2 Defenses 2 Defenses

2.1 O'Callaghan v. Waller & Beckwith Realty Co. ("The Exculpated Lessor Case") 2.1 O'Callaghan v. Waller & Beckwith Realty Co. ("The Exculpated Lessor Case")

May tort duties be altered by contracts? The following opinion explores some of the difficulties of making decisions about when, if ever, they may be.

(No. 34723.

Virginia O’Callaghan, Admrx., Appellant, vs. Waller & Beckwith Realty Company, Appellee.

Opinion filed November 26, 1958

Rehearing denied Jan. 22, 1959.

Bristow, J., and Daily, C.J., dissenting.

James A. Dooley, of Chicago, for appellant.

*437Peterson, Lowry, Rale, Barber & Ross, of Chicago, (A. R. Peterson, Owen Raee, Haroed W. Hupp, and HERBERT C. Loth, Jr., of counsel,) for appellee.

Mr. Justice Schaeper

delivered the opinion of the court:

This is an action to recover for injuries allegedly caused by the defendant’s negligence in maintaining and operating a large apartment building. Mrs. Ella O’Callaghan, a tenant in the building, was injured when she fell while crossing the paved courtyard on her way from the garage to her apartment. She instituted this action to recover for her injuries, alleging that they were caused by defective pavement in the courtyard^ Before the case was tried, Mrs. O’Callaghan died and her administratrix was substituted as plaintiff. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff in the sum of $14,000, and judgment was entered on the verdict. Defendant appealed. The Appellate Court held that the action was barred by an exculpatory clause in the lease that Mrs. O’Callaghan had signed, and that a verdict should have been directed for the defendant. (15 Ill. App. 2d 349.) It therefore reversed the judgment and remanded the cause with directions to enter judgment for the defendant. We granted leave to appeal.

In reaching its conclusion the Appellate Court relied upon our recent decision in Jackson v. First National Bank, 415 Ill. 453. There we considered the validity of such an exculpatory clause in a lease of property for business purposes. We pointed out that contracts by which one seeks to relieve himself from the consequences of his own negligence are generally enforced “unless (1) it would be against the settled public policy of the State to do so, or (2) there is something in the social relationship of the parties militating against upholding the agreement.” (415 Ill. at 460.) And we held that there was nothing in the public policy of *438the State or in the social relationship of the parties to forbid enforcement of the exculpatory clause there involved.

The exculpatory clause in the lease now before us clearly purports to relieve the lessor and its agents from any liability to the lessee for personal injuries or property damage caused by any act or neglect of the lessor or its agents. It does not appear to be amenable to the strict construction to which such clauses are frequently subjected. (See 175 A.L.R. 8, 89.) The plaintiff does not question its applicability, and she concedes that if it is valid it bars her recovery. She argues vigorously, however, that such a clause is contrary to public policy, and so invalid, in a lease of residential property.

Freedom of contract is basic to our law. But when that freedom expresses itself in a provision designed to absolve one of the parties from the consequences of his own negligence, there is danger that the standards of conduct which the law hasjdeveloped for the protection of others may be diluted. , These competing considerations have produced results that are not completely consistent. This court has refused to enforce contracts exculpating or limiting liability for negligence between common carriers and shippers of freight or paying passengers, (Chicago and Northwestern Railway Co. v. Chapman, 133 Ill. 96,) between telegraph companies and those sending messages, (Tyler, Ullman & Co. v. Western Union Telegraph Co. 60 Ill. 421,) and between masters and servants, (Campbell v. Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railway Co. 243 Ill. 620.) The obvious public interest in these relationships, coupled with the dominant position of those seeking exculpation, were compelling considerations in these decisions, which are in accord with similar results in other jurisdictions. See 175 A.L.R. 8.

On the other hand, as pointed out in tht'-Ias-kson^^ase, the relation of lessor and lessee has been considered a matter of private concern. Clauses-that exculpate the land-lord-fre-m *439the consequences of his negligence have been sustained in residential as well as commercial leases. (Manaster v. Gopin, 330 Mass. 569 (1953), 116 N.E.2d 134; Mackenzie v. Ryan, 230 Minn. 378 (1950), 41 N.W.2d 878; Kirshenbaum v. General Outdoor Adv. Co. 258 N.Y. 489 (1932), 180 N.E. 245; King v. Smith, 47 Ga. App. 360 (1933), 170 S.E. 546; Wright v. Sterling Land Co. 157 Pa. Super. 625 (1945), 43 A.2d 614; 6 Williston on Contracts, sec. 1715D; 6 Corbin on Contracts, sec. 1472.) There are intimations in other jurisdictions that run counter to the current authority. (See Kuzmiak v. Brookchester, Inc. 33 N.J. Super. 575 (1955), III A.2d 425; Kay v. Cain (App. D.C. 1946), 154 E.2d 305.) The New Hampshire court applies to exculpatory clauses in all leases its uniform rule that any attempt to contract against liability for negligence is contrary to public policy. (Papakalos v. Shaka, 91 N.H. 265 (1941), 18 A.2d 377.) But apart from the Papakalos case we know of no court of last resort that has held such clauses invalid in the absence of a statute so requiring.

A contract shifting the risk of liability for negligence may benefit a tenant as well as a landlord. ( See Cerny-Pickas & Co. v. C. R. Jahn Co. 7 Ill.2d 393.) ! Such an agreement transfers the risk of a possible financial burden and so lessens the impact of the sanctions that induce adherence to the required standard of care. But this consideration is applicable as well to contracts for insurance that indemnify against liability for one’s own negligence. Such contracts are accepted, and even encouraged. ¡ See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1957, chap. 953/2, pars. 7 — 202(1) and 7 — 315.Í

The plaintiff contends that due to a shortage of housing there is a disparity of bargaining power between lessors of residential property and their lessees that gives landlords an unconscionable advantage over tenants. And upon this ground it is said that exculpatory clauses jn residential leases must be held to be contrary to public pol/cy. No attempt was made upon the trial to show that Mrs. O’Callaghan was at *440all concerned about the exculpatory clause, that she tried to negotiate with the defendant about its modification or elimination, or that she made any effort to rent an apartment elsewhere. To establish the existence of a widespread housing shortage the plaintiff points to numerous statutes designed to alleviate the shortage, (see Ill. Rev. Stat. 1957, chap. 6jt/2, passim) and to the existence of rent control during the period of the lease. 65 Stat. 145 (1947), 50 append. U.S.C., sec. 1894.

Unquestionably there has been a housing shortage. That shortage has produced an active and varied legislative response. Since legislative attention has been so sharply focused upon housing problems in recent years, it might be assumed that the legislature has taken all of the remedial action that it thought necessary or desirable. One of the major- legislative responses was the adoption of rent controls which placed ceilings upon the amount of rent that landlords could charge. But the very existence of that control made it impossible for a lessor to negotiate for an increased rental in exchange for the elimination of an exculpatory clause. We are asked to assume, however, that the legislative response to the housing shortage has been inadequate and incomplete, and to augment it judicially.

The relationship of landlord and tenant does not have the monopolistic characteristics that have characterized some other relations with respect to which exculpatory clauses have been held invalid. There are literally thousands of landlords who are in competition with one another. The rental market affords a variety of competing types of housing accommodations, from simple farm house to- luxurious apartment. The use of a form contract does not of itself establish disparity of bargaining power. That there is a shortage of housing at one particular time or place does not indicate that such shortages have always and everywhere existed, or that there will be shortages in the future. Judicial determinations of public policy cannot readily take account *441of sporadic and transitory circumstances. They should rather, we think, rest upon a durable moral basis. Other jurisdictions have dealt with this problem by legislation. (McKinney’s Consol. Laws of N.Y. Ann., Real Property Laws, sec, 234, Vol. 49, Part I; Ann. Laws of Mass., Vol. 6, c. 186, sec. 15.) In our opinion the subject is one that is appropriate for legislative rather than judicial action.

The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

Bristow, J., and Dairy, C.J.,

dissenting:

We cannot accept the conclusions and analysis of the majority opinion, which in our judgment not only arbitrarily eliminates the concept of negligence in the landlord and tenant relationship, but creates anomalies in the law, and will produce grievous social consequences for hundreds of thousands of persons in this State.

According to the undisputed facts in the instant case, this form lease with its exculpatory clause, was executed in a metropolitan area in 1947, when housing shortages were so acute that “waiting lists” were the order of the day, and gratuities to landlords to procure shelter were common. (U.S. Sen. Rep. 1780, Committee on Banking & Currency, vol. II, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess. (1950), p. 2565 et seq.; Cremer v. Peoria Housing Authority, 399 Ill. 579, 589.) While plaintiff admittedly did not negotiate about the exculpatory clause, as the majority opinion notes, the' record shows unequivocally that the apartment would not have been rented to her if she had quibbled about any clause in the form lease. According to the uncontroverted testimony, “If a person refused to sign a [form] lease in the form it was in, the apartment would not be rented to him.”

Apparently, the majority opinion has chosen to ignore those facts and prevailing circumstances, and finds instead that there were thousands of landlords competing with each other with a variety of rental units. Not only was the *442element of competition purely theoretical — and judges need not be more naive than other men — but there wasn’t even theoretical competition, as far as the exculpatory clauses were concerned, since these clauses were included in all form leases used by practically all landlords in urban areas. (Simmons v. Columbus Venetian Stevens Building, Inc., 20 Ill. App. 2d 1, 155 N.E.2d 372; 1952 Ill. L. Forum, 321, 328.) This meant that even if a prospective tenant were to “take his business elsewhere,” he would still be confronted by the same exculpatory clause in a form lease offered by another landlord.

Thus, we are not construing merely an isolated provision of a contract specifically bargained for by one landlord and one tenant, “a matter of private concern,” as the majority opinion myoptically views the issue in order to sustain its conclusion. We are construing, instead, a provision affecting thousands of tenants now bound by such provisions, which were foisted upon them at a time when it would be pure fiction to state that they had anything but a Hobson’s choice in the matter. Can landlords, by that technique, immunize themselves from liability for negligence, and have the blessings of this court as they destroy the concept of negligence and standards of law painstakingly evolved in the case law? That is the issue in this case, and the majority opinion at no time realistically faces it.

In resolving this issue, it is evident that despite the assertion in the majority opinion, there is no such thing as absolute “freedom of contract” in the law. (West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 392, 81 L. ed. 703.) As Mr. Justice Holmes stated, “pretty much all law consists in forbidding men to do some things that they want to do, and contract is no more exempt from the law than other acts.” (Dissent, Adkins v. Children’s Hospital of the District of Columbia, 261 U.S. 525, 568, 67 L. ed. 785.) Thus, there is no freedom to contract to commit a crime; or to *443contract to give a reward for the commission of a crime; or to contract to violate essential morality; or to contract to accomplish an unlawful purpose, or to contract in violation of public policy. 12 I.L.P., Contracts, secs. 151» 154.

In the instant case we must determine whether the exculpatory clause in the lease offends the public policy of this State. We realize that there is no precise definition of “public policy” or rule to test whether a contract is contrary to public policy, so that each case must be judged according to its own peculiar circumstances. (First Trust & Savings Bank of Kankakee v. Powers, 393 Ill. 97, 102.) None would dispute, however, that there is a recognized policy of discouraging negligence and protecting those in need of goods or services from being overreached by those with power to drive unconscionable bargains.

Even the majority opinion recognizes this policy as a possible limitation on the concept of “freedom-of contract” in its statement, “when that freedom expresses itself in a provision designed to absolve one of the parties from the consequences of his own negligence, there is danger that the standards of conduct which the law has developed for the protection of others may be diluted.” Diluted? As applied in the instant case, the word is “destroyed.” When landlords are no longer liable for failure to observe standards of care, or for conduct amounting to negligence by virtue of an exculpatory clause in a lease, then such standards cease to exist: They are not merely "diluted.” Negligence cannot exist in abstraction. The exculpatory clause destroys the concept of negligence in the landlord-tenant relationship, and the majority opinion, in sustaining the validity of that clause, has given the concept of negligence in this relationship a “judicial burial.”

This court, however, has refused to countenance such a destruction of standards of conduct and of the concept of negligence in other relationships. We have invalidated *444such exculpatory clauses as contrary to our public policy in contracts between common carriers and shippers or paying passengers (Checkley v. Illinois Central Railroad Co. 257 Ill. 491; Chicago and Northwestern Railway Co. v. Chapman, 133 Ill. 96) ; between telegraph companies and those sending messages (Tyler, Uliman & Co. v. Western Union Telegraph Co. 60 Ill. 421) ; and between employers and employees (Campbell v. Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railway Co. 243 Ill. 620; Devine v. Delano, 272 Ill. 166; Consolidated Coal Co. v. Lundak, 196 Ill. 594; Himrod Coal Co. v. Clark, 197 Ill. 514.)

By what logic and reasoning can you hold that such clauses are void and contrary to public policy in an employer-employee contract, but valid in contracts between landlords and tenants, as the majority opinion does? If the criterion for invalidating exculpatory clauses is the presence of “monopolistic characteristics” in the relationship, as the majority opinion suggests, then do employers have a greater monopoly on the labor market than landlords have on the tenant market ? Is there less competition among employers for employees than among landlords for tenants? The facts defy any such reasoning. Nor are there any other cogent groúnds for distinguishing between these categories.

The legal anomaly of sustaining such clauses in leases, while voiding them in other types of contracts, when the grounds on which they are held void can be matched by similar grounds in the relationship of landlord and tenant, is pointed out by the court in the aforementioned Simmons case, where the court made a scholarly review of the decisions in Illinois and other jurisdictions respecting exculpatory clauses in leases and other contracts. The court stated : “Is it more important that a man should have a safe place to work than that he should have a safe place to live, and is there any more reason in the employer-employee relationship that the employer should not be allowed to avoid *445liability for his negligence than there is that a landlord should not be able to avoid the liability for negligence in maintaining the common area which must be used by people to attain ingress and egress when they rent a portion of the premises? Is safety while working more important than safety while living?”

