Mr. Justice Sanford

delivered the opinion of the Court.'

By a criminal information filed in the Superior Court of Alameda County, California, the plaintiff in error was charged, in five counts, with violations of the Criminal Syndicalism Act of that State. Statutes, 1919, c. 188, p. 281. She was tried, convicted on the first count, and sentenced to imprisonment. The judgment was affirmed by the District Court of Appeal. 57 Cal. App. 449. Her petition to have the case heard by the Supreme Court1 was denied. Ib. 453. And the case was brought here on a writ of error which was allowed by the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal, the highest court of the State in which a decision could be had. Jud. Code, § 237.

On the first hearing in .this Court, the writ of error was dismissed for want of jurisdiction. 269 U. S. 530. Thereafter, a petition for rehearing was granted, Ib. 538; and the case was again heard and reargued both as to the jurisdiction and the merits.

The pertinent provisions of the Criminal Syndicalism Act are:

“ Section 1. The term ‘ criminal syndicalism ’ as used in this act is hereby defined as any doctrine or precept advocating, teaching or aiding and abetting the commis*360sion of crime, sabotage (which word is hereby defined as meaning wilful and malicious physical damage or injury to physical property), or unlawful acts of force and violence or unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing a change in industrial ownership or control, or effecting any political change.

“Sec. 2. Any person who: . . . .4. Organizes or assists in organizing, or is or knowingly becomes a mem-, ber of, any organization, society, group or assemblage of persons organized or assembled to advocate, teach or aid and abet criminal syndicalism ...

“Is guilty of a felony and punishable by imprisonment.”

The first count of the information, on which the conviction was had, charged that on or about November 28, 1919, in Alameda County, the-defendant, in violation.,of the Criminal Syndicalism Act, “ did then and there unlawfully, wilfully, wrongfully, deliberately and feloniously organize and assist in organizing, and was, is, and knowingly became a member of an organization, society, group and assemblage of persons organized and assembled to advocate, teach, aid and abet criminal syndicalism.”

. It has long been settled that this Court acquires no jurisdiction to review" the judgment of a state court of last resort on a writ of error, unless it affirmatively appears on the face of the record that a federal question constituting an appropriate ground for such review was presented in and expressly or necessarily decided by such state court. Crowell v. Randell, 10 Pet. 368, 392; Railroad Co. v. Rock, 4 Wall, 177, 180; California, Powder Works v. Davis, 151 U. S. 389, 393; Cincinnati, etc. Railway v. Slade, 216 U. S. 78; 83; Hiawassee Power Co. v. Carolina-Tenn. Co., 252 U. S. 341, 343; New York v. Kleinert, 268 U. S. 646, 650.

Here the record does not show that the defendant raised or that the State courts considered or decided any *361Federal question whatever, excepting as appears in an order made and entered by the Court of Appeal after it had decided the case and the writ of error had issued and been returned to this Court. A certified copy of that order, brought here as an addition to the record, shows that it was made and entered pursuant to a stipulation. of the parties, approved by the court, and that it contains the following statement:

“ The question'whether the California Criminal Syndicalism Act . . . and its application in this case is repugnant to the provision's of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, providing, that'no state shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, and that all persons shall bé accorded the equal protection, of the laws, was considered and passed upon by this Court.”

In Cincinnati Packet Co. v. Bay, 200 U. S. 179, 182, where it appeared that a federal question had been presented in a petition in error to the State Supreme Court in a case in which the judgment was affirmed without opinion, it was held that the certificate of that court to the effect that it had considered and necessarily decided this question, was sufficient to show its existence. And see Marvin v. Trout, 199 U. S. 212, 217, et seq.; Consolidated Turnpike v. Norfolk, etc. Railway, 228 U. S. 596, 599.

So — while the unusual course here taken to show that federal questions weré raised and decided below is not to be commended — we shall give effect to the order of the Court of Appeal as would be done if the statement had been made in the opinion of that court when delivered. See Gross v. United States Mortgage Co., 108 U. S. 477, 484-486; Philadelphia Fire Association v. New York, 119 U. S. 110, 116; Home for Incurables v. City of New York, 187 U. S. 155, 157; Land & Water Co. v. San Jose Ranch Co., 189 U. S. 177, 179-180; Rector v. City Deposit Bank, *362200 U. S. 405, 412; Haire v. Rice, 204 U. S. 291, 299; Chambers v. Baltimore, etc. Railroad, 207 U. S. 142, 148; Atchison, etc. Railway v. Sowers, 213 U. S. 55, 62; Consolidated Turnpike Co. v. Norfolk, etc. Railway, 228 U. S. 596, 599; Miedreich v. Lauenstein, 232 U. S. 236, 242; North Carolina Railroad v. Zachary, 232 U. S. 248, 257; Chicago, etc. Railway v. Perry, 259 U. S. 548, 551.

And here, since it appears from the statement in the order of the Court of Appeal thát the question whether the Syndicalism Act arid its application in this case was repugnant, to the due process and .equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, was considered and passed upon by that court — this being a federal question constituting an appropriate ground for a review of ’the judgment — we conclude that this Court has acquired jurisdiction under the writ of error. The order dismissing the writ for want of jurisdiction will accordingly be set aside.

We proceed to the determination, upon the merits, of the constitutional question considered and passed upon by the Court of. Appeal. Of course our review is to be confined to that question, since it does not appear, either from the order of the Court of Appeal or from the record otherwise, that any other federal question was presented in and either expressly or necessarily decided by that court. National Bank v. Commonwealth, 9 Wall. 353, 363; Edwards v. Elliott, 21 Wall. 532, 557; Dewey v. Des Moines, 173 U. S. 193, 200; Keokuk & Hamilton Bridge Co. v. Illinois, 175 U. S. 626, 633; Capital City Dairy Co. v. Ohio, 183 U. S. 238, 248; Haire v. Rice, 204 U. S. 291, 301; Selover, Bates & Co. v. Walsh, 226 U. S. 112, 126. Missouri Pacific Railway v. Coal Co., 256 U. S. 134, 135. It is not eriough that thére may be somewhere hidden in the record a question which, if it had been raised, would have been of a federal nature. Dewey v. Des Moines, supra, 199; Keokuk & Hamilton Bridge Co. v. Illinois, supra, 634. And this necessarily excludes from our con*363sideration a question sought'to be raised for the first time by the assignments of error here — not presented in or passed upon by the Court of Appeal — whether apart from the constitutionality of the Syndicalism Act, the judgment of the Superior Court, by reason of the rulings of that court on questions of pleading, evidence and the like, operated as a denial to the defendant of due process of law. See Oxley Stave Co. v. Butler County, 166 U. S. 648, 660; Capital City Dairy Co. v. Ohio, supra, 248; Manhattan Life Ins. Co. v. Cohen, 234 U. S. 123, 134; Bass, etc. Ltd. v. Tax Commission, 266 U. S. 271, 283.

The following facts, among many others, were established on the trial by undisputed evidence: The defendant, a resident of Oakland, in Alameda County, California, had been a member of the Local Oakland branch of the Socialist Party. This Local sent delegates to the national convention of the' Socialist Party held in Chicago in 1919, which resulted in a split between the “radical” group and the old-wing Socialists. The “radicals” — to whom the Oakland delegates adhered — being ejected, went to another hall, and formed the Communist Labor Party of America. Its Constitution provided for the membership of persons subscribing to the principles of the Party and pledging themselves to be guided by its Platform, and for the formation of state organizations conforming to its Platform as the supreme declaration of the Party. In its “ Platform and Program ” the Party declared that it was in full harmony with “ the revolutionary working class parties of all countries ” and adhered to the principles of Communism laid down in the Manifesto of the Third International at Moscow, and that its purpose was “ to create a unified revolutionary working class movement in America,” organizing the workers as a class, in a revolutionary class struggle to conquer the capitalist state, for the overthrow of capitalist rule, the conquest of political power and the establishment *364of a working class government, the Dictatorship of the Proletariat, in place of the state machinery of the capitalists, which should make and enforce the laws, reorganize society on the basis of Communism and bring about the Communist Commonwealth — advocated, as the most important means of capturing state power, the‘action of the massés, proceeding from the shops -and factories, the use of the political machinery of the capitalist state being only secondary; the- organization of the workers into “ revolutionary industrial unions ”; propaganda pointing out their revolutionary nature and possibilities; and great industrial battles showing the value of the, strike as a political weapon — commended the propaganda and example of the Industrial Workers of the World and their, struggles and sacrifices in the class war — pledged support and cooperation to “ the revolutionary industrial proletariat of America ” in their struggles against the capitalist class — cited the Seattle and Winnipeg strikes and the numerous strikes all over the country “ proceeding without the authority of the old reactionary Trade Union officials,” as manifestations of the new tendency — and recommended that strikes of national importance be supported and given a political character, and that propagandists and organizers be mobilized “who can.not only teach, but actually help to put in practice the principles of revolutionary industrial unionism and Communism.”

Shortly thereafter the Local Oakland withdrew from the Socialist Party, and sent accredited delegates, including the defendant, to á convention held in Oakland in November, 1919, for the purpose of organizing a California branch of the Communist' Labor -'Party. The defendant, after taking büt a temporary membership in the Communist Labor Party, attended this convention' as a delegate and took an active part in its proceedings. She was elected a member of the Credentials. Committee, and, as its chairman, made a. report to the convention upon *365which the delegates were seated. She was also appointed a member of the Resolutions Committee, add as such, signed, the following resolution in reference to political action, among others proposed by the Committee: “ The C. L. P. of California fully recognizes the value of political action as a means of spreading communist propaganda; it insists that in proportion to the development of the economic strength of the working class, it, the working class, must also develop its political power; The C. L- P. of California proclaims and insists that the capture of political power, locally or nationally by the revolutionary working class can-be of tremendous assistance* to the workers in their struggle of '«mancipation. . Therefore, we again urge the workers who-are possessed of the right of franchise to cast their votes for the party which represents their immediate and- final interest — the C. L. P. — at all elections, being fully convinced of the utter futility of obtaining any real measure of justice or freedom under officials elected *by parties owned'and controlled by the capitalist class.” The minutes-show that this resolution, with the others proposed by the committee, was read by its chairman to the convention before the Committee on the Constitution. had submitted its report. According to the recollection of the defendant, however, she herself read this resolution. Thereafter, before the report of the Committee on the Constitution had been acted upon, the defendant was- elected an alternate member of the State Executive Committee. The Constitution, as finally read, was then adopted. This provided that the organization should be named thé Communist Labor Party of California; that it should be “af-. filiated .with ” the -Communist Labor Party of America, and subscribe to its Program, Platform and Constitution, and “ through this, affiliation ” be “ joined with the Communist International of Moscow;” and that the qualifications for membership should be those prescribed in the *366National Constitution. The proposed resolutions were later taken up and all adopted, except that on political action, which caused a lengthy debate, resulting in its defeat and the acceptance of the National Program in its place. After this action, the defendant, without, so far as appears, making any protest, remained in the convention until it adjourned. She later attended as an alternate member one or two meetings of the State Executive Committee in San José and San Francisco, and stated, on the trial, that she was then a member of the Communist Labor Party. She also testified that it was not her intention that the Communist Labor Party of California-should be an instrument of terrorism or violence, and that it was not her purpose or that of the Convention to violate any known law.

In the light of this preliminary statement, we now take up, in so far as they require specific consideration, the various grounds upon which it is here contended that the Syndicalism Act and its application in this case is repugnant to the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.

1. While it is not denied that the evidence warranted the jury in finding that the defendant became a member of and assisted in organizing the Communist Labor Party of California, and that this was organized to advocate, teach, aid or abet criminal syndicalism as defined by the Act, it is urged that the Act, as here construed and applied, deprived the defendant of her liberty without due process of law in that it has made her action in attending the Oakland convention unlawful by reason of “ a subsequent event brought about .against her will, by the agency of others,” with no showing of a specific intent on her jpart to join in the forbidden purpose of the association, and merely because, by reason of a lack of “ prophetic ” understanding she failed to foresee the quality that others would give to the convention. The argu*367ment is, in effect, that the character of the state organization could not be forecast when she attended the convention; that she had no purpose of helping to create an. instrument of terrorism and violence; that she “took part in formulating and presenting to the convention a resolution which, if adopted, would have committed the new organization to a legitimate policy of political reform by the use of the ballot ”; that it was not until after the majority of the convention turned out to be “ contrary-minded, and other less temperate policies prevailed ” that the convention could have taken^ on the character of criminal syndicalism; and that as this was done over her protest, her mere presence in the convention, however violent the opinions expressed therein, could not thereby become a crime. This contention, while advanced in the form of a constitutional objection to the Act, is in effect nothing more than an effort to review the weight of the evidence for the purpose of showing that the defendant did not join and assist in organizing the Communist Labor Party of California with a knowledge of its unlawful character and purpose. This question, which is foreclosed by the verdict of the jury — sustained by the Court of Appeal over the specific objection that it was not supported by the evidence — is one of fact merely which is not open to review in this Court, involving as it does no constitutional question whatever. And we may add that the argument entirely disregards the facts: that the defendant had previously taken out a membership card in the National Party, that the resolution which she supported did not advocate the use of the ballot to the exclüsion of violent and unlawful means of bringing about the desired changes in industrial and political conditions; and that,-after the constitution of the California Party had been adopted, and this resolution had been voted down and the National Program accepted, she not only remained in the convention, without *368protest, until its close, but'subsequently manifested her acquiescence by attending as an alternate member of the State Executive Committee and continuing as a member of the Communist Labor Party.

2. It is clear that the Syndicalism Act is not repugnant to the due process clause by reason of vagueness and uncertainty of definition. It has no substantial resemblance to the statutes held void for uncertainty under the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments in International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U. S. 216, 221; and United States v. Cohen Grocery, 255 U. S. 81, 89, because not .fixing an ascertainable standard of guilt. The language of § 2, subd. 4, of the Act, under which the plaintiff in error was convicted, is clear; the definition of “ criminal syndicalism ” specific.

. The Act, plainly, meets the essential requirement of due process that a penal statute be “ sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it, what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties,” and be couched in terms that are not “ so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.” Connolly v. General Construction Co., 269 U. S. 385, 391. And see United States v. Brewer, 139 U. S. 278, 288; Chicago, etc., Railway v. Dey, (C. C.) 35 Fed. 866, 876; Tozer v. United States, (C. C.) 52 Fed. 917, 919. In Omaechevarria v. Idaho, 246 U. S. 343, 348, in which it was held that a . criminal statute, prohibiting the grazing of sheep on any “ range ” previously occupied by cattle “ in the usual and customary use” thereof, was not void for indefiniteness because it failed to provide for the ascertainment of the boundaries of a “ range ” or to determine the length of ‘time necessary to constitute a prior occupation a “ usual ” one, this Court said: “ Men familiar with range conditions and desirojus of observing the law will have little difficulty *369in determining what is prohibited by it. Similar expressions are common in the criminal statutes of other States. This statute presents no greater uncertainty or difficulty, in application to necessarily varying facts, than has been repeatedly sanctioned by this court. Nash v. United States, 229 U. S. 373, 377; Miller v. Strahl, 239 U. S. 426, 434.” So, as applied here, the Syndicalism Act required of the defendant no “prophetic” understanding of its meaning.

And similar Criminal Syndicalism statutes of other States, some less specific in their definitions, have been held by the State courts not to be void for indefiniteness. State v. Hennessy, 114 Wash. 351, 364; State v. Laundy, 103 Ore. 443, 460; People v. Ruthenberg, 229 Mich. 315, 325. And see Fox v. Washington, 236 U. S. 273, 277; People v. Steelik, 187 Cal. 361, 372; People v. Lloyd, 304 Ill. 23, 34.

3. Neither is the Syndicalism Act repugnant to the equal protection clause, on the ground that, as its penalties are confined to those who advocate a resort to violent and unlawful methods as a means of changing industrial and political conditions, it arbitrarily discriminates between such persons and those who may advocate a resort to these methods as a means of maintaining such conditions.

It is settled by repeated decisions of this Court that the equal protection clause does not take from a State the power to classify in the adoption of police laws, but admits of the exercise of a wide scope of discretion, and avoids what is done only when it is without any reasonable basis.and therefore is purely arbitrary; and that one who assails the classification must carry the burden of showing thát.it does not rest upon any reasonable basis, but is essentially arbitrary. Lindsley v. National Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U. S. 61, 78, and cases cited.

*370A statute does not violate the equal protection clause merely because it is not all-embracing. Zucht v. King, 260 U. S. 174, 177; James-Dickinson Farm Mortgage Co. v. Harry, 273 U. S. 119. A State may properly direct its legislation against what it deems an existing evil without covering the whole field of possible abuses. Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U. S. 138, 144; Farmers Bank v. Federal Reserve Bank, 262 U. S. 649, 661; James-Dickinson Mortgage Co. v. Harry, supra. The statute must be presumed to be aimed at an evil where experience shows it to be most felt, and to be deemed by the legislature coextensive with the practical need; and is not to be overthrown merely because other instances may be suggested to which also it might have been applied; that being a matter for the legislature to determine unless the case is very clear. Keokee Coke Co. v. Taylor, 234 U. S. 224, 227. And it is not open to objection unless the classification is so lacking in any adequate or reasonable basis as to preclude the assumption that it was made in the exercise of the legislative judgment and discretion. Stebbins v. Riley, 268 U. S. 137, 143; Graves v. Minnesota, 272 U. S. 425; Swiss Oil Corporation v. Shanks, 273 U. S. 407.

The Syndicalism Act is not class legislation; it affects all alike, no matter what their business associations or callings, who come within its terms arid do the things prohibited. See State v. Hennessy, supra, 361; State v. Laundy, supra, 460. And there is no substantial basis for the contention that the legislature has arbitrarily or unreasonably limited its application to those advocating the use of violent and unlawful methods to effect changes in industrial and political conditions; there being nothing indicating any ground to apprehend that those desiring to maintain existing industrial and political conditions did or would advocate such methods. That there is a wide-spread conviction of the necessity for legislation of *371this character is indicated by the adoption of similar statutes in several other States.

4-. Nor is the Syndicalism Act as applied in this case repugnant to the due process clause as a restraint of the rights of free speech, assembly, and association.

That the freedom of speech which is secured by the Constitution does not confer an absolute right to speak, without responsibility, whatever one may choose, or an unrestricted and unbridled license giving immunity for every possible use of language and preventing the punishment of those who abuse this freedom; and that a State in the exercise of its police power may punish those who abuse this freedom by utterances inimical to thfe public welfare, tending to incite to crime, disturb the public peace, or "endanger the foundations of organized government and threaten its overthrow by unlawful means, is not open to question. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S. 652, 666-668, and cases cited.

By enacting the provisions of the Syndicalism Act the State has declared, through its legislative body, that to knowingly be or become a member of dr assist in organizing an association to advocate, teach or aid and abet the commission of crimes or unlawful acts of force, violence or terrorism as a means of accomplishing industrial or political changes, involves such danger to the public peace and the security of the State, that these acts should be penalized in the exercise of its police power. That determination must be given great weight. Every presumption is to be indulged in favor of the validity of the statute, Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623, 661; and it may not be declared unconstitutional unless it is an arbitrary or unreasonable attempt to exercise the authority vested in the State in the public-interest. Great Northern Railway v. Clara City, 246 U. S. 434, 439.

The essence of the offense denounced by the Act is the combining with others in an association for the ac*372complishment of the desired ends through the advocacy and use of criminal and unlawful methods. It partakes of the nature of a criminal conspiracy. See People v. Steelik, supra, 376. That such united and joint action involves even greater danger to the public peace and security than the isolated utterances and acts of individuals; is clear. We cannot hold that, as here applied, the' Act is an unreasonable or arbitrary exercise -of the police power of the State, unwarrantably infringing any right of free speech, assembly or association, or that those persons are protected from punishment by the due process clause who abuse such rights by joining and furthering an organization thus menacing the peace and welfare of the State.

We find no repugnancy in the Syndicalism Act as applied in this case to either the due process or equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment on any of the grounds upon which. its validity has been here challenged.

The order dismissing the writ of error will be vacated and set aside, and the judgment of the. Court of Appeal

Affirmed.

Mr. Justice Brandéis,

concurring.

■ Miss Whitney was convicted of the felony of assisting in organizing, in the year 1919,. the Communist Labor Party of California, of being a member of it, and of assembling with it. These acts are held to constitute a crime, because the party was formed to teach criminal syndicalism. The statute which made these acts a crime restricted the right of free speech and of assembly theretofore existing. The claim is that, the statute,'as applied, denied to. Miss Whitney the liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.

The felony which the statute created is a crime very unlike the old felony of conspiracy or the old misdemeanor *373of unlawful assembly. The mere act of assisting in forming a society for teaching syndicalism, of becoming a member of it, or of assembling with others for that purpose is given the dynamic quality of crime. There is guilt although the society may not contemplate immediate promulgation of the doctrine. Thus the accused is to be punished, not for contempt, incitement or conspiracy, but for a step' in preparation, which, if it threatens the public order at all, does so only remotely. The novelty in. the prohibition introduced is that thé statute .aims, not at the practice of criminal syndicalism, ,nor even directly at the preaching of it, but at association with those who propose to preach it.

Despite arguments to the contrary which had seemed to me persuasive, it is settled that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies to matters of substantive law as well as to matters of procedure. Thus all fundamental rights comprised within the term liberty are protected by the Federal Constitution from invasion by the States. The right of free speech, the right to teach and the right of assembly are, of course, fundamental rights. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390; Pierce v, Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510; Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S. 652, 666; Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U. S. 284. These may not be denied or abridged. . But, although the rights of free speech and assembly are fundamental, they are not in their nature absolute. Their exercise is subject to restriction, if the particular restriction proposed is required in order to protect the State from destructipn or from serious injury, political, economic or moral. That the necessity which is essential to a valid restriction does not exist unless speech would produce, or is intended to" produce, a clear and imminent danger of some substantive evil which the State constitutionally may seek to prevent has been settled. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U. S. 47, 52.

*374It is said to be the function of the legislature to determine whether at a particular time and under the particular circumstances the formation of, or assembly with, a society organized to advocate criminal syndicalism constitutes a clear and present danger of substantive evil; and that by enacting the law here in question the legislature of California determined that question in the affirmative. Compare Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S. 652, 668-671. The legislature must obviously decide, in the first instance, whether a danger exists which calls for a. particular protective measure. But where a statute is valid only in case certain conditions exist, the enactment of the statute cannot alone establish the facts which are essential to its validity. Prohibitory legislation has repeatedly been held invalid, because unnecessary, where the denial of liberty involved was that of engaging in a particular business.1 The power of the courts to. strike down an offending law is no less when the interests involved are not property rights, but the fundamental per-. sonal rights of free speech and assembly.

This Court has not yet fixed the standard by which to determine when a danger shall be deemed clear; how remote the danger may be and yet be deemed present; and what degree of evil shall be deemed sufficiently substantial to justify resort to abridgement of free speech and assembly as the means of protection. To reach sound conclusions on these matters, we must bear in mind why a State is, ordinarily, denied the power to prohibit dissemination of social, economic and political doctrine which a vast majority of its citizens believes to be false and fraught with evil consequence.

*375Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the State was to make men free to develop their faculties; and that in its government the deliberative forces should prevail over the arbitrary. They valued liberty both as an end and as a means. They believed liberty to be the secret of happiness and courage to be the secret of liberty. They believed that freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth; that without free speech and assembly discussion would be futile; that with them, discussion affords ordinarily adequate protection against the dissemination of noxious doctrine; that the greatest menace to freedom is an inert people; that public discussion is a political duty; and that this should be a fundamental principle of the American government.2 They recognized the risks to which all human institutions are subject. But they knew that order cannot be secured merely through fear of punishment for its infraction; that it is hazardous to discourage thought, hope and imagination; that fear.breeds repression; that repression breeds hate; that hate menaces stable government; that the path of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely supposed grievances and proposed remedies; and that the fitting remedy for evil counsels is good ones. Believing in the power of reason as applied through public discussion, they eschewed silence *376coerced by law — the argument of force in its worst form. Recognizing the occasional tyrannies of governing majorities, they amended the Constitution so that free speech and assembly should be guaranteed.

Fear of serious.-injury cannot alone justify suppression of free speech and assembly. Men feared witches,,, and burnt women. It is the functioif of speech to free men from the bondage of irrational fears. To justify sup-/^ pression of free speech there must be reasonable ground to fear that serious evil will result if free speech is practiced: There must be reasonable groimd to believe that the danger apprehended is imminent. There ,must be"v reasonable ground to believe that the evil to be prevented is a serious one. Every denunciation of existing law/ tends in some measure to increase the probability that there will be violation of it.3 Condonation of a breach enhances the probability. Expressions of approval add to the probability. Propagation of the criminal state of mind by teaching syndicalism 'increases it. Advocacy of law-breaking heightens it still further. But even advo-/ cacy of violation, however reprehensible morally, is not a justification for denying free speech where the advocacy falls short of incitement and there is nothing to indicate that the advocacy would be immediately acted on. The wide difference between advocacy and incitement, be-tween preparation and attempt, between assembling and conspiracy, must be borne in mind. In order to support a finding of clear and present danger it must be shown either that immediate serious violence was to be expected or was advocated, or that the past conduct furnished reason to believe that such advocacy was then contemplated.

*377Those who won our independence by revolution were not cowards.. They did not fear political change. They did not exalt order at the cost of liberty.. To courageous,' self-reliant men, with confidence in the power of free and fearless reasoning applied through the procésses of popular government, no danger flowing from speech can be deemed clear and present, unless the incidence of the evil apprehendedls so imminent that it may befall before there is opportunity for full discussion. If there be time expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy. to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence. Only an emergency can justify repression. Such must be the rule if authority is to be reconciled with freedom.4 Such, in my opinion, is the command of the .Constitution. It is therefore always open to Americans to challenge a law abridging free speech and assembly by showing that there was no emergency justifying it.

Moreover, even imminent danger cannot justify resort to prohibition of. these functions essential to effective democracy, unless the evil apprehended is relatively serious. Prohibition of free speech and assembly is a measure so stringent that it would be inappropriate as the means for averting a relatively trivial harm to society. A police measure may be unconstitutional merely because the remedy, although effective as means of protection, is unduly harsh or oppressive. Thus, a State might, in the exercise of its police power, make any trespass upon the *378land of another a crime, regardless of the results or of the intent or purpose of the trespasser. It might, also, punish an attempt, a conspiracy, or an incitement to commit the trespass. But it is hardly conceivable that this Court would hold constitutional a statute which punished as a felony the mere voluntary assembly with a society formed to teach that pedestrians had the moral right to cross unenclosed, unposted, waste lands and to advocate their doing so, even if there was imminent danger that advocacy would lead to a trespass. The fact that speech is likely to result in some violence or in destruction of property is not enough to justify its suppression. There must be the probability of serious injury to the State. Among free men, the deterrents ordinarily to be applied to prevent crime are education and punishment for violations of the law, not abridgment of the rights of free speech and assembly.

The California Syndicalism Act recites in § 4:

“ Inasmuch- as this act concerns and is necessary to the immediate preservation of the public peace and safety, for the reason that at the present time large numbers of persons are going from place to place in this state advocating, teaching and practicing criminal-syndicalism, this act shall take effect upon approval by the Governor.”

This legislative declaration satisfies the requirement of the constitution of the State concerning emergency legislation. In re McDermott, 180 Cal. 783. But it does not preclude enquiry into the question whether, at the time and under the circumstances, the conditions existed which are essential to validity under the Federal Constitution. As a statute, even if not void on its face, may be challenged because invalid as applied, Dahnke-Walker Milling Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U. S. 282, the result of such an enquiry may depend upon the specific facts of the particular case. Whenever the fundamental rights of free speech and assembly are alleged to have been in*379vaded, it must remain open to a defendant to present the issue whether there actually did exist at the time a clear danger; whether the danger, if any, was imminent; and whether the evil apprehended was one so substantial as to justify the stringent restriction interposed by the legislature. The legislative declaration, like the fact that the statute was passed and was sustained by the highest court of the State, creates merely a rebuttable presumption that these conditions have been satisfied.

Whether in 1919, when Miss Whitney did the things complained of, there was in California such clear and present danger of serious evil, might have been made the important issue in the ease. She might have required that the issue be determined either by the court or the jury.' She claimed below that the statute as applied to her violated the Federal Constitution; but she did not claim that it was void because there was no clear and present danger of serious evil, nor did she request that the existence of these conditions of a valid measure thus restricting the rights of free speech and assembly be passed upon by the court or a jury. On the other hand, there was evidence on which the court or jury, might have found that such danger existed. I am unable to assent to the suggestion in the opinion of the Court that assembling with a political party, formed to advocate the desirability of a proletarian revolution by mass action at some date necessarily far in the future, is not a right within the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment. In the present case, however, there was other testimony which tended to .establish the existence of a conspiracy, on the part of members of the International Workers of the World, to commit present serious crimes; and likewise to show that such a conspiracy would be furthered by the activity of the society of which Miss Whitney was a member. Under these circumstances the judgment of the state court cannot be disturbed.

*380Our power of review in this case is limited not only to the question whether a right guaranteed by the Federal Constitution was denied, Murdock v. City of Memphis, 20 Wall. 590; Haire v. Rice, 204 U. S. 291, 301; but to the particular claims duly made below, and denied. Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Duvall, 225 U. S. 477, 485-488. We lack here the power occasionally exercised on review of judgments of lower federal courts to correct in criminal cases vital errors, although the objection was not taken in the trial court. Wiborg v. United States, 163 U. S. 632, 658-660; Clyatt v. United States, 197 U. S. 207, 221-222. This is a writ of error to a state court. Because we may not enquire into the errors now alleged, I concur in affirming the judgment of the state court.

Mr. Justice Clarke

delivered the opinion of the court.

On a single indictment, containing four counts, the five plaintiffs in error, hereinafter designated the defendants, were convicted of conspiring to violate provisions of the *617Espionage Act of Congress (§ 3, Title I, of Act approved June 15,1917, as amended May 16, 1918, 40 Stat. 553).

Each of the first three counts charged the defendants with conspiring, when the United States was at war with the Imperial Government of Germany, to unlawfully utter, print, write and publish: In the first count, “disloyal, scurrilous and abusive language about the form of Government of the United States; ” in the second count, language “intended to bring the form of Government of the United States into contempt, scorn, contumely and disrepute;” and in the third count, language “intended to incite, provoke and encourage resistance to the United States in said war.” The charge.in the fourth count was ' that the defendants conspired “when the United States was at war with the Imperial German Government, . . . unlawfully and wilfully, by utterance, writing, printing and publication, to urge, incite and advocate curtailment of production of things and products, to wit, ordnance and ammunition, necessary and essential to the prosecution of the war.” The offenses were charged in the language of the act of Congress.

It was charged in each count of the indictment that it was a part of the conspiracy that the defendants would attempt to accomplish their unlawful purpose by printing, writing and distributing in the City of New York many copies of a leaflet or circular, printed in- the English language, and of another printed in the Yiddish language, copies of which, properly identified, were attached to the indictment.

All of the five defendants were bom in Russia. They were intelligent, had considerable schooling, and at the time they were arrested they had. lived in the United States terms varying from five to ten years, but none of them had applied for naturalization. Four of them testified as'witnesses in their own behalf and of these, three frankly avowed that they were “rebels,” “revolution*618ists,” “anarchists,” that they did not believe in government in any form, and they declared that they had no interest whatever in the Government of the United States. The fourth defendant testified that he was a “socialist” and believed in “a proper kind of government, not capitalistic,” but in his classification the Government of the United States was “capitalistic.”

It was admitted on the trial that the defendants had united to print and distribute the described circulars and that five thousand of them had been printed and distributed about the 22d day of August, 1918. The group had a meeting place in New York City, in rooms rented by defendant Abrams, under an assumed name, and there the subject of printing the circulars was discussed about two weeks before the defendants were arrested. The defendant Abrams, although not a printer, on July 27,1918, purchased the printing outfit with which the circulars were printed and installed it in a basement room where the work was done at night. The circulars were distributed some by throwing them from a window of a building where one of the defendants was employed and others secretly, in New York City.

The defendants pleaded “not guilty,” and the case of the Government consisted in showing the facts we have stated, and in introducing in evidence copies of the two printed circulars attached to the indictment, a sheet entitled “Revolutionists Unite for Action,” written by the defendant Lipman, and found on him when he was arrested, and another paper, found at the headquarters of the group, and for which Abrams assumed respon-. sibility.

Thus the conspiracy and the doing of the overt acts charged were largely admitted and were fully established.

On the record thus described it is argued, somewhat faintly, that the acts charged against the defendants were not unlawful because within the protection of that freedom *619of speech and of the press which is guaranteed by the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and that the entire Espionage Act is unconstitutional because in conflict with that Amendment.

This contention is sufficiently discussed and is definitely negatived in Schenck v. United States and Baer v. United States, 249 U. S. 47; and in Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U. S. 204.

The claim chiefly elaborated upon by the defendants in the oral argument and in their brief is that there is no substantial evidence in the record to support the judgment upon the verdict of guilty and that the motiou of the dedendants for an instructed verdict in their favor was erroneously denied. A question of law is thus presented, which calls for an examination of the record, not for the purpose of weighing conflicting testimony, but only to determine whether there wras some evidence, competent and substantial, before the jury, fairly tending to sustain the verdict. Troxell v. Delaware, Lackawanna & Western R. R. Co., 227 U. S. 434, 442; Lancaster v. Collins, 115 U. S. 222, 225; Chicago & Northwestern Ry. Co. v. Ohle, 117 U. S. 123, 129. We shall not need to consider the sufficiency, under the rule just stated, of the evidence introduced as to all of the counts of the indictment, for, since the sentence imposed did not exceed that which might lawfully have been imposed under any single count, the judgment upon the verdict of the jury must be affirmed if the evidence is sufficient to sustain any one of the counts. Evans v. United States, 153 U. S. 608; Claassen v. United States, 142 U. S. 140; Debs v. United States, 249 U. S. 211, 216.

The first of the two articles attached to the indictment is conspicuously headed, “The Hypocrisy of the United States and her Allies.” After denouncing President Wilson as a hypocrite and a coward because troops were sent into Russia, it proceeds to assail our Government in general, saying:

*620“His [the President’s] shameful, cowardly silence about the intervention in Russia reveals the hypocrisy of the plutocratic gang in Washington and Vicinity.”

It continues:

“He [the President] is too much of a coward to come out openly and say: ‘We capitalistic nations cannot afford to have a proletarian republic in Russia. ’ ”

Among the capitalistic nations Abrams testified the United States was included.

Growing more inflammatory as it proceeds, the circular culminates in:

“The Russian Revolution cries: Workers of the World! Awake! Rise! Put down your enemy and mine!

“Yes! friends, there is only one enemy of the workers of the world and that is CAPITALISM.”

This is clearly an appeal to the “workers” of this country to arise and put down by force the Government of the United States which they characterize as their “hypocritical,” “cowardly” and “capitalistic” enemy.

It concludes:

‘ ‘ Awake! Awake, yon Workers of the World!

“Revolutionists.”

The second of the articles was printed in the Yiddish language and in the translation is headed, “Workers— Wake up.” After referring to “his Majesty, Mr. Wilson, and the rest of the gang; dogs of all colors!”, it continues:

“Workers, Russian emigrants, you who had the least belief in the honesty of our Government,” which defendants admitted referred to the United States Government, “must now throw away all confidence, must spit in the face the false, hypoeritic, military propaganda which has fooled you so relentlessly, calling forth your sympathy, your help, to the prosecution of the war.”

The purpose of this obviously was to persuade the persons to whom it was addressed to turn a deaf ear to patri*621otic appeals in behalf of the Government of the United States, and to cease to render it assistance in the prosecution of the war.

It goes on:

“With the money which you have.loaned, or are going to loan them, they will make bullets not only for the Germans, but also for the Workers Soviets of Russia. ‘ Workers in the ammunition factories, you are producing bullets, bayonets, cannon, to murder not only the Germans, but also your dearest, best, who are in Russia and are fighting for freedom.”

It will not do to say, as is now argued, that the only intent of these defendants was to prevent injury to the Russian cause. Men must be held to have intended, and to be accountable for, the effects which their acts were/ likely to produce. Even if their primary purpose and in- j tent was to aid the cause of the Russian Revolution, the plan of. action which they adopted necessarily involved, before it could be realized, defeat of the war program of the United States, for the obvious effect of this appeal, if it should become effective, as they hoped it might, would be to persuade persons of character such as those whom they regarded themselves as addressing, not to aid government loans and not to work in ammunition factories, where . their work would produce “bullets, bayonets, cannon” and other munitions of war, the use of which would cause the “murder” of Germans and Russians.

Again, the spirit becomes more bitter as it proceeds to declare that —

“America and her Allies have betrayed (the Workers).. Their robberish aims are clear to all men. The destruction of the, Russian Revolution, that is the politics of the march to Russia.

“Workers, our reply to the barbaric intervention has to be a general strike! An open challenge only will let the Government know that, not only the Russian Worker fights for *622freedom, but also here in America lives the spirit of Revoke tion.”

This is not an attempt to bring about a change of administration by candid discussion, for no matter what may have incited the outbreak on the part of the defendant anarchists, the manifest purpose of such a publication was to create an attempt to defeat the war plans of the Government of the United States, by bringing upon the country the paralysis of a general strike, thereby arresting the production of all munitions'and other things essential to the conduct of the war.

This purpose is emphasized in the next paragraph, which reads:

“Do not let the Government scare you with their wild punishment in prisons, hanging and shooting. We must not and will not betray the splendid fighters of Russia. Workers, up to fight.”

After more of the same kind, the circular concludes:

“Woe unto those who will be in the way of progress. Let solidarity live!”

It is signed, “The Rebels.”

That the interpretation we have put upon these articles, circulated in the greatest port of our land, from which great numbers of soldiers were at the tipa^-taking ship daily, and in which great quantities of wansiipplies of every kind were at the time being manufactured for transportation overseas, is not only the fair interpretation of them, but that it is the meaning which their authors consciously intended should be conveyed by them to others is further shown by the additional writings found in the meeting place of the defendant group and on the person of one of them. One of these circulars is headed: “Revolutionists! Unite for Action! ”

After denouncing the President as “Our Kaiser” and the hypocrisy of the United States and her Allies, this article concludes:

*623“Socialists, Anarchists, Industrial Workers of the World, Socialists, Labor party men and other revolutionary organizations Unite for action and let us save the Workers’ Republic of Russia!

“Know ym lovers of freedom that in order to save the-Russian revolution, we must keep the armies of the allied cmntries busy at home.”

Thus was again avowed the purpose to throw the country into a state of revolution if possible and to thereby frustrate the military program of the Government.

The remaining article, after denouncing the President for what is characterized as hostility to the Russian revolution, continues:

“We, the toilers of America, who believe in real liberty, shall pledge ourselves, in case the United States will participate in that bloody conspiracy against Russia, to create so great a disturbance that the autocrats of America shall be compelled to keep their armies at home, and not be able to spare any for Russia.”

It concludes with this definite threat of armed rebellion:

“If tljey will use arms against the Russian people to enforce their standard of order, so will we use arms, and they shall never see the ruin of the Russian Revolution.”

These excerpts sufficiently show, that while the immediate occasion for this particular outbreak of lawlessness, on the part of the defendant alien anarchists, may have been resentment caused by our Government sending troops into Russia as a strategic operation against, the Germans on the eastern battle front, yet the plain purpose of their propaganda was to excite, at the supreme crisis of the war, disaffection, sedition, riots, and, as they hoped, revolution, in this country for the purpose of embarrassing and if possible defeating the military plans of the Government in Europe. A technical distinction may perhaps be taken between disloyal and abusive language applied to the form of our government or language intended to bring the form *624of our government into contempt and disrepute, and language of like character and intended to produce like results directed against the President and Congress, the agencies through which that form of government must function in time of war. But it is not necessary to a decision of this case to consider whether such distinction is vital or merely formal, for the language of these circulars was obviously intended to provoke and to encourage resistance to the United States in the war, as the third count runs, and, the defendants, in terms, plainly urged and advocated a resort to a general strike of workers in ammunition factories for the purpose of curtailing the production of ordnance and munitions necessary and essential to the prosecution of the war as is charged in the fourth count. Thus it is clear not only that some evidence but that much persuasive evidence was before the jury tending to prove that the defendants were guilty as charged in both the third and fourth counts of the indictment ánd Under the long established rule of law hereinbefore stated the jüdg-' ment of the District Court must be

Affirmed.

Me. Justice Holmes

dissenting.

This indictment is founded wholly upon the publication of two leaflets which I shall describe in a moment. The first count charges a conspiracy pending the war with Germany to publish abusive language about the form of government of the United States, laying the preparation and publishing of the first leaflet as overt acts. The second count charges a conspiracy pending the war to publish language intended to bring the form of government into contempt, laying the preparation and publishing of the two leaflets as overt acts. The third count alleges a conspiracy to encourage resistance to the Unitéd States in the same, war and to attempt to effectuate the purpose by publishing the same leaflets. The fourth count lays a con*625spiracy to incite curtailment of production of things necessary, to the prosecution of the war and to attempt to accomplish it by publishing the second leaflet to which I have referred.,

The first of these leaflets says that the President’s cowardly silence about the intervention in Russia reveals the hypocrisy of the plutocratic gang in Washington. It intimates that “German militarism combined with allied capitalism to crush the Russian revolution” — goes on that the tyrants of the world fight each other until they see a common enemy — working class enlightenment, when they combine to crush it; and that now militarism and capitalism combined, though not openly, to crush the Russian revolution. It says that there is only one enemy of the workers of the world and that is capitalism; that it is a crime for workers of America, &c., to fight the workers’ republic of Russia, and ends “Awake! Awake, you Workers of the World! Revolutionists.” A note adds “It is absurd to call us pro-German. We hate and despise German militarism more than do you hypocritical tyrants. We have more reasons for denouncing German militarism than has the coward of the White House.”

The other leaflet, headed “Workers — Wake Up,” with abusive language says that America together with the Allies will march for Russia to help the Czecko-Slovaks in their struggle against the Bolsheviki, and that this time the hypocrites shall not fool the Russian emigrants and friends of Russia in America. It tells the Russian emigrants that they now must spit in the face of the false military propaganda by which their sympathy and help to the prosecution of the war have been called forth and says that with the money they have lent or are going to lend “they will make bullets not only for the Germans but also for the Workers Soviets of Russia,” and further, “Workers in the ammunition factories, you are producing bullets, bayonets, cannon, to murder not only the Ger*626mans, but also your dearest, best, who are. in Russia and are fighting for freedom.” It then appeals to the same Russian emigrants at some length not to consent to the “inquisitionary expedition to Russia,” and says that the destruction of the Russian revolution is “the politics of the march to Russia.” The leaflet winds up by saying “Workers, our reply to this barbaric intervention has to be a general strike!,” and after a few words on the spirit of revolution, exhortations not to be afraid, and some usual tall talk ends “Woe unto those who will be in the way of progress. Let solidarity live! The Rebels.”

No argument seems to me necessary to show that these pronunciamentos in no way attack the form of government of . the United States, or that they do not support either of the first two counts. What little I have to say about the third count may be postponed until I have considered the fourth. With regard to that it seems too plain to be denied that the suggestion to workers in the ammunition factories that they are producing bullets to murder their dearest, and the further advocacy of a general strike, both in the second leaflet, do urge curtailment of production of things necessary to the. prosecution of the war within the meaning of the Act of May 16, 1918, c. .75, 40 Stat. 553, amending § 3 of the earlier Act of 1917. But to make the conduct criminal that statute requires that it should be “with intent by sucb curtailment to cripple or hinder the United States in the prosecution of the war.” It seems to me that no such intent is proved.

I am aware of course that the word intent as vaguely used in ordinary legal discussion means no more than knowledge at the time of the act that the consequences said to be intended will ensue. Even less than that will satisfy the general principle of civil and criminal liability. A man may have to pay damages, may be sent to prison, at common law might be hanged, if at the. time of his act *627he knew facts from which common experience showed that _the consequences would follow, whether he individually could foresee them or not. But, when words are used exactly, a deed is not done with intent to produce a consequence unless that consequence is the aim of the deed. It may be obvious, and obvious to the actor, that the consequence will follow, and he may be hable for it even if he regrets it, but he does not do the act .with intent to produce it unless the aim to produce it is the proximate motive of the specific act, although there may be some deeper i.jnotive behind.

It seems to me that this statute must be taken to use its words in a strict and accurate sense. They would be absurd in any other. A patriot might think that we were wasting money on aeroplanes, or making more cannon of a certain kind than we needed, and might advocate curtailment with success, yet even if it turned out that the curtailment hindered and was thought by other minds to have been obviously likely to hinder the United States in the prosecution of the war, no one would hold such conduct a. crime; I admit that my illustration does not answer all that might be said but it is enough to show what I think and to let me pass to a more important aspect of the case.

SI refer to the First Amendment to the Constitution, that Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of speech. .

I never have seen any reason to doubt that the questions •of law that alone were before this Court in the cases of Schenck, Frohwerk and Debs, 249 U. S. 47, 204, 211, were rightly decided. I do not doubt for a moment that by the same reasoning that would justify punishing persuasion to murder, the United States constitutionally fnay punish speech that produces or is intended to produce a clear and imminent danger that it will bring about forthwith certain substantive evils that the United States constitutionally may seek to prevent. The power undoubtedly is *628greater in time of war than in time of peace because war I opens dangers that do not exist at other times..

But as against dangers peculiar to war, as against others, the principle of the right to free speech is always the same./ It is only the present danger of immediate evil or an in-/ tent to bring it about that warrants Congress in setting a limit to the expression of opinion where private rights are not concerned. Congress certainly cannot forbid all effortj to change the mind of the country. Now nobody can suppose that the surreptitious publishing of a silly leaflet by an unknown man, without more, would present any immediate danger that its opinions would hinder the success of the government aims or have any appreciable tendency to do so. /Publishing those opinions for. the very purposé of obstructing however, might indicate a greater danger and at any rate would have the quality of an attempt. So I assume, that the second leaflet if published for the purposes alleged in the fourth count might be punishable. But. it seems pretty clear to me that nothing less than that would bring these papiers within the scope of this law. An actual intent in the sense that I have explained is necessary to constitute an attempt, where a further act of the same individual is required to complete the substantive crime, for reasons given in Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U. S. 375, 396; It is necessary where the success of the "attempt depends upon others because if that intent is not i present the actor’s aim may be accomplished without ^ bringing about the evils sought to be checked. An intent 'Id prevent interference with the revolution in Russia might have been satisfied without' any hindrance to carrying on the war in which we were engaged:

I do not see how anyone can find the intent required by the statute in any of the defendants’ words. The second leaflet is the' only one that affords even a foundation for the charge, and there, without invoking the hatred of German militarism expressed in the former one, it is evi*629dent .from the beginning to the end that the only object of the paper is to help Russia and stop American intervention there' against the popular government — not to impede the United States in the war that it was carrying on. To say that two phrases taken literally might import a suggestion of conduct that would have interference with the war as an indirect and probably undesired effect seems to me by no means enough to show an attempt to produce that effect.

' I return for a moment to the third count. That charges an intent to provoke resistance to the United States in its war with Germany. Taking the clause in the statute that deals with that in connection with the other elaborate provisions of the act, I think that resistance to the United States means some forcible act Of opposition to some proceeding of the United States in pursuance of the war. I think the intent must be the specific intent that I have described and for the reasons that I háVe given I think that no such intent was proved or existed in fact. I also think that there is no hint at resistance to the United States as’ I construe the phrase.

In this case sentences of twenty years imprisonment have been imposed for the publishing of two leaflets that I believe the defendants had as much right to publish as the. Government has to publish the Constitution of the United States now vainly invoked by themv Even if I am technically wrong and enough can be squeezed from these, poor and puny anonymities to turn the color of legal litmus paper; I will add, even if what I think the necessary intent, were shown; the most nominal punishment seems to me all that possibly could be inflicted, unless the defendants are to be made to suffer not for what the indictment alleges but for the creed that they avow — a creed that I believe to be the creed of ignorance and immaturity when honestly held, as I see no reason to doubt that it was held here, but which, although made the subject of examination at the *630trial, no one has a right even to consider in dealing with the charges before the Court.

Persecution for the expression of opinions seems to me perfectly logical. If you have no doubt of your premises or your power and want a certain result with all your heart you naturally express your wishes in law and sweep away all opposition. To allow opposition by speech seems to indicate that you think the speech impotent, as when a man says that he has squared the circle, or that you do not care whole-heartedly for the result, or that you doubt either your power or your premises. But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas — that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out. That at any rate is the theory of our Con- A stitution. It is an experiment, as all life is an experiment. L Every year if not every day we have to wager our salvation upon some prophecy based upon imperfect knowledge. While that experiment is part of our system I think that we should be eternally vigilant against attempts to check the expression of opinions that we loathe and believe to be fraught with death, unless they so imminently threaten >'• immediate interference with the lawful and pressing pur-f' poses of the law that an immediate check is required to savel the country. / I wholly disagree with the argument of the\ Government that the First Amendment left the common law as to seditious libel in force. History seems to me against the ■ notion. I had conceived that the. United States through many years had shown its repentance for the Sedition Act of 1798, by repaying fines that it imposed. Only the emergency that makes it immediately dangerous to leave the correction of evil counsels to time warrants *631making any exception to the sweeping command, “Congress shall make no law . . ' . abridging the freedom of speech.” Of course I am speaking only of expressions of opinion and exhortations, which were all that were uttered here, but I regret that I cannot put into more impressive words my belief that in their conviction upon this indictment the defendants were deprived of their rights under the Constitution of the United Spates.

*569 Mr. Justice Murphy

delivered the opinion of the Court.

Appellant, a member of the sect known as Jehovah’s Witnesses, was convicted in the municipal court of Rochester, New Hampshire, for violation of Chapter 378, § 2, of the Public Laws of New Hampshire:

“No person shall address any offensive, derisive or annoying word to any other person who is lawfully in any street or other public place, nor call him by any offensive or derisive name, nor make any noise or exclamation in his presence and hearing with intent to deride, offend or annoy him, or to prevent him from pursuing his lawful business or occupation.”

The complaint charged that appellant, “with force and arms, in a certain public place in said city of Rochester, to wit, on the public sidewalk on the easterly side of Wake-field Street, near unto the entrance of the City Hall, did unlawfully repeat, the words following, addressed to the complainant, that is to say, ‘You are a God damned racketeer’ and ‘a damned Fascist and the whole government of Rochester are Fascists or agents of Fascists,’ the same being offensive, derisive and annoying words and names.”

Upon appeal there was a trial de novo of appellant before a jury in the Superior Court. He was found guilty and the judgment of conviction was affirmed by the Supreme Court of the State. 91 N. H. 310, 18 A. 2d 754.

By motions and exceptions, appellant raised the questions that the statute was invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, in that it placed an unreasonable restraint on freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and freedom of worship, and because it was vague and indefinite. These contentions were overruled and the case comes here on appeal.

There is no substantial dispute over the facts. Chaplin-sky was distributing the literature of his sect on the streets *570 of Rochester on a busy Saturday afternoon. Members of the local citizenry complained to the City Marshal, Bowering, that Chaplinsky was denouncing all religion as a “racket.” Bowering told them that Chaplinsky was lawfully engaged, and then warned Chaplinsky that the crowd was getting restless. Some time later, a disturbance occurred and the traffic officer on duty at the busy intersection started with Chaplinsky for the police station, but did not inform him that he was under arrest or that he was going to be arrested. On the way, they encountered Marshal Bowering, who had been advised that a riot was under way and was therefore hurrying to the scene. Bowering repeated his earlier warning to Chaplinsky, who then addressed to Bowering the words set forth in the complaint.

Chaplinsky’s version of the affair was slightly different. He testified that, when he met Bowering, he asked him to arrest the ones responsible for the disturbance. In reply, Bowering cursed him and told him to come along. Appellant admitted that he said the words charged in the complaint, with the exception of the name of the Deity.

Over appellant’s objection the trial court excluded, as immaterial, testimony relating to appellant’s mission “to preach the true facts of the Bible,” his treatment at the hands of the crowd, and the alleged neglect of duty on the part of the police. This action was approved by the court below, which held that neither provocation nor the truth of the utterance would constitute a defense to the charge.

It is now clear that “Freedom of speech and freedom of the press, which are protected by the First Amendment from infringement by Congress, are among the fundamental personal rights and liberties which are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment from invasion by state *571 action.” Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U. S. 444, 450. 1 Freedom of worship is similarly sheltered. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 303.

Appellant assails the statute as a violation of all three freedoms, speech, press and worship, but only an attack on the basis of free speech is warranted. The spoken, not the written, word is involved. And we cannot conceive that cursing a public officer is the exercise of religion in any sense of the term. But even if the activities of the appellant which preceded the incident could be viewed as religious in character, and therefore entitled to the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment, they would not cloak him with immunity from the legal consequences for concomitant acts committed in violation of a valid criminal statute. We turn, therefore, to an examination of the statute itself.

Allowing the broadest scope to the language and purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment, it is well understood that the right of free speech is not absolute at all times and under all circumstances. 2 There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention *572 and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. 3 These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or “fighting” words — those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. 4 It has been well observed that such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality. 5 “Resort to epithets or personal abuse is not in any proper sense communication of information or opinion safeguarded by the Constitution, and its punishment as a criminal act would raise no question under that instrument.” Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 309-310.

The state statute here challenged comes to us authoritatively construed by the highest court of New Hampshire. It has two provisions — the first relates to words or names addressed to another in a public place; the second refers to noises and exclamations. The court said: “The two provisions are distinct. One may stand separately from the other. Assuming, without holding, that the second were unconstitutional, the first could stand if constitutional.” We accept that construction of severability and limit our consideration to the first provision of the statute. 6

*573 On the authority of its earlier decisions, the state court declared that the statute’s purpose was to preserve the public peace, no words being “forbidden except such as have a direct tendency to cause acts of violence by the persons to whom, individually, the remark is addressed.” 7 It was further said: “The word 'offensive’ is not to be defined in terms of what a particular addressee thinks. . . . The test is what men of common intelligence would understand would be words likely to cause an average addressee to fight. . . . The English language has a number of words and expressions which by general consent are 'fighting words’ when said without a disarming smile. . . . Such words, as ordinary men know, are likely to cause a fight. So are threatening, profane or obscene revilings. Derisive and annoying words can be taken as coming within the purview of the statute as heretofore interpreted only when they have this characteristic of plainly tending to excite the addressee to a breach of the peace. . . . The statute, as construed, does no more than prohibit the face-to-face words plainly likely to cause a breach of the peace by the addressee, words whose speaking constitutes a breach of the peace by the speaker— including 'classical fighting words’, words in current use less 'classical’ but equally likely to cause violence, and other disorderly words, including profanity, obscenity and threats.”

We are unable to say that the limited scope of the statute as thus construed contravenes the Constitutional right of free expression. It is a statute narrowly drawn and limited to define and punish specific conduct lying within the domain of state power, the use in a public place of words likely to cause a breach of the peace. Cf. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 311; Thornhill v. Alabama, *574 310 U. S. 88, 105. This conclusion necessarily disposes of appellant’s contention that the statute is so vague and indefinite as to render a conviction thereunder a violation of due process. A statute punishing verbal acts, carefully drawn so as not unduly to impair liberty of expression,‘is not too vague for a criminal law. Cf. Fox v. Washington, 236 U. S. 273, 277. 8

Nor can we say that the application of the statute to the facts disclosed by the record substantially or unreasonably impinges upon the privilege of free speech. Argument is unnecessary to demonstrate that the appellations “damned racketeer” and “damned Fascist” are epithets likely to provoke the average person to retaliation, and thereby cause a breach of the peace.

The refusal of the state court to admit evidence of provocation and evidence bearing on the truth or falsity of the utterances, is open to no Constitutional objection. Whether the facts sought to be proved by such evidence constitute a defense to the charge, or may be shown in mitigation, are questions for the state court to determine. Our function is fulfilled by a determination that the challenged statute, on its face and as applied, does not contravene the Fourteenth Amendment.

Affirmed.

Per Curiam.

The appellant, a leader of a Ku Klux Klan group, was convicted under the Ohio Criminal Syndicalism statute for “advocating] .. . the duty, necessity, or propriety *445of crime, sabotage, violence, or unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing industrial or political reform” and for “voluntarily assembl[ing] with any society, group, or assemblage of persons formed to teach or advocate the doctrines of criminal syndicalism.” Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2923.13. He was fined $1,000 and sentenced to one to 10 years’ imprisonment. The appellant challenged the constitutionality of the criminal syndicalism statute under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, but the intermediate appellate court of Ohio affirmed his conviction without opinion. The Supreme Court of Ohio dismissed his appeal, sua sponte, “for the reason that no substantial constitutional question exists herein.” It did not file an opinion or explain its conclusions. Appeal was taken to this Court, and we noted probable jurisdiction. 393 U. S. 948 (1968). We reverse.

The record shows that a man, identified at trial as the appellant, telephoned an announcer-reporter on the staff of a Cincinnati television station and invited him to come to a Ku Klux Klan “rally” to be held at a farm in Hamilton County. With the cooperation of the organizers, the reporter and a cameraman attended the meeting and filmed the events. Portions of the films were later broadcast on the local station and on a national network.

The prosecution’s case rested on the films and on testimony identifying the appellant as the person who communicated with the reporter and who spoke at the rally. The State also introduced into evidence several articles appearing in the film, including a pistol, a rifle, a shotgun, ammunition, a Bible, and a red hood worn by the speaker in the films.

One film showed 12 hooded figures, some of whom carried firearms. They were gathered around a large wooden cross, which they burned. No one was present *446other than the participants and the newsmen who made the film. Most of the words uttered during the scene were incomprehensible when the film was projected, but scattered phrases could be understood that were derogatory of Negroes and, in one instance, of Jews.1 Another scene on the sanie film showed the appellant, in Klan regalia, making a speech. The speech, in full, was as follows:

“This is an organizers’ meeting. We have had quite a few members here today which are — we have hundreds, hundreds of members throughout the State of Ohio. I can quote from a newspaper clipping from the Columbus, Ohio Dispatch, five weeks ago Sunday morning. The Klan has more members in the State of Ohio than does any other organization. We’re not a revengent organization, but if our President, our Congress, our Supreme Court, continues to suppress the white, Caucasian race, it’s possible that there might have to be some revengeance taken.

“We are marching on Congress July the Fourth, four hundred thousand strong. From there we are dividing into two groups, one group to march on St. Augustine, Florida, the other group to march into Mississippi. Thank you.”

*447The second film showed six hooded figures one of whom, later identified as the appellant, repeated a speech very similar to that recorded on the first film. The reference to the possibility of “revengeance” was omittted, and one sentence was added: “Personally, I believe the nigger should be returned to Africa, the Jew returned to Israel.” Though some of the figures in the films carried weapons, the speaker did not.

The Ohio Criminal Syndicalism Statute was enacted in 1919. From 1917 to 1920, identical or quite similar laws were adopted by 20 States and two territories. E. Dowell, A History of Criminal Syndicalism Legislation in the United States 21 (1939). In 1927, this Court sustained the constitutionality of California’s Criminal Syndicalism Act, Cal. Penal Code §§ 11400-11402, the text of which is quite similar to that of the laws of Ohio. Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357 (1927). The Court upheld the statute on the ground that, without more, “advocating” violent means to effect political and economic change involves such danger to the security of the State that the State may outlaw it. Cf. Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U. S. 380 (1927). But Whitney has been thoroughly discredited by later decisions. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U. S. 494, at 507 (1951). These later decisions have fashioned the principle that the constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.2 As we *448said in Noto v. United States, 367 U. S. 290, 297-298 (1961), “the mere abstract teaching ... of the moral propriety or even moral necessity for a resort to force and violence, is not the same as preparing a group for violent action and steeling it to such action.” See also Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U. S. 242, 259-261 (1937); Bond v. Floyd, 385 U. S. 116, 134 (1966). A statute which fails to draw this distinction impermissibly intrudes upon the freedoms guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. It sweeps within its condemnation speech which our Constitution has immunized from governmental control. Cf. Yates v. United States, 354 U. S. 298 (1957); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U. S. 353 (1937); Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359 (1931). See also United States v. Robel, 389 U. S. 258 (1967); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U. S. 589 (1967); Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U. S. 11 (1966); Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U. S. 500 (1964); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U. S. 360 (1964).

Measured by this test, Ohio’s Criminal Syndicalism Act cannot be sustained. The Act punishes persons who “advocate or teach the duty, necessity, or propriety” of violence “as a means of accomplishing industrial or political reform”; or who publish or circulate or display any book or paper containing such advocacy; or who “justify” the commission of violent acts “with intent to exemplify, spread or advocate the propriety of the doctrines of criminal syndicalism”; or who “voluntarily assemble” with a group formed “to teach or advocate the doctrines of criminal syndicalism.” Neither the indictment nor the trial judge’s instructions to the jury in any way refined the statute’s bald definition of the crime *449in terms of mere advocacy not distinguished from incitement to imminent lawless action.3

Accordingly, we are here confronted with a statute which, by its own words and as applied, purports to punish mere advocacy and to forbid, on pain of criminal punishment, assembly with others merely to advocate the described type of action.4 Such a statute falls within the condemnation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The contrary teaching of Whitney v. California, supra, cannot be supported, and that decision is therefore overruled.

Reversed.

Mr. Justice Black,

concurring.

I agree with the views expressed by Mr. Justice Douglas in his concurring opinion in this case that the “clear and present danger” doctrine should have no place *450in the interpretation of the First Amendment. I join the Court’s opinion, which, as I understand it, simply cites Dennis v. United States, 341 U. S. 494 (1951), but does not indicate any agreement on the Court’s part with the “clear and present danger” doctrine on which Dennis purported to rely.

Mr. Justice Douglas,

concurring.

While I join the opinion of the Court, I desire to enter a caveat.

The “clear and present danger” test was adumbrated by Mr. Justice Holmes in a case arising during World War I — a war “declared” by the Congress, not by the Chief Executive. The case was Schenck v. United States, 249 U. S. 47, 52, where the defendant was charged with attempts to cause insubordination in the military and obstruction of enlistment. The pamphlets that were distributed urged resistance to the draft, denounced conscription, and impugned the motives of those backing the war effort. The First Amendment was tendered as a defense. Mr. Justice Holmes in rejecting that defense said:

“The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree.”

Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U. S. 204, also authored by Mr. Justice Holmes, involved prosecution and punishment for publication of articles very critical of the war effort in World War I. Schenck was referred to as a conviction for obstructing security “by words of persuasion.” Id., at 206. And the conviction in Frohwerk was sustained because “the circulation of the paper was *451in quarters where a little breath would be enough to kindle a flame.” Id., at 209.

Debs v. United States, 249 U. S. 211, was the third of the trilogy of the 1918 Term. Debs was convicted of speaking in opposition to the war where his “opposition was so expressed that its natural and intended effect would be to obstruct recruiting.” Id., at 215.

“If that was intended and if, in all the circumstances, that would be its probable effect, it would not be protected by reason of its being part of a general program and expressions of a general and conscientious belief.” Ibid.

In the 1919 Term, the Court applied the Schenck doctrine to affirm the convictions of other dissidents in World War I. Abrams v. United States, 250 U. S. 616, was one instance. Mr. Justice Holmes, with whom Mr. Justice Brandéis concurred, dissented. While adhering to Schenck, he did not think that on the facts a case for overriding the First Amendment had been made out:

“It is only the present danger of immediate evil or an intent to bring it about that warrants Congress in setting a limit to the expression of opinion where private rights are not concerned. Congress certainly cannot forbid all effort to change the mind of the country.” Id., at 628.

Another instance was Schaefer v. United States, 251 U. S. 466, in which Mr. Justice Brandeis, joined by Mr. Justice Holmes, dissented. A third was Pierce v. United States, 252 U. S. 239, in which again Mr. Justice Brandéis, joined by Mr. Justice Holmes, dissented.

Those, then, were the World War I cases that put the gloss of “clear and present danger” on the First Amendment. Whether the war power — the greatest leveler of them all — is adequate to sustain that doctrine is debat*452able. The dissents in Abrams, Schaefer, and Pierce show how easily “clear and present danger” is manipulated to crush what Brandéis called “[t]he fundamental right of free men to strive for better conditions through new legislation and new institutions” by argument and discourse (Pierce v. United States, supra, at 273) even in time of war. Though I doubt if the “clear and present danger” test is congenial to the First Amendment in time of a declared war, I am certain it is not reconcilable with the First Amendment in days of peace.

The Court quite properly overrules Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357, which involved advocacy of ideas which the majority of the Court deemed unsound and dangerous.

Mr. Justice Holmes, though never formally abandoning the “clear and present danger” test, moved closer to the First Amendment ideal when he said in dissent in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S. 652, 673:

“Every idea is an incitement. It offers itself for belief and if believed it is acted on unless some other belief outweighs it or some failure of energy stifles the movement at its birth. The only difference between the expression of an opinion and an incitement in the narrower sense is the speaker’s enthusiasm for the result. Eloquence may set fire to reason. But whatever may be thought of the redundant discourse before us it had no chance of starting a present conflagration. If in the long run the beliefs expressed in proletarian dictatorship are destined to be accepted by the dominant forces of the community, the only meaning of free speech is that they should be given their chance and have their way.”

We have never been faithful to the philosophy of that dissent.

*453The Court in Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U. S. 242, overturned a conviction for exercising First Amendment rights to incite insurrection because of lack of evidence of incitement. Id., at 259-261. And see Hartzel v. United States, 322 U. S. 680. In Bridges v. California, 314 U. S. 252, 261-263, we approved the “clear and present danger” test in an elaborate dictum that tightened it and confined it to a narrow category. But in Dennis v. United States, 341 U. S. 494, we opened wide the door, distorting the “clear and present danger” test beyond recognition.1

In that case the prosecution dubbed an agreement to teach the Marxist creed a “conspiracy.” The case was submitted to a jury on a charge that the jury could not convict unless it found that the defendants “intended to overthrow the Government ‘as speedily as circumstances would permit.' ” Id., at 509-511. The Court sustained convictions under that charge, construing it to mean a determination of ‘“whether the gravity of the “evil,” discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger.’ ”2 Id., at 510, quoting from United States v. Dennis, 183 F. 2d 201, 212.

Out of the “clear and present danger” test came other offspring. Advocacy and teaching of forcible overthrow of government as an abstract principle is immune from prosecution. Yates v. United States, 354 U. S. 298, 318. But an “active” member, who has a guilty knowledge and intent of the aim to overthrow the Government *454by violence, Noto v. United States, 367 U. S. 290, may be prosecuted. Scales v. United States, 367 U. S. 203, 228. And the power to investigate, backed by the powerful sanction of contempt, includes the power to determine which of the two categories fits the particular witness. Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U. S. 109, 130. And so the investigator roams at will through all of the beliefs of the witness, ransacking his conscience and his innermost thoughts.

Judge Learned Hand, who wrote for the Court of Appeals in affirming the judgment in Dennis, coined the “not improbable” test, 183 F. 2d 201, 214, which this Court adopted and which Judge Hand preferred over the “clear and present danger” test. Indeed, in his book, The Bill of Rights 59 (1958), in referring to Holmes’ creation of the “clear and present danger” test, he said, “I cannot help thinking that for once Homer nodded.”

My own view is quite different. I see no place in the regime of the First Amendment for any “clear and present danger” test, whether strict and tight as some would make it, or free-wheeling as the Court in Dennis rephrased it.

When one reads the opinions closely and sees when and how the “clear and present danger” test has been applied, great misgivings are aroused. First, the threats were often loud but always puny and made serious only by judges so wedded to the status quo that critical analysis made them nervous. Second, the test was so twisted and perverted in Dennis as to make the trial of those teachers of Marxism an all-out political trial which was part and parcel of the cold war that has eroded substantial parts of the First Amendment.

Action is often a method of expression and within the protection of the First Amendment.

Suppose one tears up his own copy of the Constitution in eloquent protest to a decision of this Court. May he be indicted?

*455Suppose one rips his own Bible to shreds to celebrate his departure from one “faith” and his embrace of atheism. May he be indicted?

Last Term the Court held in United States v. O’Brien, 391 U. S. 367, 382, that a registrant under Selective Service who burned his draft card in protest of the war in Vietnam could be prosecuted. The First Amendment was tendered as a defense and rejected, the Court saying:

“The issuance of certificates indicating the registration and eligibility classification of individuals is a legitimate and substantial administrative aid in the functioning of this system. And legislation to insure the continuing availability of issued certificates serves a legitimate and substantial purpose in the system’s administration.” 391 U. S., at 377-378.

But O’Brien was not prosecuted for not having his draft card available when asked for by a federal agent. He was indicted, tried, and convicted for burning the card. And this Court’s affirmance of that conviction was not, with all respect, consistent with the First Amendment.

The act of praying often involves body posture and movement as well as utterances. It is nonetheless protected by the Free Exercise Clause. Picketing, as we have said on numerous occasions, is “free speech plus.” See Bakery Drivers Local v. Wohl, 315 U. S. 769, 775 (Douglas, J., concurring); Giboney v. Empire Storage Co., 336 U. S. 490, 501; Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U. S. 460, 465; Labor Board v. Fruit Packers, 377 U. S. 58, 77 (Black, J., concurring), and id., at 93 (Harlan, J., dissenting); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 559, 578 (opinion of Black, J.); Food Employees v. Logan Plaza, 391 U. S. 308, 326 (Douglas, J., concurring). That means that it can be regulated when it comes to the “plus” or “action” side of the protest. It can be regulated as to *456the number of pickets and the place and hours (see Cox v. Louisiana, supra), because traffic and other community problems would otherwise suffer.

But none of these considerations are implicated in the symbolic protest of the Vietnam war in the burning of a draft card.

One’s beliefs have long been thought to be sanctuaries which government could not invade. Barenblatt is one example of the ease with which that sanctuary can be violated. The lines drawn by the Court between the criminal act of being an “active” Communist and the innocent act of being a nominal or inactive Communist mark the difference only between deep and abiding belief and casual or uncertain belief. But I think that all matters of belief are beyond the reach of subpoenas or the probings of investigators. That is why the invasions of privacy made by investigating committees were notoriously unconstitutional. That is the deep-seated fault in the infamous loyalty-security hearings which, since 1947 when President Truman launched them, have processed 20,000,000 men and women. Those hearings were primarily concerned with one’s thoughts, ideas, beliefs, and convictions. They were the most blatant violations of the First Amendment we have ever known.

The line between what is permissible and not subject to control and what may be made impermissible and subject to regulation is the line between ideas and overt acts.

The example usually given by those who would punish speech is the case of one who falsely shouts fire in a crowded theatre.

This is, however, a classic case where speech is brigaded with action. See Speiser v. Randall, 357 U. S. 513, 536-537 (Douglas, J., concurring). They are indeed inseparable and a prosecution can be launched for the overt *457acts actually caused. Apart from rare instances of that kind, speech is, I think, immune from prosecution. Certainly there is no constitutional line between advocacy of abstract ideas as in Yates and advocacy of political action as in Scales. The quality of advocacy turns on the depth of the conviction; and government has no power to invade that sanctuary of belief and conscience.3

*464Chief Justice Roberts

delivered the opinion of the Court.

Congress enacted 18 U. S. C. § 48 to criminalize the commercial creation, sale, or possession of certain depictions of animal cruelty. The statute does not address underlying acts harmful to animals, but only portrayals of such conduct. The question presented is whether the prohibition in the statute is consistent with the freedom of speech guaranteed by the First Amendment.

I

Section 48 establishes a criminal penalty of up to five years in prison for anyone who knowingly “creates, sells, or possesses a depiction of animal cruelty,” if done “for commercial *465gain” in interstate or foreign commerce. § 48(a).1 A depiction of “animal cruelty” is defined as one “in which a living animal is intentionally maimed, mutilated, tortured, wounded, or killed,” if that conduct violates federal or state law where “the creation, sale, or possession takes place.” § 48(e)(1). In what is referred to as the “exceptions clause,” the law exempts from prohibition any depiction “that has serious religious, political, scientific, educational, journalistic, historical, or artistie value.” §48(b).

The legislative background of § 48 focused primarily on the interstate market for “crush videos.” According to the House Committee Report on the bill, such videos feature the intentional torture and killing of helpless animals, including cats, dogs, monkeys, mice, and hamsters. H. R. Rep. No. 106-397, p. 2 (1999) (hereinafter H. R. Rep.). Crush videos often depict women slowly crushing animals to death “with their bare feet or while wearing high heeled shoes,” *466sometimes while “talking to the animals in a kind of dominatrix patter” over “[t]he cries and squeals of the animals, obviously in great pain.” Ibid. Apparently these depictions “appeal to persons with a very specific sexual fetish who find them sexually arousing or otherwise exciting.” Id., at 2-3. The acts depicted in crush videos are typically prohibited by the animal cruelty laws enacted by all 50 States and the District of Columbia. See Brief for United States 25, n. 7 (listing statutes). But crush videos rarely disclose the participants' identities, inhibiting prosecution of the underlying conduct. See H. R. Rep., at 3; accord, Brief for State of Florida et al. as Amici Curiae 11.

This case, however, involves an application of § 48 to depictions of animal fighting. Dogfighting, for example, is unlawful in all 50 States and the District of Columbia, see Brief for United States 26, n. 8 (listing statutes), and has been restricted by federal law since 1976. Animal Welfare Act Amendments of 1976, §17, 90 Stat. 421, 7 U.S.C. §2156. Respondent Robert J. Stevens ran a business, “Dogs of Velvet and Steel,” and an associated Web site, through which he sold videos of pit bulls engaging in dogfights and attacking other animals. Among these videos were Japan Pit Fights and Pick-A-Winna: A Pit Bull Documentary, which include contemporary footage of dogfights in Japan (where such conduct is allegedly legal) as well as footage of American dogfights from the 1960’s and 1970's.2 A third video, Catch Dogs and Country Living, depicts the use of pit bulls to hunt wild boar, as well as a “gruesome” scene of a pit bull attacking a domestic farm pig. 533 F. 3d 218, 221 (CA3 2008) (en banc). On the basis of these videos, Stevens was indicted on three counts of violating §48.

*467Stevens moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that § 48 is facially invalid under the First Amendment. The District Court denied the motion; It held that the depictions subject to §48, like obscenity or child pornography, are categorically unprotected by the First Amendment. 2:04-cr-00051-ANB (WD Pa., Nov. 10, 2004), App. to Pet. for Cert. 65a-71a. It went on to hold that §48 is not substantially overbroad, because the exceptions clause sufficiently narrows the statute to constitutional applications. Id., at 71a-75a. The jury convicted Stevens on all counts, and the District Court sentenced him to three concurrent sentences of 37 months’ imprisonment, followed by three years of supervised release. App. 37.

The en banc Third Circuit, over a three-judge dissent, declared §48 facially unconstitutional and vacated Stevens’s conviction. 533 F. 3d 218. The Court of Appeals first held that §48 regulates speech that is protected by the First Amendment. The Court declined to recognize a new category of unprotected speech for depictions of animal cruelty, id., at 224, and n. 6, and rejected the Government’s analogy between animal cruelty depictions and child pornography, id., at 224-232.

The Court of Appeals then held that §48 could not survive strict scrutiny as a content-based regulation of protected speech. Id., at 232. It found that the statute lacked a compelling Government interest and was neither narrowly tailored to preventing animal cruelty nor the least restrictive means of doing so. Id., at 232-235. It therefore held §48 facially invalid.

In an extended footnote, the Third Circuit noted that §48 “might also be unconstitutionally overbroad,” because it “potentially covers a great deal of constitutionally protected speech” and “sweeps [too] widely” to be limited only by prosecutorial discretion. Id., at 235, n. 16. But the Court of Appeals declined to rest its analysis on this ground.

We granted certiorari. 556 U. S. 1181 (2009).

*468II

The Government’s primary submission is that §48 necessarily complies with the Constitution because the banned depictions of animal cruelty, as a class, are categorically unprotected by the First Amendment. We disagree.

The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.” “[A]s a general matter, the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.” Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union, 535 U. S. 564, 573 (2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). Section 48 explicitly regulates expression based on content: The statute restricts “visual [and] auditory depietion[s],” such as photographs, videos, or sound recordings, depending on whether they depict conduct in which a living animal is intentionally harmed. As such, §48 is “‘presumptively invalid,’ and the Government bears the burden to rebut that presumption.” United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 529 U. S. 803, 817 (2000) (quoting R. A. V. v. St. Paul, 505 U. S. 377, 382 (1992); citation omitted).

