”

I know she told me that they had been having sex and [she] had told him she didn’t like it, that she didn’t want to do it, and she had told him that she wanted him to leave her alone. And he wouldn’t leave her alone. And she couldn’t tell anybody because it would get the church in trouble, her parents, her grandparents — you know, it would hurt everybody!.]

Nailah said that these encounters were in a “hotel, motel, whatever.” Yvonne testified that Nailah transferred out of Business Careers shortly after the beginning of her sophomore year. Yvonne also transferred to a different high school later that year, but the two have remained friends over the years. She said that she had not heard about this case until the defense investigator called her.

The defense then presented evidence that the Hampton Inn on 1-35 — where Nailah testified that she and appellant had their first sexual encounter — had not been built or open for business until May, 1995. Nailah would have been seventeen years old at that time.

Appellant’s closing argument included the following:

[Nailah] tried to list these dates, but her dates didn’t coincide with the dates she gave in her prior statements, which were given just four months ago in this deposition, that I cross-examined her from. You remember that. How could you forget it. How could you forget her testimony. How could you forget her talking about, “My lawyer gave me these dates.” That’s manufacturing evidence. That’s conspiring to manufacture evidence in the courtroom. That’s a criminal charge, that’s a criminal offense. I’m incensed by that. I can’t believe she testified to that up here in front of you.

The defense emphasized that Nailah testified that the first encounter — in 1992 — was in the Hampton Inn, but that the motel was not built until 1995. That meant

that it couldn’t have happened like that, like she said, at the time she said, and by her own testimony she made up dates with her lawyer.

*803This is one of those — remember, I talked to you about the preponderance of the evidence, but these are the guys that — you know, the rich lawyers that sue people and raise your insurance rates. Remember, we talked about that? Well, that’s one of these guys who sued my client. It didn’t work because it’s no good. The evidence is no good in this case. This case was thrown out, the civil case. And now she’s angry because she didn’t get any money. And this is now about a criminal case. That’s getting revenge.

When the defense attorney discussed Yvonne’s testimony, he noted that she and Nailah were still best friends and still talked together.

Well, if they talked, what do you think the biggest thing going on in [Nailah’s] life was? This case coming up and her civil case, which was in January, that got dismissed two or three weeks ago. So what did she — you know you’ve got to stick with me on this, Yvonne. Come on, got to be with me. Think about it. That’s your reason. When you think about the credibility and about why a person might testify one way or the other, think about those things.

Concerning Bishop Iglehart’s testimony, the defense stated the following:

So what did they prove? It’s not relevant what the bishop heard from her, because the testimony comes from her. And you got to believe her testimony to believe she was a minor. And to believe that, you got to believe she wasn’t lying in this deposition; she wasn’t lying in the police statement, where she gave another date, when she gave these other dates; and then when she finally said, We made them up, we made up these dates so we could get some money.

The jury found appellant guilty and sentenced him to ten years’ imprisonment and a $10,000 fine, but they recommended community supervision.

On appeal, appellant claimed, inter alia, that the trial court erred in overruling his hearsay objections to Bishop Iglehart’s and Yvonne’s testimony about Nailah’s out-of-court statements to them.3 The court of appeals stated that, although hearsay is generally not admissible, a prior consistent statement is not hearsay if it is “consistent with the declarant’s testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied charge against the declarant of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive.”4 The court of appeals held that a proper predicate must be laid that “illustrates a charge of fabrication has been made.” 5 Then, “the prior consistent statement must have been made at a time before the declarant had a motive to testify falsely.”6 The court of appeals stated that merely questioning “a witness’s recollection of events or dates through rigorous cross-examination does not equate to a charge of fabrication. To hold otherwise subjects all defendants who challenge the memory of prosecution witnesses to the improper admission of prior consistent statements.”7 The court of appeals rejected the State’s argument that appellant’s cross-examination8 suggested both *804recent fabrication and improper influence or motive, and held that the trial court erred in admitting Bishop Iglehart’s and Yvonne’s hearsay testimony. Finding that error harmful, the court of appeals reversed appellant’s conviction and remanded the case for a new trial.9

II.

Rule 801(e)(1)(B) gives substantive, non-hearsay status to prior consistent statements of a witness “offered to rebut an express or implied charge against the declarant of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive.”10 We have previously stated that our rule mirrors that of Federal Rule 801(d)(1)(B) and thus federal decisions provide helpful analysis.11 The Supreme Court has explained the four requirements that must be met for prior consistent statements to be admissible under Federal Rule 801(d)(1)(B):

(1)the declarant must testify at trial and be subject to cross-examination;

(2) there must be an express or implied charge of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive of the declarant’s testimony by the opponent;

(3) the proponent must offer a prior statement that is consistent with the declarant’s challenged in-court testimony; and,

(4) the prior consistent statement must be made prior to the time that the supposed motive to falsify arose.12

The rule sets forth a minimal foundation requirement of an implied or express charge of fabrication or improper motive.13 It is minimal. Dean McCormick has noted that even an attack upon the accuracy of the witness’s memory might suffice to permit the introduction of a prior consistent statement.14 In any event, “there need be only a suggestion that the witness consciously altered his testimony in order to permit the use of earlier statements that are generally consistent with the testimony at trial.” 15 The fact that “there need be *805only a suggestion” of conscious alteration or fabrication gives the trial court substantial discretion to admit prior consistent statements under the rule.16 However, the rule cannot be construed to permit the admission of what would otherwise be hearsay any time a witness’s credibility or memory is challenged.17 Were that true, mere cross-examination would always turn the prior consistent statement into non-hearsay.18 There is no bright line between a general challenge to memory or credibility and a suggestion of conscious fabrication, but the trial court should determine whether the cross-examiner’s questions or the tenor of that questioning would reasonably imply an intent by the witness to fabricate.19

*806Furthermore, the fact that the State might “bring out its own uglies” on direct examination in anticipation of an attack on a witness’s credibility does not preclude the introduction of a witness’s prior consistent statement as rebuttal evidence after a witness has, in fact, been impeached on cross-examination with an express or implied accusation of recent fabrication.20

As with most evidentiary rulings, a trial court’s determination that a prior consistent statement is admissible because the cross-examination suggested or implied an assertion of recent fabrication or improper motive is reviewed only for an abuse of discretion.21

*807III.