This patent inconsistency respecting the validity of an exculpatory clause, created by the majority opinion, is in no way required by Illinois precedents. The only Illinois authority cited — and this is done indirectly by referring to the Appellate Court’s reliance on the case — is Jackson v. First National Bank of Lake Forest, 415 Ill. 453. However, even a cursory reading of that case reveals that the court, in sustaining an exculpatory clause in a business lease, inferred that a different result would have followed if there was anything in the record indicating that the parties were not on an equal footing, or that the lessee had no freedom of choice, or had to accept what was offered. That court stated at page 463: “This is a business lease. There is nothing to suggest that the parties were not dealing at arms’ length and upon equal footing. No facts are brought to our attention from which it might be reasonable to infer that the lessee was forced to take the storeroom upon lessor’s terms.”

Compare that situation with the facts in the instant case, where it is admitted that there were waiting lists for the apartment and that if a person refused to sign the lease with the exculpatory clause in the form it was in, the apartment would not be rented to- him. Only by the blind application of precedent can the Jackson case be deemed determinative herein. Nor is there any established line of authority elsewhere sustaining exculpatory clauses in leases, but only conflicting decisions, and a disposition to emasculate such exculpatory clauses by giving them a strict, if not distorted construction. 175 A.L.R. 8, go; 15 Univ. Pitt. L. Rev. 493, 496.

*446Furthermore, while stare decisis has a strong social justification, it should not be used to stifle the growth of the law. When experience, which Mr. Justice Holmes has stated is the “life of the law,” makes manifest that a rule is without vitality, a court cannot abdicate its responsibility of reappraisal.

The basis of voiding exculpatory clauses is that they are contrary to the public policy of discouraging negligence and protecting those in need of goods or services from being overreached by those with power to drive unconscionable bargains. (Bisso v. Inland Waterways Corp. 349 U.S. 85, 91, 99 L. ed. 911.) In determining whether such clauses should be deemed void, the courts have weighed such factors as the importance which the subject has for the physical and economic well-being of the group agreeing to the release; their bargaining power; the amount of free choice actually exercised in areeing to the exemption; and the existence of competition among the group to be exempted. (Williston, Contracts, vol. 6, p. 4968: “The Significance of Bargaining Power in the Law of Exculpation,” 37 Col. L. Rev. 248; 175 A.L.R. 8, 48; 15 Univ. Pitt. L. Rev. 493.) Adjudged by such criteria, it is evident that the subject matter of the exculpatory clause herein— shelter — is indispensable for the physical well being of tenants; that they have nothing even approaching equality of bargaining power with landlords and no free choice whatever in agreeing to the exemption, since they will be confronted with the same clause in other form leases if they seek shelter elsewhere. Although the majority opinion claims that such clauses may also benefit tenants, it is hard for us to envisage a tenant on a waiting list for an apartment, insisting that the lease include a provision relieving him from liability for his negligence in the maintenance of the premises. Consequently, in our judgment, every material ground for voiding the exculpatory clause exists in the lease involved in the instant case.

*447Similar conclusions have been reached by other courts, after recognizing the change in the status and bargaining power in the landlord-tenant relationship that has taken place. (Kuzniak v. Brookchester, 33 N.J. Super. 575, III A.2d 425; Kay v. Cain (D.C. Cir.) 154 F.2d 305.) Thus, the New Jersey court stated in the Kuzniak case at page 432: “Under present conditions the comparative bargaining position of landlords and tenants in housing accommodations within many areas of the state are so unequal that tenants are in no position to bargain, and an exculpatory clause which purports to immunize the landlord from all liability would be contrary to public policy.” (Italics ours.)

In the same vein, the Federal court in Kay v. Cain, 154 F.2d 305, stated at page 306: “Moreover, it is doubtful whether such a clause which would undertake to exempt a landlord from responsibility for such negligence would now be valid. The acute housing shortage in or near the District of Columbia gives a landlord so great a bargaining advantage over a tenant that such an exemption might well be invalid on the grounds of public policy.” The majority opinion, however, labels such changed conditions as “sporadic” and.chooses to1 ignore them because they may change again at some future time. It holds that judicial determinations of public policy should “rest upon a more durable moral basis.” Our concept of the judicial function is not so circumscribed, nor is it elastic in one case and restrictive in another, depending upon economic predilections. It is hard for us to fathom that this same court which enunciated the liberal and scholarly approach of interpreting common-law concepts in the light of contemporary conditions and social needs in Nudd v. Matsoukas, 7 Ill.2d 608, 619, Amann v. Faidy, 415 Ill. 422, and Brandt v. Keller, 413 Ill. 503, can now hold with academic detachment that landlords, who are in the position to dictate whatever terms they choose to those in need of shelter, have a right to immunize themselves by contract from lia*448bility for failure to make essential repairs of areas which the tenants cannot legally repair, and that such contracts do not offend the public policy of this State. Upon what “durable moral basis” does that public policy determination rest?

We prefer to consistently follow our realistic policy of interpreting common-law concepts created by the courts in the light of contemporary conditions, as pledged in Nudd v. Matsoukas and the other cases, in accordance with the traditions of the creative jurists of our time. Holmes, Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221, 61 L. ed. 1086; Cardozo, “Growth of the Law.”

As Mr. Justice Cardozo explained in his treatise, “Growth of the Law,” (Selected Writings of Benjamin Nathan Cardozo, p. 246) : “A rule which in its origin was the creation of the courts themselves and was supposed in the making to express the mores of the day, may be abrogated by the courts when the mores have so changed that perpetuation of the rule would do violence to the social conscience. * * * This is not usurpation. It is not even innovation. It is the reservation for ourselves of the same power of creation that built up the common law through its exercise by the judges of the past.”

In this connection, Mr. Chief Justice Warren more recently observed: “A * * * reason for the success of our legal system is its adaptability to changing circumstances. As Pollack said, all courts have a duty, which ours generally try to perform, ‘to keep the rules of law in harmony with the enlightened common sense of the nation.’ ” “The Law of the Future,” Mr. Chief Justice Warren, Fortune Magazine, Nov. 1955, p. 107.

The majority opinion apparently dismisses whatever misgivings it has for the resulting social consequences of its decision with the observation that the problem is “appropriate for legislative rather than judicial action,” and refers to the New York and Massachusetts statutes. McKinney’s *449Consol. Laws of N.Y. Ann., Real Prop. Laws, sec. 234, vol. 49, part I; Ann. Laws of Mass, vol. 6, chap. 186, sec. 15.

Future legislation on this subject will be of small comfort to the hundreds of persons with cases pending in our courts for injuries sustained through conduct of landlords tantamount to common-law negligence. What help can the legislature give to such persons? Their only protection lies in the inherent power of the courts to adjudicate common-law rights and their duty to strike down contracts in derogation of the public policy of the State. That duty is in no way abridged by the fact that some legislatures have declared such exculpatory clauses contrary to public policy. We cannot perceive how such legislative action elsewhere relieves this court from its duty of also recognizing the public policy in the case law, which is an equally cogent source of a State’s public policy. People ex rel. Nelson v. Wiersema State Bank, 361 Ill. 75, 86.

Moreover, for this court, which has recently and repeatedly expressly refused to relegate to the legislature the task of reinterpreting common-law concepts necessary in the development of the law (People ex rel. Noren v. Dempsey, 10 Ill.2d 288, 293; Nudd v. Matsoukas, 7 Ill.2d 608), to now adbdicate to the legislature, as the majority opinion has done, is not only inconsistent but an admission of failure to resolve the problem. Legislative intrusion into the field of the common law can only be justified when courts have refused to exercise their own function. (Green, “Freedom of Litigation,” 38 Ill. L. Rev. 355, 378, 382.) There should be no such refusal by this court in the instant case.

In our judgment, authorizing landlords to immunize themselves from liability for negligence, as the majority opinion has done, at a time of critical housing shortages, recognized by Congress and the courts, is not only inconsistent with much law and the public policy of this State, but it is in derogation of our duty “to keep the rules of law *450in harmony with the enlightened common sense of the nation.” Therefore, we believe it our obligation to dissent from that opinion, and to protest against the destruction of the common-law rights of a significant proportion of the population of this State.

2.2 Boyce v. West ("The Gonzaga Scuba Diver Case") 2.2 Boyce v. West ("The Gonzaga Scuba Diver Case")

This a more modern case laying out the reasoning a court will use to evaluate a negligence-exculpating clause in a contract. Do you think the clause should have been enforced under these facts?

[No. 12447-9-III.

Division Three.

November 16, 1993.]

Iris L. Boyce, as Personal Representative, Appellant, v. James West, et al, Respondents.

*659 Stanley A. Bastían, James M. Danielson, and Jeffers, Dan-ielson, Sonn & Aylward, P.S., for appellant.

Curtis L. Shoemaker, Michael L. Wolfe, and Paine, Hamb-len, Coffin, Brooke & Miller, for respondents.

Shields, J.*

This is a wrongful death action arising out of a scuba diving accident. The court dismissed the defendants on summary judgment after finding the decedent Peter Boyce had released them from liability and assumed all risks associated with the scuba diving course he was taking. Iris Boyce appeals, contending the liability releases that her son signed did not cover instructor James West and should not be enforced as to Gonzaga University as a matter of public policy. Mrs. Boyce further contends there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether Mr. West was grossly negligent and whether her son assumed the risk of negligent instruction and supervision by Mr. West. We affirm.

Mr. Boyce was a student at Gonzaga University. In the spring of 1988, dining his freshman year, he enrolled in Scuba Diving 1, an introductory scuba diving course offered as a physical education elective. At the beginning of the course he signed documents entitled "PADI[1] Standard Safe Diving Practices Statement of Understanding", "PADI Medical Statement", and "Affirmation and Liability Release". The latter document purported to release Down Under Divers and PADI from all Lability for negligence and to affirm Mr. *660Boyce's full assumption of all risks associated with the program. Mr. Boyce successfully completed the course, taught by Down Under Divers' employee John Miller; he earned an A and received one credit. All dives took place in the school's swimming pool.

During the summer, Mr. Boyce became a certified scuba diver after completing at least four open-water dives with an independent certifying authority. Certification was a prerequisite for taking the advanced scuba diving course (Scuba Diving 2) offered by Gonzaga.

In the fall of 1988, Mr. Boyce enrolled in Scuba Diving 2, which was taught by James West, an adjunct instructor at Gonzaga and owner of Down Under Divers. At the first class on September 5, Mr. Boyce again signed documents entitled "PADI Standard Safe Diving Practices Statement of Understanding", "PADI Medical Statement", and "Affirmation and Liability Release". The forms were not identical to those he had signed for the beginning course, but were substantially similar. This time the release named PADI and Gonzaga University.

By November 27, 1988, Mr. Boyce had successfully completed three of the five specialty dives planned for the course. He died that day during the fourth dive, a deepwater dive in Lake Coeur d'Alene. The diving group consisted of instructor West, Mr. Boyce, and two other students, Steve Kozlowski and John Sterling. The dive required the use of dry suits, so they had spent several hours the day before learning to use them. During the dive the divers descended 80 to 100 feet along an anchor line to the bottom of the lake, then swam 10 to 15 feet to a wreck. There, Mr. West checked his students' air supplies. Concerned that they were running low on air because Mr. Kozlowski and Mr. Boyce both registered only 800 pounds of air, one-half of the amount they started with, he signaled the group to return to the anchor line and ascend to the surface. When they got back to the anchor line, Mr. Kozlowski indicated he was very low on air: he had just 100 *661pounds of air left. As Mr. West turned to check on Mr. Sterling and Mr. Boyce, Mr. Kozlowski tugged at him, panicked over lack of air. Mr. West immediately gave Mr. Kozlowski his alternate regulator and assisted him to the surface, buddy breathing along the way. In the emergency, he lost sight of Mr. Boyce. Mr. West next saw Mr. Boyce floating on the surface. Resuscitation efforts were unsuccessful; Mr. Boyce died of air embolism resulting from too rapid an ascent.

Iris Boyce, as personal representative of her son's estate, sued Mr. West and Gonzaga for wrongful death. The complaint asserts Mr. West negligently caused Mr. Boyce's death and Gonzaga is vicariously liable for the negligence of its agent. The defendants denied negligence and asserted as alternative affirmative defenses the release of liability2 and assumption of risk3 provisions contained in the documents signed by Mr. Boyce.

Mr. West and Gonzaga moved for summary judgment. Mrs. Boyce resisted the motion and submitted parts of a deposition of Charles R. Lewis, a dive master, in which Mr. Lewis expresses his opinion that Mr. West was negligent in his instruction and supervision of the students. Mr. Lewis did acknowledge that with the 50 pounds of air Mr. Boyce still had when he reached the surface, he would have had enough air had he continued to exhale on the way up, and that free *662ascents have been made from greater depths. By memorandum decision entered April 15, 1992, the court granted the motion for summary judgment.

Release of Liability

Mrs. Boyce first contends neither of the releases of liability signed by Mr. Boyce cover Mr. West. We agree the spring release does not apply to Mr. West,4 but conclude the fall release does.

A release is a contract in which one party agrees to abandon or relinquish a claim, obligation or cause of action against another party. 6 M. Minzer, J. Nates, C. Kimball, and D. Axelrod, Damages in Tort Actions § 51.11[3], at 51-9 (1991). As a contract, a release is to be construed according to the legal principles applicable to contracts. Stottlemyre v. Reed, 35 Wn. App. 169, 171, 665 P.2d 1383, review denied, 100 Wn.2d 1015 (1983). Exculpatory clauses are strictly construed and must be clear if the release from liability is to be enforced. Scott v. Pacific West Mt. Resort, 119 Wn.2d 484, 490, 834 P.2d 6 (1992).