“From 1791 to the present,” however, the First Amendment has “permitted restrictions upon the content of speech in a few limited areas,” and has never “inelude[d] a freedom to disregard these traditional limitations.” Id., at 382-383. These “historic and traditional categories long familiar to the bar,” Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N. Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 127 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment) — including obscenity, Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476, 483 (1957), defamation, Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U. S. 250, 254-255 (1952), fraud, Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U. S. 748, 771 (1976), incitement, Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U. S. 444, 447-449 (1969) (per curiam), and speech integral to criminal conduct, Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U. S. 490, 498 (1949) — are “well-defined *469and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem,” Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568, 571-572 (1942).

The Government argues that '‘depictions of animal cruelty” should be added to the list. It contends that depictions of “illegal acts of animal cruelty” that are “made, sold, or possessed for commercial gain” necessarily “lack expressive value,” and may accordingly “be regulated as unprotected speech.” Brief for United States 10 (emphasis added). The claim is not just that Congress may regulate depictions of animal cruelty subject to the First Amendment, but that these depictions are outside the reach of that Amendment altogether — that they fall into a “‘First Amendment Free Zone.’” Board of Airport Comm’rs of Los Angeles v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U. S. 569, 574 (1987).

As the Government notes, the prohibition of animal cruelty itself has a long history in American law, starting with the early settlement of the Colonies. Reply Brief 12, n. 8; see, e. g., The Body of Liberties § 92 (Mass. Bay Colony 1641), reprinted in American Historical Documents 1000-1904, 43 Harvard Classics 66, 79 (C. Eliot ed. 1910) (“No man shall exercise any Tirranny or Crueltie towards any bruite Creature which are usuallie kept for man’s use”). But we are unaware of any similar tradition excluding depictions of animal cruelty from “the freedom of speech” codified in the First Amendment, and the Government points us to none.

The Government contends that “historical evidence” about the reach of the First Amendment is not “a necessary prerequisite for regulation today,” Reply Brief 12, n. 8, and that categories of speech may be exempted from the First Amendment’s protection without any long-settled tradition of subjecting that speech to regulation. Instead, the Government points to Congress’s “ ‘legislative judgment that... depictions of animals being intentionally tortured and killed [are] of such minimal redeeming value as to render [them] *470unworthy of First Amendment protection/ ” Brief for United States 28 (quoting 538 F. 3d, at 243 (Cowen, J., dissenting)), and asks the Court to uphold the ban on the same basis. The Government thus proposes that a claim of categorical exclusion should be considered under a simple balancing test: “Whether a given category of speech enjoys First Amendment protection depends upon a categorical balancing of the value of the speech against its societal costs.” Brief for United States 8; see also id., at 12.

As a free-floating test for First Amendment coverage, that sentence is startling and dangerous. The First Amendment’s guarantee of free speech does not extend only to categories of speech that survive an ad hoc balancing of relative social costs and benefits. The First Amendment itself reflects a judgment by the American people that the benefits of its restrictions on the Government outweigh the costs. Our Constitution forecloses any attempt to revise that judgment simply on the basis that some speech is not worth it. The Constitution is not a document “prescribing limits, and declaring that those limits may be passed at pleasure.” Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 178 (1803).

To be fair to the Government, its view did not emerge from a vacuum. As the Government correctly notes, this Court has often described historically unprotected categories of speech as being “ ‘of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.’” R. A. V., supra, at 383 (quoting Chaplinsky, supra, at 572). In New York v. Ferber, 458 U. S. 747 (1982), we noted that within these categories of unprotected speech, “the evil to be restricted so overwhelmingly outweighs the expressive interests, if any, at stake, that no process of case-by-ease adjudication is required,” because “the balance of competing interests is clearly struck,” id., at 763-764. The Government derives its proposed test from these descriptions in our precedents. See Brief for United States 12-13.

*471But such descriptions are just that — descriptive. They do not set forth a test that may be applied as a general matter to permit the Government to imprison any speaker so long as his speech is deemed valueless or unnecessary or so long as an ad hoc calculus of costs and benefits tilts in a statute’s favor.

When we have identified categories of speech as fully outside the protection of the First Amendment, it has not been on the basis of a simple cost-benefit analysis. In Ferber, for example, we classified child pornography as such a category, 458 U. S., at 763. We noted that the State of New York had a compelling interest in protecting children from abuse, and that the value of using children in these works (as opposed to simulated conduct or adult actors) was de minimis. Id., at 756-757, 762. But our decision did not rest on this “balance of competing interests” alone. Id., at 764. We made clear that Ferber presented a special case: The market for child pornography was “intrinsically related” to the underlying abuse, and was therefore “an integral part of the production of such materials, an activity illegal throughout the Nation.” Id., at 759, 761. As we noted, “‘[i]t rarely has been suggested that the constitutional freedom for speech and press extends its immunity to speech or writing used as an integral part of conduct in violation of a valid criminal statute.’” Id., at 761-762 (quoting Giboney, 336 U. S., at 498). Ferber thus grounded its analysis in a previously recognized, long-established category of unprotected speech, and our subsequent decisions have shared this understanding. See Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U. S. 103, 110 (1990) (describing Ferber as finding “persuasive” the argument that the advertising and sale of child pornography was “an integral part” of its unlawful production (internal quotation marks omitted)); Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U. S. 234, 249-250 (2002) (noting that distribution and sale “were intrinsically related to the sexual abuse of children,” giving the speech at issue “a proximate link to the crime from which it came” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

*472Our decisions in Ferber and other cases cannot be taken as establishing a freewheeling authority to declare new categories of speech outside the scope of the First Amendment. Maybe there are some categories of speech thát have been historically unprotected, but have not yet been specifically identified or discussed as such in our case law. But if so, there is no evidence that “depictions of animal cruelty” is among them. We need not foreclose the future recognition of such additional categories to reject the Government’s highly manipulable balancing test as a means of identifying them.

III

Because we decline to carve out from the First Amendment any novel exception for § 48, we review Stevens’s First Amendment challenge under our existing doctrine.

A

Stevens challenged § 48 on its face, arguing that any conviction secured under the statute would be unconstitutional. The court below decided the case on that basis, 533 F. 3d, at 231, n. 13, and we granted the Solicitor General’s petition for certiorari to determine “whether 18 U. S. C. 48 is facially invalid under the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment,” Pet. for Cert. I.

To succeed in a typical facial attack, Stevens would have to establish “that no set of circumstances exists under which [§ 48] would be valid,” United States v. Salerno, 481 U. S. 739, 745 (1987), or that the statute lacks any “plainly legitimate sweep,” Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U. S. 702, 740, n. 7 (1997) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgments) (internal quotation marks omitted). Which standard applies in a typical case is a matter of dispute that we need not and do not address, and neither Salerno nor Glucksberg is a speech case. Here the Government asserts that Stevens cannot prevail because §48 is plainly legitimate as applied to crush videos and animal fighting depictions. Deciding this case through *473a traditional facial analysis would require us to resolve whether these applications of § 48 are in fact consistent with the Constitution.

In the First Amendment context, however, this Court recognizes “a second type of facial challenge,” whereby a law may be invalidated as overbroad if “a substantial number of its applications are unconstitutional, judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.” Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party, 552 U. S. 442, 449, n. 6 (2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). Stevens argues that § 48 applies to common depictions of ordinary and lawful activities, and that these depictions constitute the vast majority of materials subject to the statute. Brief for Respondent 22-25. The Government makes no effort to defend such a broad ban as constitutional. Instead, the Government’s entire defense of §48 rests on interpreting the statute as narrowly limited to specific types of “extreme” material. Brief for United States 8. As the parties have presented the issue, therefore, the constitutionality of §48 hinges on how broadly it is construed. It is to that question that we now turn.8

*474B

As we explained two Terms ago, “[t]he first step in over-breadth analysis is to construe the challenged statute; it is impossible to determine whether a statute reaches too far without first knowing what the statute covers.” United States v. Williams, 553 U. S. 285, 293 (2008). Because §48 is a federal statute, there is no need to defer to a state court’s authority to interpret its own law.

We read §48 to create a criminal prohibition of alarming breadth. To begin with, the text of the statute’s ban on a “ 'depiction of animal cruelty’ ” nowhere requires that the depicted conduct be cruel. That text applies to “any... depiction” in which “a living animal is intentionally maimed, mutilated, tortured, wounded, or killed.” § 48(c)(1). “[M]aimed, mutilated, [and] tortured” convey cruelty, but “wounded” or “killed” do not suggest any such limitation.

The Government contends that the terms in the definition should be read to require the additional element of “accompanying acts of cruelty. ” Reply Brief 6; see also Tr. of Oral Arg. 17-19. (The dissent hinges on the same assumption. See post, at 486-487,489.) The Government bases this argument on the definiendum, “depiction of animal cruelty,” c£ Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U. S. 1, 11 (2004), and on “ 'the eommonsense canon of noscitur a sociis.’ ” Reply Brief 7 (quoting Williams, 553 U. S., at 294). As that canon recognizes, an ambiguous term may be “given more precise content by the neighboring words with which it is associated.” Id., at 294. Likewise, an unclear definitional phrase may take meaning from the term to be defined, see Leocal, supra, at 11 (interpreting a ‘“substantial risk’” of the “us[e]” of “physical force” as part of the definition of “ ‘crime of violence’ ”).

But the phrase “wounded ... or killed” at issue here contains little ambiguity. The Government’s opening brief properly applies the ordinary meaning of these words, stating for example that to “'kill’ is ‘to deprive of life.’” Brief for United States 14 (quoting Webster’s Third New Interna*475tional Dictionary 1242 (1993)). We agree that “wounded” and “killed” should be read according to their ordinary meaning. Cf. Engine Mfrs. Assn. v. South Coast Air Quality Management Dist., 541 U. S. 246, 252 (2004). Nothing about that meaning requires cruelty.

While not requiring cruelty, § 48 does require that the depicted conduct be “illegal.” But this requirement does not limit §48 along the lines the Government suggests. There are myriad federal and state laws concerning the proper treatment of animals, but many of them are not designed to guard against animal cruelty. Protections of endangered species, for example, restrict even the humane “wound[ing] or killing]” of “living animal[s].” § 48(c)(1). Livestock regulations are often designed to protect the health of human beings, and hunting and fishing rules (seasons, licensure, bag limits, weight requirements) can be designed to raise revenue, preserve animal populations, or prevent accidents. The text of § 48(c) draws no distinction based on the reason the intentional killing of an animal is made illegal, and includes, for example, the humane slaughter of a stolen cow.4

What is more, the application of § 48 to depictions of illegal conduct extends to conduct that is illegal in only a single jurisdiction. Under subsection (c)(1), the depicted conduct need only be illegal in “the State in which the creation, sale, or possession takes place, regardless of whether the . . . wounding ... or killing took place in [that] State.” A depiction of entirely lawful conduct runs afoul of the ban if that depiction later finds its way into another State where the *476same conduct is unlawful. This provision greatly expands the scope of §48, because although there may be “a broad societal consensus” against cruelty to animals, Brief for United States 2, there is substantial disagreement on what types of conduct are properly regarded as cruel. Both views about cruelty to animals and regulations having no connection to cruelty vary widely from place to place.

In the District of Columbia, for example, all hunting is unlawful. D. C. Code Munic. Regs., tit. 19, §1560 (June 2004). Other jurisdictions permit or encourage hunting, and there is an enormous national market for hunting-related depictions in which a living animal is intentionally killed. Hunting periodicals have circulations in the hundreds of thousands or millions, see Mediaweek, Sept. 29, 2008, p. 28, and hunting television programs, videos, and Web sites are equally popular, see Brief for Professional Outdoor Media Association et al. as Amici Curiae 9-10. The demand for hunting depictions exceeds the estimated demand for crush videos or animal fighting depictions by several orders of magnitude. Compare ibid, and Brief for National Rifle Association of America, Inc., as Amicus Curiae 12 (hereinafter NRA Brief) (estimating that hunting magazines alone account for $135 million in annual retail sales) with Brief for United States 43-44,46 (suggesting $1 million in crush video sales per year, and noting that Stevens earned $57,000 from his videos). Nonetheless, because the statute allows each jurisdiction to export its laws to the rest of the country, § 48(a) extends to any magazine or video depicting lawful hunting, so long as that depiction is sold within the Nation's Capital.

Those seeking to comply with the law thus face a bewildering maze of regulations from at least 56 separate jurisdictions. Some States permit hunting with crossbows, Ga. Code Ann. §27-3-4(1) (2007); Va. Code Ann. §29.1-519(A)(6) (Lexis 2008 Cum. Supp.), while others forbid it, Ore. Admin. Rule 635-065-0725 (2009), or restrict it only to the disabled, *477N. Y. Envir. Conserv. Lavs? Ann. §11-0901(16) (West 2005). Missouri allows the “canned” hunting of ungulates held in captivity, Mo. Code Regs. Ann., tit. 3, 10-9.560(1) (2009), but Montana restricts such hunting to certain bird species, Mont. Admin. Rule 12.6.1202(1) (2007). The sharp-tailed grouse may be hunted in Idaho, but not in Washington. Compare Idaho Admin. Code § 13.01.09.606 (2009) with Wash. Admin. Code §232-28-342 (2009).

The disagreements among the States — and the “commonwealthfs], territor[ies], or possession^] of the United States,” 18 U. S. C. § 48(c)(2) — extend well beyond hunting. State agricultural regulations permit different methods of livestock slaughter in different places or as applied to different animals. Compare, e.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. §828.23(5) (West 2006) (excluding poultry from humane slaughter requirements) with Cal. Food & Agrie. Code Ann. § 19501(b) (West 2001) (including some poultry). California has recently banned cutting or “docking” the tails of dairy cattle, which other States permit. 2009 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 344 (S. B. 135) (West). Even cockfighting, long considered immoral in much of America, see Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U. S. 560, 575 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment), is legal in Puerto Rico, see 15 Laws P. R. Ann. §301 (Supp. 2008); Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of P. R., 478 U. S. 328, 342 (1986), and was legal in Louisiana until 2008, see La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §14:102.23 (West) (effective Aug. 15, 2008). An otherwise-lawful image of any of these practices, if sold or possessed for commercial gain within a State that happens to forbid the practice, falls within the prohibition of § 48(a).

C

The only thing standing between defendants who sell such depictions and five years in federal prison — other than the mercy of a prosecutor — is the statute’s exceptions clause. Subsection (b) exempts from prohibition “any depiction that has serious religious, political, scientific, educational, jour*478nalistic, historical, or artistic value.” The Government argues that this clause substantially narrows the statute’s reach: News reports about animal cruelty have “journalistic” value; pictures of bullfights in Spain have “historical” value; and instructional hunting videos have “educational” value. Reply Brief 6. Thus, the Government argues, §48 reaches only crush videos, depictions of animal fighting (other than Spanish bullfighting, see Brief for United States 47-48), and perhaps other depictions of “extreme acts of animal cruelty.” Id., at 41.

The Government’s attempt to narrow the statutory ban, however, requires an unrealistically broad reading of the exceptions clause. As the Government reads the clause, any material with “redeeming societal value,” id., at 9, 16, 23, “ ‘at least some minimal value,’ ” Reply Brief 6 (quoting H. R. Rep., at 4), or anything more than “scant social value,” Reply Brief 11, is excluded under § 48(b). But the text says “serious” value, and “serious” should be taken seriously. We decline the Government’s invitation — advanced for the first time in this Court — to regard as “serious” anything that is not “scant.” (Or, as the dissent puts it, “ ‘trifling.’ ” Post, at 487.) As the Government recognized below, “serious” ordinarily means a good bit more. The District Court’s jury instructions required value that is “significant and of great import,” App. 132, and the Government defended these instructions as properly relying on “a commonly accepted meaning of the word ‘serious,’ ” Brief for United States in No. 05-2497 (CA3), p. 50.

Quite apart from the requirement of “serious” value in § 48(b), the excepted speech must also fall within one of the enumerated categories. Much speech does not. Most hunting videos, for example, are not obviously instructional in nature, except in the sense that all life is a lesson. According to Safari Club International and the Congressional Sportsmen’s Foundation, many popular videos “have primarily entertainment value” and are designed to “entertai[n] the *479viewer, marke[t] hunting equipment, or increas[e] the hunting community.” Brief for Safari Club International et al. as Amici Curiae 12. The National Rifle Association agrees that “much of the content of hunting media ... is merely recreational in nature.” NR A Brief 28. The Government offers no principled explanation why these depictions of hunting or depictions of Spanish bullfights would be inherently valuable while those of Japanese dogfights are not. The dissent contends that hunting depictions must have serious value because hunting has serious value, in a way that dogfights presumably do not. Post, at 487-488. But § 48(b) addresses the value of the depictions, not of the underlying activity. There is simply no adequate reading of the exceptions clause that results in the statute’s banning only the depictions the Government would like to ban.

The Government explains that the language of § 48(b) was largely drawn from our opinion in Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 15 (1973), which excepted from its definition of obscenity any material with “serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value,” id., at 24. See Reply Brief 8, 9, and n. 5. According to the Government, this incorporation of the Miller standard into § 48 is therefore surely enough to answer any First Amendment objection. Reply Brief 8-9.

In Miller we held that “serious” value shields depictions of sex from regulation as obscenity. 413 U. S., at 24-25. Limiting Miller's exception to “serious” value ensured that “ ‘[a] quotation from Voltaire in the flyleaf of a book [would] not constitutionally redeem an otherwise obscene publication.’ ” Id., at 25, n. 7 (quoting Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U. S. 229, 231 (1972) (per curiam)). We did not, however, determine that serious value could be used as a general precondition to protecting other types of speech in the first place. Most of what we say to one another lacks “religious, political, scientific, educational, journalistic, historical, or artistie value” (let alone serious value), but it is still sheltered from Government regulation. Even “ ‘[w]holly neutral fútil*480ities ... come under the protection of free speech as fully as do Keats’ poems or Donne’s sermons.’” Cohen v. California, 403 U. S. 15, 25 (1971) (quoting Winters v. New York, 333 U. S. 507, 528 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); alteration in original).

Thus, the protection of the First Amendment presumptively extends to many forms of speech that do not qualify for the serious-value exception of § 48(b), but nonetheless fall within the broad reach of § 48(c).

D

Not to worry, the Government says: The Executive Branch construes §48 to reach only “extreme” cruelty, Brief for United States 8, and it “neither has brought nor will bring a prosecution for anything less,” Reply Brief 6-7. The Government hits this theme hard, invoking its prosecutorial discretion several times; See id., at 6-7, 10, and n. 6, 19, 22. But the First Amendment protects against the Government; it does not leave us at the mercy of noblesse oblige. We would not uphold an unconstitutional statute merely because the Government promised to use it responsibly. Gf. Whitman v. American Trucking Assns., Inc., 531 U. S. 457, 473 (2001).

This prosecution is itself evidence of the danger in putting faith in Government representations of prosecutorial restraint. When this legislation was enacted, the Executive Branch announced that it would interpret §48 as covering only depictions “of wanton cruelty to animals designed to appeal to a prurient interest in sex.” See Statement by President William J. Clinton upon Signing H. R. 1887, 34 Weekly Comp, of Pres. Doc. 2557 (1999). No one suggests that the videos in this case fit that description. The Government’s assurance that it will apply §48 far more restrietively than its language provides is pertinent only as an implicit acknowledgment of the potential constitutional problems with a more natural reading.

*481Nor can we rely upon the canon of construction that “ambiguous statutory language [should] be construed to avoid serious constitutional doubts.” FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U. S. 502, 516 (2009). “[T]his Court may impose a limiting construction on a statute only if it is ‘readily susceptible’ to such a construction.” Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U. S. 844, 884 (1997). We “‘will not rewrite a... law to conform it to constitutional requirements,’” id., at 884-885 (quoting Virginia v. American Booksellers Assn., Inc., 484 U. S. 383, 397 (1988); omission in original), for doing so would constitute a “serious invasion of the legislative domain,” United States v. Treasury Employees, 513 U. S. 454, 479, n. 26 (1995), and sharply diminish Congress’s “incentive to draft a narrowly tailored law in the first place,” Osborne, 495 U. S., at 121. To read §48 as the Government desires requires rewriting, not just reinterpretation.

* * *

Our construction of §48 decides the constitutional question; the Government makes no effort to defend the constitutionality of §48 as applied beyond crush videos and depictions of animal fighting. It argues that those particular depictions are intrinsically related to criminal conduct or are analogous to obscenity (if not themselves obscene), and that the ban on such speech is narrowly tailored to reinforce restrictions on the underlying conduct, prevent additional crime arising from the depictions, or safeguard public mores. But the Government nowhere attempts to extend these arguments to depictions of any other activities — depictions that are presumptively protected by the First Amendment but that remain subject to the criminal sanctions of §48.

Nor does the Government seriously contest that the presumptively impermissible applications of §48 (properly construed) far outnumber any permissible ones. However “growing” and “lucrative” the markets for crush videos and dogfighting depictions might be, see Brief for United States *48243, 46 (internal quotation marks omitted), they are dwarfed by the market for other depictions, such as hunting magazines and videos, that we have determined to be within the scope of §48, see supra, at 477. We therefore need not and do not decide whether a statute limited to crush videos or other depictions of extreme animal cruelty would be constitutional. We hold only that § 48 is not so limited but is instead substantially overbroad, and therefore invalid under the First Amendment.

The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit is affirmed.

It is so ordered.

Justice Alito,

dissenting.

The Court strikes down in its entirety a valuable statute, 18 U. S. C. § 48, that was enacted not to suppress speech, but to prevent horrific acts of animal cruelty — in particular, the creation and commercial exploitation of “crush videos,” a form of depraved entertainment that has no social value. The Court’s approach, which has the practical effect of legalizing the sale of such videos and is thus likely to spur a resumption of their production, is unwarranted. Respondent was convicted under §48 for selling videos depicting dogfights. On appeal, he argued, among other things, that §48 is unconstitutional as applied to the facts of this case, and he highlighted features of those videos that might distinguish them from other dogfight videos brought to our attention.1 *483The Court of Appeals — incorrectly, in my view — declined to decide whether §48 is unconstitutional as applied to respondent’s videos and instead reached out to hold that the statute is facially invalid. Today’s decision does not endorse the Court of Appeals’ reasoning, but it nevertheless strikes down §48 using what has been aptly termed the “strong medicine” of the overbreadth doctrine, United States v. Williams, 553 U. S. 285, 293 (2008) (internal quotation marks omitted), a potion that generally should be administered only as “a last resort,” Los Angeles Police Dept. v. United Reporting Publishing Corp., 528 U. S. 32, 39 (1999) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Instead of applying the doctrine of overbreadth, I would vacate the decision below and instruct the Court of Appeals on remand to decide whether the videos that respondent sold are constitutionally protected. If the question of over-breadth is to be decided, however, I do not think the present record supports the Court’s conclusion that § 48 bans a substantial quantity of protected speech.

I

A party seeking to challenge the constitutionality of a statute generally must show that the statute violates the party’s own rights. New York v. Ferber, 458 U. S. 747, 767 (1982). The First Amendment overbreadth doctrine carves out a narrow exception to that general rule. See id., at 768; Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U. S. 601, 611-612 (1973). Because an overly broad law may deter constitutionally protected speech, the overbreadth doctrine allows a party to *484whom the law may constitutionally be applied to challenge the statute on the ground that it violates the First Amendment rights of others. See, e. g., Board of Trustees of State Univ. of N. Y. v. Fox, 492 U. S. 469, 483 (1989) (“Ordinarily, the principal advantage of the overbreadth doctrine for a litigant is that it enables him to benefit from the statute’s unlawful application to someone else”); see also Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn., 436 U. S. 447, 462, n. 20 (1978) (describing the doctrine as one “under which a person may challenge a statute that infringes protected speech even if the statute constitutionally might be applied to him”).

The “strong medicine” of overbreadth invalidation need not and generally should not be administered when the statute under attack is unconstitutional as applied to the challenger before the court. As we said in Fox, supra, at 484-485, “[i]t is not the usual judicial practice, . . . nor do we consider it generally desirable, to proceed to an overbreadth issue unnecessarily — that is, before it is determined that the statute would be valid as applied.” Accord, New York State Club Assn., Inc. v. City of New York, 487 U. S. 1, 11 (1988); see also Broadrick, supra, at 613; United Reporting Publishing Corp., supra, at 45 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

I see no reason to depart here from the generally preferred procedure of considering the question of overbreadth only as a last resort.2 Because the Court has addressed the overbreadth question, however, I will explain why I do not think that the record supports the conclusion that §48, when properly interpreted, is overly broad.

II

The overbreadth doctrine “strike[s] a balance between competing social costs.” Williams, 553 U. S., at 292. Specifically, the doctrine seeks to balance the “harmful effects” of “invalidating a law that in some of its applications is per*485fectly constitutional” against the possibility that “the threat of enforcement of an overbroad law [will] dete[r] people from engaging in constitutionally protected speech.” Ibid. “In order to maintain an appropriate balance, we have vigorously enforced the requirement that a statute’s overbreadth be substantial, not only in an absolute sense, but also relative to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.” Ibid.

In determining whether a statute’s overbreadth is substantial, we consider a statute’s application to real-world conduct, not fanciful hypothetieals. See, e. g., id., at 301-302; see also Ferber, supra, at 773; Houston v. Hill, 482 U. S. 451, 466-467 (1987). Accordingly, we have repeatedly emphasized that an overbreadth claimant bears the burden of demonstrating, “from the text of [the law] and from actual fact,” that substantial overbreadth exists. Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U. S. 113, 122 (2003) (quoting New York State Club Assn., supra, at 14; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted; alteration in original). Similarly, “there must be a realistic danger that the statute itself will significantly compromise recognized First Amendment protections of parties not before the Court for it to be facially challenged on overbreadth grounds.” Members of City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U. S. 789, 801 (1984) (emphasis added).

III

In holding that §48 violates the overbreadth rule, the Court declines to decide whether, as the Government maintains, § 48 is constitutional as applied to two broad categories of depictions that exist in the real world: crush videos and depictions of deadly animal fights. See ante, at 473, 481. Instead, the Court tacitly assumes for the sake of argument that § 48 is valid as applied to these depictions, but the Court concludes that §48 reaches too much protected speech to survive. The Court relies primarily on depictions of hunters killing or wounding game and depictions of animals being slaughtered for food. I address the Court’s examples below.

*486A

I turn first to depictions of hunting. As the Court notes, photographs and videos of hunters shooting game are common. See ante, at 476. But hunting is legal in all 50 States, and §48 applies only to a depiction of conduct that is illegal in the jurisdiction in which the depiction is created, sold, or possessed. §§ 48(a), (c). Therefore, in all 50 States, the creation, sale, or possession for sale of the vast majority of hunting depictions indisputably falls outside §48’s reach.

Straining to find overbreadth, the Court suggests that §48 prohibits the sale or possession in the District of Columbia of any depiction of hunting because the District — undoubtedly because of its urban character — does not permit hunting within its boundaries. Ante, at 475-476. The Court also suggests that, because some States prohibit a particular type of hunting (e. g., hunting with a crossbow or “canned” hunting) or the hunting of a particular animal (e. g., the “sharp-tailed grouse”), §48 makes it illegal for persons in such States to sell or possess for sale a depiction of hunting that was perfectly legal in the State in which the hunting took place. See ante, at 475-477.

The Court’s interpretation is seriously flawed. “When a federal court is dealing with a federal statute challenged as overbroad, it should, of course, construe the statute to avoid constitutional problems, if the statute is subject to such a limiting construction.” Ferber, 458 U. S., at 769, n. 24. See also Williams, supra, at 307 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“[T]o the extent the statutory text alone is unclear, our duty to avoid constitutional objections makes it especially appropriate to look beyond the text in order to ascertain the intent of its drafters”).

Applying this canon, I would hold that §48 does not apply to depictions of hunting. First, because §48 targets depictions of “animal cruelty,” I would interpret that term to apply only to depictions involving acts of animal cruelty as defined by applicable state or federal law, not to depictions *487of acts that happen to be illegal for reasons having nothing to do with the prevention of animal cruelty. See ante, at 475 (interpreting “[t]he text of § 48(c)” to ban a depiction of “the humane slaughter of a stolen cow”). Virtually all state laws prohibiting animal cruelty either expressly define the term “animal” to exclude wildlife or else specifically exempt lawful hunting activities,3 so the statutory prohibition set forth in § 48(a) may reasonably be interpreted not to reach most if not all hunting depictions.

Second, even if the hunting of wild animals were otherwise covered by § 48(a), I would hold that hunting depictions fall within the exception in § 48(b) for depictions that have “serious” (i. e., not “trifling”4) “scientific,” “educational,” or “historical” value. While there are certainly those who find hunting objectionable, the predominant view in this country has long been that hunting serves many important values, and it is clear that Congress shares that view. Since 1972, when Congress called upon the President to designate a National Hunting and Fishing Day, see S. J. Res. 117, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972), 86 Stat. 133, Presidents have regularly issued proclamations extolling the values served by hunting. See Presidential Proclamation No. 8421, 74 Fed. Reg. 49305 (Pres. Obama 2009) (hunting and fishing are “ageless pursuits” that promote “the conservation and restoration of numerous species and their natural habitats”); Presidential *488Proclamation No. 8295, 73 Fed. Reg. 57233 (Pres. Bush 2008) (hunters and anglers “add to . our heritage and keep our wildlife populations healthy and strong,” and “are among our foremost conservationists”); Presidential Proclamation No. 7822, 69 Fed. Reg. 59539 (Pres. Bush 2004) (hunting and fishing are “an important part of our Nation’s heritage,” and “America’s hunters and anglers represent the great spirit of our country”); Presidential Proclamation No. 4682, 44 Fed. Reg. 53149 (Pres. Carter 1979) (hunting promotes conservation and an appreciation of “healthy recreation, peaceful solitude and closeness to nature”); Presidential Proclamation No. 4318, 39 Fed. Reg. 35315 (Pres. Ford 1974) (hunting furthers “appreciation and respect for nature” and preservation of the environment). Thus, it is widely thought that hunting has “scientific” value in that it promotes conservation, “historical” value in that it provides a link to past times when hunting played a critical role in daily life, and “educational” value in that it furthers the understanding and appreciation of nature and our country’s past and instills valuable character traits. And if hunting itself is widely thought to serve these values, then it takes but a small additional step to conclude that depictions of hunting make a nontrivial contribution to the exchange of ideas. Accordingly, I would hold that hunting depictions fall comfortably within the exception set out in § 48(b).

I do not have the slightest doubt that Congress, in enacting § 48, had no intention of restricting the creation, sale, or possession of depictions of hunting. Proponents of the law made this point clearly. See H. R. Rep. No. 106-397, p. 8 (1999) (hereinafter H. R. Rep.) (“[D]epictions of ordinary hunting and fishing activities do not fall within the scope of the statute”); 145 Cong. Rec. 25894 (1999) (Rep. McCollum) (“[T]he sale of depictions of legal activities, such as hunting and fishing, would not be illegal under this bill”); id., at 25895 (Rep. Smith) (“[L]et us be clear as to what this legislation will not do. It will in no way prohibit hunting, fishing, or wildlife videos”). Indeed, even opponents acknowledged *489that § 48 was not intended to reach ordinary hunting depictions. See ibid. (Rep. Scott); id., at 25897 (Rep. Paul).

For these reasons, I am convinced that §48 has no application to depictions of hunting. But even if § 48 did impermissibly reach the sale or possession of depictions of hunting in a few unusual situations (for example, the sale in Oregon of a depiction of hunting with a crossbow in Virginia or the sale in Washington State of the hunting of a sharp-tailed grouse in Idaho, see ante, at 476-477), those isolated applications would hardly show that §48 bans a substantial amount of protected speech.

B

Although the Court’s overbreadth analysis rests primarily on the proposition that §48 substantially restricts the sale and possession of hunting depictions, the Court cites a few additional examples, including depictions of methods of slaughter and the docking of the tails of dairy cows. See ante, at 477.

Such examples do not show that the statute is substantially overbroad, for two reasons. First, as explained above, §48 can reasonably be construed to apply only to depictions involving acts of animal cruelty as defined by applicable state or federal law, and anticruelty laws do not ban the sorts of acts depicted in the Court’s hypotheticals. See, e. g., Idaho Code §25-3514 (Lexis 2000) (“No part of this chapter [prohibiting cruelty to animals] shall be construed as interfering with or allowing interference with . .. [t]he humane slaughter of any animal normally and commonly raised as food, or for production of fiber . . . [or] [n]ormal or accepted practices of . . . animal husbandry”); Kan. Stat. Ann. §21 — 4310(b) (2007) (“The provisions of this section shall not apply . . . with respect to farm animals, normal or accepted practices of animal husbandry, including the normal and accepted practices for the slaughter of such animals”); Md. Crim. Law Code Ann. § 10-603 (Lexis 2002) (sections prohibiting animal cruelty “do not apply to ... customary and normal veterinary *490and agricultural husbandry practices including dehorning, castration, tail docking, and limit feeding”).

Second, nothing in the record suggests that anyone has ever created, sold, or possessed for sale a depiction of the slaughter of food animals or of the docking of the tails of dairy cows that would not easily qualify under the exception set out in § 48(b). Depictions created to show proper methods of slaughter or tail docking would presumably have serious “educational” value, and depictions created to focus attention on methods thought to be inhumane or otherwise objectionable would presumably have either serious “educational” or “journalistic” value or both. In short, the Court’s examples of depictions involving the docking of tails and humane slaughter do not show that § 48 suffers from any over-breadth, much less substantial overbreadth.

The Court notes, finally, that cockfighting, which is illegal in all States, is still legal in Puerto Rico, ante, at 477, and I take the Court’s point to be that it would be impermissible to ban the creation, sale, or possession in Puerto Rico of a depiction of a cockfight that was legally staged in Puerto Rico.5 But assuming for the sake of argument that this is correct, this veritable sliver of unconstitutionality would not be enough to justify striking down §48 in toto.

In sum, we have a duty to interpret §48 so as to avoid serious constitutional concerns, and §48 may reasonably be construed not to reach almost all, if not all, of the depictions that the Court finds constitutionally protected. Thus, §48 does not appear to have a large number of unconstitutional *491applications. Invalidation for overbreadth is appropriate only if the challenged statute suffers from substantial over-breadth — judged not just in absolute terms, but in relation to the statute’s “plainly legitimate sweep.” Williams, 553 U. S., at 292. As I explain in the following Part, § 48 has a substantial core of constitutionally permissible applications.

IV

A

1

As the Court of Appeals recognized, “the primary conduct that Congress sought to address through its passage [of § 48] was the creation, sale, or possession of ‘crush videos.’ ” 533 F. 3d 218, 222 (CA3 2008) (en banc). A sample crush video, which has been lodged with the Clerk, records the following event:

“[A] kitten, secured to the ground, watches and shrieks in pain as a woman thrusts her high-heeled shoe into its body, slams her heel into the kitten’s eye socket and mouth loudly fracturing its skull, and stomps repeatedly on the animal’s head. The kitten hemorrhages blood, screams blindly in pain, and is ultimately left dead in a moist pile of blood-sóaked hair and bone.” Brief for Humane Society of United States as Amicus Curiae 2 (hereinafter Humane Society Brief).

It is undisputed that the conduct depicted in crush videos may constitutionally be prohibited. All 50 States and the District of Columbia have enacted statutes prohibiting animal cruelty. See 533 F. 3d, at 223, and n. 4 (citing statutes); H. R. Rep., at 3. But before the enactment of §48, the underlying conduct depicted in crush videos was nearly impossible to prosecute. These videos, which “often appeal to persons with a very specific sexual fetish,” id., at 2, were made in secret, generally without a live audience, and “the faces of the women inflicting the torture in the material often were not shown, nor could the location of the place where *492the cruelty was being inflicted or the date of the activity be ascertained from the depiction,” id., at 3. Thus, law enforcement authorities often were not able to identify the parties responsible for the torture. See Punishing Depictions of Animal Cruelty and the Federal Prisoner Health Care Co-Payment Act of 1999: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Crime of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 106th Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1999) (hereinafter Hearing on Depictions of Animal Cruelty). In the rare instances in which it was possible to identify and find the perpetrators, they “often were able to successfully assert as a defense that the State could not prove its jurisdiction over the place where the act occurred or that the actions depicted took place within the time specified in the State statute of limitations.” H. R. Rep., at 3; see also 145 Cong. Rec. 25896 (Rep. Gallegly) (“[I]t is the prosecutors from around this country, Federal prosecutors as well as State prosecutors, that have made an appeal to us for this”); Hearing on Depictions of Animal Cruelty 21 (“If the production of the video is not discovered during the actual filming, then prosecution for the offense is virtually impossible without a cooperative eyewitness to the filming or an undercover police operation ”); id., at 34-35 (discussing example of case in which state prosecutor “had the defendant telling us he produced these videos,” but where prosecution was not possible because the State could not prove where or when the tape was made).

In light of the practical problems thwarting the prosecution of the creators of crush videos under state animal cruelty laws, Congress concluded that the only effective way of stopping the underlying criminal conduct was to prohibit the commercial exploitation of the videos of that conduct. And Congress’ strategy appears to have been vindicated. We are told that “[b]y 2007, sponsors of §48 declared the crush video industry dead. Even overseas websites shut down in the wake of §48. Now, after the Third Circuit’s decision [facially invalidating the statute], crush videos are *493already back online.” Humane Society Brief 5 (citations omitted).

2

The First Amendment protects freedom of speech, but it most certainly does not protect violent criminal conduct, even if engaged in for expressive purposes. Crush videos present a highly unusual free speech issue because they are so closely linked with violent criminal conduct. The videos record the commission of violent criminal acts, and it appears that these crimes are committed for the sole purpose of creating the videos. In addition, as noted above, Congress was presented with compelling evidence that the only way of preventing these crimes was to target the sale of the videos. Under these circumstances, I cannot believe that the First Amendment commands Congress to step aside and allow the underlying crimes to continue.

The most relevant of our prior decisions is Ferber, 458 U. S. 747, which concerned child pornography. The Court there held that child pornography is not protected speech, and I believe that Ferber’s reasoning dictates a similar conclusion here.

In Ferber, an important factor — I would say the most important factor — was that child pornography involves the commission of a crime that inflicts severe personal injury to the “children who are made to engage in sexual conduct for commercial purposes.” Id., at 758 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Ferber Court repeatedly described the production of child pornography as child “abuse,” “molestation,” or “exploitation.” See, e.g., id., at 749 (“In recent years, the exploitive use of children in the production of pornography has become a serious national problem”); id., at 758, n. 9 (“Sexual molestation by adults is often involved in the production of child sexual performances”). As later noted in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U. S. 234, 249 (2002), in Ferber “[t]he production of the work, not its content, was the target of the statute.” See also 535 U. S., at *494250 (Ferber involved “speech that itself is the record of sexual abuse”).

Second, Ferber emphasized the fact that these underlying crimes could not be effectively combated without targeting the distribution of child pornography. As the Court put it, “the distribution network for child pornography must be closed if the production of material which requires the sexual exploitation of children is to be effectively controlled.” 458 U. S., at 759. The Court added:

“[T]here is no serious contention that the legislature was unjustified in believing that it is difficult, if not impossible, to halt the exploitation of children by pursuing only those who produce the photographs and movies____ The most expeditious if not the only practical method of law enforcement may be to dry up the market for this material by imposing severe criminal penalties on persons selling, advertising, or otherwise promoting the product.” Id., at 759-760.

See also id., at 761 (“The advertising and selling of child pornography provide an economic motive for and are thus an integral part of the production of such materials”).

Third, the Ferber Court noted that the value of child pornography “is exceedingly modest, if not de minimis,” and that any such value was “overwhelmingly outweigh[ed]” by “the evil to be restricted.” Id., at 762-763.

All three of these characteristics, are shared by §48, as applied to crush videos. First, the conduct' depicted in crush videos is criminal in every State and the District of Columbia. Thus, any crush video made in this country records the actual commission of a criminal act that inflicts severe physical injury and excruciating pain and ultimately results in death. Those who record the underlying criminal acts are likely to be criminally culpable, either as aiders and abettors or conspirators. And in the tight and secretive market for these videos, some who sell the videos or possess *495them with the intent to make a profit may be similarly culpable. (For example, in some cases, crush videos were commissioned by purchasers who specified the details of the acts that they wanted to see performed. See H. R. Rep., at 3; Hearing on Depictions of Animal Cruelty 27.) To the extent that § 48 reaches such persons, it surely does not violate the First Amendment.

Second, the criminal acts shown in crush videos cannot be prevented without targeting the conduct prohibited by §48 — the creation, sale, and possession for sale of depictions of animal torture with the intention of realizing a commercial profit. The evidence presented to Congress posed a stark choice: Either ban the commercial exploitation of crush videos or tolerate a continuation of the criminal acts that they record. Faced with this evidence, Congress reasonably chose to target the lucrative crush video market.

Finally, the harm caused by the underlying crimes vastly outweighs any minimal value that the depictions might conceivably be thought to possess. Section 48 reaches only the actual recording of acts of animal torture; the statute does not apply to verbal descriptions or to simulations. And, unlike the child pornography statute in Ferber or its federal counterpart, 18 U. S. C. §2252, § 48(b) provides an exception for depictions having any “serious religious, political, scientific, educational, journalistic, historical, or artistic value.”

It must be acknowledged that § 48 differs from a child pornography law in an important respect: Preventing the abuse of children is certainly much more important than preventing the torture of the animals used in crush videos. It was largely for this reason that the Court of Appeals concluded that Ferber did not support the constitutionality of § 48. 533 F. 3d, at 228 (“Preventing cruelty to animals, although an exceedingly worthy goal, simply does not implicate interests of the same magnitude as protecting children from physical and psychological harm”). But while protecting children is unquestionably more important than protecting animals, the *496Government also has a compelling interest in preventing the torture depicted in crush videos.

The animals used in crush videos are living creatures that experience excruciating pain. Our society has long banned such cruelty, which is illegal throughout the country. In Ferber, the Court noted that “virtually all of the States and the United States have passed legislation proscribing the production of or otherwise combating 'child pornography/ ” and the Court declined to “second-guess [that] legislative judgment.”6 458 U. S., at 758. Here, likewise, the Court of Appeals erred in second-guessing the legislative judgment about the importance of preventing cruelty to animals.

Section 48’s ban on trafficking in crush videos also helps to enforce the criminal laws and to ensure that criminals do not profit from their crimes. See 145 Cong. Ree. 25897 (1999) (Rep. Gallegly) (“The state has an interest in enforcing its existing laws. Right now, the laws are not only being violated, but people are making huge profits from promoting the violations”); id., at 10685 (1999) (same) (explaining that he introduced the House version of the bill because “criminals should not profit from [their] illegal acts”). We have already judged that taking the profit out of crime is a compelling interest. See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N. Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U. S. 105, 119 (1991).

In short, Ferber is the case that sheds the most light on the constitutionality of Congress’ effort to halt the production of crush videos. Applying the principles set forth in Ferber, I would hold that crush videos are not protected by the First Amendment.

*497B

Application of the Ferber framework also supports the constitutionality of §48 as applied to depictions of brutal animal fights. (For convenience, I will focus on videos of dogfights, which appear to be the most common type of animal fight videos.)

First, such depictions, like crush videos, record the actual commission of a crime involving deadly violence. Dogfights are illegal in every State and the District of Columbia, Brief for United States 26-27, and n. 8 (citing statutes), and under federal law constitute a felony punishable by imprisonment for up to five years, 7 U. S. C. § 2156 et seq. (2006 ed. and Supp. II); 18 U. S. C. §49 (2006 ed., Supp. II).

Second, Congress had an ample basis for concluding that the crimes depicted in these videos cannot be effectively controlled without targeting the videos. Like crush videos and child pornography, dogfight videos are very often produced as part of a “low-profile, clandestine industry,” and “the need to market the resulting products requires a visible apparatus of distribution.” Ferber, 458 U. S., at 760. In such circumstances, Congress had reasonable grounds for concluding that it would be “difficult, if not impossible, to halt” the underlying exploitation of dogs by pursuing only those who stage the fights. Id., at 759-760; see 533 F. 3d, at 246 (Cowen, J., dissenting) (citing evidence establishing “the existence of a lucrative market for depictions of animal cruelty,” including videos of dogfights, “which in turn provides a powerful incentive to individuals to create [such] videos”).

The commercial trade in videos of dogfights is “an integral part of the production of such materials,” Ferber, supra, at 761. As the Humane Society explains, “[videotapes memorializing dogfights are integral to the success of this criminal industry” for a variety of reasons. Humane Society Brief 5. For one thing, some dogfighting videos are made “solely for the purpose of selling the video (and not for a live audience).” Id., at 9. In addition, those who stage dogfights profit not just from the sale of the videos themselves, but from the *498gambling revenue they take in from the fights; the videos “encourage [such] gambling activity because they allow those reluctant to attend actual fights for fear of prosecution to still bet on the outcome.” Ibid.; accord, Brief for Center on the Administration of Criminal Law as Amicus Curiae 12 (“Selling videos of dogfights effectively abets the underlying crimes by providing a market for dogfighting while allowing actual dogfights to remain underground”); ibid. (“These videos are part of a ‘lucrative market’ where videos are produced by a ‘bare-boned, clandestine staff’ in order to permit the actual location of dogfights and the perpetrators of these underlying criminal activities to go undetected” (citation omitted)). Moreover, “[v]ideo documentation is vital to the criminal enterprise because it provides proof of a dog’s fighting prowess — proof demanded by potential buyers and critical to the underground market.” Humane Society Brief 9. Such recordings may also serve as “ ‘training’ videos for other fight organizers.” Ibid. In short, because videos depicting live dogfights are essential to the success of the criminal dogfighting subculture, the commercial sale of such videos helps to fuel the market for, and thus to perpetuate the perpetration of, the criminal conduct depicted in them.

Third, depictions of dogfights that fall within § 48’s reach have by definition no appreciable social válue. As noted, § 48(b) exempts depictions having any appreciable social value, and thus the mere inclusion of a depiction of a live fight in a larger work that aims at communicating an idea or a message with a modicum of social value would not run afoul of the statute.

Finally, the harm caused by the underlying criminal acts greatly outweighs any trifling value that the depictions might be thought to possess. As the Humane Society explains;

“The abused dogs used in fights endure physical torture and emotional manipulation throughout their lives to *499predispose them to violence; common tactics include feeding the animals hot peppers and gunpowder, prodding them with sticks, and electrocution. Dogs are conditioned never to give up a fight, even if they will be gravely hurt or killed. As a result, dogfights inflict horrific injuries on the participating animals, including lacerations, ripped ears, puncture wounds and broken bones. Losing dogs are routinely refused treatment, beaten further as ‘punishment’ for the loss, and executed by drowning, hanging, or incineration.” Id., at 5-6 (footnotes omitted).

For these dogs, unlike the animals killed in crush videos, the suffering lasts for years rather than minutes. As with crush videos, moreover, the statutory ban on commerce in dogfighting videos is also supported by compelling governmental interests in effectively enforcing the Nation’s criminal laws and preventing criminals from profiting from their illegal activities. See Ferber, supra, at 757-758; Simon & Schuster, 502 U. S., at 119.

In sum, §48 may validly be applied to at least two broad real-world categories of expression covered by the statute: crush videos and dogfighting videos. Thus, the statute has a substantial core of constitutionally permissible applications. Moreover, for the reasons set forth above, the record does not show that §48, properly interpreted, bans a substantial amount of protected speech in absolute terms. A fortiori, respondent has not met his burden of demonstrating that any impermissible applications of the statute are “substantial” in relation to its “plainly legitimate sweep.” Williams, 553 U. S., at 292. Accordingly, I would reject respondent’s claim that § 48 is facially unconstitutional under the overbreadth doctrine.

* * *

For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.

*500APPENDIX

As the following chart makes clear, virtually all state laws prohibiting animal cruelty either expressly define the term “animal” to exclude wildlife or else specifically exempt lawful hunting activities.

Alaska Alaska Stat. § 11.61.140(c)(4) (2008) (“It is a defense to a prosecution under this section that the conduct of the defendant... was necessarily incidental to lawful fishing, hunting or trapping activities”)

Arizona Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 13-2910(0(1), (3) (West Supp. 2009) (“This section does not prohibit or restrict . . . [t]he taking of wildlife or other activities permitted by or pursuant to title 17 ... [or] [activities regulated by the Arizona game and fish department or the Arizona department of agriculture”)

Arkansas Ark. Code Ann. §5-62-105(a) (Supp. 2009) (“This sub-chapter does not prohibit any of the following activities: ... (9) Engaging in the taking of game or fish through hunting, trapping, or fishing, or engaging in any other activity authorized by Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 35, by § 15-41-101 et seq., or by any Arkansas State Game and Fish Commission regulation promulgated under either Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 35, or statute”)

California Cal. Penal Code Ann. §599c (West 1999) (“No part of this title shall be construed as interfering with any of the laws of this state known as the ‘game laws,’ . . . or to interfere with the right to kill all animals used for food”)

Colorado Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 18-9-201.5(2) (2009) (“In case of any conflict between this part 2 [prohibiting cruelty to animals] or section 35-43-126, [Colo. Rev. Stat.], and section 35-43-126, [Colo. Rev. Stat.], and the wildlife statutes of the state, said wildlife statutes shall control”), § 18-9-202(3) (“Nothing in this part 2 shall be construed to amend or in any manner change the authority of the wildlife commission, as established in title 33, [Colo. Rev. Stat.], or to prohibit any conduct therein authorized or permitted”)

*501Connecticut Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-247(b) (2009) (“Any person who maliciously and intentionally maims, mutilates, tortures, wounds or kills an animal shall be fined not more than five thousand dollars or imprisoned not more than five years or both. The provisions of this subsection shall not apply to . . . any person . . . while lawfully engaged in the taking of wildlife”)

Delaware Del. Code Ann., Tit. 11, § 1325(f) (2007) (“This section shall not apply to the lawful hunting or trapping of animals as provided by law”)

Florida Fla. Stat. §828.122(9)(b) (2007) (“This section shall not apply to . . . [a]ny person using animals to pursue or take wildlife or to participate in any hunting regulated or subject to being regulated by the rules and regulations of the Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission”)

Georgia Ga. Code Ann. § 16-12-4(e) (2007) (“The provisions of this Code section shall not be construed as prohibiting conduct which is otherwise permitted under the laws of this state or of the United States, including, but not limited to . . . hunting, trapping, fishing, [or] wildlife management”)

Hawaii Haw. Rev. Stat. §711-1108.5(1) (2008 Cum. Supp.) (“A person commits the offense of cruelty to animáis in the first degree if the person intentionally or knowingly tortures, mutilates, or poisons or causes the torture, mutilation, or poisoning of any pet animal or equine animal resulting in serious bodily injury or death of the pet animal or equine animal”)

Idaho Idaho Code §25-3515 (Lexis 2000) (“No part of this chapter shall be construed as interfering with, negating or preempting any of the laws or rules of the department of fish and game of this state... or to interfere with the right to kill, slaughter, bag or take all animals used for food”)

Illinois Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 510, §70/13 (West 2006) (“In ease of any alleged conflict between this Act . . . and the ‘Wildlife Code of Illinois’ or ‘An Act to define and require the use of humane methods in the handling, preparation for slaughter, and slaughter of livestock for meat or meat products to be offered for sale',... the provisions of those Acts shall prevail” (footnotes omitted)), §70/3.03(b)(l) (“For the purposes of this Section, *502'animal torture’ does not include any death, harm, or injury caused to any animal by... any hunting, fishing, trapping, or other activity allowed under the Wildlife Code, the Wildlife Habitat Management Areas Act, or the Fish and Aquatic Life Code” (footnotes omitted))

Indiana Ind. Code § 35-46-3-5(a) (West 2004) (subject to certain exceptions not relevant here, “this chapter [prohibiting “Offenses Relating to Animals”] does not apply to ... [f]ishing, hunting, trapping, or other conduct authorized under [Ind. Code §] 14-22”)

Iowa Iowa Code §717B.2(5) (2009) (“This section [banning ‘animal abuse’] shall not apply to . .. [a] person taking, hunting, trapping, or fishing for a wild animal as provided in chapter 481A”), § 717B.3A(2)(e) (“This section [banning ‘animal torture’] shall not apply to ... [a] person taking, hunting, trapping, or fishing for a wild animal as provided in chapter 481A”)

Kansas Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-4310(b)(3) (2007) (“The provisions of this section shall not apply to . . . killing, attempting to kill, trapping, catching or taking of any animal in accordance with the provisions of chapter 32 [Wildlife, Parks and Recreation] or chapter 47 [Livestock and Domestic Animals] of the Kansas Statutes Annotated”)

Kentucky Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 525.130(2)(a), (e) (Lexis 2008) (“Nothing in this section shall apply to the killing of animals ... [p]ursuant to a license to hunt, fish, or trap . .. [or] [f]or purposes relating to sporting activities”), § 525.130(3) (“Activities of animals engaged in hunting, field trials, dog training other than training a dog to fight for pleasure or profit, and other activities authorized either by a hunting license or by the Department of Fish and Wildlife shall not constitute a violation of this section”)

Louisiana La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:102.1(C)(1) (West Supp. 2010) (“This Section shall not apply to ... [t]he lawful hunting or trapping of wildlife as provided by law”)

Maine Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 17, §1031(1)(G) (West Supp. 2009) (providing that hunting and trapping an animal is not a form of prohibited animal cruelty if “permitted pursuant to” parts of state code regulating the shooting of large game, inland fisheries, and wildlife)

Maryland Md. Crim. Law Code Ann. §10-603(3) (Lexis 2002) (“Sections 10-601 through 10-608 of this subtitle do

*503Michigan Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 750.50(ll)(a), (b) (West Supp. 2009) (“This section does not prohibit the lawful killing or other use of an animal, including... [fishing . . . [h]unting, [or] trapping [as regulated by state law]”), §§ 750.50b(9)(a), (b) (“This section does not prohibit the lawful killing of an animal pursuant to . . . [fBshing . . . [hjunting, [or] trapping [as regulated by state law]”)

Missouri Mo. Rev. Stat. §578.007(3) (2000) (“The provisions of sections 578.005 to 578.023 shall not apply to... [hjunting, fishing, or trapping as allowed by” state law)

Montana Mont. Code Ann. §45-8-211(4)(d) (2009) (“This section does not prohibit... lawful fishing, hunting, and trapping activities”)

Nebraska Neb. Rev. Stat. §28-1013(4) (2008) (exempting “[e]ommonly accepted practices of hunting, fishing, or trapping”)

Nevada Nev. Rev. Stat. §§574.200(1), (3) (2007) (provisions of Nevada law banning animal cruelty “do not... [ijnterfere with any of the fish and game laws . . . [or] the right to kill all animals and fowl used for food”)

New Hampshire N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 644:8(11) (West Supp. 2009) (“In this section, ‘animal’ means a domestic animal, a household pet or a wild animal in captivity”)

New Jersey N. J. Stat. Ann. § 4:22-16(c) (West 1998) (“Nothing contained in this article shall be construed to prohibit or interfere with .. . [t]he shooting or taking of game or game fish in such manner and at such times as is allowed or provided by the laws of this State”)

New Mexico N. M. Stat. Ann. §30-18-l(I)(D (Supp. 2009) (“The provisions of this section do not apply to ... fishing, hunting, falconry, taking and trapping”)

New York N. Y. Agrie. & Mkts. Law Ann. §353-a(2) (West 2004) (“Nothing contained in this section shall be construed to prohibit or interfere in any way with anyone lawfully engaged in hunting, trapping, or fishing”)

North Carolina N. C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 14-360(c)(l) (Lexis 2009) (“[TJhis section shall not apply to... [t]he lawful taking of animals under the jurisdiction and regulation of the Wildlife Resources Commission ... ”) not apply to... an activity that may cause unavoidable physical pain to an animal, including ... hunting, if the person performing the activity uses the most humane method reasonably available”)

*504North Dakota N. D. Cent. Code Ann. §36-21.1-01(5)(a) (Lexis Supp. 2009) (“‘Cruelty’ or ‘torture’.. . does not include .. . [a]ny activity that requires a license or permit under chapter 20.1-03 [which governs gaming and other licenses]”)

Oregon Ore. Rev. Stat. §167.335 (2007) (“Unless gross negligence can be shown, the provisions of [certain statutes prohibiting animal cruelty] do not apply to . . . (7) [l]awful fishing, hunting and trapping activities”)

Pennsylvania 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. §5511(a)(3)(ii) (2008) (“This subsection [banning killing, maiming, or poisoning of domestic animals or zoo animals] shall not apply to... the killing of any animal or fowl pursuant to ... The Game Law”), § 5511(c)(1) (“A person commits an offense if he wantonly or cruelly illtreats, overloads, beats, otherwise abuses any animal, or neglects any animal as to which he has a duty of care”)

Rhode Island R. I. Gen. Laws §4-l-3(a) (Lexis 1998) (prohibiting “[e]very owner, possessor, or person having the charge or custody of any animal” from engaging in certain acts of unnecessary cruelty), §§4-l-5(a), (b) (prohibiting only “[mjalidous” injury to or killing of animals and further providing that “[t]his section shall not apply to licensed hunters during hunting season or a licensed business killing animals for human consumption”)

South Carolina S. C. Code Ann. §47-1-40(0 (Supp. 2009) (“This section does not apply to . .. activity authorized by Title 50 [consisting of laws on Fish, Game, and Watercraft]”)

South Dakota S. D. Codified Laws §40-1-17 (2004) (“The acts and conduct of persons who are lawfully engaged in any of the activities authorized by Title 41 [Game, Fish, Parks and Forestry] . . . and persons who properly kill any animal used for food and sport hunting, trapping, and fishing as authorized by the South Dakota Department of Game, Fish and Parks, are exempt from the provisions of this chapter”)

Tennessee Tenn. Code Ann. §39-14-201(1) (2010 Supp.) (“‘Animal’ means a domesticated living creature or a wild creature previously captured”), §39-14-201(4) (“[N]othing in this part shall be construed as prohibiting the shooting of birds or game for the purpose of human food or the use of animate targets by incorporated gun clubs”)

Texas Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 42.092(a)(2) (West Supp. 2009) (“‘Animal’ means a domesticated living creature, in-*505eluding any stray or feral cat or dog, and a wild living creature previously captured. The term does not include an uncaptured wild living creature or a livestock animal”), § 42.092(f)(1)(A) (“It is an exception to the application of this section that the conduct engaged in by the actor is a generally accepted and otherwise lawful . . . form of conduct occurring solely for the purpose of or in support of . . . fishing, hunting, or trapping”)

Utah Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-301(l)(b)(ii)(D) (Lexis 2008) (“‘Animal’ does not include . . . wildlife, as defined in Section 23-13-2, including protected and unprotected wildlife, if the conduct toward the wildlife is in accordance with lawful hunting, fishing, or trapping practices or other lawful practices”), § 76-9-301(9)(C) (“This section does not affect or prohibit... the lawful hunting of, fishing for, or trapping of, wildlife”)

Vermont Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 13, §851b(l) (2009) (“This subchapter shall not apply to . . . activities regulated by the department of fish and wildlife pursuant to Part 4 of Title 10”)

Virginia Va. Code Ann. §3.2-6570(D) (Lexis 2008) (“This section shall not prohibit authorized wildlife management activities or hunting, fishing or trapping [as regulated by state law]”)

Washington Wash. Rev. Code §16.52.180 (2008) (“No part of this chapter shall be deemed to interfere with any of the laws of this state known as the ‘game laws’... or to interfere with the right to kill animals to be used for food”)

West Virginia W. Va. Code Ann. § 61-8-19(f) (Lexis Supp. 2009) (“The provisions of this section do not apply to lawful acts' of hunting, fishing, [or] trapping”)

Wisconsin Wis. Stat. §951.015(1) (2007-2008) (“This chapter may not be interpreted as controverting any law regulating wild animals that are subject to regulation under ch. 169 [regulating, among other things, hunting], [or] the taking of wild animals”)

Wyoming Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-203(m)(iv) (2009) (“Nothing in subsection (a), (b) or (n) of this section shall be construed to prohibit... [t]he hunting, capture or destruction of any predatory animal or other wildlife in any manner not otherwise prohibited by law”)

Justice THOMASdelivered the opinion of the Court.

The town of Gilbert, Arizona (or Town), has adopted a comprehensive code governing the manner in which people may display outdoor signs. Gilbert, Ariz., Land Development Code (Sign Code or Code), ch. 1, § 4.402 (2005). 1 The Sign Code identifies various categories of signs based on the type of information they convey, then subjects each category to different restrictions. One of the categories is "Temporary Directional Signs Relating to a Qualifying Event," loosely defined as signs directing the public to a meeting of a nonprofit group. § 4.402(P). The Code imposes more stringent restrictions on these signs than it does on signs conveying other messages. We hold that these provisions are content-based regulations of speech that cannot survive strict scrutiny.

I

A

The Sign Code prohibits the display of outdoor signs anywhere within the Town without a permit, but it then exempts 23 categories of signs from that requirement. These exemptions include everything from bazaar signs to flying banners. Three categories of exempt signs are particularly relevant here.

The first is "Ideological Sign[s]." This category includes any "sign communicating a message or ideas for noncommercial purposes that is not a Construction Sign, Directional Sign, Temporary Directional Sign Relating to a Qualifying Event, Political Sign, Garage Sale Sign, or a sign owned or required by a governmental agency." Sign Code, Glossary of General Terms (Glossary), p. 23 (emphasis deleted). Of the three categories discussed here, the Code treats ideological signs most favorably, allowing them to be up to 20 square feet in area and to be placed in all "zoning districts" without time limits. § 4.402(J).

The second category is "Political Sign[s]." This includes any "temporary sign designed to influence the outcome of an election called by a public body." Glossary 23. 2 The Code treats these signs less favorably than ideological signs. The Code allows the placement of political signs up to 16 square feet on residential property and up to 32 square feet on nonresidential property, undeveloped municipal property, and "rights-of-way."

*2225 § 4.402(I). 3 These signs may be displayed up to 60 days before a primary election and up to 15 days following a general election. Ibid.

The third category is "Temporary Directional Signs Relating to a Qualifying Event." This includes any "Temporary Sign intended to direct pedestrians, motorists, and other passersby to a 'qualifying event.' " Glossary 25 (emphasis deleted). A "qualifying event" is defined as any "assembly, gathering, activity, or meeting sponsored, arranged, or promoted by a religious, charitable, community service, educational, or other similar non-profit organization." Ibid. The Code treats temporary directional signs even less favorably than political signs. 4 Temporary directional signs may be no larger than six square feet. § 4.402(P). They may be placed on private property or on a public right-of-way, but no more than four signs may be placed on a single property at any time. Ibid . And, they may be displayed no more than 12 hours before the "qualifying event" and no more than 1 hour afterward. Ibid.

B

Petitioners Good News Community Church (Church) and its pastor, Clyde Reed, wish to advertise the time and location of their Sunday church services. The Church is a small, cash-strapped entity that owns no building, so it holds its services at elementary schools or other locations in or near the Town. In order to inform the public about its services, which are held in a variety of different locations, the Church began placing 15 to 20 temporary signs around the Town, frequently in the public right-of-way abutting the street. The signs typically displayed the Church's name, along with the time and location of the upcoming service. Church members would post the signs early in the day on Saturday and then remove them around midday on Sunday. The display of these signs requires little money and manpower, and thus has proved to be an economical and effective way for the Church to let the community know where its services are being held each week.

This practice caught the attention of the Town's Sign Code compliance manager, who twice cited the Church for violating the Code. The first citation noted that the Church exceeded the time limits for displaying its temporary directional signs. The second citation referred to the same problem, along with the Church's failure to include the date of the event on the signs. Town officials even confiscated one of the Church's signs, which Reed had to retrieve from the municipal offices.

Reed contacted the Sign Code Compliance Department in an attempt to reach an accommodation. His efforts proved unsuccessful. The Town's Code compliance manager informed the Church that there *2226 would be "no leniency under the Code" and promised to punish any future violations.

Shortly thereafter, petitioners filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, arguing that the Sign Code abridged their freedom of speech in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The District Court denied the petitioners' motion for a preliminary injunction. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that the Sign Code's provision regulating temporary directional signs did not regulate speech on the basis of content. 587 F.3d 966 , 979 (2009). It reasoned that, even though an enforcement officer would have to read the sign to determine what provisions of the Sign Code applied to it, the " 'kind of cursory examination' " that would be necessary for an officer to classify it as a temporary directional sign was "not akin to an officer synthesizing the expressive content of the sign." Id., at 978. It then remanded for the District Court to determine in the first instance whether the Sign Code's distinctions among temporary directional signs, political signs, and ideological signs nevertheless constituted a content-based regulation of speech.

On remand, the District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the Town. The Court of Appeals again affirmed, holding that the Code's sign categories were content neutral. The court concluded that "the distinctions between Temporary Directional Signs, Ideological Signs, and Political Signs ... are based on objective factors relevant to Gilbert's creation of the specific exemption from the permit requirement and do not otherwise consider the substance of the sign." 707 F.3d 1057 , 1069 (C.A.9 2013). Relying on this Court's decision in Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 , 120 S.Ct. 2480 , 147 L.Ed.2d 597 (2000), the Court of Appeals concluded that the Sign Code is content neutral. 707 F.3d, at 1071-1072 . As the court explained, "Gilbert did not adopt its regulation of speech because it disagreed with the message conveyed" and its "interests in regulat[ing] temporary signs are unrelated to the content of the sign." Ibid. Accordingly, the court believed that the Code was "content-neutral as that term [has been] defined by the Supreme Court." Id., at 1071. In light of that determination, it applied a lower level of scrutiny to the Sign Code and concluded that the law did not violate the First Amendment. Id., at 1073-1076.

We granted certiorari, 573 U.S. ----, 134 S.Ct. 2900 , 189 L.Ed.2d 854 (2014), and now reverse.

II

A

The First Amendment, applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits the enactment of laws "abridging the freedom of speech." U.S. Const., Amdt. 1. Under that Clause, a government, including a municipal government vested with state authority, "has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content." Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 , 95, 92 S.Ct. 2286 , 33 L.Ed.2d 212 (1972). Content-based laws-those that target speech based on its communicative content-are presumptively unconstitutional and may be justified only if the government proves that they are narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests. R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 , 395, 112 S.Ct. 2538 , 120 L.Ed.2d 305 (1992); Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105 , 115, 118, 112 S.Ct. 501 , 116 L.Ed.2d 476 (1991).

*2227 Government regulation of speech is content based if a law applies to particular speech because of the topic discussed or the idea or message expressed. E.g., Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 564 U.S. ----, ---- - ----, 131 S.Ct. 2653 , 2663-2664, 180 L.Ed.2d 544 (2011); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 , 462, 100 S.Ct. 2286 , 65 L.Ed.2d 263 (1980); Mosley, supra, at 95, 92 S.Ct. 2286 . This commonsense meaning of the phrase "content based" requires a court to consider whether a regulation of speech "on its face" draws distinctions based on the message a speaker conveys. Sorrell, supra, at ----, 131 S.Ct., at 2664 . Some facial distinctions based on a message are obvious, defining regulated speech by particular subject matter, and others are more subtle, defining regulated speech by its function or purpose. Both are distinctions drawn based on the message a speaker conveys, and, therefore, are subject to strict scrutiny.

Our precedents have also recognized a separate and additional category of laws that, though facially content neutral, will be considered content-based regulations of speech: laws that cannot be " 'justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech,' " or that were adopted by the government "because of disagreement with the message [the speech] conveys," Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 , 791, 109 S.Ct. 2746 , 105 L.Ed.2d 661 (1989) . Those laws, like those that are content based on their face, must also satisfy strict scrutiny.

B

The Town's Sign Code is content based on its face. It defines "Temporary Directional Signs" on the basis of whether a sign conveys the message of directing the public to church or some other "qualifying event." Glossary 25. It defines "Political Signs" on the basis of whether a sign's message is "designed to influence the outcome of an election." Id., at 24. And it defines "Ideological Signs" on the basis of whether a sign "communicat [es] a message or ideas" that do not fit within the Code's other categories. Id., at 23. It then subjects each of these categories to different restrictions.

The restrictions in the Sign Code that apply to any given sign thus depend entirely on the communicative content of the sign. If a sign informs its reader of the time and place a book club will discuss John Locke's Two Treatises of Government, that sign will be treated differently from a sign expressing the view that one should vote for one of Locke's followers in an upcoming election, and both signs will be treated differently from a sign expressing an ideological view rooted in Locke's theory of government. More to the point, the Church's signs inviting people to attend its worship services are treated differently from signs conveying other types of ideas. On its face, the Sign Code is a content-based regulation of speech. We thus have no need to consider the government's justifications or purposes for enacting the Code to determine whether it is subject to strict scrutiny.

C

In reaching the contrary conclusion, the Court of Appeals offered several theories to explain why the Town's Sign Code should be deemed content neutral. None is persuasive.

1

The Court of Appeals first determined that the Sign Code was content neutral because the Town "did not adopt its regulation of speech [based on] disagree [ment] with the message conveyed," and its justifications for regulating temporary directional signs were "unrelated to the content of the sign." 707 F.3d, at 1071-1072 .

*2228 In its brief to this Court, the United States similarly contends that a sign regulation is content neutral-even if it expressly draws distinctions based on the sign's communicative content-if those distinctions can be " 'justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech.' " Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 20, 24 (quoting Ward, supra, at 791, 109 S.Ct. 2746 ; emphasis deleted).

But this analysis skips the crucial first step in the content-neutrality analysis: determining whether the law is content neutral on its face. A law that is content based on its face is subject to strict scrutiny regardless of the government's benign motive, content-neutral justification, or lack of "animus toward the ideas contained" in the regulated speech. Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410 , 429, 113 S.Ct. 1505 , 123 L.Ed.2d 99 (1993). We have thus made clear that " '[i]llicit legislative intent is not the sine qua non of a violation of the First Amendment,' " and a party opposing the government "need adduce 'no evidence of an improper censorial motive.' " Simon & Schuster, supra, at 117, 112 S.Ct. 501 . Although "a content-based purpose may be sufficient in certain circumstances to show that a regulation is content based, it is not necessary." Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 , 642, 114 S.Ct. 2445 , 129 L.Ed.2d 497 (1994). In other words, an innocuous justification cannot transform a facially content-based law into one that is content neutral.

That is why we have repeatedly considered whether a law is content neutral on its face before turning to the law's justification or purpose. See, e.g., Sorrell, supra, at ---- - ----, 131 S.Ct., at 2663-2664 (statute was content based "on its face," and there was also evidence of an impermissible legislative motive); United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 , 315, 110 S.Ct. 2404 , 110 L.Ed.2d 287 (1990)("Although the [statute] contains no explicit content-based limitation on the scope of prohibited conduct, it is nevertheless clear that the Government's asserted interest is related to the suppression of free expression" (internal quotation marks omitted)); Members of City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 , 804, 104 S.Ct. 2118 , 80 L.Ed.2d 772 (1984)("The text of the ordinance is neutral," and "there is not even a hint of bias or censorship in the City's enactment or enforcement of this ordinance"); Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 , 293, 104 S.Ct. 3065 , 82 L.Ed.2d 221 (1984)(requiring that a facially content-neutral ban on camping must be "justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech"); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 , 375, 377, 88 S.Ct. 1673 , 20 L.Ed.2d 672 (1968)(noting that the statute "on its face deals with conduct having no connection with speech," but examining whether the "the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression"). Because strict scrutiny applies either when a law is content based on its face or when the purpose and justification for the law are content based, a court must evaluate each question before it concludes that the law is content neutral and thus subject to a lower level of scrutiny.

The Court of Appeals and the United States misunderstand our decision in Ward as suggesting that a government's purpose is relevant even when a law is content based on its face. That is incorrect. Ward had nothing to say about facially content-based restrictions because it involved a facially content- neutral ban on the use, in a city-owned music venue, of sound amplification systems not provided by the city. 491 U.S., at 787 , and n. 2, 109 S.Ct. 2746 . In that context, we looked to *2229 governmental motive, including whether the government had regulated speech "because of disagreement" with its message, and whether the regulation was " 'justified without reference to the content of the speech.' " Id., at 791, 109 S.Ct. 2746 . But Ward 's framework "applies only if a statute is content neutral." Hill, 530 U.S., at 766 , 120 S.Ct. 2480 (KENNEDY, J., dissenting). Its rules thus operate "to protect speech," not "to restrict it." Id., at 765, 120 S.Ct. 2480 .

The First Amendment requires no less. Innocent motives do not eliminate the danger of censorship presented by a facially content-based statute, as future government officials may one day wield such statutes to suppress disfavored speech. That is why the First Amendment expressly targets the operation of the laws- i.e., the "abridg[ement] of speech"-rather than merely the motives of those who enacted them. U.S. Const., Amdt. 1. " 'The vice of content-based legislation ... is not that it is always used for invidious, thought-control purposes, but that it lends itself to use for those purposes.' " Hill, supra, at 743, 120 S.Ct. 2480 (SCALIA, J., dissenting).

For instance, in NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 , 83 S.Ct. 328 , 9 L.Ed.2d 405 (1963), the Court encountered a State's attempt to use a statute prohibiting " 'improper solicitation' " by attorneys to outlaw litigation-related speech of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People. Id., at 438, 83 S.Ct. 328 . Although Button predated our more recent formulations of strict scrutiny, the Court rightly rejected the State's claim that its interest in the "regulation of professional conduct" rendered the statute consistent with the First Amendment, observing that "it is no answer ... to say ... that the purpose of these regulations was merely to insure high professional standards and not to curtail free expression." Id., at 438-439, 83 S.Ct. 328 . Likewise, one could easily imagine a Sign Code compliance manager who disliked the Church's substantive teachings deploying the Sign Code to make it more difficult for the Church to inform the public of the location of its services. Accordingly, we have repeatedly "rejected the argument that 'discriminatory ... treatment is suspect under the First Amendment only when the legislature intends to suppress certain ideas.' " Discovery Network, 507 U.S., at 429 , 113 S.Ct. 1505 . We do so again today.

2

The Court of Appeals next reasoned that the Sign Code was content neutral because it "does not mention any idea or viewpoint, let alone single one out for differential treatment." 587 F.3d, at 977 . It reasoned that, for the purpose of the Code provisions, "[i]t makes no difference which candidate is supported, who sponsors the event, or what ideological perspective is asserted." 707 F.3d, at 1069 .

The Town seizes on this reasoning, insisting that "content based" is a term of art that "should be applied flexibly" with the goal of protecting "viewpoints and ideas from government censorship or favoritism." Brief for Respondents 22. In the Town's view, a sign regulation that "does not censor or favor particular viewpoints or ideas" cannot be content based. Ibid . The Sign Code allegedly passes this test because its treatment of temporary directional signs does not raise any concerns that the government is "endorsing or suppressing 'ideas or viewpoints,' " id., at 27, and the provisions for political signs and ideological signs "are neutral as to particular ideas or viewpoints" within those categories. Id., at 37.

This analysis conflates two distinct but related limitations that the First *2230 Amendment places on government regulation of speech. Government discrimination among viewpoints-or the regulation of speech based on "the specific motivating ideology or the opinion or perspective of the speaker"-is a "more blatant" and "egregious form of content discrimination." Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 , 829, 115 S.Ct. 2510 , 132 L.Ed.2d 700 (1995). But it is well established that "[t]he First Amendment's hostility to content-based regulation extends not only to restrictions on particular viewpoints, but also to prohibition of public discussion of an entire topic." Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N. Y., 447 U.S. 530 , 537, 100 S.Ct. 2326 , 65 L.Ed.2d 319 (1980).

Thus, a speech regulation targeted at specific subject matter is content based even if it does not discriminate among viewpoints within that subject matter. Ibid. For example, a law banning the use of sound trucks for political speech-and only political speech-would be a content-based regulation, even if it imposed no limits on the political viewpoints that could be expressed. See Discovery Network, supra, at 428, 113 S.Ct. 1505 . The Town's Sign Code likewise singles out specific subject matter for differential treatment, even if it does not target viewpoints within that subject matter. Ideological messages are given more favorable treatment than messages concerning a political candidate, which are themselves given more favorable treatment than messages announcing an assembly of like-minded individuals. That is a paradigmatic example of content-based discrimination.

3

Finally, the Court of Appeals characterized the Sign Code's distinctions as turning on " 'the content-neutral elements of who is speaking through the sign and whether and when an event is occurring.' " 707 F.3d, at 1069 . That analysis is mistaken on both factual and legal grounds.