In the present case, appellant argues that “no fair reading of this record ... supports the state’s assertion that the defense made any” charge of recent fabrication of improper motive. According to appellant, the State relied upon a single cross-examination question by defense counsel (“Your lawyer tell you that you knew that?” referring to the date of her first sexual encounter with appellant as a time before her seventeenth birthday) as raising a charge of recent fabrication. But, as the State explained,

This question made clear what had already [been] implied by defense counsel’s earlier questions — that [Nailah’s] lawyer had given her the dates to establish that she was underage at the time of the incidents and that she was lying when she testified that she was underage to make her case in the civil suit.22

Appellant argues that he was merely bringing out Nailah’s inconsistency on dates. “The state is simply wrong when it accuses the defense of making it ‘clear’ that the complainant had been improperly influenced or motivated by her civil lawyer.”23 Appellant asserts that “the prior consistent statement rule did not apply because the defense did not charge the complainant with improper fabrication, motive, or influence.”24

But appellant’s assertion that he did not imply that Nailah fabricated her testimony is refuted by his own closing argument in which he expressly accused Nailah of “manufacturing” evidence with her civil attorney, noted that it is a criminal charge to manufacture evidence, and stated that the civil case was “thrown out,” and “now she’s angry because she didn’t get any money. And this is now about a criminal case. That’s getting revenge.” He concluded with the assertion that Nailah “made up” the dates so she “could get some money.” It is crystal clear that appellant’s position, at the time of final argument, was that Nailah had unsuccessfully conspired with her civil attorney to fabricate dates that would support her civil lawsuit, and, having lost that lawsuit, she would wreak revenge at this criminal trial by fabricating even more different dates than the ones to which she had testified during her civil deposition.25

*808The court of appeals “conclude[d] the State failed to lay ‘a proper predicate ... that illustrates a charge of fabrication has been made.’”26 The court of appeals is correct that the State’s explanation to the trial judge of precisely how the defense had implied that Nailah was fabricating portions her testimony was cryptic at best. However, the State cannot lay a proper predicate for the admission of a prior consistent statement. That predicate is laid by the content, tone, and tenor of defense cross-examination. It either does or does not “open the door” to the admissibility of a prior consistent statement by an express or implied suggestion that the witness is fabricating her testimony in some relevant respect. In deciding that question, the trial court must consider the totality of the cross-examination, not isolated portions or selected questions and answers.

The specific words that appellant used during cross-examination might be interpreted as either a benign inquiry into Nai-lah’s confusion over the dates and locations where the sexual encounters took place or as an implied charge of recent fabrication. But much of the force of cross-examination depends upon the tone and tenor of the questioning, combined with the cross-examiner’s demeanor, facial expressions, pregnant pauses, and other nonverbal cues.27

In this case, the State responded to appellant’s hearsay objections with the assertion that “[t]he defense has clearly questioned the credibility of Nailah and has suggested that she is confused about her age. This comes in as nonhearsay under 801 and [a] prior consistent statement by the witness.” Although the State’s response was certainly cryptic, the trial judge clearly understood its position, and he, assessing not only the words spoken on cross-examination, but its tone, ten- or, and nonverbal cues, agreed. Although the questioning was subtle, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in concluding that appellant was making an implied charge of fabrication during his cross-examination.28 That subtly implied charge became vociferously express during appellant’s closing argument. At that point, the “sinister seed of innuendo” sowed during cross-examination came to full fruition.29

Thus, we note that a reviewing court, in assessing whether the cross-examination of a witness makes an implied charge of recent fabrication or improper motive, should focus on the “purpose of the impeaching party, the surrounding circumstances, and the interpretation put on them by the [trial] court.”30 Courts may also consider clues from the voir dire, opening statements, and closing arguments. From the totality of the questioning, giving deference to the trial judge’s assessment of tone, tenor, and demeanor, *809could a reasonable trial judge conclude that the cross-examiner is mounting a charge of recent fabrication or improper motive?31 If so, the trial judge does not abuse his discretion in admitting a prior consistent statement that was made before any such motive to fabricate arose.32

We therefore hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Nailah’s prior consistent statements to Bishop Iglehart and Yvonne. The judgment of the court of appeals is reversed, and the case remanded for the court of appeals to address appellant’s remaining claims.

WOMACK, J.,

delivered the opinion of the Court,

in which MEYERS, PRICE, JOHNSON, HERVEY, HOLCOMB, and COCHRAN, JJ., joined.

Appellant, convicted of aggravated sexual assault and indecency with a child,1 claims that the trial court reversibly erred by permitting the State to bolster the credibility of its essential witness although her character for truthfulness had not been attacked. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court and held that, historically, impeachment of a witness with prior inconsistent statements is always an attack on the character of the witness, thus allowing rehabilitative evidence of truthfulness under Texas Rules of Evidence 608(a).2 We disagree with such an analysis and therefore vacate and remand.

Facts

On June 12, 2002, H.F.,3 a nine-year-old girl, attended a sleep-over at the appellant’s house. She slept in a guest bedroom with the appellant’s two daughters. That night, appellant entered the room at approximately 1:00 am. He knelt by H.F’s sleeping bag, pulled down his shorts, and began to masturbate. Appellant tried to get H.F. to touch his penis and eventually started performing oral sex on her. H.F. did not report this to anyone. Several months later while watching an episode of “The Practice” about a girl who had been raped, H.F. told her mother that appellant had “licked” her vagina. H.F’s mother reported the assault to the police who eventually referred her to the National Alliance for Children (NAC). At the NAC, H.F. was interviewed about the assault. This interview was recorded on a video tape.