The fall release, signed September 5,1988, names only Gonzaga and PADI. Mrs. Boyce concedes it releases Gonzaga from liability unless a public interest is involved. The release does not name Mr. West, but it is undisputed that Mr. West was Gonzaga's employee. The general rule is that a preinjury release of the employer from liability also releases the employee.5 Restatement (Second) of Agency § 347(2) & comment *663 b (1958); see 3 C.J.S. Agency § 379 (1973). Mr. West, in the performance of his job as an instructor for Gonzaga, owed Mr. Boyce no greater duty of care than Gonzaga, which by contract relieved itself from liability for harm caused by ordinary negligence.6 Restatement (Second) of Agency § 347(2), comment 6; § 350, comment d (1958). Put another way,

[when] a valid agreement is entered into between an employer and a third person, exculpating the former from liability to the latter for ordinary negligence, an employee is ordinarily entitled to the same exculpation as his employer, even though he is not expressly named as a beneficiary of such exculpation.

Mayfair Fabrics v. Henley, 101 N.J. Super. 363, 375-76, 244 A.2d 344, 351 (1968). Mr. West, as an employee of Gonzaga, was covered by the agreement releasing Gonzaga from liability for negligent harm to Mr. Boyce.

Mrs. Boyce next contends the release of Gonzaga from liability violates public policy and should not be enforced. In Washington, contracts of release of liability for negligence are valid unless a public interest is involved. Hewitt v. Miller, 11 Wn. App. 72, 521 P.2d 244, review denied, 84 Wn.2d 1007 (1974).

Wagenblast v. Odessa Sch. Dist. 105-157-166J, 110 Wn.2d 845, 758 P.2d 968, 85 A.L.R.4th 331 (1988) sets forth six factors, taken from Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 60 Cal. 2d 92, 383 P.2d 441, 32 Cal. Rptr. 33, 6 A.L.R.3d 693 (1963), which are to be considered in determining whether exculpatory agreements violate public policy. The court considers whether (1) the agreement concerns an endeavor of a type *664generally thought suitable for public regulation; (2) the party seeking exculpation is engaged in performing a service of great importance to the public, which is often a. matter of practical necessity for some members of the public; (3) such party holds itself out as willing to perform this service for any member of the public who seeks it, or at least for any member coming within certain established standards; (4) because of the essential nature of the service, in the economic setting of the transaction, the party invoking exculpation possesses a decisive advantage of bargaining strength against any member of the public who seeks the services; (5) in exercising a superior bargaining power, the party confronts the public with a standardized adhesion contract of exculpation, and makes no provision whereby a purchaser may pay additional reasonable fees and obtain protection against negligence; and (6) the person or property of members of the public seeking such services must be placed under the control of the furnisher of the services, subject to the risk of carelessness on the part of the furnisher, its employees or agents. Wagenblast, at 851-55. Those factors are not present here. As noted in Hewitt, at 74, "[e]xtended discussion is not required to conclude that instruction in scuba diving does not involve a public duty . . .." Accord, Blide v. Rainier Mountaineering, Inc., 30 Wn. App. 571, 574, 636 P.2d 492 (1981), review denied, 96 Wn.2d 1027 (1982), in which the court noted: "Although a popular sport in Washington, mountaineering, like scuba diving, does not involve public interest. . .."

Madison v. Superior Court, 203 Cal. App. 3d 589, 250 Cal. Rptr. 299 (1988) is' a factually similar case arising out of the death of a student enrolled in a scuba diving course offered through the YMCA. The Madison court applied the Turikl factors and concluded a release signed by the scuba student did not involve a public interest. It then observed, in words that apply to this case as well:

Here, [decedent] certainly had the option of not taking the class. There was no practical necessity that he do so. In view of the *665dangerous nature of this particular activity defendants could reasonably require the execution of the release as a condition of enrollment. [Decedent] entered into a private and voluntary transaction in which, in exchange for an enrollment in a class which he desired to take, he freely agreed to waive any claim against the defendants for a negligent act by them. This case involves no more a question of public interest than does motor-cross racing, sky diving, or motorcycle dirtbike riding.

(Citations omitted.) Madison, at 599. We do not find a public interest in a private school7 offering scuba diving instruction to qualified students as an elective course. Upholding the release of Gonzaga does not violate public policy.

Mrs. Boyce further contends there are issues of material fact whether the defendants were grossly negligent. If Mr. West's negligent acts fell greatly below the standard established by law for the protection of others against unreasonable risk of harm, the releases are unenforceable. Blide, at 573.

A defendant who can point out to the trial court that the plaintiff lacks competent evidence to support an essential element of the plaintiff's case is entitled to summary judgment because a complete failure of proof concerning an element necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. Young v. Key Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 112 Wn.2d 216, 225 & n.l, 770 P.2d 182 (1989); Guile v. Ballard Comm'ty Hosp., 70 Wn. App. 18, 23, 851 P.2d 689, review denied, 122 Wn.2d 1010 (1993). Evidence of negligence is not evidence of gross negligence; to raise an issue of gross negligence, there must be substantial evidence of serious negligence. Nist v. Tudor, 67 Wn.2d 322, 332, 407 P.2d 798 (1965). Since a release of liability exculpates ordinary negligence, if it occurs, the plaintiff must establish gross negligence affirmatively to avoid enforcement of the release.

Mrs. Boyce neither alleged gross negligence in her complaint, nor amended it to make that allegation, nor provided *666the court with any evidence supporting an allegation of gross negligence. The only evidence of any degree of negligence presented by Mrs. Boyce consists of excerpts of the deposition testimony of her expert, Mr. Lewis. In those excerpts, Mr. Lewis expresses his opinion that Mr. West was negligent. However, as the trial court found, nothing in Mr. Lewis' testimony supports Mrs. Boyce's assertion that Mr. West was grossly negligent. Mrs. Boyce's allegation, supported by nothing more substantial than argument, is insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. CR 56(e); Guile, at 25. Because there was no material issue of fact as to the existence of gross negligence, an essential element for avoidance of the release of liability, summary judgment was proper.

Assumption of Risk

Mrs. Boyce, in response to respondents' alternative defense, also contends her son did not assume the risk of negligent instruction and supervision. She argues assumption of the risk, whether express or implied primary, bars recovery only for injuries resulting from known risks voluntarily assumed. Kirk v. WSU, 109 Wn.2d 448, 453-54, 746 P.2d 285 (1987) and cases cited therein. Thus, to the extent Mr. Boyce's death resulted from other unknown risks, created by the defendants, Mrs. Boyce argues Mr. West and Gonzaga remain liable. Kirk, at 455. See also Scott v. Pacific West Mt. Resort, 119 Wn.2d 484, 499, 834 P.2d 6 (1992).

In its memorandum decision, the trial court blurs the distinction between express assumption of the risk and implied primary assumption of the risk and refers to "express primary assumption of the risk." The confusion is understandable; the entire doctrine is surrounded by confusion. Scott, at 496. Express primary assumption of risk arises out of a contract concept; implied primary assumption of risk arises out of a tort concept. Scott, at 496-98. Identical in result to a release of liability which exculpates for ordinary negligence if it occurs, express and imphed primary assumption of risk exculpate by shifting the duty of care from the defendant to the plaintiff, thus preventing negligence from *667occurring. Express assumption of risk bars a claim resulting from risks actually assumed by the plaintiff; implied primary assumption of risk bars a claim resulting from specific known and appreciated risks. Scott, at 497. One who participates in sports impliedly assumes the risks which are inherent in the sport. Scott, at 498.

1. Express assumption of risk. Mr. Boyce acknowledged the possibility of death from scuba diving and assumed "all risks in connection with [the scuba diving] course . . . while I am enrolled as a student of the course, including all risks connected therewith, whether foreseen or unforeseen . . .". Negligent instruction and supervision are clearly risks associated with being a student in a scuba diving course and are encompassed by the broad language of the contract. That Mr. Boyce may not have specifically considered the possibility of instructor negligence when he signed the release does not invalidate his express assumption of all risks associated with his participation in the course. Again, the words used by the court in Madison, at 601 (quoting from Coates v. Newhall Land & Farming, Inc., 191 Cal. App. 3d 1, 9, 236 Cal. Rptr. 181 (1987)), apply just as well to this case:

"... knowledge of a particular risk is unnecessary when there is an express agreement to assume all risk; by express agreement a 'plaintiff may undertake to assume all of the risks of a particular. . . situation, whether they are known or unknown to him.' (Rest.2d Torts § 496D, com. a, italics added; Prosser & Keeton, Torts (5th ed. 1984) § 68, p. 482.)" (Fn. Omitted.)

As with the release of liability exculpating ordinary negligence, in the absence of a showing of gross negligence, Mr. Boyce's express assumption of all risks associated with his enrollment in the scuba diving course bars a claim for recovery. W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on Torts § 68, at 484 (5th ed. 1984). The summary judgment on this alternative defense was also proper.

2. Implied primary assumption of risk. Although the summary judgment is supported alternatively on the grounds of release of liability and express assumption of risk, the trial court's memorandum decision suggests the court also relied *668on implied primary assumption of risk as a basis for summary judgment. This was unnecessary. In any case, Mr. Boyce's express assumption of all risk provides adequate grounds to support the summary judgment. We need not, and do not, decide whether implied primary assumption of the risk applies to these facts. Summary judgment was properly granted.

We affirm.

Sweeney, A.C.J., and Munson, J., concur.

2.3 Arthur v. Holy Rosary Credit Union ("The Contractor Case") 2.3 Arthur v. Holy Rosary Credit Union ("The Contractor Case")

When can a non-employee's negligence be imputed to the party that hired the contractor?

HORTON, J.

The plaintiff, Robert J. Arthur, appeals an order of the Superior Court (Mohl, J.), granting the motion of the defendant, Holy Rosary Credit Union (Holy Rosary), for a directed verdict on all counts of the plaintiffs negligence claim. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

Holy Rosary hired Credit Union Building Corporation (CUBC) to oversee and coordinate the construction, design, and furnishing of its new building in Rochester. CUBC charged a fee of three-and-one-half percent of the approximately $650,000 cost of construction. Although CUBC did not involve itself in the manner or means of construction, as project manager it inspected the construction on a weekly basis. CUBC helped Holy Rosary select Whitcher Builder, Inc., a New Hampshire construction firm with over twenty-six years of experience, as the general contractor for the construction project. Whitcher Builder was the lowest bidder for the job. The plaintiff was an employee of Whitcher Builder.

On the day of the injury, Whitcher Builder directed the plaintiff to work on an unfinished roof, which was also the floor deck for the second story. The plaintiff was to assist in covering the concrete deck with polyethylene so that the concrete would cure. The stairwell hole to the first floor was covered only by polyethylene and had not yet been covered with plywood or planks. The plaintiff injured his back by falling through this hole into the basement twenty-three feet below. The plaintiff received workers’ compensation benefits. He also sued Holy Rosary, essentially asserting that (1) the construction work was an inherently dangerous activity which created a non-delegable duty in Holy Rosary, (2) CUBC was Holy Rosary’s agent and negligently controlled Whitcher Builder, and (3) Holy Rosary was negligent in selecting Whitcher Builder as a contractor. The trial judge granted Holy Rosary’s motion for a directed verdict on all counts at the close of the plaintiffs case,- ruling that the construction work was not, as a matter of law, inherently dangerous, and that there was no evidence of negligent control or selection.

*465The plaintiff appeals, arguing that the court erred in granting the directed verdict by taking from the jury the following issues: (1) whether the work in which the plaintiff was engaged at the time of his injury was inherently dangerous, and thus created a non-delegable duty in Holy Rosary; (2) whether CUBC was Holy Rosary’s agent, and whether, by acting negligently in its duties to supervise and control the construction, CUBC caused the plaintiffs injury; and (3) whether Holy Rosary negligently selected Whitcher Builder as the contractor.

“A trial court may grant a directed verdict only when the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom, construed most favorably to the party opposing the motion, would not enable a jury to find for that party.” Cloutier v. A. & P. Tea Co., Inc., 121 N.H. 915, 920, 436 A.2d 1140, 1143 (1981) (quotation omitted). The trial court “cannot weigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses, and, if the evidence is conflicting or several reasonable inferences may be drawn, the motion for [a directed verdict] should be denied.” Amabello v. Colonial Motors, 117 N.H. 556, 561, 374 A.2d 1182, 1185 (1977). The plaintiffs claim must be found to be “completely without merit.” Cloutier, 121 N.H. at 920, 436 A.2d at 1143. This court will uphold a trial court’s decision to grant a motion for a directed verdict unless the trial judge abused his or her discretion in determining that no rational juror could find for the party against whom the motion is filed. Vincent v. Public Service Co. of N.H., 129 N.H. 621, 625, 529 A.2d 397, 399 (1987).

The plaintiff first contends that the trial court erred by not permitting the juiy to decide whether the roof work was inherently dangerous. Respondeat superior, or vicarious liability, ordinarily does not extend to torts by independent contractors because the employer reserves no control or power of discretion over the execution of the work. Carter v. Berlin Mills Co., 58 N.H. 52, 53-54 (1876). We have long recognized an exception to this general rule when the independent contractor is engaged to perform work that is dangerous in itself. Thomas v. Harrington, 72 N.H. 45, 46-7, 54 A. 285, 286 (1903). The inherent danger exception applies only when “[t]he danger [arises] directly from the work . . . required to be done, and not from the negligent manner of its performance.” Id. “[T]he phrase ‘inherently dangerous’ as applied to undertakings conducted through independent contractors often implies work that is dangerous even when conducted with reasonable care; . . . the exception relating to such undertakings has been principally applied in cases of demolition, excavation, and other clearly dangerous activities.” Carr v. Merrimack Farmers Exchange, 101 N.H. 445, 449, 146 A.2d 276, 279 (1958).