To start, the Sign Code's distinctions are not speaker based. The restrictions for political, ideological, and temporary event signs apply equally no matter who sponsors them. If a local business, for example, sought to put up signs advertising the Church's meetings, those signs would be subject to the same limitations as such signs placed by the Church. And if Reed had decided to display signs in support of a particular candidate, he could have made those signs far larger-and kept them up for far longer-than signs inviting people to attend his church services. If the Code's distinctions were truly speaker based, both types of signs would receive the same treatment.

In any case, the fact that a distinction is speaker based does not, as the Court of Appeals seemed to believe, automatically render the distinction content neutral. Because "[s]peech restrictions based on the identity of the speaker are all too often simply a means to control content," Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310 , 340, 130 S.Ct. 876 , 175 L.Ed.2d 753 (2010), we have insisted that "laws favoring some speakers over others demand strict scrutiny when the legislature's speaker preference reflects a content preference," Turner, 512 U.S., at 658 , 114 S.Ct. 2445 . Thus, a law limiting the content of newspapers, but only newspapers, could not evade strict scrutiny simply because it could be characterized as speaker based. Likewise, a content-based law that restricted the political speech of all corporations would not become content neutral just because it singled out corporations as a class of speakers. See Citizens United, supra, at 340-341, 130 S.Ct. 876 . Characterizing a distinction *2231 as speaker based is only the beginning-not the end-of the inquiry.

Nor do the Sign Code's distinctions hinge on "whether and when an event is occurring." The Code does not permit citizens to post signs on any topic whatsoever within a set period leading up to an election, for example. Instead, come election time, it requires Town officials to determine whether a sign is "designed to influence the outcome of an election" (and thus "political") or merely "communicating a message or ideas for noncommercial purposes" (and thus "ideological"). Glossary 24. That obvious content-based inquiry does not evade strict scrutiny review simply because an event ( i.e., an election) is involved.

And, just as with speaker-based laws, the fact that a distinction is event based does not render it content neutral. The Court of Appeals cited no precedent from this Court supporting its novel theory of an exception from the content-neutrality requirement for event-based laws. As we have explained, a speech regulation is content based if the law applies to particular speech because of the topic discussed or the idea or message expressed. Supra, at 2226 - 2227. A regulation that targets a sign because it conveys an idea about a specific event is no less content based than a regulation that targets a sign because it conveys some other idea. Here, the Code singles out signs bearing a particular message: the time and location of a specific event. This type of ordinance may seem like a perfectly rational way to regulate signs, but a clear and firm rule governing content neutrality is an essential means of protecting the freedom of speech, even if laws that might seem "entirely reasonable" will sometimes be "struck down because of their content-based nature." City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43 , 60, 114 S.Ct. 2038 , 129 L.Ed.2d 36 (1994)(O'Connor, J., concurring).

III

Because the Town's Sign Code imposes content-based restrictions on speech, those provisions can stand only if they survive strict scrutiny, " 'which requires the Government to prove that the restriction furthers a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest,' " Arizona Free Enterprise Club's Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 564 U.S. ----, ----, 131 S.Ct. 2806 , 2817, 180 L.Ed.2d 664 (2011)(quoting Citizens United, 558 U.S., at 340 , 130 S.Ct. 876 ). Thus, it is the Town's burden to demonstrate that the Code's differentiation between temporary directional signs and other types of signs, such as political signs and ideological signs, furthers a compelling governmental interest and is narrowly tailored to that end. See ibid .

The Town cannot do so. It has offered only two governmental interests in support of the distinctions the Sign Code draws: preserving the Town's aesthetic appeal and traffic safety. Assuming for the sake of argument that those are compelling governmental interests, the Code's distinctions fail as hopelessly underinclusive.

Starting with the preservation of aesthetics, temporary directional signs are "no greater an eyesore," Discovery Network, 507 U.S., at 425 , 113 S.Ct. 1505 , than ideological or political ones. Yet the Code allows unlimited proliferation of larger ideological signs while strictly limiting the number, size, and duration of smaller directional ones. The Town cannot claim that placing strict limits on temporary directional signs is necessary to beautify the Town while at the same time allowing unlimited numbers of other types of signs that create the same problem.

*2232 The Town similarly has not shown that limiting temporary directional signs is necessary to eliminate threats to traffic safety, but that limiting other types of signs is not. The Town has offered no reason to believe that directional signs pose a greater threat to safety than do ideological or political signs. If anything, a sharply worded ideological sign seems more likely to distract a driver than a sign directing the public to a nearby church meeting.

In light of this underinclusiveness, the Town has not met its burden to prove that its Sign Code is narrowly tailored to further a compelling government interest. Because a " 'law cannot be regarded as protecting an interest of the highest order, and thus as justifying a restriction on truthful speech, when it leaves appreciable damage to that supposedly vital interest unprohibited,' " Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 , 780, 122 S.Ct. 2528 , 153 L.Ed.2d 694 (2002), the Sign Code fails strict scrutiny.

IV

Our decision today will not prevent governments from enacting effective sign laws. The Town asserts that an " 'absolutist' " content-neutrality rule would render "virtually all distinctions in sign laws ... subject to strict scrutiny," Brief for Respondents 34-35, but that is not the case. Not "all distinctions" are subject to strict scrutiny, only content-based ones are. Laws that are content neutral are instead subject to lesser scrutiny. See Clark, 468 U.S., at 295 , 104 S.Ct. 3065 .

The Town has ample content-neutral options available to resolve problems with safety and aesthetics. For example, its current Code regulates many aspects of signs that have nothing to do with a sign's message: size, building materials, lighting, moving parts, and portability. See, e.g., § 4.402(R). And on public property, the Town may go a long way toward entirely forbidding the posting of signs, so long as it does so in an evenhanded, content-neutral manner. See Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S., at 817 , 104 S.Ct. 2118 (upholding content-neutral ban against posting signs on public property). Indeed, some lower courts have long held that similar content-based sign laws receive strict scrutiny, but there is no evidence that towns in those jurisdictions have suffered catastrophic effects. See, e.g., Solantic, LLC v. Neptune Beach, 410 F.3d 1250 , 1264-1269 (C.A.11 2005)(sign categories similar to the town of Gilbert's were content based and subject to strict scrutiny); Matthews v. Needham, 764 F.2d 58 , 59-60 (C.A.1 1985)(law banning political signs but not commercial signs was content based and subject to strict scrutiny).

We acknowledge that a city might reasonably view the general regulation of signs as necessary because signs "take up space and may obstruct views, distract motorists, displace alternative uses for land, and pose other problems that legitimately call for regulation." City of Ladue, 512 U.S., at 48 , 114 S.Ct. 2038 . At the same time, the presence of certain signs may be essential, both for vehicles and pedestrians, to guide traffic or to identify hazards and ensure safety. A sign ordinance narrowly tailored to the challenges of protecting the safety of pedestrians, drivers, and passengers-such as warning signs marking hazards on private property, signs directing traffic, or street numbers associated with private houses-well might survive strict scrutiny. The signs at issue in this case, including political and ideological signs and signs for events, are far removed from those purposes. As discussed above, they are facially content based and are neither justified by traditional safety concerns nor narrowly tailored.

* * *

*2233 We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Justice ALITO, with whom Justice KENNEDYand Justice SOTOMAYORjoin, concurring.

I join the opinion of the Court but add a few words of further explanation.

As the Court holds, what we have termed "content-based" laws must satisfy strict scrutiny. Content-based laws merit this protection because they present, albeit sometimes in a subtler form, the same dangers as laws that regulate speech based on viewpoint. Limiting speech based on its "topic" or "subject" favors those who do not want to disturb the status quo. Such regulations may interfere with democratic self-government and the search for truth. See Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N. Y., 447 U.S. 530 , 537, 100 S.Ct. 2326 , 65 L.Ed.2d 319 (1980).

As the Court shows, the regulations at issue in this case are replete with content-based distinctions, and as a result they must satisfy strict scrutiny. This does not mean, however, that municipalities are powerless to enact and enforce reasonable sign regulations. I will not attempt to provide anything like a comprehensive list, but here are some rules that would not be content based:

Rules regulating the size of signs. These rules may distinguish among signs based on any content-neutral criteria, including any relevant criteria listed below.

Rules regulating the locations in which signs may be placed. These rules may distinguish between free-standing signs and those attached to buildings.

Rules distinguishing between lighted and unlighted signs.

Rules distinguishing between signs with fixed messages and electronic signs with messages that change.

Rules that distinguish between the placement of signs on private and public property.

Rules distinguishing between the placement of signs on commercial and residential property.

Rules distinguishing between on-premises and off-premises signs.

Rules restricting the total number of signs allowed per mile of roadway.

Rules imposing time restrictions on signs advertising a one-time event. Rules of this nature do not discriminate based on topic or subject and are akin to rules restricting the times within which oral speech or music is allowed. *

In addition to regulating signs put up by private actors, government entities may also erect their own signs consistent with the principles that allow governmental speech. See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460 , 467-469, 129 S.Ct. 1125 , 172 L.Ed.2d 853 (2009). They may put up all manner of signs to promote safety, as well as directional signs and signs pointing out historic sites and scenic spots.

Properly understood, today's decision will not prevent cities from regulating signs in a way that fully protects public *2234 safety and serves legitimate esthetic objectives.

Justice BREYER, concurring in the judgment.

I join Justice KAGAN's separate opinion. Like Justice KAGAN I believe that categories alone cannot satisfactorily resolve the legal problem before us. The First Amendment requires greater judicial sensitivity both to the Amendment's expressive objectives and to the public's legitimate need for regulation than a simple recitation of categories, such as "content discrimination" and "strict scrutiny," would permit. In my view, the category "content discrimination" is better considered in many contexts, including here, as a rule of thumb, rather than as an automatic "strict scrutiny" trigger, leading to almost certain legal condemnation.

To use content discrimination to trigger strict scrutiny sometimes makes perfect sense. There are cases in which the Court has found content discrimination an unconstitutional method for suppressing a viewpoint. E.g., Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 , 828-829, 115 S.Ct. 2510 , 132 L.Ed.2d 700 (1995); see also Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 , 318-319, 108 S.Ct. 1157 , 99 L.Ed.2d 333 (1988)(plurality opinion) (applying strict scrutiny where the line between subject matter and viewpoint was not obvious). And there are cases where the Court has found content discrimination to reveal that rules governing a traditional public forum are, in fact, not a neutral way of fairly managing the forum in the interest of all speakers. Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 , 96, 92 S.Ct. 2286 , 33 L.Ed.2d 212 (1972)("Once a forum is opened up to assembly or speaking by some groups, government may not prohibit others from assembling or speaking on the basis of what they intend to say"). In these types of cases, strict scrutiny is often appropriate, and content discrimination has thus served a useful purpose.

But content discrimination, while helping courts to identify unconstitutional suppression of expression, cannot and should not always trigger strict scrutiny. To say that it is not an automatic "strict scrutiny" trigger is not to argue against that concept's use. I readily concede, for example, that content discrimination, as a conceptual tool, can sometimes reveal weaknesses in the government's rationale for a rule that limits speech. If, for example, a city looks to litter prevention as the rationale for a prohibition against placing newsracks dispensing free advertisements on public property, why does it exempt other newsracks causing similar litter? Cf. Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410 , 113 S.Ct. 1505 , 123 L.Ed.2d 99 (1993). I also concede that, whenever government disfavors one kind of speech, it places that speech at a disadvantage, potentially interfering with the free marketplace of ideas and with an individual's ability to express thoughts and ideas that can help that individual determine the kind of society in which he wishes to live, help shape that society, and help define his place within it.

Nonetheless, in these latter instances to use the presence of content discrimination automatically to trigger strict scrutiny and thereby call into play a strong presumption against constitutionality goes too far. That is because virtually all government activities involve speech, many of which involve the regulation of speech. Regulatory programs almost always require content discrimination. And to hold that such content discrimination triggers strict scrutiny is to write a recipe for judicial management of ordinary government regulatory activity.

Consider a few examples of speech regulated by government that inevitably involve *2235 content discrimination, but where a strong presumption against constitutionality has no place. Consider governmental regulation of securities, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78 l (requirements for content that must be included in a registration statement); of energy conservation labeling-practices, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 6294 (requirements for content that must be included on labels of certain consumer electronics); of prescription drugs, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 353 (b)(4)(A)(requiring a prescription drug label to bear the symbol "Rx only"); of doctor-patient confidentiality, e.g., 38 U.S.C. § 7332 (requiring confidentiality of certain medical records, but allowing a physician to disclose that the patient has HIV to the patient's spouse or sexual partner); of income tax statements, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 6039F(requiring taxpayers to furnish information about foreign gifts received if the aggregate amount exceeds $10,000); of commercial airplane briefings, e.g., 14 CFR § 136.7 (2015)(requiring pilots to ensure that each passenger has been briefed on flight procedures, such as seatbelt fastening); of signs at petting zoos, e.g., N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law Ann. § 399 -ff(3) (West Cum. Supp. 2015) (requiring petting zoos to post a sign at every exit " 'strongly recommend[ing] that persons wash their hands upon exiting the petting zoo area' "); and so on.

Nor can the majority avoid the application of strict scrutiny to all sorts of justifiable governmental regulations by relying on this Court's many subcategories and exceptions to the rule. The Court has said, for example, that we should apply less strict standards to "commercial speech." Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Service Comm'n of N. Y., 447 U.S. 557 , 562-563, 100 S.Ct. 2343 , 65 L.Ed.2d 341 (1980). But I have great concern that many justifiable instances of "content-based" regulation are noncommercial. And, worse than that, the Court has applied the heightened "strict scrutiny" standard even in cases where the less stringent "commercial speech" standard was appropriate. See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. ----, ----, 131 S.Ct. 2653 , 2664, 180 L.Ed.2d 544 (2011)(BREYER, J., dissenting). The Court has also said that "government speech" escapes First Amendment strictures. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 , 193-194, 111 S.Ct. 1759 , 114 L.Ed.2d 233 (1991). But regulated speech is typically private speech, not government speech. Further, the Court has said that, "[w]hen the basis for the content discrimination consists entirely of the very reason the entire class of speech at issue is proscribable, no significant danger of idea or viewpoint discrimination exists." R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 , 388, 112 S.Ct. 2538 , 120 L.Ed.2d 305 (1992). But this exception accounts for only a few of the instances in which content discrimination is readily justifiable.

I recognize that the Court could escape the problem by watering down the force of the presumption against constitutionality that "strict scrutiny" normally carries with it. But, in my view, doing so will weaken the First Amendment's protection in instances where "strict scrutiny" should apply in full force.

The better approach is to generally treat content discrimination as a strong reason weighing against the constitutionality of a rule where a traditional public forum, or where viewpoint discrimination, is threatened, but elsewhere treat it as a rule of thumb, finding it a helpful, but not determinative legal tool, in an appropriate case, to determine the strength of a justification. I would use content discrimination as a supplement to a more basic analysis, which, tracking most of our First Amendment cases, asks whether the regulation at issue works harm to First Amendment interests that is disproportionate in light of *2236 the relevant regulatory objectives. Answering this question requires examining the seriousness of the harm to speech, the importance of the countervailing objectives, the extent to which the law will achieve those objectives, and whether there are other, less restrictive ways of doing so. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. ----, ---- - ----, 132 S.Ct. 2537 , 2551-2553, 183 L.Ed.2d 574 (2012)(BREYER, J., concurring in judgment); Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U.S. 377 , 400-403, 120 S.Ct. 897 , 145 L.Ed.2d 886 (2000)(BREYER, J., concurring). Admittedly, this approach does not have the simplicity of a mechanical use of categories. But it does permit the government to regulate speech in numerous instances where the voters have authorized the government to regulate and where courts should hesitate to substitute judicial judgment for that of administrators.

Here, regulation of signage along the roadside, for purposes of safety and beautification is at issue. There is no traditional public forum nor do I find any general effort to censor a particular viewpoint. Consequently, the specific regulation at issue does not warrant "strict scrutiny." Nonetheless, for the reasons that Justice KAGAN sets forth, I believe that the Town of Gilbert's regulatory rules violate the First Amendment. I consequently concur in the Court's judgment only.

Justice KAGAN, with whom Justice GINSBURGand Justice BREYERjoin, concurring in the judgment.

Countless cities and towns across America have adopted ordinances regulating the posting of signs, while exempting certain categories of signs based on their subject matter. For example, some municipalities generally prohibit illuminated signs in residential neighborhoods, but lift that ban for signs that identify the address of a home or the name of its owner or occupant. See, e.g., City of Truth or Consequences, N. M., Code of Ordinances, ch. 16, Art. XIII, §§ 11-13-2.3, 11-13-2.9(H)(4) (2014). In other municipalities, safety signs such as "Blind Pedestrian Crossing" and "Hidden Driveway" can be posted without a permit, even as other permanent signs require one. See, e.g., Code of Athens-Clarke County, Ga., Pt. III, § 7-4-7(1) (1993). Elsewhere, historic site markers-for example, "George Washington Slept Here"-are also exempt from general regulations. See, e.g., Dover, Del., Code of Ordinances, Pt. II, App. B, Art. 5, § 4.5(F) (2012). And similarly, the federal Highway Beautification Act limits signs along interstate highways unless, for instance, they direct travelers to "scenic and historical attractions" or advertise free coffee. See 23 U.S.C. §§ 131 (b), (c)(1), (c)(5).

Given the Court's analysis, many sign ordinances of that kind are now in jeopardy. See ante, at 2231 (acknowledging that "entirely reasonable" sign laws "will sometimes be struck down" under its approach (internal quotation marks omitted)). Says the majority: When laws "single[ ] out specific subject matter," they are "facially content based"; and when they are facially content based, they are automatically subject to strict scrutiny. Ante, at 2230, 2232 - 2233. And although the majority holds out hope that some sign laws with subject-matter exemptions "might survive" that stringent review, ante, at 2232 - 2233, the likelihood is that most will be struck down. After all, it is the "rare case[ ] in which a speech restriction withstands strict scrutiny." Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, 575 U.S. ----, ----, 135 S.Ct. 1656 , 1666, ---L.Ed.2d ---- (2015). To clear that high bar, the government must show that a content-based distinction "is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and is narrowly drawn to achieve that end." Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc.

*2237 v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221 , 231, 107 S.Ct. 1722 , 95 L.Ed.2d 209 (1987). So on the majority's view, courts would have to determine that a town has a compelling interest in informing passersby where George Washington slept. And likewise, courts would have to find that a town has no other way to prevent hidden-driveway mishaps than by specially treating hidden-driveway signs. (Well-placed speed bumps? Lower speed limits? Or how about just a ban on hidden driveways?) The consequence-unless courts water down strict scrutiny to something unrecognizable-is that our communities will find themselves in an unenviable bind: They will have to either repeal the exemptions that allow for helpful signs on streets and sidewalks, or else lift their sign restrictions altogether and resign themselves to the resulting clutter. *

Although the majority insists that applying strict scrutiny to all such ordinances is "essential" to protecting First Amendment freedoms, ante, at 2231, I find it challenging to understand why that is so. This Court's decisions articulate two important and related reasons for subjecting content-based speech regulations to the most exacting standard of review. The first is "to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail." McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. ----, ---- - ----, 134 S.Ct. 2518 , 2529, 189 L.Ed.2d 502 (2014)(internal quotation marks omitted). The second is to ensure that the government has not regulated speech "based on hostility-or favoritism-towards the underlying message expressed." R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 , 386, 112 S.Ct. 2538 , 120 L.Ed.2d 305 (1992). Yet the subject-matter exemptions included in many sign ordinances do not implicate those concerns. Allowing residents, say, to install a light bulb over "name and address" signs but no others does not distort the marketplace of ideas. Nor does that different treatment give rise to an inference of impermissible government motive.

We apply strict scrutiny to facially content-based regulations of speech, in keeping with the rationales just described, when there is any "realistic possibility that official suppression of ideas is afoot." Davenport v. Washington Ed. Assn., 551 U.S. 177 , 189, 127 S.Ct. 2372 , 168 L.Ed.2d 71 (2007)(quoting R. A.V., 505 U.S., at 390 , 112 S.Ct. 2538 ). That is always the case when the regulation facially differentiates on the basis of viewpoint. See Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 , 829, 115 S.Ct. 2510 , 132 L.Ed.2d 700 (1995). It is also the case (except in non-public or limited public forums) when a law restricts "discussion of an entire topic" in public debate. Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N. Y., 447 U.S. 530 , 537, 539-540, 100 S.Ct. 2326 , 65 L.Ed.2d 319 (1980)(invalidating a limitation on speech about nuclear power). We have stated that "[i]f the marketplace of ideas is to remain free and open, governments must not be allowed to choose 'which issues are worth discussing or debating.' " Id., at 537-538, 100 S.Ct. 2326 (quoting Police Dept. of *2238 Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 , 96, 92 S.Ct. 2286 , 33 L.Ed.2d 212 (1972)). And we have recognized that such subject-matter restrictions, even though viewpoint-neutral on their face, may "suggest[ ] an attempt to give one side of a debatable public question an advantage in expressing its views to the people." First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 , 785, 98 S.Ct. 1407 , 55 L.Ed.2d 707 (1978); accord, ante, at 2233 (ALITO, J., concurring) (limiting all speech on one topic "favors those who do not want to disturb the status quo"). Subject-matter regulation, in other words, may have the intent or effect of favoring some ideas over others. When that is realistically possible-when the restriction "raises the specter that the Government may effectively drive certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace"-we insist that the law pass the most demanding constitutional test. R.A.V., 505 U.S., at 387 , 112 S.Ct. 2538 (quoting Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105 , 116, 112 S.Ct. 501 , 116 L.Ed.2d 476 (1991)).

But when that is not realistically possible, we may do well to relax our guard so that "entirely reasonable" laws imperiled by strict scrutiny can survive. Ante, at 2231. This point is by no means new. Our concern with content-based regulation arises from the fear that the government will skew the public's debate of ideas-so when "that risk is inconsequential, ... strict scrutiny is unwarranted." Davenport, 551 U.S., at 188 , 127 S.Ct. 2372 ; see R.A.V., 505 U.S., at 388 , 112 S.Ct. 2538 (approving certain content-based distinctions when there is "no significant danger of idea or viewpoint discrimination"). To do its intended work, of course, the category of content-based regulation triggering strict scrutiny must sweep more broadly than the actual harm; that category exists to create a buffer zone guaranteeing that the government cannot favor or disfavor certain viewpoints. But that buffer zone need not extend forever. We can administer our content-regulation doctrine with a dose of common sense, so as to leave standing laws that in no way implicate its intended function.

And indeed we have done just that: Our cases have been far less rigid than the majority admits in applying strict scrutiny to facially content-based laws-including in cases just like this one. See Davenport, 551 U.S., at 188 , 127 S.Ct. 2372 (noting that "we have identified numerous situations in which [the] risk" attached to content-based laws is "attenuated"). In Members of City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 , 104 S.Ct. 2118 , 80 L.Ed.2d 772 (1984), the Court declined to apply strict scrutiny to a municipal ordinance that exempted address numbers and markers commemorating "historical, cultural, or artistic event[s]" from a generally applicable limit on sidewalk signs. Id., at 792, n. 1, 104 S.Ct. 2118 (listing exemptions); see id., at 804-810, 104 S.Ct. 2118 (upholding ordinance under intermediate scrutiny). After all, we explained, the law's enactment and enforcement revealed "not even a hint of bias or censorship." Id., at 804, 104 S.Ct. 2118 ; see also Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 , 48, 106 S.Ct. 925 , 89 L.Ed.2d 29 (1986)(applying intermediate scrutiny to a zoning law that facially distinguished among movie theaters based on content because it was "designed to prevent crime, protect the city's retail trade, [and] maintain property values ..., not to suppress the expression of unpopular views"). And another decision involving a similar law provides an alternative model. In City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43 , 114 S.Ct. 2038 , 129 L.Ed.2d 36 (1994), the Court assumed arguendo that a sign ordinance's exceptions for address *2239 signs, safety signs, and for-sale signs in residential areas did not trigger strict scrutiny. See id., at 46-47, and n. 6, 114 S.Ct. 2038 (listing exemptions); id., at 53, 114 S.Ct. 2038 (noting this assumption). We did not need to, and so did not, decide the level-of-scrutiny question because the law's breadth made it unconstitutional under any standard.

The majority could easily have taken Ladue 's tack here. The Town of Gilbert's defense of its sign ordinance-most notably, the law's distinctions between directional signs and others-does not pass strict scrutiny, or intermediate scrutiny, or even the laugh test. See ante, at 2231 - 2232 (discussing those distinctions). The Town, for example, provides no reason at all for prohibiting more than four directional signs on a property while placing no limits on the number of other types of signs. See Gilbert, Ariz., Land Development Code, ch. I, §§ 4.402(J), (P)(2) (2014). Similarly, the Town offers no coherent justification for restricting the size of directional signs to 6 square feet while allowing other signs to reach 20 square feet. See §§ 4.402(J), (P)(1). The best the Town could come up with at oral argument was that directional signs "need to be smaller because they need to guide travelers along a route." Tr. of Oral Arg. 40. Why exactly a smaller sign better helps travelers get to where they are going is left a mystery. The absence of any sensible basis for these and other distinctions dooms the Town's ordinance under even the intermediate scrutiny that the Court typically applies to "time, place, or manner" speech regulations. Accordingly, there is no need to decide in this case whether strict scrutiny applies to every sign ordinance in every town across this country containing a subject-matter exemption.

I suspect this Court and others will regret the majority's insistence today on answering that question in the affirmative. As the years go by, courts will discover that thousands of towns have such ordinances, many of them "entirely reasonable." Ante, at 2231. And as the challenges to them mount, courts will have to invalidate one after the other. (This Court may soon find itself a veritable Supreme Board of Sign Review.) And courts will strike down those democratically enacted local laws even though no one-certainly not the majority-has ever explained why the vindication of First Amendment values requires that result. Because I see no reason why such an easy case calls for us to cast a constitutional pall on reasonable regulations quite unlike the law before us, I concur only in the judgment.

Justice White

delivered the opinion of the Court.

The issue before us is the constitutionality of § 223(b) of the Communications Act of 1934. 47 U. S. C. § 223(b) (1982 ed., Supp. V). The statute, as amended in 1988, imposes an outright ban on indecent as well as obscene interstate commercial telephone messages. The District Court upheld the prohibition against obscene interstate telephone communications for commercial purposes, but enjoined the enforcement of the statute insofar as it applied to indecent messages. We affirm the District Court in both respects.

HH

In 1983, Sable Communications, Inc., a Los Angeles-based affiliate of Carlin Communications, Inc., began offering sexu*118ally oriented prerecorded telephone messages1 (popularly known as “dial-a-porn”) through the Pacific Bell telephone network. In order to provide the messages, Sable arranged with Pacific Bell to use special telephone lines, designed to handle large volumes of calls simultaneously. Those who called the adult message number were charged a special fee. The fee was collected by Pacific Bell and divided between the phone company and the message provider. Callers outside the Los Angeles metropolitan area could reach the number by means of a long-distance toll call to the Los Angeles area code.

In 1988, Sable brought suit in District Court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against enforcement of the recently amended § 223(b). The 1988 amendments to the statute imposed a blanket prohibition on indecent as well as obscene interstate commercial telephone messages. Sable brought this action to enjoin the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and the Justice Department from initiating any criminal investigation or prosecution, civil action or administrative proceeding under the statute. Sable also sought a declaratory judgment, challenging the indecency and the obscenity provisions of the amended § 223(b) as unconstitutional, chiefly under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution.

The District Court found that a concrete controversy existed and that Sable met the irreparable injury requirement for issuance of a preliminary injunction under Elrod v. Burns, 427 U. S. 347, 373 (1976). 692 F. Supp. 1208, 1209 (CD Cal. 1988). The District Court denied Sable’s request for a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the statute’s ban on obscene telephone messages, rejecting the argument that the statute was unconstitutional because it created a national standard of obscenity. The District Court, how*119ever, struck down the “indecent speech” provision of § 223(b), holding that in this respect the statute was overbroad and unconstitutional and that this result was consistent with FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U. S. 726 (1978). “While the government unquestionably has a legitimate interest in, e. g., protecting children from exposure to indecent dial-a-porn messages, § 223(b) is not narrowly drawn to achieve any such purpose. Its flat-out ban of indecent speech is contrary to the First Amendment.” 692 F. Supp., at 1209. Therefore, the court issued a preliminary injunction prohibiting enforcement of § 223(b) with respect to any communication alleged to be “indecent.”

We noted probable jurisdiction on Sable’s appeal of the obscenity ruling (No. 88-515); we also noted probable jurisdiction on the federal parties’ cross-appeal of the preliminary injunction holding the statute unconstitutional with respect to its ban on indecent speech (No. 88-525). 488 U. S. 1003 (1989).2

II

While dial-a-porn services are a creature of this decade, the medium, in its brief history, has been the subject of much litigation and the object of a series of attempts at regula*120tion.3 The first litigation involving dial-a-porn was brought under 82 Stat. 112, 47 U. S. C. § 223, which proscribed knowingly “permitting a telephone under [one’s] control” to be used to make “any comment, request, suggestion or proposal which is obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, or indecent.” However, the FCC concluded in an administrative action that the existing law did not cover dial-a-porn. In re Application for Review of Complaint Filed by Peter F. Cohalan, FCC File No. E-83-14 (memorandum opinions and orders adopted May 13, 1983).

In reaction to that FCC determination, Congress made its first effort explicitly to address “dial-a-porn” when it added a subsection 223(b) to the 1934 Communications Act. The provision, which was the predecessor to the amendment at issue in this case, pertained directly to sexually oriented commercial telephone messages and sought to restrict the access of minors to dial-a-porn. The relevant provision of the Act, Federal Communications Commission Authorization Act of 1983, Pub. L. 98-214, §8(b), 97 Stat. 1470, made it a crime to use telephone facilities to make “obscene or indecent” interstate telephone communications “for commercial purposes to any person under eighteen years of age or to any other person without that person’s consent.” 47 U. S. C. §223(b)(1) (A) (1982 ed., Supp. V). The statute criminalized commercial transmission of sexually oriented communications to minors and required the FCC to promulgate regulations laying out the means by which dial-a-porn sponsors could screen out underaged callers. § 223(b)(2). The enactment provided that it would be a defense to prosecution that the defendant restricted access to adults only, in accordance with procedures established by the FCC. The statute did not criminal*121ize sexually oriented messages to adults, whether the messages were obscene or indecent.

The FCC initially promulgated regulations that would have established a defense to message providers operating only between the hours of 9 p.m. and 8 a.m. eastern time (time channeling) and to providers requiring payment by credit card (screening) before transmission of the dial-a-porn message. Restrictions on Obscene or Indecent Telephone Message Services, 47 CFR §64.201 (1988). In Carlin Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 749 F. 2d 113 (1984) (Carlin I), the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit set aside the time channeling regulations and remanded to the FCC to examine other alternatives, concluding that the operating hours requirement was “both overinclusive and underinclusive” because it denied “access to adults between certain hours, but not to youths who can easily pick up a private or public telephone and call dial-a-porn during the remaining hours.” Id., at 121. The Court of Appeals did not reach the constitutionality of the underlying legislation.

In 1985, the FCC promulgated new regulations which continued to permit credit card payment as a defense to prosecution. Instead of time restrictions, however, the Commission added a defense based on use of access codes (user identification codes). Thus, it would be a defense to prosecution under § 223(b) if the defendant, before transmission of the message, restricted customer access by requiring either payment by credit card or authorization by access or identification code. 50 Fed. Reg. 42699, 42705 (1985). The regulations required each dial-a-porn vendor to develop an identification code data base and implementation scheme. Callers would be required to provide an access number for identification (or a credit card) before receiving the message. The access code would be received through the mail after the message provider reviewed the application and concluded through a written age ascertainment procedure that the ap*122plicant was at least 18 years of age. The FCC rejected a proposal for “exchange blocking” which would block or screen telephone numbers at the customer’s premises or at the telephone company offices. In Carlin Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 787 F. 2d 846 (CA2 1986) (Carlin II), the Court of Appeals set aside the new regulations because of the FCC’s failure adequately to consider customer premises blocking. Again, the constitutionality of the underlying legislation was not addressed.

The FCC then promulgated a third set of regulations, which again rejected customer premises blocking but added to the prior defenses of credit card payment and access code use a third defense: message scrambling. 52 Fed. Reg. 17760 (1987). Under this system, providers would scramble the message, which would then be unintelligible without the use of a descrambler, the sale of which would be limited to adults. On January 15, 1988, in Carlin Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 837 F. 2d 546 (Carlin III), cert. denied, 488 U. S. 924 (1988), the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the new regulations, which made access codes, along with credit card payments and scrambled messages, defenses to prosecution under § 223(b) for dial-a-porn providers, were supported by the evidence, had been properly arrived at, and were a “feasible and effective way to serve” the “compelling state interest” in protecting minors, 837 F. 2d, at 555; but the Court directed the FCC to reopen proceedings if a less restrictive technology became available. The Court of Appeals, however, this time reaching the constitutionality of the statute, invalidated § 223(b) insofar as it sought to apply to nonobscene speech. Id., at 560, 561.

Thereafter, in April 1988, Congress amended § 223(b) of the Communications Act to prohibit indecent as well as obscene interstate commercial telephone communications directed to any person regardless of age. The amended statute, which took effect on July 1, 1988, also eliminated the requirement that the FCC promulgate regulations for re*123stricting access to minors since a total ban was imposed on dial-a-porn, making it illegal for adults, as well as children, to have access to the sexually explicit messages, Pub. L. 100-297, 102 Stat. 424.4 It was this version of the statute that was in effect when Sable commenced this action.5

*124r — <

In the ruling at issue in No. 88-515, the District Court upheld § 223(b)’s prohibition of obscene telephone messages as constitutional. We agree with that judgment. In contrast to the prohibition on indecent communications, there is no constitutional barrier to the ban on obscene dial-a-porn recordings. We have repeatedly held that the protection of the First Amendment does not extend to obscene speech. See, e. g., Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U. S. 49, 69 (1973). The cases before us today do not require us to decide what is obscene or what is indecent but rather to determine whether Congress is empowered to prohibit transmission of obscene telephonic communications.

In its facial challenge to the statute, Sable argues that the legislation creates an impermissible national standard of obscenity, and that it places message senders in a “double bind” by compelling them to tailor all their messages to the least tolerant community.6

We do not read § 223(b) as contravening the “contemporary community standards” requirement of Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 15 (1973). Section 223(b) no more establishes a “national standard” of obscenity than do federal statutes *125prohibiting the mailing of obscene materials, 18 U. S. C. § 1461, see Hamling v. United States, 418 U. S. 87 (1974), or the broadcasting of obscene messages, 18 U. S. C. §1464. In United States v. Reidel, 402 U. S. 351 (1971), we said that Congress could prohibit the use of the mails for commercial distribution of materials properly classifiable as obscene, even though those materials weré being distributed to willing adults who stated that they were adults. Similarly, we hold today that there is no constitutional stricture against Congress’ prohibiting the interstate transmission of obscene commercial telephone recordings.

We stated in United States v. 12 200-ft. Reels of Film, 413 U. S. 123 (1973), that the Miller standards, including the “contemporary community standards” formulation, apply to federal legislation. As we have said before, the fact that “distributors of allegedly obscene materials may be subjected to varying community standards in the various federal judicial districts into which they transmit the materials does not render a federal statute unconstitutional because of the failure of application of uniform national standards of obscenity.” Hamling v. United States, supra, at 106.

Furthermore, Sable is free to tailor its messages, on a selective basis, if it so chooses, to the communities it chooses to serve. While Sable may be forced to incur some costs in developing and implementing a system for screening the locale of incoming calls, there is no constitutional impediment to enacting a law which may impose such costs on a medium electing to provide these messages. Whether Sable chooses to hire operators to determine the source of the calls or engages with the telephone company to arrange for the screening and blocking of out-of-area calls or finds another means for providing messages compatible with community standards is a decision for the message provider to make. There is no constitutional barrier under Miller to prohibiting communications that are obscene in some communities under local standards even though they are not obscene in *126others. If Sable’s audience is comprised of different communities with different local standards, Sable ultimately bears the burden of complying with the prohibition on obscene messages.

IV

In No. 88-525, the District Court concluded that while the Government has a legitimate interest in protecting children from exposure to indecent dial-a-porn messages, § 223(b) was not sufficiently narrowly drawn to serve that purpose and thus violated the First Amendment. We agree.

Sexual expression which is indecent but not obscene is protected by the First Amendment; and the federal parties do not submit that the sale of such materials to adults could be criminalized solely because they are indecent. The Government may, however, regulate the content of constitutionally protected speech in order to promote a compelling interest if it chooses the least restrictive means to further the articulated interest. We have recognized that there is a compelling interest in protecting the physical and psychological well-being of minors. This interest extends to shielding minors from the influence of literature that is not obscene by adult standards. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U. S. 629, 639-640 (1968); New York v. Ferber, 458 U. S. 747, 756-757 (1982). The Government may serve this legitimate interest, but to withstand constitutional scrutiny, “it must do so by narrowly drawn regulations designed to serve those interests without unnecessarily interfering with First Amendment freedoms. Hynes v. Mayor ofOradell, 425 U. S., at 620; First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U. S. 765, 786 (1978).” Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U. S. 620, 637 (1980). It is not enough to show that the Government’s ends are compelling; the means must be carefully tailored to achieve those ends.

In Butler v. Michigan, 352 U. S. 380 (1957), a unanimous Court reversed a conviction under a statute which made it an offense to make available to the general public materials *127found to have a potentially harmful influence on minors. The Court found the law to be insufficiently tailored since it denied adults their free speech rights by allowing them to read only what was acceptable for children. As Justice Frankfurter said in that case, “[s]urely this is to bum the house to roast the pig.” Id., at 383. In our judgment, this case, like Butler, presents us with “legislation not reasonably restricted to the evil with which it is said to deal.” Ibid.

In attempting to justify the complete ban and criminalization of the indecent commercial telephone communications with adults as well as minors, the federal parties rely on FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U. S. 726 (1978), a case in which the Court considered whether the FCC has the power to regulate a radio broadcast that is indecent but not obscene. In an emphatically narrow holding, the Pacifica Court concluded that special treatment of indecent broadcasting was justified.

Pacifica is readily distinguishable from these cases, most obviously because it did not involve a total ban on broadcasting indecent material. The FCC rule was not “ ‘intended to place an absolute prohibition on the broadcast of this type of language, but rather sought to channel it to times of day when children most likely would not be exposed to it.’” Pacifica, supra, at 733, quoting Pacifica Foundation, 59 F. C. C. 2d 892 (1976). The issue of a total ban was not before the Court. 438 U. S., at 750, n. 28.

The Pacifica opinion also relied on the “unique” attributes of broadcasting, noting that broadcasting is “uniquely pervasive,” can intrude on the privacy of the home without prior warning as to program content, and is “uniquely accessible to children, even those too young to read.” Id., at 748-749. The private, commercial telephone communications at issue here are substantially different from the public radio broadcast at issue in Pacifica. In contrast to public displays, unsolicited mailings and other means of expression which the recipient has no meaningful opportunity to avoid, the dial-it *128medium requires the listener to take affirmative steps to receive the communication. There is no “captive audience” problem here; callers will generally not be unwilling listeners. The context of dial-in services, where a caller seeks and is willing to pay for the communication, is manifestly different from a situation in which a listener does not want the received message. Placing a telephone call is not the same as turning on a radio and being taken by surprise by an indecent message. Unlike an unexpected outburst on a radio broadcast, the message received by one who places a call to a dial-a-porn service is not so invasive or surprising that it prevents an unwilling listener from avoiding exposure to it.

The Court in Pacifica was careful “to emphasize the narrowness of [its] holding.” Id., at 750. As we did in Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U. S. 60 (1983), we distinguish Pacifica from the cases before us and reiterate that “the government may not ‘reduce the adult population ... to . . . only what is fit for children.’” 463 U. S., at 73, quoting Butler v. Michigan, supra, at 383.

The federal parties nevertheless argue that the total ban on indecent commercial telephone communications is justified because nothing less could prevent children from gaining access to such messages. We find the argument quite unpersuasive. The FCC, after lengthy proceedings, determined that its credit card, access code, and scrambling rules were a satisfactory solution to the problem of keeping indecent dial-a-porn messages out of the reach of minors. The Court of Appeals, after careful consideration, agreed that these rules represented a “feasible and effective” way to serve the Government’s compelling interest in protecting children. 837 F. 2d, at 555.

The federal parties now insist that the rules would not be effective enough — that enterprising youngsters could and would evade the rules and gain access to communications from which they should be shielded. There is no evidence in the record before us to that effect, nor could there be since *129the FCC’s implementation of § 223(b) prior to its 1988 amendment has never been tested over time. In this respect, the federal parties assert that in amending § 223(b) in 1988, Congress expressed its view that there was not a sufficiently effective way to protect minors short of the total ban that it enacted. The federal parties claim that we must give deference to that judgment.

To the extent that the federal parties suggest that we should defer to Congress’ conclusion about an issue of constitutional law, our answer is that while we do not ignore it, it is our task in the end to decide whether Congress has violated the Constitution. This is particularly true where the Legislature has concluded that its product does not violate the First Amendment. “Deference to a legislative finding cannot limit judicial inquiry when First Amendment rights are at stake.” Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U. S. 829, 843 (1978). The federal parties, however, also urge us to defer to the factual findings by Congress relevant to resolving the constitutional issue; they rely on Walters v. National Association of Radiation Survivors, 473 U. S. 305, 331, n. 12 (1985), and Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U. S. 57, 72-73 (1981). Beyond the fact that whatever deference is due legislative findings would not foreclose our independent judgment of the facts bearing on an issue of constitutional law, our answer is that the congressional record contains no legislative findings that would justify us in concluding that there is no constitutionally acceptable less restrictive means, short of a total ban, to achieve the Government’s interest in protecting minors.

There is no doubt Congress enacted a total ban on both obscene and indecent telephone communications. But aside from conclusory statements during the debates by proponents of the bill,7 as well as similar assertions in hearings on *130a substantially identical bill the year before, H. R. 1786,8 that under the FCC regulations minors could still have access to dial-a-porn messages, the congressional record presented to us contains no evidence as to how effective or ineffective the FCC’s most recent regulations were or might prove to be. It may well be that there is no fail-safe method of guaranteeing that never will a minor be able to access the dial-a-porn system. The bill that was enacted, however, was introduced on the floor; nor was there a committee report on the bill from which the language of the enacted bill was taken. No Congressman or Senator purported to present a considered judgment with respect to how often or to what extent minors could or would circumvent the rules and have access to dial-a-porn messages. On the other hand, in the hearings on H. R. 1786, the Committee heard testimony from the FCC and other witnesses that the FCC rules would be effective and should be tried out in practice.9 Furthermore, at the conclusion of the hearing, the Chairman of the Subcommittee suggested consultation looking toward “drafting a piece of legislation that will pass constitutional muster, while at the same time providing for the practical relief which families and groups are looking for.” Hearings, at 235. The bill never emerged from Committee.

For all we know from this record, the FCC’s technological approach to restricting dial-a-porn messages to adults who seek them would be extremely effective, and only a few of the most enterprising and disobedient young people would manage to secure access to such messages.10 If this is the case, *131it seems to us that § 223(b) is not a narrowly tailored effort to serve the compelling interest of preventing minors from being exposed to indecent telephone messages. Under our precedents, § 223(b), in its present form, has the invalid effect of limiting the content of adult telephone conversations to that which is suitable for children to hear. It is another case of “burn[ing] the house to roast the pig.” Butler v. Michigan, 352 U. S., at 383.

Because the statute’s denial of adult access to telephone messages which are indecent but not obscene far exceeds that which is necessary to limit the access of minors to such messages, we hold that the ban does not survive constitutional scrutiny.

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the District Court in Nos. 88-515 and 88-525.

It is so ordered.

Justice Scalia,

concurring.

I join the opinion of the Court, but add a few words. It should not be missed that we are making a value judgment with respect to the indecency portion of the statute. The conclusion of the reasoning in Part IV of our opinion is as follows:

“For all we know from this record, the FCC’s technological approach to restricting dial-a-porn messages to adults who seek them would be extremely effective, and only a few of the most enterprising and disobedient *132young people would manage to secure access to such messages. If this is the case, it seems to us that § 223(b) is not a narrowly tailored effort to serve the compelling interest of preventing minors from being exposed to indecent telephone messages.” Ante, at 130-131. .

We could as well have said:

“We know from this record that the FCC’s technological approach to restricting dial-a-porn messages to adults who seek them would be inadequate, since some enterprising and disobedient young people would manage to secure access to such messages. Since this is the case, it seems to us that § 223(b) is a narrowly tailored effort to serve the compelling interest of preventing minors from being exposed to indecent telephone messages.”

I join the Court’s opinion because I think it correct that a wholesale prohibition upon adult access to indecent speech cannot be adopted merely because the FCC’s alternate proposal could be circumvented by as few children as the evidence suggests. But where a reasonable person draws the line in this balancing process —that is, how few children render the risk unacceptable — depends in part upon what mere “indecency” (as opposed to “obscenity”) includes. The more narrow the understanding of what is “obscene,” and hence the more pornographic what is embraced within the residual category of “indecency,” the more reasonable it becomes to insist upon greater assurance of insulation from minors. So while the Court is unanimous on the reasoning of Part IV, I am not sure it is unanimous on the assumptions underlying that reasoning. I do not believe, for example, that any sort of sexual activity portrayed or enacted over the phone lines would fall outside of the obscenity portion of the statute that we uphold, and within the indecency portion that we strike down, so long as it appeals only to “normal, healthy sexual desires” as opposed to “shameful or morbid” ones. Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U. S. 491, 498 (1985).

*133In joining Part IV, I do so with the understanding that its examination of the legislative history (ante, at 129-130) is merely meant to establish that no more there than anywhere else can data be found demonstrating the infeasibility of alternative means to provide (given the nature of this material) adequate protection of minors. I do not understand the Court to suggest that such data must have been before Congress in order for the law to be valid. Even though “[n]o Congressman or Senator purported to present a considered judgment” on infeasibility, ante, at 130, the law would be valid if infeasibility was true. Neither due process nor the First Amendment requires legislation to be supported by committee reports, floor debates, or even consideration, but only by a vote.

Finally, I note that while we hold the Constitution prevents Congress from banning indecent speech in this fashion, we do not hold that the Constitution requires public utilities to carry it.

Justice Brennan,

with whom Justice Marshall and Justice Stevens join, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

I agree that a statute imposing criminal penalties for making, or for allowing others to use a telephone under one’s control to make, any indecent telephonic communication for a commercial purpose is patently unconstitutional. I therefore join Parts I, II, and IV of the Court’s opinion.

In my view, however, 47 U. S. C. § 223(b)(l)(A)’s parallel criminal prohibition with regard to obscene commercial communications likewise violates the First Amendment. I have long been convinced that the exaction of criminal penalties for the distribution of obscene materials to consenting adults is constitutionally intolerable. In my judgment, “the concept of ‘obscenity’ cannot be defined with sufficient specificity and clarity to provide fair notice to persons who create and distribute sexually oriented materials, to prevent substantial erosion of protected speech as a byproduct of the attempt *134to suppress unprotected speech, and to avoid very costly institutional harms.” Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U. S. 49, 103 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting). To be sure, the Government has a strong interest in protecting children against exposure to pornographic material that might be harmful to them. New York v. Ferber, 458 U. S. 747, 775-777 (1982) (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U. S. 629 (1968). But a complete criminal ban on obscene telephonic messages for profit is “unconstitutionally overbroad, and therefore invalid on its face,” as a means for achieving this end. Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 15, 47 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).

The very evidence the Court adduces to show that denying adults access to all indecent commercial messages “far exceeds that which is necessary to limit the access of minors to such messages,” ante, at 131, also demonstrates that forbidding the transmission of all obscene messages is unduly heavyhanded. After painstaking scrutiny, both the FCC and the Second Circuit found that “a scheme involving access codes, scrambling, and credit card payment is a feasible and effective way to serve this compelling state interest” in safeguarding children. Carlin Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 837 F. 2d 546, 555, cert. denied, 488 U. S. 924 (1988). And during the 1987 hearings on H. R. 1786, a United States attorney speaking on behalf of the Justice Department described the FCC’s proposed regulations as “very effective,” because they would “dramatically reduc[e] the number of calls from minors in the United States, almost eliminating them.” Telephone Decency Act of 1987: Hearings on H. R. 1786 before the Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 231 (1987). In addition, as the Court notes, ante, at 129-130, no contrary evidence was before Congress when it voted to impose a total prohibition on obscene telephonic messages for profit. Hence, the federal parties cannot plausibly claim that their legitimate interest *135in protecting children warrants this Draconian restriction on the First Amendment rights of adults who seek to hear the messages that Sable and others provide.

Section 223(b)(1)(A) unambiguously proscribes all obscene commercial messages, and thus admits of no construction that would render it constitutionally permissible. Because this criminal statute curtails freedom of speech far more radically than the Government’s interest in preventing harm to minors could possibly license on the record before us, I would reverse the District Court’s decision in No. 88-515 and strike down the statute on its face. Accordingly, I dissent from Part III of the Court’s opinion.

Justice Stevens

delivered the opinion of the Court.

Section 28.04 of the Los Angeles Municipal Code prohibits the posting of signs on public property.1 The question pre*792sented is whether that prohibition abridges appellees’ freedom of speech within the meaning of the First Amendment.2

In March 1979, Roland Vincent was a candidate for election to the Los Angeles City Council. A group of his supporters known as Taxpayers for Vincent (Taxpayers) entered into a contract with a political sign service company known as Candidates’ Outdoor Graphics Service (COGS) to fabricate and post signs with Vincent’s name on them. COGS produced 15- by 44-inch cardboard signs and attached them to utility poles at various locations by draping them over crosswires *793which support the poles and stapling the cardboard together at the bottom. The signs’ message was: “Roland Vincent— City Council.”

Acting under the authority of §28.04 of the Municipal Code, employees of the city’s Bureau of Street Maintenance routinely removed all posters attached to utility poles and similar objects covered by the ordinance, including the COGS signs. The weekly sign removal report covering the period March 1-March 7, 1979, indicated that among the 1,207 signs removed from public property during that week, 48 were identified as “Roland Vincent” signs. Most of the other signs identified in that report were apparently commercial in character.3

On March 12, 1979, Taxpayers and COGS filed this action in the United States District Court for the Central District of California, naming the city, the Director of the Bureau of Street Maintenance, and members of the City Council as defendants.4 They sought an injunction against enforcement of the ordinance as well as compensatory and punitive damages. After engaging in discovery, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment on the issue of liability. The District Court entered findings of fact, concluded that the ordinance was constitutional, and granted the City’s motion.

The District Court’s findings do not purport to resolve any disputed issue of fact; instead, they summarize material in the record that appears to be uncontroverted. The findings recite that the principal responsibility for locating and remov*794ing signs and handbills posted in violation of §28.04 is assigned to the Street Use Inspection Division of the city’s Bureau of Street Maintenance. The court found that both political and nonpolitical signs are illegally posted and that they are removed “without regard to their content.”5

After explaining the purposes for which the City’s zoning code had been enacted, and noting that the prohibition in §28.04 furthered those purposes, the District Court found that the large number of illegally posted signs “constitute a clutter and visual blight.”6 With specific reference to the posting of the COGS signs on utility pole crosswires, the District Court found that such posting “would add somewhat to the blight and inevitably would encourage greatly increased posting in other unauthorized and unsightly places . . . .”7

In addition, the District Court found that placing signs on utility poles creates a potential safety hazard, and that other violations of §28.04 “block views and otherwise cause traffic hazards.”8 Finally, the District Court concluded that the sign prohibition does not prevent taxpayers or COGS “from *795exercising their free speech rights on the public streets and in other public places; they remain free to picket and parade, to distribute handbills, to carry signs and to post their signs and handbills on their automobiles and on private property with the permission of the owners thereof.”9

In its conclusions of law the District Court characterized the esthetic and economic interests in improving the beauty of the City “by eliminating clutter and visual blight” as “legitimate and compelling.”10 Those interests, together with the interest in protecting the safety of workmen who must scale utility poles and the interest in eliminating traffic hazards, adequately supported the sign prohibition as a reasonable regulation affecting the time, place, and manner of expression.

The Court of Appeals did not question any of the District Court’s findings of fact, but it rejected some of its conclusions of law. The Court of Appeals reasoned that the ordinance was presumptively unconstitutional because significant First Amendment interests were involved. It noted that the City had advanced three separate justifications for the ordinance, but concluded that none of them was sufficient. The Court of Appeals held that the City had failed to make a sufficient showing that its asserted interests in esthetics and preventing visual clutter were substantial because it had not offered to demonstrate that the City was engaged in a comprehensive effort to remove other contributions to an unattractive environment in commercial and industrial areas. The City’s interest in minimizing traffic hazards was rejected because it was readily apparent that no substantial traffic problems would result from permitting the posting of certain kinds of signs on many of the publicly owned objects covered by the ordinance. Finally, while acknowledging that a flat prohibition against signs on certain objects such as fire hydrants and traffic signals would be a permissible method of prevent*796ing interference with the intended use of public property, and that regulation of the size, design, and construction of posters, or of the method of removing them, might be reasonable, the Court of Appeals concluded that the City had not justified its total ban.11

In its appeal to this Court the City challenges the Court of Appeals’ holding that §28.04 is unconstitutional on its face. Taxpayers and COGS defend that holding and also contend that the ordinance is unconstitutional as applied to their posting of political campaign signs on the crosswires of utility poles. There are two quite different ways in which a statute or ordinance may be considered invalid “on its face” — either because it is unconstitutional in every conceivable application, or because it seeks to prohibit such a broad range of protected conduct that it is unconstitutionally “overbroad.” We shall analyze the “facial” challenges to the ordinance, and then address its specific application to appellees.

I

The seminal cases in which the Court held state legislation unconstitutional “on its face” did not involve any departure from the general rule that a litigant only has standing to vindicate his own constitutional rights. In Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359 (1931),12 and Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U. S. *797444 (1938),13 the statutes were unconstitutional as applied to the defendants’ conduct, but they were also unconstitutional on their face because it was apparent that any attempt to enforce such legislation would create an unacceptable risk of the suppression of ideas.14 In cases of this character a holding of facial invalidity expresses the conclusion that the statute *798could never be applied in a valid manner. Such holdings15 invalidated entire statutes, but did not create any exception from the general rule that constitutional adjudication requires a review of the application of a statute to the conduct of the party before the Court.

Subsequently, however, the Court did recognize an exception to this general rule for laws that are written so broadly that they may inhibit the constitutionally protected speech of third parties. This “overbreadth” doctrine has its source in Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88 (1940). In that case the Court concluded that the very existence of some broadly written statutes may have such a deterrent effect on free expression that they should be subject to challenge even by a party whose own conduct may be unprotected.16 The Court *799has repeatedly held that such a statute may be challenged on its face even though a more narrowly drawn statute would be valid as applied to the party in the case before it.17 This exception from the general rule is predicated on “a judicial prediction or assumption that the statute’s very existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression.” Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U. S. 601, 612 (1973).

In the development of the overbreadth doctrine the Court has been sensitive to the risk that the doctrine itself might sweep so broadly that the exception to ordinary standing requirements would swallow the general rule. In order to decide whether the overbreadth exception is applicable in a particular case, we have weighed the likelihood that the statute’s very existence will inhibit free expression.

“[T]here comes a point where that effect — at best a prediction — cannot, with confidence, justify invalidating a statute on its face and so prohibiting a State from enforcing the statute against conduct that is admittedly within its power to proscribe. To put the matter another way, particularly where conduct and not merely speech is involved, we believe that the overbreadth of a *800statute must not only be real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.” Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U. S., at 615 (citation omitted).18

The concept of “substantial overbreadth” is not readily reduced to an exact definition. It is clear, however, that the mere fact that one can conceive of some impermissible applications of a statute is not sufficient to render it susceptible to an overbreadth challenge.19 On the contrary, the requirement of substantial overbreadth stems from the underlying justification for the overbreadth exception itself— the interest in preventing an invalid statute from inhibiting the speech of third parties who are not before the Court.

“The requirement of substantial overbreadth is directly derived from the purpose and nature of the doctrine. While a sweeping statute, or one incapable of limitation, *801has the potential to repeatedly chill the exercise of expressive activity by many individuals, the extent of deterrence of protected speech.can be expected to decrease with the declining reach of the regulation.” New York v. Ferber, 458 U. S. 747, 772 (1982) (footnote omitted).

In short, there must be a realistic danger that the statute itself will significantly compromise recognized First Amendment protections of parties not before the Court for it to be facially challenged on overbreadth grounds. See Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U. S. 205, 216 (1975). See also Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn., 436 U. S. 447, 462, n. 20 (1978); Parker v. Levy, 417 U. S. 733, 760-761 (1974).

The Court of Appeals concluded that the ordinance was vulnerable to an overbreadth challenge because it was an “overinclusive” response to traffic concerns and not the “least drastic means” of preventing interference with the normal use of public property. This conclusion rested on an evaluation of the assumed effect of the ordinance on third parties, rather than on any specific consideration of the impact of the ordinance on the parties before the court. This is not, however, an appropriate case to entertain a facial challenge based on overbreadth. For we have found nothing in the record to indicate that the ordinance will have any different impact on any third parties’ interests in free speech than it has on Taxpayers and COGS.

Taxpayers and COGS apparently would agree that the prohibition against posting signs on most of the publicly owned objects mentioned in the ordinance is perfectly reasonable. Thus, they do not dispute the City’s power to proscribe the attachment of any handbill or sign to any sidewalk, crosswalk, curb, lamppost, hydrant, or lifesaving equipment.20 Their *802position with respect to utility poles is not entirely clear, but they do contend that it is unconstitutional to prohibit the attachment of their cardboard signs to the horizontal cross-wires supporting utility poles during a political campaign. They have, in short, failed to identify any significant difference between their claim that the ordinance is invalid on overbreadth grounds and their claim that it is unconstitutional when applied to their political signs. Specifically, Taxpayers and COGS have not attempted to demonstrate that the ordinance applies to any conduct more likely to be protected by the First Amendment than their own crosswire signs. Indeed, the record suggests that many of the signs posted in violation of the ordinance are posted in such a way that they may create safety or traffic problems that COGS has tried to avoid. Accordingly, on this record it appears that if the ordinance may be validly applied to COGS, it can be validly applied to most if not all of the signs of parties not before the Court. Appellees have simply failed to demonstrate a realistic danger that the ordinance will significantly compromise recognized First Amendment protections of individuals not before the Court. It would therefore be inappropriate in this case to entertain an overbreadth challenge to the ordinance.

Taxpayers and COGS do argue generally that the City’s interest in eliminating visual blight is not sufficiently weighty to justify an abridgment of speech. If that were the only interest the ordinance advanced, then this argument would be analogous to the facial challenges involved in cases like Stromberg and Lovell. But as previously observed, appel-lees acknowledge that the ordinance serves safety interests in many of its applications, and hence do not argue that the ordinance can never be validly applied. Instead, appellees argue that they have placed their signs in locations where only the esthetic interest is implicated. In addition, they argue that they have developed an expertise in not “placing signs in offensive manners which will alienate its own clien*803tele or their constituencies,”21 and emphasize the special value of free communication during political campaigns, see Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U. S. 490, 555 (1981) (STEVENS, J., dissenting in part); id., at 550 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). In light of these arguments, appellees’ attack on the ordinance is basically a challenge to the ordinance as applied to their activities. We therefore limit our analysis of the constitutionality of the ordinance to the concrete case before us, and now turn to the arguments that it is invalid as applied to the expressive activity of Taxpayers and COGS.22

II

The ordinance prohibits appellees from communicating with the public in a certain manner, and presumably diminishes the total quantity of their communication in the City.23 The application of the ordinance to appellees’ expressive activities surely raises the question whether the ordinance abridges their “freedom of speech” within the meaning of the First Amendment, and appellees certainly have standing to challenge the application of the ordinance to their own expressive activities. “But to say the ordinance presents a *804First Amendment issue is not necessarily to say that it constitutes a First Amendment violation.” Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U. S., at 561 (Burger, C. J., dissenting). It has been clear since this Court’s earliest decisions concerning the freedom of speech that the state may sometimes curtail speech when necessary to advance a significant and legitimate state interest. Schenck v. United States, 249 U. S. 47, 52 (1919).

As Stromberg and Lovell demonstrate, there are some purported interests — such as a desire to suppress support for a minority party or an unpopular cause, or to exclude the expression of certain points of view from the marketplace of ideas — that are so plainly illegitimate that they would immediately invalidate the rule. The general principle that has emerged from this line of cases is that the First Amendment forbids the government to regulate speech in ways that favor some viewpoints or ideas at the expense of others. See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U. S. 60, 65, 72 (1983); Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm’n, 447 U. S. 530, 535-536 (1980); Carey v. Brown, 447 U. S. 455, 462-463 (1980); Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U. S. 50, 63-65, 67-68 (1976) (plurality opinion); Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U. S. 92, 95-96 (1972).

That general rule has no application to this case. For there is not even a hint of bias or censorship in the City’s enactment or enforcement of this ordinance. There is no claim that the ordinance was designed to suppress certain ideas that the City finds distasteful or that it has been applied to appellees because of the views that they express. The text of the ordinance is neutral — indeed it is silent — concerning any speaker’s point of view, and the District Court’s findings indicate that it has been applied to appellees and others in an evenhanded manner.

In United States v. O’Brien, 391 U. S. 367 (1968), the Court set forth the appropriate framework for reviewing a viewpoint-neutral regulation of this kind:

*805“[A] government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.” Id., at 377.

It is well settled that the state may legitimately exercise its police powers to advance esthetic values. Thus, in Berman v. Parker, 348 U. S. 26, 32-33 (1954), in referring to the power of the legislature to remove blighted housing, this Court observed that such housing may be “an ugly sore, a blight on the community which robs it of charm, which makes it a place from which men turn.” Ibid. We concluded: “The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive. The values it represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary.” Id., at 33 (citation omitted). See also Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U. S. 104, 129 (1978); Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U. S. 1, 9 (1974); Euclid v. Ambler Co., 272 U. S. 365, 387-388 (1926); Welch v. Swasey, 214 U. S. 91, 108 (1909).

In this case, taxpayers and COGS do not dispute that it is within the constitutional power of the City to attempt to improve its appearance, or that this interest is basically unrelated to the suppression of ideas. Therefore the critical inquiries are whether that interest is sufficiently substantial to justify the effect of the ordinance on appellees’ expression, and whether that effect is no greater than necessary to accomplish the City’s purpose.

III

In Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U. S. 77 (1949), the Court rejected the notion that a city is powerless to protect its citizens from unwanted exposure to certain methods of expression which may legitimately be deemed a public nuisance. *806In upholding an ordinance that prohibited loud and raucous sound trucks, the Court held that the State had a substantial interest in protecting its citizens from unwelcome noise.24 In Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U. S. 298 (1974), the Court upheld the city’s prohibition of political advertising on its buses, stating that the city was entitled to protect unwilling viewers against intrusive advertising that may interfere with the city’s goal of making its buses “rapid, convenient, pleasant, and inexpensive,” id., at 302-303 (plurality opinion). See also id., at 307 (Douglas, J., concurring in judgment); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U. S., at 209, and n. 5. These eases indicate that the municipalities have a weighty, essentially esthetic interest in proscribing intrusive and unpleasant formats for expression.

Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, supra, dealt with San Diego’s prohibition of certain forms of outdoor billboards. There the Court considered the city’s interest in avoiding visual clutter, and seven Justices explicitly concluded *807that this interest was sufficient to justify a prohibition of billboards, see id., at 507-508, 510 (opinion of WHITE, J., joined by Stewart, Marshall, and Powell, JJ.); id., at 552 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part); id., at 559-561 (Burger, C. J., dissenting); id., at 570 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).25 Justice White, writing for the plurality, expressly concluded that the city’s esthetic interests were sufficiently substantial to provide an acceptable justification for a content-neutral prohibition against the use of billboards; San Diego’s interest in its appearance was undoubtedly a substantial governmental goal. Id., at 507-508.26

We reaffirm the conclusion of the majority in Metromedia. The problem addressed by this ordinance — the visual assault on the citizens of Los Angeles presented by an accumulation of signs posted on public property — constitutes a significant substantive evil within the City’s power to prohibit. “[T]he city’s interest in attempting to preserve [or improve] the quality of urban life is one that must be accorded high respect.” Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U. S., at 71 (plurality opinion).

*808IV

We turn to the question whether the scope of the restriction on appellees’ expressive activity is substantially broader than necessary to protect the City’s interest in eliminating visual clutter. The incidental restriction on expression which results from the City’s attempt to accomplish such a purpose is considered justified as a reasonable regulation of the time, place, or manner of expression if it is narrowly tailored to serve that interest. See, e. g., Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U. S. 640, 647-648 (1981); Schad v. Mount Ephraim, 452 U. S. 61, 68-71 (1981); Carey v. Brown, 447 U. S., at 470-471 (1980); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U. S. 104, 115-117 (1972); Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U. S., at 98. The District Court found that the signs prohibited by the ordinance do constitute visual clutter and blight. By banning these signs, the City did no more than eliminate the exact source of the evil it sought to remedy.27 The plurality wrote in Metromedia: “It is not speculative to recognize that billboards by their very nature, wherever located and however constructed, can be perceived as an ‘esthetic harm.’” 453 U. S., at 510. The same is true of posted signs.

It is true that the esthetic interest in preventing the kind of litter that may result from the distribution of leaflets on the public streets and sidewalks cannot support a prophylactic prohibition against the citizen’s exercise of that method of expressing his views. In Schneider v. State, 308 U. S. 147 (1939), the Court held that ordinances that absolutely prohibited handbilling on the streets were invalid. The Court explained that cities could adequately protect the esthetic inter*809est in avoiding litter without abridging protected expression merely by penalizing those who actually litter. See id., at 162. Taxpayers contend that their interest in supporting Vincent’s political campaign, which affords them a constitutional right to distribute brochures and leaflets on the public streets of Los Angeles, provides equal support for their asserted right to post temporary signs on objects adjacent to the streets and sidewalks. They argue that the mere fact that their temporary signs “add somewhat” to the city’s visual clutter is entitled to no more weight than the temporary unsightliness of discarded handbills and the additional street-cleaning burden that were insufficient to justify the ordinances reviewed in Schneider.

The rationale of Schneider is inapposite in the context of the instant case. There, individual citizens were actively exercising their right to communicate directly with potential recipients of their message. The conduct continued only while the speakers or distributors remained on the scene. In this case, appellees posted dozens of temporary signs throughout an area where they would remain unattended until removed. As the Court expressly noted in Schneider, the First Amendment does not “deprive a municipality of power to enact regulations against throwing literature broadcast in the streets. Prohibition of such conduct would not abridge the constitutional liberty since such activity bears no necessary relationship to the freedom to speak, write, print or distribute information or opinion.” 308 U. S., at 160-161. In short, there is no constitutional impediment to “the punishment of those who actually throw papers on the streets.” Id., at 162. A distributor of leaflets has no right simply to scatter his pamphlets in the air — or to toss large quantities of paper from the window of a tall building or a low flying airplane. Characterizing such an activity as a separate means of communication does not diminish the State’s power to condemn it as a public nuisance. The right recognized in *810Schneider is to tender the written material to the passerby who may reject it or accept it, and who thereafter may keep it, dispose of it properly, or incur the risk of punishment if he lets it fall to the ground. One who is rightfully on a street open to the public “carries with him there as elsewhere the constitutional right to express his views in an orderly fashion. This right extends to the communication of ideas by handbills and literature as well as by the spoken word.” Jamison v. Texas, 318 U. S. 413, 416 (1943); see also Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 559, 578 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting in part).

With respect to signs posted by appellees, however, it is the tangible medium of expressing the message that has the adverse impact on the appearance of the landscape. In Schneider, an antilittering statute could have addressed the substantive evil without prohibiting expressive activity, whereas application of the prophylactic rule actually employed gratuitously infringed upon the right of an individual to communicate directly with a willing listener. Here, the substantive evil — visual blight — is not merely a possible byproduct of the activity, but is created by the medium of expression itself. In contrast to Schneider, therefore, the application of the ordinance in this case responds precisely to the substantive problem which legitimately concerns the City. The ordinance curtails no more speech than is necessary to accomplish its purpose.

V

The Court of Appeals accepted the argument that a prohibition against the use of unattractive signs cannot be justified on esthetic grounds if it fails to apply to all equally unattractive signs wherever they might be located. A comparable argument was categorically rej ected in Metromedia. In that case it was argued that the city could not simultaneously permit billboards to be used for onsite advertising and also justify the prohibition against offsite advertising on esthetic grounds, since both types of advertising were equally un*811attractive. The Court held, however, that the city could reasonably conclude that the esthetic interest was outweighed by the countervailing interest in one kind of advertising even though it was not outweighed by the other.28 So here, the validity of the esthetic interest in the elimination of signs on public property is not compromised by failing to extend the ban to private property. The private citizen’s interest in controlling the use of his own property justifies the disparate treatment. Moreover, by not extending the ban to all locations, a significant opportunity to communicate by means of temporary signs is preserved, and private property owners’ esthetic concerns will keep the posting of signs on their property within reasonable bounds. Even if some visual blight remains, a partial, content-neutral ban may nevertheless enhance the City’s appearance.

Furthermore, there is no finding that in any area where appellees seek to place signs, there are already so many signs posted on adjacent private property that the elimination of appellees’ signs would have an inconsequential effect on the esthetic values with which the City is concerned. There is simply no predicate in the findings of the District Court for *812the conclusion that the prohibition against the posting of appellees’ signs fails to advance the City’s esthetic interest.

VI

While the First Amendment does not guarantee the right to employ every conceivable method of communication at all times and in all places, Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U. S., at 647, a restriction on expressive activity may be invalid if the remaining modes of communication are inadequate. See, e. g., United States v. Grace, 461 U. S. 171, 177 (1983); Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U. S., at 654-655; Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm’n, 447 U. S., at 535; Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 U. S. 85, 93 (1977). The Los Angeles ordinance does not affect any individual’s freedom to exercise the right to speak and to distribute literature in the same place where the posting of signs on public property is prohibited.29 To the extent that the posting of signs on public property has advantages over these forms of expression, see, e. g., Talley v. California, 362 U. S. 60, 64-65 (1960), there is no reason to believe that these same advantages cannot be obtained through other means. To the contrary, the findings of the District Court indicate that there are ample alternative modes of communication in Los Angeles. Notwithstanding appellees’ general assertions in their brief concerning the utility of political posters, nothing in the findings indicates that the posting of political posters on public property is a uniquely valuable or important mode of communication, or that appellees’ ability to communicate effectively is threatened by ever-increasing restrictions on expression.30

*813VII

Appellees suggest that the public property covered by the ordinance either is itself a “public forum” for First Amendment purposes, or at least should be treated in the same respect as the “public forum” in which the property is located. “Traditional public forum property occupies a special position in terms of First Amendment protection,” United States v. Grace, 461 U. S., at 180, and appellees maintain that their sign-posting activities are entitled to this protection.

In Hague v. CIO, 307 U. S. 496, 515-516 (1939) (opinion of Roberts, J.), it was recognized:

“Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public, and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions. Such use of the streets and public places has, from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens. The privilege of a citizen of the United States to use the streets and parks for communication of views on national questions may be regulated in the interest of all; it is not absolute, but relative, and must be exercised in subordination to the general comfort and convenience, and in consonance with peace and *814good order; but it must not, in the guise of regulation, be abridged or denied.”

See also Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U. S., at 115; Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U. S. 147, 152 (1969); Kunz v. New York, 340 U. S. 290, 293 (1951); Schneider v. State, 308 U. S., at 163.

Appellees’ reliance on the public forum doctrine is misplaced. They fail to demonstrate the existence of a traditional right of access respecting such items as utility poles for purposes of their communication comparable to that recognized for public streets and parks, and it is clear that “the First Amendment does not guarantee access to government property simply because it is owned or controlled by the government.” United States Postal Service v. Greenburgh Civic Assns., 453 U. S. 114, 129 (1981). Rather, the “existence of a right of access to public property and the standard by which limitations upon such a right must be evaluated differ depending on the character of the property at issue.” Perry Education Assn. v. Perry Local Educators’ Assn., 460 U. S. 37, 44 (1983).

Lampposts can of course be used as signposts, but the mere fact that government property can be used as a vehicle for communication does not mean that the Constitution requires such uses to be permitted. Cf. United States Postal Service v. Greenburgh Civic Assns., 453 U. S., at 131.31 Public property which is not by tradition or designation a forum for *815public communication may be reserved by the State “for its intended purposes, communicative or otherwise, as long as the regulation on speech is reasonable and not an effort to suppress expression merely because public officials oppose the speaker’s view.” Perry Education Assn. v. Perry Local Educators’ Assn., 460 U. S., at 46. Given our analysis of the legitimate interest served by the ordinance, its viewpoint neutrality, and the availability of alternative channels of communication, the ordinance is certainly constitutional as applied to appellees under this standard.32

VIII

Finally, Taxpayers and COGS argue that Los Angeles could have written an ordinance that would have had a less severe effect on expressive activity such as theirs, by permitting the posting of any kind of sign at any time on some types of public property, or by making a variety of other more specific exceptions to the ordinance: for signs carrying certain types of messages (such as political campaign signs), for signs posted during specific time periods (perhaps during political campaigns), for particular locations (perhaps for areas already cluttered by an excessive number of signs on adjacent private property), or for signs meeting design specifications (such as size or color). Plausible public policy arguments *816might well be made in support of any such exception, but it by no means follows that it is therefore constitutionally mandated, cf. Singer v. United States, 380 U. S. 24, 34-35 (1965), nor is it clear that some of the suggested exceptions would even be constitutionally permissible. For example, even though political speech is entitled to the fullest possible measure of constitutional protection, there are a host of other communications that command the same respect. An assertion that “Jesus Saves,” that “Abortion is Murder,” that every woman has the “Right to Choose,” or that “Alcohol Kills,” may have a claim to a constitutional exemption from the ordinance that is just as strong as “Roland Vincent — City Council.” See Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U. S. 209, 231-232 (1977).33 To create an exception for appellees’ political speech and not these other types of speech might create a risk of engaging in constitutionally forbidden content discrimination. See, e. g., Carey v. Brown, 447 U. S. 455 (1980); Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U. S. 92 (1972). Moreover, the volume of permissible postings under such a mandated exemption might so limit the ordinance’s effect as to defeat its aim of combating visual blight.

Any constitutionally mandated exception to the City’s total prohibition against temporary signs on public property would necessarily rest on a judicial determination that the City’s traffic control and safety interests had little or no applicability within the excepted category, and that the City’s interests in esthetics are not sufficiently important to justify the prohibition in that category. But the findings of the District Court provide no basis for questioning the substantiality of the esthetic interest at stake, or for believing that a uniquely important form of communication has been abridged for the categories of expression engaged in by Taxpayers and COGS. Therefore, we accept the City’s position that it may decide that the esthetic interest in avoiding “visual clutter” justifies *817a removal of signs creating or increasing that clutter. The findings of the District Court that COGS signs add to the problems addressed by the ordinance and, if permitted to remain, would encourage others to post additional signs, are sufficient to justify application of the ordinance to these appellees.

As recognized in Metromedia, if the city has a sufficient basis for believing that billboards are traffic hazards and are unattractive, “then obviously the most direct and perhaps the only effective approach to solving the problems they create is to prohibit them.” 453 U. S., at 508. As is true of billboards, the esthetic interests that are implicated by temporary signs are presumptively at work in all parts of the city, including those where appellees posted their signs, and there is no basis in the record in this case upon which to rebut that presumption. These interests are both psychological and economic. The character of the environment affects the quality of life and the value of property in both residential and commercial areas. We hold that on this record these interests are sufficiently substantial to justify this content-neutral, impartially administered prohibition against the posting of appellees’ temporary signs on public property and that such an application of the ordinance does not create an unacceptable threat to the “profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.” New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254, 270 (1964).34

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded to that Court.

It is so ordered.

*818Justice Brennan,

with whom Justice Marshall and Justice Blackmun join, dissenting.

The plurality opinion in Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U. S. 490 (1981), concluded that the City of San Diego could, consistently with the First Amendment, restrict the commercial use of billboards in order to “preserve and improve the appearance of the City.” Id., at 493. Today, the Court sustains the constitutionality of Los Angeles’ similarly motivated ban on the posting of political signs on public property. Because the Court’s lenient approach towards the restriction of speech for reasons of aesthetics threatens seriously to undermine the protections of the First Amendment, I dissent.