During trial, H.F’s direct testimony was impeached on cross-examination by several prior inconsistent statements from her recorded interview at the NAC. Specifically, H.F. admitted that she told the interview*725er that the room was extremely small and she did not see how the appellant “could have done anything.” She admitted that she never told the interviewer that the appellant rolled her on her back, despite being asked specifically that question. She also admitted that she told the NAC interviewer that appellant’s penis was “hanging down,” while her direct testimony was that it was “sticking out.” Finally, she admitted that, during the interview, she stated that the entire attack occurred while she was on her left side, which was inconsistent with her in-court direct testimony.

During rebuttal the State called Stacy Turner, H.F.’s former teacher and babysitter, to testify about her opinion as to H.F.’s character for truthfulness. The trial defense counsel objected stating that the character of H.F. had not been attacked:

I don’t believe we have attacked the credibility of the child. It’s a issue of dates. It’s a fact. It’s a fact issue for the jury. It’s not a question of credibility. We haven’t — we haven’t brought the — the child’s character in — into question at all. We — we merely state that it didn’t happen, and that’s — that’s just— that’s our defense.

In response, the State argued:

Oh, just for the record, Your Honor, for the appellate lawyers, defense counsel went at great length through the contents of the videotape with the victim indicating, well, you said this then and you’re saying this now. That kind of testimony absolutely opens the door to rebuttal on grounds of truthfulness. If that is the fact, regardless of what is said, it’s an attack on credibility.

The trial judge overruled the objection, and Ms. Turner was permitted to testify. She testified that she taught H.F. in the second grade and later baby-sat H.F. the following fall, and in her opinion H.F.’s character for truthfulness was good.

Appellant challenged his conviction on the grounds that the testimony of Ms. Turner improperly bolstered the testimony of H.F., the State’s essential witness, resulting in his conviction. Appellant argues that impeaching H.F. with her prior statements to the NAC interviewer was not an attack on her character that would permit rebuttal evidence of character for truthfulness. The Court of Appeals disagreed and affirmed the conviction. We believe that the Court did not use the correct standard for evaluating rehabilitative evidence under Texas Rule of Evidence 608(a), and we vacate its judgment and remand.

Self Contradiction and Impeachment

Impeaching a witness with a prior inconsistent statement is not necessarily an attack on credibility that would allow rehabilitative evidence of character for truthfulness under Rule of Evidence 608(a). Although rehabilitation may be permitted under 608(a), it is not automatic. In this opinion we will address why a cross-examination with prior inconsistent statements is not necessarily an attack on character, as well as what factors a trial judge should examine .to determine whether an attack has occurred and if character evidence as to truthfulness should be permitted.

At the outset, every witness is assumed to have a truthful character. If that character is attacked, Rule 608(a) allows the presentation of evidence of that witness’s good character. In order to determine when character evidence of truthfulness is permitted, we must first decide what constitutes an attack on a witness’s character for truthfulness.

There are five major forms of impeachment: two are specific, and three *726are nonspecific. The two specific forms of impeachment are impeachment by pri- or inconsistent statements (also known as self-contradiction) and impeachment by another witness. The three non-specific forms of impeachment are impeachment through bias or motive or interest, impeachment by highlighting testimonial defects, and impeachment by general credibility or lack of truthfulness. Specific impeachment is an attack on the accuracy of the specific testimony (ie., the witness may normally be a truthteller, but she is wrong about X), while non-specific impeachment is an attack on the witness generally (the witness is a liar, therefore she is wrong about X).

When a witness’s credibility has been attacked by any one of the five forms of impeachment, the sponsoring party may rehabilitate the witness only in direct response to the attack. “The wall attacked at one point may not be fortified at another and distinct point.” 4 Generally, a witness’s character for truthfulness may be rehabilitated with “good character” witnesses only when the witness’s general character for truthfulness has been attacked.

Impeachment by a prior inconsistent statement (or “self-contradiction”) is normally just an attack on the witness’s accuracy, not his character for truthfulness. As Wigmore explained:

The exposure of an error of a witness on one material point by his own self-contradictory statements is a recognized mode of impeachment. It serves as a basis for further inference that he is capable of having made errors on other points. This possibility of other errors, however, is not attributable to any specific defect; it may be supposed to arise from a defect of knowledge, of memory, of bias, or of interest, or, by possibility only, of moral character. Thus, though the error may conceivably be due to dishonest character, it is not necessarily, and not even probably, due to that cause. 5

There are circumstances, however, where the cross-examiner’s intent and method clearly demonstrate that he is not merely attacking the conflict in the witness’s testimony between one or more specific facts, but mounting a wholesale attack on the general credibility of the witness. If the inconsistent statement is used to show that the witness is of “dishonest character,” then it follows that the opposing party should be allowed to rehabilitate this witness through testimony explaining that witness’s character for truthfulness. Alternatively, if this testimony is used to show some other defect, then such evidence should not be allowed. How is one to know for which purpose the proponent is eliciting the inconsistent information?

Prior to the adoption of the Texas Rules of Evidence, our case law held that impeachment with prior inconsistent statements was an attack on credibility, allowing character evidence to rehabilitate a witness. In O’Bryan v. State, the defendant impeached a State’s witness’s testimony with his prior sworn testimony concerning dates, times, and descriptions of the defendant’s clothing.6 In rebuttal the State presented evidence of the witness’s reputation for truth and veracity. The *727Court likened impeachment by self-contradiction to an attack on a witness’s “veracity character,” and held that the testimony was permissible.7 The Court did not explain, however, why this form of impeachment necessarily impugned a witness’s character for truthfulness.