The inherent danger doctrine applies only where the alleged danger is “naturally to be apprehended” by the defendant at the time it *466engages the independent contractor to perform the work. See Thomas, 72 N.H. at 46, 54 A. at 286; Restatement (SECOND) of Torts § 427, comment d at 417 (1965). “[Wjhether an activity is inherently dangerous is a question of fact to be determined by the trier of fact.” Elliott v. Public Service Co. of N.H., 128 N.H. 676, 682, 517 A.2d 1185, 1189 (1986). If the activity is, in fact, inherently dangerous, “one who undertakes [it] has a non-delegable duty to protect third parties against injury resulting from that activity.” Id. at 679, 517 A.2d at 1187.

The trial judge ruled that the plaintiff failed to establish a claim under the inherently dangerous activity doctrine because the danger here arose not directly from the work required to be done, but from the negligent manner of its performance by Whitcher Builder. See Elliott, 128 N.H. at 679, 517 A.2d at 1187. The trial judge noted that to consider

[t]he activity in and of itself ... as, inherently dangerous . . . would literally make the construction of every commercial or residential building in this [S]tate an inherently dangerous activity rendering the owner liable for the negligence of the contractor, and it seems to me that I cannot read that into the Elliott case.

We agree that construction projects, typically fraught with a varieiy of potential dangers that may arise if the work is not carefully done, do not, as a rule, fall within the inherently dangerous category. We hold that to be an inherently dangerous activity, construction, or any other work, must be dangerous in and of itself and not dangerous simply because of the negligent performance of the work, and that the danger must be naturally apprehended by the parties when they contract. See Thomas, 72 N.H. at 46-47, 54 A.2d at 286. Only then will the work constitute an inherent danger that places a non-delegable duty upon the one ordering it to protect third parties against resulting injury.

A review of the record indicates that the danger Whitcher Builder caused by first covering the hole with plastic instead of wood was not a “necessary and anticipated part of the work,” see id. at 46, 54 A. at 286, and that the evidence does not show that Holy Rosary either knew or should have known that Whitcher Builder would perform the work in this potentially dangerous manner. We find that the trial judge properly ruled that because the inherent danger doctrine is inapplicable as a matter of law where, as here, the danger derived not from the nature of the work, but from the negligence of the contractor, see Elliott, 128 N.H. at 679, 517 A.2d at 1187, there was no issue for the jury. See Vincent, 129 N.H. at 625, 529 A.2d at 399.

*467The plaintiff next argues that the trial court erred by not permitting the jury to decide whether CUBC was Holy Rosary’s agent, and whether, by acting negligently in its duties to supervise and control the construction, CUBC caused the plaintiffs injury. A review of the record indicates that the evidence is insufficient to enable a reasonable jury to find that Holy Rosary exercised direct control over the construction. The trial court’s finding that the evidence was insufficient for a reasonable jury to determine CUBC to be an agent of Holy Rosary, however, was in error. We find that the evidence, including the contract and related correspondence between CUBC and Holy Rosary, could lead a reasonable jury to the conclusion that CUBC, as project manager, was the agent of Holy Rosary. In a February 15, 1989, letter outlining CUBC’s services and fees, CUBC stated that Holy Rosary “would have a single source of responsibility whereby all disciplines (general contractors, sub-contractors, architect, engineers, interior suppliers, equipment, building inspectors, etc.) would be supervised and coordinated by Credit Union Building Corporation as Project Manager, and at the same time allow you to be in control of the project.” The actual contract, signed by CUBC on February 15, 1989, and by Holy Rosary on February 16, 1989, provided that CUBC “will include in its budget a line-item for on-site supervision and project management.” If a jury were to find that CUBC was Holy Rosary’s agent, Holy Rosary would be liable if CUBC was responsible for the reasonable supervision and safety of the worksite and, in negligently carrying out this duty, caused the injury.

As the court noted during the last day of trial, “some conflict in the testimony” exists regarding the responsibilities of CUBC. The plaintiffs expert testified that the role of a project manager would include ensuring “that the work is being performed in an orderly and safe fashion . . . .” The expert also testified that “[i]t doesn’t appear that there was adequate supervision” here. In contrast, Harvey Levin, the owner of CUBC, testified in his deposition that Whitcher Builder, not CUBC, was responsible for supervision and safety at the site. David R. Whitcher, the principal of Whitcher Builder, offered corroborating testimony, and his contract with Holy Rosary placed the responsibility for the safety of the worksite upon Whitcher Builder:

10.1.1 The Contractor shall be responsible for initiating, maintaining and supervising all safety precautions and programs in connection with the performance of the Contract.
10.2.1 The Contractor shall take reasonable precautions for safety of, and shall provide reasonable protection to prevent damage, injury or loss to:
*468.1 employees on the work and other persons who may be affected thereby;
10.2.3 The Contractor shall erect and maintain, as required by existing conditions and performance of the Contract, reasonable safeguards for safety and protection, including posting danger signs and other warnings against hazards, promulgating safety regulations and notifying owners and users of adjacent sites and utilities.

It is not our province, however, to weigh the evidence. We therefore reverse the directed verdict on this count and remand for a determination as to whether CUBC had a duty of supervision and responsibility for the safety of the worksite, and, if so, whether it causally breached this duty as the agent of Holy Rosary, vesting liability in Holy Rosary. See Vincent, 129 N.H. at 625, 529 A.2d at 399.

The plaintiff finally argues that the trial court erred by not permitting the jury to decide whether Holy Rosary negligently selected the contractor. As a general rule, the employer has a duty to use reasonable care to choose a contractor who is properly qualified to perform the work. 41 Am. Jur. 2d Independent Contractor § 26 (1968 & Supp. 1994). “[A]n employer of an independent contractor may be liable to one injured as a result of the contractor’s fault where it is shown that the employer was negligent in selecting a careless or incompetent person with whom to contract.” Annotation, When Is Employer Chargeable with Negligence in Hiring Careless, Reckless, or Incompetent Independent Contractor, 78 A.L.R.3d 910, 916 (1977).

The lack of due care in selection must have a causal connection to the injury sustained. Restatement (SECOND) of Torts § 411, comment b at 377 (1965). Holy Rosary cannot be held liable for having employed an incompetent contractor unless the plaintiff proves that Holy Rosary knew or by the exercise of reasonable care could have known of the contractor’s lack of qualifications, and that the alleged lack of due care in selection resulted in the injuiy at issue. 41 Am. Jur. 2d Independent Contractor § 26. Here, the trial judge concluded that there was no evidence suggesting that Whitcher Builder lacked qualification:

[Biased on the evidence I have heard in the case so far, I don’t believe that there is any evidence from which a jury could find that the selection of the Whitcher Corporation was negligent. It seems to me the only evidence we have is evidence of what was done with respect to the Whitcher Corporation in terms of prior construction activity, and the arguments made with *469respect to whether or not Whitcher was overextended and the like are really speculation and are not based upon evidence in this case, and I don’t believe that any reasonable jury could, viewing this evidence, determine that the selection of Whitcher was negligent, that is was negligent on the part of the Defendant Holy Rosary Credit Union.

A review of the record indicates that the evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, could not be construed by a reasonable jury as constituting a case of negligent selection of Whitcher Builder by Holy Rosary. See Vincent, 129 N.H. at 625, 529 A.2d at 399.

Affirmed, in part; reversed in part; remanded.

All concurred.

2.4 Coleman v. Soccer Ass'n ("The Holdout Contributory Negligence Case") 2.4 Coleman v. Soccer Ass'n ("The Holdout Contributory Negligence Case")

What is the difference between contributory and comparative negligence? Use the following case to understand the difference--don't  be fooled because both words sound the same. Contributory negligence is one doctrine and comparative negligence another. The first is the old school, and the second is the new school.

69 A.3d 1149 (2013)
432 Md. 679

James COLEMAN et al.
v.
SOCCER ASSOCIATION OF COLUMBIA.

No. 9, September Term, 2012.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

July 9, 2013.

John Vail (Center for Constitutional Litigation, P.C., Washington, D.C.), on brief, Bruce M. Plaxen (Plaxen & Adler, P.A., Columbia, MD; Lloyd J. Eisenberg of Lloyd J. Eisenberg & Associates P.A., Columbia, MD), on brief for Appellant/Cross-Appellee.

1150*1150 Wayne M. Willoughby (Gershon, Willoughby, Getz & Smith, LLC, Baltimore, MD), for Amicus Curiae brief of Professor Robert H. Lande in Support of Plaintiff-Petitioner.

Robert J. Zarbin (James K. MacAlister, Upper Marlboro, MD), for Amicus Curiae brief of Maryland Association for Justice in Support of Plaintiff-Petitioner.

Douglas W. Biser (Matthew P. Lalumia of Mudd, Harrison & Burch, L.L.P., Towson, MD), on brief, M. Albert Figinski (Peter G. Angelos and Jeffrey J. Utermohle of Law Offices of Peter G. Angelos, P.C., Baltimore, MD—Brief of Amicus Curiae, Law Offices of Peter G. Angelos, P.C.), on brief, for Appellees/Cross-Appellants.

Gardner M. Duvall (Danielle G. Marcus, Peter W. Sheehan, Jr. of Whiteford, Taylor & Preston, L.L.P., Baltimore, MD), for Amicus Curiae brief of Maryland Defense Counsel.

Karen J. Kruger (David M. Funk of Funk & Bolton, P.A., Baltimore, MD), for Amici Curiae brief of Local Government Insurance Trust, Maryland Association of Counties, Maryland Municipal League, Mayor and City Council of Baltimore.

Paul A. Tiburzi (Carville B. Collins of DLA Piper LLP (US), Baltimore, MD), for Amici Curiae brief of the Maryland Chamber of Commerce and the Maryland Tort Reform Coalition in Support of Appellees.

Mark A. Behrens, Esquire, Christopher E. Appel, Esquire, Shook, Hardy & Bacon L.L.P., Washington, DC, for Amici Curiae brief of the American Tort Reform Association, Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, Coalition for Litigation Justice, Inc., American Insurance Association, Property Casualty Insurers Association of America, National Association of Mutual Insurance Companies, Physician Insurers Association of America, American Medical Association, and NFIB Small Business Legal Center in Support of Respondents.

Argued before BELL, C.J.,[*] HARRELL, BATTAGLIA, GREENE, McDONALD, JOHN C. ELDRIDGE (Retired, Specially Assigned) and IRMA S. RAKER (Retired, Specially Assigned) JJ.

ELDRIDGE, J.

Thirty years ago, in Harrison v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 295 Md. 442, 444, 456 A.2d 894 (1983), this Court issued a writ of certiorari to decide "whether the common law doctrine of contributory negligence should be judicially abrogated in Maryland and the doctrine of comparative negligence adopted in its place as the rule governing trial of negligence actions in this State." In a comprehensive opinion by then Chief Judge Robert C. Murphy, the Court in Harrison, 295 Md. at 463, 456 A.2d at 905, declined to abandon the doctrine of contributory negligence in favor of comparative negligence, pointing out that such change "involves fundamental and basic public policy considerations properly to be addressed by the legislature."

The petitioner in the case at bar presents the same issue that was presented in Harrison, namely whether this Court should change the common law and abrogate the defense of contributory negligence in certain types of tort actions. After reviewing the issue again, we shall arrive at the same conclusion that the Court reached in Harrison.

 

1151*1151 I.

 

The petitioner and plaintiff below, James Kyle Coleman, was an accomplished soccer player who had volunteered to assist in coaching a team of young soccer players in a program of the Soccer Association of Columbia, in Howard County, Maryland. On August 19, 2008, Coleman, at the time 20 years old, was assisting the coach during the practice of a team of young soccer players on the field of the Lime Kiln Middle School. While the Soccer Association of Columbia had fields of its own, it did not have enough to accommodate all of the program's young soccer players; the Association was required to use school fields for practices. At some point during the practice, Coleman kicked a soccer ball into a soccer goal. As he passed under the goal's metal top rail, or crossbar, to retrieve the ball, he jumped up and grabbed the crossbar. The soccer goal was not anchored to the ground, and, as he held on to the upper crossbar, Coleman fell backwards, drawing the weight of the crossbar onto his face. He suffered multiple severe facial fractures which required surgery and the placing of three titanium plates in his face. Coleman instituted the present action by filing a complaint, in the Circuit Court for Howard County, alleging that he was injured by the defendants' negligence.[1] The defendant and respondent, the Soccer Association of Columbia, asserted the defense of contributory negligence.

At the ensuing jury trial, the soccer coach who had invited Coleman to help coach the soccer players testified that he had not inspected or anchored the goal which fell on Coleman. The coach also testified that the goal was not owned or provided by the Soccer Association, and he did not believe that it was his responsibility to anchor the goal. During the trial, the parties disputed whether the goal was located in an area under the supervision and control of the Soccer Association and whether the Soccer Association was required to inspect and anchor the goal. The Soccer Association presented testimony tending to show that, because the goal was not owned by the Soccer Association, the Soccer Association owed no duty to Coleman. The Soccer Association also presented testimony that the condition of the goal was open and obvious to all persons. The Association maintained that the accident was caused solely by Coleman's negligence.

Testimony was provided by Coleman to the effect that players commonly hang from soccer goals and that his actions should have been anticipated and expected by the Soccer Association. Coleman also provided testimony that anchoring goals is a standard safety practice in youth soccer.