The Court finds that the City’s “interest [in eliminating visual clutter] is sufficiently substantial to justify the effect of the ordinance on appellees’ expression” and that the effect of the ordinance on speech is “no greater than necessary to accomplish the City’s purpose.” Ante, at 805. These are the right questions to consider when analyzing the constitutionality of the challenged ordinance, see Metromedia, supra, at 525-527 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment); Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U. S. 640, 656 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), but the answers that the Court provides reflect a startling insensitivity to the principles embodied in the First Amendment. In my view, the City of Los Angeles has not shown that its interest in eliminating “visual clutter” justifies its restriction of appellees’ ability to communicate with the local electorate.

I

The Court recognizes that each medium for communicating ideas and information presents its own particular problems. Our analysis of the First Amendment concerns implicated by a given medium must therefore be sensitive to these particular problems and characteristics. The posting of signs is, *819of course, a time-honored means of communicating a broad range of ideas and information, particularly in our cities and towns. At thé same time, the unfettered proliferation of signs on public fixtures may offend the public’s legitimate desire to preserve an orderly and aesthetically pleasing urban environment. In this case, as in Metromedia, we are called upon to adjudge the constitutionality under the First Amendment of a local government’s response to this recurring dilemma — namely, the clash between the public’s aesthetic interest in controlling the use of billboards, signs, handbills, and other similar means of communication, and the First Amendment interest of those who wish to use these media to express their views, or to learn the views of others, on matters of importance to the community.

In deciding this First Amendment question, the critical importance of the posting of signs as a means of communication must not be overlooked. Use of this medium of communication is particularly valuable in part because it entails a relatively small expense in reaching a wide audience, allows flexibility in accommodating various formats, typographies, and graphics, and conveys its message in a manner that is easily read and understood by its reader or viewer. There may be alternative channels of communication, but the prevalence of a large number of signs in Los Angeles1 is a strong indication that, for many speakers, those alternatives are far less satisfactory. Cf. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U. S. 546, 556 (1975).

Nevertheless, the City of Los Angeles asserts that ample alternative avenues of communication are available. The City notes that, although the posting of signs on public property is prohibited, the posting of signs on private property and the distribution of handbills are not. Brief for Appellants *82025-26. But there is no showing that either of these alternatives would serve appellees’ needs nearly as well as would the posting of signs on public property. First, there is no proof that a sufficient number of private parties would allow the posting of signs on their property. Indeed, common sense suggests the contrary at least in some instances. A speaker with a message that is generally unpopular or simply unpopular among property owners is hardly likely to get his message across if forced to rely on this medium. It is difficult to believe, for example, that a group advocating an increase in the rate of a property tax would succeed in persuading private property owners to accept its signs.

Similarly, the adequacy of distributing handbills is dubious, despite certain advantages of handbills over signs. See Martin v. Struthers, 319 U. S. 141, 145-146 (1943). Particularly when the message to be carried is best expressed by a few words or a graphic image, a message on a sign will typically reach far more people than one on a handbill. The message on a posted sign remains to be seen by passersby as long as it is posted, while a handbill is typically read by a single reader and discarded. Thus, not only must handbills be printed in large quantity, but many hours must be spent distributing them. The average cost of communicating by handbill is therefore likely to be far higher than the average cost of communicating by poster. For that reason, signs posted on public property are doubtless “essential to the poorly financed causes of little people,” id., at 146, and their prohibition constitutes a total ban on an important medium of communication. Cf. Stone, Fora Americana: Speech in Public Places, 1974 S. Ct. Rev. 233, 257. Because the City has completely banned the use of this particular medium of communication, and because, given the circumstances, there are no equivalent alternative media that provide an adequate substitute, the Court must examine with particular care the justifications that the City proffers for its ban. See Metromedia, supra, at 525-527 (BRENNAN, J., concur*821ring in judgment); Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 U. S. 85, 93 (1977).

II

As the Court acknowledges, ante, at 805, when an ordinance significantly limits communicative activity, “the delicate and difficult task falls upon the courts to weigh the circumstances and to appraise the substantiality of the reasons advanced in support of the regulation.” Schneider v. State, 308 U. S. 147, 161 (1939). The Court’s first task is to determine whether the ordinance is aimed at suppressing the content of speech, and, if it is, whether a compelling state interest justifies the suppression. Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm’n, 447 U. S. 530, 540 (1980); Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U. S. 92, 99 (1972). If the restriction is content-neutral, the court’s task is to determine (1) whether the governmental objective advanced by the restriction is substantial, and (2) whether the restriction imposed on speech is no greater than is essential to further that objective. Unless both conditions are met the restriction must be invalidated. See ante, at 805, 808, 810.2

My suggestion in Metromedia was that courts should exercise special care in addressing these questions when a purely aesthetic objective is asserted to justify a restriction of speech. Specifically, “before deferring to a city’s judgment, a court must be convinced that the city is seriously and comprehensively addressing aesthetic concerns with respect to its environment.” 453 U. S., at 531. I adhere to that view. Its correctness — premised largely on my concern that aesthetic interests are easy for a city to assert and difficult for a court to evaluate — is, for me, reaffirmed by this case.

The fundamental problem in this kind of case is that a purely aesthetic state interest offered to justify a restriction on speech — that is, a governmental objective justified solely *822in terms like “proscribing intrusive and unpleasant formats for expression,” ante, at 806 — creates difficulties for a reviewing court in fulfilling its obligation to ensure that government regulation does not trespass upon protections secured by the First Amendment. The source of those difficulties is the unavoidable subjectivity of aesthetic judgments — the fact that “beauty is in the eye of the beholder.” As a consequence of this subjectivity, laws defended on aesthetic grounds raise problems for judicial review that are not presented by laws defended on more objective grounds — such as national security, public health, or public safety.3 In practice, therefore, the inherent subjectivity of aesthetic judgments makes it all too easy for the government to fashion its justification for a law in a manner that impairs the ability of a reviewing court meaningfully to make the required inquiries.4

A

Initially, a reviewing court faces substantial difficulties determining whether the actual objective is related to the suppression of speech. The asserted interest in aesthetics may be only a facade for content-based suppression. Of course, all would agree that the improvement and preser*823vation of the aesthetic environment are important governmental functions, and that some restrictions on speech may be necessary to carry out these functions. Metromedia, supra, at 530. But a governmental interest in aesthetics cannot be regarded as sufficiently compelling to justify a restriction of speech based on an assertion that the content of the speech is, in itself, aesthetically displeasing. Cohen v. California, 403 U. S. 15 (1971). Because aesthetic judgments are so subjective, however, it is too easy for government to enact restrictions on speech for just such illegitimate reasons and to evade effective judicial review by asserting that the restriction is aimed at some displeasing aspect of the speech that is not solely communicative — for example, its sound, its appearance, or its location. An objective standard for evaluating claimed aesthetic judgments is therefore essential; for without one, courts have no reliable means of assessing the genuineness of such claims.

For example, in evaluating the ordinance before us in this case, the City might be pursuing either of two objectives, motivated by two very different judgments. One objective might be the elimination of “visual clutter,” attributable in whole or in part to signs posted on public property. The aesthetic judgment underlying this objective would be that the clutter created by these signs offends the community’s desire for an orderly, visually pleasing environment. A second objective might simply be the elimination of the messages typically carried by the signs.5 In that case, the aesthetic judgment would be that the signs’ messages are themselves displeasing. The first objective is lawful, of course, but the second is not. Yet the City might easily mask the second *824objective by asserting the first and declaring that signs constitute visual clutter. In short, we must avoid unquestioned acceptance of the City’s bare declaration of an aesthetic objective lest we fail in our duty to prevent unlawful trespasses upon First Amendment protections.

B

A total ban on an important medium of communication may be upheld only if the government proves that the ban (1) furthers a substantial government objective, and (2) constitutes the least speech-restrictive means of achieving that objective. Schad v. Mount Ephraim, 452 U. S. 61 (1981). Here too, however, meaningful judicial application of these standards is seriously frustrated.

(1)

No one doubts the importance of a general governmental interest in aesthetics, but in order to justify a restriction of speech, the particular objective behind the restriction must be substantial. E. g., United States v. Grace, 461 U. S. 171, 177 (1983); Perry Education Assn. v. Perry Local Educators’ Assn., 460 U. S. 37, 45 (1983); United States v. O’Brien, 391 U. S. 367, 377 (1968). Therefore, in order to uphold a restriction of speech imposed to further an aesthetic objective, a court must ascertain the substantiality of the specific objective pursued. Although courts ordinarily defer to the government’s assertion that its objective is substantial, that assertion is not immune from critical examination. See, e. g., Schad v. Mount Ephraim, supra, at 72-73. This is particularly true when aesthetic objectives underlie the restrictions. But in such cases independent judicial assessment of the substantiality of the government’s interest is difficult. Because aesthetic judgments are entirely subjective, the government may too easily overstate the substantiality of its goals. Accordingly, unless courts carefully scrutinize *825aesthetics-based restrictions of speech, they risk standing idly by while important media of communication are foreclosed for the sake of insubstantial governmental objectives.

(2)

Similarly, when a total ban is justified solely in terms of aesthetics, the means inquiry necessary to evaluate the constitutionality of the ban may be impeded by deliberate or unintended government manipulation. Governmental objectives that are purely aesthetic can usually be expressed in a virtually limitless variety of ways. Consequently, objectives can be tailored to fit whatever program the government devises to promote its general aesthetic interests. Once the government has identified a substantial aesthetic objective and has selected a preferred means of achieving its objective, it will be possible for the government to correct any mismatch between means and ends by redefining the ends to conform with the means.

In this case, for example, any of several objectives might be the City’s actual substantial goal in banning temporary signs: (1) the elimination of all signs throughout the City, (2) the elimination of all signs in certain parts of the City, or (3) a reduction of the density of signs. Although a total ban on the posting of signs on public property would be the least restrictive means of achieving only the first objective, it would be a very effective means of achieving the other two as well. It is quite possible, therefore, that the City might select such a ban as the means by which to further its general interest in solving its sign problem, without explicitly considering which of the three specific objectives is really substantial. Then, having selected the total ban as its preferred means, the City would be strongly inclined to characterize the first objective as the substantial one. This might be done purposefully in order to conform the ban to the least-restrictive-means requirement, or it might be done inadvertently as a natural *826concomitant of considering means and ends together. But regardless of why it is done, a reviewing court will be confronted with a statement of substantiality the subjectivity of which makes it impossible to question on its face.

This possibility of interdependence between means and ends in the development of policies to promote aesthetics poses a major obstacle to judicial review of the availability of alternative means that are less restrictive of speech. Indeed, when a court reviews a restriction of speech imposed in order to promote an aesthetic objective, there is a significant possibility that the court will be able to do little more than pay lipservice to the First Amendment inquiry into the availability of less restrictive alternatives. The means may fit the ends only because the ends were defined with the means in mind. In this case, for example, the City has expressed an aesthetic judgment that signs on public property constitute visual clutter throughout the City and that its objective is to eliminate visual clutter. We are then asked to determine whether that objective could have been achieved with less restriction of speech. But to ask the question is to highlight the circularity of the inquiry. Since the goal, at least as currently expressed, is essentially to eliminate all signs, the only available means of achieving that goal is to eliminate all signs.

The ease with which means can be equated with aesthetic ends only confirms the importance of close judicial scrutiny of the substantiality of such ends. See supra, at 824-825. In this case, for example, it is essential that the Court assess the City's ban on signs by evaluating whether the City has a substantial interest in eliminating the visual clutter caused by all posted signs throughout the City — as distinguished from an interest in banning signs in some areas or in preventing densely packed signs. If, in fact, either of the latter two objectives constitute the substantial interest underlying this ordinance, they could be achieved by means far less restric*827tive of speech than a total ban on signs, and the ban, therefore, would be invalid.

C

Regrettably, the Court’s analysis is seriously inadequate. Because the Court has failed to develop a reliable means of gauging the nature or depth of the City’s commitment to pursuing the goal of eradicating “visual clutter,” it simply approves the ordinance with only the most cursory degree of judicial oversight. Without stopping to consider carefully whether this supposed commitment is genuine or substantial, the Court essentially defers to the City’s aesthetic judgment and in so doing precludes serious assessment of the availability of alternative means.

The Court begins by simply affirming that “[t]he problem addressed by this ordinance — the visual assault on the citizens of Los Angeles presented by an accumulation of signs posted on public property — constitutes a significant substantive end within the City’s power to prohibit.” Ante, at 807. Then, addressing the availability of less restrictive alternatives, the Court can do little more than state the unsurprising conclusion that “[b]y banning these signs, the City did no more than eliminate the exact source of the evil it sought to remedy.” Ante, at 808. Finally, as if to explain the ease with which it reaches its conclusion, the Court notes that “[w]ith respect to signs posted by appellees ... it is the tangible medium of expressing the message that has adverse impact on the appearance of the landscape.” Ante, at 810. But, as I have demonstrated, it is precisely the ability of the State to make this judgment that should lead us to approach these cases with more caution.

III

The fact that there are difficulties inherent in judicial review of aesthetics-based restrictions of speech does not imply *828that government may not engage in such activities. As I have said, improvement and preservation of the aesthetic environment are often legitimate and important governmental functions. But because the implementation of these functions creates special dangers to our First Amendment freedoms, there is a need for more stringent judicial scrutiny than the Court seems willing to exercise.

In cases like this, where a total ban is imposed on a particularly valuable method of communication, a court should require the government to provide tangible proof of the legitimacy and substantiality of its aesthetic objective. Justifications for such restrictions articulated by the government should be critically examined to determine whether the government has committed itself to addressing the identified aesthetic problem.

In my view, such statements of aesthetic objectives should be accepted as substantial and unrelated to the suppression of speech only if the government demonstrates that it is pursuing an identified objective seriously and comprehensively and in ways that are unrelated to the restriction of speech. Metromedia, 453 U. S., at 531 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment). Without such a demonstration, I would invalidate the restriction as violative of the First Amendment. By requiring this type of showing, courts can ensure that governmental regulation of the aesthetic environment remains within the constraints established by the First Amendment. First, we would have a reasonably reliable indication that it is not the content or communicative aspect of speech that the government finds unaesthetic. Second, when a restriction of speech is part of a comprehensive and seriously pursued program to promote an aesthetic objective, we have a more reliable indication of the government’s own assessment of the substantiality of its objective. And finally, when an aesthetic objective is pursued on more than one front, we have a better basis upon which to ascertain its precise nature *829and thereby determine whether the means selected are the least restrictive ones for achieving the objective.6

This does not mean that a government must address all aesthetic problems at one time or that a government should hesitate to pursue aesthetic objectives. What it does mean, however, is that when such an objective is pursued, it may not be pursued solely at the expense of First Amendment freedoms, nor may it be pursued by arbitrarily discriminating against a form of speech that has the same aesthetic characteristics as other forms of speech that are also present in the community. See Metromedia, supra, at 531-534 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment).

Accordingly, in order for Los Angeles to succeed in defending its total ban on the posting of signs, the City would have to demonstrate that it is pursuing its goal of eliminating visual clutter in a serious and comprehensive manner. Most importantly, the City would have to show that it is pursuing its goal through programs other than its ban on signs, that at least some of those programs address the visual clutter problem through means that do not entail the restriction of speech, and that the programs parallel the ban in their stringency, geographical scope, and aesthetic focus. In this case, however, as the Court of Appeals found, there is no indication that the City has addressed its visual clutter problem in any way other than by prohibiting the posting of signs— *830throughout the City and without regard to the density of their presence. 682 F. 2d 847, 852 (CA9 1982). Therefore, I would hold that the prohibition violates appellees’ First Amendment rights.

In light of the extreme stringency of Los Angeles’ ban— barring all signs from being posted — and its wide geographical scope — covering the entire City — it might be difficult for Los Angeles to make the type of showing I have suggested. Cf. Metromedia, supra, at 538-534. A more limited approach to the visual clutter problem, however, might well pass constitutional muster. I have no doubt that signs posted on public property in certain areas — including, perhaps, parts of Los Angeles — could contribute to the type of eyesore that a city would genuinely have a substantial interest in eliminating. These areas might include parts of the City that are particularly pristine, reserved for certain uses, designated to reflect certain themes, or so blighted that broad-gauged renovation is necessary. Presumably, in these types of areas, the City would also regulate the aesthetic environment in ways other than the banning of temporary signs. The City might zone such areas for a particular type of development or lack of development; it might actively create a particular type of environment; it might be especially vigilant in keeping the area clean; it might regulate the size and location of permanent signs; or it might reserve particular locations, such as kiosks, for the posting of temporary signs. Similarly, Los Angeles might be able to attack its visual clutter problem in more areas of the City by reducing the stringency of the ban, perhaps by regulating the density of temporary signs, and coupling that approach with additional measures designed to reduce other forms of visual clutter. There are a variety of ways that the aesthetic environment can be regulated, some restrictive of speech and others not, but it is only when aesthetic regulation is addressed in a comprehensive and focused manner that we can ensure that the *831goals pursued are substantial and that the manner in which they are pursued is no more restrictive of speech than is necessary.

In the absence of such a showing in this case, I believe that Los Angeles' total ban sweeps so broadly and trenches so completely on appellees’ use of an important medium of political expression that it must be struck down as violative of the First Amendment.7

I therefore dissent.

Justice Kennedy

delivered the opinion of the Court.

The University of Virginia, an instrumentality of the Commonwealth for which it is named and thus bound by the First and Fourteenth Amendments, authorizes the payment of outside contractors for the printing costs of a variety of student publications. It withheld any authorization for payments on behalf of petitioners for the sole reason that their student *823paper “primarily promotes or manifests a particular belie[f] in or about a deity or an ultimate reality.” That the paper did promote or manifest views within the defined exclusion seems plain enough. The challenge is to the University’s regulation and its denial of authorization, the case raising issues under the Speech and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment.

i — I

The public corporation we refer to as the “University” is denominated by state law as “the Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia,” Va. Code Ann. § 23-69 (1993), and it is responsible for governing the school, see §§23-69 to 23-80. Founded by Thomas Jefferson in 1819, and ranked by him, together with the authorship of the Declaration of Independence and of the Virginia Act for Religious Freedom, Va. Code Ann. § 57-1 (1950), as one of his proudest achievements, the University is among the Nation’s oldest and most respected seats of higher learning. It has more than 11,000 undergraduate students, and 6,000 graduate and professional students. An understanding of the case requires a somewhat detailed description of the program the University created to support extracurricular student activities on its campus.

Before a student group is eligible to submit bills from its outside contractors for payment by the fund described below, it must become a “Contracted Independent Organization” (CIO). CIO status is available to any group the majority of whose members are students, whose managing officers are full-time students, and that complies with certain procedural requirements. App. to Pet. for Cert. 2a. A CIO must file its constitution with the University; must pledge not to discriminate in its membership; and must include in dealings with third parties and in all written materials a disclaimer, stating that the CIO is independent of the University and that the University is not responsible for the CIO. App. 27-28. CIO’s enjoy access to University facilities, including meeting rooms and computer terminals. Id.. at 30. *824A standard agreement signed between each CIO and the University provides that the benefits and opportunities afforded to CIO’s “should not be misinterpreted as meaning that those organizations are part of or controlled by the University, that the University is responsible for the organizations’ contracts or other acts or omissions, or that the University approves of the organizations’ goals or activities.” Id., at 26.

All CIO’s may exist and operate at the University, but some are also entitled to apply for funds from the Student Activities Fund (SAF). Established and governed by University Guidelines, the purpose of the SAF is to support a broad range of extracurricular student activities that “are related to the educational purpose of the University.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 61a. The SAF is based on the University’s “recognition] that the availability of a wide range of opportunities” for its students “tends to enhance the University environment.” App. 26. The Guidelines require that it be administered “in a manner consistent with the educational purpose of the University as well as with state and federal law.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 61a. The SAF receives its money from a mandatory fee of $14 per semester assessed to each full-time student. The Student Council, elected by the students, has the initial authority to disburse the funds, but its actions are subject to review by a faculty body chaired by a designee of the Vice President for Student Affairs. Cf. id., at 63a-64a.

Some, but not all, CIO’s may submit disbursement requests to the SAF. The Guidelines recognize 11 categories of student groups that may seek payment to third-party contractors because they “are related to the educational purpose of the University of Virginia.” Id., at 61a~62a. One of these is “student news, information, opinion, entertainment, or academic communications media groups.” Id., at 61a. The Guidelines also specify, however, that the costs of certain activities of CIO’s that are otherwise eligible for funding *825will not be reimbursed by the SAF. The student activities that are excluded from SAF support are religious activities, philanthropic contributions and activities, political activities, activities that would jeopardize the University’s tax-exempt status, those which involve payment of honoraria or similar fees, or social entertainment or related expenses. Id., at 62a-63a. The prohibition on “political activities” is defined so that it is limited to electioneering and lobbying. The Guidelines provide that “[t]hese restrictions on funding political activities are not intended to preclude funding of any otherwise eligible student organization which . . . espouses particular positions or ideological viewpoints, including those that may be unpopular or are not generally accepted.” Id., at 65a-66a. A “religious activity,” by contrast, is defined as any activity that “primarily promotes or manifests a particular belie[f] in or about a deity or an ultimate reality.” Id., at 66a.

The Guidelines prescribe these criteria for determining the amounts of third-party disbursements that will be allowed on behalf of each eligible student organization: the size of the group, its financial self-sufficiency, and the University-wide benefit of its activities. If an organization seeks SAF support, it must submit its bills to the Student Council, which pays the organization’s creditors upon determining that the expenses are appropriate. No direct payments are made to the student groups. During the 1990-1991 academic year, 343 student groups qualified as CIO’s. One hundred thirty-five of them applied for support from the SAF, and 118 received funding. Fifteen of the groups were funded as “student news, information, opinion, entertainment, or academic communications media groups.”

Petitioners’ organization, Wide Awake Productions (WAP), qualified as a CIO. Formed by petitioner Ronald Rosen-berger and other undergraduates in 1990, WAP was established “[t]o publish a magazine of philosophical and religious expression,” “[t]o facilitate discussion which fosters an at*826mosphere of sensitivity to and tolerance of Christian viewpoints,” and “[t]o provide a unifying focus for Christians of multicultural backgrounds.” App. 67. WAP publishes Wide Awake: A Christian Perspective at the University of Virginia. The paper’s Christian viewpoint was evident from the first issue, in which its editors wrote that the journal “offers a Christian perspective on both personal and community issues, especially those relevant to college students at the University of Virginia.” App. 45. The editors committed the paper to a two-fold mission: “to challenge Christians to live, in word and deed, according to the faith they proclaim and to encourage students to consider what a personal relationship with Jesus Christ means.” Ibid. The first issue had articles about racism, crisis pregnancy, stress, prayer, C. S. Lewis’ ideas about evil and free will, and reviews of religious music. In the next two issues, Wide Awake featured stories about homosexuality, Christian missionary work, and eating disorders, as well as music reviews and interviews with University professors. Each page of Wide Awake, and the end of each article or review, is marked by a cross. The advertisements carried in Wide Awake also reveal the Christian perspective of the journal. For the most part, the advertisers are churches, centers for Christian study, or Christian bookstores. By June 1992, WAP had distributed about 5,000 copies of Wide Awake to University students, free of charge.

WAP had acquired CIO status soon after it was organized. This is an important consideration in this case, for had it been a “religious organization,” WAP would not have been accorded CIO status. As defined by the Guidelines, a “[Religious [organization” is “an organization whose purpose is to practice a devotion to an acknowledged ultimate reality or deity.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 66a. At no stage in this controversy has the University contended that WAP is such an organization.

*827A few months after being given CIO status, WAP requested the SAF to pay its printer $5,862 for the costs of printing its newspaper. The Appropriations Committee of the Student Council denied WAP’s request on the ground that Wide Awake was a “religious activity” within the meaning of the Guidelines, i. e., that the newspaper “promote[d] or manifested] a particular belie[f] in or about a deity or an ultimate reality.” Ibid. It made its determination after examining the first issue. App. 54. WAP appealed the denial to the full Student Council, contending that WAP met all the applicable Guidelines and that denial of SAF support on the basis of the magazine’s religious perspective violated the Constitution. The appeal was denied without further comment, and WAP appealed to the next level, the Student Activities Committee. In a letter signed by the Dean of Students, the committee sustained the denial of funding. App. 55.

Having no further recourse within the University structure, WAP, Wide Awake, and three of its editors and members filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, challenging the SAF’s action as violative of Rev. Stat. § 1979, 42 U. S. C. § 1988. They alleged that refusal to authorize payment of the printing costs of the publication, solely on the basis of its religious editorial viewpoint, violated their rights to freedom of speech and press, to the free exercise of religion, and to equal protection of the law. They relied also upon Article I of the Virginia Constitution and the Virginia Act for Religious Freedom, Va. Code Ann. §§57-1, 57-2 (1986 and Supp. 1994), but did not pursue those theories on appeal. The suit sought damages for the costs of printing the paper, injunctive and declaratory relief, and attorney’s fees.

On cross-motions for summary judgment, the District Court ruled for the University, holding that denial of SAF support was not an impermissible content or viewpoint dis*828crimination against petitioners’ speech, and that the University’s Establishment Clause concern over its “religious activities” was a sufficient justification for denying payment to third-party contractors. The court did not issue a definitive ruling on whether reimbursement, had it been made here, would or would not have violated the Establishment Clause. 795 F. Supp. 175, 181-182 (WD Va. 1992).

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in disagreement with the District Court, held that the Guidelines did discriminate on the basis of content. It ruled that, while the State need not underwrite, speech, there was a presumptive violation of the Speech Clause when viewpoint discrimination was invoked to deny third-party payment otherwise available to CIO’s. 18 F. 3d 269, 279-281 (1994). The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the District Court nonetheless, concluding that the discrimination by the University was justified by the “compelling interest in maintaining strict separation of church and state.” Id., at 281. We granted certiorari. 513 U. S. 959 (1994).

II

It is axiomatic that the government may not regulate speech based on its substantive content or the message it conveys. Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U. S. 92, 96 (1972). Other principles follow from this precept. In the realm of private speech or expression, government regulation may not favor one speaker over another. Members of City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U. S. 789, 804 (1984). Discrimination against speech because of its message is presumed to be unconstitutional. See Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U. S. 622, 641-643 (1994). These rules informed our determination that the government offends the First Amendment when it imposes financial burdens on certain speakers based on the content of their expression. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N. Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U. S. 105, *829115 (1991). When the government targets not subject matter, but particular views taken by speakers on a subject, the violation of the First Amendment is all the more blatant. See R. A. V. v. St. Paul, 505 U. S. 377, 391 (1992). Viewpoint discrimination is thus an egregious form of content discrimination. The government must abstain from regulating speech when the specific motivating ideology or the opinion or perspective of the speaker is the rationale for the restriction. See Perry Ed. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators’ Assn., 460 U. S. 37, 46 (1983).

These principles provide the framework forbidding the State to exercise viewpoint discrimination, even when the limited public forum is one of its own creation. In a case involving a school district’s provision of school facilities for private uses, we declared that “[tjhere is no question that the District, like the private owner of property, may legally preserve the property under its control for the use to which it is dedicated.” Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School Dist., 508 U. S. 384, 390 (1993). The necessities of confining a forum to the limited and legitimate purposes for which it was created may justify the State in reserving it for certain groups or for the discussion of certain topics. See, e. g., Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Ed. Fund, Inc., 473 U. S. 788, 806 (1985); Perry Ed. Assn., supra, at 49. Once it has opened a limited forum, however, the State must respect the lawful boundaries it has itself set. The State may not exclude speech where its distinction is not “reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum,” Cornelius, supra, at 804-806; see also Perry Ed. Assn., supra, at 46, 49, nor may it discriminate against speech on the basis of its viewpoint, Lamb’s Chapel, supra, at 392-393; see also Perry Ed. Assn., supra, at 46; R. A. V., supra, at 386-388, 391-393; cf. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U. S. 397, 414-415 (1989). Thus, in determining whether the State is acting to preserve the limits of the forum it has created so that the exclusion of a class of speech is legitimate, we have observed a distinction be*830tween, on the one hand, content discrimination, which may be permissible if it preserves the purposes of that limited forum, and, on the other hand, viewpoint discrimination, which is presumed impermissible when directed against speech otherwise within the forum's limitations. See Perry Ed. Assn., supra, at 46.

The SAF is a forum more in a metaphysical than in a spatial or geographic sense, but the same principles are applicable. See, e. g., Perry Ed. Assn., supra, at 46-47 (forum analysis of a school mail system); Cornelius, supra, at 801 (forum analysis of charitable contribution program). The most recent and most apposite case is our decision in Lamb’s Chapel, supra. There, a school district had opened school facilities for use after school hours by community groups for a wide variety of social, civic, and recreational purposes. The district, however, had enacted a formal policy against opening facilities to groups for religious purposes. Invoking its policy, the district rejected a request from a group desiring to show a film series addressing various child-rearing questions from a “Christian perspective.” There was no indication in the record in Lamb’s Chapel that the request to use the school facilities was “denied, for any reason other than the fact that the presentation would have been from a religious perspective.” 508 U. S., at 393-394. Our conclusion was unanimous: “[I]t discriminates on the basis of viewpoint to permit school property to be used for the presentation of all views about family issues and child rearing except those dealing with the subject matter from a religious standpoint.” Id., at 393.

The University does acknowledge (as it must in light of our precedents) that “ideologically driven attempts to suppress a particular point of view are presumptively unconstitutional in funding, as in other contexts,” but insists that this case does not present that issue because the Guidelines draw lines based on content, not viewpoint. Brief for Respondents 17, n. 10. As we have noted, discrimination against one set of *831views or ideas is but a subset or particular instance of the more general phenomenon of content discrimination. See, e. g., R. A. V., supra, at 391. And, it must be acknowledged, the distinction is not a precise one. It is, in a sense, something of an understatement to speak of religious thought and discussion as just a viewpoint, as distinct from a comprehensive body of thought. The nature of our origins and destiny and their dependence upon the existence of a divine being have been subjects of philosophic inquiry throughout human history. We conclude, nonetheless, that here, as in Lamb’s Chapel, viewpoint discrimination is the proper way to interpret the University’s objections to Wide Awake. By the very terms of the SAF prohibition, the University does not exclude religion as a subject matter but selects for disfavored treatment those student journalistic efforts with religious editorial viewpoints. Religion may be a vast area of inquiry, but it also provides, as it did here, a specific premise, a perspective, a standpoint from which a variety of subjects may be discussed and considered. The prohibited perspective, not the general subject matter, resulted in the refusal to make third-party payments, for the subjects discussed were otherwise within the approved category of publications.

The dissent’s assertion that no viewpoint discrimination occurs because the Guidelines discriminate against an entire class of viewpoints reflects an insupportable assumption that all debate is bipolar and that antireligious speech is the only response to religious speech. Our understanding of the complex and multifaceted nature of public discourse has not embraced such a contrived description of the marketplace of ideas. If the topic of debate is, for example, racism, then exclusion of several views on that problem is just as offensive to the First Amendment as exclusion of only one. It is as objectionable to exclude both a theistic and an atheistic perspective on the debate as it is to exclude one, the other, or yet another political, economic, or social viewpoint. The dissent’s declaration that debate is not skewed so long as multi-*832pie voices arc silenced is simply wrong; the debate is skewed in multiple ways.

The University’s denial of WAP’s request for third-party payments in the present case is based upon viewpoint discrimination not unlike the discrimination the school district relied upon in Lamb’s Chapel and that we found invalid. The church group in Lamb’s Chapel would have been qualified as a social or civic organization, save for its religious purposes. Furthermore, just as the school district in Lamb’s Chapel pointed to nothing but the religious views of the group as the rationale for excluding its message, so in this case the University justifies its denial of SAF participation to WAP on the ground that the contents of Wide Awake reveal an avowed religious perspective. See supra, at 827. It bears only passing mention that the dissent’s attempt to distinguish Lamb’s Chapel is entirely without support in the law. Relying on the transcript of oral argument, the dissent seems to argue that we found viewpoint discrimination in that case because the government excluded Christian, but not atheistic, viewpoints from being expressed in the forum there. Post, at 897-898, and n. 13. The Court relied on no such distinction in holding that discriminating against religious speech was discriminating on the basis of viewpoint. There is no indication in the opinion of the Court (which, unlike an advocate’s statements at oral argument, is the law) that exclusion or inclusion of other religious or antireligious voices from that forum had any bearing on its decision.

The University tries to escape the consequences of our holding in Lamb’s Chapel by urging that this case involves the provision of funds rather than access to facilities. The University begins with the unremarkable proposition that the State must have substantial discretion in determining how to allocate scarce resources to accomplish its educational mission. Citing our decisions in Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U. S. 173 (1991), Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U. S. 540 (1983), and Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U. S. 263 *833(1981), the University argues that content-based funding decisions are both inevitable and lawful. Were the reasoning of Lamb’s Chapel to apply to funding decisions as well as to those involving access to facilities, it is urged, its holding “would become a judicial juggernaut, constitutionalizing the ubiquitous content-based decisions that schools, colleges, and other government entities routinely make in the allocation of public funds.” Brief for Respondents 16.

To this end the University relies on our assurance in Widmar v. Vincent, supra. There, in the course of striking down a public university’s exclusion of religious groups from use of school facilities made available to all other student groups, we stated: “Nor do we question the right of the University to make academic judgments as to how best to allocate scarce resources.” 454 U. S., at 276. The quoted ■language in Widmar was but a proper recognition of the principle that when the State is the speaker, it may make content-based choices. When the University determines the content of the education it provides, it is the University speaking, and we have permitted the government to regulate the content of what is or is not expressed when it is the speaker or' when it enlists private entities to convey its own message. In the same vein, in Rust v. Sullivan, supra, we upheld the government’s prohibition on abortion-related advice applicable to recipients of federal funds for family planning counseling. There, the government did not create a program to encourage private speech but instead used private speakers to transmit specific information pertaining to its own program. We recognized that when the government appropriates public funds to promote a particular policy of its own it is entitled to say what it wishes. 500 U. S., at 194. When the government disburses public funds to private entities to convey a governmental message, it may take legitimate and appropriate steps to ensure that its message is neither garbled nor distorted by the grantee. See id., at 196-200.

*834It does not follow, however, and we did not suggest in Widmar, that viewpoint-based restrictions are proper when the University does not itself speak or subsidize transmittal of a message it favors but instead expends funds to encourage a diversity of views from private speakers. A holding that the University may not discriminate based on the viewpoint of private persons whose speech it facilitates does not restrict the University’s own speech, which is controlled by different principles. See, e. g., Board of Ed. of Westside Community Schools (Dist. 66) v. Mergens, 496 U. S. 226, 250 (1990); Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U. S. 260, 270-272 (1988). For that reason, the University’s reliance on Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., supra, is inapposite as well. Regan involved a challenge to Congress’ choice to grant tax deductions for contributions made to veterans’ groups engaged in lobbying, while denying that favorable status to other charities which pursued lobbying efforts. Although acknowledging that the Government is not required to subsidize the exercise of fundamental rights, see 461 U. S., at 545-546, we reaffirmed the requirement of viewpoint neutrality in the Government’s provision of financial benefits by observing that “[t]he case would be different if Congress were to discriminate invidiously in its subsidies in such a way as to ‘ai[m] at the suppression of dangerous ideas,’ ” see id., at 548 (quoting Cammarano v. United States, 858 U. S. 498, 513 (1959), in turn quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U. S. 513, 519 (1958)). Regan relied on a distinction based on preferential treatment of certain speakers — veterans’ organizations — and not a distinction based on the content or messages of those groups’ speech. 461 U. S., at 548; cf. Perry Ed. Assn., 460 U. S., at 49. The University’s regulation now before us, however, has a speech-based restriction as its sole rationale and operative principle.

The distinction between the University’s own favored message and the private speech of students is evident in the case before us. The University itself has taken steps to ensure *835the distinction in the agreement each CIO must sign. See supra, at 824. The University declares that the student groups eligible for SAF support are not the University’s agents, are not subject to its control, and are not its responsibility. Having offered to pay the third-party contractors on behalf of private speakers who convey their own messages, the University may not silence the expression of selected viewpoints.

The University urges that, from a constitutional standpoint, funding of speech differs from provision of access to facilities because money is scarce and physical facilities are not. Beyond the fact that in any given case this proposition might not be true as an empirical matter, the underlying premise that the University could discriminate based on viewpoint if demand for space exceeded its availability is wrong as well. The government cannot justify viewpoint discrimination among private speakers on the economic fact of scarcity. Had the meeting rooms in Lamb's Chapel been scarce, had the demand been greater than the supply, our decision would have been no different. It would have been incumbent on the State, of course, to ration or allocate the scarce resources on some acceptable neutral principle; but nothing in our decision indicated that scarcity would give the State the right to exercise viewpoint discrimination that is otherwise impermissible.

Vital First Amendment speech principles are at stake here. The first danger to liberty lies in granting the State the power to examine publications to determine whether or not they are based on some ultimate idea and, if so, for the State to classify them. The second, and corollary, danger is to speech from the chilling of individual thought and expression. That danger is especially real in the University setting, where the State acts against a background and tradition of thought and experiment that is at the center of our intellectual and philosophic tradition. See Healy v. James, 408 U. S. 169, 180-181 (1972); Keyishian v. Board of Regents of *836Univ. of State of N. Y., 385 U. S. 589, 603 (1967); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U. S. 234, 250 (1957). In ancient Athens, and, as Europe entered into a new period of intellectual awakening, in places like Bologna, Oxford, and Paris, universities began as voluntary and spontaneous assemblages or concourses for students to speak and to write and to learn. See generally R. Palmer & J. Colton, A History of the Modern World 39 (7th ed. 1992). The quality and creative power of student intellectual life to this day remains a vital measure of a school’s influence and attainment. For the University, by regulation, to cast disapproval on particular viewpoints of its students risks the suppression of free speech and creative inquiry in one of the vital centers for the Nation’s intellectual life, its college and university campuses.

The Guideline invoked by the University to deny third-party contractor payments on behalf of WAP effects a sweeping restriction on student thought and student inquiry in the context of University sponsored publications. The prohibition on funding on behalf of publications that “primarily promot[e] or manifes[t] a particular belie[f] in or about a deity or an ultimate reality,” in its ordinary and commonsense meaning, has a vast potential reach. The term “promotes” as used here would comprehend any writing advocating a philosophic position that rests upon a belief in a deity or ultimate reality. See Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1815 (1961) (defining “promote” as “to contribute to the growth, enlargement, or prosperity of: further, encourage”). And the term “manifests” would bring within the scope of the prohibition any writing that is explicable as resting upon a premise that presupposes the existence of a deity or ultimate reality. See id, at 1375 (defining “manifest” as “to show plainly: make palpably evident or certain by showing or displaying”). Were the prohibition applied with much vigor at all, it would bar funding of essays by hypothetical student contributors named Plato, Spinoza, and Descartes. And if the regulation covers, as the University *837says it does, see Tr. of Oral Arg. 18-19, those student journalistic efforts that primarily manifest or promote a belief that there is no deity and no ultimate reality, then undergraduates named Karl Marx, Bertrand Russell, and Jean-Paul Sartre would likewise have some of their major essays excluded from student publications. If any manifestation of beliefs in first principles disqualifies the writing, as seems to be the case, it is indeed difficult to name renowned thinkers whose writings would be accepted, save perhaps for articles disclaiming all connection to their ultimate philosophy. Plato could contrive perhaps to submit an acceptable essay on making pasta or peanut butter cookies, provided he did not point out their (necessary) imperfections.

Based on the principles we have discussed, we hold that the regulation invoked to deny SAF support, both in its terms and in its application to these petitioners, is a denial of their right of free speech guaranteed by the First Amendment. It remains to be considered whether the violation following from the University’s action is excused by the necessity of complying with the Constitution’s prohibition against state establishment of religion. We turn to that question.

III

Before its brief on the merits in this Court, the University had argued at all stages of the litigation that inclusion of WAP’s contractors in SAF funding authorization would violate the Establishment Clause. Indeed, that is the ground on which the University prevailed in the Court of Appeals. We granted certiorari on this question: “Whether the Establishment Clause compels a state university to exclude an otherwise eligible student publication from participation in the student activities fund, solely on the basis of its religious viewpoint, where such exclusion would violate the Speech and Press Clauses if the viewpoint of the publication were nonreligious.” Pet. for Cert. i. The University now seems to have abandoned this position, contending that “[t]he fun*838damental objection to petitioners’ argument is not that it implicates the Establishment Clause but that it would defeat the ability of public education at all levels to control the use of public funds.” Brief for Respondents 29; see id., at 27-29, and n. 17; Tr. of Oral Arg. 14. That the University itself no longer presses the Establishment Clause claim is some indication that it lacks force; but as the Court of Appeals rested its judgment on the point and our dissenting colleagues would find it determinative, it must be addressed.

The Court of Appeals ruled that withholding SAF support from Wide Awake contravened the Speech Clause of the First Amendment, but proceeded to hold that the University’s action was justified by the necessity of avoiding a violation of the Establishment Clause, an interest it found compelling. 18 F. 3d, at 281. Recognizing that this Court has regularly “sanctioned awards of direct nonmonetary benefits to religious groups where government has created open fora to which all similarly situated organizations are invited,” id., at 286 (citing Widmar, 454 U. S., at 277), the Fourth Circuit asserted that direct monetary subsidization of religious organizations and projects is “a beast of an entirely different color,” 18 F. 3d, at 286. The court declared that the Establishment Clause would not permit the use of public funds to support “ ‘a specifically religious activity in an otherwise substantially secular setting.’ ” Id., at 285 (quoting Hunt v. McNair, 413 U. S. 734, 743 (1973) (emphasis deleted)). It reasoned that because Wide Awake is “a journal pervasively devoted to the discussion and advancement of an avowedly Christian theological and personal philosophy,” the University’s provision of SAF funds for its publication would “send an unmistakably clear signal that the University of Virginia supports Christian values and wishes to promote the wide promulgation of such values.” 18 F. 3d, at 286.

If there is to be assurance that the Establishment Clause retains its force in guarding against those governmental actions it was intended to prohibit, we must in each case in*839quire first into the purpose and object of the governmental action in question and then into the practical details of the program’s operation. Before turning to these matters, however, we can set forth certain general principles that must bear upon our determination.

A central lesson of our decisions is that a significant factor in upholding governmental programs in the face of Establishment Clause attack is their neutrality towards religion. We have decided a series of cases addressing the receipt of government benefits where religion or religious views are implicated in some degree. The first case in our modern Establishment Clause jurisprudence was Everson v. Board of Ed. of Ewing, 330 U. S. 1 (1947). There we cautioned that in enforcing the prohibition against laws respecting establishment of religion, we must “be sure that we do not inadvertently prohibit [the government] from extending its general state law benefits to all its citizens without regard to their religious belief.” Id., at 16. We have held that the guarantee of neutrality is respected, not offended, when the government, following neutral criteria and evenhanded policies, extends benefits to recipients whose ideologies and viewpoints, including religious ones, are broad and diverse. See Board of Ed. of Kiryas Joel Village School Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U. S. 687, 704 (1994) (Souter, J.) (“[T]he principle is well grounded in our ease law [and] we have frequently relied explicitly on the general availability of any benefit provided religious groups or individuals in turning aside Establishment Clause challenges”); Witters v. Washington Dept. of Servs. for Blind, 474 U. S. 481, 487-488 (1986); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U. S. 388, 398-399 (1983); Widmar, supra, at 274-275. More than once have we rejected the position that the Establishment Clause even justifies, much less requires, a refusal to extend free speech rights to religious speakers who participate in broad-reaching government programs neutral in design. See Lamb’s Chapel, 508 U. S., at 393-394; Mergens, 496 U. S., at 248, 252; Widmar, supra, at 274-275.

*840The governmental program here is neutral toward religion. There is no suggestion that the University created it to advance religion or adopted some ingenious device with the purpose of aiding a religious cause. The object of the SAF is to open a forum for speech and to support various student enterprises, including the publication of newspapers, in recognition of the diversity and creativity of student life. The University’s SAF Guidelines have a separate classification for, and do not make third-party payments on behalf of, “religious organizations,” which are those “whose purpose is to practice a devotion to an acknowledged ultimate reality or deity.” Pet. for Cert. 66a. The category of support here is for “student news, information, opinion, entertainment, or academic communications media groups,” of which Wide Awake was 1 of 15 in the 1990 school year. WAP did not seek a subsidy because of its Christian editorial viewpoint; it sought funding as a student journal, which it was.

The neutrality of the program distinguishes the student fees from a tax levied for the direct support of a church or group of churches. A tax of that sort, of course, would run contrary to Establishment Clause concerns dating from the earliest days of the Republic. The apprehensions of our predecessors involved the levying of taxes upon the public for the sole and exclusive purpose of establishing and supporting specific sects. The exaction here, by contrast, is a student activity fee designed to reflect the reality that student life in its many dimensions includes the necessity of wide-ranging speech and inquiry and that student expression is an integral part of the University’s educational mission. The fee is mandatory, and we do not have before us the question whether an objecting student has the First Amendment right to demand a pro rata return to the extent the fee is expended for speech to which he or she does not subscribe. See Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U. S. 1, 15-16 (1990); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Ed., 431 U. S. 209, 235-236 (1977). We must treat it, then, as an exaction upon the students. *841But the $14 paid each semester by the students is not a general tax designed to raise revenue for the University. See United States v. Butler, 297 U. S. 1, 61 (1936) (“A tax, in the general understanding of the term, and as used in the Constitution, signifies an exaction for the support of the Government”); see also Head Money Cases, 112 U. S. 580, 595-596 (1884). The SAF cannot be used for unlimited purposes, much less the illegitimate purpose of supporting one religion. Much like the arrangement in Widmar, the money goes to a special fund from which any group of students with CIO status can draw for purposes consistent with the University’s educational mission; and to the extent the student is interested in speech, withdrawal is permitted to cover the whole spectrum of speech, whether it manifests a religious view, an antireligious view, or neither. Our decision, then, cannot be read as addressing an expenditure from a general tax fund. Here, the disbursements from the fund go to private contractors for the cost of printing that which is protected under the Speech Clause of the First Amendment. This is a far cry from a general public assessment designed and effected to provide financial support for a church.

Government neutrality is apparent in the State’s overall scheme in a further meaningful respect. The program respects the critical difference “between government speech endorsing religion, which the Establishment Clause forbids, and private speech endorsing religion, which the Free 'Speech and Free Exercise Clauses protect.” Mergens, supra, at 250 (opinion of O’Connor, J.). In this case, “the government has not fostered or encouraged” any mistaken impression that the student newspapers speak for the University. Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, ante, at 766. The University has taken pains to disassociate itself from the private speech involved in this case. The Court of Appeals’ apparent concern that Wide Awake’s religious orientation would be attributed to the University is not a plausible fear, and there is no real likelihood that the *842speech in question is being either endorsed or coerced by the State, see Lee v. Weisman, 505 U. S. 577, 587 (1992); Witters, supra, at 489 (citing Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U. S. 668, 688 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring)); see also Witters, supra, at 493 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (citing Lynch, supra, at 690 (O’Connor, J., concurring)).

The Court of Appeals (and the dissent) are correct to extract from our decisions the principle that we have recognized special Establishment Clause dangers where the government makes direct money payments to sectarian institutions, citing Roemer v. Board of Public Works of Md., 426 U. S. 736, 747 (1976); Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U. S. 589, 614-615 (1988); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U. S., at 742; Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 672, 679-680 (1971); Board of Ed. of Central School Dist. No. 1 v. Allen, 392 U. S. 236 (1968). The error is not in identifying the principle, but in believing that it controls this case. Even assuming that WAP is no different from a church and that its speech is the same as the religious exercises conducted in Widmar (two points much in doubt), the Court of Appeals decided a case that was, in essence, not before it, and the dissent would have us do the same. We do not confront a case where, even under a neutral program that includes nonsectarian recipients, the government is making direct money payments to an institution or group that is engaged in religious activity. Neither the Court of Appeals nor the dissent, we believe, takes sufficient cognizance of the undisputed fact that no public funds flow directly to WAP’s coffers.

It does not violate the Establishment Clause for a public university to grant access to its facilities on a religion-neutral basis to a wide spectrum of student groups, including groups that use meeting rooms for sectarian activities, accompanied by some devotional exercises. See Widmar, 454 U. S., at 269; Mergens, 496 U. S., at 252. This is so even where the upkeep, maintenance, and repair of the facilities *843attributed to those uses are paid from a student activities fund to which students are required to contribute. Widmar, supra, at 265. The government usually acts by spending money. Even the provision of a meeting room, as in Mergens and Widmar, involved governmental expenditure, if only in the form of electricity and heating or cooling costs. The error made by the Court of Appeals, as well as by the dissent, lies in focusing on the money that is undoubtedly expended by the government, rather than on the nature of the benefit received by the recipient. If the expenditure of governmental funds is prohibited whenever those funds pay for a service that is, pursuant to a religion-neutral program, used by a group for sectarian purposes, then Widmar, Mergens, and Lamb’s Chapel would have to be overruled. Given our holdings in these cases, it follows that a public university may maintain its own computer facility and give student groups access to that facility, including the use of the printers, on a religion neutral, say first-come-first-served, basis. If a religious student organization obtained access on that religion-neutral basis and used a computer to compose or a printer or copy machine to print speech with a religious content or viewpoint, the State’s action in providing the group with access would no more violate the Establishment Clause than would giving those groups access to an assembly hall. See Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School Dist, 508 U. S. 384 (1993); Widmar, supra; Mergens, supra. There is no difference in logic or principle, and no difference of constitutional significance, between a school using its funds to operate a facility to which students have access, and a school paying a third-party contractor to operate the facility on its behalf. The latter occurs here. The University provides printing services to a broad spectrum of student newspapers qualified as CIO’s by reason of their officers and membership. Any benefit to religion is incidental to the government’s provision of secular services for secular *844purposes on a religion-neutral basis. Printing is a routine, secular, and recurring attribute of student life.

By paying outside printers, the University in fact attains a further degree of separation from the student publication, for it avoids the duties of supervision, escapes the costs of upkeep, repair, and replacement attributable to student use, and has a clear record of costs. As a result, and as in Widmar, the University can charge the SAF, and not the taxpayers as a whole, for the discrete activity in question. It would be formalistic for us to say that the University must forfeit these advantages and provide the services itself in order to comply with the Establishment Clause. It is, of course, true that if the State pays a church’s bills it is subsidizing it, and we must guard against this abuse. That is not a danger here, based on the considerations we have advanced and for the additional reason that the student publication is not a religious institution, at least in the usual sense of that term as used in our case law, and it is not a religious organization as used in the University’s own regulations. It is instead a publication involved in a pure forum for the expression of ideas, ideas that would be both incomplete and chilled were the Constitution to be interpreted to require that state officials and courts scan the publication to ferret out views that principally manifest a belief in a divine being.

Were the dissent’s view to become law, it would require the University, in order to avoid a constitutional violation, to scrutinize the content of student speech, lest the expression in question — speech otherwise protected by the Constitution — contain too great a religious content. The dissent, in fact, anticipates such censorship as “crucial” in distinguishing between “works characterized by the evangelism of Wide Awake and writing that merely happens to express views that a given religion might approve.” Post, at 896. That eventuality raises the specter of governmental censorship, to ensure that all student writings and publications meet some baseline standard of secular orthodoxy. To impose that *845standard on student speech at a university is to imperil the very sources of free speech and expression. As we recognized in Widmar, official censorship would be far more inconsistent with the Establishment Clause’s dictates than would governmental provision of secular printing services on a religion-blind basis.

“[T]he dissent fails to establish that the distinction [between ‘religious’ speech and speech ‘about’ religion] has intelligible content. There is no indication when ‘singing hymns, reading scripture, and teaching biblical principles’ cease to be ‘singing, teaching, and reading’ — all apparently forms of ‘speech,’ despite their religious subject matter — and become unprotected ‘worship.’. .. “[E]ven if the distinction drew an arguably principled line, it is highly doubtful that it would lie within the judicial competence to administer. Merely to draw the distinction would require the university — and ultimately the courts — to inquire into the significance of words and practices to different religious faiths, and in varying circumstances by the same faith. Such inquiries would tend inevitably to entangle the State with religion in a manner forbidden by our cases. E.g., Walz v. Tax Comm’n of City of New York, 397 U. S. 664 (1970).” 454 U. S., at 269-270, n. 6 (citations omitted).

* * *

To obey the Establishment Clause, it was not necessary for the University to deny eligibility to student publications because of their viewpoint. The neutrality commanded of the State by the separate Clauses of the First Amendment was compromised by the University’s course of action. The viewpoint discrimination inherent in the University’s regulation required public officials to scan and interpret student publications to discern their underlying philosophic assumptions respecting religious theory and belief. That course of action was a denial of the right of free speech and would risk *846fostering a pervasive bias or hostility to religion, which could undermine the very neutrality the Establishment Clause requires. There is no Establishment Clause violation in the University’s honoring its duties under the Free Speech Clause.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals must be, and is, reversed.

It is so ordered.

Justice O’Connor,

concurring.

“We have time and again held that the government generally may not treat people differently based on the God or gods they worship, or do not worship.” Board of Ed. of Kiryas Joel Village School Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U. S. 687, 714 (1994) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). This insistence on government neutrality toward religion explains why we have held that schools may not discriminate against religious groups by denying them equal access to facilities that the schools make available to all. See Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School Dist., 508 U. S. 384 (1993); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U. S. 263 (1981). Withholding access would leave an impermissible perception that religious activities are disfavored: “[T]he message is one of neutrality rather than endorsement; if a State refused to let religious groups use facilities open to others, then it would demonstrate not neutrality but hostility toward religion.” Board of Ed. of Westside Community Schools (Dist. 66) v. Mergens, 496 U. S. 226, 248 (1990) (plurality opinion). “The Religion Clauses prohibit the government from favoring religion, but they provide no warrant for discriminating against religion.” Kiryas Joel, supra, at 717 (O’Connor, J.). Neutrality, in both form and effect, is one hallmark of the Establishment Clause.

As Justice Souter demonstrates, however, post, at 868-872 (dissenting opinion), there exists another axiom in the history and precedent of the Establishment Clause. “Public *847funds may not be used to endorse the religious message.” Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U. S. 589, 642 (1988) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see also id., at 622 (O’Connor, J., concurring). Our cases have permitted some government funding of secular functions performed by sectarian organizations. See, e. g., id., at 617 (funding for sex education); Roemer v. Board of Public Works of Md., 426 U. S. 736, 741 (1976) (cash grant to colleges not to be used for “sectarian purposes”); Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U. S. 291, 299-300 (1899) (funding of health care for indigent patients). These decisions, however, provide no precedent for the use of public funds to finance religious activities.

This case lies at the intersection of the principle of government neutrality and the prohibition on state funding of religious activities. It is clear that the University has established a generally applicable program to encourage the free exchange of ideas by its students, an expressive marketplace that includes some 15 student publications with predictably divergent viewpoints. It is equally clear that petitioners’ viewpoint is religious and that publication of Wide Awake is a religious activity, under both the University’s regulation and a fair reading of our precedents. Not to finance Wide Awake, according to petitioners, violates the principle of neutrality by sending a message of hostility toward religion. To finance Wide Awake, argues the University, violates the prohibition on direct state funding of religious activities.

When two bedrock principles so conflict, understandably neither can provide the definitive answer. Reliance on categorical platitudes is unavailing. Resolution instead depends on the hard task of judging — sifting through the details and determining whether the challenged program offends the Establishment Clause. Such judgment requires courts to draw lines, sometimes quite fine, based on the particular facts of each case. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U. S. 577, 598 (1992) (“Our jurisprudence in this area is of necessity one of line-drawing”). As Justice Holmes observed in a different *848context: “Neither are we troubled by the question where to draw the line. That is the question in pretty much everything worth arguing in the law. Day and night, youth and age are only types.” Irwin v. Gavit, 268 U. S. 161, 168 (1926) (citation omitted).

In Witters v. Washington Dept. of Servs. for Blind, 474 U. S. 481 (1986), for example, we unanimously held that the State may, through a generally applicable financial aid program, pay a blind student’s tuition at a sectarian theological institution. The Court so held, however, only after emphasizing that “vocational assistance provided under the Washington program is paid directly to the student, who transmits it to the educational institution of his or her choice.” Id., at 487. The benefit to religion under the program, therefore, is akin to a public servant contributing her government paycheck to the church. Ibid. We thus resolved the conflict between the neutrality principle and the funding prohibition, not by permitting one to trump the other, but by relying on the elements of choice peculiar to the facts of that case: “The aid to religion at issue here is the result of petitioner’s private choice. No reasonable observer is likely to draw from the facts before us an inference that the State itself is endorsing a religious practice or belief.” Id., at 493 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). See also Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School Dist., 509 U. S. 1, 10-11 (1993).

The need for careful judgment and fine distinctions presents itself even in extreme cases. Everson v. Board of Ed. of Ewing, 330 U. S. 1 (1947), provided perhaps the strongest exposition of the no-funding principle: “No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion.” Id., at 16. Yet the Court approved the use of public funds, in a general program, to reimburse parents for their children’s bus fares to attend Catholic schools. Id., at 17-18. *849Although some would cynically dismiss the Court’s disposition as inconsistent with its protestations, see id., at 19 (Jackson, J,, dissenting) (“[T]he most fitting precedent is that of Julia who, according to Byron’s reports, ‘whispering “I will ne’er consent,” — consented’ ”), the decision reflected the need to rely on careful judgment — not simple categories — when two principles, of equal historical and jurisprudential pedigree, come into unavoidable conflict.

So it is in this case. The nature of the dispute does not admit of categorical answers, nor should any be inferred from the Court’s decision today, see ante, at 838-839. Instead, certain considerations specific to the program at issue lead me to conclude that by providing the same assistance to Wide Awake that it does to other publications, the University would not be endorsing the magazine’s religious perspective.

First, the student organizations, at the University’s insistence, remain strictly independent of the University. The University’s agreement with the Contracted Independent Organizations (CIO) — i. e., student groups — provides:

“The University is a Virginia public corporation and the CIO is not part of that corporation, but rather exists and operates independently of the University. .. .

“The parties understand and agree that this Agreement is the only source of any control the University may have over the CIO or its activities . .. .” App. 27.

And the agreement requires that student organizations include in every letter, contract, publication, or other written materials the following disclaimer:

“Although this organization has members who are University of Virginia students (faculty) (employees), the organization is independent of the corporation which is the University and which is not responsible for the organization’s contracts, acts or omissions.” Id., at 28.

*850Any reader of Wide Awake would be on notice of the publication’s independence from the University. Cf. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U. S., at 274, n. 14.

Second, financial assistance is distributed in a manner that ensures its use Only for permissible purposes. A student organization seeking assistance must submit disbursement requests; if approved, the funds are paid directly to the third-party vendor and do not pass through the organization’s coffers. This safeguard accompanying the University’s financial assistance, when provided to a publication with a religious viewpoint such as Wide Awake, ensures that the funds are used only to further the University’s purpose in maintaining a free and robust marketplace of ideas, from whatever perspective. This feature also makes this case analogous to a school providing equal access to a generally available printing press (or other physical facilities), ante, at 843, and unlike a block grant to religious organizations.

Third, assistance is provided to the religious publication in a context that makes improbable any perception of government endorsement of the religious message. Wide Awake does not exist in a vacuum. It competes with 15 other magazines and newspapers for advertising and readership. The widely divergent viewpoints of these many purveyors of opinion, all supported on an equal basis by the University, significantly diminishes the danger that the message of any one publication is perceived as endorsed by the University. Besides the general news publications, for example, the University has provided support to The Yellow Journal, a humor magazine that has targeted Christianity as a subject of satire, and Al-Salam, a publication to “promote a better understanding of Islam to the University Community,” App. 92. Given this wide array of nonreligious, anti-religious and competing religious viewpoints in the forum supported by the University, any perception that the University endorses one particular viewpoint would be illogical. This is not the harder case where religious speech threatens *851to dominate the forum. Cf. Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, ante, at 777 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); Mergens, 496 U. S., at 275.

Finally, although the question is not presented here, I note the possibility that the student fee is susceptible to a Free Speech Clause challenge by an objecting student that she should not be compelled to pay for speech with which she disagrees. See, e. g., Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U. S. 1, 15 (1990); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Ed., 431 U. S. 209, 236 (1977). There currently exists a split in the lower courts as to whether such a challenge would be successful. Compare Hays County Guardian v. Supple, 969 F. 2d 111, 123 (CA5 1992), cert. denied, 506 U. S. 1087 (1993); Kania v. Fordham, 702 F. 2d 475, 480 (CA4 1983); Good v. Associated Students of Univ. of Wash., 86 Wash. 2d 94, 105-106, 542 P. 2d 762, 769 (1975) (en banc), with Smith v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 4 Cal. 4th 843, 863-864, 844 P. 2d 500, 513-514, cert. denied, 510 U. S. 863 (1993). While the Court does not resolve the question here, see ante, at 840, the existence of such an opt-out possibility not available to citizens generally, see Abood, supra, at 259, n. 13 (Powell, J., concurring in judgment), provides a potential basis for distinguishing proceeds of the student fees in this case from proceeds of the general assessments in support of religion that lie at the core of the prohibition against religious funding, see ante, at 840-841; post, at 852-855 (Thomas, J., concurring); post, at 868-872 (Souter, J., dissenting), and from government funds generally. Unlike moneys dispensed from state or federal treasuries, the Student Activities Fund is collected from students who themselves administer the fund and select qualifying recipients only from among those who originally paid the fee. The government neither pays into nor draws from this common pool, and a fee of this sort appears conducive to granting individual students proportional refunds. The Student Activities Fund, then, represents not government resources, *852whether derived from tax revenue, sales of assets, or otherwise, but a fund that simply belongs to the students.

The Court’s decision today therefore neither trumpets the supremacy of the neutrality principle nor signals the demise of the funding prohibition in Establishment Clause jurisprudence. As I observed last Term, “[experience proves that the Establishment Clause, like the Free Speech Clause, cannot easily be reduced to a single test.” Kiryas Joel, 512 U. S., at 720 (opinion concurring in part and concurring in judgment). When bedrock principles collide, they test the limits of categorical obstinacy and expose the flaws and dangers of a Grand Unified Theory that may turn out to be neither grand nor unified. The Court today does only what courts must do in many Establishment Clause cases — focus on specific features of a particular government action to ensure that it does not violate the Constitution. By withholding from Wide Awake assistance that the University provides generally to all other student publications, the University has discriminated on the basis of the magazine’s religious viewpoint in violation of the Free Speech Clause. And particular features of the University’s program — such as the explicit disclaimer, the disbursement of funds directly to third-party vendors, the vigorous nature of the forum at issue, and the possibility for objecting students to opt out— convince me that providing such assistance in this case would not carry the danger of impermissible use of public funds to endorse Wide Awake’s religious message.

Subject to these comments, I join the opinion of the Court.

Justice Thomas,

concurring.

I agree with the Court’s opinion and join it in full, but I write separately to express my disagreement with the historical analysis put forward by the dissent. Although the dissent starts down the right path in consulting the original meaning of the Establishment Clause, its misleading application of history yields a principle that is inconsistent with our Nation’s long tradition of allowing religious adher*853ents to participate on equal terms in neutral government programs.

Even assuming that the Virginia debate on the so-called “Assessment Controversy” was indicative of the principles embodied in the Establishment Clause, this incident hardly compels the dissent’s conclusion that government must actively discriminate against religion. The dissent’s historical discussion glosses over the fundamental characteristic of the Virginia assessment bill that sparked the controversy: The assessment was to be imposed for the support of clergy in the performance of their function of teaching religion. Thus, the “Bill Establishing a Provision for Teachers of the Christian Religion” provided for the collection of a specific tax, the proceeds of which were to be appropriated “by the Vestries, Elders, or Directors of each religious society ... to a provision for a Minister or Teacher of the Gospel of their denomination, or the providing places of divine worship, and to none other use whatsoever.” See Everson v. Board of Ed. of Ewing, 330 U. S. 1, 74 (1947) (appendix to dissent of Rutledge, J.).1

*854James Madison’s Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments (hereinafter Madison’s Remonstrance) must be understood in this context. Contrary to the dissent’s suggestion, Madison’s objection to the assessment bill did not rest on the premise that religious entities may never participate on equal terms in neutral government programs. Nor did Madison embrace the argument that forms the linchpin of the dissent: that monetary subsidies are constitutionally different from other neutral benefits programs. Instead, Madison’s comments are more consistent with the neutrality principle that the dissent inexplicably discards. According to Madison, the Virginia assessment was flawed because it “violate [d] that equality which ought to be the basis of every law.” Madison’s Remonstrance ¶ 4, reprinted in Everson, supra, at 66 (appendix to dissent of Rutledge, J.). The assessment violated the “equality” principle not be*855cause it allowed religious groups to participate in a generally available government program, but because the bill singled out religious entities for special benefits. See ibid, (arguing that the assessment violated the equality principle “by subjecting some to peculiar burdens” and “by granting to others peculiar exemptions”).

Legal commentators have disagreed about the historical lesson to take from the Assessment Controversy. For some, the experience in Virginia is consistent with the view that the Framers saw the Establishment Clause simply as a prohibition on governmental preferences for some religious faiths over others. See R. Cord, Separation of Church and State: Historical Fact and Current Fiction 20-23 (1982); Smith, Getting Off on the Wrong Foot and Back on Again: A Reexamination of the History of the Framing of the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment and a Critique of the Reynolds and Everson Decisions, 20 Wake Forest L. Rev. 569, 590-591 (1984). Other commentators have rejected this view, concluding that the Establishment Clause forbids not only government preferences for some religious sects over others, but also government preferences for religion over irreligión. See, e.g., Laycock, “Nonpreferential” Aid to Religion: A False Claim About Original Intent, 27 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 875 (1986).

I find much to commend the former view. Madison’s focus on the preferential nature of the assessment was not restricted to the fourth paragraph of the Remonstrance discussed above. The funding provided by the Virginia assessment was to be extended only to Christian sects, and the Remonstrance seized on this defect:

“Who does not see that the same authority which can establish Christianity, in exclusion of all other Religions, may establish with the same ease any particular sect of Christians, in exclusion of all other Sects.” Madison’s Remonstrance ¶ 3, reprinted in Everson, supra, at 65.

*856In addition to the third and fourth paragraphs of the Remonstrance, “Madison’s seventh, ninth, eleventh, and twelfth arguments all speak, in some way, to the same intolerance, bigotry, unenlightenment, and persecution that had generally resulted from previous exclusive religious establishments.” Cord, supra, at 21. The conclusion that Madison saw the principle of nonestablishment as barring governmental preferences for particular religious faiths seems especially clear in light of statements he made in the more relevant context of the House debates on the First Amendment. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U. S. 38, 98 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (Madison’s views “as reflected by actions on the floor of the House in 1789, [indicate] that he saw the [First] Amendment as designed to prohibit the establishment of a national religion, and perhaps to prevent discrimination among sects,” but not “as requiring neutrality on the part of government between religion and irreligión”). Moreover, even if more extreme notions of the separation of church and state can be attributed to Madison, many of them clearly stem from “arguments reflecting the concepts of natural law, natural rights, and the social contract between government and a civil society,” Cord, supra, at 22, rather than the principle of nonestablishment in the Constitution. In any event, the views of one man do not establish the original understanding of the First Amendment.

But resolution of this debate is not necessary to decide this case. Under any understanding of the Assessment Controversy, the history cited by the dissent cannot support the conclusion that the Establishment Clause “categorically condemn[s] state programs directly aiding religious activity” when that aid is part of a neutral program available to a wide array of beneficiaries. Post, at 875. Even if Madison believed that the principle of nonestablishment of religion precluded government financial support for religion per se (in the sense of government benefits specifically targeting religion), there is no indication that at the time of the fram*857ing he took the dissent’s extreme view that the government must discriminate against religious adherents by excluding them from more generally available financial subsidies.2

In fact, Madison’s own early legislative proposals cut against the dissent’s suggestion. In 1776, when Virginia’s Revolutionary Convention was drafting its Declaration of Rights, Madison prepared an amendment that would have disestablished the Anglican Church. This amendment (which went too far for the Convention and was not adopted) is not nearly as sweeping as the dissent’s version of disestablishment; Madison merely wanted the Convention to declare that “no man or class of men ought, on account of religion[,] to be invested with peculiar emoluments or privileges . ...” Madison’s Amendments to the Declaration of Rights (May 29-June 12, 1776), in 1 Papers of James Madison 174 (W. Hutchinson & W. Rachal eds. 1962) (emphasis added). Likewise, Madison’s Remonstrance stressed that “just government” is “best supported by protecting every citizen in the enjoyment of his Religion with the same equal hand which protects his person and his property; by neither invading the equal rights of any Sect, nor suffering any Sect to invade those of another.” Madison’s Remonstrance ¶8, reprinted in Everson, 380 U. S., at 68; cf. Terrett v. Taylor, 9 Cranch 43, 49 (1815) (holding that the Virginia Constitution did not prevent the government from “aiding ... the votaries of *858every sect to perform their own religious duties,” or from “establishing funds for the support of ministers, for public charities, for the endowment of churches, or for the sepulture of the dead”).

Stripped of its flawed historical premise, the dissent’s argument is reduced to the claim that our Establishment Clause jurisprudence permits neutrality in the context of access to government facilities but requires discrimination in access to government funds. The dissent purports to locate the prohibition against “direct public funding” at the “heart” of the Establishment Clause, see post, at 878, but this conclusion fails to confront historical examples of funding that date back to the time of the founding. To take but one famous' example, both Houses of the First Congress elected chaplains, see S. Jour., 1st Cong., 1st Sess., 10 (1820 ed.); H. R. Jour., 1st Cong., 1st Sess., 26 (1826 ed.), and that Congress enacted legislation providing for an annual salary of $600 to be paid out of the Treasury, see Act of Sept. 22, 1789, ch. 17, § 4, 1 Stat. 70, 71. Madison himself was a member of the committee that recommended the chaplain system in the House. See H. R. Jour., at 11-12; 1 Annals of Cong. 891 (1789); Cord, Separation of Church and State: Historical Fact and Current Fiction, at 25. This same system of “direct public funding” of congressional chaplains has “continued without interruption ever since that early session of Congress.” Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U. S. 783, 788 (1983).3

*859The historical evidence of government support for reli- • gious entities through property tax exemptions is also overwhelming. As the dissent concedes, property tax exemptions for religious bodies “have been in place for over 200 years without disruption to the interests represented by the Establishment Clause.” Post, at 881, n. 7 (citing Walz v. Tax Comm’n of City of New York, 397 U. S. 664, 676-680 (1970)).4 In my view, the dissent’s acceptance of this tradition puts to rest the notion that the Establishment Clause bars monetary aid to religious groups even when the aid is equally available to other groups. A tax exemption in many cases is economically and functionally indistinguishable from a direct monetary subsidy.5 In one instance, the government relieves reli*860gious entities (along with others) of a generally applicable tax; in the other, it relieves religious entities (along with others) of some or all of the burden of that tax by returning it in the form of a cash subsidy. Whether the benefit is provided at the front or back end of the taxation process, the financial aid to religious groups is undeniable. The analysis under the Establishment Clause must also be the same: “Few concepts are more deeply embedded in the fabric of our na*861tional life, beginning with pre-Revolutionary colonial times, than for the government to exercise at the very least this kind of benevolent neutrality toward churches and religious exercise . .. Walz, supra, at 676-677.

Consistent application of the dissent’s “no-aid” principle would require that “ ‘a church could not be protected by the police and fire departments, or have its public sidewalk kept in repair.’ ” Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School Dist., 509 U. S. 1, 8 (1993) (quoting Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U. S. 263, 274-275 (1981)). The dissent admits that “evenhandedness may become important to ensuring that religious interests are not inhibited.” Post, at 879, n. 5. Surely the dissent must concede, however, that the same result should obtain whether the government provides the populace with fire protection by reimbursing the costs of smoke detectors and overhead sprinkler systems or by establishing a public fire department. If churches may benefit on equal terms with other groups in the latter program — that is, if a public fire department may extinguish fires at churches — then they may also benefit on equal terms in the former program.

Though our Establishment Clause jurisprudence is in hopeless disarray, this case provides an opportunity to reaffirm one basic principle that has enjoyed an uncharacteristic degree of consensus: The Clause does not compel the exclusion of religious groups from government benefits programs that are generally available to a broad class of participants. See Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School Dist., 508 U. S. 384 (1993); Zobrest, supra; Board of Ed. of Westside Community Schools (Dist. 66) v. Mergens, 496 U. S. 226 (1990); Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U. S. 1 (1989); Witters v. Washington Dept. of Servs. for Blind, 474 U. S. 481 (1986); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U. S. 388 (1983); Widmar, supra. Under the dissent’s view, however, the University of Virginia may provide neutral access to the University’s own printing press, but it may not provide the same service when the press is owned by a third party. Not sur*862prisingly, the dissent offers no logical justification for this conclusion, and none is evident in the text or original meaning of the First Amendment.

If the Establishment Clause is offended when religious adherents benefit from neutral programs such as the University of Virginia’s Student Activities Fund, it must also be offended when they receive the same benefits in the form of in-kind subsidies. The constitutional demands of the Establishment Clause may be judged against either a baseline of “neutrality” or a baseline of “no aid to religion,” but the appropriate baseline surely cannot depend on the fortuitous circumstances surrounding the form of aid. The contrary rule would lead to absurd results that would jettison centuries of practice respecting the right of religious adherents to participate on neutral terms in a wide variety of government-funded programs.

Our Nation’s tradition of allowing religious adherents to participate in evenhanded government programs is hardly limited to the class of “essential public benefits” identified by the dissent. See post, at 879, n. 5. A broader tradition can be traced at least as far back as the First Congress, which ratified the Northwest Ordinance of 1787. See Act of Aug. 7, 1789, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 50. Article III of that famous enactment of the Confederation Congress had provided: “Religion, morality, and knowledge ... being necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind, schools and the means of education shall forever be encouraged.” Id., at 52, n. (a). Congress subsequently set aside federal lands in the Northwest Territory and other territories for the use of schools. See, e. g., Act of Mar. 3, 1803, ch. 21, § 1, 2 Stat. 225-226; Act of Mar. 26, 1804, ch. 35, § 5, 2 Stat. 279; Act of Feb. 15, 1811, ch. 14, § 10, 2 Stat. 621; Act of Apr. 18, 1818, ch. 67, § 6, 3 Stat. 430; Act of Apr. 20, 1818, ch. 126, § 2, 3 Stat. 467. Many of the schools that enjoyed the benefits of these land grants undoubtedly were church-affiliated sectarian institutions as there was no requirement that the schools be “public.” See *863C. Antieau, A. Downey, & E. Roberts, Freedom From Federal Establishment, Formation and Early History of the First Amendment Religion Clauses 163 (1964). Nevertheless, early Congresses found no problem with the provision of such neutral benefits. See also id., at 174 (noting that “almost universally[,] Americans from 1789 to 1825 accepted and practiced governmental aid to religion and religiously oriented educational institutions”).

Numerous other government benefits traditionally have been available to religious adherents on neutral terms. Several examples may be found in the work of early Congresses, including copyright protection for “the author and authors of any map, chart, book or books,” Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124, and a privilege allowing “every printer of newspapers [to] send one paper to each and every other printer of newspapers within the United States, free of postage,” Act of Feb. 20, 1792, ch. 7, § 21, 1 Stat. 238. Neither of these laws made any exclusion for the numerous authors or printers who manifested a belief in or about a deity.

Thus, history provides an answer for the constitutional question posed by this case, but it is not the one given by the dissent. The dissent identifies no evidence that the Framers intended to disable religious entities from participating on neutral terms in evenhanded government programs. The evidence that does exist points in the opposite direction and provides ample support for today’s decision.

Justice Souter,

dissenting.

The Court today, for the first time, approves direct funding of core religious activities by an arm of the State. It does so, however, only after erroneous treatment of some familiar principles of law implementing the First Amendment’s Establishment and Speech Clauses, and by viewing the very funds in question as beyond the reach of the Establishment Clause’s funding restrictions as such. Because there is no *864warrant for extinguishing among public funding sources for purposes of applying the First Amendment’s prohibition of religious establishment, I would hold that the University’s refusal to support petitioners’ religious activities is compelled by the Establishment Clause. I would therefore affirm.