The Federal Rules of Evidence modified the common-law position held by some states, including Texas, that allowed rehabilitation evidence of truthful character when the witness was impeached by self-contradiction. Although the text of Federal Rule 608(a) does not make an explicit delineation between impeachment by self-contradiction and other forms of impeachment, the advisory committee notes state: “Whether evidence in the form of contradiction is an attack upon the character of a witness must depend in part upon the circumstances.”8 Texas Rule 608(a) is identical to Federal Rule 608(a). We find no reason for the Texas rule to be interpreted differently than the identical federal rule.

Since the Texas Rules of Evidence were adopted in 1986, this Court has not written an opinion directly addressing the issue of determining when a cross-examination by prior inconsistent statement is an attack against someone’s character for truthfulness, thus permitting rehabilitation by character evidence of truthfulness. Some courts have held that rehabilitation should be permitted when the witness is subject to a “slashing cross-examination.”9 We, however, believe that the question should not be whether the cross-examination is “slashing” but whether the overall tone and tenor of the cross-examination implied that the witness is a liar.

It may be quite obvious that a witness’s character for truthfulness has been attacked directly, as by a question such as, “Were you lying then or are you lying now?” or another witness’s testimony that the witness is a liar or is untruthful. When a party uses prior inconsistent statements to impeach someone, the cross-examiner’s intent may not be as clear. As we have said above, there are several reasons why one’s statements may be inconsistent, and most of them do not imply dishonest character.

Federal Cases

Since there are several federal cases on point, we look to them for guidance in determining a workable standard. In United States v. Dring, the Ninth Circuit held that specific attacks on the defendant’s testimony during cross-examination did not open the door to opinion or reputation evidence in rehabilitation.10 Dring was impeached by inconsistencies between his testimony and that of other witnesses. The Ninth Circuit reasoned that since these were direct attacks on specific testimony and not attacks on the witness’s general character, rehabilitation evidence of truthful character was not relevant.

The purpose of Rule 608(a)(2) is to encourage direct attacks on a witness’s veracity in the instant case and to discourage peripheral attacks on a witness’s general character for truthfulness. To this end, the Rule prohibits rehabilitation by character evidence of truthfulness after direct attacks on a witness’s veracity in the instant case. However the Rule permits rehabilitation *728after indirect attacks on a witness’s general character for truthfulness.11

The Court further discussed what indicators may help a trial judge to determine whether a witness’s character for veracity was sufficiently attacked to warrant rehabilitation under Rule 608(a)(2). It stated that vigorous cross-examination alone, even though it pointed out inconsistencies between prior statements or statements of other witnesses, may not be enough.12 Alternatively, it held that vigorous cross-examination that amounts to an indirect attack by eliciting information as to bad reputation, bad opinion of character for truthfulness, conviction of a crime, or eliciting information from the witness about misconduct that did not result in conviction would justify rehabilitation under Rule 608(a)(2).13

The Ninth Circuit has also held that an opening statement that a particular witness is a liar or not to be trusted is close enough to credibility impeachment to allow a party to offer rehabilitative evidence.14

The Seventh Circuit has held that impeachment by self-contradiction may be an attack triggering Federal Rule 608(a) when used to suggest a deliberate falsehood by the witness.15

The facts of an unpublished Fourth Circuit case, United States v. Cruz, are also illustrative.16 In that case, a co-defendant, Nelson, was convicted of conspiracy to transport drugs aboard a sailboat.17 Her only defense at trial was her testimony that she could not have participated in the conspiracy since she had no knowledge that drugs were on board.18 During her cross-examination the government questioned her about several self-contradicting statements, including inconsistent statements to her Mends, law-enforcement officers, and the magistrate judge concerning her involvement with a co-defendant. The government “painted a picture of Nelson as a calculating deceitful person.”19 In a case like that it is error not to allow a defendant the ability to call witnesses to defend her character since such an attack discredited her presumed honest character.20

Standard

Based on the reasoning in these decisions, we hold that the question for the trial judge is whether a reasonable juror would believe that a witness’s character for truthfulness has been attacked by cross-examination, evidence from other •witnesses, or statements of counsel (e.g., during voir dire or opening statements).

*729Conclusion

We vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case to that Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

KELLER, P.J., and KEASLER, J., concurred in the judgment.

OPINION

ONION, Presiding Judge.

This appeal results from a conviction for sale of heroin where the punishment was assessed at 7 years by the court following a waiver of trial by jury and a plea of not guilty.

In his first two grounds of error appellant urges the trial court “erred in allowing a State’s witness to reiterate statements contained in an offense report” and “erred in admitting testimony based on refreshing of a past recollection and not a present recollection.”

Herado Rangel, San Antonio police officer, testified that he worked as a narcotics undercover agent from February 15 to December 3, 1970; that he grew a beard, let his hair get long, wore old clothes and a hat and didn’t take a bath for two or three months. He related that on September 22, 1970, he purchased one capsule of heroin from the appellant; took it immediately to the police station and field tested the capsule, then wrote a handwritten report of the alleged offense. He turned the capsule and the report over to Detective Carpenter and returned to “the field”.

On cross-examination he related that Carpenter had typed an offense report from his handwritten report. Upon request, the prosecutor made available to appellant’s counsel a copy of a typed report *953entitled “Supplemental Report” which report appellant’s counsel promptly introduced into evidence before the court.

Subsequently, Rangel testified that he did not know what disposition had been made of his handwritten memorandum but that the day after the alleged offense he had checked the typed report and found it true and correct, “word for word”. When asked, on cross-examination, if he had “any personal recollection of this transaction” other than the report, he replied he was testifying from “his own mind and the report.” Later he revealed that prior to trial he had refreshed his memory by reading the typed report.

At this point appellant objected to Ran-gel’s entire testimony because he had re-freshéd his memory from a typed memorandum not in his handwriting, not signed or initialed by him, and not verified by “as being exactly a copy” of his handwritten memorandum.