At the close of evidence, Coleman's attorney proffered a jury instruction on comparative negligence.[2] The judge declined 1152*1152 to give Coleman's proffered comparative negligence instruction and, instead, instructed the jury on contributory negligence.

The jury was given a verdict sheet posing several questions. The first question was: "Do you find that the Soccer Association of Columbia was negligent?" The jury answered "yes" to this question. The jury also answered "yes" to the question: "Do you find that the Soccer Association of Columbia's negligence caused the Plaintiff's injuries?" Finally, the jury answered "yes" to the question: "Do you find that the Plaintiff was negligent and that his negligence contributed to his claimed injuries?"

In short, the jury concluded that the Soccer Association of Columbia was negligent and that the Soccer Association's negligence caused Coleman's injuries. The jury also found that Coleman was negligent, and that his negligence contributed to his own injuries. Because of the contributory negligence finding, Coleman was barred from any recovery. The trial court denied Coleman's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and subsequently entered judgment in favor of the Soccer Association of Columbia.

Coleman filed a notice of appeal, and the Soccer Association filed a notice of cross-appeal.[3] Before briefing and argument in the Court of Special Appeals, Coleman filed in this Court a petition for a writ of certiorari, which was granted. Coleman v. Soccer Ass'n of Columbia, 425 Md. 396, 41 A.3d 570 (2012). In his petition, Coleman posed only one question: whether this Court should retain the standard of contributory negligence as the common law standard governing negligence cases in the State of Maryland.

We shall hold that, although this Court has the authority to change the common law rule of contributory negligence, we decline to abrogate Maryland's long-established common law principle of contributory negligence.

 

II.

 

This Court last addressed the continuing viability of the contributory negligence doctrine in Harrison v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., supra, 295 Md. 442, 456 A.2d 894. In Harrison, the Court held that the contributory negligence principle remained the valid standard in Maryland negligence cases and that "any change in the established doctrine [was for] the Legislature." 295 Md. at 463, 456 A.2d at 905.

Chief Judge Murphy, for the Court in Harrison, began his review of the contributory negligence standard by tracing the standard's historical origins to Lord Chief Justice Ellenborough's opinion in Butterfield v. Forrester, 11 East 60, 103 Eng. 1153*1153 Rep. 926 (K.B. 1809).[4] As Harrison explained the case,

"Butterfield left a public inn at dusk, mounted his horse and rode off `violently' down the street. Forrester, who was effecting some repairs to his house, had placed a pole in the roadway. Although Butterfield could have seen and avoided the obstruction, he did not and was injured. The [English] court there noted:
`One person being in fault will not dispense with another's using ordinary care for himself. Two things must concur to support this action, an obstruction in the road by the fault of the defendant, and no want of ordinary care to avoid it on the part of the plaintiff.' [11 East] at 61, 103 Eng. Rep. at 927."

The Harrison opinion explained that, when the contributory negligence standard was first judicially adopted in the United States, the courts at the time were concerned that juries would award to plaintiffs sums that had the potential to stifle "newly developing industry."[5] Early American courts were also concerned that they should not adopt a policy in which "courts... assist a wrongdoer who suffered an injury as a result of his own wrongdoing." Harrison, 295 Md. at 450, 456 A.2d at 898. See also Smith v. Smith, 2 Pick. 621, 19 Mass. 621, 624 (1824) (a leading early American case incorporating the contributory negligence bar as part of common law).

This Court, relying on Butterfield v. Forrester, supra, first adopted the standard of contributory negligence in Irwin v. Sprigg, 6 Gill. 200, 205 (1847), stating:

"The established doctrine now is, that although the defendant's misconduct 1154*1154 may have been the primary cause of the injury complained of, yet the plaintiff cannot recover in an action of this kind, if the proximate and immediate cause of the damage can be traced to a want of ordinary care and caution on his part. Under such circumstances he must bear the consequences of his own recklessness or folly."

The contributory negligence standard was later modified in part by this Court's adoption of the last clear chance doctrine, see N. C. R.R. Co. v. State, Use of Price, 29 Md. 420, 436 (1868), which allowed a plaintiff to recover "if the defendant might, by the exercise of care on its part, have avoided the consequences of the neglect or carelessness" of the plaintiff. The Court recognized another exception to the contributory negligence standard where the plaintiff is under five years old. See Taylor v. Armiger, 277 Md. 638, 358 A.2d 883 (1975).

The Harrison Court examined the origins and impact of comparative negligence, noting that early in the 20th century, the Maryland General Assembly had adopted a form of comparative negligence for "certain perilous occupations," but had subsequently repealed the provisions. The Court in Harrison also pointed out that, as of 1983, of the thirty-nine states that had adopted comparative negligence, thirty-one had done so by statute, with the eight remaining states having adopted the principle by judicial action. The Court noted that it was "clear" that legal scholars "favored" the comparative negligence standard, as supported by "[a]n almost boundless array of scholarly writings." 295 Md. at 453, 456 A.2d at 899.

Nevertheless, the Harrison Court pointed to other considerations involved in changing the standard from contributory negligence to comparative negligence (295 Md. at 454-455, 456 A.2d at 900-901):

"Also to be considered is the effect which a comparative fault system would have on other fundamental areas of negligence law. The last clear chance doctrine, assumption of the risk, joint and several liability, contribution, setoffs and counterclaims, and application of the doctrine to other fault systems, such as strict liability in tort, are several of the more obvious areas affected by the urged shift to comparative negligence. Even that change has its complications; beside the `pure' form of comparative negligence, there are several `modified' forms, so that abrogation of the contributory negligence doctrine will necessitate the substitution of an alternate doctrine. Which form to adopt presents its own questions and the choice is by no means clear.... That a change from contributory to comparative negligence involves considerably more than a simple common law adjustment is readily apparent."

Harrison also examined those states which had abrogated the contributory negligence standard, pointing out that "most of the states which have adopted comparative negligence have done so by statute in derogation of the common law." 295 Md. at 456, 456 A.2d at 901. The Court observed that, in several of these states, the courts had refused to judicially abrogate the contributory negligence standard because they "expressly deferred on policy grounds to their respective legislatures." 295 Md. at 456, 456 A.2d at 901. Only eight state supreme courts, as of 1983, had adopted a comparative negligence standard by judicial decision.

The Harrison opinion further held that, when this Court is

"called upon, as here, to overrule our own decisions, consideration must be given to the doctrine of stare decisis— the policy which entails the reaffirmation 1155*1155 of a decisional doctrine of an appellate court, even though if considered for the first time, the Court might reach a different conclusion. Deems v. Western Maryland Ry., 247 Md. 95, 231 A.2d 514 (1966)." 295 Md. at 458, 456 A.2d at 902.

Chief Judge Murphy in Harrison continued his assessment by explaining that the principle of stare decisis should not be construed to

"inhibit [this Court] from changing or modifying a common law rule by judicial decision where we find, in light of changed conditions or increased knowledge, that the rule has become unsound in the circumstances of modern life, a vestige of the past, no longer suitable to our people." (295 Md. at 459, 456 A.2d at 903).

Nevertheless, Harrison concluded (295 Md. at 459, 456 A.2d at 903):

"[I]n considering whether a long-established common law rule—unchanged by the legislature and thus reflective of this State's public policy—is unsound in the circumstances of modern life, we have always recognized that declaration of the public policy of Maryland is normally the function of the General Assembly; that body, by Article 5 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, is expressly empowered to revise the common law of Maryland by legislative enactment. See Felder v. Butler, 292 Md. [174], 183, 438 A.2d 494 [499]; Adler v. American Standard Corp., 291 Md. [31], 45, 432 A.2d 464 [472]. The Court, therefore, has been particularly reluctant to alter a common law rule in the face of indications that to do so would be contrary to the public policy of the State. See, e.g., Condore v. Prince George's Co., 289 Md. [516] 532, 425 A.2d 1011 [1019]."

In the years immediately prior to Harrison, from 1966 to 1982, the Maryland General Assembly had considered twenty-one bills seeking to change the contributory negligence standard. None of the bills had been enacted. The Harrison Court accorded a great deal of weight to the General Assembly's failure to enact any of these bills, stating:

"[T]he legislature's action in rejecting the proposed change is indicative of an intention to retain the contributory negligence doctrine." 295 Md. at 462, 456 A.2d at 904.

The Court further pointed out that enactment of a comparative negligence standard is not a single issue; instead, such a decision would encompass a variety of choices to be made, beginning with the initial inquiry of what form of comparative negligence to adopt, "pure" or one "of the several types of modified comparative negligence," 295 Md. at 462-463, 456 A.2d at 904. If Maryland's common law were to change, the Harrison opinion explained, the decision as to which form of comparative negligence to adopt "plainly involves major policy considerations" of the sort best left to the General Assembly. 295 Md. at 462, 456 A.2d at 904.

 

III.

 

Since the time of Harrison, this Court has continued to recognize the standard of contributory negligence as the applicable principle in Maryland negligence actions. See, e.g., Thomas v. Panco Management of Maryland, LLC, 423 Md. 387, 417, 31 A.3d 583, 601 (2011); Erie Insurance Exchange v. Heffernan, 399 Md. 598, 925 A.2d 636 (2007); Dehn v. Edgecombe, 384 Md. 606, 865 A.2d 603 (2005); Franklin v. Morrison, 350 Md. 144, 168, 711 A.2d 177, 189 (1998); County Commissioners v. Bell Atlantic, 346 Md. 160, 695 A.2d 171 (1997); Brady v. Parsons Co., 327 Md. 275, 609 A.2d 297 (1992); Wegad v. Howard Street Jewelers, 326 Md. 409, 605 A.2d 123 (1992); Liscombe v. Potomac Edison Co., 303 Md. 619, 495 A.2d 838 (1985).

1156*1156 Although the contributory negligence principle has been part of this State's common law for over 165 years, petitioners and numerous amici in this case urge this Court to abolish the contributory negligence standard and replace it with a form of comparative negligence. They argue contributory negligence is an antiquated doctrine, that it has been roundly criticized by academic legal scholars, and that it has been rejected in a majority of our sister states. It is also pointed out that contributory negligence works an inherent unfairness by barring plaintiffs from any recovery, even when it is proven, in a particular case, that a defendant's negligence was primarily responsible for the act or omission which resulted in a plaintiff's injuries. It is said that contributory negligence provides harsh justice to those who may have acted negligently, in minor ways, to contribute to their injuries, and that it absolves those defendants from liability who can find any minor negligence in the plaintiffs' behavior.

Petitioner correctly contends that, because contributory negligence is a court-created principle, and has not been embodied in Maryland statutes, this Court possesses the authority to change the principle. This Court has recognized that (Ireland v. State, 310 Md. 328, 331-332, 529 A.2d 365, 366 (1987)),

"[b]ecause of the inherent dynamism of the common law, we have consistently held that it is subject to judicial modification in light of modern circumstances or increased knowledge. Harris v. State, 306 Md. 344, 357, 509 A.2d 120 (1986); Kelley v. R.G. Industries, Inc., 304 Md. 124, 497 A.2d 1143 (1985). Equally well established is the principle that the common law should not be changed contrary to the public policy of this State set forth by the General Assembly. Kelley, supra, 304 Md. at 141, 497 A.2d [at 1151]; Harrison v. Mont. Co. Bd. of Educ., 295 Md. 442, 460-61, 456 A.2d 894 [903] (1983). In the area of civil common law this Court has not only modified the existing law but also added to the body of law by recognizing new causes of action. Kelley, supra, (recognizing cause of action against manufacturers or marketers for damages caused by `Saturday Night Special' handguns); Boblitz v. Boblitz, 296 Md. 242, 462 A.2d 506 (1983) (permitting negligence action by one spouse against another); Moxley v. Acker, 294 Md. 47, 447 A.2d 857 (1982)(deleting force as a required element of the action of forceable detainer); Adler v. American Standard Corp., 291 Md. 31, 432 A.2d 464 (1981) (recognizing tort of abusive or wrongful discharge); Lusby v. Lusby, 283 Md. 334, 390 A.2d 77 (1978) (abolishing the defense of interspousal immunity in the case of outrageous intentional torts); Harris v. Jones, 281 Md. 560, 380 A.2d 611 (1977) (recognizing tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress)."

The Court's ability to modify the common law was further underscored in Kelley v. R.G. Industries, Inc., 304 Md. 124, 140, 497 A.2d 1143, 1151 (1985):

"This Court has repeatedly said that `the common law is not static; its life and heart is its dynamism—its ability to keep pace with the world while constantly searching for just and fair solutions to pressing societal problems.' Harrison v. Mont. Co. Bd. of Educ., 295 Md. 442, 460, 456 A.2d 894 (1983). See Felder v. Butler, 292 Md. 174, 182, 438 A.2d 494 (1981). The common law is, therefore, subject to judicial modification in light of modern circumstances or increased knowledge. Jones v. State, 302 Md. 153, 161, 486 A.2d 184 (1985); Boblitz v. Boblitz, 296 Md. 242, 462 A.2d 506 (1983); 1157*1157 Condore v. Prince George's Co., 289 Md. 516, 425 A.2d 1011 (1981)."

See also, e.g., Bowden v. Caldor, 350 Md. 4, 710 A.2d 267 (1998)("as often pointed out, this Court has authority under the Maryland Constitution to change the common law"); Telnikoff v. Matusevitch, 347 Md. 561, 593 n. 29, 702 A.2d 230, 246 n. 29 (1997); Owens-Illinois v. Zenobia, 325 Md. 420, 469-470, 601 A.2d 633, 657 (1992).