HH

The central question in this case is whether a grant from the Student Activities Fund to pay Wide Awake’s printing expenses would violate the Establishment Clause. Although the Court does not dwell on the details of Wide Awake’s message, it recognizes something sufficiently religious in the publication to demand Establishment Clause scrutiny. Although the Court places great stress on the eligibility of secular as well as religious activities for grants from the Student Activities Fund, it recognizes that such evenhanded availability is not by itself enough to satisfy constitutional requirements for any aid scheme that results in a benefit to religion. Ante, at 839; see also ante, at 846-848 (O’Connor, J., concurring). Something more is necessary to justify any religious aid. Some Members of the Court, at least, may think the funding permissible on a view that it is indirect, since the money goes to Wide Awake’s printer, not through Wide Awake’s own checking account. The Court’s principal reliance, however, is on an argument that providing religion with economically valuable services is permissible on the theory that services are economically indistinguishable from religious access to governmental speech forums, which sometimes is permissible. But this reasoning would commit the Court to approving direct religious aid beyond anything justifiable for the sake of access to speaking forums. The Court implicitly recognizes this in its further attempt to circumvent the clear bar to direct governmental aid to religion. Different Members of the Court seek to avoid this bar in different ways. The opinion of the Court makes the novel assumption that only direct aid financed with tax *865revenue is barred, and draws the erroneous conclusion that the involuntary Student Activities Fee is not a tax. I do not read Justice O’Connor’s opinion as sharing that assumption; she places this Student Activities Fund in a category of student binding enterprises from which religious activities in public universities may benefit, so long as there is no consequent endorsement of religion. The resulting decision is in unmistakable tension with the accepted law that the Court continues to avow.

A

The Court’s difficulties will be all the more clear after a closer look at Wide Awake than the majority opinion affords. The character of the magazine is candidly disclosed on the opening page of the first issue, where the editor-in-chief announces Wide Awake’s mission in a letter to the readership signed, “Love in Christ”: it is “to challenge Christians to live, in word and deed, according to the faith they proclaim and to encourage students to consider what a personal relationship with Jesus Christ means.” App. 45. The masthead of every issue bears St. Paul’s exhortation, that “[t]he hour has come for you to awake from your slumber, because our salvation is nearer now than when we first believed. Romans 13:11.”

Each issue of Wide Awake contained in the record makes good on the editor’s promise and echoes the Apostle’s call to accept salvation:

“The only way to salvation through Him is by confessing and repenting of sin. It is the Christian’s duty to make sinners aware of their need for salvation. Thus, Christians must confront and condemn sin, or else they fail in their duty of love.” Mourad & Prince, A Love/Hate Relationship, Nov./Dec. 1990, p. 3.

“When you get to the final gate, the Lord will be handing out boarding passes, and He will examine your ticket. If, in your lifetime, you did not request a seat *866on His Friendly Skies Flyer by trusting Him and asking Him to be your pilot, then you will not be on His list of reserved seats (and the Lord will know you not). You will not be able to buy a ticket then; no amount of money or desire will do the trick. You will be met by your chosen pilot and flown straight to Hell on an express jet (without air conditioning or toilets, of course).” Ace, The Plane Truth, ibid.

“ ‘Go into all the world and preach the good news to all creation.’ (Mark 16:15) The Great Commission is the prime-directive for our lives as Christians . . . .” Liu, Christianity and the Five-legged Stool, Sept./Oct. 1991, p. 3.

“The Spirit provides access to an intimate relationship with the Lord of the Universe, awakens our minds to comprehend spiritual truth and empowers us to serve as effective ambassadors for the Lord Jesus in our earthly lives.” Buterbaugh, A Spiritual Advantage, Mar./Apr. 1991, p. 21.

There is no need to quote further from articles of like tenor, but one could examine such other examples as religious poetry, see Macpherson, I Have Started Searching for Angels, Nov. /Dec. 1990, p. 18; religious textual analysis and commentary, see Buterbaugh, Colossians 1:1-14: Abundant Life, id., at 20; Buterbaugh, John 14-16: A Spiritual Advantage, Mar./Apr., pp. 20-21; and instruction on religious practice, see Early, Thanksgiving and Prayer, Nov./Dec. 1990, p. 21 (providing readers with suggested prayers and posing contemplative questions about biblical texts); Early, Hope and Spirit, Mar./Apr. 1991, p. 21 (similar).

Even featured essays on facially secular topics become platforms from which to call readers to fulfill the tenets of Christianity in their lives. Although a piece on racism has some general discussion on the subject, it proceeds beyond even the analysis and interpretation of biblical texts to con-*867elude with the counsel to take action because that is the Christian thing to do:

“God calls us to take the risks of voluntarily stepping out of our comfort zones and to take joy in the whole richness of our inheritance in the body of Christ. We must take the love we receive from God and share it with all peoples of the world.

“Racism is a disease of the heart, soul, and mind, and only when it is extirpated from the individual consciousness and replaced with the love and peace of God will true personal and communal healing begin.” Liu, Rosenberger, Mourad, and Prince, “Eracing” Mistakes, Nov./Dee. 1990, p. 14.

The same progression occurs in an article on eating disorders, which begins with descriptions of anorexia and bulimia and ends with this religious message:

“As thinking people who profess a belief in God, we must grasp firmly the truth, the reality of who we are because of Christ. Christ is the Bread of Life (John 6:35). Through Him, we are full. He alone can provide the ultimate source of spiritual fulfillment which permeates the emotional, psychological, and physical dimensions of our lives.” Ferguson & Lassiter, From Calorie to Calvary, Sept. /Oct. 1991, p. 14.

This writing is no merely descriptive examination of religious doctrine or even of ideal Christian practice in confronting life’s social and personal problems. Nor is it merely the expression of editorial opinion that incidentally coincides with Christian ethics and reflects a Christian view of human obligation. It is straightforward exhortation to enter into a relationship with God as revealed in Jesus Christ, and to satisfy a series of moral obligations derived from the teachings of Jesus Christ. These are not the words of “student news, information, opinion, entertainment, or academic com-municatio[n]...” (in the language of the University’s funding *868criterion, App. to Pet. for Cert. 61a), but the words of “challenge [to] Christians to live, in word and deed, according to the faith they proclaim and ... to consider what a personal relationship with Jesus Christ means” (in the language of Wide Awake’s founder, App. 46). The subject is not the discourse of the scholar’s study or the seminar room, but of the evangelist’s mission station and the pulpit. It is nothing other than the preaching of the word, which (along with the sacraments) is what most branches of Christianity offer those called to the religious life.

Using public funds for the direct subsidization of preaching the word is categorically forbidden under the Establishment Clause, and if the Clause was meant to accomplish nothing else, it was meant to bar this use of public money. Evidence on the subject antedates even the Bill of Rights itself, as may be seen in the writings of Madison, whose authority on questions about the meaning of the Establishment Clause is well settled, e. g., Committee for Public Ed. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756, 770, n. 28 (1973); Everson v. Board of Ed. of Ewing, 330 U. S. 1, 13 (1947). Four years before the First Congress proposed the First Amendment, Madison gave his opinion on the legitimacy of using public funds for religious purposes, in the Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, which played the central role in ensuring the defeat of the Virginia tax assessment bill in 1786 and framed the debate upon which the Religion Clauses stand:

“Who does not see that . . . the same authority which can force a citizen to contribute three pence only of his property for the support of any one establishment, may force him to conform to any other establishment in all cases whatsoever?” James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments ¶ 3 (hereinafter Madison’s Remonstrance), reprinted in Everson, supra, at 65-66 (appendix to dissent of Rutledge, J.).

*869Madison wrote against a background in which nearly every Colony had exacted a tax for church support, Everson, supra, at 10, n. 8, the practice having become “so commonplace as to shock the freedom-loving colonials into a feeling of abhorrence,” 330 U. S., at 11 (footnote omitted). Madison’s Remonstrance captured the colonists’ “conviction that individual religious liberty could be achieved best under a government which was stripped of all power to tax, to support, or otherwise to assist any or all religions, or to interfere with the beliefs of any religious individual or group.” Ibid.1 Their sentiment, as expressed by Madison in Virginia, *870led not only to the defeat of Virginia’s tax assessment bill, but also directly to passage of the Virginia Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, written by Thomas Jefferson. That *871bill’s preamble declared that “to compel a man to furnish contributions of money for the propagation of opinions which he disbelieves, is sinful and tyrannical,” Jefferson, A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, reprinted in 5 The Founder’s Constitution 84 (P. Kurland & R. Lerner eds. 1987), and its text provided “[t]hat no man shall be compelled to frequent or support any religious worship, place, or ministry whatsoever . . . id., at 85. See generally Everson, 330 U. S., at 13. We have “previously recognized that the provisions of the First Amendment, in the drafting and adoption of which Madison and Jefferson played such leading roles, had the same objective and were intended to provide the same protection against governmental intrusion on religious liberty as the Virginia statute.” Ibid.; see also Laycock, “Nonpreferential” Aid to Religion: A False Claim About Original Intent, 27 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 875, 921, 923 (1986) (“[I]f the debates of the 1780’s support any proposition, it is that the Framers opposed government financial support for religion. . . . They did not substitute small taxes for large taxes; three pence was as bad as any larger sum. The principle was what mattered. With respect to money, religion was to be wholly voluntary. Churches either would support *872themselves or they would not, but the government would neither help nor interfere”) (footnote omitted); T. Curry, The First Freedoms 217 (1986) (At the time of the framing of the Bill of Rights, “[t]he belief that government assistance to religion, especially in the form of taxes, violated religious liberty had a long history”); J. Choper, Securing Religious Liberty 16 (1995) (“There is broad consensus that a central threat to the religious freedom of individuals and groups— indeed, in the judgment of many the most serious infringement upon religious liberty — is posed by forcing them to pay taxes in support of a religious establishment or religious activities”) (footnotes omitted; internal quotation marks omitted).2

*873The principle against direct funding with public money is patently violated by the contested use of today’s student activity fee.3 Like today’s taxes generally, the fee is Madison’s threepence. The University exercises the power of the State to compel a student to pay it, see Jefferson’s Preamble, supra, and the use of any part of it for the direct support of religious activity thus strikes at what we have repeatedly *874held to be the heart of the prohibition on establishment. Everson, 330 U. S., at 15-16 (“The ‘establishment of religion’ clause . . . means at least this .... No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion”); see School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U. S. 373, 385 (1985) (“Although Establishment Clause jurisprudence is characterized by few absolutes, the Clause does absolutely prohibit government-financed or government-sponsored indoctrination into the beliefs of a particular religious faith”); Committee for Public Ed. v. Nyquist, 413 U. S., at 780 (“In the absence of an effective means of guaranteeing that the state aid derived from public funds will be used exclusively for secular, neutral, and nonideological purposes, it is clear from our cases that direct aid in whatever form is invalid”); id., at 772 (“Primary among those evils” against which the Establishment Clause guards “have been sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Lee v. Weisman, 505 U. S. 577, 640 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The coercion that was a hallmark of historical establishments of religion was coercion of religious orthodoxy and of financial support by force of law and threat of penalty”) (emphasis deleted); cf. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S. 83, 103-104 (1968) (holding that taxpayers have an adequate stake in the outcome of Establishment Clause litigation to satisfy Article III standing requirements, after stating that “[o]ur history vividly illustrates that one of the specific evils feared by those who drafted the Establishment Clause and fought for its adoption was that the taxing and spending power would be used to favor one religion over another or to support religion in general”).

The Court, accordingly, has never before upheld direct state funding of the sort of proselytizing published in Wide *875Awake and, in fact, has categorically condemned state programs directly aiding religious activity, School Dist. v. Ball, supra, at 395 (striking programs providing secular instruction to nonpublic school students on nonpublic school premises because they are “indistinguishable from the provision of a direct cash subsidy to the religious school that is most clearly prohibited under the Establishment Clause”); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U. S. 229, 254 (1977) (striking field trip aid program because it constituted “an impermissible direct aid to sectarian education”); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U. S. 349, 365 (1975) (striking material and equipment loan program to nonpublic schools because of the inability to “channe[l] aid to the secular without providing direct aid to the sectarian”); Committee for Public Ed. v. Nyquist, supra, at 774 (striking aid to nonpublic schools for maintenance and repair of facilities because “[n]o attempt is made to restrict payments to those expenditures related to the upkeep of facilities used exclusively for secular purposes”); Levitt v. Committee for Public Ed. & Religious Liberty, 413 U. S. 472, 480 (1973) (striking aid to nonpublic schools for state-mandated tests because the State had failed to “assure that the state-supported activity is not being used for religious indoctrination”); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 672, 683 (1971) (plurality opinion) (striking as insufficient a 20-year limit on prohibition for religious use in federal construction program for university facilities because unrestricted use even after 20 years “is in effect a contribution of some value to a religious body”); id., at 689 (Douglas, J., joined by Black, and Marshall, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

Even when the Court has upheld aid to an institution performing both secular and sectarian functions, it has always made a searching enquiry to ensure that the institution kept the secular activities separate from its sectarian ones, with any direct aid flowing only to the former and never the latter. Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U. S. 589, 614-615 (1988) (upholding *876grant program for services related to premarital adolescent sexual relations on ground that funds cannot be “used by the grantees in such a way as to advance religion”); Roemer v. Board of Public Works of Md., 426 U. S. 736, 746-748, 755, 759-761 (1976) (plurality opinion) (upholding general aid program restricting uses of funds to secular activities only); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U. S. 734, 742-745 (1973) (upholding general revenue bond program excluding from participation facilities used for religious purposes); Tilton v. Richardson, supra, at 679-682 (plurality opinion) (upholding general aid program for construction of academic facilities as “[t]here is no evidence that religion seeps into the use of any of these facilities”); see Board of Ed. of Central School Dist. No. 1 v. Allen, 392 U. S. 236, 244-248 (1968) (upholding textbook loan program limited to secular books requested by individual students for secular educational purposes).

Reasonable minds may differ over whether the Court reached the correct result in each of these cases, but their common principle has never been questioned or repudiated. “Although Establishment Clause jurisprudence is characterized by few absolutes, the Clause does absolutely prohibit government-financed ... indoctrination into the beliefs of a particular religious faith.” School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U. S., at 385.

B

Why does the Court not apply this clear law to these clear facts and conclude, as I do, that the funding scheme here is a clear constitutional violation? The answer must be in part that the Court fails to confront the evidence set out in the preceding section. Throughout its opinion, the Court refers uninformatively to Wide Awake’s “Christian viewpoint,” ante, at 826, or its “religious perspective,” ante, at 832, and in distinguishing funding of Wide Awake from the funding of a church, the Court maintains that “[Wide Awake] is not a religious institution, at least in the usual sense,” ante, at *877844;4 see also ante, at 826. The Court does not quote the magazine’s adoption of Saint Paul’s exhortation to awaken to the nearness of salvation, or any of its articles enjoining readers to accept Jesus Christ, or the religious verses, or the religious textual analyses, or the suggested prayers. And so it is easy for the Court to lose sight of what the University students and the Court of Appeals found so obvious, and to blanch the patently and frankly evangelistic character of the magazine by unrevealing allusions to religious points of view.

Neverthéless, even without the encumbrance of detail from Wide Awake’s actual pages, the Court finds something sufficiently religious about the magazine to require examination under the Establishment Clause, and one may therefore ask why the unequivocal prohibition on direct funding does not lead the Court to conclude that funding would be unconstitutional. The answer is that the Court focuses on a subsidiary body of law, which it correctly states but ultimately misapplies. That subsidiary body of law accounts for the Court’s substantial attention to the fact that the University’s funding scheme is “neutral,” in the formal sense that it makes funds available on an evenhanded basis to secular and sectarian applicants alike. Ante, at 839-842. While this is indeed true and relevant under our cases, it does not alone satisfy the requirements of the Establishment Clause, as the Court recognizes when it says that evenhandedness is only a “significant factor” in certain Establishment Clause analysis, not a dispositive one. Ante, at 839; see ante, at 840-841; see also ante, at 846-848 (O’Connor, J., concurring); ante, at 846 (“Neutrality, in both form and effect, is one hallmark of the Establishment Clause”); Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, ante, at 777 (O’Connor, J., concur*878ring in part and concurring in judgment) (“[T]he Establishment Clause forbids a State to hide behind the application of formally neutral criteria and remain studiously oblivious to the effects of its actions. . . . [N]ot all state policies are permissible under the Religion Clauses simply because they are neutral in form”). This recognition reflects the Court’s appreciation of two general rules: that whenever affirmative government aid ultimately benefits religion, the Establishment Clause requires some justification beyond evenhandedness on the government’s part; and that direct public funding of core sectarian activities, even if accomplished pursuant to an evenhanded program, would be entirely inconsistent with the Establishment Clause and would strike at the very heart of the Clause’s protection. See ante, at 842 (“We do not confront a case where, even under a neutral program that includes nonsectarian recipients, the government is making direct money payments to an institution or group that is engaged in religious activity”); ante, at 840-841, 844; see also ante, at 847 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“[Our] decisions ... provide no precedent for the use of public funds to finance religious activities”).

In order to understand how the Court thus begins with sound rules but ends with an unsound result, it is necessary to explore those rules in greater detail than the Court does. As the foregoing quotations from the Court’s opinion indicate, the relationship between the prohibition on direct aid and the requirement of evenhandedness when affirmative government aid does result in some benefit to religion reflects the relationship between basic rule and marginal criterion. At the heart of the Establishment Clause stands the prohibition against direct public funding, but that prohibition does not answer the questions that occur at the margins of the Clause’s application. Is any government activity that provides any incidental benefit to religion likewise unconstitutional? Would it be wrong to put out fires in burning churches, wrong to pay the bus fares of students on the way *879to parochial schools, wrong to allow a grantee of special education funds to spend them at a religious college? These are the questions that call for drawing lines, and it is in drawing them that evenhandedness becomes important. However the Court may in the past have phrased its line-drawing test, the question whether such benefits are provided on an evenhanded basis has been relevant, for the question addresses one aspect of the issue whether a law is truly neutral with respect to religion (that is, whether the law either “advance[s] [or] inhibits] religion,” County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U. S. 573, 592 (1989)). In Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U. S. 263, 274 (1981), for example, we noted that “[t]he provision of benefits to [a] broad . . . spectrum of [religious and nonreligious] groups is an important index of secular effect.” See also Board of Ed. of Kiryas Joel Village School Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U. S. 687, 702-705 (1994). In the doubtful cases (those not involving direct public funding), where there is initially room for argument about a law’s effect, evenhandedness serves to weed out those laws that impermissibly advance religion by channelling aid to it exclusively. Even-handedness is therefore a prerequisite to further enquiry into the constitutionality of a doubtful law,5 but evenhandedness goes no further. It does not. guarantee success under Establishment Clause scrutiny.

Three cases permitting indirect aid to religion, Mueller v. Allen, 463 U. S. 388 (1983), Witters v. Washington Dept. of Servs. for Blind, 474 U. S. 481 (1986), and Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School Dist., 509 U. S. 1 (1993), are among the latest of those to illustrate this relevance of evenhandedness when advancement is not so obvious as to be patently uncon*880stitutional. Each case involved a program in which benefits given to individuals on a religion-neutral basis ultimately were used by the individuals, in one way or another, to support religious institutions.6 In each, the fact that aid was distributed generally and on a neutral basis was a necessary condition for upholding the program at issue. Witters, supra, at 487-488; Mueller, supra, at 397-399; Zobrest, supra, at 10-11. But the significance of evenhandedness stopped there. We did not, in any of these cases, hold that satisfying the condition was sufficient, or dispositive. Even more importantly, we never held that evenhandedness might be sufficient to render direct aid to religion constitutional. Quite the contrary. Critical to our decisions in these cases was the fact that the aid was indirect; it reached religious institutions “only as a result of the genuinely independent and private choices of aid recipients,” Witters, supra, at 487; see also Mueller, supra, at 399-400; Zobrest, supra, at 10-13. In noting and relying on this particular feature of each of the programs at issue, we in fact reaffirmed the core prohibition on direct funding of religious activities. See Zobrest, supra, at 12-13; Witters, supra, at 487; see also Mueller, supra, at 399-400. Thus, our holdings in these cases were little more than extensions of the unremarkable proposition that “a State may issue a paycheck to one of its employees, who may then donate all or part of that paycheck to a religious institution, all without constitutional barrier . . . .” Witters, supra, at 486-487. Such “attenuated financial benefit[s], ultimately controlled by the private choices of indi*881vidual[s],” we have found, are simply not within the contemplation of the Establishment Clause’s broad prohibition. Mueller, supra, at 400; see also Witters, supra, at 493 (opinion of O’Connor, J.).7

*882Evenhandedness as one element of a permissibly attenuated benefit is, of course, a far cry from evenhandedness as a sufficient condition of constitutionality for direct financial support of religious proselytization, and our cases have unsurprisingly repudiated any such attempt to cut the Establishment Clause down to a mere prohibition against unequal direct aid. See, e. g., Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U. S., at 682-684 (striking portion of general aid program providing grants' for construction of college and university facilities to the extent program made possible the use of funds for sectarian activities);8 Wolman v. Walter, 433 U. S., at 252-255 (striking funding of field trips for nonpublic school students, such as are “provided to public school students in the district,” because of unacceptable danger that state funds would be used to foster religion). And nowhere has the Court’s adherence to the preeminence of the no-direct-funding principle over the principle of evenhandedness been as clear as in Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U. S. 589 (1988).

Bowen involved consideration of the Adolescent Family Life Act (AFLA), a federal grant program providing funds to institutions for counseling and educational services related to adolescent sexuality and pregnancy. At the time of the litigation, 141 grants had been awarded under the AFLA to *883a broad array of both secular and religiously affiliated institutions. Id., at 597. In an Establishment Clause challenge to the Act brought by taxpayers and other interested parties, the District Court resolved the case on a pretrial motion for summary judgment, holding the AFLA program unconstitutional both on its face and also insofar as religious institutions were involved in receiving grants under the Act. When this Court reversed on the issue of facial constitutionality under the Establishment Clause, id., at 602-618, we said that there was “no intimation in the statute that at some point, or for some grantees, religious uses are permitted.” Id., at 614. On the contrary, after looking at the legislative history and applicable regulations, we found safeguards adequate to ensure that grants would not be “used by ... grantees in such a way as to advance religion.” Id., at 615.

With respect to the claim that the program was unconstitutional as applied, we remanded the ease to the District Court “for consideration of the evidence presented by appel-lees insofar as it sheds light on the manner in which the statute is presently being administered.” Id., at 621. Specifically, we told the District Court, on remand, to “consider . . . whether in particular cases AFLA aid has been used to fund ‘specifically religious activities] in an otherwise substantially secular setting.’ ” Ibid., quoting Hunt v. McNair, 413 U. S., at 743. In giving additional guidance to the District Court, we suggested that application of the Act would be unconstitutional if it turned out that aid recipients were using materials “that have an explicitly religious content or are designed to inculcate the views of a particular religious faith.” Bowen, 487 U. S., at 621. At no point in our opinion did we suggest that the breadth of potential recipients, or distribution on an evenhanded basis, could have justified the use of federal funds for religious activities, a position that would have made no sense after we had pegged the Act’s facial constitutionality to our conclusion that advancement of religion was not inevitable. Justice O’Connor’s separate *884opinion in the case underscored just this point: “I fully agree . . . that ‘[p]ublic funds may not be used to endorse the religious message.’ [487 U. S.,] at 642 [(Blackmun, J., dissenting)]. . . . [AJny use of public funds to promote religious doctrines violates the Establishment Clause.” Id., at 622-623 (concurring opinion) (emphasis in original).

Bowen was no sport; its pedigree was the line of Everson v. Board of Ed., 330 U. S., at 16-18, Board of Ed. v. Allen, 392 U. S., at 243-249, Tilton v. Richardson, supra, at 678-682, Hunt v. McNair, supra, at 742-745, and Roemer v. Board of Public Works of Md., 426 U. S., at 759-761. Each of these cases involved a general aid program that provided benefits to a broad array of secular and sectarian institutions on an evenhanded basis, but in none of them was that fact dispositive. The plurality opinion in Roemer made this point exactly:

“The Court has taken the view that a secular purpose and a facial neutrality may not be enough, if in fact the State is lending direct support to a religious activity. The State may not, for example, pay for what is actually a religious education, even though it purports to be paying for a secular one, and even though it makes its aid available to secular and religious institutions alike.” 426 U. S., at 747 (opinion of Blackmun, J.).

Instead, the central enquiry in each of these general aid cases, as in Bowen, was whether secular activities could be separated from the sectarian ones sufficiently to ensure that aid would flow to the secular alone.

Witters, Mueller, and Zobrest expressly preserve the standard thus exhibited so often. Each of these eases explicitly distinguished the indirect aid in issue from contrasting examples in the line of cases striking down direct aid, and each thereby expressly preserved the core constitutional principle that direct aid to religion is impermissible. See Zobrest, 509 U. S., at 11-13 (distinguishing Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U. S. 349 (1975), and School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U. S. 373 (1985), and noting that “ ‘[t]he State may not grant aid to a *885religious school, whether cash or in kind, where the effect of the aid is “that of a direct subsidy to the religious school” ’ ”) (quoting Witters, 474 U. S., at 487); see also ibid.; Mueller, 463 U. S., at 399. It appears that the University perfectly understood the primacy of the no-direct-funding rule over the evenhandedness principle when it drew the line short of funding “an[y] activity which primarily promotes or manifests a particular belief(s) in or about a deity or an ultimate reality.”9 App. to Pet. for Cert. 66a.

*886c

Since conformity with the marginal or limiting principle of evenhandedness is insufficient of itself to demonstrate the constitutionality of providing a government benefit that reaches religion, the Court must identify some further element in the funding scheme that does demonstrate its permissibility. For one reason or another, the Court’s chosen element appears to be the fact that under the University’s Guidelines, funds are sent to the printer chosen by Wide Awake, rather than to Wide Awake itself. Ante, at 842-844.

1

If the Court’s suggestion is that this feature of the funding program brings this case into line with Witters, Mueller, and Zobrest (discussed supra, at 879-881), the Court has misread those cases, which turned on the fact that the choice to benefit religion was made by a nonreligious third party standing between the government and a religious institution. See Witters, supra, at 487; see also Mueller, supra, at 399-400; Zobrest, supra, at 8-13. Here there is no third-party standing between the government and the ultimate religious beneficiary to break the circuit by its independent discretion to put state money to religious use. The printer, of course, has no option to take the money and use it to print a secular journal instead of Wide Awake. It only gets the money because of its contract to print a message of religious evangelism at the direction of Wide Awake, and it will receive payment only for doing precisely that. The formalism of distinguishing between payment to Wide Awake so it can pay an approved bill and payment of the approved bill itself cannot be the basis of a decision of constitutional law. If *887this indeed were a critical distinction, the Constitution would permit a State to pay all the bills of any religious institution;10 in fact, despite the Court’s purported adherence to the no-direct-funding principle, the State could simply hand out credit cards to religious institutions and honor the monthly statements (so long as someone could devise an evenhanded umbrella to cover the whole scheme). Witters and the other cases cannot be distinguished out of existence this way.

2

It is more probable, however, that the Court’s reference to the printer goes to a different attempt to justify the payment. On this purported justification, the payment to the printer is significant only as the last step in an argument resting on the assumption that a public university may give a religious group the use of any of its equipment or facilities so long as secular groups are likewise eligible. The Court starts with the cases of Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U. S. 263 (1981), Board of Ed. of Westside Community Schools (Dist. 66) v. Mergens, 496 U. S. 226 (1990), and Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School Dist., 508 U. S. 384 (1993), in which religious groups were held to be entitled to access for speaking in government buildings open generally for that purpose. The Court reasons that the availability of a forum has economic value (the government built and maintained the building, while the speakers saved the rent for a hall); and that economically there is no difference be*888tween the University’s provision of the value of the room and the value, say, of the University’s printing equipment; and that therefore the University must be able to provide the use of the latter. Since it may do that, the argument goes, it would be unduly formalistic to draw the line at paying for an outside printer, who simply does what the magazine’s publishers could have done with the University’s own printing equipment. Ante, at 843-844.

The argument is as unsound as it is simple, and the first of its troubles emerges from an examination of the cases relied upon to support it. The common factual thread running through Widmar, Mergens, and Lamb’s Chapel is that a governmental institution created a limited forum for the use of students in a school or college, or for the public at large, but sought to exclude speakers with religious messages. See generally Perry Ed. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators’ Assn., 460 U. S. 37, 45-46 (1983) (forum analysis). In each case the restriction was struck down either as an impermissible attempt to regulate the content of speech in an open forum (as in Widmar and Mergens) or to suppress a particular religious viewpoint (as in Lamb’s Chapel, see infra, at 897-898). In each case, to be sure, the religious speaker’s use of the room passed muster as an incident of a plan to facilitate speech generally for a secular purpose, entailing neither secular entanglement with religion nor risk that the religious speech would be taken to be the speech of the government or that the government’s endorsement of a religious message would be inferred. But each case drew ultimately on unexceptionable Speech Clause doctrine treating the evangelist, the Salvation Army, the millennialist, or the Hare Krishna like any other speaker in a public forum. It was the preservation of free speech on the model of the street corner that supplied the justification going beyond the requirement of evenhandedness.

The Court’s claim of support from these forum-access cases is ruled out by the very scope of their holdings. While *889they do indeed allow a limited benefit to religious speakers, they rest on the recognition that all speakers are entitled to use the street corner (even though the State paves the roads and provides police protection to everyone on the street) and on the analogy between the public street corner and open classroom space. Thus, the Court found it significant that the classroom speakers would engage in traditional speech activities in these forums, too, even though the rooms (like street corners) require some incidental state spending to maintain them. The analogy breaks down entirely, however, if the cases are read more broadly than the Court wrote them, to cover more than forums for literal speaking. There is no traditional street corner printing provided by the government on equal terms to all comers, and the forum cases cannot be lifted to a higher plane of generalization without admitting that new economic benefits are being extended directly to religion in clear violation of the principle barring direct aid. The argument from economic equivalence thus breaks down on recognizing that the direct state aid it would support is not mitigated by the street corner analogy in the service of free speech. Absent that, the rule against direct aid stands as a bar to printing services as well as printers.

3

It must, indeed, be a recognition of just this point that leads the Court to take a third tack, not in coming up with yet a third attempt at justification within the rules of existing case law, but in recasting the scope of the Establishment Clause in ways that make further affirmative justification unnecessary. Justice O’Connor makes a comprehensive analysis of the manner in which the activity fee is assessed and distributed. She concludes that the funding differs so sharply from religious funding out of governmental treasuries generally that it falls outside Establishment Clause’s purview in the absence of a message of religious endorsement (which she finds not to be present). Ante, at 849-852 (con*890curring opinion). The opinion of the Court concludes more expansively that the activity fee is not a tax, and then proceeds to find the aid permissible on the legal assumption that the bar against direct aid applies only to aid derived from tax revenue. I have already indicated why it is fanciful to treat the fee as anything but a tax, supra, at 873-874, and n. 3; see also ante, at 840 (noting mandatory nature of the fee), and will not repeat the point again. The novelty of the assumption that the direct aid bar only extends to aid derived from taxation, however, requires some response.

Although it was a taxation scheme that moved Madison to write in the first instance, the Court has never held that government resources obtained without taxation could be used for direct religious support, and our cases on direct government aid have frequently spoken in terms in no way limited to tax revenues. E. g., School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U. S., at 385 (“Although Establishment Clause jurisprudence is characterized by few absolutes, the Clause does absolutely prohibit government-financed or government-sponsored indoctrination into the beliefs of a particular religious faith”); Nyquist, 413 U. S., at 780 (“In the absence of an effective means of guaranteeing that the state aid derived from public funds will be used exclusively for secular, neutral, and non-ideological purposes, it is clear from our cases that direct aid, in whatever form is invalid”); id., at 772 (“Primary among' those evils” against which the Establishment Clause guards “have been sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also T. Curry, The First Freedoms 217 (1986) (At the time of the framing of the Bill of Rights, “[t]he belief that government assistance to religion, especially in the form of taxes, violated religious liberty had a long history”).

Allowing nontax funds to be spent on religion would, in fact, fly in the face of clear principle. Leaving entirely aside the question whether public nontax revenues could ever be used to finance religion without violating the endorsement *891test, see County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, 492 U. S., at 593-594, any such use of them would ignore one of the dual objectives of the Establishment Clause, which was meant not only to protect individuals and their republics from the destructive consequences of mixing government and religion, but to protect religion from a corrupting dependence on support from the Government. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U. S. 421, 431 (1962) (the Establishment Clause’s “first and most immediate purpose rested on the belief that a union of government and religion tends to destroy government and to degrade religion”); Everson, 330 U. S., at 53 (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (“The great condition of religious liberty is that it be maintained free from sustenance, as also from other interferences, by the state. For when it comes to rest upon that secular foundation it vanishes with the resting”) (citing Madison’s Remonstrance ¶¶ 7, 8, reprinted in Everson, supra, at 63-72 (appendix to dissent of Rutledge, J.)); School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203, 259 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring) (“It is not only the nonbeliever who fears the injection of sectarian doctrines and controversies into the civil polity, but in as high degree it is the devout believer who fears the secularization of a creed which becomes too deeply involved with and dependent upon the government”) (footnote omitted); Jefferson, A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, reprinted in 5 The Founder’s Constitution, at 84-85. Since the corrupting effect of government support does not turn on whether the Government’s own money comes from taxation or gift or the sale of public lands, the Establishment Clause could hardly relax its vigilance simply because tax revenue was not implicated. Accordingly, in the absence of a forthright disavowal, one can only assume that the Court does not mean to eliminate one half of the Establishment Clause’s justification.

D

Nothing in the Court’s opinion would lead me to end this enquiry into the application of the Establishment Clause any *892differently from the way I began it. The Court is ordering an instrumentality of the State to support religious evangelism with direct funding. This is a flat violation of the Establishment Clause.

II

Given the dispositive effect of the Establishment Clause’s bar to funding the magazine, there should be no need to decide whether in the absence of this bar the University would violate the Free Speech Clause by limiting funding as it has done. Widmar, 454 U. S., at 271 (university’s compliance with its Establishment Clause obligations can be a compelling interest justifying speech restriction). But the Court’s speech analysis may have independent application, and its flaws should not pass unremarked.

The Court acknowledges, ante, at 832, the necessity for a university to make judgments based on the content of what may be said or taught when it decides, in the absence of unlimited amounts of money or other resources, how to honor its educational responsibilities. Widmar, supra, at 276; cf. Perry, 460 U. S., at 49 (subject matter and speaker identity distinctions “are inherent and inescapable in the process of limiting a nonpublic forum to activities compatible with the intended purpose of the property”). Nor does the Court generally question that in allocating public funds a state university enjoys spacious discretion. Cf. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U. S. 173, 194 (1991) (“[W]hen the government appropriates public funds to establish a program it is entitled to define the limits of that program”); Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U. S. 540 (1983) (upholding government subsidization decision partial to one class of speaker).11 Ac*893cordingly, the Court recognizes that the relevant enquiry in this case is not merely whether the University bases its funding decisions on the subject matter of student speech; if there is an infirmity in the basis for the University’s funding decision, it must be that the University is impermissibly distinguishing among competing viewpoints, ante, at 829-830, citing, inter alia, Perry, supra, at 46; see also Lamb’s Chapel, 508 U. S., at 392-393 (subject-matter distinctions permissible in controlling access to limited public forum if reasonable and viewpoint neutral); Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Ed. Fund, Inc., 473 U. S. 788, 806 (1985) (similar); Regan, supra, at 548.12

The issue whether a distinction is based on viewpoint does not turn simply on whether a government regulation happens to be applied to a speaker who seeks to advance a particular viewpoint; the issue, of course, turns on whether the burden on speech is explained by reference to viewpoint. See Cornelius, supra, at 806 (“[T]he government violates the First Amendment when it denies access to a speaker solely *894to suppress the point of view he espouses on an otherwise includible subject”). As when deciding whether a speech restriction is content based or content neutral, “[t]he government’s purpose is the controlling consideration.” Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U. S. 781, 791 (1989); see also ibid. (content neutrality turns on, inter alia, whether a speech restriction is “justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis deleted). So, for example, a city that enforces its excessive noise ordinance by pulling the plug on a rock band using a forbidden amplification system is not guilty of viewpoint discrimination simply because the band wishes to use that equipment to espouse antiracist views. Accord, Rock Against Racism, supra. Nor does a municipality’s decision to prohibit political advertising on bus placards amount to viewpoint discrimination when in the course of applying this policy it denies space to a person who wishes to speak in favor of a particular political candidate. Accord, Lehman v. Shaker Heights, 418 U. S. 298, 304 (1974) (plurality opinion).

Accordingly, the prohibition on viewpoint discrimination serves that important purpose of the Free Speech Clause, which is to bar the government from skewing public debate. Other things being equal, viewpoint discrimination occurs when government allows one message while prohibiting the messages of those who can reasonably be expected to respond. See First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U. S. 765, 785-786 (1978) (“Especially where . . . the-legislature’s suppression of speech suggests an attempt to give one side of a debatable public question an advantage in expressing its views to the people, the First Amendment is plainly offended”) (footnote omitted); Madison Joint School Dist. No. 8 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm’n, 429 U. S. 167, 175-176 (1976) (“To permit one side of a debatable public question to have a monopoly in expressing its views ... is the antithesis of constitutional guarantees”) (footnote omitted); *895United States v. Kokinda, 497 U. S. 720, 736 (1990) (viewpoint discrimination involves an “inten[t] to discourage one viewpoint and advance another”) (plurality opinion) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). It is precisely this element of taking sides in a public debate that identifies viewpoint discrimination and makes it the most pernicious of all distinctions based on content. Thus, if government assists those espousing one point of view, neutrality requires it to assist those espousing opposing points of view, as well.

There is no viewpoint discrimination in the University’s application of its Guidelines to deny funding to Wide Awake. Under those Guidelines, a “religious activity],” which is not eligible for funding, App. to Pet. for Cert. 62a, is “an activity which primarily promotes or manifests a particular belief(s) in or about a deity or an ultimate reality,” id., at 66a. It is clear that this is the basis on which Wide Awake Productions was denied funding. Letter from Student Council to Ronald W. Rosenberger, App. 54 (“In reviewing the request by Wide Awake Productions, the Appropriations Committee determined your organization’s request could not be funded as it is a religious activity”). The discussion of Wide Awake’s content, supra, at 865-868, shows beyond any question that it “primarily promotes or manifests a particular belief(s) in or about a deity ... ,” in the very specific sense that its manifest function is to call students to repentance, to commitment to Jesus Christ, and to particular moral action because of its Christian character.

If the Guidelines were written or applied so as to limit only such Christian advocacy and no other evangelical efforts that might compete with it, the discrimination would be based on viewpoint. But that is not what the regulation authorizes; it applies to Muslim and Jewish and Buddhist advocacy as well as to Christian. And since it limits funding to activities promoting or manifesting a particular belief not only “in” but “about” a deity or ultimate reality, it applies to agnostics and atheists as well as it does to deists and theists *896(as the University maintained at oral argument, Tr. of Oral Arg. 18-19, and as the Court recognizes, see ante, at 836-837). The Guidelines, and their application to Wide Awake, thus do not skew debate by funding one position but not its competitors. As understood by their application to Wide Awake, they simply deny funding for hortatory speech that “primarily promotes or manifests” any view on the merits of religion; they deny funding for the entire subject matter of religious apologetics.

The Court, of course, reads the Guidelines differently, but while I believe the Court is wrong in construing their breadth, the important point is that even on the Court’s own construction the Guidelines impose no viewpoint discrimination. In attempting to demonstrate the potentially chilling effect such funding restrictions might have on learning in our Nation’s universities, the Court describes the Guidelines as “a sweeping restriction on student thought and student inquiry,” disentitling a vast array of topics to funding. Ante, at 836. As the Court reads the Guidelines to exclude “any writing that is explicable as resting upon a premise which presupposes the existence of a deity or ultimate reality,” ibid., as well as “those student journalistic efforts which primarily manifest or promote a belief that there is no deity and no ultimate reality,” the Court concludes that the major works of writers from Descartes to Sartre would be barred from the funding forum, ante, at 837. The Court goes so far as to suggest that the Guidelines, properly interpreted, tolerate nothing much more than essays on “making pasta or peanut butter cookies.” Ibid.

Now, the regulation is not so categorically broad as the Court protests. The Court reads the word “primarily” (“primarily promotes or manifests a particular belief(s) in or about a deity or an ultimate reality”) right out of the Guidelines, whereas it is obviously crucial in distinguishing between works characterized by the evangelism of Wide Awake and writing that merely happens to express views that a given religion might approve, or simply descriptive *897writing informing a reader about the position of a given religion. But, as I said, that is not the important point. Even if the Court were indeed correct about the funding restriction’s categorical breadth, the stringency of the restriction would most certainly not work any impermissible viewpoint discrimination under any prior understanding of that species of content discrimination. If a university wished to fund no speech beyond the subjects of pasta and cookie preparation, it surely would not be discriminating on the basis of someone’s viewpoint, at least absent some controversial claim that pasta and cookies did not exist. The upshot would be an instructional universe without higher education, but not a universe where one viewpoint was enriched above its competitors.

The Guidelines are thus substantially different from the access restriction considered in Lamb’s Chapel, the case upon which the Court heavily relies in finding a viewpoint distinction here, ante, at 830-832. Lamb’s Chapel addressed a school board’s regulation prohibiting the after-hours use of school premises “by any group for religious purposes,” even though the forum otherwise was open for a variety of social, civic, and recreational purposes. 508 U. S., at 387 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “Religious” was understood to refer to the viewpoint of a believer, and the regulation did not purport to deny access to any speaker wishing to express a nonreligious or expressly anti-religious point of view on any subject, see ibid. (“The issue in this case is whether ... it violates the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment... to deny a church access to school premises to exhibit for public viewing and for assertedly religious purposes, a film series dealing with family and child-rearing issues”); id., at 394, citing May v. Evansville-Vanderburgh School Corp., 787 F. 2d 1105, 1114 (CA7 1986).13

*898With this understanding, it was unremarkable that in Lamb’s Chapel we unanimously determined that the access restriction, as applied to a speaker wishing to discuss family values from a Christian perspective, impermissibly distinguished between speakers on the basis of viewpoint. See Lamb’s Chapel, supra, at 393-394 (considering as-applied challenge only). Equally obvious is the distinction between that case and this one, where the regulation is being applied, not to deny funding for those who discuss issues in general from a religious viewpoint, but to those engaged in promoting or opposing religious conversion and religious observances as such. If this amounts to viewpoint discrimination, the Court has all but eviscerated the line between viewpoint and content.

To put the point another way, the Court’s decision equating a categorical exclusion of both sides of the religious debate with viewpoint discrimination suggests the Court has concluded that primarily religious and antireligious speech, grouped together, always provides an opposing (and not merely a related) viewpoint to any speech about any secular topic. Thus, the Court’s reasoning requires a university that funds private publications about any primarily nonreli*899gious topic also to fund publications primarily espousing adherence to or rejection of religion. But a university’s decision to fund a magazine about racism, and not to fund publications aimed at urging repentance before God does not skew the debate either about racism or the desirability of religious conversion. The Court’s contrary holding amounts to a significant reformulation of our viewpoint discrimination precedents and will significantly expand access to limited-access forums. See Greer v. Spock, 424 U. S. 828 (1976) (upholding regulation prohibiting political speeches on military base); Cornelius, 473 U. S., at 812 (exclusion from fundraising drive of political activity or advocacy groups is facially viewpoint neutral despite inclusion of charitable, health, and welfare agencies); Perry, 460 U. S., at 49-50, and n. 9 (ability of teachers’ bargaining representative to use internal school mail system does not require that access be provided to “any other citizen’s group or community organization with a message for school personnel”); Lehman, 418 U. S., at 304 (plurality opinion) (exclusion of political messages from forum permissible despite ability of nonpolitical speakers to use the forum).

►* — i H — H H-\

Since I cannot see the future I cannot tell, whether today’s decision portends much more than making a shambles out of student activity fees in public colleges. Still, my apprehension is whetted by Chief Justice Burger’s warning in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, 624 (1971): “in constitutional adjudication some steps, which when taken were thought to approach ‘the verge,’ have become the platform for yet further steps. A certain momentum develops in constitutional theory and it can be a ‘downhill thrust’ easily set in motion but difficult to retard or stop.”

I respectfully dissent.

*379Justice Scalia

delivered the opinion of the Court.

In the predawn hours of June 21,1990, petitioner and several other teenagers allegedly assembled a crudely made cross by taping together broken chair legs. They then allegedly burned the cross inside the fenced yard of a black family that lived across the street from the house where petitioner was staying. Although this conduct could have been pun*380ished under any of a number of laws,1 one of the two provisions under which respondent city of St. Paul chose to charge petitioner (then a juvenile) was the St. Paul Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance, St. Paul, Minn., Legis. Code § 292.02 (1990), which provides:

“Whoever places on public or private property a symbol, object, appellation, characterization or graffiti, including, but not limited to, a burning cross or Nazi swastika, which one knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender commits disorderly conduct and shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.”

Petitioner moved to dismiss this count on the ground that the St. Paul ordinance was substantially overbroad and impermissibly content based and therefore facially invalid under the First Amendment.2 The trial court granted this motion, but the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed. That court rejected petitioner’s overbreadth claim because, as construed in prior Minnesota cases, see, e. g., In re Welfare of S. L. J., 263 N. W. 2d 412 (Minn. 1978), the modifying phrase “arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others” limited the reach of the ordinance to conduct that amounts to “fighting words,” i. e., “conduct that itself inflicts injury or tends to incite immediate violence . . . ,” In re Welfare of R. A. V., 464 N. W. 2d 507, 510 (Minn. 1991) (citing Chaplin*381sky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568, 572 (1942)), and therefore the ordinance reached only expression “that the first amendment does not protect,” 464 N. W. 2d, at 511. The court also concluded that the ordinance was not impermissi-bly content based because, in its view, “the ordinance is a narrowly tailored means toward accomplishing the compelling governmental interest in protecting the community against bias-motivated threats to public safety and order.” Ibid. We granted certiorari, 501 U. S. 1204 (1991).

HH

In construing the St. Paul ordinance, we are bound by the construction given to it by the Minnesota court. Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U. S. 328, 339 (1986); New York v. Ferber, 458 U. S. 747, 769, n. 24 (1982); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U. S. 1, 4 (1949). Accordingly, we accept the Minnesota Supreme Court’s authoritative statement that the ordinance reaches only those expressions that constitute “fighting words” within the meaning of Chaplinsky. 464 N. W. 2d, at 510-511. Petitioner and his amici urge us to modify the scope of the Chaplinsky formulation, thereby invalidating the ordinance as “substantially overbroad,” Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U. S. 601, 610 (1973). We find it unnecessary to consider this issue. Assuming, arguendo, that all of the expression reached by the ordinance is proscribable under the “fighting words” doctrine, we nonetheless conclude that the ordinance is facially unconstitutional in that it prohibits otherwise permitted speech solely on the basis of the subjects the speech addresses.3

*382The First Amendment generally prevents government from proscribing speech, see, e. g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 309-311 (1940), or even expressive conduct, see, e. g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U. S. 397, 406 (1989), because of disapproval of the ideas expressed. Content-based regulations are presumptively invalid. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N. Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U. S. 105, 115 (1991); id., at 124 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment); Consolidated Edison Co. of N. Y. v. Public Serv. Comm’n of N. Y, 447 U. S. 530, 536 (1980); Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U. S. 92, 95 (1972). From 1791 to the present, however, our society, like other free but civilized societies, has permitted restrictions upon the content of speech in a *383few limited areas, which are “of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.” Chaplinsky, supra, at 572. We have recognized that “the freedom of speech” referred to by the First Amendment does not include a freedom to disregard these traditional limitations. See, e. g., Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476 (1957) (obscenity); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U. S. 250 (1952) (defamation); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, supra (“ ‘fighting’ words”); see generally Simon & Schuster, supra, at 124 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment). Our decisions since the 1960’s have narrowed the scope of the traditional categorical exceptions for defamation, see New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254 (1964); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U. S. 323 (1974); see generally Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U. S. 1, 13-17 (1990), and for obscenity, see Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 15 (1973), but a limited categorical approach has remained an important part of our First Amendment jurisprudence.

We have sometimes said that these categories of expression are “not within the area of constitutionally protected speech,” Roth, supra, at 483; Beauharnais, supra, at 266; Chaplinsky, supra, at 571-572, or that the “protection of the First Amendment does not extend” to them, Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U. S. 485, 504 (1984); Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U. S. 115, 124 (1989). Such statements must be taken in context, however, and are no more literally true than is the occasionally repeated shorthand characterizing obscenity “as not being speech at all,” Sunstein, Pornography and the First Amendment, 1986 Duke L. J. 589, 615, n. 46. What they mean is that these areas of speech can, consistently with the First Amendment, be regulated because of their constitutionally proscribable content (obscenity, defamation, etc.)— not that they are categories of speech entirely invisible to the Constitution, so that they may be made the vehicles for *384content discrimination unrelated to their distinctively pro-scribable content. Thus, the government may proscribe libel; but it may not make the further content discrimination of proscribing only libel critical of the government. We recently acknowledged this distinction in Ferber, 458 U. S., at 763, where, in upholding New York’s child pornography law, we expressly recognized that there was no “question here of censoring a particular literary theme . . . See also id., at 775 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“As drafted, New York’s statute does not attempt to suppress the communication of particular ideas”).

Our cases surely do not establish the proposition that the First Amendment imposes no obstacle whatsoever to regulation of particular instances of such proseribable expression, so that the government “may regulate [them] freely,” post, at 400 (White, J., concurring in judgment). That would mean that a city council could enact an ordinance prohibiting only those legally obscene works that contain criticism of the city government or, indeed, that do not include endorsement of the city government. Such a simplistic, all-or-nothing-at-all approach to First Amendment protection is at odds with common sense and with our jurisprudence as well.4 It is *385not true that “fighting words” have at most a “de minimis” expressive content, ibid., or that their content is in all respects “worthless and undeserving of constitutional protection,” post, at 401; sometimes they are quite expressive indeed. We have not said that they constitute “no part of the expression of ideas,” but only that they constitute “no essential part of any exposition of ideas.” Chaplinsky, supra, at 572 (emphasis added).

The proposition that a particular instance of speech can be proseribable on the basis of one feature (e. g., obscenity) but not on the basis of another (e. g., opposition to the city government) is commonplace and has found application in many contexts. We have long held, for example, that nonverbal expressive activity can be banned because of the action it entails, but not because of the ideas it expresses — so that burning a flag in violation of an ordinance against outdoor fires could be punishable, whereas burning a flag in violation of an ordinance against dishonoring the flag is not. See Johnson, 491 U. S., at 406-407. See also Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U. S. 560, 569-570 (1991) (plurality opinion); id., at 573-574 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment); id., at 581-582 (Souter, J., concurring in judgment); United *386States v. O’Brien, 391 U. S. 367, 376-377 (1968). Simüarly, we have upheld reasonable “time, place, or manner” restrictions, but only if they are “justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech.” Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U. S. 781, 791 (1989) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Clark v. Community for Creative NonViolence, 468 U. S. 288, 298 (1984) (noting that the OBrien test differs little from the standard applied to time, place, or manner restrictions). And just as the power to proscribe particular speech on the basis of a noncontent element (e. g., noise) does not entail the power to proscribe the same speech on the basis of a content element; so also, the power to proscribe it on the basis of one content element (e. g., obscenity) does not entail the power to proscribe it on the basis of other content elements.

In other words, the exclusion of “fighting words” from the scope of the First Amendment simply means that, for purposes of that Amendment, the unprotected features of the words are, despite their verbal character, essentially a “non-speech” element of communication. Fighting words are thus analogous to a noisy sound truck: Each is, as Justice Frankfurter recognized, a “mode of speech,” Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U. S. 268, 282 (1951) (opinion concurring in result); both can be used to convey an idea; but neither has, in and of itself, a claim upon the First Amendment. As with the sound truck, however, so also with fighting words: The government may not regulate use based on hostility — or favoritism — towards the underlying message expressed. Compare Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U. S. 474 (1988) (upholding, against facial challenge, a content-neutral ban on targeted residential picketing), with Carey v. Brown, 447 U. S. 455 (1980) (invalidating a ban on residential picketing that exempted labor picketing).5

*387The concurrences describe us as setting forth a new First Amendment principle that prohibition of constitutionally proseribable speech cannot be “underinelusiv[e],” post, at 402 (White, J., concurring in judgment) — a First Amendment “absolutism” whereby “[wjithin a particular ‘proseribable’ category of expression, ... a government must either proscribe all speech or no speech at all,” post, at 419 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment). That easy target is of the concurrences’ own invention. In our view, the First Amendment imposes not an “underinclusiveness” limitation but a “content discrimination” limitation upon a State’s prohibition of proseribable speech. There is no problem whatever, for example, with a State’s prohibiting obscenity (and other forms of proseribable expression) only in certain media or markets, for although that prohibition would be “underinclu-sive,” it would not discriminate on the basis of content. See, e. g., Sable Communications, 492 U. S., at 124-126 (upholding 47 U. S. C. § 223(b)(1), which prohibits obscene telephone communications).

Even the prohibition against content discrimination that we assert the First Amendment requires is not absolute. It applies differently in the context of proseribable speech than in the area of fully protected speech. The rationale of the general prohibition, after all, is that content discrimination “raises the specter that the Government may effectively drive certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace,” Simon & Schuster, 502 U. S., at 116; Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U. S. 439, 448 (1991); FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U. S. 364, 383-384 (1984); Consolidated Edison Co., 447 U. S., at 536; Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U. S., *388at 95-98. But content discrimination among various instances of a class of proscribable speech often does not pose this threat.

When the basis for the content discrimination consists entirely of the very reason the entire class of speech at issue is proscribable, no significant danger of idea or viewpoint discrimination exists. Such a reason, having been adjudged neutral enough to support exclusion of the entire class of speech from First Amendment protection, is also neutral enough to form the basis of distinction within the class. To illustrate: A State might choose to prohibit only that obscenity which is the most patently offensive in its 'prurience— i. e., that which involves the most lascivious displays of sexual activity. But it may not prohibit, for example, only that obscenity which includes offensive political messages. See Kucharek v. Hanaway, 902 F. 2d 513, 517 (CA7 1990), cert. denied, 498 U. S. 1041 (1991). And the Federal Government can criminalize only those threats of violence that are directed against the President, see 18 U. S. C. § 871 — since the reasons why threats of violence are outside the First Amendment (protecting individuals from the fear of violence, from the disruption that fear engenders, and from the possibility that the threatened violence will occur) have special force when applied to the person of the President. See Watts v. United States, 394 U. S. 705, 707 (1969) (upholding the facial validity of §871 because of the “overwhelmin[g] interest in protecting the safety of [the] Chief Executive and in allowing him to perform his duties without interference from threats of physical violence”). But the Federal Government may not criminalize only those threats against the President that mention his policy on aid to inner cities. And to take a final example (one mentioned by Justice Stevens, post, at 421-422), a State may choose to regulate price advertising in one industry but not in others, because the risk of fraud (one of the characteristics of commercial speech' that justifies depriving it of full First Amendment protection, see Virginia *389State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U. S. 748, 771-772 (1976)) is in its view greater there. Cf. Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U. S. 374 (1992) (state regulation of airline advertising); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn., 436 U. S. 447 (1978) (state regulation of lawyer advertising). But a State may not prohibit only that commercial advertising that depicts men in a demeaning fashion. See, e. g., Los Angeles Times, Aug. 8, 1989, section 4, p. 6, col. 1.

Another valid basis for according differential treatment to even a content-defined subclass of proseribable speech is that the subclass happens to be associated with particular “secondary effects” of the speech, so that the regulation is “justified without reference to the content of the... speech,” Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U. S. 41, 48 (1986) (quoting, with emphasis, Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, supra, at 771); see also Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U. S. 50, 71, n. 34 (1976) (plurality opinion); id., at 80-82 (Powell, J., concurring); Barnes, 501 U. S., at 586 (Souter, J., concurring in judgment). A State could, for example, permit all obscene live performances except those involving minors. Moreover, since words can in some circumstances violate laws directed not against speech but against conduct (a law against treason, for example, is violated by telling the enemy the Nation’s defense secrets), a particular content-based subcategory of a proseribable class of speech can be swept up incidentally within the reach of a statute directed at conduct rather than speech. See id., at 571 (plurality opinion); id., at 577 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment); id., at 582 (Souter, J., concurring in judgment); FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Assn., 493 U. S. 411, 425-432 (1990); O’Brien, 391 U. S., at 376-377. Thus, for example, sexually derogatory “fighting words,” among other words, may produce a violation of Title VII’s general prohibition against sexual discrimination in employment practices, 42 U. S. G. §2000e-2; 29 GFR § 1604.11 (1991). See also 18 *390U. S. C. §242; 42 U. S. C. §§ 1981, 1982. Where the government does not target conduct on the basis of its expressive content, acts are not shielded from regulation merely because they express a discriminatory idea or philosophy.

These bases for distinction refute the proposition that the selectivity of the restriction is “even arguably ‘conditioned upon the sovereign’s agreement with what a speaker may intend to say.’ ” Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U. S. 490, 555 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting in part) (citation omitted). There may be other such bases as well. Indeed, to validate such selectivity (where totally proscribable speech is at issue) it may not even be necessary to identify any particular “neutral” basis, so long as the nature of the content discrimination is such that there is no realistic possibility that official suppression of ideas is afoot. (We cannot think of any First Amendment interest that would stand in the way of a State’s prohibiting only those obscene motion pictures with blue-eyed actresses.) Save for that limitation, the regulation of “fighting words,” like the regulation of noisy speech, may address some offensive instances and leave other, equally offensive, instances alone. See Posadas de Puerto Rico, 478 U. S., at 342-343.6

*391HH I-H

Applying these principles to the St. Paul ordinance, we conclude that, even as narrowly construed by the Minnesota Supreme Court, the ordinance is facially unconstitutional. Although the phrase in the ordinance, “arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others,” has been limited by the Minnesota Supreme Court’s construction to reach only those symbols or displays that amount to “fighting words,” the remaining, unmodified terms make clear that the ordinance applies only to “fighting words” that insult, or provoke violence, “on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender.” Displays containing abusive invective, no matter how vicious or severe, are permissible unless they are addressed to one of the specified disfavored topics. Those who wish to use “fighting ■words” in connection with other ideas — to express hostility, for example, on the basis of political affiliation, union membership, or homosexuality — are not covered. The First Amendment does not permit St. Paul to impose special prohibitions on those speakers who express views on disfavored subjects. See Simon & Schuster, 502 U. S., at 116; Arkansas Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U. S. 221, 229-230 (1987).

In its practical operation, moreover, the ordinance goes even beyond mere content discrimination, to actual viewpoint discrimination. Displays containing some words— odious racial epithets, for example — would be prohibited to proponents of all views. But “fighting words” that do not themselves invoke race, color, creed, religion, or gender— aspersions upon a person’s mother, for example — would seemingly be usable ad libitum in the placards of those arguing in favor of racial, colorj etc., tolerance and equality, but could not be used by those speakers’ opponents. One could hold up a sign saying, for example, that all “anti-*392Catholic bigots” are misbegotten; but not that all “papists” are, for that would insult and provoke violence “on the basis of religion.” St. Paul has no such authority to license one side of a debate to fight freestyle, while requiring the other to follow Marquis of Queensberry rules.

What we have here, it must be emphasized, is not a prohibition of fighting words that are directed at certain persons or groups (which would be facially valid if it met the requirements of the Equal Protection Clause); but rather, a prohibition of fighting words that contain (as the Minnesota Supreme Court repeatedly emphasized) messages of “bias-motivated” hatred and in particular, as applied to this case, messages “based on virulent notions of racial supremacy.” 464 N. W. 2d, at 508, 511. One must wholeheartedly agree with the Minnesota Supreme Court that “[i]t is the responsibility, even the obligation, of diverse communities to confront such notions in whatever form they appear,” id., at 508, but the manner of that confrontation cannot consist of selective limitations upon speech. St. Paul’s brief asserts that a general “fighting words” law would hot meet the city’s needs because only a content-specific measure can communicate to minority groups that the “group hatred” aspect of such speech “is not condoned by the majority.” Brief for Respondent 25. The point of the First Amendment is that majority preferences must be expressed in some fashion other than silencing speech on the basis of its content.

Despite the fact that the Minnesota Supreme Court and St. Paul acknowledge that the ordinance is directed at expression of group hatred, Justice Stevens suggests that this “fundamentally misreads” the ordinance. Post, at 438. It is directed, he claims, not to speech of a particular content, but to particular “injur[ies]” that are “qualitatively different” from other injuries. Post, at 424. This is wordplay. What makes the anger, fear, sense of dishonor, etc., produced by violation of this ordinance distinct from the anger, fear, sense of dishonor, etc., produced by other fighting words is *393nothing other than the fact that it is caused by a distinctive idea, conveyed by a distinctive message. The First Amendment cannot be evaded that easily. It is obvious that the symbols which will arouse “anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender” are those symbols that communicate a message of hostility based on one of these characteristics. St. Paul concedes in its brief that the ordinance applies only to “racial, religious, or gender-specific symbols” such as “a burning cross, Nazi swastika or other instrumentality of like import.” Brief for Respondent 8. Indeed, St. Paul argued in the Juvenile Court that “[t]he burning of a cross does express a message and it is, in fact, the content of that message which the St. Paul Ordinance attempts to legislate.” Memorandum from the Ramsey County Attorney to the Honorable Charles A. Flinn, Jr., dated July 13, 1990, in In re Welfare of R. A. V., No. 89-D-1231 (Ramsey Cty. Juvenile Ct.), p. 1, reprinted in App. to Brief for Petitioner C-l.

The content-based discrimination reflected in the St. Paul ordinance comes within neither any of the specific exceptions to the First Amendment prohibition we discussed earlier nor a more general exception for content discrimination that does not threaten censorship of ideas. It assuredly does not fall within the exception for content discrimination based on the very reasons why the particular class of speech at issue (here, fighting words) is proseribable. As explained earlier, see supra, at 386, the reason why fighting words are categorically excluded from the protection of the First Amendment is not that their content communicates any particular idea, but that their content embodies a particularly intolerable (and socially unnecessary) mode of expressing whatever idea the speaker wishes to convey. St. Paul has not singled out an especially offensive mode of expression — it has not, for example, selected for prohibition only those fighting words that communicate ideas in a threatening (as opposed to a merely obnoxious) manner. Rather, it has proscribed fight*394ing words of whatever manner that communicate messages of racial, gender, or religious intolerance. Selectivity of this sort creates the possibility that the city is seeking to handicap the expression of particular ideas. That possibility would alone be enough to render the ordinance presumptively invalid, but St. Paul's comments and concessions in this ease elevate the possibility to a certainty.

St. Paul argues that the ordinance comes within another of the specific exceptions we mentioned, the one that allows content discrimination aimed only at the “secondary effects” of the speech, see Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U. S. 41 (1986). According to St. Paul, the ordinance is intended, “not to impact on [sic] the right of free expression of the accused,” but rather to. “protect against the victimization of a person or persons who are particularly vulnerable because of their membership in a group that historically has been discriminated against.” Brief for Respondent 28. Even assuming that an ordinance that completely proscribes, rather than merely regulates, a specified category of speech can ever be considered to be directed only to the secondary effects of such speech, it is clear that the St. Paul ordinance is not directed to secondary effects within the meaning of Renton. As we said in Boos v. Barry, 485 U. S. 312 (1988), “Listeners' reactions to speech are not the type of ‘secondary effects’ we referred to in Renton.” Id., at 321. “The emotive impact of speech on its audience is not a ‘secondary effect.’” Ibid. See also id., at 334 (opinion of Brennan, J.).7

*395It hardly needs discussion that the ordinance does not fall within some more general exception permitting all selectivity that for any reason is beyond the suspicion of official suppression of ideas. The statements of St. Paul in this very case afford ample basis for, if not full confirmation of, that suspicion.

Finally, St. Paul and its amici defend the conclusion of the Minnesota Supreme Court that, even if the ordinance regulates expression based on hostility towards its protected ideological content, this discrimination is nonetheless justified because it is narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests. Specifically, they assert that the ordinance helps to ensure the basic human rights of members of groups that have historically been subjected'to discrimination, including the right of such group members to live in peace where they wish. We do not doubt that these interests are compelling, and that the ordinance can be said to promote them. But the “danger of censorship” presented by a facially content-based statute, Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U. S., at 448, requires that that weapon be employed only where it is “necessary to serve the asserted [compelling] interest,” Burson v. Freeman, 504 U. S. 191, 199 (1992) (plurality opinion) (emphasis added); Perry Ed. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators’ Assn., 460 U. S. 37, 45 (1983). The existence of adequate content-neutral alternatives thus “undercuts] significantly” any defense of such a statute, Boos v. Barry, supra, at 329, easting considerable doubt on the government’s protestations that “the asserted justification is in fact an accurate description of the purpose and effect of the law,” Burson, supra, at 213 (Kennedy, J., concurring). See Boos, supra, at 324-329; cf. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U. S. 575, 586-587 (1983). The dispositive question in this case, therefore, is whether content discrimination is reasonably necessary to achieve St. Paul’s compel*396ling interests; it plainly is not. An ordinance not limited to the favored topics, for example, would have precisely the same beneficial effect. In fact the only interest distinctively served by the content limitation is that of displaying the city council’s special hostility towards the particular biases thus singled out.8 That is precisely what the First Amendment forbids. The politicians of St. Paul are entitled to express that hostility — but not through the means of imposing unique limitations upon speakers who (however benightedly) disagree.

* * *

Let there be no mistake about our belief that burning a cross in someone’s front yard is reprehensible. But St. Paul has sufficient means at its disposal to prevent such behavior without adding the First Amendment to the fire.

The judgment of the Minnesota Supreme Court is reversed, and the case is remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

*397Justice White,

concurring in the judgment.

I agree with the majority that the judgment of the Minnesota Supreme Court should be reversed. However, our agreement ends there.

This ease could easily be decided within the contours of established First Amendment law by holding, as petitioner argues, that the St. Paul ordinance is fatally overbroad because it criminalizes not only unprotected expression but expression protected by the First Amendment. See Part II, infra. Instead, “find[ing] it unnecessary” to consider the questions upon which we granted review,1 ante, at 381, the *398Court holds the ordinance facially unconstitutional on a ground that was never presented to the Minnesota Supreme Court, a ground that has not been briefed by the parties before this Court, a ground that requires serious departures from the teaching of prior cases and is inconsistent with the plurality opinion in Burson v. Freeman, 504 U. S. 191 (1992), which was joined by two of the five Justices in the majority in the present case.

This Court ordinarily is not so eager to abandon its precedents. Twice within the past month, the Court has declined to overturn longstanding but controversial decisions on questions of constitutional law. See Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Director, Division of Taxation, 504 U. S. 768 (1992); Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U. S. 298 (1992). In each case, we had the benefit of full briefing on the critical issue, so that the parties and amici had the opportunity to apprise us of the impact of a change in the law. And in each case, the Court declined to abandon its precedents, invoking the principle of stare decisis. Allied-Signal, Inc., supra, at 783-786; Quill Corp., supra, at 317-318.

But in the present ease, the majority casts aside long-established First Amendment doctrine without the benefit of briefing and adopts an untried theory. This is hardly a judicious way of proceeding, and the Court’s reasoning in reaching its result is transparently wrong.

*399I

A

This Court’s decisions have plainly stated that expression falling within certain limited categories so lacks the values the First Amendment was designed to protect that the Constitution affords no protection to that expression. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568 (1942), made the point in the clearest possible terms:

“There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem.... It has been well observed that such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.” Id., at 571-572.

See also Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U. S. 485, 504 (1984) (citing Chaplinsky).

Thus, as the majority concedes, see ante, at 383-384, this Court has long held certain discrete categories of expression to be proscribable on the basis of their content. For instance, the Court has held that the individual who falsely shouts “fire” in a crowded theater may not claim the protection of the First Amendment. Schenck v. United States, 249 U. S. 47, 52 (1919). The Court has concluded that neither child pornography nor obscenity is protected by the First Amendment. New York v. Ferber, 458 U. S. 747, 764 (1982); Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 15, 20 (1973); Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476, 484-485 (1957). And the Court has observed that, “[ljeaving aside the special considerations when public officials [and public figures] are the target, a libelous publication is not protected by the Constitution.” Ferber, supra, at 763 (citations omitted).

*400All of these categories are content based. But the Court has held that the First Amendment does not apply to them because their expressive content is worthless or of de mini-mis value to society. Chaplinsky, supra, at 571-572. We have not departed from this principle, emphasizing repeatedly that, “within the confines of [these] given classification[s], the evil to be restricted so overwhelmingly outweighs the expressive interests, if any, at stake, that no process of case-by-case adjudication is required.” Ferber, supra, at 763-764; Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U. S. 809, 819 (1975). This categorical approach has provided a principled and narrowly focused means for distinguishing between expression that the government may regulate freely and that which it may regulate on the basis of content only upon a showing of compelling need.2

Today, however, the Court announces that earlier Courts did not mean their repeated statements that certain categories of expression are “not within the area of constitutionally protected speech.” Roth, supra, at 483. See ante, at 383, citing Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U. S. 250, 266 (1952); Chaplinsky, supra, at 571-572; Bose Corp., supra, at 504; Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U. S. 115, 124 (1989). The present Court submits that such clear statements “must be taken in context” and are not “literally true.” Ante, at 383.

To the contrary, those statements meant precisely what they said: The categorical approach is a firmly entrenched part of our First Amendment jurisprudence. Indeed, the Court in Roth reviewed the guarantees of freedom of expression in effect at the time of the ratification of the Constitution and concluded, “In light of this history, it is apparent that the unconditional phrasing of the First Amendment was *401not intended to protect every utterance.” 354 U. S., at 482-483.

In its decision today, the Court points to “[njothing ... in this Court’s precedents warranting] disregard of this longstanding tradition.” Burson, 504 U. S., at 216 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment); Allied-Signal, Inc., supra, at 783. Nevertheless, the majority holds that the First Amendment protects those narrow categories of expression long held to be undeserving of First Amendment protection — at least to the extent that lawmakers may not regulate some fighting words more strictly than others because of their content. The Court announces that such content-based distinctions violate the First Amendment because “[t]he government may not regulate use based on hostility — or favoritism — towards the underlying message expressed.” Ante, at 386. Should the government want to criminalize certain fighting words, the Court now requires it to criminalize all fighting words.

To borrow a phrase: “Such a simplistic, all-or-nothing-at-all approach to First Amendment protection'is at odds with common sense and with our jurisprudence as well.” Ante, at 384. It is inconsistent to hold that the government may proscribe an entire category of speech because the content of that speech is evil, Ferber, supra, at 763-764; but that the government may not treat a subset of that category differently without violating the First Amendment; the content of the subset is by definition worthless and undeserving of constitutional protection.

The majority’s observation that fighting words are “quite expressive indeed,” ante, at 385, is no answer. Fighting words are not a means of exchanging views, rallying supporters, or registering a protest; they are directed against individuals to provoke violence or to inflict injury. Chaplinsky, 315 U. S., at 572. Therefore, a ban on all fighting words or on a subset of the fighting words category would restrict only the social evil of hate speech, without creating the danger of driving viewpoints from the marketplace. See ante, at 387.

*402Therefore, the Court’s insistence on inventing its brand of First Amendment underinclusiveness puzzles me.3 The overbreadth doctrine has the redeeming virtue of attempting to avoid the chilling of protected expression, Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U. S. 601, 612 (1973); Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U. S. 103,112, n. 8 (1990); Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U. S. 491, 503 (1985); Ferber, supra, at 772, but the Court’s new “underbreadth” creation serves no desirable function. Instead, it permits, indeed invites, the continuation of expressive conduct that in this case is evil and worthless in First Amendment terms, see Ferber, supra, at 763-764; Chaplinsky, supra, at 571-572, until the city of St. Paul cures the underbreadth by adding to its ordinance a catchall phrase such as “and all other fighting words that may constitutionally be subject to this ordinance.”

Any contribution of this holding to First Amendment jurisprudence is surely a negative one, since it necessarily signals that expressions of violence, such as the message of intimidation and racial hatred conveyed by burning a cross on someone’s lawn, are of sufficient value to outweigh the social interest in order and morality that has traditionally placed such fighting words outside the First Amendment.4 Indeed, by characterizing fighting words as a form of “debate,” ante, at 392, the majority legitimates hate speech as a form of public discussion.

*403Furthermore, the Court obscures the line between speech that could be regulated freely on the basis of content (i. e., the narrow categories of expression falling outside the First Amendment) and that which could be regulated on the basis of content only upon a showing of a compelling state interest (i e., all remaining expression). By placing fighting words, which the Court has long held to be valueless, on at least equal constitutional footing with political discourse and other forms of speech that we have deemed to have the greatest social value, the majority devalues the latter category. See Burson v. Freeman, supra, at 196; Eu v. San Francisco Cty. Democratic Central Comm., 489 U. S. 214, 222-223 (1989).

B

In a second break with precedent, the Court refuses to sustain the ordinance even though it would survive under the strict scrutiny applicable to other protected expression. Assuming, arguendo, that the St. Paul ordinance is a content-based regulation of protected expression, it nevertheless would pass First Amendment review under settled law upon a showing that the regulation “'is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and is narrowly drawn to achieve that end/ ” Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N. Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U. S. 105, 118 (1991) (quoting Arkansas Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U. S. 221, 231 (1987)). St. Paul has urged that its ordinance, in the words of the majority, “helps to ensure the basic human rights of members of groups that have historically been subjected to discrimination . . . .” Ante, at 395. The Court expressly concedes that this interest is compelling and is promoted by the ordinance. Ibid. Nevertheless, the Court treats strict scrutiny analysis as irrelevant to the constitutionality of the legislation:

“The dispositive question ... is whether content discrimination is reasonably necessary to achieve St. Paul’s compelling interests; it plainly is not. An ordinance not *404limited to the favored topics, for example, would have precisely the same beneficial effect.” Ante, at 395-396.

Under the majority’s view, a narrowly drawn, content-based ordinance could never pass constitutional muster if the object of that legislation could be accomplished by banning a wider category of speech. This appears to be a general renunciation of strict scrutiny review, a fundamental tool of First Amendment analysis.5

This abandonment of the doctrine is inexplicable in light of our decision in Burson v. Freeman, 504 U. S. 191 (1992), which was handed down just a month ago.6 In Burson, seven of the eight participating Members of the Court agreed that the strict scrutiny standard applied in a ease involving a First Amendment challenge to a content-based statute. See id., at 198 (plurality opinion); id., at 217 (Stevens, J., *405dissenting).7 The statute at issue prohibited the solicitation of Votes and the display or distribution of campaign materials within 100 feet of the entrance to a polling place. The plurality concluded that the legislation survived strict scrutiny because the State had asserted a compelling interest in regulating electioneering near polling places and because the statute at issue was narrowly tailored to accomplish that goal. Id., at 208-210.

Significantly, the statute in Burson did not proscribe all speech near polling places; it restricted only political speech. Id., at 197. The Burson plurality, which included The ChieF Justice and Justice Kennedy, concluded that the distinction between types of speech required application of strict scrutiny, but it squarely rejected the proposition that the legislation failed First Amendment review because it could have been drafted in broader, content-neutral terms:

“States adopt laws to address the problems that confront them. The First Amendment does not require States to regulate for problems that do not exist .” Id., at 207 (emphasis added).

This reasoning is in direct conflict with the majority’s analysis in the present case, which leaves two options to lawmakers attempting to regulate expressions of violence: (1) enact a sweeping prohibition on an entire class of speech (thereby requiring “regulation] for problems that do not exist”); or (2) not legislate at all.

Had the analysis adopted by the majority in the present case been applied in Burson, the challenged election law would have failed constitutional review, for its content-based distinction between political and nonpolitical speech could not have been characterized as “reasonably necessary,” ante, *406at 395, to achieve the State’s interest in regulating polling place premises.8

As with its rejection of the Court’s categorical analysis, the majority offers no reasoned basis for discarding our firmly established strict scrutiny analysis at this time. The majority appears to believe that its doctrinal revisionism is necessary to prevent our elected lawmakers from prohibiting libel against members of one political party but not another and from enacting similarly preposterous laws. Ante, at 884. The majority is misguided.

Although the First Amendment does not apply to categories of unprotected speech, such as fighting words, the Equal Protection Clause requires that the regulation of unprotected speech be rationally related to a legitimate government interest. A defamation statute that drew distinctions on the basis of political affiliation or “an ordinance prohibiting only those legally obscene works that contain criticism of the city government,” ibid., would unquestionably fail rational-basis review.9

*407Turning to the St. Paul ordinance and assuming, arguendo, as the majority does, that the ordinance is not constitutionally overbroad (but see Part II, infra), there is no question that it would pass equal protection review. The ordinance proscribes a subset of “fighting words,” those that injure “on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender.” This selective regulation reflects the city’s judgment that harms based on race, color, creed, religion, or gender are more pressing public concerns than the harms caused by other fighting words. In light of our Nation’s long and painful experience with discrimination, this determination is plainly reasonable. Indeed, as the majority concedes, the interest is compelling. Ante, at 395.