The objection was overruled.

Detective Manuel Ortiz was called by the State. On cross-examination he testified he had been the person who typed the supplemental report from Rangel’s handwritten report or field notes and he had also prepared the typewritten offense report which the appellant then introduced into evidence. Ortiz revealed that the handwritten report was discarded after the preparation of the written report, a customary practice within the San Antonio Polide Department.

It is clearly permissible and proper for an officer to refer to the notes he has made for the purpose of refreshing his memory. Davis v. State, 168 Tex.Cr.R. 588, 330 S.W.2d 443 (1959).

It would be absurd to say that the rule has no application because the report has been transcribed or typed by someone else and the witness refreshes his memory from the typed report, particularly where as in the instant case the witness had examined the report and found it correct “word for word” with his earlier handwriting memorandum. Under these circumstances, we know of no requirement that the report written in the first person must be signed or initialed by the witness before it can be used for refreshing the memory.

In Richardson v. State, 432 S.W.2d 100 (Tex.Crim.App.1965) this court found no error in an officer-witness refreshing his memory from a case report he had helped prepare along with other officers.

Further, it is not necessary that the memorandum have been made by the witness so long as it refreshes his memory. Putnam v. United States, 162 U.S. 687, 16 S.Ct. 923, 40 L.Ed. 1118; Stephens v. State, 93 Tex.Cr.R. 164, 245 S.W. 687 (1922). See also Artell v. State, 372 S.W. 2d 944 (Tex.Crim.App.1963) cert. den. 375 U.S. 951, 84 S.Ct. 439, 11 L.Ed.2d 312; Leal v. State, 442 S.W.2d 736 (Tex.Crim.App.1969).

In 1 Branch’s Ann.P.C.2d Ed., Sec. 182, p. 189, it is stated that:

“When the witness recollects seeing the writing before but has now no independent recollection of the facts mentioned therein, yet if he remembers that at the time he saw it he knew its contents to be correct, he may read from the writing.”

Further, we are not here dealing with a trial court’s refusal to order that reports made by other individuals and used by witnesses to refresh their memories be produced for the purpose of cross-examination and possible impeachment which question has sometimes divided the court. See, i.e. Leal v. State, supra; Artell v. State, supra; Rose v. State, 427 S.W.2d 609 (Tex.Crim.App.1968); cf. Dover v. State, 421 S.W.2d 110 (Tex.Crim.App.1967).

Still further the appellant himself introduced into evidence the “Supplemental Report” and the offense report based thereupon. The reports were entirely consistent with Officer Rangel’s testimony.

*954We perceive no error or merit in either one of appellant’s first two grounds of error.

Appellant’s counsel at the “special request” of the appellant advances six other grounds of error. These have been examined and found to be without merit, including the claimed discrepancy in the State’s testimony as to whether Carpenter or Ortiz typed the “Supplemental Report.” The jurisprudence of this state cannot be aided by a discussion of non-meritorious contentions.

The judgment is affirmed.

OPINION

MANSFIELD, Judge,

delivered the opinion of the Court.

McCORMICK, Presiding Judge, and OVERSTREET and PRICE, Judges, join.

A Bexar County jury found appellant, Arnold E. Johnson, guilty of the October 26, 1995, capital murder of Frank Johnson, Jr. See Tex. Penal Code § 19.03(a)(2).1 At the punishment stage of trial, the jury answered the special issues in such a manner as to require the trial court to sentence appellant to death. See Tex.Code Crim. Proc. article 37.071, § 2(b), (e), & (g).2 Direct appeal to this Court is automatic. Id. at § 2(h). Appellant brings 53 points of error in his brief to this Court. We will reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the cause for a new trial.

We will address appellant’s evidentiary sufficiency point first, and then we will address points of error numbers one and twelve. Because of our resolution of these points, it is unnecessary for us to address the remainder of appellant’s claims.

In point of error number 53, appellant argues that he has been denied his liberty without due process of law because the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to support the jury’s finding of guilt. Appellant argues that because Reginald Taylor, a surviving victim of the offense, was unable to identify him in court as the person who assisted Carl Brooks in the capital murder of Frank Johnson, Jr., there is no evidence linking him to this offense.

The jury charge instructed the jurors that, to find appellant guilty of capital murder, they had to find he committed the offense of murder by intentionally or knowingly causing the death of an individual while in the course of committing or attempting to commit the offense of robbery and/or kidnapping. The charge also included a paragraph on the law of parties. See Tex. Penal Code § 7.02(a)(2).

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution requires that every state criminal conviction be supported by evidence that a rational factfinder could find as sufficient to prove all the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 362-364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1072, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970); Coit v. State, 808 S.W.2d 473, 475 (Tex.Crim.App.1991). Section 2.01 of the Penal Code contains the same requirement. As an appellate court reviewing a cold record long after the jury has evaluated the evidence and made its finding, our task is to consider all the record evidence, direct and circumstantial, in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, and to determine whether, based on that evidence, any rational jury could have found all the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319-320, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); Geesa v. State, 820 S.W.2d 154, 158-159 (Tex. *412Crim.App.1991). In determining sufficiency of the evidence, we consider all the evidence, admissible and inadmissible. Gardner v. State, 699 S.W.2d 831, 835 (Tex.Crim.App.1985). If, based on all the evidence, a reasonably-minded jury must necessarily entertain a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt, due process requires that we reverse and order a judgment of acquittal. Appellate judges are not factfinders, however; we may not reevaluate the weight and credibility of the record evidence. Rather, we act only “as a final, due process safeguard ensuring ... the rationality of the factfinder.” Moreno v. State, 755 S.W.2d 866, 867 (Tex.Crim.App.1988).