Since the Harrison case, the General Assembly has continually considered and failed to pass bills that would abolish or modify the contributory negligence standard.[6] The failure of so many bills, attempting to change the contributory negligence doctrine, is a clear indication of legislative policy at the present time. This Court in Moore v. State, 388 Md. 623, 641, 882 A.2d 256, 267 (2005), with regard to the failure of legislation, explained:

"Although the failure of a single bill in the General Assembly may be due to many reasons, and thus is not always a good indication of the Legislature's intent, under some circumstances, the failure to enact legislation is persuasive evidence of legislative intent. See, e.g., Lee v. Cline, 384 Md. 245, 255-256, 863 A.2d 297, 303-304 (2004); Arundel Corp. v. Marie, 383 Md. 489, 504, 860 A.2d 886, 895 (2004) (`The Legislature [has] declined invitations to modify the rule as [appellant] wishes'); Stearman v. State Farm, 381 Md. 436, 455, 849 A.2d 539, 550-551 (2004) (`The refusal of the Legislature to act to change a [statute] ... provides ... support for the Court to exercise restraint and refuse to step in and make the change'); In re Anthony R., supra, 362 Md. [51], 65-67, 763 A.2d [136], 144-145 (2000); State v. Sowell, 353 Md. 713, 723-724, 728 A.2d 712, 717-718 (1999) (`We have recognized that the General Assembly's failure to amend ... sometimes reflects its desired public policy'); State v. Bell, 351 Md. 709, 723, 720 A.2d 311, 318 (1998) (`Therefore, by declining to adopt the proposed language of the amending bill, the Legislature clearly did not intend' to adopt the result being urged); State v. Frazier, 298 Md. 422, 459, 470 A.2d 1269, 1288 (1984) (`All of these proposals [supporting different views of a statute advocated by the parties] were rejected by the General Assembly')."

The Moore opinion continued (388 Md. at 641-642, 882 A.2d at 267):

"Legislative inaction is very significant where bills have repeatedly been introduced in the General Assembly to accomplish a particular result, and where the General Assembly has persistently refused to enact such bills. See, e.g., Arundel Corp. v. Marie, supra, 383 Md. at 502-504, 860 A.2d at 894-896; Stearman v. State Farm, supra, 381 Md. at 455, 849 A.2d at 551 (`Every year since 2000, legislators have introduced bills in the General Assembly that would' accomplish what the appellant urges, but `[n]one of these bills were enacted'); Bozman v. Bozman, 376 Md. 461, 492, 830 A.2d 450, 469 (2003), quoting 1158*1158 Boblitz v. Boblitz, 296 Md. 242, 274, 462 A.2d 506, 521 (1983) (The Court will decline to adopt a particular position `where the Legislature repeatedly had rejected efforts to achieve legislatively that which we were asked to grant judicially'); Halliday v. Sturm, 368 Md. 186, 209, 792 A.2d 1145, 1159 (2002) (The Court refused to adopt positions `that have been presented on several occasions to the General Assembly' and `[s]o far, the Legislature has chosen not' to adopt them)...."

See also Potomac Valley Orth. v. Board of Physicians, 417 Md. 622, 640-641, 12 A.3d 84, 95 (2011).

The General Assembly's repeated failure to pass legislation abrogating the defense of contributory negligence is very strong evidence that the legislative policy in Maryland is to retain the principle of contributory negligence. Chief Judge Bell emphasized for the Court in Baltimore v. Clark, 404 Md. 13, 36, 944 A.2d 1122, 1135-1136 (2008), the following:

"It is well settled that, where the General Assembly has announced public policy, the Court will decline to enter the public policy debate, even when it is the common law that is at issue and the Court certainly has the authority to change the common law. Adler v. American Standard Corp., 291 Md. at 47, 432 A.2d at 473."

See Ireland v. State, supra, 310 Md. at 331, 529 A.2d at 366 ("[T]he common law should not be changed contrary to the public policy of the State as set forth by the General Assembly"); Kelley v. R.G. Industries, supra, 304 Md. at 141, 497 A.2d at 1151 ("[W]e have consistently recognized that common law principles should not be changed contrary to the public policy of the State set forth by the General Assembly").

For this Court to change the common law and abrogate the contributory negligence defense in negligence actions, in the face of the General Assembly's repeated refusal to do so, would be totally inconsistent with the Court's long-standing jurisprudence.

JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR HOWARD COUNTY AFFIRMED. COSTS TO BE PAID BY THE APPELLANT JAMES COLEMAN.

BELL, C.J. and HARRELL, J., dissent.

BATTAGLIA, GREENE, McDONALD and RAKER, JJ. Concur.

HARRELL, J., dissenting, which BELL, C.J., joins.

Paleontologists and geologists inform us that Earth's Cretaceous period (including in what is present day Maryland) ended approximately 65 million years ago with an asteroid striking Earth (the Cretaceous-Paleogene Extinction Event), wiping-out, in a relatively short period of geologic time, most plant and animal species, including dinosaurs. As to the last premise, they are wrong. A dinosaur roams yet the landscape of Maryland (and Virginia, Alabama, North Carolina and the District of Columbia), feeding on the claims of persons injured by the negligence of another, but who contributed proximately in some way to the occasion of his or her injuries, however slight their culpability. The name of that dinosaur is the doctrine of contributory negligence. With the force of a modern asteroid strike, this Court should render, in the present case, this dinosaur extinct. It chooses not to do so. Accordingly, I dissent.

My dissent does not take the form of a tit-for-tat trading of thrusts and parries with the Majority opinion. Rather, I write for a future majority of this Court, which, I have no doubt, will relegate the fossilized 1159*1159 doctrine of contributory negligence to a judicial tar pit at some point.

 

I. The History of Contributory Negligence in Maryland

 

Under the doctrine of contributory negligence, a plaintiff who fails to exercise ordinary care for his or her own safety, and thus contributes proximately to his or her injury, "is barred from all recovery, regardless of the quantum of a defendant's primary negligence." Harrison v. Montgomery Cnty. Bd. of Ed., 295 Md. 442, 451, 456 A.2d 894, 898 (1983). Contributory negligence is the "neglect of duty imposed upon all men to observe ordinary care for their own safety," Potts v. Armour & Co., 183 Md. 483, 490, 39 A.2d 552, 556 (1944), and refers not to the breach of a duty owed to another, but rather to the failure of an individual to exercise that degree of care necessary to protect him or her self. Baltimore Cnty. v. State, Use of Keenan, 232 Md. 350, 362, 193 A.2d 30, 37 (1963). An "all-or-nothing" doctrine, contributory negligence operates in application as a total bar to recovery by an injured plaintiff.

The doctrine is of judicial "Big Bang" origin, credited generally to the 1809 English case of Butterfield v. Forrester (1809) 103 Eng. Rep. 926 (K.B.). In Butterfield, the court considered whether a plaintiff, injured while "violently" riding his horse on a roadway, by a pole negligently placed in the roadway, could recover damages. Denying recovery, Lord Ellenborough penned the first recognized incantation of contributory negligence, declaring, "One person being in fault will not dispense with another's using ordinary care for himself. Two things must concur to support this action, an obstruction in the road by the fault of the defendant, and no want of ordinary care to avoid it on the part of the plaintiff." Id. at 927.

Soon after Butterfield, American courts began to recognize the doctrine of contributory negligence. See Smith v. Smith, 19 Mass. (2 Pick.) 621 (1824); William L. Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 51 Mich. L.Rev. 465, 468 (1953). Although early courts explained rarely the reasons for their adoption of the doctrine, scholars set forth later multiple reasons for its widespread acceptance in the U.S. in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. For example, its ascendance was considered a means of encouraging potential plaintiffs to comply with the relevant standard of care, 4 Harper, James & Gray on Torts, § 22.2 at 340 (3d ed. 2006) (hereinafter "Harper, James & Gray"); requiring plaintiffs to enter court with clean hands, Prosser & Keeton on the Law of Torts, § 65 at 451 (5th ed. 1984) (hereinafter "Prosser & Keeton"); and, insulating developing industry from liability and fostering economic growth by keeping in check plaintiff-minded juries. Id. at 452; 4 Harper, James & Gray, supra, § 22.1 at 328-30. The doctrine was seen also as consistent with "several unwritten policies of the [nineteenth and early twentieth century] common law"—specifically, the idea that courts should not assist someone who contributes to causing his or her own injuries, and the "passion for a simple issue that could be categorically answered yes or no..." Harrison, 295 Md. at 450, 456 A.2d at 897-98; see also Edward S. Digges, Jr. & Robert Dale Klein, Comparative Fault in Maryland: The Time Has Come, 41 Md. L.Rev. 276, 278 (1982); Prosser & Keeton, supra, § 65 at 452.

Whatever the initial justifications attributed to its birth, contributory negligence has been a mainstay of Maryland law since its adoption in Irwin v. Sprigg, 6 Gill 200 (1847).[1] Since that time, Maryland courts 1160*1160 applied the doctrine of contributory negligence to bar recovery in negligence actions by at-fault plaintiffs. Exceptions evolved, however, to allow recovery in specific instances. For example, the defense of contributory negligence is not available against claimants under five years of age, Taylor v. Armiger, 277 Md. 638, 649, 358 A.2d 883, 889 (1976), in strict liability actions, Ellsworth v. Sherne Lingerie, Inc., 303 Md. 581, 597, 495 A.2d 348, 356 (1985), and in actions based on intentional conduct, Tucker v. State, Use of Johnson, 89 Md. 471, 486, 43 A. 778, 783 (1899); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Hill, 139 Md.App. 308, 316-18, 775 A.2d 476, 481-82 (2001). Additionally, the doctrine of last clear chance developed, Northern Cent. Ry. Co. v. State, Use of Price, 29 Md. 420, 436 (1868), to allow a plaintiff to recover, despite his or her contributory negligence, if he or she establishes "something new or sequential, which affords the defendant a fresh opportunity (of which he fails to avail himself) to avert the consequences of his original negligence."[2] Sanner v. Guard, 236 Md. 271, 276, 203 A.2d 885, 888 (1964).

The all-or-nothing consequences of the application of contributory negligence have long been criticized nationally by scholars and commentators. See, e.g., Hilen v. Hays, 673 S.W.2d 713, 717 (Ky.1984) ("A list of the critics of contributory negligence as a complete bar to a plaintiff's recovery reads like a tort hall of fame. The list includes, among others, Campbell, Fleming, Green, Harper and James, Dreton, Leflar, Malone, Pound and Prosser."); Prosser, Comparative Negligence, supra, at 469 ("Criticism of the denial of recovery was not slow in coming, and it has been with us for more than a century."); 2 Dan B. Dobbs, Paul T. Hayden & Ellen M. Bublick, The Law of Torts, § 218 at 763 (2d ed. 2011) (hereinafter "Dobbs") ("The traditional contributory negligence rule was extreme not merely in results but in principle. No satisfactory reasoning has ever explained the rule."). Many have argued instead for, and most states have adopted,[3] a system of comparative negligence which apportions damages between a negligent plaintiff and a negligent defendant according to each party's relative degree of fault. Thus, under a comparative negligence system, a plaintiff's contributory negligence does not bar recovery, but rather reduces proportionately his or her damages in relation to his or her degree of 1161*1161 fault.[4] 2 Dobbs, supra, § 220 at 771.

This Court considered previously whether to replace the common law doctrine of contributory negligence with a system of comparative fault. See Harrison, 295 Md. 442, 456 A.2d 894; Pittsburg & Connellsville R.R. Co. v. Andrews, 39 Md. 329, 351 (1874) (noting that a doctrine requiring the relative fault of a plaintiff and defendant to be compared "has never been sanctioned in this State, but the exact contrary is the settled rule here"). We confronted this question most recently nearly thirty years ago. In Harrison, we considered whether to abrogate judicially contributory negligence in the midst of a nation-wide movement to transition to a system of comparative fault.[5] We engaged first in a comparison of the historical and doctrinal principles of both contributory and comparative negligence. Harrison, 295 Md. at 449-53, 456 A.2d at 897-99. Although recognizing the growing trend toward adopting principles of comparative fault, id. at 456-58, 456 A.2d at 901-02, we noted, on the other hand, Maryland's long history of applying the doctrine of contributory negligence. Id. at 458, 456 A.2d at 902. See Irwin, 6 Gill at 205 (adopting the doctrine of contributory negligence); Pittsburg & Connellsville R.R. Co., 39 Md. at 351 (affirming Maryland's adherence to contributory, rather than comparative, negligence).

Although acknowledging further that jurisdictions transitioning from contributory negligence to comparative fault regimes experienced little difficulty in doing so, Harrison, 295 Md. at 454, 456 A.2d at 900, we noted that making such a doctrinal change requires consideration of a multitude of options and implications. Id. at 462-63, 456 A.2d at 904-05. For example, this Court would have to choose between a pure or modified fault system, and consider "the effect which a comparative fault system would have on other fundamental areas of negligence law," such as the "last clear chance doctrine, assumption of the risk, joint and several liability, contribution, setoffs and counterclaims, and application of the doctrine to other fault systems, such as strict liability in tort...." Id. at 455, 456 A.2d at 900. Noting the lack of uniformity among the systems adopted by new comparative fault jurisdictions in their treatment of these areas, we characterized the decision whether to adopt either pure or modified comparative fault as one "plainly involv[ing] major policy considerations." Id. at 462, 456 A.2d at 904.