C

The Court has patched up its argument with an apparently nonexhaustive list of ad hoc exceptions, in what can be viewed either as an attempt to confine the effects of its decision to the facts of this case, see post, at 415 (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment), or as an effort to anticipate some of the questions that will arise from its radical revision of First Amendment law.

For instance, if the majority were to give general application to the rule on which it decides this case, today’s decision would call into question the constitutionality of the statute making it illegal to threaten the life of the President. 18 U.S.C. §871. See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969) (per curiam). Surely, this statute, by singling out certain threats, incorporates a content-based distinction; it indicates that the Government especially disfavors threats against the President as opposed to threats against all oth*408ers.10 See ante, at 391. But because the Government could prohibit all threats and not just those directed against the President, under the Court’s theory, the compelling reasons justifying the enactment of special legislation to safeguard the President would be irrelevant, and the statute would fail First Amendment review.

To save the statute, the majority has engrafted the following exception onto its newly announced First Amendment rule: Content-based distinctions may be drawn within an unprotected category of speech if the basis for the distinctions is “the very reason the entire class of speech at issue is proscribable.” Ante, at 388. Thus, the argument goes, the statute making it illegal to threaten the life of the President is constitutional, “since the reasons why threats of violence are outside the First Amendment (protecting individuals from the fear of violence, from the disruption that fear engenders, and from the possibility that the threatened violence will occur) have special force when applied to the person of the President.” Ibid.

The exception swallows the majority’s rule. Certainly, it should apply to the St. Paul ordinance, since “the reasons why [fighting words] are outside the First Amendment. . . have special force when applied to [groups that have historically been subjected to discrimination].”

To avoid the result of its own analysis, the Court suggests that fighting words are simply a mode of communication, rather than a content-based category, and that the St. Paul ordinance has not singled out a particularly objectionable mode of communication. Ante, at 386,393. Again, the majority confuses the issue. A prohibition on fighting words is not a time, place, or manner restriction; it is a ban on a class of speech that conveys an overriding message of personal injury and imminent violence, Chaplinsky, 315 U. S., at 572, a message that is at its ugliest when directed against groups *409that have long been the targets of discrimination. Accordingly, the ordinance falls within the first exception to the majority’s theory.

As its second exception, the Court posits that certain content-based regulations will survive under the new regime if the regulated subclass “happens to be associated with particular ‘secondary effects’ of the speech . . .,” ante, at 389, which the majority treats as encompassing instances in which “words can... violate laws directed not against speech but against conduct. . . ,” ibid.11 Again, there is a simple explanation for the Court’s eagerness to craft an exception to its new First Amendment rule: Under the general rule the Court applies in this case, Title VII hostile work environment claims would suddenly be unconstitutional.

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it unlawful to discriminate “because of [an] individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin,” 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2(a)(l), and the regulations covering hostile workplace claims forbid “sexual harassment,” which includes “[u]nwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature” that create “an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment,” 29 CFR § 1604.11(a) (1991). The regulation does not prohibit workplace harassment generally; it focuses on what the majority would characterize as the “disfavored topi[e]” of sexual harassment. Ante, at 391. In this way, Title VII is similar to the St. Paul ordinance that the majority condemns because it “impose[sJ special prohibitions on those speakers who express views on disfavored subjects.” Ibid. Under the broad principle the Court uses to decide the present ease, *410hostile work environment claims based on sexual harassment should fail First Amendment review; because a general ban on harassment in the workplace would cover the problem of sexual harassment, any attempt to proscribe the subcategory of sexually harassing expression would violate the First Amendment.

Hence, the majority’s second exception, which the Court indicates would insulate a Title VII hostile work environment claim from an underinclusiveness challenge because “sexually derogatory ‘fighting words’... may produce a violation of Title VII’s general prohibition against sexual discrimination in employment practices.” Ante, at 389. But application of this exception to a hostile work environment claim does not hold up under close examination.

First, the hostile work environment regulation is not keyed to the presence or absence of an economic quid pro quo, Meritor Savings Bank, F. S. B. v. Vinson, 477 U. S. 57, 65 (1986), but to the impact of the speech on the victimized worker. Consequently, the regulation would no more fall within a secondary effects exception than does the St. Paul ordinance. Ante, at 394. Second, the majority’s focus on the statute’s general prohibition on discrimination glosses over the language of the specific regulation governing hostile working environment, which reaches beyond any “incidental” effect on speech. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U. S. 367, 376 (1968). If the relationship between the broader statute and specific regulation is sufficent to bring the Title VII regulation within O’Brien, then all St. Paul need do to bring its ordinance within this exception is to add some prefatory language concerning discrimination generally.

As to the third exception to the Court’s theory for deciding this case, the majority concocts a catchall exclusion to protect against unforeseen problems, a concern that is heightened here given the lack of briefing on the majority’s deci-sional theory. This final exception would apply in cases in which “there is no realistic possibility that official suppression of ideas is afoot.” Ante, at 390. As I have demon*411strated, this case does not concern the official suppression of ideas. See supra, at 401. The majority discards this notion out of hand. Ante, at 395.

As I see it, the Court’s theory does not work and will do nothing more than confuse the law. Its selection of this ease to rewrite First Amendment law is particularly inexplicable, because the whole problem could have been avoided by deciding this case under settled First Amendment principles.

HH ] — I

Although I disagree with the Court s analysis, I do agree with its conclusion: The St. Paul ordinance is unconstitutional. However, I would decide the case on overbreadth grounds.

We have emphasized time and again that overbreadth doctrine is an exception to the established principle that “a person to whom a statute may constitutionally be applied will not be heard to challenge that statute on the ground that it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others, in other situations not before the Court.” Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U. S., at 610; Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U. S., at 503-504. A defendant being prosecuted for speech or expressive conduct may challenge the law on its face if it reaches protected expression, even when that person’s activities are not protected by the First Amendment. This is because “the possible harm to society in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that protected speech of others may be muted.” Broadrick, supra, at 612; Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U. S., at 112, n. 8; New York v. Ferber, 458 U. S., at 768-769; Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U. S. 620, 634 (1980); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U. S. 518, 521 (1972).

However, we have consistently held that, because over-breadth analysis is “strong medicine,” it may be invoked to strike an entire statute only when the overbreadth of the statute is not only “real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep,” Broad*412rick, 413 U. S., at 615, and when the statute is not susceptible to limitation or partial invalidation, id., at 613; Board of Airport Comm’rs of Los Angeles v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U. S. 569, 574 (1987). “When a federal court is dealing with a federal statute challenged as overbroad, it should ... construe the statute to avoid constitutional problems, if the statute is subject to a limiting construction.” Ferber, 458 U. S., at 769, n. 24. Of course, “[a] state court is also free to deal with a state statute in the same way.” Ibid. See, e.g., Osborne, 495 U. S., at 113-114.

Petitioner contends that the St. Paul ordinance is not susceptible to a narrowing construction and that the ordinance therefore should be considered as written, and not as construed by the Minnesota Supreme Court. Petitioner is wrong. Where a state court has interpreted a provision of state law, we cannot ignore that interpretation, even if it is not one that we would have reached if we were construing the statute in the first instance. Ibid.; Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U. S. 352, 355 (1983); Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U. S. 489, 494, n. 5 (1982).12

Of course, the mere presence of a state court interpretation does not insulate a statute from overbreadth review. We have stricken legislation when the construction supplied by the state court failed to cure the overbreadth problem. *413See, e. g., Lewis v. New Orleans, 415 U. S. 130, 132-133 (1974); Gooding, supra, at 524-525. But in such cases, we have looked to the statute as construed in determining whether it contravened the First Amendment. Here, the Minnesota Supreme Court has provided an authoritative construction of the St. Paul antibias ordinance. Consideration of petitioner’s overbreadth claim must be based on that interpretation.

I agree with petitioner that the ordinance is invalid on its face. Although the ordinance as construed reaches categories of speech that are constitutionally unprotected, it also criminalizes a substantial amount of expression that — however repugnant — is shielded by the First Amendment.

In attempting to narrow the scope of the St. Paul antibias ordinance, the Minnesota Supreme Court relied upon two of the categories of speech and expressive conduct that fall outside the First Amendment’s protective sphere: words that incite “imminent lawless action,” Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U. S. 444, 449 (1969), and “fighting” words, Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S., at 571-572. The Minnesota Supreme Court erred in its application of the Chaplinsky fighting words test and consequently interpreted the St. Paul ordinance in a fashion that rendered the ordinance facially overbroad.

In construing the St. Paul ordinance, the Minnesota Supreme Court drew upon the definition of fighting words that appears in Chaplinsky — words “which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.” Id., at 572. However, the Minnesota court was far from clear in identifying the “injúr[ies]” inflicted by the expression that St. Paul sought to regulate. Indeed, the Minnesota court emphasized (tracking the language of the ordinance) that “the ordinance censors only those displays that one knows or should know will create anger, alarm or resentment based on racial, ethnic, gender or religious bias.” In re Welfare of R. A. V., 464 N. W. 2d 507, 510 (1991). I *414therefore understand the court to have ruled that St. Paul may constitutionally prohibit expression that “by its very utterance” causes “anger, alarm or resentment.”

Our fighting words cases have made clear, however, that such generalized reactions are not sufficient to strip expression of its constitutional protection. The mere fact that expressive activity causes hurt feelings, offense, or resentment does not render the expression unprotected. See United States v. Eichman, 496 U. S. 310, 319 (1990); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U. S. 397, 409, 414 (1989); Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U. S. 46, 55-56 (1988); FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U. S. 726, 745 (1978); Hess v. Indiana, 414 U. S. 105, 107-108 (1973); Cohen v. California, 403 U. S. 15, 20 (1971); Street v. New York, 394 U. S. 576, 592 (1969); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U. S. 1 (1949).

In the First Amendment context, “[e]rrminal statutes must be scrutinized with particular care; those that make unlawful a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct may be held facially invalid even if they also have legitimate application.” Houston v. Hill, 482 U. S. 451,459 (1987) (citation omitted). The St. Paul antibias ordinance is such a law. Although the ordinance reaches conduct that is unprotected, it also makes criminal expressive conduct that causes only hurt feelings, offense, or resentment, and is protected by the First Amendment. Cf. Lewis, supra, at 132.13 The ordinance is therefore fatally overbroad and invalid on its face.

*415HH hH

Today, the Court has disregarded two established principles of First Amendment law without providing a coherent replacement theory. Its decision is an arid, doctrinaire interpretation, driven by the frequently irresistible impulse of judges to tinker with the First Amendment. The decision is mischievous at best and will surely confuse the lower courts. I join the judgment, but not the folly of the opinion.

Justice Blackmun,

concurring in the judgment.

I regret what the Court has done in this case. The majority opinion signals one of two possibilities: It will serve as precedent for future cases, or it will not. Either result is disheartening.

In the first instance, by deciding that a State cannot regulate speech that causes great harm unless it also regulates speech that does not (setting law and logic on their heads), the Court seems to abandon the categorical approach, and inevitably to relax the level of scrutiny applicable to content-based laws. As Justice White points out, this weakens the traditional protections of speech. If all expressive activity must be accorded the same protection, that protection will be scant. The simple reality is that the Court will never provide child pornography or cigarette advertising the level of protection customarily granted political speech. If we are forbidden to categorize, as the Court has done here, we shall reduce protection across the board. It is sad that in its effort to reach a satisfying result in this case, the Court is willing to weaken First Amendment protections.

In the second instance is the possibility that this case will not significantly alter First Amendment jurisprudence but, instead, will be regarded as an aberration — a case where the Court manipulated doctrine to strike down an ordinance whose premise it opposed, namely, that racial threats and verbal assaults are of greater harm than other fighting words. I fear that the Court has been distracted from its *416proper mission by the temptation to decide the issue over “politically correct speech” and “cultural diversity,” neither of which is presented here. If this is the meaning of today’s opinion, it is perhaps even more regrettable.

I see no First Amendment values that are compromised by a law that prohibits hoodlums from driving minorities out of their homes by burning crosses on their lawns, but I see great harm in preventing the people of Saint Paul from specifically punishing the race-based fighting words that so prejudice their community.

I coneur in the judgment, however, because I agree with Justice White that this particular ordinance reaches beyond fighting words to speech protected by the First Amendment.

Justice Stevens,

concurring in the

judgment.

Conduct that creates special risks or causes special harms may be prohibited by special rules. Lighting a fire near an ammunition dump or a gasoline storage tank is especially dangerous; such behavior may be punished more severely than burning trash in a vacant lot. Threatening someone because of her race or religious beliefs may cause particularly severe trauma or touch off a riot, and threatening a high public official may cause substantial social disruption; such threats may be punished more severely than threats against someone based on, say, his support of a particular athletic team. There are legitimate, reasonable, and neutral justifications for such special rules.

This case involves the constitutionality of one such ordinance. Because the regulated conduct has some communicative content — a message of racial, religious, or gender hostility — the ordinance raises two quite different First Amendment questions. Is the ordinance “overbroad” be*417cause it prohibits too much speech? If not, is it “under-broad” because it does not prohibit enough speech?

In answering these questions, my colleagues today wrestle with two broad principles: first, that certain “categories of expression [including ‘fighting words’] are ‘not within the area of constitutionally protected speech,”’ ante, at 400 (White, J., concurring in judgment); and second, that “[e]ontent-based regulations [of expression] are presumptively invalid,” ante, at 382 (majority opinion). Although in past opinions the Court has repeated both of these maxims, it has — quite rightly — adhered to neither with the absolutism suggested by my colleagues. Thus, while I agree that the St. Paul ordinance is unconstitutionally overbroad for the reasons stated in Part II of Justice White’s opinion, I write separately to suggest how the allure of absolute principles has skewed the analysis of both the majority and Justice White’s opinions.

I

Fifty years ago, the Court articulated a categorical approach to First Amendment jurisprudence.

“There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem.... It has been well observed that such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.” Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568, 571-572 (1942).

We have, as Justice White observes, often described such categories of expression as “not within the area of constitutionally protected speech.” Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476, 483 (1957).

*418The Court today revises this categorical approach. It is not, the Court rules, that certain “categories” of expression ' are “unprotected,” but rather that certain “elements” of expression are wholly “proseribable.” To the Court, an expressive act, like a chemical compound, consists of more than one element. Although the act may be regulated because it contains a proseribable element, it may not be regulated on the basis of another (nonproscribable) element it also contains. Thus, obscene antigovernment speech may be regulated because it is obscene,-but not because it is antigovernment. Ante, at 384. It is this revision of the categorical approach that allows the Court to assume that the St. Paul ordinance proscribes only fighting words, while at the same time concluding that the ordinance is invalid because it imposes a content-based regulation on expressive activity.

As an initial matter, the Court’s revision of the categorical approach seems to me something of an adventure in a doctrinal wonderland, for the concept of “obscene antigovernment” speech is fantastical. The category of the obscene is very narrow;’to be obscene, expression must be found by the trier of fact to “appea[l] to the prurient interest,... depie[t] or deserib[e], in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct, [and], taken as a whole, lac[k] serious literary, artistic, 'political, or scientific value.” Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 15, 24 (1973) (emphasis added). “Obscene antigovernment” speech, then, is a contradiction in terms: If expression is anti-government, it does not “lac[k] serious... political... value” and cannot be obscene.

The Court attempts to bolster its argument by likening its novel analysis to that applied to restrictions on the time, place, or manner of expression or on expressive conduct. It is true that loud speech in favor of the Republican Party can be regulated because it is loud, but not because it is pro-Republican; and it is true that the public burning of the American flag can be regulated because it involves public burning and not because it involves the flag. But these anal*419ogies are inapposite. In each of these examples, the two elements (e. g., loudness and pro-Repuhlican orientation) can coexist; in the case of “obscene antigovernment” speech, however, the presence of one element (“obscenity”) by definition means the absence of the other. To my mind, it is unwise and unsound to craft a new doctrine based on such highly speculative hypotheticals.

I am, however, even more troubled by the second step of the Court’s analysis — namely, its conclusion that the St. Paul ordinance is an unconstitutional content-based regulation of speech. Drawing on broadly worded dicta, the Court establishes a near-absolute ban on content-based regulations of expression and holds that the First Amendment prohibits the regulation of fighting words by subject matter. Thus, while the Court rejects the “all-or-nothing-at-all” nature of the categorical approach, ante, at 384, it promptly embraces an absolutism of its own: Within a particular “proscribable” category of expression, the Court holds, a government must either proscribe all speech or no speech at all.1 This aspect of the Court’s ruling, fundamentally misunderstands the role and constitutional status of content-based regulations on speech, conflicts with the very nature of First Amendment jurisprudence, and disrupts well-settled principles of First Amendment law.

*420Although the Court has, on occasion, declared that content-based regulations of speech are "never permitted,” Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U. S. 92, 99 (1972), such claims are overstated. Indeed, in Mosley itself, the Court indicated that Chicago's selective proscription of non-labor picketing was not per se unconstitutional, but rather could be upheld if the city demonstrated that nonlabor picketing was “clearly more disruptive than [labor] picketing.” Id., at 100. Contrary to the broad dicta in Mosley and elsewhere, our decisions demonstrate that content-based distinctions, far from being presumptively invalid, are an inevitable and indispensable aspect of a coherent understanding of the First Amendment.

This is true at every level of First Amendment law. In broadest terms, our entire First Amendment jurisprudence creates a regime based on the content of speech. The scope of the First Amendment is determined by the content of expressive activity: Although the First Amendment broadly protects “speech,” it does not protect the right to “fix prices, breach contracts, make false warranties, place bets with bookies, threaten, [or] extort.” Schauer, Categories and the First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 Vand. L. Rev. 265, 270 (1981). Whether an agreement among competitors is a violation of the Sherman Act or protected activity under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine2 hinges upon the content of the agreement. Similarly, “the line between permissible advocacy and impermissible ineitation to crime or violence depends, not merely on the setting in which the speech occurs, but also on exactly what the speaker had to say.” Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U. S. 50, 66 (1976) (plurality opinion); see also Musser v. Utah, 333 U. S. 95, 100-103 (1948) (Rutledge, J., dissenting).

*421Likewise, whether speech falls within one of the categories of “unprotected” or “proscribable” expression is determined, in part, by its content. Whether a magazine is obscene, a gesture a fighting word, or a photograph child pornography is determined, in part, by its content. Even within categories of protected expression, the First Amendment status of speech is fixed by its content. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254 (1964), and Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U. S. 749 (1985), establish that the level of protection given to speech depends upon its subject matter: Speech about public officials or matters of public concern receives greater protection than speech about other topics. It can, therefore, scarcely be said that the regulation of expressive activity cannot be predicated on its content: Much of our First Amendment jurisprudence is premised on the assumption that content makes a difference.

Consistent with this general premise, we have frequently upheld content-based regulations of speech. For example, in Young v. American Mini Theatres, the Court upheld zoning ordinances that regulated movie theaters based on the content of the films shown. In FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U. S. 726 (1978) (plurality opinion), we upheld a restriction on the broadcast of specific indecent words. In Lehman v. Shaker Heights, 418 U. S. 298 (1974) (plurality opinion), we upheld a city law that permitted commercial advertising, but prohibited political advertising, on city buses. In Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U. S. 601 (1973), we upheld a state law that restricted the speech of state employees, but only as concerned partisan political matters. We have long recognized the power of the Federal Trade Commission to regulate misleading advertising and labeling, see, e.g., Jacob Siegel Co. v. FTC, 327 U.S. 608 (1946), and the National Labor Relations Board’s power to regulate an employer’s election-related speech on the basis of its content, see, e. g., NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U. S. 575, 616-618 (1969). *422It is also beyond question that the Government may choose to limit advertisements for cigarettes, see 15 U. S. C. §§ 1331-1340,3 but not for cigars; choose to regulate airline advertising, see Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U. S. 374 (1992), but not bus advertising; or choose to monitor solicitation by lawyers, see Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn., 436 U. S. 447 (1978), but not by doctors.

All of these cases involved the selective regulation of speech based on content — precisely the sort of regulation the Court invalidates today. Such selective regulations are unavoidably content based, but they are not, in my opinion, “presumptively invalid.” As these many decisions and examples demonstrate, the prohibition on content-based regulations is not nearly as total as the Mosley dictum suggests.

Disregarding this vast body of ease law, the Court today goes beyond even the overstatement in Mosley and applies the prohibition on content-based regulation to speech that the Court had until today considered wholly “unprotected” by the First Amendment — namely, fighting words. This new absolutism in the prohibition of content-based regulations severely contorts the fabric of settled First Amendment law.

Our First Amendment decisions have created a rough hierarchy in the constitutional protection of speech. Core political speech occupies the highest, most protected position; commercial speech and nonobscene, sexually explicit speech are regarded as a sort of second-class expression; obscenity and fighting words receive the least protection of all. Assuming that the Court is correct that this last class of speech is not wholly “unprotected,” it certainly does not follow that fighting words and obscenity receive the same sort of protection afforded core political speech. Yet in ruling that proseribable speech cannot be regulated based on subject *423matter, the Court does just that.4 Perversely, this gives fighting words greater protection than is afforded commercial speech. If Congress can prohibit false advertising directed at airline passengers without also prohibiting false advertising directed at bus passengers and if a city can prohibit political advertisements in its buses while allowing other advertisements, it is ironic to hold that a city cannot regulate fighting words based on “race, color, creed, religion or gender” while leaving unregulated fighting words based on “union membership ... or homosexuality.” Ante, at 391. The Court today turns First Amendment law on its head: Communication that was once entirely unprotected (and that still can be wholly proscribed) is now entitled to greater protection than commercial speech — and possibly greater protection than core political speech. See Burson v. Freeman, 504 U. S. 191, 195, 196 (1992).

Perhaps because the Court recognizes these perversities, it quickly offers some ad hoe limitations on its newly extended prohibition on content-based regulations. First, the Court states that a content-based regulation is valid “[w]hen the basis for the content discrimination consists entirely of the very reason the entire class of speech ... is proscribable.” Ante, at 388. In a pivotal passage, the Court writes:

“[T]he Federal Government can criminalize only those threats of violence that are directed against the President, see 18 U. S. C. § 871 — since the reasons why *424threats of violence are outside the First Amendment (protecting individuals from the fear of violence, from the disruption that fear engenders, and from the possibility that the threatened violence will occur) have special force when applied to the . . . President.” Ibid.

As I understand this opaque passage, Congress may choose from the set of unprotected speech (all threats) to proscribe only a subset (threats against the President) because those threats are particularly likely to cause “fear of violence,” “disruption,” and actual “violence.”

Precisely this same reasoning, however, compels the conclusion that St. Paul’s ordinance is constitutional. Just as Congress may determine that threats against the President entail more severe consequences than other threats, so St. Paul’s City Council may determine that threats based on the target’s race, religion, or gender cause more severe harm to both the target and to society than other threats. This latter judgment — that harms caused by racial, religious, and gender-based invective are qualitatively different from that caused by other fighting words — seems to me eminéntly reasonable and realistic.

Next, the Court recognizes that a State may regulate advertising in one industry but not another because “the risk of fraud (one of the characteristics... that justifies depriving [commercial speech] of full First Amendment protection...)” in the regulated industry is “greater” than in other industries. Ibid. Again, the same reasoning demonstrates the constitutionality of St. Paul’s ordinance. “[Q]ne of the characteristics that justifies” the constitutional status of fighting words is that such words “by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.” Chaplinsky, 315 U. S., at 572. Certainly a legislature that may determine that the risk of fraud is greater in the legal *425trade than in the medical trade may determine that the risk of injury or breach of peace created by race-based threats is greater than that created by other threats.

Similarly, it is impossible to reconcile the Court’s analysis of the St. Paul ordinance with its recognition that “a prohibition of fighting words that are directed at certain persons or groups ... would be facially valid.” Ante, at 392 (emphasis deleted). A selective proscription of unprotected expression designed to protect “certain persons or groups” (for example, a law proscribing threats directed at the elderly) would be constitutional if it were based on a legitimate determination that the harm created by the regulated expression differs from that created by the unregulated expression (that is, if the elderly are more severely injured by threats than are the nonelderly). Such selective protection is no different from a law prohibiting minors (and only minors) from obtaining obscene publications. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U. S. 629 (1968). St. Paul has determined — reasonably in my judgment — that fighting-word injuries “based on race, color, creed, religion or gender” are qualitatively different and more severe than fighting-word injuries based on other characteristics. Whether the selective proscription of pro-seribable speech is defined by the protected target (“certain persons or groups”) or the basis of the harm (injuries “based on race, color, creed, religion or gender”) makes no constitutional difference: What matters is whether the legislature’s selection is based on a legitimate, neutral, and reasonable distinction.

In sum, the central premise of the Court’s ruling — that “[cjontent-based regulations are presumptively invalid”— has simplistic appeal, but lacks support in our First Amendment jurisprudence. To make matters worse, the Court today extends this overstated claim to reach categories of hitherto unprotected speech and, in doing so, wreaks havoc in an area of settled law. Finally, although the Court reeog-*426nizes exceptions to its new principle, those exceptions undermine its very conclusion that the St. Paul ordinance is unconstitutional. Stated directly, the majority’s position cannot withstand scrutiny.

II

Although I agree with much of Justice White’s analysis, I do not join Part I-A of his opinion because I have reservations about the “categorical approach” to the First Amendment. These concerns, which I have noted on other occasions, see, e. g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U. S. 747, 778 (1982) (opinion concurring in judgment), lead me to find Justice White’s response to the Court’s analysis unsatisfying.

Admittedly, the categorical approach to the First Amendment has some appeal: Either expression is protected or it is not — the categories create safe harbors for governments and speakers alike. But this approach sacrifices subtlety for clarity and is, I am convinced, ultimately unsound. As an initial matter, the concept of “categories” fits poorly with the complex reality of expression. New dividing lines in First Amendment law are straight and unwavering, and efforts at categorization inevitably give rise oiily to fuzzy boundaries. Our definitions of “obscenity,” see, e. g., Marks v. United States, 430 U. S. 188, 198 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), and “public forum,” see, e. g., United States Postal Service v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Assns., 453 U. S. 114, 126-131 (1981); id., at 136-140 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment); id., at 147-151 (Marshall, J., dissenting); id., at 152-154 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (all debating the definition of “public forum”), illustrate this all too well. The quest for doctrinal certainty through the definition of categories and subcategories is, in my opinion, destined to fail.

Moreover, the categorical approach does not take seriously the importance of context. The meaning of any expression and the legitimacy of its regulation can only be determined *427in context.5 Whether, for example, a picture or a sentence is obscene cannot be judged in the abstract, but rather only-in the context of its setting, its use, and its audience. Similarly, although legislatures may freely regulate most nonob-seene child pornography, such pornography that is part of “a serious work of art, a documentary on behavioral problems, or a medical or psychiatric teaching device” may be entitled to constitutional protection; the “question whether a specific act of communication is protected by the First Amendment always requires some consideration of both its content and its context.” Ferber, 458 U. S., at 778 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment); see also Smith v. United States, 431 U. S. 291, 311-321 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting). The categorical approach sweeps too broadly when it declares that all such expression is beyond the protection of the First Amendment.

Perhaps sensing the limits of such an all-or-nothing approach, the Court has applied its analysis less categorically than its doctrinal statements suggest. The Court has recognized intermediate categories of speech (for example, for indecent nonobscene speech and commercial speech) and geographic categories of speech (public fora, limited public fora, nonpublic fora) entitled to varying levels of protection. The Court has also stringently delimited the categories of unprotected speech. While we once declared that “[ljibelous utterances [are] not... within the area of constitutionally protected speech,” Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U. S. 250, 266 (1952), our rulings in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254 (1964); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U. S. 323 (1974), and Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U. S. 749 (1985), have substantially qualified this *428broad claim. Similarly, we have consistently construed the “fighting words” exception set forth in Chaplinsky narrowly. See, e. g., Houston v. Hill, 482 U. S. 451 (1987); Lewis v. New Orleans, 415 U. S. 130 (1974); Cohen v. California, 403 U. S. 15 (1971). In the case of commercial speech, our ruling that “the Constitution imposes no . . . restraint on government [regulation] as respects purely commercial advertising,” Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U. S. 52, 54 (1942), was expressly repudiated in Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U. S. 748 (1976). In short, the history of the categorical approach is largely the history of narrowing the categories of unprotected speech.

This evolution, I believe, indicates that the categorical approach is unworkable and the quest for absolute categories of “protected” and “unprotected” speech ultimately futile. My analysis of the faults and limits of this approach persuades me that the categorical approach presented in Part I-A of Justice White’s opinion is not an adequate response to the novel “underbreadth” analysis the Court sets forth today.

Ill

As the foregoing suggests, I disagree with both the Court’s and part of Justice White’s analysis of the constitutionality of the St. Paul ordinance. Unlike the Court, I do not believe that all content-based regulations are equally infirm and presumptively invalid; unlike Justice White, I do not believe that fighting words are wholly unprotected by the First Amendment. To the contrary, I believe our decisions establish a more complex and subtle analysis, one that considers the content and context of the regulated speech, and the nature and scope of the restriction on speech. Applying this analysis and assuming, arguendo, (as the Court does) that the St. Paul ordinance is not overbroad, I conclude that such a selective, subject-matter regulation on proscribable speech is constitutional.

*429Not all content-based regulations are alike; our decisions clearly recognize that some content-based restrictions raise more constitutional questions than others. Although the Court’s analysis of content-based regulations cannot be reduced to a simple formula, we have considered a number of factors in determining the validity of such regulations.

First, as suggested above, the scope of protection provided expressive activity depends in part upon its content and character. We have long recognized that when government regulates political speech or “the expression of editorial opinion on matters of public importance,” FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U. S. 364, 375-376 (1984), “First Amendment protectio[n] is "at its zenith/ ” Meyer v. Grant, 486 U. S. 414, 425 (1988). In comparison, we have recognized that “commercial speech receives a limited form of First Amendment protection,” Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U. S. 328, 340 (1986), and that “society’s interest in protecting [sexually explicit films] is of a wholly different, and lesser, magnitude than [its] interest in untrammeled political debate,” Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U. S., at 70; see also FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U. S. 726 (1978). The character of expressive activity also weighs in our consideration of its constitutional status. As we have frequently noted, “[t]he government generally has a freer hand in restricting expressive conduct than it has in restricting the written or spoken word.” Texas v. Johnson, 491 U. S. 397, 406 (1989); see also United States v. O’Brien, 391 U. S. 367 (1968).

The protection afforded expression turns as well on the context of the regulated speech. We have noted, for example, that “[a]ny assessment of the precise scope of employer expression, of course, must be made in the context of its labor relations setting . .. [and] must take into account the economic dependence of the employees on their employers.” NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U. S., at 617. Similarly, the distinctive character of a university environment, see *430Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U. S. 263, 277-280 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment), or a secondary school environment, see Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U. S. 260 (1988), influences our First Amendment analysis. The same is true of the presence of a “‘captive audience[, one] there as a matter of necessity, not of choice.’ ” Lehman v. Shaker Heights, 418 U. S., at 302 (citation omitted).6 Perhaps the most familiar embodiment of the relevance of context is our “fora” jurisprudence, differentiating the levels of protection afforded speech in different locations.

The nature of a contested restriction of speech also informs our evaluation of its constitutionality. Thus, for example, “[a]ny system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity.” Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U. S. 58, 70 (1963). More particularly to the matter of content-based regulations, we have implicitly distinguished between restrictions on expression based on subject matter and restrictions based on viewpoint, indicating that the latter are particularly pernicious. “If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the Government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.” Texas v. Johnson, 491 U. S., at 414. “Viewpoint discrimination is censorship in its purest form,” Perry Ed. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators’ Assn., 460 U. S. 37, 62 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting), and requires particular scrutiny, in part because such regulation often indicates a legislative effort to skew public debate on an issue, see, e. g., Schacht v. United States, 398 U. S. 58, 63 (1970). “Especially where... the legislature’s suppression of speech suggests an attempt *431to give one side of a debatable public question an advantage in expressing its views to the people, the First Amendment is plainly offended.” First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U. S. 765, 785-786 (1978). Thus, although a regulation that on its face regulates speech by subject matter may in some instances effectively suppress particular viewpoints, see, e. g., Consolidated Edison Co. of N. Y. v. Public Serv. Comm’n of N. Y., 447 U. S. 530, 546-547 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment), in general, viewpoint-based restrictions on expression require greater scrutiny than subject-matter-based restrictions.7

Finally, in considering the validity of content-based regulations we have also looked more broadly at the scope of the restrictions. For example, in Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U. S., at 71, we found significant the fact that “what [was] ultimately at stake [was] nothing more than a limitation on the place where adult films may be exhibited.” Similarly, in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, the Court emphasized two dimensions of the limited scope of the FCC ruling. First, the ruling concerned only broadcast material which presents particular problems because it “confronts the citizen ... in the privacy of the home”; second, the ruling was not a complete ban on the use of selected offensive words, but rather merely a limitation on the times such speech could be broadcast. 438 U. S., at 748-750.

All of these factors play some role in our evaluation of content-based regulations on expression. Such a multifaceted analysis cannot be conflated into two dimensions. Whatever the allure of absolute doctrines, it is just too simple to declare expression “protected” or “unprotected” or to proclaim a regulation “content based” or “content neutral.”

*432In applying this analysis to the St. Paul ordinance, I assume, arguendo — as the Court does — that the ordinance regulates only fighting words and therefore is wot overbroad. Looking to the content and character of the regulated activity, two things are clear. First, by hypothesis the ordinance bars only low-value speech, namely, fighting words. By definition such expression constitutes “no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and [is] of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from [it] is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.” Chaplinsky, 315 U. S., at 572. Second, the ordinance regulates “expressive conduct [rather] than ... the written or spoken word.” Texas v. Johnson, 491 U. S., at 406.

Looking to the context of the regulated activity, it is again significant that the ordinance (by hypothesis) regulates only fighting words. Whether words are fighting words is determined in part by their context. Fighting words are not words that merely cause offense; fighting words must be directed at individuals so as to “by their very utterance inflict injury.” By hypothesis, then, the St. Paul ordinance restricts speech in confrontational and potentially violent situations. The case at hand is illustrative. The cross burning in this case — directed as it was to a single African-American family trapped in their home — was nothing more than a crude form of physical intimidation. That this cross burning sends a message of racial hostility does not automatically endow it with complete constitutional protection.8

*433Significantly, the St. Paul ordinance regulates speech not on the basis of its subject matter or the viewpoint expressed, but rather on the basis of the harm the speech causes. In this regard, the Court fundamentally misreads the St. Paul ordinance. The Court describes the St. Paul ordinance as regulating expression “addressed to one of [several] specified disfavored topics,” ante, at 391 (emphasis supplied), as policing “disfavored subjects,” ibid, (emphasis supplied), and as “prohibiting].. . speech solely on the basis of the subjects the speech addresses,” ante, at 381 (emphasis supplied). Contrary to the Court’s suggestion, the ordinance regulates only a subcategory of expression that causes injuries based on “race, color, creed, religion or gender,” not a subcategory that involves discussions that concern those characteristics.9 The ordinance,- as construed by the Court, criminalizes expression that “one knows ... [by its very utterance inflicts injury on] others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or *434gender.” In this regard, the ordinance resembles the child pornography law at issue in Ferber,. which in effect singled out child pornography because those publications caused far greater harms than pornography involving adults.

Moreover, even if the St. Paul ordinance did regulate fighting words based on its subject matter, such a regulation would, in my opinion, be constitutional. As noted above, subject-matter-based regulations on commercial speech are widespread and largely unproblematic. As we have long recognized, subject-matter regulations generally do not raise the same concerns of government censorship and the distortion of public discourse presented by viewpoint regulations. Thus, in upholding subject-matter regulations we have carefully noted that viewpoint-based discrimination was not implicated. See Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U. S., at 67 (emphasizing “the need for absolute neutrality by the government,” and observing that the contested statute was not animated by “hostility for the point of view" of the theaters); FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U. S., at 745-746 (stressing that “government must remain neutral in the marketplace of ideas”); see also FCC v. League of Women’s Voters of Cal., 468 U. S., at 412-417 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U. S. 490, 554-555 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting in part). Indeed, some subject-matter restrictions are a functional necessity in contemporary governance: “The First Amendment does not require States to regulate for problems that do not exist.” Burson v. Freeman, 504 U. S., at 207.

Contrary to the suggestion of the majority, the St. Paul ordinance does not regulate expression based on viewpoint. The Court contends that the ordinance requires proponents of racial intolerance to “follow the Marquis of Queensberry rules” while allowing advocates of racial tolerance to “fight freestyle.” The law does no such thing.

*435The Court writes:

“One could hold up a sign saying, for example, that all ‘anti-Catholic bigots’ are misbegotten; but not that all ‘papists’ are, for that would insult and provoke violence ‘on the basis of religion.’ ” Ante, at 391-392.

This may be true, but it hardly proves the Court’s point. The Court’s reasoning is asymmetrical. The response to a sign saying that “all [religious] bigots are misbegotten” is a sign saying that “all advocates of religious tolerance are misbegotten.” Assuming such signs could be fighting words (which seems to me extremely unlikely), neither sign would be banned by the ordinance for the attacks were not “based on . . . religion” but rather on one’s beliefs about tolerance. Conversely (and again assuming such signs are fighting words), just as the ordinance would prohibit a Muslim from hoisting a sign claiming that all Catholics were misbegotten, so the ordinance would bar a Catholic from hoisting a similar sign attacking Muslims.

The St. Paul ordinance is evenhanded. In a battle between advocates of tolerance and advocates of intolerance, the ordinance does not prevént either side from hurling fighting words at the other on the basis of their conflicting ideas, but it does bar both sides from hurling such words on the basis of the target’s “race, color, creed, religion or gender.” To extend the Court’s pugilistic metaphor, the St. Paul ordinance simply bans punches “below the belt”— by either party. It does not, therefore, favor one side of any debate.10

*436Finally, it is noteworthy that the St. Paul ordinance is, as construed by the Court today, quite narrow. The St. Paul ordinance does not ban all “hate speech,” nor does it ban, say, all cross burnings or all swastika displays. Rather it only bans a subcategory of the already narrow category of fighting words. Such a limited ordinance leaves open and protected a vast range of expression on the subjects of racial, religious, and gender equality. As construed by the Court today, the ordinance certainly does not “ 'rais[e] the specter that the Government may effectively drive certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace.’” Ante, at 387. Petitioner is free to burn a cross to announce a rally or to express his views about racial supremacy, he may do so on private property or public land, at day or at night, so long as the burning is not so threatening and so directed at an individual as to “by its very [execution] inflict injury.” Such a limited proscription scarcely offends the First Amendment.

In sum, the St. Paul ordinance (as construed by the Court) regulates expressive activity that is wholly proseribable and does so not on the basis of viewpoint, but rather in recognition of the different harms caused by such activity. Taken together, these several considerations persuade me that the St. Paul ordinance is not an unconstitutional content-based regulation of speech. Thus, were the ordinance not over-broad, I would vote to uphold it.

*784Justice Kennedy

delivered the opinion of the Court.

In the southeast portion of New York City’s Central Park, about 10 blocks upward from the park’s beginning point at 59th Street, there is an amphitheater and stage structure known as the Naumberg Acoustic Bandshell. The bandshell faces west across the remaining width of the park. In close proximity to the bandshell, and lying within the directional path of its sound, is a grassy open area called the Sheep Meadow. The city has designated- the Sheep Meadow as a quiet area for passive recreations like reclining, walking, and reading. Just beyond the park, and also within the potential sound range of the bandshell, are the apartments and residences of Central Park West.

This case arises from the city’s attempt to regulate the volume of amplified music at the bandshell so the performances are satisfactory to the audience without intruding upon those who use the Sheep Meadow or live on Central Park West and in its vicinity.

The city’s regulation requires bandshell performers to use sound-amplification equipment and a sound technician provided by the city. The challenge to this volume control technique comes from the sponsor of a rock concert. The trial court sustained the noise control measures, but the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed. We granted cer-tiorari to resolve the important First Amendment issues presented by the case.

I

Rock Against Racism, respondent in this case, is an unincorporated association which, in its own words, is “dedicated to the espousal and promotion of antiracist views.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 3. Each year from 1979 through 1986, RAR has sponsored a program of speeches and rock music at the *785bandshell. RAR has furnished the sound equipment and sound technician used by the various performing groups at these annual events.

Over the years, the city received numerous complaints about excessive sound amplification at respondent’s concerts from park users and residents of areas adjacent to the park. On some occasions RAR was less than cooperative when city officials asked that the volume be reduced; at one concert, police felt compelled to cut off the power to the sound system, an action that caused the audience to become unruly and hostile. App. 127-131, 140-141, 212-214, 345-347.

Before the 1984 concert, city officials met with RAR representatives to discuss the problem of excessive noise. It was decided that the city would monitor sound levels at the edge of the concert ground, and would revoke respondent’s event permit if specific volume limits were exceeded. Sound levels at the concert did exceed acceptable levels for sustained periods of time, despite repeated warnings and requests that the volume be lowered. Two citations for excessive volume were issued to respondent during the concert. When the power was eventually shut off, the audience became abusive and disruptive.

The following year, when respondent sought permission to hold its upcoming concert at the bandshell, the city declined to grant an event permit, citing its problems with noise and crowd control at RAR’s previous concerts. The city suggested some other city-owned facilities as alternative sites for the concert. RAR declined the invitation and filed suit in United States District Court against the city, its mayor, and various police and parks department officials, seeking an injunction directing issuance of an event permit. After respondent agreed to abide by all applicable regulations, the parties reached agreement and a permit was issued.

The city then undertook to develop comprehensive New York City Parks Department Use Guidelines for the Naum-berg Bandshell. A principal problem to be addressed by *786the guidelines was controlling the volume of amplified sound at bandshell events. A major concern was that at some bandshell performances the event sponsors had been unable to “provide the amplification levels required and ‘crowds unhappy with the sound became disappointed or unruly.’” Brief for Petitioners 9. The city found that this problem had several causes, including inadequate sound equipment, sound technicians who were either unskilled at mixing sound outdoors or unfamiliar with the acoustics of the bandshell and its surroundings, and the like. Because some performers compensated for poor sound mix by raising volume, these factors tended to exacerbate the problem of excess noise.1 App. 30, 189, 218-219.

The city considered various solutions to the sound-amplification problem. The idea of a fixed decibel limit for all performers using the bandshell was rejected because the impact on listeners of a single decibel level is not constant, but varies in response to changes in air temperature, foliage, audience size, and like factors. Id., at 31, 220, 285-286. The city also rejected the possibility of employing a sound technician to operate the equipment provided by the various sponsors of bandshell events, because the city’s technician might have had difficulty satisfying the needs of sponsors while operating unfamiliar, and perhaps inadequate, sound equipment. Id., *787at 220. Instead, the city concluded that the most effective way to achieve adequate but not excessive sound amplification would be for the city to furnish high quality sound equipment and retain an independent, experienced sound technician for all performances at the bandshell. After an extensive search the city hired a private sound company capable of meeting the needs of all the varied users of the bandshell.

The Use Guidelines were promulgated on March 21, 1986.2 After learning that it would be expected to comply with the guidelines at its upcoming annual concert in May 1986, respondent returned to the District Court and filed a motion for an injunction against the enforcement of certain aspects of the guidelines. The District Court preliminarily enjoined enforcement of the sound-amplification rule on May 1, 1986. See 636 F. Supp. 178 (SDNY 1986). Under the protection of the injunction, and alone among users of the bandshell in the 1986 season, RAR was permitted to use its own sound equip*788ment and technician, just as it had done in prior years. RAR’s 1986 concert again generated complaints about excessive noise from park users and nearby residents. App. 127, 138.

After the concert, respondent amended its complaint to seek damages and a declaratory judgment striking down the guidelines as facially invalid. After hearing five days of testimony about various aspects of the guidelines, the District Court issued its decision upholding the sound-amplification guideline.3 The court found that the city had been “motivated by a desire to obtain top-flight sound equipment and experienced operators” in selecting an independent contractor to provide the equipment and technician for bandshell events, and that the performers who did use the city’s sound system in the 1986 season, in performances “which ran the full cultural gamut from grand opera to salsa to reggae,” were uniformly pleased with the quality of the sound provided. 658 F. Supp. 1346, 1352 (SDNY 1987).

Although the city’s sound technician controlled both sound volume and sound mix by virtue of his position at the mixing board, the court found that “[t]he City’s practice for events at the Bandshell is to give the sponsor autonomy with respect to the sound mix: balancing treble with bass, highlighting a particular instrument or voice, and the like,” and that the city’s sound technician “does all he can to accommodate the sponsor’s desires in those regards.” Ibid. Even with respect to volume control, the city’s practice was to confer with the sponsor before making any decision to turn the volume down. Ibid. In some instances, as with a New York Grand Opera performance, the sound technician accommodated the performers’ unique needs by integrating special microphones with the city’s equipment. The court specifically found that “[t]he City’s implementation of the Bandshell guidelines provides for a sound amplification system capable of meeting *789RAR’s technical needs and leaves control of the sound ‘mix’ in the hands of RAR.” Id., at 1353. Applying this Court’s three-part test for judging the constitutionality of government regulation of the time, place, or manner of protected speech, the court found the city’s regulation valid.

The Court of Appeals reversed. 848 F. 2d 367 (CA2 1988). After recognizing that “[cjontent neutral time, place and manner regulations are permissible so long as they are narrowly tailored to serve a substantial government interest and do not unreasonably limit alternative avenues of expression,” the court added the proviso that “the method and extent of such regulation must be reasonable, that is, it must be the least intrusive upon the freedom of expression as is reasonably necessary to achieve a legitimate purpose of the regulation.” Id., at 370 (citing United States v. O’Brien, 391 U. S. 367, 377 (1968)). Applying this test, the court determined that the city’s guideline was valid only to the extent necessary to achieve the city’s legitimate interest in controlling excessive volume, but found there were various alternative means of controlling volume without also intruding on respondent’s ability to control the sound mix. For example, the city could have directed respondent’s sound technician to keep the volume below specified levels. Alternatively, a volume-limiting device could have been installed; and as a “last resort,” the court suggested, “the plug can be pulled on the sound to enforce the volume limit.” 848 F. 2d, at 372, n. 6. In view of the potential availability of these seemingly less restrictive alternatives, the Court of Appeals concluded that the sound-amplification guideline was invalid because the city had failed to prove that its regulation “was the least intrusive means of regulating the volume.” Id., at 371.

We granted certiorari, 488 U. S. 816 (1988), to clarify the legal standard applicable to governmental regulation of the time, place, or manner of protected speech. Because the Court of Appeals erred in requiring the city to prove that its regulation was the least intrusive means of furthering its le*790gitimate governmental interests, and because the ordinance is valid on its face, we now reverse.

II

Music is one of the oldest forms of human expression. From Plato’s discourse in the Republic to the totalitarian state in our own times, rulers have known its capacity to appeal to the intellect and to the emotions, and have censored musical compositions to serve the needs of the state. See 2 Dialogues of Plato, Republic, bk. 3, pp. 231, 245-248 (B. Jow-ett transí., 4th ed. 1953) (“Our poets must sing in another and a nobler strain”); Musical Freedom and Why Dictators Fear It, N. Y. Times, Aug. 23, 1981, section 2, p. 1, col. 5; Soviet Schizophrenia toward Stravinsky, N. Y. Times, June 26, 1982, section 1, p. 25, col. 2; Symphonic Voice from China Is Heard Again, N. Y. Times, Oct. 11, 1987, section 2, p. 27, col. 1. The Constitution prohibits any like attempts in our own legal order. Music, as a form of expression and communication, is protected under the First Amendment. In the case before us the performances apparently consisted of remarks by speakers, as well as rock music, but the case has been presented as one in which the constitutional challenge is to the city’s regulation of the musical aspects of the concert; and, based on the principle we have stated, the city’s guideline must meet the demands of the First Amendment. The parties do not appear to dispute that proposition.

We need not here discuss whether a municipality which owns a bandstand or stage facility may exercise, in some circumstances, a proprietary right to select performances and control their quality. See Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U. S. 546, 570-574 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Though it did demonstrate its own interest in the effort to insure high quality performances by providing the equipment in question, the city justifies its guideline as a regulatory measure to limit and control noise. Here the bandshell was open, apparently, to all performers; and we de*791cide the case as one in which the bandshell is a public forum for performances in which the government’s right to regulate expression is subject to the protections of the First Amendment. United States v. Grace, 461 U. S. 171, 177 (1983); see Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U. S. 474, 481 (1988); Perry Education Assn. v. Perry Local Educators' Assn., 460 U. S. 37, 45 (1983). Our cases make clear, however, that even in a public forum the government may impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or manner of protected speech, provided the restrictions “are justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and that they leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information.” Clark v. Community for Creative NonViolence, 468 U. S. 288, 293 (1984); see Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U. S. 640, 648 (1981) (quoting Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U. S. 748, 771 (1976)). We consider these requirements in turn.

A

The principal inquiry in determining content neutrality, in speech cases generally and in time, place, or manner cases in particular, is whether the government has adopted a regulation of speech because of disagreement with the message it conveys. Community for Creative Non-Violence, supra, at 295. The government’s purpose is the controlling consideration. A regulation that serves purposes unrelated to the content of expression is deemed neutral, even if it has an incidental effect on some speakers or messages but not others. See Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U. S. 41, 47-48 (1986). Government regulation of expressive activity is content neutral so long as it is “justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech.” Community for Creative Non-Violence, supra, at 293 (emphasis added); Heffron, supra, at 648 (quoting Virginia Pharmacy Bd., supra, at *792771); see Boos v. Barry, 485 U. S. 312, 320-321 (1988) (opinion of O’Connor, J.).

The principal justification for the sound-amplification guideline is the city’s desire to control noise levels at bandshell events, in order to retain the character of the Sheep Meadow and its more sedate activities, and to avoid undue intrusion into residential areas and other areas of the park. This justification for the guideline “ha[s] nothing to do with content,” Boos v. Barry, supra, at 320, and it satisfies the requirement that time, place, or manner regulations be content neutral.

The only other justification offered below was the city’s interest in “ensuring] the quality of sound at Bandshell events.” 658 F. Supp., at 1352; see 848 F. 2d, at 370, n. 3. Respondent urges that this justification is not content neutral because it is based upon the quality, and thus the content, of the speech being regulated. In respondent’s view, the city is seeking to assert artistic control over performers at the bandshell by enforcing a bureaucratically determined, value-laden conception of good sound. That all performers who have used the city’s sound equipment have been completely satisfied is of no moment, respondent argues, because “[t]he First Amendment does not permit and cannot tolerate state control of artistic expression merely because the State claims that [its] efforts will lead to ‘top-quality’ results.” Brief for Respondent 19.

While respondent’s arguments that the government may not interfere with artistic judgment may have much force in other contexts, they are inapplicable to the facts of this case. The city has disclaimed in express terms any interest in imposing its own view of appropriate sound mix on performers. To the contrary, as the District Court found, the city requires its sound technician to defer to the wishes of event sponsors concerning sound mix. 658 F. Supp., at 1352-1353. On this record, the city’s concern with sound quality extends only to the clearly content-neutral goals of ensuring adequate *793sound amplification and avoiding the volume problems associated with inadequate sound mix.4 Any governmental attempt to serve purely esthetic goals by imposing subjective standards of acceptable sound mix on performers would raise serious First Amendment concerns, but this case provides us with no opportunity to address those questions. As related above, the District Court found that the city’s equipment and its sound technician could meet all of the standards requested by the performers, including RAR.

Respondent argues further that the guideline, even if not content based in explicit terms, is nonetheless invalid on its face because it places unbridled discretion in the hands of city officials charged with enforcing it. See Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 486 U. S. 750, 769-772 (1988) (4-to-3 decision); Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., supra, at 649; Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U. S. 51, 56 (1965); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88, 97 (1940). According to respondent, there is nothing in the language of the guideline to prevent city officials from selecting wholly inadequate sound equipment or technicians, or even from varying the volume and quality of sound based on the message being conveyed by the performers.

As a threshold matter, it is far from clear that respondent should be permitted to bring a facial challenge to this aspect of the regulation. Our cases permitting facial challenges to regulations that allegedly grant officials unconstrained authority to regulate speech have generally involved licensing schemes that “ves[t] unbridled discretion in a government official over whether to permit or deny expressive activity.” Plain Dealer, supra, at 755. The grant of discretion that re*794spondent seeks to challenge here is of an entirely different, and lesser, order of magnitude, because respondent does not suggest that city officials enjoy unfettered discretion to deny bandshell permits altogether. Rather, respondent contends only that the city, by exercising what is concededly its right to regulate amplified sound, could choose to provide inadequate sound for performers based on the content of their speech. Since respondent does not claim that city officials enjoy unguided discretion to deny the right to speak altogether, it is open to question whether respondent’s claim falls within the narrow class of permissible facial challenges to allegedly unconstrained grants of regulatory authority. Cf. 486 U. S., at 787 (White, J., dissenting) (arguing that facial challenges of this type are permissible only where “the local law at issue require[s] licenses — not for a narrow category of expressive conduct that could be prohibited — but for a sweeping range of First Amendment protected activity”).

We need not decide, however, whether the “extraordinary doctrine” that permits facial challenges to some regulations of expression, see id., at 772 (White, J., dissenting), should be extended to the circumstances of this case, for respondent’s facial challenge fails on its merits. The city’s guideline states that its goals are to “provide the best sound for all events” and to “insure appropriate sound quality balanced with respect for nearby residential neighbors and the may-orally decreed quiet zone of [the] Sheep Meadow.” App. 375. While these standards are undoubtedly flexible, and the officials implementing them will exercise considerable discretion, perfect clarity and precise guidance have never been required even of regulations that restrict expressive activity. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U. S. 104, 110 (1972) (“Condemned to the use of words, we can never expect mathematical certainty in our language”); see also Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U. S. 77, 79 (1949) (rejecting vagueness challenge to city ordinance forbidding “loud and raucous” sound amplification) (opinion of Reed, J.). By its own terms the *795city’s sound-amplification guideline must be interpreted to forbid city officials purposely to select inadequate sound systems or to vary the sound quality or volume based on the message being delivered by performers. The guideline is not vulnerable to respondent’s facial challenge.5

Even if the language of the guideline were not sufficient on its face to withstand challenge, our ultimate conclusion would be the same, for the city has interpreted the guideline in such a manner as to provide additional guidance to the officials charged with its enforcement. The District Court expressly found that the city’s policy is to defer to the sponsor’s desires concerning sound quality. 658 F. Supp., at 1352. With respect to sound volume, the city retains ultimate control, but city officials “mak[e] it a practice to confer with the sponsor if any questions of excessive sound arise, before taking any corrective action.” Ibid. The city’s goal of ensuring that “the sound amplification [is] sufficient to reach all listeners within the defined concertground,” ibid., serves to limit further the discretion of the officials on the scene. Administrative interpretation and implementation of a regulation are, of course, highly relevant to our analysis, for “[i]n evaluating a facial *796challenge to a state law, a federal court must . . . consider any limiting construction that a state court or enforcement agency has proffered.” Hoffman Estates v. The Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U. S. 489, 494, n. 5 (1982); see Plain Dealer, 486 U. S., at 769-770, and n. 11; United States v. Grace, 461 U. S., at 181, n. 10; Grayned v. City of Rockford, supra, at 110; Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U. S. 395 (1953). Any inadequacy on the face of the guideline would have been more than remedied by the city’s narrowing construction.

B

The city’s regulation is also “narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest.” Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U. S., at 293. Despite respondent’s protestations to the contrary, it can no longer be doubted that government “ha[s] a substantial interest in protecting its citizens from unwelcome noise.” City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U. S. 789, 806 (1984) (citing Kovacs v. Cooper, supra)-, see Grayned, supra, at 116. This interest is perhaps at its greatest when government seeks to protect “‘the well-being, tranquility, and privacy of the home,”’ Frisby v. Schidtz, 487 U. S., at 484 (quoting Carey v. Brown, 447 U. S. 455, 471 (1980)), but it is by no means limited to that context, for the government may act to protect even such traditional public forums as city streets and parks from excessive noise. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U. S., at 86-87 (opinion of Reed, J.); id., at 96-97 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); id., at 97 (Jackson, J., concurring); see Community for Creative Non-Violence, supra, at 296 (recognizing the government’s “substantial interest in maintaining the parks ... in an attractive and intact condition, readily available to the millions of people who wish to see and enjoy them”).

We think it also apparent that the city’s interest in ensuring the sufficiency of sound amplification at bandshell events is a substantial one. The record indicates that inadequate *797sound amplification has had an adverse affect on the ability of some audiences to hear and enjoy performances at the bandshell. The city enjoys a substantial interest in ensuring the ability of its citizens to enjoy whatever benefits the city parks have to offer, from amplified music to silent meditation. See Community for Creative Non-Violence, supra, at 296.

The Court of Appeals recognized the city’s substantial interest in limiting the sound emanating from the bandshell. See 848 F. 2d, at 370. The court concluded, however, that the city’s sound-amplification guideline was not narrowly tailored to further this interest, because “it has not [been] shown . . . that the requirement of the use of the city’s sound system and technician was the least intrusive means of regulating the volume.” Id., at 371 (emphasis added). In the court’s judgment, there were several alternative methods of achieving the desired end that would have been less restrictive of respondent’s First Amendment rights.

The Court of Appeals erred in sifting through all the available or imagined alternative means of regulating sound volume in order to determine whether the city’s solution was “the least intrusive means” of achieving the desired end. This “less-restrictive-alternative analysis . . . has never been a part of the inquiry into the validity of a time, place, and manner regulation.” Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U. S. 641, 657 (1984) (opinion of White, J.). Instead, our cases quite clearly hold that restrictions on the time, place, or manner of protected speech are not invalid “simply because there is some imaginable alternative that might be less burdensome on speech.” United States v. Albertini, 472 U. S. 675, 689 (1985).

The Court of Appeals apparently drew its least-intrusive-means requirement from United States v. O’Brien, 391 U. S., at 377, the case in which we established the standard for judging the validity of restrictions on expressive conduct. See 848 F. 2d, at 370. The court’s reliance was misplaced, *798however, for we have held that the O’Brien test “in the last analysis is little, if any, different from the standard applied to time, place, or manner restrictions.” Community for Creative Non-Violence, supra, at 298. Indeed, in Community for Creative Non-Violence, we squarely rejected reasoning identical to that of the court below:

“We are unmoved by the Court of Appeals’ view that the challenged regulation is unnecessary, and hence invalid, because there are less speech-restrictive alternatives that could have satisfied the Government interest in preserving park lands. . . . We do not believe . . . that either United States v. O’Brien or the time, place, or manner decisions assign to the judiciary the authority to replace the [parks department] as the manager of the [city’s] parks or endow the judiciary with the competence to judge how much protection of park lands is wise and how that level of conservation is to be attained.” 468 U. S., at 299.

Lest any confusion on the point remain, we reaffirm today that a regulation of the time, place, or manner of protected speech must be narrowly tailored to serve the government’s legitimate, content-neutral interests but that it need not be the least restrictive or least intrusive means of doing so.6 *799Rather, the requirement of narrow tailoring is satisfied “so long as the . . . regulation promotes a substantial government interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation.” United States v. Albertini, supra, at 689; see also Community for Creative Non-Violence, supra, at 297. To be sure, this standard does not mean that a time, place, or manner regulation may burden substantially more speech than is necessary to further the government’s legitimate interests. Government may not regulate expression in such a manner that a substantial portion of the burden on speech does not serve to advance its goals.7 See Frisby *800v. Schultz, 487 U. S., at 485 (“A complete ban can be narrowly tailored but only if each activity within the proscription’s scope is an appropriately targeted evil”). So long as the means chosen are not substantially broader than necessary to achieve the government’s interest, however, the regulation will not be invalid simply because a court concludes that the government’s interest could be adequately served by some less-speech-restrictive alternative. “The validity of [time, place, or manner] regulations does not turn on a judge’s agreement with the responsible decisionmaker concerning the most appropriate method for promoting significant government interests” or the degree to which those interests should be promoted. United States v. Albertini, 472 U. S., at 689; see Community for Creative Non-Violence, supra, at 299.

It is undeniable that the city’s substantial interest in limiting sound volume is served in a direct and effective way by the requirement that the city’s sound technician control the mixing board during performances. Absent this requirement, the city’s interest would have been served less well, as is evidenced by the complaints about excessive volume generated by respondent’s past concerts. The alternative regulatory methods hypothesized by the Court of Appeals reflect nothing more than a disagreement with the city over how much control of volume is appropriate or how that level of control is to be achieved. See Community for Creative Non-Violence, supra, at 299. The Court of Appeals erred in failing to defer to the city’s reasonable determination that its interest in controlling volume would be best served by requiring bandshell performers to utilize the city’s sound technician.

The city’s second content-neutral justification for the guideline, that of ensuring “that the sound amplification [is] sufficient to reach all listeners within the defined concert-*801ground,” 658 F. Supp., at 1352, also supports the city’s choice of regulatory methods. By providing competent sound technicians and adequate amplification equipment, the city eliminated the problems of inexperienced technicians and insufficient sound volume that had plagued some bandshell performers in the past. No doubt this concern is not applicable to respondent’s concerts, which apparently were characterized by more-than-adequate sound amplification. But that fact is beside the point, for the validity of the regulation depends on the relation it bears to the overall problem the government seeks to correct, not on the extent to which it furthers the government’s interests in an individual case. Here, the regulation’s effectiveness must be judged by considering all the varied groups that use the bandshell, and it is valid so long as the city could reasonably have determined that its interests overall would be served less effectively without the sound-amplification guideline than with it. United States v. Albertini, supra, at 688-689; Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U. S., at 296-297. Considering these proffered justifications together, therefore, it is apparent that the guideline directly furthers the city’s legitimate governmental interests and that those interests would have been less well served in the absence of the sound-amplification guideline.

Respondent nonetheless argues that the sound-amplification guideline is not narrowly tailored because, by placing control of sound mix in the hands of the city’s technician, the guideline sweeps far more broadly than is necessary to further the city’s legitimate concern with sound volume. According to respondent, the guideline “targets . . . more than the exact source of the ‘evil’ it seeks to remedy.” Frisby v. Schultz, supra, at 485.

If the city’s regulatory scheme had a substantial deleterious effect on the ability of bandshell performers to achieve the quality of sound they desired, respondent’s concerns would have considerable force. The District Court found, *802however, that pursuant to city policy, the city’s sound technician “give[s] the sponsor autonomy with respect to the sound mix . . . [and] does all that he can to accommodate the sponsor’s desires in those regards.” 658 F. Supp., at 1352. The court squarely rejected respondent’s claim that the city’s “technician is not able properly to implement a sponsor’s instructions as to sound quality or mix,” finding that “[n]o evidence to that effect was offered at trial; as noted, the evidence is to the contrary.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 89. In view of these findings, which were not disturbed by the Court of Appeals, we must conclude that the city’s guideline has no material impact on any performer’s ability to exercise complete artistic control over sound quality. Since the guideline allows the city to control volume without interfering with the performer’s desired sound mix, it is not “substantially broader than necessary” to achieve the city’s legitimate ends, City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U. S., at 808, and thus it satisfies the requirement of narrow tailoring.

C

The final requirement, that the guideline leave open ample alternative channels of communication, is easily met. Indeed, in this respect the guideline is far less restrictive than regulations we have upheld in other cases, for it does not attempt to ban any particular manner or type of expression at a given place or time. Cf. Frisby, supra, at 482-484; Community for Creative Non-Violence, supra, at 295; Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U. S., at 53-54. Rather, the guideline continues to permit expressive activity in the bandshell, and has no effect on the quantity or content of that expression beyond regulating the extent of amplification. That the city’s limitations on volume may reduce to some degree the potential audience for respondent’s speech is of no consequence, for there has been no showing that the remaining avenues of communication are inadequate. See Taxpay*803ers for Vincent, supra, at 803, and n. 23, 812, and n. 30; Kovacs, 336 U. S., at 88-89 (opinion of Reed, J.).

m

The city’s sound-amplification guideline is narrowly tailored to serve the substantial and content-neutral governmental interests of avoiding excessive sound volume and providing sufficient amplification within the bandshell concert ground, and the guideline leaves open ample channels of communication. Accordingly, it is valid under the First Amendment as a reasonable regulation of the place and manner of expression. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is

Reversed.

Justice Marshall,

dissenting.

No one can doubt that government has a substantial interest in regulating the barrage of excessive sound that can plague urban life. Unfortunately, the majority plays to our shared impatience with loud noise to obscure the damage that it does to our First Amendment rights. Until today, a key safeguard of free speech has been government’s obligation to adopt the least intrusive restriction necessary to achieve its goals. By abandoning the requirement that time, place, and manner regulations must be narrowly tailored, the majority replaces constitutional scrutiny with mandatory deference. The majority’s willingness to give government officials a free hand in achieving their policy ends extends so far as to permit, in this case, government control of speech in advance of its dissemination. Because New York City’s Use Guidelines (Guidelines) are not narrowly tailored to serve its interest in regulating loud noise, and because they constitute an impermissible prior restraint, I dissent.

*804HH

The majority sets forth the appropriate standard for assessing the constitutionality of the Guidelines. A time, place, and manner regulation of expression must be content neutral, serve a significant government interest, be narrowly tailored to serve that interest, and leave open ample alternative channels of communication. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U. S. 474, 481-482 (1988); Perry Education Assn. v. Perry Local Educators’ Assn., 460 U. S. 37, 44 (1983). The Guidelines indisputably are content neutral as they apply to all bandshell users irrespective of the message of their music. App. 375; see Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Comm’n of Cal., 475 U. S. 1, 20 (1985).1 They also serve government’s significant interest in limiting loud noise in public places, see Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U. S. 104, 116 (1972), by giving the city exclusive control of all sound equipment.

My complaint is with the majority’s serious distortion of the narrow tailoring requirement. Our cases have not, as the majority asserts, “clearly” rejected a less-restrictive-alternative test. Ante, at 797. On the contrary, just last Term, we held that a statute is narrowly tailored only “if it targets and eliminates no more than the exact source of the ‘evil’ it seeks to remedy.” Frisby v. Schultz, supra, at 485. While there is language in a few opinions which, taken out of *805context, supports the majority’s position,2 in practice, the Court has interpreted the narrow tailoring requirement to mandate an examination of alternative methods of serving the asserted governmental interest and a determination whether the greater efficacy of the challenged regulation outweighs the increased burden it places on protected speech. See, e. g., Martin v. Struthers, 319 U. S. 141, 147-148 (1943); Schneider v. State, 308 U. S. 147, 162 (1939). In Schneider, for example, the Court invalidated a ban on handbill distribution on public streets, notwithstanding that it was the most effective means of serving government’s legitimate interest in minimizing litter, noise, and traffic congestion, and in preventing fraud. The Court concluded that punishing those who actually litter or perpetrate frauds was a much less intrusive, albeit not quite as effective, means to serve those significant interests. Id., at 162, 164; see also Martin, supra, at 148 (invalidating ban on door-to-door distribution of handbills because directly punishing fraudulent solicitation was a less intrusive, yet still effective, means of serving government’s interest in preventing fraud).3

*806The Court’s past concern for the extent to which a regulation burdens speech more than would a satisfactory alternative is noticeably absent from today’s decision. The majority requires only that government show that its interest cannot be served as effectively without the challenged restriction. Ante, at 799. It will be enough, therefore, that the challenged regulation advances the government’s interest only in the slightest, for any differential burden on speech that results does not enter the calculus. Despite its protestations to the contrary, the majority thus has abandoned the requirement that restrictions on speech be narrowly tailored in any ordinary use of the phrase.4 Indeed, after today’s decision, a city could claim that bans on handbill distribution or on door-to-door solicitation are the most effective means of avoiding littering and fraud, or that a ban on loudspeakers and radios in a public park is the most effective means of avoiding loud noise. Logically extended, the majority’s analysis would permit such far-reaching restrictions on speech.

True, the majority states that “[gjovernment may not regulate expression in such a manner that a substantial portion of the burden on speech does not serve to advance its goals.” Ibid. But this means that only those regulations that “engage in the gratuitous inhibition of expression” will be invalidated. Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 1482, 1485 (1975). Moreover, the majority has robbed courts of the necessary analytic tools to make even this limited inquiry. The Court of Appeals examined “how much control of volume is appropriate [and] how that level of control is to be achieved,” ante, at 800, but the majority admonishes that court for doing so, stating that it should *807have “deferred] to the city’s reasonable determination.” Ibid. The majority thus instructs courts to refrain from examining how much speech may be restricted to serve an asserted interest and how that level of restriction is to be achieved. If a court cannot engage in such inquiries, I am at a loss to understand how a court can ascertain whether the government has adopted a regulation that burdens substantially more speech than is necessary.

Had the majority not abandoned the narrow tailoring requirement, the Guidelines could not possibly survive constitutional scrutiny. Government’s interest in avoiding loud sounds cannot justify giving government total control over sound equipment, any more than its interest in avoiding litter could justify a ban on handbill distribution. In both cases, government’s legitimate goals can be effectively and less intrusively served by directly punishing the evil — the persons responsible for excessive sounds and the persons who litter. Indeed, the city concedes that it has an ordinance generally limiting noise but has chosen not to enforce it. See Tr. of Oral. Arg. 5-6. 5

By holding that the Guidelines are valid time, place, and manner restrictions, notwithstanding the availability of less intrusive but effective means of controlling volume, the majority deprives the narrow tailoring requirement of all meaning.6 Today, the majority enshrines efficacy but sacrifices free speech.

*808II

The majority’s conclusion that the city’s exclusive control of sound equipment is constitutional is deeply troubling for another reason. It places the Court’s imprimatur on a quintessential prior restraint, incompatible with fundamental First Amendment values. See Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U. S. 697 (1931). Indeed, just as “[mjusic is one of the oldest forms of human expression,” ante, at 790, the city’s regulation is one of the oldest forms of speech repression. In 16th- and 17th-century England, government controlled speech through its monopoly on printing presses. See L. Levy, Emergence of a Free Press 6 (1985). Here, the city controls the volume and mix of sound through its monopoly on sound equipment. In both situations, government’s exclusive control of the means of communication enables public officials to censor speech in advance of its expression. See Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U. S. 546, 553 (1975). Under more familiar prior restraints, government officials censor speech “by a simple stroke of the pen,” Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 Law & Contemp. Prob. 648, 657 (1955). Here, it is done by a single turn of a knob.

The majority’s implication that government control of sound equipment is not a prior restraint because city officials do not “enjoy unguided discretion to deny the right to speak altogether,” a?ite, at 794, is startling. In the majority’s view, this case involves a question of “different and lesser” magnitude — the discretion to provide inadequate sound for performers. But whether the city denies a performer a bandshell permit or grants the permit and then silences or *809distorts the performer’s music, the result is the same — the city censors speech. In the words of Chief Justice Rehn-QUIST, the First Amendment means little if it permits government to “allo[w] a speaker in a public hall to express his views while denying him the use of an amplifying system.” FEC v. National Conservative Political Action Committee, 470 U. S. 480, 493 (1985); see also Southeastern Promotions, supra, at 556, n. 8 (“A licensing system need not effect total suppression in order to create a prior restraint”).

As a system of prior restraint, the Guidelines are presumptively invalid. See Southeastern Promotions, supra, at 558; Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U. S. 58, 70 (1963). They may be constitutional only if accompanied by the procedural safeguards necessary “to obviate the dangers of a censorship system.” Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U. S. 51, 58 (1965). The city must establish neutral criteria embodied in “narrowly drawn, reasonable and definite standards,” in order to ensure that discretion is not exercised based on the content of speech. Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U. S. 268, 271 (1951); see also Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 486 U. S., 750, 758 (1988); Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U. S. 147, 150-151 (1969). Moreover, there must be “an almost immediate judicial determination” that the restricted material was unprotected by the First Amendment. Bantam Books, supra, at 70; see also Southeastern Promotions, supra, at 560.

The Guidelines contain neither of these procedural safeguards. First, there are no “narrowly drawn, reasonable and definite standards” guiding the hands of the city’s sound technician as he mixes the sound. The Guidelines state that the goals are “to provide the best sound for all events” and to “insure appropriate sound quality balanced with respect for nearby residential neighbors and the mayoralty decreed quiet zone.” App. 375; see also ante, at 794. But the city never defines “best sound” or “appropriate sound quality.” The bandshell program director-manager testified that quality of *810sound refers to tone and to sound mix. App. 229, 230. Yet questions of tone and mix cannot be separated from musical expression as a whole. See The New Grove Dictionary of Music and Musicians 51-55 (S. Sadie ed. 1980) (tonality involves relationship between pitches and harmony); F. Everest, Successful Sound System Operation 173 (1985) (“The mixing console . . . must be considered as a creative tool”). Because judgments that sounds are too loud, noiselike, or discordant can mask disapproval of the music itself,7 government control of the sound-mixing equipment necessitates detailed and neutral standards.

The majority concedes that the standards in the Guidelines are “undoubtedly flexible” and that “the officials implementing them will exercise considerable discretion.” Ante, at 794. Nevertheless, it concludes that “[b]y its own terms the city’s sound-amplification guideline must be interpreted to forbid city officials purposefully to select inadequate sound systems or to vary the sound quality or volume based on the message being delivered by performers.” Ante, at 794-795. Although the majority wishes it were so, the language of the Guidelines simply does not support such a limitation on the city’s discretion. Alternatively, the majority finds a limitation in the city’s practice of deferring to the sponsor with respect to sound mix, and of conferring “with the sponsor if any questions of excessive sound arise, before taking any corrective action.” 658 F. Supp. 1346, 1352 (SDNY 1987). A promise to consult, however, does not provide the detailed *811“neutral criteria” necessary to prevent future abuses of discretion any more than did the city’s promise in Lakewood to deny permit applications only for reasons related to the health, safety, or welfare of Lakewood citizens. Indeed, a presumption that city officials will act in good faith and adhere to standards absent from a regulation’s face is “the very presumption that the doctrine forbidding unbridled discretion disallows.” Lakewood, supra, at 770.8

Second, even if there were narrowly drawn guidelines limiting the city’s discretion, the Guidelines would be fundamentally flawed. For the requirement that there be detailed standards is of value only so far as there is a judicial mechanism to enforce them. Here, that necessary safeguard is absent. The city’s sound technician consults with the performers for several minutes before the performance and then decides how to present each song or piece of music. During the performance itself, the technician makes hundreds of decisions affecting the mix and volume of sound. Tr. of Oral Arg. 13. The music is played immediately after each decision. There is, of course, no time for appeal in the middle of a song. As a result, no court ever determines that a particular restraint on speech is necessary. The city’s admission that it does not impose sanctions on violations of its general sound ordinance because the necessary litigation is too costly and time consuming only underscores its contempt for the need for judicial review of restrictions on speech. Id., at 5. With neither prompt judicial review nor detailed and neutral standards fettering the city’s discretion to restrict protected *812speech, the Guidelines constitute a quintessential, and unconstitutional, prior restraint.

Ill

Today’s decision has significance far beyond the world of rock music. Government no longer need balance the effectiveness of regulation with the burdens on free speech. After today, government need only assert that it is most effective to control speech in advance of its expression. Because such a result eviscerates the First Amendment, I dissent.

Me. Justice Powell

delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case presents the question whether a regulation of the Public Service Commission of the State of New York violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments because it completely bans promotional advertising by an electrical utility.

I

In December 1973, the Commission, appellee here, ordered electric utilities in New York State to cease all advertising that “promot[es] the use of electricity.” App. to Juris. *559Statement 31a. The order was based on the Commission’s finding that “the interconnected utility system in New York State does not have sufficient fuel stocks or sources of supply to continue furnishing all customer demands for the 1973-1974 winter.” Id., at 26a.

Three years later, when the fuel shortage had eased, the Commission requested comments from the public on its proposal to continue the ban on promotional advertising. Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp., the appellant in this case, opposed the ban on First Amendment grounds. App. A10. After reviewing the public comments, the Commission extended the prohibition in a Policy Statement issued on February 25, 1977.