The State presented twenty-six witnesses and numerous exhibits at guilt/innocence in an effort to prove its case. The most incriminating evidence came from a statement made by the surviving victim, Reginald Taylor:

My name is Reginald Taylor, I am 17 years old. My date of birth is 12-05-77. I live at 556 Pennystone with my Mother and brother Christian Taylor. I went to the Cass Job Corps in Arkansas and I got an Arkansas High School Diploma. I can read and write and understand English. I am not working right now but I’m putting in applications I used to work at Bill Millers.

I have come to the Homicide Office at the San Antonio Police Department, to give Detective Hernandez a statement about how my friend Frank Johnson got killed. At 2:30 p.m. on October 26th 1995 I ran into Frank Johnson at the Candle Stick Apartments off of Rigsby. I know Frank Johnson as Frank Jr. I have known him for three weeks. He was in a white car I don’t know what the make was, When I saw him he was going to his apartment, I waited downstairs, with a friend of mine named Demetrius DeLane I call him Mick-ery. When frank Jr. Came down he said I’m gonna go drop some “dank” off “dank” being pot, marijuana. Mickery said why don’t you give us some and Mickery went up and got a joint. After that we all left and Frank Jr. said I Gotta go to Big Arnold’s garage. All I knew is that it was by the Phillips 66 at MLK and 10. He asked if either one of us had a beef with big Arnold or little Arnold or any of them “Jolly Time niggers”. Mickery said yea I got a beef with big Arnold and little Arnold. I said lets go, Mickery had a Glock 40. Frank parked near the Phillip 66 and frank went to Big Arnold’s garage. He took the pound of weed in a towel. He wasn’t coming back, about five minutes passed and Little Arnold Ross, His Daddy big Arnold owns the Garage. Little Arnold said that Frank Jr. Had told hm to bring the car round back. So we believed him and he parked the car in the back near the gates. Little Arnold said Frank told me to tell you to get out the car.

Me and Mickery walked around and I saw this dude wearing an Emmit Smith Jersey it was a white Dallas Cowboys Jersey with the stars on it and the number 22 I think it said Smith on the back. He pulled a Tech-9 it was black and it had a silverish color clip, it had thing on the end of the barrel with holes in it. He said ‘yall niggers get in hear,” He pointed the gun at us, Mickery pulled his Glock but it wasn’t cocked so he bailed, he ran around the corner and I didn’t see him no more. The guy with the Tech made me go in and sit down in the office. Frank was in the office behind the desk, Little Arnold was next to me on the couch. Dometric Jones was outside near the window with another dude I don’t know who he was. The Dude with the tech asked Dometrich if he had his “strap” on, meaning a gun, Dometrich said no, He asked the guy sitting next to Dom-etrieh if he had his the guy said yea I got’s mine. Little Arnold was asking frank if he had any more money, and Frank said I give you all I had, the dude with the Tech said “all you had was a pound of weed and twenty-five Dollars” They kept asking Frank for more weed and finally Frank said all I got is six ounces left, it’s in the car. Some dude went and got the weed. They told me to get off the couch and go stand by Frank. Little Arnold and the dude with the Tech-9 told me to strip, they told me to take off my shoes and my clothes. Little Arnold drove the car from the back to the front and backed it into the *413garage near the office where we were. Domitrich opened the Door and the guy with the Tech-9 pointed the gun at us and said get in the car. I got in the back seat first and PRANK got in the front passenger seat. Little Arnold had been sitting in the drivers seat since he had backed the ear in. The guy with the Tech got in the back passenger seat right behind Frank. The guy with the Teeh-9 pointed the gun at me and told me to bend down. He said “nigger don’t look up keep your head down or I’ll kill you. I don’t know where we were going, we didn’t drive more than ten minutes. Little Arnold he told me to get out, the dude with the Tech-9 said no. We drove a little bit more and When we first got into that neighborhood Little Arnold said I’m gonna take you to where I dumped the Last Nigger I killed. I remember we made a right turn. I heard a shot, I saw blood come off Pranks neck the guy with the Tech-9 shot frank. Little Arnold said Shoot him in the head, and at the same time he say get out the car. so I bailed, I saw him raise the Tech-9 as I jumped out. the car never stopped rolling. I’m running down the street, I didn’t know where I was I trying to get help. I never looked back. I ran towards where I saw some people standing, I told them to call the Police they told me to get out of here, I saw the Whataburger, I saw the access rd and I ran all the way to Southcross, and I ran all the way home to Pennystone. I told my little brother what happened, My brother Christian and me caught the 3:35 bus to Starcrest and I told Larry what happened I don’t know Larry’s last name. I told him we need to tell his mother. Larry called them, Me Larry’s Girlfriend, Larry and my brother got in her car and we drove back to where the shooting happened. I saw all the blood, some people told us they had found a body and the Police had already left. After that we went to Frank’s mother’s house and waited for the Detectives to call so I could give my statement. I did not hear from the Detective so Larry’s girlfriend and Larry drove me to the East Side Sub Station. The Police brought me downtown where I spoke with you. All I have told you is the truth, I really don’t know little Arnold but can identify him if I see a picture of him, I have known Dometrich Jones three years, and I don’t know the guy with the Tech-9 but if I see a picture of him I can recognize him. I remember seeing a Tatoo on little arnold that said “Pookie”

I have read this statement and it is the truth.

(All errors included are as they appear in the statement.)

During Taylor’s cross-examination, Defense counsel had appellant strip down to his waist to demonstrate the absence of a tatoo which read “Pookie.” Appellant did, however, have a tatoo on his right arm which read “Lil Arnold.”

Harold Bellamy, a San Antonio police officer, testified that he showed Taylor two photo arrays of suspects in this case. The first one was shown on October 27, 1995, but Taylor was unable to identify appellant. The second photo array, which included a more recent photograph, was shown on October 28, 1995, and Taylor positively identified appellant.