Perhaps overawed by the difficult choices inherent in adopting comparative negligence, however, the Harrison court declined to ride atop the tsunami of states abandoning contributory negligence. Instead, 1162*1162 the Harrison majority observed that "scant attention" had been paid by the Maryland Bench and Bar to the relative merits of contributory and comparative negligence, id. at 458, 456 A.2d at 902, and that, although the Legislature had considered numerous bills proposing to adopt comparative fault, none were enacted ultimately. Id. at 461-62, 456 A.2d at 904. Thus, ignoring the great societal change nationally demonstrating the unsuitability of contributory negligence principles to modern life, but finding no evidence of that groundswell in Maryland, we deferred instead to the Legislature, inferring from its inaction an "intention to retain the contributory negligence doctrine" as the public policy of the State of Maryland. Id. at 462, 456 A.2d at 904. We concluded:

All things considered, we are unable to say that the circumstances of modern life have so changed as to render contributory negligence a vestige of the past, no longer suitable to the needs of the people of Maryland. In the final analysis, whether to abandon the doctrine of contributory negligence in favor of comparative negligence involves fundamental and basic public policy considerations properly to be addressed by the legislature. We therefore conclude ... that while we recognize the force of the plaintiff's argument, in the present state of the law, we leave any change in the established doctrine to the Legislature.

Id. at 463, 456 A.2d at 905 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). We are given straightforwardly in the present case another opportunity to replace the doctrine of contributory negligence with a system of comparative fault.

 

II. The Maryland Court of Appeals Has the Power to Abrogate Contributory Negligence

 

Unquestionably (as the Majority opinion agrees—see Maj. op. at 691-93, 69 A.3d at 1156-57), this Court has the power to change the doctrine of contributory negligence. Although the common law may be changed also by legislative act, Md. Const. Decl. of Rts. art. 5, we have stated frequently that it is "our duty to determine the common law as it exists in this State." Pope v. State, 284 Md. 309, 341-42, 396 A.2d 1054, 1073 (1979) (quoting Ass'n of Taxi Oprs. v. Yellow Cab Co., 198 Md. 181, 204, 82 A.2d 106, 117 (1951)). See also Tracey v. Solesky, 427 Md. 627, 639-40, 50 A.3d 1075, 1081-82 (2012) (quoting Ireland v. State, 310 Md. 328, 331-32, 529 A.2d 365, 366 (1987)); McGarvey v. McGarvey, 286 Md. 19, 27, 405 A.2d 250, 254 (1979). Contributory negligence is, and has always been, a common law doctrine of judicial origin in this State. See Irwin, 6 Gill 200. In the absence of codification by the Legislature, the defense of contributory negligence remains a dependent of the common law, and as such, is within the province of its parent, this Court, to abrogate or modify that to which it gave birth and nurtured. See, e.g., Price v. State, 405 Md. 10, 23, 949 A.2d 619, 627 (2008) (noting that because "the Maryland principles governing inconsistent verdicts are neither reflected in statutes nor in the Rules promulgated by this Court[,] ... those principles ... [are] part of Maryland common law" and subject to judicial modification); Jones v. State, 303 Md. 323, 337 n. 10, 493 A.2d 1062, 1069 n. 10 (1985) ("The common law rule may, within constitutional constraints, be changed or modified by ... judicial decision...."); Ireland, 310 Md. at 331, 529 A.2d at 366 ("[T]he determination of what part of th[e] common law is consistent with the spirit of Maryland's Constitution and her political institutions[] are to be made by this Court.").

In accordance with our authority to alter the common law, Petitioner James Coleman ("Coleman") urges this Court to abolish 1163*1163 the doctrine of contributory negligence, arguing that it is a vestige of the past. In response, Respondent Soccer Association of Columbia ("SAC") and its Amici[6] claim principally that this Court is bound by its decision in Harrison to retain the doctrine of contributory negligence; but, assuming that we are not bound by Harrison, Respondent contends that the abrogation of contributory negligence is more appropriate for legislative, rather than judicial, action, due to the complex policy considerations involved in adopting comparative negligence. I disagree. Principles of stare decisis do not require continued adherence to our decision in Harrison, nor does this Court owe continued deference to the General Assembly simply because of the difficult choices inherent in formulating a comparative negligence rule. Thus, I would abolish the doctrine of contributory negligence and replace it with comparative fault—"not because [it is] easy, but because [it is] hard." President John F. Kennedy, Address at Rice University on the Nation's Space Effort (12 Sept. 1962).[7]

 

A. Stare Decisis Does Not Require Retention of the Doctrine of Contributory Negligence

 

Under the doctrine of stare decisis, changes in long-standing "decisional doctrine are left to the Legislature" for purposes of "certainty and stability." Harrison, 295 Md. at 458-59, 456 A.2d at 902 (quoting Deems v. Western Md. Ry. Co., 247 Md. 95, 102, 231 A.2d 514, 518 (1967)). Stare decisis, meaning to stand by the thing decided, "promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process." Livesay v. Baltimore Cnty., 384 Md. 1, 14, 862 A.2d 33, 40-41 (2004) (quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 2609, 115 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991)). Notwithstanding the doctrine of stare decisis, the common law remains "subject to judicial modification in the light of modern circumstances or increased knowledge." Ireland, 310 Md. at 331, 529 A.2d at 366. As we stated in Harrison, we have never construed the doctrine of stare decisis "to inhibit us from changing or modifying a common law rule by judicial decision where we find, in light of changed conditions or increased knowledge, that the rule has become unsound in the circumstances of modern life, a vestige of the past, no longer suitable to our people." 295 Md. at 459, 456 A.2d at 903.

Although this Court has declined frequently to alter long-standing common law rules, see, e.g., Fennell v. Southern Md. Hosp. Ctr., 320 Md. 776, 786-87, 580 A.2d 206, 211 (1990) (refusing to revise the common law to permit damages for "lost chance of survival" claims in medical malpractice 1164*1164 actions); Frye v. Frye, 305 Md. 542, 567, 505 A.2d 826, 839 (1986) (declining to overturn parent-child immunity in motor tort cases); State v. Minster, 302 Md. 240, 245, 486 A.2d 1197, 1199 (1985) (refusing to abrogate the common law "year and a day rule"), we may depart from principles of stare decisis in two circumstances: (1) when a prior decision was "clearly wrong and contrary to established principles," Tracey, 427 Md. at 659, 50 A.3d at 1093 (quoting State v. Adams, 406 Md. 240, 259, 958 A.2d 295, 307 (2008)), or (2) "when precedent has been superseded by significant changes in the law or facts." Id. (citing Harrison, 295 Md. at 459, 456 A.2d at 903). For example, in B & K Rentals & Sales Co. v. Universal Leaf Tobacco Co., we abandoned the common law rule of res gestae in favor of the version set forth in the Federal Rules of Evidence, after noting our "[i]ncreased knowledge," "the guidance of a significant majority of other states," and the near-universal condemnation of the common law rule by both courts and commentators. 324 Md. 147, 158, 596 A.2d 640, 645 (1991). Similarly, in Julian v. Christopher, we departed from our prior interpretation of silent consent clauses allowing landlords to refuse unreasonably and arbitrarily a lessee's request to sublet or assign a lease in favor of a standard of reasonableness, after noting summarily that the common law interpretation is a "vestige of the past" and contrary to established public policy. 320 Md. 1, 8-9, 575 A.2d 735, 738-39 (1990).

This Court has shown a willingness to depart from its stale decisions even where we expressed previously an intention to defer to legislative action on a longstanding, but widely-disfavored, common law rule. For example, we declined for decades to abrogate the common law interspousal immunity doctrine prohibiting married women from maintaining actions in tort against their husbands, in each instance deferring expressly to the Legislature. See Stokes v. Ass'n of Indep. Taxi Operators, Inc., 248 Md. 690, 692, 237 A.2d 762, 763 (1968) ("[I]f the rule is to be changed, the Legislature will have to do it."); Ennis v. Donovan, 222 Md. 536, 543, 161 A.2d 698, 702 (1960) ("We can only repeat that if it be desirable to permit a married woman, under certain circumstances, to sue her husband in tort, this authorization should emanate from the Legislature, not from the courts."); Fernandez v. Fernandez, 214 Md. 519, 524, 135 A.2d 886, 889 (1957) ("We think the appellant here must proceed in equity unless the Legislature sees fit to change the law."); Gregg v. Gregg, 199 Md. 662, 667, 87 A.2d 581, 583 (1952) ("[T]hese ancient theories which form a part of the common law have to be followed by us unless they have been changed by legislative action....").

Shortly after our decision in Harrison, however, we abrogated the common law doctrine of interspousal immunity in negligence actions.[8] Boblitz v. Boblitz, 296 Md. 242, 462 A.2d 506 (1983). In so doing, we distanced ourselves from our prior cases and characterized the decision as one appropriate 1165*1165 for judicial action.[9] We considered persuasive the evolution of society's conceptions regarding women and the trend toward abrogation in other states, concluding that the foundation of the doctrine no longer coincided with modern values. Thus, we determined that we could depart fairly from principles of stare decisis and overrule the doctrine's application in negligence actions as a "vestige of the past." Id. at 273-75, 462 A.2d at 521-22. We distinguished Harrison, however, as both possessing a history of legislative inaction on proposed bills (lacking in the context of interspousal immunity) and involving necessarily more complex issues, stating that Harrison represented an attempt to grant judicially that which "the Legislature repeatedly had rejected efforts to achieve legislatively." Id. at 274, 462 A.2d at 521. Yet, we emphasized that, despite our decision in Harrison, it remains well within the authority of this Court to abrogate an outmoded rule of the common law. Id. at 274, 462 A.2d at 522.

We abandoned completely the doctrine of interspousal immunity finally in Bozman v. Bozman, 376 Md. 461, 830 A.2d 450 (2003). We noted that, because forty-six states had done so already, in full or in part, "the trend and, indeed, the great weight of authority" was in favor of abrogating the common law doctrine as "outdated and serv[ing] no useful purpose." Id. at 487-88, 830 A.2d at 466. Although we acknowledged that certain aspects of the common law concept, upon which the doctrine rested at its conception, would be retained in various provisions of the Maryland Code, we found such remnants insufficient to shield the doctrine from judicial abolition. Id. at 489, 830 A.2d at 466-67. Considering the decisions of our sister jurisdictions to be persuasive authority in analyzing the arguments "both in support of, and against, retention of the interspousal immunity rule," id. at 490, 830 A.2d at 467, we determined that the doctrine of stare decisis did not require strict adherence to the doctrine or continued legislative deference. Id. at 494-95, 830 A.2d at 470.

Thus, as our abrogation of the interspousal tort immunity doctrine demonstrates, this Court has not only the power, but also the responsibility (Harrison notwithstanding) to abrogate the doctrine of contributory negligence if it concludes that the state of society and law have changed so that contributory negligence is a vestige of the past, unsuitable to the conditions of modern life. To that end, this Court reviews the foundation of the doctrine to determine its continued relevance in modern society, and considers persuasive, although not binding, the actions of other states on this issue. See id. at 490, 830 A.2d at 467. Additionally, we may analyze, to some degree (limited by the factual record before us), "the public policy concerns raised by the parties and by the other courts which have grappled with this issue." State v. Wiegmann, 350 Md. 585, 607, 714 A.2d 841, 851 (1998) (quoting Gaver v. Harrant, 316 Md. 17, 30, 557 A.2d 210, 217 (1989)).

As noted above, the widespread acceptance of contributory negligence as a complete defense is attributed principally to (1) the desire to protect the nations' newly-developing industry from liability and plaintiff-minded juries, E.A. Turk, Comparative Negligence on the March, 28 Chi.-Kent L.Rev. 189, 201 (1950); 4 Harper, James & Gray, supra, § 22.1 at 328-30; and (2) "the concept prevalent at the time 1166*1166 that a plaintiff's irresponsibility in failing to use due care for his own safety erased whatever fault could be laid at defendant's feet for contributing to the injury." Scott v. Rizzo, 96 N.M. 682, 634 P.2d 1234, 1237 (1981) (citing F. Harper and F. James, Law of Torts, § 22.1 at 1198 (1956)). Neither of these justifications, however, carry weight in present-day Maryland. In today's society,[10] there has been no need demonstrated to protect any "newly-developing" industry at the expense of injured litigants. Industry generally in this nation is no longer fledgling or so prone to withering at the prospect of liability. See, e.g., Alvis v. Ribar, 85 Ill.2d 1, 52 Ill.Dec. 23, 421 N.E.2d 886, 893 (1981) ("There is no longer any justification for providing the protective barrier of the contributory negligence rule for industries of the nation at the expense of deserving litigants."); Frummer v. Hilton Hotels Int'l, Inc., 60 Misc.2d 840, 304 N.Y.S.2d 335, 341-42 (N.Y.Sup.1969) ("Courts now do not feel any need to act as a protector of our nation's infant industries, for their infancy has long since passed.... In an age where a defendant may through various means, such as insurance, readily protect himself from a ruinous judgment, the solicitude of nineteenth century courts for defendants is certainly out of place...."). Moreover, tilting the scales to favor industry is inconsistent with modern conceptions of justice, which focus instead on proportional responsibility and fundamental fairness. See Hilen v. Hays, 673 S.W.2d 713, 718 (Ky. 1984) ("It may well be that the 19th century judicial mind perceived of the need for courts to tilt the scales of justice in favor of defendants to keep the liabilities of growing industry within some bounds. But assuming such a rule was ever viable, 1167*1167 certainly it no longer comports to present day morality and concepts of fundamental fairness." (internal citation and quotation marks omitted)); Robert H. Lande & James MacAlister, Comparative Negligence with Joint & Several Liability: The Best of Both Worlds, U. Balt. L.Rev. Online 1, 2 (2012) (noting that Maryland's system of contributory negligence "frustrate[s] the interests of justice as to the litigants"). Rather, the array of Amici lined up in support of the continuation of contributory negligence is populated by the entrenched and established business interests who seek to maintain an economic advantage.