The Policy Statement divided advertising expenses “into two broad categories: promotional — advertising intended to stimulate the purchase of utility services — and institutional and informational, a broad category inclusive of all advertising not clearly intended to promote sales.” 1 App. to Juris. Statement 35a. The Commission declared all promotional advertising contrary to the national policy of conserving energy. It acknowledged that the ban is not a perfect vehicle for conserving energy. For example, the Commission’s order prohibits promotional advertising to develop consumption during periods when demand for electricity is low. By limiting growth in “off-peak” consumption, the ban limits the “beneficial side effects” of such growth in terms of more efficient use of existing powerplants. Id., at 37a. And since oil dealers are not under the Commission’s jurisdiction and *560thus remain free to advertise, it was recognized that the ban can achieve only “piecemeal conservationism” Still, the Commission adopted the restriction because it was deemed likely to “result in some dampening of unnecessary growth” in energy consumption. Ibid.

The Commission’s order explicitly permitted “informational” advertising designed to encourage “shifts of consumption” from peak demand times to periods of low electricity demand. Ibid, (emphasis in orginal). Informational advertising would not seek to increase aggregate consumption, but would invite a leveling of demand throughout any given 24-hour period. The agency offered to review “specific proposals by the companies for specifically described [advertising] programs that meet these criteria.” Id., at 38a.

When it rejected requests for rehearing on the Policy Statement, the Commission supplemented its rationale for the advertising ban. The agency observed that additional electricity probably would be more expensive to produce than existing output. Because electricity rates in New York were not then based on marginal cost,2 the Commission feared that additional power would be priced below the actual cost of generation. The additional electricity would be subsidized by all consumers through generally higher rates. Id., at 57a-58a. The state agency also thought that promotional advertising would give “misleading signals” to the public by appearing to encourage energy consumption at a time when conservation is needed. Id., at 59a.

Appellant challenged the order in state court, arguing that the Commission had restrained commercial speech in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.3 The Commis*561sion’s order was upheld by the trial court and at the intermediate appellate level.4 The New York Court of Appeals affirmed. It found little value to advertising in “the noncompetitive market in which electric corporations operate.” Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm’n, 47 N. Y. 2d 94, 110, 390 N. E. 2d 749, 757 (1979). Since consumers “have no choice regarding the source of their electric power,” the court denied that “promotional advertising of electricity might contribute to society’s interest in ‘informed and reliable’ economic decisionmaking.” Ibid. The court also observed that by encouraging consumption, promotional advertising would only exacerbate the current energy situation. Id., at 110, 390 N. E. 2d, at 758. The court concluded that the governmental interest in the prohibition outweighed the limited constitutional value of the commercial speech at issue. We noted probable jurisdiction, 444 U. S. 962 (1979), and now reverse.

The Commission’s order restricts only commercial speech, that is, expression related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience. Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U. S. 748, 762 (1976); Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U. S. 350, 363-364 (1977); Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U. S. 1, 11 (1979). The First Amendment, as applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, protects commercial speech from unwarranted governmental regulation. Virginia Pharmacy Board, 425 U. S., at 761-762. Commercial expression not only serves the economic interest of the speaker, but also assists consumers and furthers the societal interest in the fullest possible *562dissemination of information. In applying the First Amendment to this area, we have rejected the “highly paternalistic” view that government has complete power to suppress or regulate commercial speech. “[P]eople will perceive their own best interests if only they are well enough informed, and . . . the best means to that end is to open the channels of communication, rather than to close them. . . .” Id., at 770; see Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 U. S. 85, 92 (1977). Even when advertising communicates only an incomplete version of the relevant facts, the First Amendment presumes that some accurate information is better than no information at all. Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, supra, at 374.

Nevertheless, our decisions have recognized "the ‘commonsense’ distinction between speech proposing a commercial transaction, which occurs in an area traditionally subject to government regulation, and other varieties of speech.” Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn., 436 U. S. 447, 455-456 (1978); see Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, supra, at 381; see also Jackson & Jeffries, Commercial Speech: Economic Due Process and the First Amendment, 65 Ya. L. Rev. 1, 38-39 (1979).5 The *563Constitution therefore accords a lesser protection to commercial speech than to other constitutionally guaranteed expression. 436 U. S., at 456, 457. The protection available for particular commercial expression turns on the nature both of the expression and of the governmental interests served by its regulation.

The First Amendment’s concern for commercial speech is based on the informational function of advertising. See First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U. S. 765, 783 (1978). Consequently, there can be no constitutional objection to the suppression of commercial messages that do not accurately inform the public about lawful activity. The government may ban forms of communication more likely to deceive the public than to inform it, Friedman v. Rogers, supra, at 13, 15-16; Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn., supra, at 46A-465, or *564commercial speech related to illegal activity, Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm’n, 413 U. S. 376, 388 (1973).6

If the communication is neither misleading nor related to unlawful activity, the government’s power is more circumscribed. The State must assert a substantial interest to be achieved by restrictions on commercial speech. Moreover, the regulatory technique must be in proportion to that interest. The limitation on expression must be designed carefully to achieve the State’s goal. Compliance with this requirement may be measured by two criteria. First, the restriction must directly advance the state interest involved; the regulation may not be sustained if it provides only ineffective or remote support for the government’s purpose. Second, if the governmental interest could be served as well by a more limited restriction on commercial speech, the excessive restrictions cannot survive.

Under the first criterion, the Court has declined to uphold regulations that only indirectly advance the state interest involved. In both Bates and Virginia Pharmacy Board, the Court concluded that an advertising ban could not be imposed to protect the ethical or performance standards of a profession. The Court noted in Virginia Pharmacy Board that “[t]he advertising ban does not directly affect professional standards one way or the other.” 425 U. S., at 769. In Bates, the Court overturned an advertising prohibition that was designed to protect the “quality” of a lawyer’s work. *565“Restraints on advertising . . . are an ineffective way of deterring shoddy work.” 433 U. S., at 378.7

The second criterion recognizes that the First Amendment mandates that speech restrictions be “narrowly drawn.” In re Primus, 436 U. S. 412, 438 (1978).8 The regulatory technique may extend only as far as the interest it serves. The State cannot regulate speech that poses no danger to the asserted state interest, see First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, supra, at 794-795, nor can it completely suppress information when narrower restrictions on expression would serve its interest as well. For example, in Bates the Court explicitly did not “foreclose the possibility that some limited supplementation, by way of warning or disclaimer or the like, might be required” in promotional materials. 433 U. S., at 384. See Virginia Pharmacy Board, supra, at 773. And in Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U. S. 678, 701-702 (1977), we held that the State’s “arguments ... do not justify the total suppression of advertising concerning contraceptives.” This holding left open the possibility that *566the State could implement more carefully drawn restrictions. See id., at 712 (Powell, J., concurring in part and in judgment) ; id., at 716-717 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and in judgment).9

In commercial speech cases, then, a four-part analysis has developed. At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is protected by the First Amendment. For commercial speech to come within that provision, it at least must concern lawful activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers, we must determine whether the regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.

Ill

We now apply this four-step analysis for commercial speech to the Commission’s arguments in support of its ban on promotional advertising.

A

The Commission does not claim that the expression at issue either is inaccurate or relates to unlawful activity. Yet the New York Court of Appeals questioned whether Central Hudson’s advertising is protected commercial speech. Because appellant holds a monopoly over the sale of electricity in its service area, the state court suggested that the Commission’s order restricts no commercial speech of any worth. The court stated that advertising in a "noncompetitive market” *567could not improve the decisionmaking of consumers. 47 N. Y. 2d, at 110, 390 N. E. 2d, at 757. The court saw no constitutional problem with barring commercial speech that it viewed as conveying little useful information.

This reasoning falls short of establishing that appellant’s advertising is not commercial speech protected by the First Amendment. Monopoly over the supply of a product provides no protection from competition with substitutes for that product. Electric utilities compete with suppliers of fuel oil and natural gas in several markets, such as those for home heating and industrial power. This Court noted the existence of interfuel competition 45 years ago, see West Ohio Gas Co. v. Public Utilities Comm’n, 294 U. S. 63, 72 (1935). Each energy source continues to offer peculiar advantages and disadvantages that may influence consumer choice. For consumers in those competitive markets, advertising by utilities is just as valuable as advertising by unregulated firms.10

Even in monopoly markets, the suppression of advertising reduces the information available for consumer decisions and thereby defeats the purpose of the First Amendment. The New York court’s argument appears to assume that the providers of a monopoly service or product are willing to pay for wholly ineffective advertising. Most businesses— even regulated monopolies — are unlikely to underwrite promotional advertising that is of no interest or use to consumers. Indeed, a monopoly enterprise legitimately may wish to inform the public that it has developed new services or terms of doing business. A consumer may need information to aid his decision whether or not to use the monopoly service at all, or how much of the service he should purchase. In the absence of factors that would distort the decision to advertise, we *568may assume that the willingness of a business to promote its products reflects a belief that consumers are interested in the advertising.11 Since no such extraordinary conditions have been identified in this case, appellant’s monopoly position does not alter the First Amendment’s protection for its commercial speech.

B

The Commission offers two state interests as justifications for the ban on promotional advertising. The first concerns energy conservation. Any increase in demand for electricity— during peak or off-peak periods — means greater consumption of energy. The Commission argues, and the New York, court agreed, that the State’s interest in conserving energy is sufficient to support suppression of advertising designed to increase consumption of electricity. In view of our country’s dependence on energy resources beyond our control, no one can doubt the importance of energy conservation. Plainly, therefore, the state interest asserted is substantial.

The Commission also argues that promotional advertising will aggravate inequities caused by the failure to base the utilities’ rates on marginal cost. The utilities argued to the Commission that if they could promote the use of electricity in periods of low demand, they would improve their utilization of generating capacity. The Commission responded that promotion of off-peak consumption also would increase consumption during peak periods. If peak demand were to rise, the absence of marginal cost rates would mean that the rates charged for the additional power would not reflect the true costs of expanding production. Instead, the extra costs would *569be borne by all consumers through higher overall rates. Withqut promotional advertising, the Commission stated, this inequitable turn of events would be less likely to occur. The choice among rate structures involves difficult and important questions of economic supply and distributional fairness.12 The State’s concern that rates be fair and efficient represents a clear and substantial governmental interest.

C

Next, we focus on the relationship between the State’s interests and the advertising ban. Under this criterion, the Commission’s laudable concern over the equity and efficiency of appellant’s rates does not provide a constitutionally adequate reason for restricting protected speech. The link between the advertising prohibition and appellant’s rate structure is, at most, tenuous. The impact of promotional advertising on the equity of appellant’s rates is highly speculative. Advertising to increase off-peak usage would have to increase peak usage, while other factors that directly affect the fairness and efficiency of appellant’s rates remained constant. Such conditional and remote eventualities simply cannot justify silencing appellant’s promotional advertising.

In contrast, the State’s interest in energy conservation is directly advanced by the Commission order at issue here. There is an immediate connection between advertising and demand for electricity. Central Hudson would not contest the advertising ban unless it believed that promotion would increase its sales. Thus, we find a direct link between the state interest in conservation and the Commission’s order.

D

We come finally to the critical inquiry in this case: whether the Commission’s complete suppression of speech ordinarily protected by the First Amendment is no more extensive than *570necessary to further the State’s interest in energy conservation. The Commission’s order reaches all promotional advertising, regardless of the impact of the touted service on overall energy use. But the energy conservation rationale, as important as it is, cannot justify suppressing information about electric devices or services that would cause no net increase in total energy use. In addition, no showing has been made that a more limited restriction on the content of promotional advertising would not serve adequately the State’s interests.

Appellant insists that but for the ban, it would advertise products and services that use energy efficiently. These include the “heat pump,” which both parties acknowledge to be a major improvement in electric heating, and the use of electric heat as a “backup” to solar and other heat sources. Although the Commission has questioned the efficiency of electric heating before this Court, neither the Commission’s Policy Statement nor its order denying rehearing made findings on this issue. In the absence of authoritative findings to the contrary, we must credit as within the realm of possibility the claim that electric heat can be an efficient alternative in some circumstances.

The Commission’s order prevents appellant from promoting electric services that would reduce energy use by diverting demand from less efficient sources, or that would consume roughly the same amount of energy as do alternative sources. In neither situation would the utility’s advertising endanger conservation or mislead the public. To. the extent that the Commission’s order suppresses speech that in no way impairs the State’s interest in energy conservation, the Commission’s order violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments and must be invalidated. See First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U. S. 765 (1978).

The Commission also has not demonstrated that its interest in conservation cannot be protected adequately by more limited regulation of appellant’s commercial expression. To fur*571ther its policy of conservation, the Commission could attempt to restrict the format and content of Central Hudson’s advertising. It might, for example, require that the advertisements include information about the relative efficiency and expense of the offered service, both under current conditions and for the foreseeable future. Cf. Banzhaf v. FCC, 132 U. S. App. D. C. 14, 405 F. 2d 1082 (1968), cert. denied sub nom. Tobacco Institute, Inc. v. FCC, 396 U. S. 842 (1969).13 In the absence of a showing that more limited speech regulation would be ineffective, we cannot approve the complete suppression of Central Hudson’s advertising.14

IV

Our decision today in no way disparages the national interest in energy conservation. We accept without reservation the argument that conservation, as well as the development of alternative energy sources, is an imperative national goal. Administrative bodies empowered to regulate electric utilities have the authority — and indeed the duty — -to take appropriate action to further this goal. When, however, such action in*572volves the suppression of speech, the First and Fourteenth Amendments require that the restriction be no more extensive than is necessary to serve the state interest. In this case, the record before us fails to show that the total ban on promotional advertising meets this requirement.15

Accordingly, the judgment of the New York Court of Appeals is

Reversed.

Mr. Justice Brennan,

concurring in the judgment.

One of the major difficulties in this case is the proper characterization of the Commission’s Policy Statement. I find it impossible to determine on the present record whether the Commission’s ban on all “promotional” advertising, in contrast to “institutional and informational” advertising, see ante, at 559, is intended to encompass more than “commercial speech.” I am inclined to think that Mr. Justice Stevens is correct that the Commission’s order prohibits more than mere proposals to engage in certain kinds of commercial transactions, and therefore I agree with his conclusion that the ban surely violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments. But even on the assumption that the Court is correct that the Commission’s order reaches only commercial speech, I agree with Mr. Justice Blackmun that “[n]o differences between commercial speech and other protected speech justify suppression of commercial speech in order to influence public conduct through manipulation of the availability of information.” Post, at 578.

Accordingly, with the qualifications implicit in the pre*573ceding paragraph, I join the opinions of Mr. Justice Black-mun and Mr. Justice Stevens concurring in the judgment.

Mr. Justice Blackmun,

with whom Mr. Justice Brennan joins, concurring in the judgment.

I agree with the Court that the Public Service Commission’s ban on promotional advertising of electricity by public utilities is inconsistent with the First and Fourteenth Amendments. I concur only in the Court’s judgment, however, because I believe the test now evolved and applied by the Court is not consistent with our prior cases and does not provide adequate protection for truthful, nonmisleading, non-coercive commercial speech.

The Court asserts, ante, at 566, that “a four-part analysis has developed” from our decisions concerning commercial speech. Under this four-part test a restraint on commercial “communication [that] is neither misleading nor related to unlawful activity” is subject to an intermediate level of scrutiny, and suppression is permitted whenever it “directly advances” a “substantial” governmental interest and is “not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.” Ante, at 564 and 566. I agree with the Court that this level of intermediate scrutiny is appropriate for a restraint on commercial speech designed to protect consumers from misleading or coercive speech, or a regulation related to the time, place, or manner of commercial speech. I do not agree, however, that the Court’s four-part test is the proper one to be applied when a State seeks to suppress information about a product in order to manipulate a private economic decision that the State .cannot or has not regulated or outlawed directly.

Since the Court, without citing empirical data or other authority, finds a “direct link” between advertising and energy consumption, it leaves open the possibility that the State may suppress advertising of electricity in order to lessen demand for electricity. I, of course, agree with the Court that, *574in today’s world, energy conservation is a goal of paramount national and local importance. I disagree with the Court, however, when it says that suppression of speech may be a permissible means to achieve that goal. Mr. Justice Stevens appropriately notes: “The justification for the regulation is nothing more than the expressed fear that the audience may find the utility’s message persuasive. Without the aid of any coercion, deception, or misinformation, truthful communication may persuade some citizens to consume more electricity than they otherwise would.” Post, at 581.

The Court recognizes that we have never held that commercial speech may be suppressed in order to further the State’s interest in discouraging purchases of the underlying product that is advertised. Ante, at 566, n. 9. Permissible restraints on commercial speech have been limited to measures designed to protect consumers from fraudulent, misleading, or coercive sales techniques.1 Those designed to deprive consumers of information about products or services that are legally offered for sale consistently have been invalidated.2

I seriously doubt whether suppression of information concerning the availability and price of a legally offered product is ever a permissible way for the State to “dampen” demand for or use of the product. Even though “commercial” speech is involved, such a regulatory measure strikes at the heart of the First Amendment. This is because it is a covert attempt *575by the State to manipulate the choices of its citizens, not by persuasion or direct regulation, but by depriving the public of the information needed to make a free choice. As the Court recognizes, the State’s policy choices are insulated from the visibility and scrutiny that direct regulation would entail and the conduct of citizens is molded by the information that government chooses to give them. Ante, at 566, n. 9 (“We review with special care regulations that entirely suppress commercial speech in order to pursue a nonspeech-related policy. In those circumstances, a ban on speech could screen from public view the underlying governmental policy”). See Rotunda, The Commercial Speech Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 1976 U. Ill. Law Forum 1080, 1080-1083.

If the First Amendment guarantee means anything, it means that, absent clear and present danger, government has no power to restrict expression because of the effect its message is likely to have on the public. See generally Comment, First Amendment Protection for Commercial Advertising: The New Constitutional Doctrine, 44 U. Chi. L. Rev. 205, 243-251 (1976). Our cases indicate that this guarantee applies even to commercial speech. In Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Consumer Council, 425 U. S. 748 (1976), we held that Virginia could not pursue its goal of encouraging the public to patronize the “professional pharmacist” (one who provided individual attention and a stable pharmacist-customer relationship) by “keeping the public in ignorance of the entirely lawful terms that competing pharmacists are offering.” Id., at 770. We noted that our decision left the State free to pursue its goal of maintaining high standards among its pharmacists by “requiring] whatever professional standards it wishes of its pharmacists.” Ibid.

We went on in Virginia Pharmacy Board to discuss the types of regulation of commercial speech that, due to the “commonsense differences” between this form of speech and other forms, are or may be constitutionally permissible. We indicated that government may impose reasonable “time, *576place, and manner” restrictions, and that it can deal with false, deceptive, and misleading commercial speech. We noted that the question of advertising of illegal transactions and the special problems of the electronic broadcast media were not presented.

Concluding with a restatement of the type of restraint that is not permitted, we said: “What is at issue is whether a State may completely suppress the dissemination of con-cededly truthful information about entirely lawful activity, fearful of that information’s effect upon its disseminators and its recipients. . . . [W]e conclude that the answer to this [question] is in the negative.” Id., at 773.

Virginia Pharmacy Board did not analyze the State’s interests to determine whether they were “substantial.” Obviously, preventing professional dereliction and low quality health care are “substantial,” legitimate, and important state goals. Nor did the opinion analyze the ban on speech to determine whether it “directly advance [d],” ante, at 566, 569, these goals. We also did not inquire whether a “more limited regulation of . . . commercial expression,” ante, at 570, would adequately serve the State’s interests. Rather, we held that the State “may not [pursue its goals] by keeping the public in ignorance.” 425 U. S., at 770. (Emphasis supplied.)

Until today, this principle has governed. In Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 U. S. 85 (1977), we considered whether a town could ban “For Sale” signs on residential property to further its goal of promoting stable, racially integrated housing. We did note that the record did not establish that the ordinance was necessary to enable the State to achieve its goal. The holding of Linmark, however, was much broader.3 We stated:

“The constitutional defect in this ordinance, however, *577is far more basic. The Township Council here, like the Virginia Assembly in Virginia Pharmacy Bd., acted to prevent its residents from obtaining certain information . . . which pertains to sales activity in Willing-boro. . . . The Council has sought to restrict the free flow of these data because it fears that otherwise homeowners will make decisions inimical to what the Council views as the homeowners’ self-interest and the corporate interest of the township: they will choose to leave town. The Council’s concern, then, was not with any commercial aspect of “For Sale” signs — with offerors communicating offers to offerees — but with the substance of the information communicated to Willingboro citizens.” Id., at 96.

The Court in Linmark resolved beyond all doubt that a strict standard of review applies to suppression of commercial information, where the purpose of the restaint is to influence behavior by depriving citizens of information. The Court followed the strong statement above with an explicit adoption of the standard advocated by Mr. Justice Brandéis in his concurring opinion in Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357, 377 (1927): “If there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence. Only an emergency can justify repression.” 431 U. S., at 97.

Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U. S. 678, 700-702 (1977), also applied to content-based restraints on commercial speech the same standard of review we have applied to other varieties of speech. There the Court held that a ban on advertising of contraceptives could not be justified *578by the State’s interest in avoiding “ 'legitimation’ of illicit sexual behavior” because the advertisements could not be characterized as “ 'directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and . . . likely to incite or produce such action,’ ” id., at 701, quoting Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U. S. 444, 447 (1969).

Our prior references to the “ 'commonsense differences’ ” between commercial speech and other speech " 'suggest that a different degree of protection is necessary to insure that the flow of truthful and legitimate commercial information is unimpaired.’ ” Limnark Associates, 431 U. S., at 98, quoting Virginia Pharmacy Board, 425 U. S., at 771-772, n. 24. We have not suggested that the “commonsense differences” between commercial speech and other speech justify relaxed scrutiny of restraints that suppress • truthful, nondeceptive, noneoercive commercial speech. The differences articulated by the Court, see ante, at 564, n. 6, justify a more permissive approach to regulation of the manner of commercial speech for the purpose of protecting consumers from deception or coercion, and these differences explain why doctrines designed to prevent “chilling” of protected speech are inapplicable to commercial speech. No differences between commercial speech and other protected speech justify suppression of commercial speech in order to influence public conduct through manipulation of the availability of information. The Court stated in Carey v. Population Services International:

“Appellants suggest no distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech that would render these discredited arguments meritorious when offered to justify prohibitions on commercial speech. On the contrary, such arguments are clearly directed not at any commercial aspect of the prohibited advertising but at the ideas conveyed and form of expression — the core of First Amendment values.” 431 U. S., at 701, n. 28 (emphasis added).

*579It appears that the Court would permit the State to ban all direct advertising of air conditioning, assuming that a more limited restriction on such advertising would not effectively deter the public from cooling its homes.. In my view, our cases do not support this type of suppression. If a governmental unit believes that use or overuse of air conditioning is a serious problem, it must attack that problem directly, by prohibiting air conditioning or regulating thermostat levels. Just as the Commonwealth of Virginia may promote professionalism of pharmacists directly, so too New York may not promote energy conservation “by keeping the public in ignorance.” Virginia Pharmacy Board, 425 U. S., at 770.

Me. Justice Stevens,

with whom Me. Justice Beennan joins, concurring in the judgment.

Because “commercial speech” is afforded less constitutional protection than other forms of speech,1 it is important that the commercial speech concept not be defined too broadly lest speech deserving of greater constitutional protection be inadvertently suppressed. The issue in this case is whether New York’s prohibition on the promotion of the use of electricity through advertising is a ban on nothing but commercial speech.

In my judgment one of the two definitions the Court uses in addressing that issue is too broad and the other may be somewhat too narrow. The Court first describes commercial speech as “expression related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience.” Ante, at 561. Although it is not entirely clear whether this definition uses the subject matter of the speech or the motivation of the speaker as the limiting factor, it seems clear to me that it encompasses speech that is entitled to the maximum protection afforded by the First Amendment. Neither a labor leader’s exhortation to *580strike, nor an economist’s dissertation on the money supply, should receive any lesser protection because the subject matter concerns only the economic interests of the audience. Nor should the economic motivation of a speaker qualify his constitutional protection; even Shakespeare may have been motivated by the prospect of pecuniary reward. Thus, the Court’s first definition of commercial speech is unquestionably too broad.2

The Court’s second definition refers to “ ‘speech proposing a commercial transaction.’ ” Ante, at 562. A saleman’s solicitation, a broker’s offer, and a manufacturer’s publication of a price list or the terms of his standard warranty would unquestionably fit within this concept.3 Presumably, the definition is intended to encompass advertising that advises possible buyers of the availability of specific products at specific prices and describes the advantages of purchasing such items. Perhaps it also extends to other communications that do little more than make the name of a product or a service more familiar to the general public. Whatever the precise contours of the concept, and perhaps it is too early to enunciate an exact formulation, I am persuaded that it should not include the entire range of communication that is embraced within the term “promotional advertising.”

This case involves a governmental regulation that completely bans promotional advertising by an electric utility. This ban encompasses a great deal more than mere proposals to engage in certain kinds of commercial transactions. It prohibits all advocacy of the immediate or future use of elec*581tricity. It curtails expression by an informed and interested group of persons of their point of view on questions relating to the production and consumption of electrical energy — questions frequently discussed and debated by our political leaders. For example, an electric company’s advocacy of the use of electric heat for environmental reasons, as opposed to wood-burning stoves, would seem to fall squarely within New York’s promotional advertising ban and also within the bounds of maximum First Amendment protection. The breadth of the ban thus exceeds the boundaries of the commercial speech concept, however that concept may be defined.4

The justification for the regulation is nothing more than the expressed fear that the audience may find the utility’s message persuasive. Without the aid of any coercion, deception, or misinformation, truthful communication may persuade some citizens to consume more electricity than they otherwise would. I assume that such a consequence would be undesirable and that government may therefore prohibit and punish the unnecessary or excessive use of electricity. But if the perceived harm associated with greater electrical usage is not sufficiently serious to justify direct regulation, surely it does'not constitute the kind of clear and present danger that can justify the suppression of speech.

*582Although they were written in a different context, the words used by Mr. Justice Brandéis in his concurring opinion in Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357, 376-377, explain my reaction to the prohibition against advocacy involved in this case:

“But even advocacy of violation, however reprehensible morally, is not a justification for denying free speech where the advocacy falls short of incitement and there is nothing to indicate that the advocacy would be immediately acted on. The wide difference between advocacy and incitement, between preparation and attempt, between assembling and conspiracy, must be borne in mind. In order to support a finding of clear and present danger it must be shown either that immediate serious violence was to be expected or was advocated, or that the past conduct furnished reason to believe that such advocacy was then contemplated.

“Those who won our independence by revolution were not cowards. They did not fear political change. They did not exalt order at the cost of liberty. To courageous, self-reliant men, with confidence in the power of free and fearless reasoning applied through the processes of popular government, no danger flowing from speech can be deemed clear and present, unless the incidence of the evil apprehended is so imminent that it may befall before there is opportunity for full discussion. If there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence. Only an emergency can justify repression. Such must be the rule if authority is to be reconciled with freedom. Such, in my opinion, is the command of the Constitution.” (Footnote omitted.)5

*583In sum, I concur in the result because I do not consider this to be a “commercial speech” case. Accordingly, I see no need to decide whether the Court’s four-part analysis, ante, at 566, adequately protects commercial speech — as properly defined— in the face of a blanket ban of the sort involved in this case.

Mr. Justice Rehnquist,

dissenting.

The Court today invalidates an order issued by the New York Public Service Commission designed to promote a policy that has been declared to be of critical national concern. The order was issued by the Commission in 1973 in response to the Mideastern oil embargo crisis. It prohibits electric corporations “from promoting the use of electricity through the use of advertising, subsidy payments ... , or employee incentives.” State of New York Public Service Commission, Case No. 26532 (Dec. 5, 1973), App. to Juris. Statement 31a (emphasis added). Although the immediate crisis created by the oil embargo has subsided, the ban on promotional advertising remains in effect. The regulation was re-examined by the New York Public Service Commission in 1977. Its constitutionality was subsequently upheld by the New York Court of Appeals, which concluded that the paramount national interest in energy conservation justified its retention.1

*584The Court’s asserted justification for invalidating the New York law is the public interest discerned by the Court to underlie the First Amendment in the free flow of commercial information. Prior to this Court’s recent decision in Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U. S. 748 (1976), however, commercial speech was afforded no protection under the First Amendment whatsoever. See, e. g.¡ Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U. S. 622 (1951); Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U. S. 52 (1942). Given what seems to me full recognition of the holding of Virginia Pharmacy Board that commercial speech is entitled to some degree of First Amendment protection, I think the Court is nonetheless incorrect in invalidating the carefully considered state ban on promotional advertising in light of pressing national and state energy needs.

The Court’s analysis in my view is wrong in several respects. Initially, I disagree with the Court’s conclusion that the speech of a state-created monopoly, which is the subject of a comprehensive regulatory scheme, is entitled to protection under the First Amendment. I also think that the Court errs here in failing to recognize that the state law is most accurately viewed as an economic regulation and that the speech involved (if it falls within the scope of the First Amendment at all) occupies a significantly more subordinate position in the hierarchy of First Amendment values than the Court gives it today. Finally, the Court in reaching its decision improperly substitutes its own judgment for that of the State in deciding how a proper ban on promotional advertising should be drafted. With regard to this latter point, the Court adopts as its final part of a four-part test a “no more *585extensive than necessary” analysis that will unduly impair a state legislature’s ability to adopt legislation reasonably designed to promote interests that have always been rightly thought to be of great importance to the State.

I

In concluding that appellant’s promotional advertising constitutes protected speech, the Court reasons that speech by electric utilities is valuable to consumers who must decide whether to use the monopoly service or turn to an alternative energy source, and if they decide to use the service how much of it to purchase. Ante, at 567. The Court in so doing “assume [s] that the willingness of a business to promote its products reflects a belief that consumers are interested in the advertising.” Ante, at 568. The Court’s analysis ignores the fact that the monopoly here is entirely state-created and subject to an extensive state regulatory scheme from which it derives benefits as well as burdens.

While this Court has stated that the “capacity [of speech] for informing the public does not depend upon the identity of its source,” First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U. S. 765, 777 (1978), the source of the speech nevertheless may be relevant in determining whether a given message is protected under the First Amendment.2 When the source of the speech is a state-created monopoly such as this, traditional First Amendment concerns, if they come into play at all, certainly do not justify the broad interventionist role adopted by the Court today. In Consolidated Edison Co. v. *586Public Service Comm’n, ante, at 549-550, Mr. Justice Black-mun observed:

“A public utility is a state-created monopoly. See, e. g., N. Y. Pub. Serv. Law § 68 (McKinney 1955); Jones, Origins of the Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity; Developments in the States 1870-1920, 79 Colum. L. Rev. 426, 458-461 (1979); Comment, Utility Rates, Consumers, and the New York State Public Service Commission, 39 Albany L. Rev. 707, 709-714 (1975). Although monopolies generally are against the public policies of the United States and of the State of New York, see, e. g., N. Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 340 (McKinney 1968 and Supp. 1979-1980), . . . utilities are permitted to operate as monopolies because of a determination by the State that the public interest is better served by protecting them from competition. See 2 A. Kahn, The Economics of Regulation 113-171 (1971).

“This exceptional grant of power to private enterprises justifies extensive oversight on the part of the State to protect the ratepayers from exploitation of the monopoly power through excessive rates and other forms of overreaching. . . . New York law gives its Public Service Commission plenary supervisory powers over all property, real and personal, 'used or to be used for or in connection with or to facilitate the . . . sale or furnishing of electricity for light, heat or power.’ N. Y. Pub. Serv. Law §§ 2 (12) and 66 (1) (McKinney 1955).”

Thus, although First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, supra, holds that speech of a corporation is entitled to some First Amendment protection, it by no means follows that a utility with monopoly power conferred by a State is also entitled to such protection.

The state-created monopoly status of a utility arises from the unique characteristics of the services that a utility provides. As recognized in Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U. S. 579, 595-596 (1976), “public utility regulation typically *587assumes that the private firm is a natural monopoly and that public controls are necessary to protect the consumer from exploitation.” The consequences of this natural monopoly in my view justify much more wide-ranging supervision and control of a utility under the First Amendment than this Court held in Bellotti to be permissible with regard to ordinary corporations. Corporate status is generally conferred as a result of a State’s determination that the corporate characteristics “enhance its efficiency as an economic entity.” First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, supra, at 825-826 (Rehnqtjist, J., dissenting). A utility, by contrast, fulfills a function that serves special public interests as a result of the natural monopoly of the service provided. Indeed, the extensive regulations governing decisionmaking by public utilities suggest that for purposes of First Amendment analysis, a utility is far closer to a state-controlled enterprise than is an ordinary corporation.3 Accordingly, I think a State has broad discretion in determining the statements that a utility may make in that such statements emanate from the entity created by the State to provide important and unique public services. And a state regulatory body charged with the oversight of these types of services may reasonably decide to impose on the utility a special duty to conform its conduct to *588the agency’s conception of the public interest. Thus I think it is constitutionally permissible for it to decide that promotional advertising is inconsistent with the public interest in energy conservation. I also think New York’s ban on such advertising falls within the scope of permissible state regulation of an economic activity by an entity that could not exist in corporate form, say nothing of enjoy monopoly status, were it not for the laws of New York.4

II

This Court has previously recognized that although commercial speech may be entitled to First Amendment protection, that protection is not as extensive as that accorded to the advocacy of ideas. Thus, we stated in Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn., 436 U. S. 447, 455-456 (1978):

“Expression concerning purely commercial transactions has come within the ambit of the Amendment’s protec*589tion only recently. In rejecting the notion that such speech 'is wholly outside the protection of the First Amendment/ Virginia Pharmacy, supra, at 761, we were careful not to hold 'that it is wholly undifferentiable from other forms’ of speech. 425 U. S., at 771, n. 24. We have not discarded the 'common-sense’ distinction between speech proposing a commercial transaction, which occurs in an area traditionally subject to government regulation, and other varieties of speech. Ibid. To require a parity of constitutional protection for commercial and noncommercial speech alike could invite dilution, simply by a leveling process, of the force of the Amendment’s guarantee with respect to the latter kind of speech. Rather than subject the First Amendment to such a devitalization, we instead have afforded commercial speech a limited measure of protection, commensurate with its subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment values, while allowing modes of regulation that might be impermissible in the realm of noncommercial expression.” (Footnote omitted.)

The Court’s decision today fails to give due deference to this subordinate position of commercial speech. The Court in so doing returns to the bygone era of Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45 (1905), in which it was common practice for this Court to strike down economic regulations adopted by a State based on the Court’s own notions of the most appropriate means for the State to implement its considered policies.

I had thought by now it had become well established that a State has broad discretion in imposing economic regulations. As this Court stated in Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502, 537 (1934):

''[T]here can be no doubt that upon proper occasion and by appropriate measures the state may regulate a business in any of its aspects. . . .

*590“So far as the requirement of due process is concerned, and in the absence of other constitutional restriction, a state is free to adopt whatever economic policy may reasonably be deemed to promote public welfare, and to enforce that policy by legislation adapted to its purpose. The courts are without authority either to declare such policy, or, when it is declared by the legislature, to override it. If the laws passed are seen to have a reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose, and are neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, the requirements of due process are satisfied, and judicial determination to that effect renders a court functus officio. ... [I]t does not lie with the courts to determine that the rule is unwise.”

And Mr. Justice Black, writing for the Court, observed more recently in Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U. S. 726, 730 (1963):

“The doctrine . . . that due process authorizes courts to hold laws unconstitutional when they believe the legislature has acted unwisely — has long since been discarded. We have returned to the original constitutional proposition that courts do not substitute their social and economic beliefs for the judgment of legislative bodies, who are elected to pass laws.”

The State of New York has determined here that economic realities require the grant of monopoly status to public utilities in order to distribute efficiently the services they provide, and in granting utilities such status it has made them subject to an extensive regulatory scheme. When the State adopted this scheme and when its Public Service Commission issued its initial ban on promotional advertising in 1973, commercial speech had not been held to fall within the scope of the First Amendment at all. Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U. S. 748 (1976), however, subsequently accorded commercial speech a limited measure of First Amendment protection.

*591The Court today holds not only that commercial speech is entitled to First Amendment protection, but also that when it is protected a State may not regulate it unless its reason for doing so amounts to a “substantial” governmental interest, its regulation “directly advances” that interest, and its manner of regulation is “not more extensive than necessary” to serve the interest. Ante, at 566. The test adopted by the Court thus elevates the protection accorded commercial speech that falls within the scope of the First Amendment to a level that is virtually indistinguishable from that of noncommercial speech. I think the Court in so doing has effectively accomplished the “devitalization” of the First Amendment that it counseled against in Ohralik. I think it has also, by labeling economic regulation of business conduct as a restraint on “free speech,” gone far to resurrect the discredited doctrine of cases such as Lochner and Tyson & Brother v. Banton, 273 U. S. 418 (1927). New York’s order here is in my view more akin to an economic regulation to which virtually complete deference should be accorded by this Court.

I doubt there would be any question as to the constitutionality of New York’s conservation effort if the Public Service Commission had chosen to raise the price of electricity, see, e. g., Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U. S. 381 (1940); Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Cory., 299 U. S. 183 (1936), to condition its sale on specified terms, see, e. g., Nebbia v. New York, supra, at 527-528, or to restrict its production, see, e. g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U. S. 111 (1942). In terms of constitutional values, I think that such controls are virtually indistinguishable from the State’s ban on promotional advertising.

An ostensible justification for striking down New York’s ban on promotional advertising is that this Court has previously “rejected the 'highly paternalistic’ view that government has complete power to suppress or regulate commercial speech. '[PJeople will perceive their own best interests if *592only they are well enough informed and . . . the best means to that end is to open the channels of communication, rather than to close them. . ..’ ” Ante, at 562. Whatever the merits of this view, I think the Court has carried its logic too far here.

The view apparently derives from the Court’s frequent reference to the “marketplace of ideas,” which was deemed analogous to the commercial market in which a laissez-faire policy would lead to optimum economic decisionmaking under the guidance of the “invisible hand.” See, e. g., Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations (1776). This notion was expressed by Mr. Justice Holmes in his dissenting opinion in Abrams v. United States, 250 U. S. 616, 630 (1919), wherein he stated that “the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market. . . .” See also, e. g., Consolidated Edison v. Public Service Comm’n, ante, at 534; J. Mill, On Liberty (1858); J. Milton, Areo-pagitica, A Speech for the Liberty of Unlicensed Printing (1644).

While it is true that an important objective of the First Amendment is to foster the free flow of information, identification of speech that falls within its protection is not aided by the metaphorical reference to a “marketplace of ideas.” There is no reason for believing that the marketplace of ideas is free from market imperfections any more than there is to believe that the invisible hand will always lead to optimum economic decisions in the commercial market. See, e. g., Baker, Scope of the First Amendment, Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. Rev. 964, 967-981 (1978). Indeed, many types of speech have been held to fall outside the scope of the First Amendment, thereby subject to governmental regulation, despite this Court’s references to a marketplace of ideas. See, e. g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568 (1942) (fighting words); Beauharnais v. Illinois. 343 U. S. 250 (1952) (group libel); Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476 (1957) (obscenity). It also has been held that the government has *593a greater interest in regulating some types of protected speech than others. See, e. g., FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U. S. 726 (1978) (indecent speech); Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, supra (commercial speech). And as this Court stated in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U. S. 323, 344, n. 9 (1974): “Of course, an opportunity for rebuttal seldom suffices to undo [the] harm of a defamatory falsehood. Indeed the law of defamation is rooted in our experience that the truth rarely catches up with a lie.” The Court similarly has recognized that false and misleading commercial speech is not entitled to any First Amendment protection. See, e. g., ante, at 566.

The above examples illustrate that in a number of instances government may constitutionally decide that societal interests justify the imposition of restrictions on the free flow of information. When the question is whether a given commercial message is protected, I do not think this Court’s determination that the information will “assist” consumers justifies judicial invalidation of a reasonably drafted state restriction on such speech when the restriction is designed to promote a concededly substantial state interest. I consequently disagree with the Court’s conclusion that the societal interest in the dissemination of commercial information is sufficient to justify a restriction on the State’s authority to regulate promotional advertising by utilities; indeed, in the case of a regulated monopoly, it is difficult for me to distinguish “society” from the state legislature and the Public Service Commission. Nor do I think there is any basis for concluding that individual citizens of the State will recognize the need for and act to promote energy conservation to the extent the government deems appropriate, if only the channels of communication are left open.5 Thus, even if I were *594to agree that commercial speech is entitled to some First Amendment protection, I would hold here that the State’s decision to ban promotional advertising, in light of the substantial state interest at stake, is a constitutionally permissible exercise of its power to adopt regulations designed to promote the interests of its citizens.

The plethora of opinions filed in this case highlights the doctrinal difficulties that emerge from this Court’s decisions granting First Amendment protection to commercial speech. My Brother Stevens, quoting Mr. Justice Brandeis in Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357, 376-377 (1927), includes Mr. Justice Brandéis’ statement that “[t]hose who won our independence by revolution were not cowards. They did-not fear political change. They did not exalt order at the cost of liberty.” Ante, at 582. Mr. Justice Blackmun, in his separate opinion, joins only in the Court’s judgment because he believes that the Court’s opinion “does not provide adequate protection for truthful, nonmisleading, noncoercive commercial speech.” Ante, at 573. Both Mr. Justice Stevens, ante, at 582, and Mr. Justice Blackmun, ante, at 577, would apply the following formulation by Mr. Justice Brandéis of the clear-and-present-danger test to the regulation of speech at issue in this case:

“If there be time to expose through discussion the false*595hood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence. Only an emergency can justify repression.” Whitney v. California, supra, at 377 (concurring opinion).

Although the Court today does not go so far as to adopt this position, its reasons for invalidating New York’s ban on promotional advertising make it quite difficult for a legislature to draft a statute regulating promotional advertising that will satisfy the First Amendment requirements established by the Court in this context. See Part III, infra.

Two ideas are here at war with one another, and their resolution, although it be on a judicial battlefield, will be a very difficult one. The sort of “advocacy” of which Mr. Justice Brandéis spoke was not the advocacy on the part of a utility to use more of its product. Nor do I think those who won our independence, while declining to “exalt order at the cost of liberty,” would have viewed a merchant’s unfettered freedom to advertise in hawking his wares as a “liberty” not subject to extensive regulation in light of the government’s substantial interest in attaining “order” in the economic sphere.

While I agree that when the government attempts to regulate speech of those expressing views on public issues, the speech is protected by the First Amendment unless it presents “a clear and present danger” of a substantive evil that the government has a right to prohibit, see, e. g., Schenck v. United States, 249 U. S. 47, 52 (1919), I think it is important to recognize that this test is appropriate in the political context in light of the central importance of such speech to our system of self-government. As observed in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 14 (1976):

“Discussion of public issues and debate on the qualifications of candidates are integral to the operation of the system of government established by our Constitution. The First Amendment affords the broadest protection to *596such political expression in order ‘to assure [the] unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people/ ”

And in Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 64, 74-75 (1964), this Court stated that “speech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-government.”

The First Amendment, however, does not always require a clear and present danger to be present before the government may regulate speech. Although First Amendment protection is not limited to the “exposition of ideas” on public issues, see, e. g., Winters v. New York, 333 U. S. 507, 510 (1948)— both because the line between the informing and the entertaining is elusive and because art, literature, and the like may contribute to important First Amendment interests of the individual in freedom of speech — it is well established that the government may regulate obscenity even though its does not present a clear and present danger. Compare, e. g., Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U. S. 49, 57-58 (1973), with Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U. S. 444, 447 (1969). Indecent speech, at least when broadcast over the airwaves, also may be regulated absent a clear and present danger of the type described by Mr. Justice Brandéis and required by this Court in Brandenburg. FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U. S. 726 (1978). And in a slightly different context this Court declined to apply the clear-and-present-danger test to a conspiracy among members of the press in violation of the Sherman Act because to do so would “degrade” that doctrine. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U. S. 1, 7 (1945). Nor does the Court today apply the clear-and-present-danger test in invalidating New York’s ban on promotional advertising. As noted above, in these and other contexts the Court has clearly rejected the notion that there must be a free “marketplace of ideas.”

If the complaint of those who feel the Court’s opinion does not go far enough is that the “only test of truth is its ability *597to get itself accepted in the marketplace of ideas” — the test advocated by Thomas Jefferson in his first inaugural address, and by Mr. Justice Holmes in Abrams v. United States, 250 U. S. 616, 630 (1919) (dissenting opinion) — there is no reason whatsoever to limit the protection accorded commercial speech to “truthful, nonmisleading, noncoercive” speech. See ante, at 573 (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment). If the “commercial speech” is in fact misleading, the “marketplace of ideas” will in time reveal that fact. It may not reveal it sufficiently soon to avoid harm to numerous people, but if the reasoning of Brandéis and Holmes is applied in this context, that was one of the risks we took in protecting free speech in a democratic society.

Unfortunately, although the “marketplace of ideas” has a historically and sensibly defined context in the world of political speech, it has virtually none in the realm of business transactions. Even so staunch a defender of the First Amendment as Mr. Justice Black, in his dissent in Breará v. Alexandria, 341 U. S., at 650, n., stated:

“Of course I believe that the present ordinance could constitutionally be applied to a 'merchant’ who goes from door to door 'selling pots.’ ”

And yet, with the change in solicitation and advertising techniques, the line between what Central Hudson did here and the peddler selling pots in Alexandria a generation ago is difficult, if not impossible to fix. Doubtless that was why Mr. Justice Black joined the unanimous opinion of the Court in Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U. S., at 54, in which the Court stated:

“This court has unequivocally held that the streets are proper places for the exercise of the freedom of communicating information and disseminating opinion and that, though the states and municipalities may appropriately regulate the privilege in the public interest, they may not unduly burden or proscribe its employment in these pub-*598lie thoroughfares. We are equally clear that the Constitution imposes no such restraint on government as respects purely commercial advertising. Whether, and to what extent, one may promote or pursue a gainful occupation in the streets, to what extent such activity shall be adjudged a derogation of the public right of user, are matters for legislative judgment.” (Emphasis added.)

I remain of the view that the Court unlocked a Pandora’s Box when it “elevated” commercial speech to the level of traditional political speech by according it First Amendment protection in Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U. S. 748 (1976). The line between “commercial speech,” and the kind of speech that those who drafted the First Amendment had in mind, may not be a technically or intellectually easy one to draw, but it surely produced far fewer problems than has the development of judicial doctrine in this area since Virginia Pharmacy Board. For in the world of political advocacy and its marketplace of ideas, there is no such thing as a “fraudulent” idea: there may be useless proposals, totally unworkable schemes, as well as very sound proposals that will receive the imprimatur of the “marketplace of ideas” through our majoritarian system of election and representative government. The free flow of information is important in this context not because it will lead, to the discovery of any objective “truth,” but because it is essential to our system of self-government.

The notion that more speech is the remedy to expose falsehood and fallacies is wholly out of place in the commercial bazaar, where if applied logically the remedy of one who was defrauded would be merely a statement, available upon request, reciting the Latin maxim “caveat emptor.” But since “fraudulent speech” in this area is to be remediable under Virginia Pharmacy Board, supra, the remedy of one defrauded is a lawsuit or an agency proceeding based on common-law notions of fraud that are separated by a world of difference *599from the realm of politics and government. What time, legal decisions, and common sense have so widely severed, I declined to join in Virginia Pharmacy Board, and regret now to see the Court reaping the seeds that it there sowed. For in a democracy, the economic is subordinate to the political, a lesson that our ancestors learned long ago, and that our descendants will undoubtedly have to relearn many years hence.

Ill

The Court concedes that the state interest in energy conservation is plainly substantial, ante, at 568, as is the State’s concern that its rates be fair and efficient. Ante, at 569. It also concedes that there is a direct link between the Commission’s ban on promotional advertising and the State’s interest in conservation. Ibid. The Court nonetheless strikes down the ban on promotional advertising because the Commission has failed to demonstrate, under the final part of the Court’s four-part test, that its regulation is no more extensive than necessary to serve the State’s interest. Ante, at 569-571. In reaching this conclusion, the Court conjures up potential advertisements that a utility might make that conceivably would result in net energy savings. The Court does not indicate that the New York Public Service Commission has in fact construed its ban on “promotional” advertising to preclude the dissemination of information that clearly would result in a net energy savings, nor does it even suggest that the Commission has been confronted with and rejected such an advertising proposal.6 The final part of the Court’s test *600thus leaves room for so many hypothetical “better” ways that any ingenious lawyer will surely seize on one of them to secure the invalidation of what the state agency actually did. As Mr. Justice Blackmun observed in Illinois Elections Bd. v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U. S. 173, 188-189 (1979) (concurring opinion):

“A° judge would be unimaginative indeed if he could not come up with something a little less ‘drastic’ or a little less ‘restrictive’ in almost any situation, and thereby enable himself to vote to strike legislation down.”

Here the Court concludes that the State’s interest in energy conservation cannot justify a blanket ban on promotional advertising. In its statement of the facts, the Court observes that the Commission’s ban on promotional advertising is not “a perfect vehicle for conserving energy.” It states:

“[T]he Commission’s order prohibits promotional advertising to develop consumption during periods when demand for electricity is low. By limiting growth in ‘off-peak’ consumption, the ban limits the ‘beneficial side effects’ of such growth in terms of more efficient use of existing powerplants. [App. to Juris. Statement] 37a.” Ante, at 559.

The Court’s analysis in this regard is in my view fundamentally misguided because it fails to recognize that the beneficial side effects of “more efficient use” may be inconsistent with the goal of energy conservation. Indeed, the Commission explicitly found that the promotion of off-peak consumption would impair conservation efforts.7 The Commission stated:

“Increased off-peak generation, . . . while conferring *601some beneficial side effects, also consumes valuable energy resources and, if it is the result of increased sales, necessarily creates incremental air pollution and thermal discharges to waterways. More important, any increase in off-peak generation from most of the major companies producing electricity in this State would not, at this time, be produced from coal or nuclear resources, but would require the use of oil-fired generating facilities. The increased requirement for fuel oil to serve the incremental off-peak load created by promotional advertising would aggravate the nation’s already unacceptably high level of dependence on foreign sources of supply and would, in addition, frustrate rather than encourage conservation efforts.” App. to Juris. Statement 37a.8

The Court also observes, as the Commission acknowledged, that the ban on promotional advertising can achieve only “piecemeal conservationism” because oil dealers are not under the Commission’s jurisdiction, and they remain free to advertise. Until I have mastered electrical engineering and marketing, I am not prepared to contradict by virtue of my judicial office those who assume that the ban will be successful in making a substantial contribution to conservation efforts. *602And I doubt that any of this Court’s First Amendment decisions justify striking down the Commission’s order because more steps toward conservation could have been made This is especially true when, as here, the Commission lacks authority over oil dealers.

The Court concludes that the Commission’s ban on promotional advertising must be struck down because it is more extensive than necessary: it may result in the suppression of advertising by utilities that promotes the use of electrical devices or services that cause no net increase in total energy use. The Court’s reasoning in this regard, however, is highly speculative. The Court provides two examples that it claims support its conclusion. It first states that both parties acknowledge that the “heat pump” will be “a major improvement in electric heating,” and that but for the ban the utilities would advertise this type of “energy efficien[t]” product.9 The New York Public Service Commission, however, considered the merits of the heat pump and concluded that it would most likely result in an overall increase in electric energy consumption. The Commission stated:

“[Installation of a heat pump means also installation of central air-conditioning. To this extent, promotion of off-peak electric space heating involves promotion of on-peak summer air-conditioning as well as on-peak usage *603of electricity for water heating. And the price of electricity to most consumers in the State does not now fully reflect the much higher marginal costs of on-peak consumption in summer peaking markets. In these circumstances, there would be a subsidization of consumption on-peak, and consequently, higher rates for all consumers.” App. to Juris. Statement 58a.

Subsidization of peak consumption not only may encourage the use of scarce energy resources during peak periods, but also may lead to larger Preserve generating capacity requirements for the State.

The Court next asserts that electric heating as a backup to solar and other heat may be an efficient alternative energy source. Ante, at 570. The Court fails to establish, however, that an advertising proposal of this sort was properly presented to the Commission. Indeed, the Court’s concession that the Commission did not make findings on this issue suggests that the Commission did not even consider it. Nor does the Court rely on any support for its assertion other than the assertion of appellant. Rather, it speculates that “[i]n the absence of authoritative findings to the contrary, we must credit as within the realm of possibility the claim that electric heat can be an efficient alternative in some circumstances.” Ibid10

Ordinarily it is the role of the State Public Service Commission to make factual determinations concerning whether a device or service will result in a net energy savings and, if so, whether and to what extent state law permits dissemination of information about the device or service. Otherwise, *604as here, this Court will have no factual basis for its assertions. And the State will never have an opportunity to consider the issue and thus to construe its law in a manner consistent with the Federal Constitution. As stated in Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U. S. 249, 256-257 (1953):

“It would indeed be undesirable for this Court to consider every conceivable situation which might possibly arise in the application of complex and comprehensive legislation. Nor are we so ready to frustrate the expressed will of Congress or that of the state legislatures. Cf. Southern Pacific Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U. S. 167, 172.”

I think the Court would do well to heed the admonition in Barrows here. The terms of the order of the New York Public Service Commission in my view indicate that advertising designed to promote net savings in energy use does not fall within the scope of the ban. The order prohibits electric corporations “from promoting the use of electricity through the use of advertising, subsidy payments ... , or employee incentives.” App. to Juris. Statement 31a (emphasis added). It is not clear to me that advertising that is likely to result in net savings of energy is advertising that “promot[es] the use of electricity,” nor does the Court point to any language in the Commission order that suggests it has adopted this construction. Rather, it would seem more accurate to characterize such advertising as designed to “discourage” the use of electricity.11 Indeed, I think it is quite likely that the Com*605mission would view advertising that would clearly result in a net savings in energy as consistent with the objectives of its order and therefore permissible.12 The Commission, for example, has authorized the dissemination of information that would result in shifts in electrical energy demand, thereby reducing the demand for electricity during peak periods. Id., at 37a.13 It has also indicated a willingness to consider at least some other types of “specific proposals” submitted by utilities. Id., at 37a-38a. And it clearly permits informational as opposed to promotional dissemination of information. Id., at 43a-46a. Even if the Commission were ultimately to reject the view that its ban on promotional advertising does not include advertising that results in net energy savings, I think the Commission should at least be given an opportunity to consider it.

It is in my view inappropriate for the Court to invalidate the State’s ban on commercial advertising here, based on its speculation that in some cases the advertising may result in a net savings in electrical energy use, and in the cases in which it is clear a net energy savings would result from utility advertising, the Public Service Commission would apply its *606ban so as to proscribe such advertising. Even assuming that the Court’s speculation is correct, I do not think it follows that facial invalidation of the ban is the appropriate course. As stated in Parker v. Levy, 417 U. S. 733, 760 (1974), “even if there are marginal applications in which a statute would infringe on First Amendment values, facial invalidation is inappropriate if the 'remainder of the statute . . . covers a whole range of easily identifiable and constitutionally pre-scribable . . . conduct. . . .’ CSC v. Letter Carriers, 413 U. S. 548, 580-581 (1973).” This is clearly the case here.

For the foregoing reasons, I would affirm the judgment of the New York Court of Appeals.

Mr. Chief Justice Warren

delivered the opinion of the Court.

On the morning of March 31,1966, David Paul O’Brien and three companions burned their Selective Service registration certificates on the steps of the South Boston Courthouse. A sizable crowd, including several agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, witnessed the event.1 Immediately after the burning, members of the crowd began attacking O’Brien and his companions. An FBI agent ushered O’Brien to safety inside the courthouse. After he was advised of his right to counsel and to silence, O’Brien stated to FBI agents that he had burned his registration certificate because of his beliefs, knowing that he was violating federal law. He produced the charred remains of the certificate, which, with his consent, were photographed.

For this act, O’Brien was indicted, tried, convicted, and sentenced in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts.2 He did not contest the fact *370that he had burned the certificate. He stated in argument to the jury that he burned the certificate publicly to influence others to adopt his antiwar beliefs, as he put it, “so that other people would reevaluate their positions with Selective Service, with the armed forces, and reevaluate their place in the culture of today, to hopefully consider my position.”

The indictment upon which he was tried charged that he “willfully and knowingly did mutilate, destroy, and change by burning . . . [his] Registration Certificate (Selective Service System Form No. 2); in violation of Title 50, App., United States Code, Section 462 (b).” Section 462 (b) is part of the Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1948. Section 462 (b)(3), one of six numbered subdivisions of § 462 (b), was amended by Congress in 1965, 79 Stat. 586 (adding the words italicized below), so that at the time O’Brien burned his certificate an offense was commited by any person,

“who forges, alters, knowingly destroys, knowingly mutilates, or in any manner changes any such certificate . . . .” (Italics supplied.)

In the District Court, O’Brien argued that the 1965 Amendment prohibiting the knowing destruction or mutilation of certificates was unconstitutional because it was enacted to abridge free speech, and because it served no legitimate legislative purpose.3 The District Court rejected these arguments, holding that the statute on its face did not abridge First Amendment rights, that the court was not competent to inquire into the motives of Congress in enacting the 1965 Amendment, and that the *371Amendment was a reasonable exercise of the power of Congress to raise armies.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held the 1965 Amendment unconstitutional as a law abridging freedom of speech.4 At the time the Amendment was enacted, a regulation of the Selective Service System required registrants to keep their registration certificates in their “personal possession at all times.” 32 CFR § 1617.1 (1962).5 Wilful violations of regulations promulgated pursuant to the Universal Military Training and Service Act were made criminal by statute. 50 U. S. C. App. §462 (b)(6). The Court of Appeals, therefore, was of the opinion that conduct punishable under the 1965 Amendment was already punishable under the nonpossession regulation, and consequently that the Amendment served no valid purpose; further, that in light of the prior regulation, the Amendment must have been “directed at public as distinguished from private destruction.” On this basis, the court concluded that the 1965 Amendment ran afoul of the First Amendment by singling out persons engaged in protests for special treatment. The court ruled, however, that O’Brien’s conviction should be affirmed under the statutory provision, 50 U. S. C. App. § 462 (b)(6), which in its view made violation of the nonpossession regulation a crime, because it regarded such violation to be a lesser included offense of the crime defined by the 1965 Amendment.6

*372The Government petitioned for certiorari in No. 232, arguing that the Court of Appeals erred in holding the statute unconstitutional, and that its decision conflicted with decisions by the Courts of Appeals for the Second7 and Eighth Circuits8 upholding the 1965 Amendment against identical constitutional challenges. O’Brien cross-petitioned for certiorari in No. 233, arguing that the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining his conviction on the basis of a crime of which he was neither charged nor tried. We granted the Government’s petition to resolve the conflict in the circuits, and we also granted O’Brien’s cross-petition. We hold that the 1965 Amendment is constitutional both as enacted and as applied. We therefore vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the judgment and sentence of the District Court without reaching the issue raised by O’Brien in No. 233.

I.

When a male reaches the age of 18, he is required by the Universal Military Training and Service Act to register with a local draft board.9 He is assigned a Selective Service number,10 and within five days he is issued a *373registration certificate (SSS Form No. 2).11 Subsequently, and based on a questionnaire completed by the registrant,12 he is assigned a classification denoting his eligibility for induction,13 and “[a]s soon as practicable” thereafter he is issued a Notice of Classification (SSS Form No. 110).14 This initial classification is not necessarily permanent,15 and if in the interim before induction the registrant’s status changes in some relevant way, he may be reclassified.16 After such a reclassification, the local board “as soon as practicable” issues to the registrant a new Notice of Classification.17

Both the registration and classification certificates are small white cards, approximately 2 by 3 inches. The registration certificate specifies the name of the registrant, the date of registration, and the number and address of the local board with which he is registered. Also inscribed upon it are the date and place of the registrant’s birth, his residence at registration, his physical description, his signature, and his Selective Service number. The Selective Service number itself indicates his State of registration, his local board, his year of birth, and his chronological position in the local board’s classification record.18

The classification certificate shows the registrant’s name, Selective Service number, signature, and eligibility classification. It specifies whether he was so classified by his local board, an appeal board, or the President. It *374contains the address of his local board and the date the certificate was mailed.

Both the registration and classification certificates bear notices that the registrant must notify his local board in writing of every change in address, physical condition, and occupational, marital, family, dependency, and military status, and of any other fact which might change his classification. Both also contain a notice that the registrant’s Selective Service number should appear on all communications to his local board.

Congress demonstrated its concern that certificates issued by the Selective Service System might be abused well before the 1965 Amendment here challenged. The 1948 Act, 62 Stat. 604, itself prohibited many different abuses involving “any registration certificate, ... or any other certificate issued pursuant to or prescribed by the provisions of this title, or rules or regulations promulgated hereunder . . . .” 62 Stat. 622. Under §§ 12 (b)(l)-(5) of the 1948 Act, it was unlawful (1) to transfer a certificate to aid a person in making false identification; (2) to possess a certificate not duly issued with the intent of using it for false identification; (3) to forge, alter, “or in any manner” change a certificate or any notation validly inscribed thereon; (4) to photograph or make an imitation of a certificate for the purpose of false identification; and (5) to possess a counterfeited or altered certificate. 62 Stat. 622. In addition, as previously mentioned, regulations of the Selective Service System required registrants to keep both their registration and classification certificates in their personal possession at all times. 32 CFR § 1617.1 (1962) (Registration Certificates);19 32 CFR § 1623.5 *375(1962) (Classification Certificates).20 And §12 (b)(6) of the Act, 62 Stat. 622, made knowing violation of any provision of the Act or rules and regulations promulgated pursuant thereto a felony.

By the 1965 Amendment, Congress added to § 12 (b)(3) of the 1948 Act the provision here at issue, subjecting to criminal liability not only one who “forges, alters, or in any manner changes” but also one who “knowingly destroys, [or] knowingly mutilates” a certificate. We note at the outset that the 1965 Amendment plainly does not abridge free speech on its face, and we do not understand O’Brien to argue otherwise. Amended § 12 (b)(3) on its face deals with conduct having no connection with speech. It prohibits the knowing destruction of certificates issued by the Selective Service System, and there is nothing necessarily expressive about such conduct. The Amendment does not distinguish between public and private destruction, and it does not punish only destruction engaged in for the purpose of expressing views. Compare Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359 (1931).21 A law prohibiting destruction of Selective Service certificates no more abridges free speech on its face than a motor vehicle law prohibiting the destruction of drivers’ licenses, or a tax law prohibiting the destruction of books and records.

*376O’Brien nonetheless argues that the 1965 Amendment is unconstitutional in its application to him, and is unconstitutional as enacted because what he calls the “purpose” of Congress was “to suppress freedom of speech.” We consider these arguments separately.

II.

O’Brien first argues that the 1965 Amendment is unconstitutional as applied to him because his act of burning his registration certificate was protected “symbolic speech” within the First Amendment. His argument is that the freedom of expression which the First Amendment guarantees includes all modes of “communication of ideas by conduct,” and that his conduct is within this definition because he did it in “demonstration against the war and against the draft.”

We cannot accept the view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled “speech” whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea. However, even on the assumption that the alleged communicative element in O’Brien’s conduct is sufficient to bring into play the First Amendment, it does not necessarily follow that the destruction of a registration certificate is constitutionally protected activity. This Court has held that when “speech” and “nonspeech” elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms. To characterize the quality of the governmental interest which must appear, the Court has employed a variety of descriptive terms: compelling;22 substantial;23 subordi*377nating;24 paramount;25 cogent;26 strong.27 Whatever imprecision inheres in these terms, we think it clear that a government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. We find that the 1965 Amendment to § 12 (b)(3) of the Universal Military Training and Service Act meets all of these requirements, and consequently that O’Brien can be constitutionally convicted for violating it.

The constitutional power of Congress to raise and support armies and to make all laws necessary and proper to that end is broad and sweeping. Lichter v. United States, 334 U. S. 742, 755-758 (1948); Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U. S. 366 (1918); see also Ex parte Quirin, 317 U. S. 1, 25-26 (1942). The power of Congress to classify and conscript manpower for military service is “beyond question.” Lichter v. United States, supra, at 756; Selective Draft Law Cases, supra. Pursuant to this power, Congress may establish a system of registration for individuals liable for training and service, and may require such individuals within reason to cooperate in the registration system. The issuance of certificates indicating the registration and eligibility classification of individuals is a legitimate and substantial administrative aid in the functioning of this system. And legislation *378to insure the continuing availability of issued certificates serves a legitimate and substantial purpose in the system’s administration.

O’Brien’s argument to the contrary is necessarily premised upon his unrealistic characterization of Selective Service certificates. He essentially adopts the position that such certificates are so many pieces of paper designed to notify registrants of their registration or classification, to be retained or tossed in the wastebasket according to the convenience or taste of the registrant. Once the registrant has received notification, according to this view, there is no reason for him to retain the certificates. O’Brien notes that most of the information on a registration certificate serves no notification purpose at all; the registrant hardly needs to be told his address and physical characteristics. We agree that the registration certificate contains much information of which the registrant needs no notification. This circumstance, however, does not lead to the conclusion that the certificate serves no purpose, but that, like the classification certificate, it serves purposes in addition to initial notification. Many of these purposes would be defeated by the certificates’ destruction or mutilation. Among these are:

1. The registration certificate serves as proof that the individual described thereon has registered for the draft. The classification certificate shows the eligibility classification of a named but undescribed individual. Voluntarily displaying the two certificates is an easy and painless way for a young man to dispel a question as to whether he might be delinquent in his Selective Service obligations. Correspondingly, the availability of the certificates for such display relieves the Selective Service System of the administrative burden it would otherwise have in verifying the registration and classification of all suspected delinquents. Further, since both certificates are in the nature of “receipts” attesting that the regis*379trant has done what the law requires, it is in the interest of the just and efficient administration of the system that they be continually available, in the event, for example, of a mix-up in the registrant’s file.. Additionally, in a time of national crisis, reasonable availability to each registrant of the two small cards assures a rapid and uncomplicated means for determining his fitness for immediate induction, no matter how distant in our mobile society he may be from his local board.

2. The information supplied on the certificates facilitates communication between registrants and local boards, simplifying the system and benefiting all concerned. To begin with, each certificate bears the address of the registrant’s local board, an item unlikely to be committed to memory. Further, each card bears the registrant’s Selective Service number, and a registrant who has his number readily available so that he can communicate it to his local board when he supplies or requests information can make simpler the board’s task in locating his file. Finally, a registrant’s inquiry, particularly through a local board other than his own, concerning his eligibility status is frequently answerable simply on the basis of his classification certificate; whereas, if the certificate were not reasonably available and the registrant were uncertain of his classification, the task of answering his questions would be considerably complicated.

3. Both certificates carry continual reminders that the registrant must notify his local board of any change of address, and other specified changes in his status. The smooth functioning of the system requires that local boards be continually aware of the status and whereabouts of registrants, and the destruction of certificates deprives the system of a potentially useful notice device.

4. The regulatory scheme involving Selective Service certificates includes clearly valid prohibitions against the alteration, forgery, or similar deceptive misuse of certifi*380cates. The destruction or mutilation of certificates obviously increases the difficulty of detecting and tracing abuses such as these. Further, a mutilated certificate might itself be used for deceptive purposes.

The many functions performed by Selective Service certificates establish beyond doubt that Congress has a legitimate and substantial interest in preventing their wanton and unrestrained destruction and assuring their continuing availability by punishing people who knowingly and wilfully destroy or mutilate them. And we are unpersuaded that the pre-existence of the nonpossession regulations in any way negates this interest.

In the absence of a question as to multiple punishment, it has never been suggested that there is anything improper in Congress’ providing alternative statutory avenues of prosecution to assure the effective protection of one and the same interest. Compare the majority and dissenting opinions in Gore v. United States, 357 U. S. 386 (1958).28 Here, the pre-existing avenue of prosecution was not even statutory. Regulations may be modified or revoked from time to time by administrative discretion. Certainly, the Congress may change or supplement a regulation.

Equally important, a comparison of the regulations with the 1965 Amendment indicates that they protect overlapping but not identical governmental interests, and that they reach somewhat different classes of wrongdoers.29 The gravamen of the offense defined by the statute is the deliberate rendering of certificates unavailable for the various purposes which they may serve. Whether registrants keep their certificates in their per*381sonal possession at all times, as required by the regulations, is of no particular concern under the 1965 Amendment, as long as they do not mutilate or destroy the certificates so as to render them unavailable. Although as we note below we are not concerned here with the nonpossession regulations, it is not inappropriate to observe that the essential elements of nonpossession are not identical with those of mutilation or destruction. Finally, the 1965 Amendment, like § 12 (b) which it amended, is concerned with abuses involving any issued Selective Service certificates, not only with the registrant’s own certificates. The knowing destruction or mutilation of someone else’s certificates would therefore violate the statute but not the nonpossession regulations.

We think it apparent that the continuing availability to each registrant of his Selective Service certificates substantially furthers the smooth and proper functioning of the system that Congress has established to raise armies. We think it also apparent that the Nation has a vital interest in having a system for raising armies that functions with maximum efficiency and is capable of easily and quickly responding to continually changing- circumstances. For these reasons,- the Government has a substantial interest in assuring the continuing availability of issued Selective Service certificates.

It is equally clear that the 1965 Amendment specifically protects this substantial governmental interest. We perceive no alternative means that would more precisely and narrowly assure the continuing availability of issued Selective Service certificates than a law which prohibits their wilful mutilation or destruction. Compare Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398, 407-408 (1963), and the cases cited therein, The 1965 Amendment prohibits such conduct and does nothing more. In other words, both the governmental interest and the operation of the 1965 Amendment are limited to the noncommuni-*382cative aspect of O’Brien’s conduct. The governmental interest and the scope of the 1965 Amendment are limited to preventing harm to the smooth and efficient functioning of the Selective Service System. When O’Brien deliberately rendered unavailable his registration certificate, he wilfully frustrated this governmental interest. For this noncommunicative impact of his conduct, and for nothing else, he was convicted.

The case at bar is therefore unlike one where the alleged governmental interest in regulating conduct arises in some measure because the communication allegedly integral to the conduct is itself thought to be harmful. In Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359 (1931), for example, this Court struck down a statutory phrase which punished people who expressed their “opposition to organized government” by displaying “any flag, badge, banner, or device.” Since the statute there was aimed at suppressing communication it could not be sustained as a regulation of noncommunicative conduct. See also, NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers Union, 377 U. S. 58, 79 (1964) (concurring opinion).

In conclusion, we find that because of the Government’s substantial interest in assuring the continuing availability of issued Selective Service certificates, because amended § 462 (b) is an appropriately narrow means of protecting this interest and condemns only the independent noncommunicative impact of conduct within its reach, and because the noncommunicative impact of O’Brien’s act of burning his registration certificate frustrated the Government’s interest, a sufficient governmental interest has been shown to justify O’Brien’s conviction.

III.

O’Brien finally argues that the 1965 Amendment is unconstitutional as enacted because what he calls the “purpose” of Congress was “to suppress freedom of *383speech.” We reject this argument because under settled principles the purpose of Congress, as O’Brien uses that term, is not a basis for declaring this legislation unconstitutional.

It is a familiar principle of constitutional law that this Court will not strike down an otherwise constitutional statute on the basis of an alleged illicit legislative motive. As the Court long ago stated:

“The decisions of this court from the beginning lend no support whatever to the assumption that the judiciary may restrain the exercise of lawful power on the assumption that a wrongful purpose or motive has caused the power to be exerted.” McCray v. United States, 195 U. S. 27, 56 (1904).

This fundamental principle of constitutional adjudication was reaffirmed and the many cases were collected by Mr. Justice Brandéis for the Court in Arizona v. California, 283 U. S. 423, 455 (1931).

Inquiries into congressional motives or purposes are a hazardous matter. When the issue is simply the interpretation of legislation, the Court will look to statements by legislators for guidance as to the purpose of the legislature,30 because the benefit to sound decision-making in *384this circumstance is thought sufficient to risk the possibility of misreading Congress’ purpose. It is entirely a different matter when we are asked to void a statute that is, under well-settled criteria, constitutional on its face, on the basis of what fewer than a handful of Congressmen said about it. What motivates one legislator to make a speech about a statute is not necessarily what motivates scores of others to enact it, and the stakes are sufficiently high for us to eschew guesswork. We decline to void essentially on the ground that it is unwise legislation which Congress had the undoubted power to enact and which could be reenacted in its exact form if the same or another legislator made a “wiser” speech about it.

O’Brien’s position, and to some extent that of the court below, rest upon a misunderstanding of Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U. S. 233 (1936), and Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 339 (1960). These cases stand, not for the proposition that legislative motive is a proper basis for declaring a statute unconstitutional, but that the inevitable effect of a statute on its face may render it unconstitutional. Thus, in Orosjean the Court, having concluded that the right of publications to be free from certain kinds of taxes was a freedom of the press protected by the First Amendment, struck down a statute which on its face did nothing other than impose *385just such a tax. Similarly, in Gomillion, the Court sustained a complaint which, if true, established that the “inevitable effect,” 364 U. S., at 341, of the redrawing of municipal boundaries was to deprive the petitioners of their right to vote for no reason other than that they were Negro. In these cases, the purpose of the legislation was irrelevant, because the inevitable effect — the “necessary scope and operation,” McCray v. United States, 195 U. S. 27, 59 (1904) — abridged constitutional rights. The statute attacked in the instant case has no such inevitable unconstitutional effect, since the destruction of Selective Service certificates is in no respect inevitably or necessarily expressive. Accordingly, the statute itself is constitutional.

We think it not amiss, in passing, to comment upon O’Brien’s legislative-purpose argument. There was little floor debate on this legislation in either House. Only Senator Thurmond commented on its substantive features in the Senate. 111 Cong. Rec. 19746, 20433. After his brief statement, and without any additional substantive comments, the bill, H. R. 10306, passed the Senate. Ill Cong. Rec. 20434. In the House debate only two Congressmen addressed themselves to the Amendment— Congressmen Rivers and Bray. Ill Cong. Rec. 19871, 19872. The bill was passed after their statements without any further debate by a vote of 393 to 1. It is principally on the basis of the statements by these three Congressmen that O’Brien makes his congressional-“purpose” argument. We note that if we were to examine legislative purpose in the instant case, we would be obliged to consider not only these statements but also the more authoritative reports of the Senate and House Armed Services Committees. The portions of those reports explaining the purpose of the Amendment are reproduced in the Appendix in their entirety. While both reports make clear a concern with the “defiant” *386destruction of so-called “draft cards” and with “open” encouragement to others to destroy their cards, both reports also indicate that this concern stemmed from an apprehension that unrestrained destruction of cards would disrupt the smooth functioning of the Selective Service System.

IV.

Since the 1965 Amendment to § 12 (b) (3) of the Universal Military Training and Service Act is constitutional as enacted and as applied, the Court of Appeals should have affirmed the judgment of conviction entered by the District Court. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and reinstate the judgment and sentence of the District Court. This disposition makes unnecessary consideration of O'Brien’s claim that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming his conviction on the basis of the nonpossession regulation.31

It is so ordered.

APPENDIX TO OPINION OF THE COURT.

Portions op the Reports op the Committees on Armed Services op the Senate and House Explaining the 1965 Amendment.

The “Explanation of the Bill” in the Senate Report is as follows:

“Section 12 (b) (3) of the Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1951, as amended, provides, among other things, that a person who forges, alters, or changes *387a draft registration certificate is subject to a fine of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment of not more than 5 years, or both. There is no explicit prohibition in this section against the knowing destruction or mutilation of such cards.

“The committee has taken notice of the defiant destruction and mutilation of draft cards by dissident persons who disapprove of national policy. If allowed to continue unchecked this contumacious conduct represents a potential threat to the exercise of the power to raise and support armies.

“For a person to be subject to fine or imprisonment the destruction or mutilation of the draft card must be ‘knowingly’ done. This qualification is intended to protect persons who lose or mutilate draft cards accidentally.” S. Rep. No. 589, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965). And the House Report explained:

“Section 12 (b)(3) of the Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1951, as amended, provides that a person who forges, alters, or in any manner changes his draft registration card, or any notation duly and validly inscribed thereon, will be subject to a fine of $10,000 or imprisonment of not more than 5 years. H. R. 10306 would amend this provision to make it apply also to those persons who knowingly destroy or knowingly mutilate a draft registration card.

“The House Committee on Armed Services is fully aware of, and shares in, the deep concern expressed throughout the Nation over the increasing incidences in which individuals and large groups of individuals openly defy and encourage others to defy the authority of their Government by destroying or mutilating their draft cards.

“While the present provisions of the Criminal Code with respect to the destruction of Government property *388may appear broad enough to cover all acts having to do with the mistreatment of draft cards in the possession of individuals, the committee feels that in the present critical situation of the country, the acts of destroying or mutilating these cards are offenses which pose such a grave threat to the security of the Nation that no question whatsoever should be left as to the intention of the Congress that such wanton and irresponsible acts should be punished.