Zachary Greenwood testified that he was present at Jesko’s Automotive Shop in San Antonio on October 26,1995, and that he saw both appellant and Carl Brooks at the shop. He also observed Frank Johnson walking toward Jesko’s. A short time later appellant drove a white, four-door ear in which two other men were passengers. Appellant parked the car in a garage around the back of Jesko’s. A man who appeared to have something in his hand, frantically ran away from Jesko’s. Shortly thereafter, appellant, Brooks, Johnson and an unidentified man drove away in the white, four-door car previously mentioned. Approximately forty-five minutes later, a car with a woman driver pulled up at Jesko’s; subsequently, appellant and Brooks emerged from the vehicle.

Evelyn Marie Whitley testified that she saw appellant at approximately 2:50 p.m. on the aftérnoon in question while she was putting some clothes in her ear. Brooks or appellant asked her if she would give them a *414ride to Kenmar Street. Whitley declined, but did agree to take them to Jesko’s.

Manuel Keith, a San Antonio police officer, testified that at 3:15 p.m., October 26, 1995, he received a dispatch requesting that he go to the intersection of Twohig and G Streets to investigate a “down and out”.3 Upon arrival, he discovered Johnson’s body lying face down with blood oozing from the back of his head.

Dr. Carolyn Rivercomb, an assistant medical examiner for Bexar County, testified that on or about October 27, 1995, she performed an autopsy on Johnson. He had been shot twice. One gunshot wound was to the back of the neck. The second gunshot wound, which was fatal, entered the back of Johnson’s head slightly left of the midline. Both wounds went completely through the body and both were surrounded with soot and powder grains indicative of the gun being fired within one foot of the victim.

Richard Funk, a San Antonio police officer, testified that on October 29, 1995, he received a dispatch requesting that he go to 369 Kenmar and search a particular drainage ditch culvert for clothing. After removing a manhole cover, Funk discovered a tennis shoe and a pair of blue pants inside the drainage ditch.

Lonnie Ginsberg, of the Bexar County Forensic Science Center, testified the pants and tennis shoes found in the drainage ditch tested positive for blood. Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) found on the clothes was consistent with Frank Johnson’s DNA.

Brian Custard, a San Antonio police officer, testified that on October 26, 1995, he investigated a 1985 Oldsmobile Regency ’98 which was found at Hedges and Terrell Streets and believed it to be involved in a homicide. Among the items discovered were a spent shell casing outside the driver’s door, blood stains on the sidewalk and curb, blood and brain matter on the door of the car, a live 9 millimeter round found on the floorboard behind the driver’s seat, a live 9 millimeter round found on the seat, an AK assault rifle found in the trunk, a bullet hole in the windshield, a spent shell casing found on the front passenger floor-board, and various items of clothing.

Ralph Looney, a latent fingerprint examiner for the San Antonio Police Department, testified that he identified fingerprints from Frank Johnson and Brooks which were lifted from the vehicle found at Hedges and Terrell Streets.

Tony Strong, an inmate of Bexar County Jail who was serving time for credit card abuse, testified that appellant told him that “if he had to do it again he wouldn’t even lay down the gun.”

Based on the above evidence, we reject appellant’s sufficiency argument. The record evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Point of error 53 is overruled.

In point of error number twelve, appellant argues that the trial judge violated Texas Rule of Criminal Evidence 803(5) by admitting Taylor’s statement into evidence. Appellant contends that the State failed to lay the proper predicate in support of admission of this evidence. The State argues that the predicate requirements of Rule 803(5) were met and that the testimony was properly admitted.

During the guilt/innocence phase of trial, the State called Taylor to the stand to testify as an eyewitness to the offense. Unfortunately for the State, Taylor was not cooperative:

Q. Mr. Taylor, could you please state your name for the record, please.

A. You already know my name.

Q. Could you please state it for the record, sir?

A. For what? You already know it.

Q. Is your name Reginald Taylor?

A. It’s right there in front of you man.

Q. All I’m asking you, sir, is that your name?

A. Yeah.

*415Q. Okay.

PROSECUTOR: May I approach the witness, Judge?

THE COURT: You may.

PROSECUTOR: Thank you.

Q. Mr. Taylor, I’m going to ask you, show you State’s Exhibit Number 120. Is that your signature, sir?

A. Yeah.

Q. Excuse me?

A. Yeah.

Q. Okay. And did you give that statement on October 26th, 1995?

A. I don’t remember.

Q. Okay. It says October 26th, 1995. Do you have any doubt on that or would you say that’s correct, sir?

A. I don’t remember. I don’t even know the date.

Q. Okay. When you gave the statement to Detective Hernandez, was everything true and correct when you told him?

A. I don’t even remember what I said.

Q. You don’t remember what you said?

A. I don’t.

Q. You don’t remember what you said? But when you told the officer — why don’t you just go look over State’s Exhibit Number 120, just read it over, okay?

A. Are you trying to make me memorize what I said?

Q. No, sir. Just go ahead and read it over, okay. There’s the next page behind it, sir. If you can read that one, the second one and the third one, please.

Mr. Taylor, the statement, 120, when you gave the statement to the police officers, was that more fresh in your mind at the time when you gave it, sir?

A. I really don’t remember, just what I read. I don’t remember what happened that day.

Q. Okay. You don’t remember what happened that day?

A. No.

Q. Okay. But when you gave this statement to the police officers on October 26th, 1995, was it more fresh in your mind then as it is today?

A. I don’t remember.

Q. Excuse me?

A. I don’t remember.

Q. You don’t remember what, sir?

A. About the statement, about what I just read.

Q. Okay.

Q. But when you gave the statement to the police officers, was it more fresh in your mind when you gave it to them? I’m not talking about today. You said today you can’t remember that well. But what I’m asking you, when you gave the statement to the police officers, was it more fresh in your mind then?