“To this end, H. R. 10306 makes specific that knowingly mutilating or knowingly destroying a draft card constitutes a violation of the Universal Military Training and Service Act and is punishable thereunder; and that a person who does so destroy or mutilate a draft card will be subject to a fine of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment of not more than 5 years.” H. R. Rep. No. 747, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).

Mr. Justice Harlan,

concurring.

The crux of the Court’s opinion, which I join, is of course its general statement, ante, at 377, that:

“a government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the Government ; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.”

I wish to make explicit my understanding that this passage does not foreclose consideration of First Amendment claims in those rare instances when an “incidental” restriction upon expression, imposed by a regulation which furthers an “important or substantial” governmental interest and satisfies the Court’s other criteria, in practice has the effect of entirely preventing a “speaker” *389from reaching a significant audience with whom he could not otherwise lawfully communicate. This is not such a case, since O’Brien manifestly could have conveyed his message in many ways other than by burning his draft card.

Mr. Justice Douglas,

dissenting.

The Court states that the constitutional power of Congress to raise and support armies is “broad and sweeping” and that Congress’ power “to classify and conscript manpower for military service is 'beyond question.’ ” This is undoubtedly true in times when, by declaration of Congress, the Nation is in a state of war. The underlying and basic problem in this case, however, is whether conscription is permissible in the absence of a declaration of war.1 That question has not been briefed nor was it presented in oral argument; but it is, I submit, a question upon which the litigants and the country are entitled to a ruling. I have discussed in Holmes v. United States, post, p. 936, the nature of the legal issue and it will be seen from my dissenting opinion in that case that this Court has never ruled on *390the question. It is time that we made a ruling. This case should be put down for reargument and heard with Holmes v. United States and with Hart v. United States, post, p. 956, in which the Court today denies certiorari.2

The rule that this Court will not consider issues not raised by the parties is not inflexible and yields in “exceptional cases” (Duignan v. United States, 274 U. S. 195, 200) to the need correctly to decide the case before the court. E. g., Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64; Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U. S. 1.

In such a case it is not unusual to ask for reargument (Sherman v. United States, 356 U. S. 369, 379, n. 2, Frankfurter, J., concurring) even on a constitutional question not raised by the parties. In Abel v. United States, 362 U. S. 217, the petitioner had conceded that an administrative deportation arrest warrant would be valid for its limited purpose even though not supported by a sworn affidavit stating probable cause; but the Court ordered reargument on the question whether the warrant had been validly issued in petitioner’s case. 362 U. S., at 219, n., par. 1; 359 U. S. 940. In Lustig v. United States, 338 U. S. 74, the petitioner argued that an exclusionary rule should apply to the fruit of an unreasonable search by state officials solely because they acted in concert with federal officers (see Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383; Byars v. United States, 273 U. S. 28). The Court ordered reargument on the question raised in a then pending case, Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25: applicability of the Fourth Amendment to the States. U. S. Sup. Ct. Journal, October Term, 1947, p. 298. In Donaldson v. Read Magazine, 333 U. S. 178, the only issue presented, *391according to both parties, was whether the record contained sufficient evidence of fraud to uphold an order of the Postmaster General. Reargument was ordered on the constitutional issue of abridgment of First Amendment freedoms. 333 U. S., at 181-182; Journal, October Term, 1947, p. 70. Finally, in Musser v. Utah, 333 U. S. 95, 96, reargument was ordered on the question of unconstitutional vagueness of a criminal statute, an issue not raised by the parties but suggested at oral argument by Justice Jackson. Journal, October Term, 1947, p. 87.

These precedents demonstrate the appropriateness of restoring the instant case to the calendar for reargument on the question of the constitutionality of a peacetime draft and having it heard with Holmes v. United States and Hart v. United States.

Per Curiam.

Appellant displayed a United States flag, which he owned, out of the window of his apartment. Affixed to both surfaces of the flag was a large peace symbol fashioned of removable tape. Appellant was convicted under a Washington statute forbidding the exhibition of a United States flag to which is attached or superimposed figures, symbols, or other extraneous material. The Supreme Court of Washington affirmed appellant’s *406conviction. 81 Wash. 2d 788, 506 P. 2d 293 (1973). It rejected appellant’s contentions that the statute under which he was charged, on its face and as applied, contravened the First Amendment, as incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment, and was void for vagueness. We noted probable jurisdiction. 414 U. S. 815 (1973). We reverse on the ground that as applied to appellant’s activity the Washington statute impermissibly infringed protected expression.

I

On May 10, 1970, appellant, a college student, hung his United States flag from the window of his apartment on private property in Seattle, Washington. The flag was upside down, and attached to the front and back was a peace symbol (i. e., a circle enclosing a trident) made of removable black tape. The window was above the ground floor. The flag measured approximately three by five feet and was plainly visible to passersby. The peace symbol occupied roughly half of the surface of the flag.

Three Seattle police officers observed the flag and entered the apartment house. They were met at the main door by appellant, who said: “I suppose you are here about the flag. I didn’t know there was anything wrong with it. I will take it down.” Appellant permitted the officers to enter his apartment, where they seized the flag and arrested him. Appellant cooperated with the officers. There was no disruption or altercation.

Appellant was not charged under Washington’s flag-desecration statute. See Wash. Rev. Code § 9.86.030, as amended.1 Rather, the State relied on the so-called *407“improper use” statute, Wash. Rev. Code § 9.86.020. This statute provides, in pertinent part:

“No person shall, in any manner, for exhibition or display:

“(1) Place or cause to be placed any word, figure, mark, picture, design, drawing or advertisement of any nature upon any flag, standard, color, ensign or shield of the United States or of this state ... or “(2) Expose to public view any such flag, standard, color, ensign or shield upon which shall have been printed, painted or otherwise produced, or to which shall have been attached, appended, affixed or annexed any such word, figure, mark, picture, design, drawing or advertisement....” 2

Appellant initially was tried to the bench in a local justice court, where he was found guilty and sentenced to 90 days’ confinement, with 60 days suspended. Appellant exercised his right to be tried de novo in King County Superior Court, where he received a jury trial.

The State based its case on the flag itself and the testimony of the three arresting officers, who testified that they had observed the flag displayed from appellant’s window and that on the flag was superimposed what they identified as a peace symbol. Appellant took *408the stand in his own defense. He testified that he put a peace symbol on the flag and displayed it to -public view as a protest against the invasion of Cambodia and the killings at Kent State University, events which occurred a few days prior to his arrest. He said that his purpose was to associate the American flag with peace instead of war and violence:

“I felt there had been so much killing and that this was not what America stood for. I felt that the flag stood for America and I wanted' people to know that I thought America stood for peace.”

Appellant further testified that he chose to fashion the peace symbol from tape so that it could be removed without damaging the flag. The State made no effort to controvert any of appellant’s testimony.

The trial court instructed the jury in essence that the mere act of displaying the flag with the peace symbol attached, if proved beyond a reasonable doubt, was sufficient to convict. There was no requirement of specific intent to do anything more than display the flag in that manner. The jury returned a verdict of guilty. The court sentenced appellant to 10 days in jail, suspended, and to a $75 fine. The Washington Court of Appeals reversed the conviction. 5 Wash. App. 752, 490 P. 2d 1321 (1971). It held the improper-use statute over-broad and invalid on its face under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. With one justice dissenting and two concurring in the result, the Washington Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the conviction. 81 Wash. 2d 788, 506 P. 2d 293 (1973).

II

A number of factors are important in the instant case. First, this was a privately owned flag. In a technical property sense it was not the property of any govern*409ment. We have no doubt that the State or National Governments constitutionally may forbid anyone from mishandling in any manner a flag that is public property. But this is a different case. Second, appellant displayed his flag on private property. He engaged in no trespass or disorderly conduct. Nor is this a case that might be analyzed in terms of reasonable time, place, or manner restraints on access to a public area. Third, the record is devoid of proof of any risk of breach of the peace. It was not appellant’s purpose to incite violence or even stimulate a public demonstration. There is no evidence that any crowd gathered or that appellant made any effort to attract attention beyond hanging the flag out of his own window. Indeed, on the facts stipulated by the parties there is no evidence that anyone other than the three police officers observed the flag.

Fourth, the State concedes, as did the Washington Supreme Court, that appellant engaged in a form of communication.3 Although the stipulated facts fail to show that any member of the general public viewed the flag, the State’s concession is inevitable on this record. The undisputed facts are that appellant “wanted people to know that I thought America stood for peace.” To be sure, appellant did not choose to articulate his views through printed or spoken words. It is therefore necessary to determine whether his activity was sufficiently imbued with elements of communication to fall within the scope of the First and Fourteenth Amendments, for as the Court noted in United States v. O’Brien, 391 U. S. 367, 376 (1968), “[w]e cannot accept the view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled 'speech’ whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea.” But the nature of *410appellant’s activity, combined with the factual context and environment in which it was undertaken, lead to the conclusion that he engaged in a form of protected expression.

The Court for decades has recognized the communicative connotations of the use of flags. E. g., Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359 (1931). In many of their uses flags are a form of symbolism comprising a “primitive but effective way of communicating ideas . . . ,” and “a short cut from mind to mind.” Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 632 (1943). On this record there can be little doubt that appellant communicated through the use of symbols. The symbolism included not only the flag but also the superimposed peace symbol.

Moreover, the context in which a symbol is used for purposes of expression is important, for the context may give meaning to the symbol. See Tinker v. Des Moines School District, 393 U. S. 503 (1969). In Tinker, the wearing of black armbands in a school environment conveyed an unmistakable message about a contemporaneous issue of intense public concern — the Vietnam hostilities. Id., at 505-514. In this case, appellant’s activity was roughly simultaneous with and concededly triggered by the Cambodian incursion and the Kent State tragedy, also issues of great public moment. Cf. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232 (1974). A flag bearing a peace symbol and displayed upside down by a student today might be interpreted as nothing more than bizarre behavior, but it would have been difficult for the great majority of citizens to miss the drift of appellant’s point at the time that he made it.

It may be noted, further, that this was not an act of mindless nihilism. Rather, it was a pointed expression of anguish by appellant about the then-current domestic and foreign affairs of his government. An intent to *411convey a particularized message was present, and in the surrounding circumstances the likelihood was great that the message would be understood by those who viewed it.

We are confronted then with a case of prosecution for the expression of an idea through activity. Moreover, the activity occurred on private property, rather than in an environment over which the State by necessity must have certain supervisory powers unrelated to expression. Cf. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U. S. 396 (1974); Healy v. James, 408 U. S. 169 (1972); Tinker v. Des Moines School District, supra. Accordingly, we must examine with particular care the interests advanced by appellee to support its prosecution.

We are met at the outset with something of an enigma in the manner in which the case was presented to us. The Washington Supreme Court rejected any reliance on a breach-of-the-peace rationale. 81 Wash. 2d, at 796 n. 1, 506 P. 2d, at 299 n. 1. It based its result primarily on the ground that “the nation and state both have a recognizable interest in preserving the flag as a symbol of the nation . ...” 4 Yet counsel for the State declined to support the highest state court’s principal rationale in argument before us.5 He pursued instead the breach-of-the-peace theory discarded by the state court. Indeed, that was the only basis on which he chose to support the constitutionality of the state statute.

*412Despite counsel’s approach, we think it appropriate to review briefly the range of various state interests that might be thought to support the challenged conviction, drawing upon the arguments before us, the opinions below, and the Court’s opinion in Street v. New York, 394 U. S. 576, 590-594 (1969). The first interest at issue is prevention of breach of the peace. In our view, the Washington Supreme Court correctly rejected this notion. It is totally without support in the record.

We are also unable to affirm the judgment below on the ground that the State may have desired to protect the sensibilities of passersby. “It is firmly settled that under our Constitution the public expression of ideas may not be prohibited merely because the ideas are themselves offensive to some of their hearers.” Street v. New York, supra, at 592. Moreover, appellant did not impose his ideas upon a captive audience. Anyone who might have been offended could easily have avoided the display. See Cohen v. California, 403 U. S. 15 (1971). Nor may appellant be punished for failing to show proper respect for our national emblem. Street v. New York, supra, at 593; Board of Education v. Barnette, supra.6

We are brought, then, to the state court’s thesis that Washington has an interest in preserving the national flag as an unalloyed symbol of our country. The court did not define this interest; it simply asserted it. See 81 Wash. 2d, at 799, 506 P. 2d, at 300. Mr. Justice Rehnquist’s dissenting opinion today, see post, at 420-422, adopts essentially the same approach. Presumably, this interest might be seen as an effort to prevent the appropriation of a revered national symbol by an individual, interest group, or enterprise where there was a risk that association of the symbol with a particular *413product or viewpoint might be taken erroneously as evidence of governmental endorsement.7 Alternatively, it might be argued that the interest asserted by the state court is based on the uniquely universal character of the national flag as a symbol. For the great majority of us, the flag is a symbol of patriotism, of pride in the history of our country, and of the service, sacrifice, and valor of the millions of Americans who in peace and war have joined together to build and to defend a Nation in which self-government and personal liberty endure. It evidences both the unity and diversity which are America. For others the flag carries in varying degrees a different message. “A person gets1 from a symbol the meaning he puts into it, and what is one man’s comfort and inspiration is another’s jest and scorn.” Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S., at 632-633. It might be said that we all draw something from our national symbol, for it is capable of conveying simultaneously a spectrum of meanings. If it may be destroyed or permanently disfigured, it could be argued that it will lose its capability of mirroring the sentiments of all who view it.

But we need not decide in this case whether the interest *414advanced by the court below is valid.8 We assume, arguendo, that it is. The statute is nonetheless unconstitutional as applied to appellant’s activity.9 There was no risk that appellant’s acts would mislead viewers into assuming that the Government endorsed his viewpoint. To the contrary, he was plainly and peacefully10 *415protesting the fact that it did not. Appellant was not charged under the desecration statute, see n. 1, supra, nor did he permanently disfigure the flag or destroy it. He displayed it as a flag of his country in a way closely analogous to the manner in which flags have always been used to convey ideas. Moreover, his message was direct, likely to be understood, and within the contours of the First Amendment. Given the protected character of his expression and in light of the fact that no interest the State may have in preserving the physical integrity of a privately owned flag was significantly impaired on these facts, the conviction must be invalidated.11

The judgment is reversed.

It is so ordered.

Mr. Justice Douglas,

concurring.

I would reverse the judgment for substantially the same reasons given by the Iowa Supreme Court in State v. Kool, 212 N. W. 2d 518. In that case the de*416fendant hung a peace symbol made of cardboard and wrapped in tinfoil in the window of his home and hung a replica of the United States flag behind the peace symbol but in an upside-down position. The state statute made it a crime to “cast contempt upon, satirize, deride or burlesque [the] flag,” Iowa Code § 32.1.

The court held that defendant’s conduct constituted “symbolic speech.” The court, in reversing the conviction, said:

“Someone in Newton might be so intemperate as to disrupt the peace because of this display. But if absolute assurance of tranquility is required, we may as well forget about free speech. Under such a requirement, the only 'free’ speech would consist of platitudes. That kind of speech does not need constitutional protection.” 212 N. W. 2d, at 521.

That view is precisely my own. Hence I concur in reversing this judgment of conviction.

Mr. Chief Justice Burger,

dissenting.

If the constitutional role of this Court were to strike, down unwise laws or restrict unwise application of some laws, I could agree with the result reached by the Court. That is not our function, however, and it should be left to each State and ultimately the common sense of its people to decide how the flag, as a symbol of national unity, should be protected.

Mr. Justice Rehnquist,

dissenting.

The Court holds that a Washington statute prohibiting 'persons from attaching material to the American flag was unconstitutionally applied to appellant. Although I agree with the Court that appellant’s activity was a form of communication, I do not agree that the First *417Amendment prohibits the State from restricting this activity in furtherance of other important interests. And I believe the rationale by which the Court reaches its conclusion is unsound.

“[T]he right of free speech is not absolute at all times and under all circumstances.” Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568, 571 (1942). This Court has long recognized, for example, that some forms of expression are not entitled to any protection at all under the First Amendment, despite the fact that they could reasonably be thought protected under its literal language. See Both v. United States, 354 U. S. 476 (1957). The Court has further recognized that even protected speech may be subject to reasonable limitation when important countervailing interests are involved. Citizens are not completely free to commit perjury, to libel other citizens, to infringe copyrights, to incite riots, or to interfere unduly with passage through a public thoroughfare. The right of free speech, though precious, remains subject to reasonable accommodation to other valued interests.

Since a State concededly may impose some limitations on speech directly, it would seem to follow a fortiori that a State may legislate to protect important state interests even though an incidental limitation on free speech results. Virtually any law enacted by a State, when viewed with sufficient ingenuity, could be thought to interfere with some citizen’s preferred means of expression. But no one would argue, I presume, that a State could not prevent the painting of public buildings simply because a particular class of protesters believed their message would best be conveyed through that medium. Had appellant here chosen to tape his peace symbol to a federal courthouse, I have little doubt that he could be prosecuted under a statute properly drawn to protect public property.

*418Yet the Court today holds that the State of Washington cannot limit use of the American flag, at least insofar as its statute prevents appellant from using a privately owned flag to convey his personal message. Expressing its willingness to assume, arguendo, that Washington has a valid interest in preserving the integrity of the flag, the Court nevertheless finds that interest to be insufficient in this case. To achieve this result the Court first devalues the State’s interest under these circumstances, noting that “no interest the State may have in preserving the physical integrity of a privately owned flag was significantly impaired on these facts . . . .” The Court takes pains to point out that appellant did not “permanently disfigure the flag or destroy it,” and emphasizes that the flag was displayed “in a way closely analogous to the manner in which flags have always been used to convey ideas.” The Court then restates the notion that such state interests are secondary to messages which are “direct, likely to be understood, and within the contours of the First Amendment.” Ante, at 415. In my view the first premise demonstrates a total misunderstanding of the State’s interest in the integrity of the American flag, and the second premise places the Court in the position either of ultimately favoring appellant’s message because of its subject matter, a position about which almost all members of the majority have only recently expressed doubt, or, alternatively, of making the flag available for a limitless succession of political and commercial messages. I shall treat these issues in reverse order.

The statute under which appellant was convicted is no stranger to this Court, a virtually identical statute having been before the Court in Halter v. Nebraska, 205 U. S. 34 (1907). In that case the Court held that the State of Nebraska could enforce its statute to prevent use of a flag representation on beer bottles, stating flatly that “a State will be wanting in care for the well-being of its people if *419it ignores the fact that they regard the flag as a symbol of their country’s power and prestige . . . Id,., at 42. The Court then continued: “Such an use tends to degrade and cheapen the flag in the estimation of the people, as well as to defeat the object of maintaining it as an emblem of National power and National honor.” Ibid.

The Court today finds Halter irrelevant to the present case, pointing out that it was decided almost 20 years before the First Amendment was applied to the States and further noting that it involved “commercial behavior,” a form of expression the Court presumably will consider another day.1 Insofar as Halter assesses the State’s interest, of course, the Court’s argument is simply beside the point. But even as the argument relates to appellant’s interest, I find it somewhat difficult to grasp. The Court may possibly be suggesting that political expression deserves greater protection than other forms of expression, but that suggestion would seem quite inconsistent with the position taken in Lehman v. Shaker Heights, ante, p. 298,2 by nearly all Members of the major*420ity in the instant case. Yet if the Court is suggesting that Halter would now be decided differently, and that the State's interest in the flag falls before any speech which is “direct, likely to be understood, and within the contours of the First Amendment,’' that view would mean the flag could be auctioned as a background to anyone willing and able to buy or copy one. I find it hard to believe the Court intends to presage that result.

Turning to the question of the State’s interest in the flag, it seems to me that the Court’s treatment lacks all substance. The suggestion that the State’s interest somehow diminishes when the flag is decorated with removable tape trivializes something which is not trivial. The State of Washington is hardly seeking to protect the flag’s resale value, and yet the Court’s emphasis on the lack of actual damage to the flag suggests that this is a significant aspect of the State’s interest. Surely the Court does not mean to imply that appellant could be prosecuted if he subsequently tore the flag in the process of trying to take the tape off. Unlike flag-desecration statutes, which the Court correctly notes are not at issue in this case, the Washington statute challenged here seeks to prevent personal use of the flag, not simply particular forms of abuse. The State of Washington has chosen to set the flag apart for a special purpose, and has directed that it not be turned into a common background for an *421endless variety of superimposed messages. The physical condition of the flag itself is irrelevant to that purpose.

The true nature of the State’s interest in this case is not only one of preserving “the physical integrity of the flag,” 3 but also one of preserving the flag as “an important symbol of nationhood and unity.” 4 Although the Court treats this important interest with a studied inattention, it is hardly one of recent invention and has previously been accorded considerable respect by this Court. In Halter, for example, the Court stated:

“As the statute in question evidently had its origin in a purpose to cultivate a feeling of patriotism among the people of Nebraska, we are unwilling to adjudge that in legislation for that purpose the State erred in duty or has infringed the constitutional right of anyone. On the contrary, it may reasonably be affirmed that a duty rests upon each State in every legal way to encourage its people to love the Union with which the State is indissolubly connected.” 205 U. S., at 43.

There was no question in Halter of physical impairment of a flag since no actual flag was even involved. And it certainly would have made no difference to the Court’s discussion of the State’s interest if the plaintiff in error in that case had chosen to advertise his product by decorating the flag with beer bottles fashioned from some removable substance.5 It is the character, not the cloth, of the flag which the State seeks to protect.

*422The value of this interest has been emphasized in recent as well as distant times. Mr. Justice Fortas, for example, noted in Street v. New York, 394 U. S. 576, 616 (1969), that “the flag is a special kind of personalty,” a form of property “burdened with peculiar obligations and restrictions.” Id., at 617 (dissenting opinion).6 Mr. Justice White has observed that “ [t]he flag is a national property, and the Nation may regulate those who would make, imitate, sell, possess, or use it.” Smith v. Goguen, 415 U. S., at 587 (concurring in judgment). I agree. What appellant here seeks is simply license to use the flag however he pleases, so long as the activity can be tied to a concept of speech, regardless of any state interest in having the flag used only for more limited purposes. I find no reasoning in the Court’s opinion which convinces me that the Constitution requires such license to be given.

The fact that the State has a valid interest in preserving the character of the flag does not mean, of course, that it can employ all conceivable means to enforce it. It certainly could not require all citizens to own the flag or compel citizens to salute one. Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624 (1943). It presumably cannot punish criticism of the flag, or the principles for which it stands, any more than it coulcL punish criticism of this country’s policies or ideas. But the statute in this case demands no such allegiance. Its operation does not depend upon whether the flag is used for communicative or noncommunicative purposes; upon whether a particular message is deemed commercial or political; upon whether the use of the flag is respectful or contemptuous; or upon whether any particular seg*423ment of the State’s citizenry might applaud or oppose the intended message.7 It simply withdraws a unique national symbol from the roster of materials that may be used as a background for communications. Since I do not believe the Constitution prohibits Washington from making that decision, I dissent.

*399Justice Brennan

delivered the opinion of the Court.

After publicly burning an American flag as a means of political protest, Gregory Lee Johnson was convicted of desecrating a flag in violation of Texas law. This case presents the question whether his conviction is consistent with the First Amendment. We hold that it is not.

I

While the Republican National Convention was taking place in Dallas in 1984, respondent Johnson participated in a political demonstration dubbed the “Republican War Chest Tour.” As explained in literature distributed by the demonstrators and in speeches made by them, the purpose of this event was to protest the policies of the Reagan administration and of certain Dallas-based corporations. The demonstrators marched through the Dallas streets, chanting political slogans and stopping at several corporate locations to stage “die-ins” intended to dramatize the consequences of nuclear war. On several occasions they spray-painted the walls of buildings and overturned potted plants, but Johnson himself took no part in such activities. He did, however, accept an American flag handed to him by a fellow protestor who had taken it from a flagpole outside one of the targeted buildings.

The demonstration ended in front of Dallas City Hall, where Johnson unfurled the American flag, doused it with kerosene, and set it on fire. While the flag burned, the' protestors chanted: “America, the red, white, and blue, we spit on you.” After the demonstrators dispersed, a witness to the flag burning collected the flag’s remains and buried them in his backyard. No one was physically injured or threatened with injury, though several witnesses testified that they had been seriously offended by the flag burning.

*400Of the approximately 100 demonstrators, Johnson alone was charged with a crime. The only criminal offense with which he was charged was the desecration of a venerated object in violation of Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 42.09(a)(3) (1989).1 After a trial, he was convicted, sentenced to one year in prison, and fined $2,000. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth District of Texas at Dallas affirmed Johnson’s conviction, 706 S. W. 2d 120 (1986), but the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reversed, 755 S. W. 2d 92 (1988), holding that the State could not, consistent with the First Amendment, punish Johnson for burning the flag in these circumstances.

The Court of Criminal Appeals began by recognizing that Johnson’s conduct was symbolic speech protected by the First Amendment: “Given the context of an organized demonstration, speeches, slogans, and the distribution of literature, anyone who observed appellant’s act would have understood the message that appellant intended to convey. The act for which appellant was convicted was clearly ‘speech’ contemplated by the First Amendment.” Id., at 95. To justify Johnson’s conviction for engaging in symbolic speech, the State asserted two interests: preserving the flag as a symbol of national unity and preventing breaches of the peace. The Court of Criminal Appeals held that neither interest supported his conviction.

*401Acknowledging that this Court had not yet decided whether the Government may criminally sanction flag desecration in order to preserve the flag’s symbolic value, the Texas court nevertheless concluded that our decision in West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624 (1943), suggested that furthering this interest by curtailing speech was impermissible. “Recognizing that the right to differ is the centerpiece of our First Amendment freedoms,” the court explained, “a government cannot mandate by fiat a feeling of unity in its citizens. Therefore, that very same government cannot carve out a symbol of unity and prescribe a set of approved messages to be associated with that symbol when it cannot mandate the status or feeling the symbol purports to represent.” 755 S. W. 2d, at 97. Noting that the State had not shown that the flag was in “grave and immediate danger,” Barnette, supra, at 639, of being stripped of its symbolic value, the Texas court also decided that the flag’s special status was not endangered by Johnson’s conduct. 755 S. W. 2d, at 97.

As to the State’s goal of preventing breaches of the peace, the court concluded that the flag-desecration statute was not drawn narrowly enough to encompass only those flag burnings that were likely to result in a serious disturbance of the peace. And in fact, the court emphasized, the flag burning in this particular case did not threaten such a reaction. “‘Serious offense’ occurred,” the court admitted, “but there was no breach of peace nor does the record reflect that the situation was potentially explosive. One cannot equate ‘serious' offense’ with incitement to breach the peace. ” Id., at 96. The court also stressed that another Texas statute, Tex. Penal Code Ann. §42.01 (1989), prohibited breaches of the peace. Citing Boos v. Barry, 485 U. S. 312 (1988), the court decided that §42.01 demonstrated Texas’ ability to prevent disturbances of the peace without punishing this flag desecration. 755 S. W. 2d, at 96.

*402Because it reversed Johnson’s conviction on the ground that §42.09 was unconstitutional as applied to him, the state court did not address Johnson’s argument that the statute was, on its face, unconstitutionally vague and over-broad. We granted certiorari, 488 U. S. 907 (1988), and now affirm.

II

Johnson was convicted of flag desecration for burning the flag rather than for uttering insulting words.2 This fact *403somewhat complicates our consideration of his conviction under the First Amendment. We must first determine whether Johnson’s burning of the flag constituted expressive conduct, permitting him to invoke the First Amendment in challenging his conviction. See, e. g., Spence v. Washington, 418 U. S. 405, 409-411 (1974). If his conduct was expressive, we next decide whether the State’s regulation is related to the suppression of free expression. See, e. g., United States v. O’Brien, 391 U. S. 367, 377 (1968); Spence, supra, at 414, n. 8. If the State’s regulation is not related to expression, then the less stringent standard we announced in United States v. O’Brien for regulations of noncommuni-cative conduct controls. See O’Brien, supra, at 377. If it is, then we are outside of O’Brien’s test, and we must ask whether this interest justifies Johnson’s conviction under a more demanding standard.3 See Spence, supra, at 411. A *404third possibility is that the State’s asserted interest is simply not implicated on these facts, and in that event the interest drops out of the picture. See 418 U. S., at 414, n. 8.

The First Amendment literally forbids the abridgment only of “speech,” but we have long recognized that its protection does not end at the spoken or written word. While we have rejected “the view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled ‘speech’ whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea,” United States v. O’Brien, supra, at 376, we have acknowledged that conduct may be “sufficiently imbued with elements of communication to fall within the scope of the First and Fourteenth Amendments,” Spence, supra, at 409.

In deciding whether particular conduct possesses sufficient communicative elements to bring the First Amendment into play, we have asked whether “[a]n intent to convey a particularized message was present, and [whether] the likelihood was great that the message would be understood by those who viewed it.” 418 U. S., at 410-411. Hence, we have recognized the expressive nature of students’ wearing of black armbands to protest American military involvement in Vietnam, Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U. S. 503, 505 (1969); of a sit-in by blacks in a “whites only” area to protest segregation, Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U. S. 131, 141-142 (1966); of the wearing of American military uniforms in a dramatic presentation criticizing American involvement in Vietnam, Schacht v. United States, 398 U. S. 58 (1970); and of picketing about a wide variety of causes, see, e. g., Food Employees v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U. S. 308, 313-314 (1968); United States v. Grace, 461 U. S. 171, 176 (1983).

Especially pertinent to this case are our decisions recognizing the communicative nature of conduct relating to flags. Attaching a peace sign to the flag, Spence, supra, at 409-410; refusing to salute the flag, Barnette, 319 U. S., at 632; and displaying a red flag, Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359, *405368-369 (1931), we have held, all may find shelter under the First Amendment. See also Smith v. Goguen, 415 U. S. 566, 588 (1974) (White, J., concurring in judgment) (treating flag “contemptuously” by wearing pants with small flag sewn into their seat is expressive conduct). That we have had little difficulty identifying an expressive element in conduct relating to flags should not be surprising. The very purpose of a national flag is to serve as a symbol of our country; it is, one might say, “the one visible manifestation of two hundred years of nationhood.” Id., at 603 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Thus, we have observed:

“[T]he flag salute is a form of utterance. Symbolism is a primitive but effective way of communicating ideas. The use of an emblem or flag to symbolize some system, idea, institution, or personality, is a short cut from mind to mind. Causes and nations, political parties, lodges and ecclesiastical groups seek to knit the loyalty of their followings to a flag or banner, a color or design.” Barnette, supra, at 632.

Pregnant with expressive content, the flag as readily signifies this Nation as does the combination of letters found in “America.”

We have not automatically concluded, however, that any action taken with respect to our flag is expressive. Instead, in characterizing such action for First Amendment purposes, we have considered the context in which it occurred. In Spence, for example, we emphasized that Spence’s taping of a peace sign to his flag was “roughly simultaneous with and concededly triggered by the Cambodian incursion and the Kent State tragedy.” 418 U. S., at 410. The State of Washington had conceded, in fact, that Spence’s conduct was a form of communication, and we stated that “the State’s concession is inevitable on this record.” Id., at 409.

The State of Texas conceded for purposes of its oral argument in this case that Johnson’s conduct was expressive conduct, Tr. of Oral Arg. 4, and this concession seems to us as *406prudent as was Washington’s in Spence. Johnson burned an American flag as part — indeed, as the culmination — of a political demonstration that coincided with the convening of the Republican Party and its renomination of Ronald Reagan for President. The expressive, overtly political nature of this conduct was both intentional and overwhelmingly apparent. At his trial, Johnson explained his reasons for burning the flag as follows: “The American Flag was burned as Ronald Reagan was being renominated as President. And a more powerful statement of symbolic speech, whether you agree with it or not, couldn’t have been made at that time. It’s quite a just position [juxtaposition]. We had new patriotism and no patriotism.” 5 Record 656. In these circumstances, Johnson’s burning of the flag was conduct “sufficiently imbued with elements of communication,” Spence, 418 U. S., at 409, to implicate the First Amendment.

1 — I I — I

The government generally has a freer hand in restricting expressive conduct than it has in restricting the written or spoken word. See O’Brien, 391 U. S. at 376-377; Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U. S. 288, 293 (1984); Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U. S. 19, 25 (1989). It may not, however, proscribe particular conduct because it has expressive elements. “[W]hat might be termed the more generalized guarantee of freedom of expression makes the communicative nature of conduct an inadequate basis for singling out that conduct for proscription. A law directed at the communicative nature of conduct must, like a law directed at speech itself, be justified by the substantial showing of need that the First Amendment requires.” Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Watt, 227 U.. S. App. D. C. 19, 55-56, 703 F. 2d 586, 622-623 (1983) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original), rev’d sub nom. Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, supra. It is, in short, not simply the verbal or nonverbal nature of the expression, but the govern*407mental interest at stake, that helps to determine whether a restriction on that expression is valid.

Thus, although we have recognized that where “‘speech’ and ‘nonspeech’ elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms,” O’Brien, supra, at 376, we have limited the applicability of O’Brien’s relatively lenient standard to those cases in which “the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression.” Id., at 377; see also Spence, supra, at 414, n. 8. In stating, moreover, that O’Brien’s test “in the last analysis is little, if any, different from the standard applied to time, place, or manner restrictions,” Clark, supra, at 298, we have highlighted the requirement that the governmental interest in question be unconnected to expression in order to come under O’Brien’s less demanding rule.

In order to decide whether O’Brien’s test applies here, therefore, we must decide whether Texas has asserted an interest in support of Johnson’s conviction that is unrelated to the suppression of expression. If we find that an interest asserted by the State is simply not implicated on the facts before us, we need not ask whether O’Brien’s test applies. See Spence, supra, at 414, n. 8. The State offers two separate interests to justify this conviction: preventing breaches of the peace and preserving the flag as a symbol of nationhood and national unity. We hold that the first interest is not implicated on this record and that the second is related to the suppression of expression.

A

Texas claims that its interest in preventing breaches of the peace justifies Johnson’s conviction for flag desecration.4 *408However, no disturbance of the peace actually occurred or threatened to occur because of Johnson’s burning of the flag. Although the State stresses the disruptive behavior of the protestors during their march toward City Hall, Brief for Petitioner 34-36, it admits that “no actual breach of the peace occurred at the time of the flagburning or in response to the flagburning.” Id., at 34. The State’s emphasis on the protestors’ disorderly actions prior to arriving at City Hall is not only somewhat surprising given that no charges were brought on the basis of this conduct, but it also fails to show that a disturbance of the peace was a likely reaction to Johnson’s conduct. The only evidence offered by the State at trial to show the reaction to Johnson’s actions was the testimony of several persons who had been seriously offended by the flag burning. Id., at 6-7.

The State’s position, therefore, amounts to a claim that an audience that takes serious offense at particular expression is necessarily likely to disturb the peace and that the expression may be prohibited on this basis.5 Our precedents do not countenance such a presumption. On the contrary, they recognize that a principal “function of free speech under our system of government is to invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or *409even stirs people to anger.” Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U. S. 1, 4 (1949). See also Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 536, 551 (1965); Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist. 393 U. S., at 508-509; Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U. S. 611, 615 (1971); Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U. S. 46, 55-56 (1988). It would be odd indeed to conclude both that “if it is the speaker’s opinion that gives offense, that consequence is a reason for according it constitutional protection,” FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U. S. 726, 745 (1978) (opinion of Stevens, J.), and that the government may ban the expression of certain disagreeable ideas on the unsupported presumption that their very disagreeableness will provoke violence.

Thus, we have not permitted the government to assume that every expression of a provocative idea will incite a riot, but have instead required careful consideration of the actual circumstances surrounding such expression, asking whether the expression “is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.” Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U. S. 444, 447 (1969) (reviewing circumstances surrounding rally and speeches by Ku Klux Klan). To accept Texas’ arguments that it need only demonstrate “the potential for a breach of the peace,” Brief for Petitioner 37, and that every flag burning necessarily possesses that potential, would be to eviscerate our holding in Brandenburg. This we decline to do.

Nor does Johnson’s expressive conduct fall within that small class of “fighting words” that are “likely to provoke the average person to retaliation, and thereby cause a breach of the peace.” Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568, 574 (1942). No reasonable onlooker would have regarded Johnson’s generalized expression of dissatisfaction with the policies of the Federal Government as a direct personal insult or an invitation to exchange fisticuffs. See id., at 572-573; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 309 (1940); FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, supra, at 745 (opinion of Stevens, J.).

*410We thus conclude that the State’s interest in maintaining order is not implicated on these facts. The State need not worry that our holding will disable it from preserving the peace. We do not suggest that the First Amendment forbids a State to prevent “imminent lawless action.” Brandenburg, supra, at 447. And, in fact, Texas already has a statute specifically prohibiting breaches of the peace, Tex. Penal Code Ann. §42.01 (1989), which tends to confirm that Texas need not punish this flag desecration in order to keep the peace. See Boos v. Barry, 485 U. S., at 327-329.

B

The State also asserts an interest in preserving the flag as a symbol of nationhood and national unity. In Spence, we acknowledged that the government’s interest in preserving the flag’s special symbolic value “is directly related to expression in the context of activity” such as affixing a peace symbol to a flag. 418 U. S., at 414, n. 8. We are equally persuaded that this interest is related to expression in the case of Johnson’s burning of the flag. The State, apparently, is concerned that such conduct will lead people to believe either that the flag does not stand for nationhood and national unity, but instead reflects other, less positive concepts, or that the concepts reflected in the flag do not in fact exist., that is, that we do not enjoy unity as a Nation. These concerns blossom only when a person’s treatment of the flag communicates some message, and thus are related “to the suppression of free expression” within the meaning of O’Brien. We are thus outside of O’Brien’s test altogether.

H-i <

It remains to consider whether the State s interest m preserving the flag as a symbol of nationhood and national unity justifies Johnson’s conviction.

As in Spence, “[w]e are confronted with a case of prosecution for the expression of an idea through activity,” and “[a]c-cordingly, we must examine with particular care the inter*411ests advanced by [petitioner] to support its prosecution.” 418 U. S., at 411. Johnson was not, we add, prosecuted for the expression of just any idea; he was prosecuted for his expression of dissatisfaction with the policies of this country, expression situated at the core of our First Amendment values. See, e. g., Boos v. Barry, supra, at 318; Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U. S. 474, 479 (1988).

Moreover, Johnson was prosecuted because he knew that his politically charged expression would cause “serious offense.” If he had burned the flag as a means of disposing of it because it was dirty or torn, he would not have been convicted of flag desecration under this Texas law: federal law designates burning as the preferred means of disposing of a flag “when it is in such condition that it is no longer a fitting emblem for display,” 36 U. S. C. § 176(k), and Texas has no quarrel with this means of disposal. Brief for Petitioner 45. The Texas law is thus not aimed at protecting the physical integrity of the flag in all circumstances, but is designed instead to protect it only against impairments that would cause serious offense to others.6 Texas concedes as much: “Section 42.09(b) reaches only those severe acts of physical abuse of the flag carried out in a way likely to be offensive. The statute mandates intentional or knowing abuse, that is, the kind of mistreatment that is not innocent, but rather is intentionally designed to seriously offend other individuals.” Id., at 44.

Whether Johnson’s treatment of the flag violated Texas law thus depended on the likely communicative impact of his expressive conduct.7 Our decision in Boos v. Barry, supra, *412tells us that this restriction on Johnson’s expression is content based. In Boos, we considered the constitutionality of a law prohibiting “the display of any sign within 500 feet of a foreign embassy if that sign tends to bring that foreign government into ‘public odium’ or ‘public disrepute.’” Id., at 315. Rejecting the argument that the law was content neutral because it was justified by “our international law obligation to shield diplomats from speech that offends their dignity,” id., at 320, we held that “[t]he emotive impact of speech on its audience is not a ‘secondary effect’ ” unrelated to the content of the expression itself. Id., at 321 (plurality opinion); see also id., at 334 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).

According to the principles announced in Boos, Johnson’s political expression was restricted because of the content of the message he conveyed. We must therefore subject the State’s asserted interest in preserving the special symbolic character of the flag to “the most exacting scrutiny.” Boos v. Barry, supra, at 321.8

*413Texas argues that its interest in preserving the flag as a symbol of nationhood and national unity survives this close analysis. Quoting extensively from the writings of this Court chronicling the flag’s historic and symbolic role in our society, the State emphasizes the “'special place’” reserved for the flag in our Nation. Brief for Petitioner 22, quoting Smith v. Goguen, 415 U. S., at 601 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The State’s argument is not that it has an interest simply in maintaining the flag as a symbol of something, no matter what it symbolizes; indeed, if that were the State’s position, it would be difficult to see how that interest is endangered by highly symbolic conduct such as Johnson’s. Rather, the State’s claim is that it has an interest in preserving the flag as a symbol of nationhood and national unity, a symbol with a determinate range of meanings. Brief for Petitioner 20-24. According to Texas, if one physically treats the flag in a way that would tend to cast doubt on either the idea that nationhood and national unity are the flag’s referents or that national unity actually exists, the message conveyed thereby is a harmful one and therefore may be prohibited.9

*414If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable. See, e. g., Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U. S., at 55-56; City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U. S. 789, 804 (1984); Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U. S. 60, 65, 72 (1983); Carey v. Brown, 447 U. S. 455, 462-463 (1980); FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U. S., at 745-746; Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U. S. 50, 63-65, 67-68 (1976) (plurality opinion); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 16-17 (1976); Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U. S. 104, 115 (1972); Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U. S. 92, 95 (1972); Bachellar v. Maryland, 397 U. S. 564, 567 (1970); O’Brien, 391 U. S., at 382; Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U. S., at 142-143; Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S., at 368-369.

We have not recognized an exception to this principle even where our flag has been involved. In Street v. New York, 394 U. S. 576 (1969), we held that a State may not criminally punish a person for uttering words critical of the flag. Rejecting the argument that the conviction could be sustained on the ground that Street had “failed to show the respect for our national symbol which may properly be demanded of every citizen,” we concluded that “the constitutionally guaranteed ‘freedom to be intellectually . . . diverse or even contrary,’ and the ‘right to differ as to things that touch the heart of the existing order,’ encompass the freedom to express publicly one’s opinions about our flag, including those opinions which are defiant or contemptuous.” Id., at 593, quoting Barnette, 319 U. S., at 642. Nor may the government, we have held, compel conduct that would evince respect for the flag. “To sustain the compulsory flag salute we are required to say that a Bill of Rights which guards the individual’s right to speak his own mind, left it open to public authorities to compel him to utter what is not in his mind.” Id., at 634.

*415In holding in Barnette that the Constitution did not leave this course open to the government, Justice Jackson described one of our society’s defining principles in words deserving of their frequent repetition: “If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.” Id., at 642. In Spence, we held that the same interest asserted by Texas here was insufficient to support a criminal conviction under a flag-misuse statute for the taping of a peace sign to an American flag. “Given the protected character of [Spence’s] expression and in light of the fact that no interest the State may have in preserving the physical integrity of a privately owned flag was significantly impaired on these facts,” we held, “the conviction must be invalidated.” 418 U. S., at 415. See also Goguen, supra, at 588 (White, J., concurring in judgment) (to convict person who had sewn a flag onto the seat of his pants for “contemptuous” treatment of the flag would be “[t]o convict not to protect the physical integrity or to protect against acts interfering with the proper use of the flag, but to punish for communicating ideas unacceptable to the controlling majority in the legislature”).

In short, nothing in our precedents suggests that a State may foster its own view of the flag by prohibiting expressive conduct relating to it.10 To bring its argument outside our *416precedents, Texas attempts to convince us that even if its interest in preserving the flag’s symbolic role does not allow it to prohibit words or some expressive conduct critical of the flag, it does permit it to forbid the outright destruction of the flag. The State’s argument cannot depend here on the distinction between written or spoken words and nonverbal conduct. That distinction, we have shown, is of no moment where the nonverbal conduct is expressive, as it is here, and where the regulation of that conduct is related to expression, as it is here. See supra, at 402-403. In addition, both Bar-nette and Spence involved expressive conduct, not only verbal communication, and both found that conduct protected.

Texas’ focus on the precise nature of Johnson’s expression, moreover, misses the point of our prior decisions: their enduring lesson, that the government may not prohibit expression simply because it disagrees with its message, is not dependent on the particular mode in which one chooses to express an idea.11 If we were to hold that a State may forbid flag burning wherever it is likely to endanger the flag’s symbolic role, but allow it wherever burning a flag promotes that role — as where, for example, a person ceremoniously burns a dirty flag — we would be saying that when it comes to impairing the flag’s physical integrity, the flag itself may be used as *417a symbol — as a substitute for the written or spoken word or a “short cut from mind to mind” — only in one direction. We would be permitting a State to “prescribe what shall be orthodox” by saying that one may burn the flag to convey one’s attitude toward it and its referents only if one does not endanger the flag’s representation of nationhood and national unity.

We never before have held that the Government may ensure that a symbol be used to express only one view of that symbol or its referents. Indeed, in Schacht v. United States, we invalidated a federal statute permitting an actor portraying a member of one of our Armed Forces to “‘wear the uniform of that armed force if the portrayal does not tend to discredit that armed force.’” 398 U. S., at 60, quoting 10 U. S. C. § 772(f). This proviso, we held, “which leaves Americans free to praise the war in Vietnam but can send persons like Schacht to prison for opposing it, cannot survive in a country which has the First Amendment.” Id., at 63.

We perceive no basis on which to hold that the principle underlying our decision in Schacht does not apply to this case. To conclude that the government may permit designated symbols to be used to communicate only a limited set of messages would be to enter territory having no discernible or defensible boundaries. Could the government, on this theory, prohibit the burning of state flags? Of copies of the Presidential seal? Of the Constitution? In evaluating these choices under the First Amendment, how would we decide which symbols were sufficiently special to warrant this unique status? To do so, we would be forced to consult our own political preferences, and impose them on the citizenry, in the very way that the First Amendment forbids us to do. See Carey v. Brown, 447 U. S., at 466-467.

There is, moreover, no indication — either in the text of the Constitution or in our cases interpreting it — that a separate juridical category exists for the American flag alone. Indeed, we would not be surprised to learn that the persons *418who framed our Constitution and wrote the Amendment that we now construe were not known for their reverence for the Union Jack. The First Amendment does not guarantee that other concepts virtually sacred to our Nation as a whole— such as the principle that discrimination on the basis of race is odious and destructive — will go unquestioned in the marketplace of ideas. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U. S. 444 (1969). We decline, therefore, to create for the flag an exception to the joust of principles protected by the First Amendment.

It is not the State’s ends, but its means, to which we object. It cannot be gainsaid that there is a special place reserved for the flag in this Nation, and thus we do not doubt that the government has a legitimate interest in making efforts to “presence] the national flag as an unalloyed symbol of our country.” Spence, 418 U. S., at 412. We reject the suggestion, urged at oral argument by counsel for Johnson, that the government lacks “any state interest whatsoever” in regulating the manner in which the flag may be displayed. Tr. of Oral Arg. 38. Congress has, for example, enacted precatory regulations describing the proper treatment of the flag, see 36 U. S. C. §§ 173-177, and we cast no doubt on the legitimacy of its interest in making such recommendations. To say that the government has an interest in encouraging proper treatment of the flag, however, is not to say that it may criminally punish a person for burning a flag as a means of political protest. “National unity as an end which officials may foster by persuasion and example is not in question. The problem is whether under our Constitution compulsion as here employed is a permissible means for its achievement.” Barnette, 319 U. S., at 640.

We are fortified in today’s conclusion by our conviction that forbidding criminal punishment for conduct such as Johnson’s will not endanger the special role played by our flag or the feelings it inspires. To paraphrase Justice Holmes, we submit that nobody can suppose that this one gesture of an un*419known man will change our Nation’s attitude towards its flag. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U. S. 616, 628 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). Indeed, Texas’ argument that the burning of an American flag “ ‘is an act having a high likelihood to cause a breach of the peace,’ ” Brief for Petitioner 31, quoting Sutherland v. DeWulf, 323 F. Supp. 740, 745 (SD Ill. 1971) (citation omitted), and its statute’s implicit assumption that physical mistreatment of the flag will lead to “serious offense,” tend to confirm that the flag’s special role is not in danger; if it were, no one would riot or take offense because a flag had been burned.

We are tempted to say, in fact, that the flag’s deservedly cherished place in our community will be strengthened, not weakened, by our holding today. Our decision is a reaffirmation of the principles of freedom and inclusiveness that the flag best reflects, and of the conviction that our toleration of criticism such as Johnson’s is a sign and source of our strength. Indeed, one of the proudest images of our flag, the one immortalized in our own national anthem, is of the bombardment it survived at Fort McHenry. It is the Nation’s resilience, not its rigidity, that Texas sees reflected in the flag — and it is that resilience that we reassert today.

The way to preserve the flag’s special role is not to punish those who feel differently about these matters. It is to persuade them that they are wrong. “To courageous, self-reliant men, with confidence in the power of free and fearless reasoning applied through the processes of popular government, no danger flowing from speech can be deemed clear and present, unless the incidence of the evil apprehended is so imminent that it may befall before there is opportunity for full discussion. If there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence.” Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandéis, J., concurring). And, precisely because it is our flag that is involved, one’s response to the flag *420burner may exploit the uniquely persuasive power of the flag itself. We ean imagine no more appropriate response to burning a flag than waving one’s own, no better way to counter a flag burner’s message than by saluting the flag that burns, no surer means of preserving the dignity even of the flag that burned than by — as one witness here did — according its remains a respectful burial. We do not consecrate the flag by punishing its desecration, for in doing so we dilute the freedom that this cherished emblem represents.

V

Johnson was convicted for engaging in expressive conduct. The State’s interest in preventing breaches of the peace does not support his conviction because Johnson’s conduct did not threaten to disturb the peace. Nor does the State’s interest in preserving the flag as a symbol of nationhood and national unity justify his criminal conviction for engaging in political expression. The judgment of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals is therefore

Affirmed.

Justice Kennedy,

concurring.

I write not to qualify the words Justice Brennan chooses so well, for he says with power all that is necessary to explain our ruling. I join his opinion without reservation, but with a keen sense that this case, like others before us from time to time, exacts its personal toll. This prompts me to add to our pages these few remarks.

The case before us illustrates better than most that the judicial power is often difficult in its exercise. We cannot here ask another Branch to share responsibility, as when the argument is made that a statute is flawed or incomplete. For we are presented with a clear and simple statute to be judged against a pure command of the Constitution. The outcome can be laid at no door but ours.

The hard fact is that sometimes we must make decisions we do not like. We make them because they are right, right *421in the sense that the law and the Constitution, as we see them, compel the result. And so great is our commitment to the process that, except in the rare case, we do not pause to express distaste for the result, perhaps for fear of undermining a valued principle that dictates the decision. This is one of those rare cases.

Our colleagues in dissent advance powerful arguments why respondent may be convicted for his expression, reminding us that among those who will be dismayed by our holding will be some who have had the singular honor of carrying the flag in battle. And I agree that the flag holds a lonely place of honor in an age when absolutes are distrusted and simple truths are burdened by unneeded apologetics.

With all respect to those views, I do not believe the Constitution gives us the right to rule as the dissenting Members of the Court urge, however painful this judgment is to announce. Though symbols often are what we ourselves make of them, the flag is constant in expressing beliefs Americans share, beliefs in law and peace and that freedom which sustains the human spirit. The case here today forces recognition of the costs to which those beliefs commit us. It is poignant but fundamental that the flag protects those who hold it in contempt.

For all the record shows, this respondent was not a philosopher and perhaps did not even possess the ability to comprehend how repellent his statements must be to the Republic itself. But whether or not he could appreciate the enormity of the offense he gave, the fact -remains that his acts were speech, in both the technical and the fundamental meaning of the Constitution. So I agree with the Court that he must go free.

Chief Justice Rehnquist,

dissenting.

In holding this Texas statute unconstitutional, the Court ignores Justice Holmes’ familiar aphorism that “a page of history is worth a volume of logic.” New York Trust Co. v. *422Eisner, 256 U. S. 345, 349 (1921). For more than 200 years, the American flag has occupied a unique position as the symbol of our Nation, a uniqueness that justifies a governmental prohibition against flag burning in the way respondent Johnson did here.

At the time of the American Revolution, the flag served to unify the Thirteen Colonies at home, while obtaining recognition of national sovereignty abroad. Ralph Waldo Emerson’s “Concord Hymn” describes the first skirmishes of the Revolutionary War in these lines:

“By the rude bridge that arched the flood Their flag to April’s breeze unfurled,

Here once the embattled farmers stood And fired the shot heard round the world.”

During that time, there were many colonial and regimental flags, adorned with such symbols as pine trees, beavers, anchors, and rattlesnakes, bearing slogans such as “Liberty or Death,” “Hope,” “An Appeal to Heaven,” and “Don’t Tread on Me.” The first distinctive flag of the Colonies was the “Grand Union Flag” — with 13 stripes and a British flag in the left corner — which was flown for the first time on January 2, 1776, by troops of the Continental Army around Boston. By June 14, 1777, after we declared our independence from England, the Continental Congress resolved:

“That the flag of the thirteen United States be thirteen stripes, alternate red and white: that the union be thirteen stars, white in a blue field, representing a new constellation.” 8 Journal of the Continental Congress 1774-1789, p. 464 (W. Ford ed. 1907).

One immediate result of the flag’s adoption was that American vessels harassing British shipping sailed under an authorized national flag. Without such a flag, the British could treat captured seamen as pirates and hang them summarily; with a national flag, such seamen were treated as prisoners of war.

*423During the War of 1812, British naval forces sailed up Chesapeake Bay and marched overland to sack and burn the city of Washington. They then sailed up the Patapsco River to invest the city of Baltimore, but to do so it was first necessary to reduce Fort McHenry in Baltimore Harbor. Francis Scott Key, a Washington lawyer, had been granted permission by the British to board one of their warships to negotiate the release of an American who had been taken prisoner. That night, waiting anxiously on the British ship, Key watched the British fleet firing on Fort McHenry. Finally, at daybreak, he saw the fort’s American flag still flying; the British attack had failed. Intensely moved, he began to scribble on the back of an envelope the poem that became our national anthem:

“0 say can you see by the dawn’s early light

What so proudly we hail’d at the twilight’s last gleaming,

Whose broad stripes & bright stars through the perilous fight

O’er the ramparts we watch’d, were so gallantly streaming?

And the rocket’s red glare, the bomb bursting in air,

Gave proof through the night that our flag was still there,

0 say does that star-spangled banner yet wave

O’er the land of the free & the home of the brave?”

The American flag played a central role in our Nation’s most tragic conflict, when the North fought against the South. The lowering of the American flag at Fort Sumter was viewed as the start of the war. G. Preble, History of the Flag of the United States of America 453 (1880). The Southern States, to formalize their separation from the Union, adopted the “Stars and Bars” of the Confederacy. The Union troops marched to the sound of “Yes We’ll Rally Round The Flag Boys, We’ll Rally Once Again.” President Abraham Lincoln refused proposals to remove from the *424American flag the stars representing the rebel States, because he considered the conflict not a war between two nations but an attack by 11 States against the National Government. Id., at 411. By war’s end, the American flag again flew over “an indestructible union, composed of indestructible states.” Texas v. White, 7 Wall. 700, 725 (1869).

One of the great stories of the Civil War is told in John Greenleaf Whittier’s poem, “Barbara Frietchie”:

“Up from the meadows rich with corn,

Clear in the cool September morn,

The clustered spires of Frederick stand

Green-walled by the hills of Maryland.

Round about them orchards sweep,

Apple- and peach-tree fruited deep,

Fair as a garden of the Lord

To the eyes of the famished rebel horde,

On that pleasant morn of the early fall

When Lee marched over the mountain wall, —

Over the mountains winding down,

Horse and foot, into Frederick town.

Forty flags with their silver stars,

Forty flags with their crimson bars,

Flapped in the morning wind: the sun

Of noon looked down, and saw not one.

Up rose old Barbara Frietchie then,

Bowed with her fourscore years and ten;

Bravest of all in Frederick town,

She took up the flag the men hauled down;

In her attic-window the staff she set,

To show that one heart was loyal yet.

Up the street came the rebel tread,

Stonewall Jackson riding ahead.

Under his slouched hat left and right

He glanced: the old flag met his sight.

‘Halt!’ — the dust-brown ranks stood fast.

‘Fire!’ — out blazed the rifle-blast.

*425It shivered the window, pane and sash;

It rent the banner with seam and gash.

Quick, as it fell, from the broken staff Dame Barbara snatched the silken scarf;

She leaned far out on the window-sill,

And shook it forth with a royal will.

‘Shoot, if you must, this old gray head,

But spare your country’s flag,’ she said.

A shade of sadness, a blush of shame,

Over the face of the leader came;

The nobler nature within him stirred

To life at that woman’s deed and word:

‘Who touches a hair of yon gray head

Dies like a dog! March on! ’ he said.

All day long through Frederick street

Sounded the tread of marching feet:

All day long that free flag tost

Over the heads of the rebel host.

Ever its torn folds rose and fell

On the loyal winds that loved it well;

And through the hill-gaps sunset light

Shone over it with a warm good-night.

Barbara Frietchie’s work is o’er,

And the Rebel rides on his raids no more.

Honor to her! and let a tear

Fall, for her sake, on Stonewall’s bier.

Over Barbara Frietchie’s grave,

Flag of Freedom and Union, wave!

Peace and order and beauty draw

Round thy symbol of light and law;

And ever the stars above look down

On thy stars below in Frederick town!”

In the First and Second World Wars, thousands of our countrymen died on foreign soil fighting for the American cause. At Iwo Jima in the Second World War, United States Marines fought hand to hand against thousands of *426Japanese. By the time the Marines reached the top of Mount Suribachi, they raised a piece of pipe upright and from one end fluttered a flag. That ascent had cost nearly 6,000 American lives. The Iwo Jima Memorial in Arlington National Cemetery memorializes that event. President Franklin Roosevelt authorized the use of the flag on labels, packages, cartons, and containers intended for export as lend-lease aid, in order to inform people in other countries of the United States’ assistance. Presidential Proclamation No. 2605, 58 Stat. 1126.

During the Korean war, the successful amphibious landing of American troops at Inchon was marked by the raising of an American flag within an hour of the event. Impetus for the enactment of the Federal Flag Desecration Statute in 1967 came from the impact of flag burnings in the United States on troop morale in Vietnam. Representative L. Mendel Rivers, then Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, testified that “[t]he burning of the flag . . . has caused my mail to increase 100 percent from the boys in Vietnam, writing me and asking me what is going on in America.” Desecration of the Flag, Hearings on H. R. 271 before Subcommittee No. 4 of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 189 (1967). Representative Charles Wiggins stated: “The public act of desecration of our flag tends to undermine the morale of American troops. That this finding is true can be attested by many Members who have received correspondence from servicemen expressing their shock and disgust of such conduct.” 113 Cong. Rec. 16459 (1967).

The flag symbolizes the Nation in peace as well as in war. It signifies our national presence on battleships, airplanes, military installations, and public buildings from the United States Capitol to the thousands of county courthouses and city halls throughout the country. Two flags are prominently placed in our courtroom. Countless flags are placed by the graves of loved ones each year on what was first called *427Decoration Day, and is now called Memorial Day. The flag is traditionally placed on the casket of deceased members of the Armed Forces, and it is later given to the deceased’s family. 10 U. S. C. §§ 1481, 1482. Congress has provided that the flag be flown at half-staff upon the death of the President, Vice President, and other government officials “as a mark of respect to their memory.” 36 U. S. C. § 175(m). The flag identifies United States merchant ships, 22 U. S. C. §454, and “[t]he laws of the Union protect our commerce wherever the flag of the country may float.” United States v. Guthrie, 17 How. 284, 309 (1855).

No other American symbol has been as universally honored as the flag. In 1931, Congress declared “The Star-Spangled Banner” to be our national anthem. 36 U. S. C. § 170. In 1949, Congress declared June 14th to be Flag Day. § 157. In 1987, John Philip Sousa’s “The Stars and Stripes Forever” was designated as the national march. Pub. L. 101-186, 101 Stat. 1286. Congress has also established “The Pledge of Allegiance to the Flag” and the manner of its deliverance. 36 U. S. C. § 172. The flag has appeared as the principal symbol on approximately 33 United States postal stamps and in the design of at least 43 more, more times than any other symbol. United States Postal Service, Definitive Mint Set 15 (1988).

Both Congress and the States have enacted numerous laws regulating misuse of the American flag. Until 1967, Congress left the regulation of misuse of the flag up to the States. Now, however, 18 U. S. C. § 700(a) provides that:

“Whoever knowingly casts contempt upon any flag of the United States by publicly mutilating, defacing, defiling, burning, or trampling upon it shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both.”

Congress has also prescribed, inter alia, detailed rules for the design of the flag, 4 U. S. C. § 1, the time and occasion of flag’s display, 36 U. S. C. § 174, the position and manner of *428its display, § 175, respect for the flag, § 176, and conduct during hoisting, lowering, and passing of the flag, § 177. With the exception of Alaska and Wyoming, all of the States now have statutes prohibiting the burning of the flag.1 Most of the state statutes are patterned after the Uniform Flag Act of 1917, which in §3 provides: “No person shall publicly mutilate, deface, defile, defy, trample upon, or by word or act cast contempt upon any such flag, standard, color, ensign or shield.” Proceedings of National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 323-324 (1917). Most were passed by the States at about the time of World War I. Rosenblatt, Flag Desecration Statutes: History and Analysis, 1972 Wash. U. L. Q. 193, 197.

*429The American flag, then, throughout more than 200 years of our history, has come to be the visible symbol embodying our Nation. It does not represent the views of any particular political party, and it does not represent any particular political philosophy. The flag is not simply another “idea” or “point of view” competing for recognition in the marketplace of ideas. Millions and millions of Americans regard it with an almost mystical reverence regardless of what sort of social, political, or philosophical beliefs they may have. I cannot agree that the First Amendment invalidates the Act of Congress, and the laws of 48 of the 50 States, which make criminal the public burning of the flag.

More than 80 years ago in Halter v. Nebraska, 205 U. S. 34 (1907), this Court upheld the constitutionality of a Nebraska statute that forbade the use of representations of the American flag for advertising purposes upon articles of merchandise. The Court there said:

“For that flag every true American has not simply an appreciation but a deep affection. . . . Hence, it has often occurred that insults to a flag have been the cause of war, and indignities put upon it, in the presence of those who revere it, have often been resented and sometimes punished on the spot.” Id., at 41.

Only two Terms ago, in San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Committee, 483 U. S. 522 (1987), the Court held that Congress could grant exclusive use of the word “Olympic” to the United States Olympic Committee. The Court thought that this “restrictio[n] on expressive speech properly [was] characterized as incidental to the primary congressional purpose of encouraging and rewarding the USOC’s activities.” Id., at 536. As the Court stated, “when a word [or symbol] acquires value ‘as the result of organization and the expenditure of labor, skill, and money’ by an entity, that entity constitutionally may obtain a limited property right in the word [or symbol].” Id., at 532, quoting International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 *430U. S. 215, 239 (1918). Surely Congress or the States may recognize a similar interest in the flag.

But the Court insists that the Texas statute prohibiting the public burning of the American flag infringes on respondent Johnson’s freedom of expression. Such freedom, of course, is not absolute. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U. S. 47 (1919). In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568 (1942), a unanimous Court said:

“Allowing the broadest scope to the language and purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment, it is well understood that the right of free speech is not absolute at all times and under all circumstances. There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or ‘fighting’ words — those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. It has been well observed that such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.” Id., at 571-572 (footnotes omitted).

The Court upheld Chaplinsky’s conviction under a state statute that made it unlawful to “address any offensive, derisive or annoying word to any person who is lawfully in any street or other public place.” Id., at 569. Chaplinsky had told a local marshal, “‘“You are a God damned racketeer” and a “damned Fascist and the whole government of Rochester are Fascists or agents of Fascists.’”” Ibid.

Here it may equally well be said that the public burning of the American flag by Johnson was no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and at the same time it had a tendency to incite a breach of the peace. Johnson was free to make any verbal denunciation of the flag that he wished; indeed, he was *431free to burn the flag in private. He could publicly burn other symbols of the Government or effigies of political leaders. He did lead a march through the streets of Dallas, and con-dücted a rally in front of the Dallas City Hall. He engaged in a “die-in” to protest nuclear weapons. He shouted out various slogans during the march, including: “Reagan, Món-dale which will it be? Either one means World War III”; “Ronald Reagan, killer of the hour, Perfect example of U. S. power”; and “red, white and blue, we spit on you, you stand for plunder, you will go under.” Brief for Respondent 3. For none of these acts was he arrested or prosecuted; it was only when he proceeded to burn publicly an American flag stolen from its rightful owner that he violated the Texas statute.

The Court could not, and did not, say that Chaplinsky’s utterances were not expressive phrases — they clearly and succinctly conveyed an extremely low opinion of the addressee. The same may be said of Johnson’s public burning of the flag in this case; it obviously did convey Johnson’s bitter dislike of his country. But his act, like Chaplinsky’s provocative words, conveyed nothing that could not have been conveyed and was not conveyed just as forcefully in a dozen different ways. As with “fighting words,” so with flag burning, for purposes of the First Amendment: It is “no. essential part of any exposition of ideas, and [is] of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that' may be derived from [it] is clearly outweighed” by the public interest in avoiding a probable breach of the peace. The highest courts of several States have upheld state statutes prohibiting the public burning of the flag on the grounds that it is so inherently inflammatory that it may cause a breach of public order. See, e. g., State v. Royal, 113 N. H. 224, 229, 305 A. 2d 676, 680 (1973); State v. Waterman, 190 N. W. 2d 809, 811-812 (Iowa 1971); see also State v. Mitchell, 32 Ohio App. 2d 16, 30, 288 N. E. 2d 216, 226 (1972).

*432The result of the Texas statute is obviously to deny one in Johnson’s frame of mind one of many means of “symbolic speech.” Far from being a case of “one picture being worth a thousand words,” flag burning is the equivalent of an inarticulate grunt or roar that, it seems fair to say, is most likely to be indulged in not to express any particular idea, but to antagonize others. Only five years ago we said in City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U. S. 789, 812 (1984), that “the First Amendment does not guarantee the right to employ every conceivable method of communication at all times and in all places.” The Texas statute deprived Johnson of only one rather inarticulate symbolic form of protest — a form of protest that was profoundly offensive to many — and left him with a full panoply of other symbols and every conceivable form of verbal expression to express his deep disapproval of national policy. Thus, in no way can it be said that Texas is punishing him because his hearers — or any other group of people — were profoundly opposed to the message that he sought to convey. Such opposition is no proper basis for restricting speech or expression under the First Amendment. It was Johnson’s use of this particular symbol, and not the idea that he sought to convey by it or by his many other expressions, for which he was punished.

Our prior cases dealing with flag desecration statutes have left open the question that the Court resolves today. In Street v. New York, 394 U. S. 576, 579 (1969), the defendant burned a flag in the street, shouting “We don’t need no damned flag” and “[i]f they let that happen to Meredith we don’t need an American flag.” The Court ruled that since the defendant might have been convicted solely on the basis of his words, the conviction could not stand, but it expressly reserved the question whether a defendant could constitutionally be convicted for burning the flag. Id., at 581.

Chief Justice Warren, in dissent, stated: “I believe that the States and Federal Government do have the power to protect the flag from acts of desecration and disgrace. . . . [I]t is dif*433ficult for me to imagine that, had the Court faced this issue, it would have concluded otherwise.” Id., at 605. Justices Black and Fortas also expressed their personal view that a prohibition on flag burning did not violate the Constitution. See id., at 610 (Black, J., dissenting) (“It passes my belief that anything in the Federal Constitution bars a State from making the deliberate burning of the American Flag an offense”); id., at 615-617 (Fortas, J., dissenting) (“[T]he States and the Federal Government have the power to protect the flag from acts of desecration committed in public. . . . [T]he flag is a special kind of personality. Its use is traditionally and universally subject to special rules and regulation. ... A person may ‘own’ a flag, but ownership is subject to special burdens and responsibilities. A flag may be property, in a sense; but it is property burdened with peculiar obligations and restrictions. Certainly . . . these special conditions are not per se arbitrary or beyond governmental power under our Constitution”).

In Spence v. Washington, 418 U. S. 405 (1974), the Court reversed the conviction of a college student who displayed the flag with a peace symbol affixed to it by means of removable black tape from the window of his apartment. Unlike the instant case, there was no risk of a breach of the peace, no one other than the arresting officers saw the flag, and the defendant owned the flag in question. The Court concluded that the student’s conduct was protected under the First Amendment, because “no interest the State may have in preserving the physical integrity of a privately owned flag was significantly impaired on these facts.” Id., at 415. The Court was careful to note, however, that the defendant “was not charged under the desecration statute, nor did he permanently disfigure the flag or destroy it.” Ibid.

In another related case, Smith v. Goguen, 415 U. S. 566 (1974), the appellee, who wore a small flag on the seat of his trousers, was convicted under a Massachusetts flag-misuse statute that subjected to criminal liability anyone who *434“publicly . . . treats contemptuously the flag of the United States.” Id., at 568-569. The Court affirmed the lower court’s reversal of appellee’s conviction, because the phrase “treats contemptuously” was unconstitutionally broad and vague. Id., at 576. The Court was again careful to point out that “[c]ertainly nothing prevents a legislature from defining with substantial specificity what constitutes forbidden treatment of United States flags.” Id., at 581-582. See also id., at 587 (White, J., concurring in judgment) (“The flag is a national property, and the Nation may regulate those who would make, imitate, sell, possess, or use it. I would not question those statutes which proscribe mutilation, defacement, or burning of the flag or which otherwise protect its physical integrity, without regard to whether such conduct might provoke violence. . . . There would seem to be little question about the power of Congress to forbid the mutilation of the Lincoln Memorial. . . . The flag is itself a monument, subject to similar protection”); id., at 591 (Black-mun, J., dissenting) (“Goguen’s punishment was constitutionally permissible for harming the physical integrity of the flag by wearing it affixed to the seat of his pants”).

But the Court today will have none of this. The uniquely deep awe and respect for our flag felt by virtually all of us are bundled off under the rubric of “designated symbols,” ante, at 417, that the First Amendment prohibits the government from “establishing.” But the government has not “established” this feeling; 200 years of history have done that. The government is simply recognizing as a fact the profound regard for the American flag created by that history when it enacts statutes prohibiting the disrespectful public burning of the flag.

The Court concludes its opinion with a regrettably patronizing civics lecture, presumably addressed to the Members of both Houses of Congress, the members of the 48 state legislatures that enacted prohibitions against flag burning, and the troops fighting under that flag in Vietnam who objected to its *435being burned: “The way to preserve the flag’s special role is not to punish those who feel differently about these matters. It is to persuade them that they are wrong.” Ante, at 419. The Court’s role as the final expositor of the Constitution is well established, but its role as a Platonic guardian admonishing those responsible to public opinion as if they were truant schoolchildren has no similar place in our system of government. The cry of “no taxation without representation” animated those who revolted against the English Crown to found our Nation — the idea that those who submitted to government should have some say as to what kind of laws would be passed. Surely one of the high purposes of a democratic society is to legislate against conduct that is regarded as evil and profoundly offensive to the majority of people — whether it be murder, embezzlement, pollution, or flag burning.

Our Constitution wisely places limits on powers of legislative majorities to act, but the declaration of such limits by this Court “is, at all times, a question of much delicacy, which ought seldom, if ever, to be decided in the affirmative, in a doubtful case.” Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87, 128 (1810) (Marshall, C. J.). Uncritical extension of constitutional protection to the burning of the flag risks the frustration of the very purpose for which organized governments are instituted. The Court decides that the American flag is just another symbol, about which not only must opinions pro and con be tolerated, but for which the most minimal public respect may not be enjoined. The government may conscript men into the Armed Forces where they must fight and perhaps die for the flag, but the government may not prohibit the public burning of the banner under which they fight. I would uphold the Texas statute as applied in this case.2

*436Justice Stevens,

dissenting.

As the Court analyzes this case, it presents the question whether the State of Texas, or indeed the Federal Government, has the power to prohibit the public desecration of the American flag. The question is unique. In my judgment rules that apply to a host of other symbols, such as state flags, armbands, or various privately promoted emblems of political or commercial identity, are not necessarily controlling. Even if flag burning could be considered just another species of symbolic speech under the logical application of the rules that the Court has developed in its interpretation of the First Amendment in other contexts, this case has an intangible dimension that makes those rules inapplicable.

A country’s flag is a symbol of more than “nationhood and national unity.” Ante, at 407, 410, 413, and n. 9, 417, 420. It also signifies the ideas that characterize the society that has chosen that emblem as well as the special history that has animated the growth and power of those ideas. The fleurs-de-lis and the tricolor both symbolized “nationhood and national unity,” but they had vastly different meanings. The message conveyed by some flags — the swastika, for example-may survive long after it has outlived its usefulness as a symbol of regimented unity in a particular nation.

*437So it is with the American flag. It is more than a proud symbol of the courage, the determination, and the gifts of nature that transformed 13 fledgling Colonies into a world power. It is a symbol of freedom, of equal opportunity, of religious tolerance, and of good will for other peoples who share our aspirations. The symbol carries its message to dissidents both at home and abroad who may have no interest at all in our national unity or survival.

The value of the flag as a symbol cannot be measured. Even so, I have no doubt that the interest in preserving that value for the future is both significant and legitimate. Conceivably that value will be enhanced by the Court’s conclusion that our national commitment to free expression is so strong that even the United States as ultimate guarantor of that freedom is without power to prohibit the desecration of its unique symbol. But I am unpersuaded. The creation of a federal right to post bulletin boards and graffiti on the Washington Monument might enlarge the market for free expression, but at a cost I would not pay. Similarly, in my considered judgment, sanctioning the public desecration of the flag will tarnish its value — both for those who cherish the ideas for which it waves and for those who desire to don the robes of martyrdom by burning it. That tarnish is not justified by the trivial burden on free expression occasioned by requiring that an available, alternative mode of expression— including uttering words critical of the flag, see Street v. New York, 394 U. S. 576 (1969)-be employed.

It is appropriate to emphasize certain propositions that are not implicated by this case. The statutory prohibition of flag desecration does not “prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.” West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 642 (1943). The statute does not compel any conduct or any profession of respect for any idea or any symbol.

*438Nor does the statute violate “the government’s paramount obligation of neutrality in its regulation of protected communication.” Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U. S. 50, 70 (1976) (plurality opinion). The content of respondent’s message has no relevance whatsoever to the case. The concept of “desecration” does not turn on the substance of the message the actor intends to convey, but rather on whether those who view the act will take serious offense. Accordingly, one intending to convey a message of respect for the flag by burning it in a public square might nonetheless be guilty of desecration if he knows that others — perhaps simply because they misperceive the intended message — will be seriously offended. Indeed, even if the actor knows that all possible witnesses will understand that he intends to send a message of respect, he might still be guilty of desecration if he also knows that this understanding does not lessen the offense taken by some of those witnesses. Thus, this is not a case in which the fact that “it is the speaker’s opinion that gives offense” provides a special “reason for according it constitutional protection,” FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U. S. 726, 745 (1978) (plurality opinion). The case has nothing to do with “disagreeable ideas,” see ante, at 409. It involves disagreeable conduct that, in my opinion, diminishes the value of an important national asset.

The Court is therefore quite wrong in blandly asserting that respondent “was prosecuted for his expression of dissatisfaction with the policies of this country, expression situated at the core of our First Amendment values.” Ante, at 411. Respondent was prosecuted because of the method he chose to express his dissatisfaction with those policies. Had he chosen to spray-paint — or perhaps convey with a motion picture projector — his message of dissatisfaction on the facade of the Lincoln Memorial, there would be no question about the power of the Government to prohibit his means of expression. The prohibition would be supported by the legitimate interest in preserving the quality of an important *439national asset. Though the asset at stake in this case is intangible, given its unique value, the same interest supports a prohibition on the desecration of the American flag.*

The ideas of liberty and equality have been an irresistible force in motivating leaders like Patrick Henry, Susan B. Anthony, and Abraham Lincoln, schoolteachers like Nathan Hale and Booker T. Washington, the Philippine Scouts who fought at Bataan, and the soldiers who scaled the bluff at Omaha Beach. If those ideas are worth fighting for — and our history demonstrates that they are — it cannot be true that the flag that uniquely symbolizes their power is not itself worthy of protection from unnecessary desecration.

I respectfully dissent.