A. I guess so.

Q. Okay. So it was more fresh in your mind then. Is that what your are telling me?

A. Yeah.

Q. And that’s your signature, October 26th, 1995. That’s what it says there, correct?

A. Yeah.

Q. And you are telling us you can’t remember anything today. Is that what you are saying?

A. Right.

PROSECUTOR: Your Honor, at this time I would like to offer into evidence State’s Exhibit Number 120 and cite to the Court 803(5), Texas Rules of Criminal Evidence. DEFENSE COUNSEL: Defense would object on the grounds we are being denied to confront the accusers under the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States; Texas Constitution Article 1, Section 10, Texas Code of Criminal Procedures Article 1.05. There has been no reliability of the statement established whatsoever ... Further, they have not met the requirements under 803(5). It is still hearsay. It is hearsay within hearsay. It does not establish the circumstances that establish reliability of the statement whatsoever.

*416THE COURT: If I may see the attorneys at the bench. The objections are overruled, number one.

The State was then allowed to read Taylor’s statement in its entirety into evidence to the jury-

Texas Rule of Criminal Evidence 803(5) provides in relevant part:

The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a witness:

(5) Recorded recollection. A memorandum or record concerning a matter about which a witness once had personal knowledge but now has insufficient recollection to enable him to testify fully and accurately, shown to have been made or adopted by the witness when the matter was fresh in his memory and to reflect that knowledge correctly, unless the circumstances of preparation casts doubt on the document’s trustworthiness. If admitted, the memorandum or record may be read into evidence but may not itself be received as an exhibit unless offered by an adverse party.

The predicate for past recollection recorded is set forth in Rule 803(5) and requires that four elements be met: (1) the witness must have had firsthand knowledge of the event, (2) the written statement must be an original memorandum made at or near the time of the event while the witness had a clear and accurate memory of it, (3) the witness must lack a present recollection of the event, and (4) the witness must vouch for the accuracy of the written memorandum. 2 J. Strong, et al., McCormick On Evidence §§ 279-283 (4th ed.1992). In particular, to meet the fourth element, the witness may testify that she presently remembers recording the fact correctly or remembers recognizing the writing as accurate when she read it at an earlier time. Id. at § 283. But if her present memory is less effective, it is sufficient if the witness testifies that she knows the memorandum is correct because of a habit or practice to record matters accurately or to check them for accuracy. Ibid. At the extreme, it is even sufficient if the individual testifies to recognizing her signature on the statement and believes the statement is correct because she would not have signed it if she had not believed it true at the time. Ibid; 3 Wigmore, Evidence § 747 (Chad-bourn rev.1970). However, the witness must acknowledge at trial the accuracy of the statement. 2 J. Strong, et al., McCormick On Evidence § 283 (4th ed.1992). An assertion of the statement’s accuracy in the acknowledgment line of a written memorandum or such an acknowledgment made previously under oath will not be sufficient. Ibid. No statement should be allowed to verify itself, especially by boilerplate language routinely added by police, lawyers, or others experienced in litigation. 4 Louisell & Mueller, Federal Evidence §§ 445, 628-29 (1980).

We have addressed the past recollection recorded hearsay exception before. In Wood v. State, 511 S.W.2d 37 (Tex.Crim.App.1974), a murder prosecution, the State attempted to prove that the defendant made a threat regarding the victim in the presence of a witness. In holding the witness’ written statement admissible under the past recollection recorded hearsay exception, we explained:

[Although the original statement was exhibited to the witness on several occasions, she consistently contended she had no present recollection of the appellant having made the threat in question just prior to the alleged offense. She did testify that, while the written sworn statement made to the police did not refresh her present recollection as to appellant’s threat made before he entered the house where the killing occurred, she did give the statement on the “night” of the alleged offense, that she signed and swore to it and that if the statement reflected appellant made such threat it was true. It thus appears that rules of the use of a memorandum of past recollection were met. It was shown that the memorandum was made at or near the time of the event in question and that the witness guaranteed the correctness of the memorandum.

Wood v. State, 511 S.W.2d at 44. See Young v. State, 891 S.W.2d 945, 951 (Tex.Crim.App.1994) (McCormick, P.J., dissenting)(noting that a writing may qualify as a past recollec*417tion recorded only if the witness can testify that he does remember that the writing is accurate); Phea v. State, 767 S.W.2d 263, 266-267 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1989) (witness identified her signature on the statements and testified that the information contained therein was true at the time the statements were given).

Given the record before us, it is apparent that the State did not lay a proper predicate for the admissibility of Taylor’s statement under Rule 803(5). As noted before, the Rule requires that four elements be met. In this case there was no testimony given to satisfy the first element requirement of firsthand knowledge. Taylor did not testify regarding the basis of the allegations contained in his statement, i.e., whether he was present during the commission of the offense. Nor was there any testimony given which supported the fourth element. Taylor never guaranteed that his memory was correctly transcribed or that the factual assertions contained in the statement were true. Consequently, the statement read into evidence was inadmissible hearsay.

A criminal conviction should not be overturned for non-constitutional error if the appellate court, after examining the record as whole, has fair assurance that the error did not influence the jury, or had but a slight effect. See Tex.R.App. Proc. 44.2(b); King v. State, 953 S.W.2d 266 (Tex.Crim.App.1997). Given the record before us, we have no such fair assurance. The reference in Taylor’s statement to an extraneous murder was highly prejudicial, as was the statement “shoot him in the head.” We are unable to say with fair assurance that the erroneous admission of Taylor’s statement did not influence the jury or that its admission did not affect appellant’s substantial rights. Point of error number twelve is sustained.*

The judgment of the trial court is REVERSED, and the ease REMANDED for a new trial.

BAIRD, MEYERS and HOLLAND, JJ., concur in the result.

KELLER and WOMACK, JJ., concur as to point of error one and otherwise join the opinion of the Court.