The evolution of society's conceptions of justice is exemplified by the move of tort law away from traditional "all-or-nothing" recovery rules and toward allocation of the burden of liability among at-fault parties. Guido Calabresi & Jeffrey O. Cooper, The Monsanto Lecture: New Directions in Tort Law, 30 Val. U.L. Rev. 859, 868 (1995). Liability, in negligence actions, "follows tortious conduct." Austin v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 286 Md. 51, 83, 405 A.2d 255, 272 (1979) (Cole, J., dissenting); Scott, 634 P.2d at 1241 ("Liability based on fault is the cornerstone of tort law...."). Contributory negligence is at odds with this fundamental premise. By barring recovery completely to a contributorily negligent plaintiff, the rule "visits the entire loss caused by the fault of two parties on one of them alone, and that one the injured plaintiff, least able to bear it, and quite possibly much less at fault than the defendant who goes scot-free." Prosser, Comparative Negligence, supra, at 469.

Respondent and its Amici count as a strength of the doctrine of contributory negligence its inflexibility in refusing to compensate any, even marginally, at-fault plaintiff. They argue that, in so doing, contributory negligence encourages personal responsibility by foreclosing the possibility of recovery for potential, negligent plaintiffs, and thus cannot possibly be outmoded.[11] To the contrary, that the doctrine of contributory negligence grants one party a windfall at the expense of the other is, as courts and commentators alike have noted, unfair manifestly as a matter of policy. See, e.g., Kaatz v. State, 540 P.2d 1037, 1048 (Alaska 1975) ("The central reason for adopting a comparative negligence system lies in the inherent injustice of the contributory negligence rule."); Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So.2d 431, 436 (Fla.1973) ("Whatever may have been the historical justification for [the rule of contributory negligence], today it is almost universally regarded as unjust and inequitable to vest an entire accidental loss on one of the parties whose negligent conduct combined with the negligence of the other party to produce the loss."); Lande & MacAlister, supra, at 4 ("The `all or nothing' system [of contributory negligence], disconnected from a party's degree of fault, is unfair and counterintuitive."); Prosser, Comparative Negligence, supra, at 469 (characterizing contributory negligence as "outrageous" and an "obvious 1168*1168 injustice" that "[n]o one has ever succeeded in justifying ..., and no one ever will"). Moreover, if contributory negligence encourages would-be plaintiffs to exercise caution with respect to themselves, then so too does the doctrine of comparative fault by reducing the plaintiff's recoverable damages. Unlike contributory negligence, however, comparative fault deters also negligence on the part of the defendant by holding him or her responsible for the damages that he or she inflicted on the plaintiff. See Lande & MacAlister, supra, at 5-6 (noting that, although contributory negligence systems "burden[] only plaintiffs with the obligation to take precautions," comparative negligence provides a "mixture of responsibility" that is "the best way to prevent most accidents"); Prosser, Comparative Negligence, supra, at 468 ("[T]he assumption that the speeding motorist is, or should be meditating on the possible failure of a lawsuit for his possible injuries lacks all reality, and it is quite as reasonable to say that the rule promotes accidents by encouraging the negligent defendant."). Thus, Respondent's contention that contributory negligence encourages personal responsibility, and is therefore preferable to comparative negligence, is unpersuasive.

Respondent contends also that the foundation of contributory negligence remains strong because, as we said in Harrison, "Maryland cases do not reflect any general dissatisfaction with the contributory negligence doctrine." 295 Md. at 458, 456 A.2d at 898. That the courts of this State have applied uniformly the doctrine, however, does not mean that we did not recognize along the way its flaws.[12] See Bozman, 376 Md. at 472, 830 A.2d at 457. For example, as Judge Eldridge noted recently, our retention of contributory negligence garnered extensive criticism—"few if any other legal principles have been criticized as much as this Court's continued adherence in negligence actions to the doctrine of contributory negligence and the Court's refusal to adopt comparative negligence." State v. Adams, 406 Md. 240, 332, 958 A.2d 295, 351 (2008) (Eldridge, J., dissenting), overruled by Unger v. State, 427 Md. 383, 48 A.3d 242 (2012). The Court of Special Appeals also noted similar criticism, calling the doctrine "harsh and pitiless," and noted that we are among the severe minority of states adhering still to it. See Preston Carter v. Senate Masonry, Inc., 156 Md. App. 162, 175, 846 A.2d 50, 58 (2004); see also Stewart v. Hechinger Stores Co., 118 Md.App. 354, 359, 702 A.2d 946, 949 (1997) ("Although we are aware of the often harsh consequences of Maryland's common law doctrine of contributory negligence, and that it has been abandoned by a vast majority of states in favor of some form of comparative negligence, we are in no position summarily to do so.").

1169*1169 Moreover, since our decision in Harrison, the doctrine of comparative negligence has continued to be accepted elsewhere as the superior legal principle. At the time Harrison was decided, thirty-nine states had replaced the doctrine of contributory negligence with some form of comparative negligence. See 295 Md. at 453, 456 A.2d at 899. This trend has continued unabated. Today, the number of states applying comparative negligence is forty-six, and not one jurisdiction adopting it has since retreated and re-adopted contributory negligence. Rather, seven additional states have enacted comparative negligence systems since Harrison. What was at the time of Harrison a quickening trend within the United States is today an established principle of law in nearly every right-thinking common law jurisdiction in the world, see Placek v. City of Sterling Heights, 405 Mich. 638, 275 N.W.2d 511, 515 (1979) ("[A]lmost every common-law jurisdiction outside the United States has discarded contributory negligence and has adopted in its place a more equitable system of comparative negligence."); John W. Wade, A Uniform Comparative Fault Act—What Should it Provide?, 10 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 220, 221 (1977) (noting that after England, Canada, and Australia abrogated contributory negligence, the United States became the "primary location of the contributory negligence rule"), with the exception of Maryland, Alabama, the District of Columbia, North Carolina, and Virginia. See 2 Dobbs, supra, § 220 at 772.

Respondent argues, in effect, that there has not been a significant change in the state of law or society since Harrison, and therefore there is no reason to depart from stare decisis and reconsider whether the doctrine of contributory negligence should be retained in the State of Maryland. I could not disagree more. At the time Harrison was decided, the country was in the midst of a broad reform effort sweeping the nation. The doctrine of comparative fault was of fairly recent vintage at the time Harrison was filed, adopted in most states in the ten years prior to our decision. See Robert D. Cooter & Thomas S. Ulen, An Economic Case for Comparative Negligence, 61 N.Y.U. L.Rev. 1067, 1075 (1986) (noting that most states adopted comparative negligence in the 1970s and early 1980s). Essentially, Respondent contends that, because our decision in Harrison was made when the movement toward reform of negligence principles was well underway, this Court is constrained to retain the doctrine forever, having missed the single opportunity to get on board the train. Respondent's argument seems to suggest that, so long as there is some delay in abandoning an unjust law, the unjust law remains irretrievably an albatross tied around the neck of our common law, unless and until the Legislature decides to save us.[13] As our decision in Bozman demonstrates, however, our authority to modify the common law and overrule prior decisions is not so limited.

Although only seven additional states have implemented comparative fault since Harrison, forty-six states now employ comparative fault.[14] Comparative fault is 1170*1170 no longer a trend or a doctrine of recent vintage, but rather is an established and integral doctrine to the negligence systems of nearly every state in the country. Other jurisdictions, most notably those that abrogated contributory negligence judicially, have decades of experience applying comparative fault—experience that, in large part, was lacking at the time we decided Harrison. The twelve states to abrogate contributory negligence by judicial decision provide examples of how comparative negligence is applied, how it impacts collateral doctrines and fault systems, and how it is applied in reality.[15] In essence, this Court may foresee more clearly today potential impacts and complications, as well as the value of a comparative fault system, than was possible in 1983. Maryland is no longer at the crest of a wave of reform—instead, it has been left behind, one of the last bastions of contributory negligence in a world which has discarded it as unjust and outmoded. In my estimation, this qualifies certainly as a significant change warranting reconsideration of Harrison.

Although I recognize certainly the value of the doctrine of stare decisis, see, e.g., Unger v. State, 427 Md. 383, 418, 48 A.3d 242, 262 (2012) (Harrell, J., dissenting), I do not believe that in this instance, strict adherence is appropriate or warranted. See, e.g., Alvis, 52 Ill.Dec. 23, 421 N.E.2d at 896 ("Clearly, the need for stability in law must not be allowed to obscure the changing needs of society or to veil the injustice resulting from a doctrine in need of reevaluation."); McIntyre v. Balentine, 833 S.W.2d 52, 56 (Tenn.1992)(declining to "mindless[ly]" follow stare decisis). I do not believe that because Harrison reaffirmed the vitality of contributory negligence in this State, absent legislative action, this Court is muted forever on the topic. The bounds of stare decisis are not so strict. Continued adherence to the doctrine of contributory negligence as rote obeisance to the principles of stare decisis and legislative deference "represents judicial inertia rather than a reasoned consideration of the intrinsic value of the rule." Kaatz, 540 P.2d at 1049. Contributory negligence is no longer justified, has been discarded by nearly every other jurisdiction, and is manifestly unjust. Thus, I conclude that contributory negligence is a vestige of the past, and that in considering whether to abrogate the doctrine of contributory negligence, we are not bound by our decision in Harrison.

 

B. This Court Need Not Defer to Continued Legislative Inaction

 

Respondent argues that, notwithstanding our decision in Harrison, whether to abrogate contributory negligence in favor of comparative fault is a matter more properly suited to the legislative, rather than judicial, process. In Harrison, we noted that "in considering whether a long-established common law rule—unchanged by the legislature and thus reflective of this State's public policy—is unsound in the circumstances of modern life, we have always recognized that declaration of the public policy of Maryland is normally the function of the General Assembly." 295 Md. at 460, 456 A.2d at 903. Because declaration of public policy is generally a matter for the Legislature, we declared our "particular[] reluctan[ce] to alter a common law rule in the face of indications 1171*1171 that to do so would be contrary to the public policy of the State[,]" id., and noted that we owe "initial deference to the legislature where change is sought in a long-established and well-settled common law principle." Id. at 461, 456 A.2d at 904.

In considering whether the doctrine of contributory negligence was declared the public policy of the State of Maryland, we placed particular emphasis on the Legislature's consideration of numerous bills proposing to adopt the doctrine of comparative negligence. Specifically, we noted that between 1966 and 1982, the General Assembly considered twenty-one bills proposing the adoption of comparative negligence, yet none passed. Id. "Although not conclusive," we stated, "the legislature's action in rejecting the proposed change is indicative of an intention [on the part of the Legislature] to retain the contributory negligence doctrine." Id.

Our statements in Harrison did not circumscribe, however, our authority to alter judicially-created common law rules in the face of repeated legislative inaction on the subject. Although we have declined frequently to effect changes in decisional doctrine upon observing repeated legislative inaction, see, e.g., Potomac Valley Orthopaedic Assocs. v. Md. State Bd. of Physicians, 417 Md. 622, 639-40, 12 A.3d 84, 94 (2011) ("Our conclusion is confirmed by the fact that, in 2007, 2008, 2009, and 2010, the General Assembly `rejected efforts to achieve legislatively that which we [are being] asked to grant judicially.'" (alterations in original) (citation omitted)); Moore v. State, 388 Md. 623, 641, 882 A.2d 256, 257 (2005) ("Legislative inaction is very significant where bills have repeatedly been introduced in the General Assembly to accomplish a particular result, and where the General Assembly has persistently refused to enact such bills."), we determined, on multiple occasions, that legislative inaction may not be a sufficient premise from which to draw a positive legislative intent in certain situations. See, e.g., City of Balt. Dev. Corp. v. Carmel Realty Assocs., 395 Md. 299, 329, 910 A.2d 406, 424 (2006) (cautioning against drawing a positive inference from legislative inaction because "the General Assembly may well have... decided not to enact the amendment for a myriad of other reasons"); Goldstein v. State, 339 Md. 563, 570, 664 A.2d 375, 378 (1995) ("[T]he mere fact that the General Assembly has declined to adopt a particular proposal does not preclude this Court from incorporating the substance of that proposal into the common law...."); Automobile Trade Assoc. of Md., Inc. v. Ins. Comm'r, 292 Md. 15, 24, 437 A.2d 199, 203 (1981) ("[T]he fact that a bill on a specific subject fails of passage in the General Assembly is a rather weak reed upon which to lean in ascertaining legislative intent."); Cicoria v. State, 89 Md.App. 403, 428 n. 9, 598 A.2d 771, 775 n. 9 (1991) (noting that "[t]rying to determine what the legislature intended (or did not intend) by rejecting those bills is no easy assignment" and declining to draw either a positive or negative inference from the rejected bills).

Although the Harrison court opted to defer to the Legislature, the opinion in that case gives no indication that such deference was unlimited. No acknowledgment was advanced that we lack the authority to alter a long-standing common law rule where the Legislature declines to enact proposed legislation. Rather, we expressed that we are "particularly reluctant" to do so, and that we give "initial deference" to the Legislature when considering a change to long-standing common law principles. Harrison, 295 Md. at 460-61, 456 A.2d at 903-04 (emphasis added). Further, we did not characterize the inaction of the General Assembly as a conclusive, definitive declaration of public policy 1172*1172 —to the contrary, we specifically stated that legislative inaction is "not conclusive" and merely "indicative of an intention to retain the doctrine of contributory negligence." Id. at 461, 456 A.2d at 904.

I acknowledge, of course, that legislative consideration of comparative negligence did not cease with our decision in Harrison. The General Assembly considered numerous comparative negligence bills since Harrison, but has not to this date reached an agreement that comparative negligence should become the law of this State by legislative act.[16] The pace of consideration of comparative negligence bills slowed dramatically in recent years, however. Since 2003, the General Assembly considered the adoption of comparative negligence only once, see H.B. 110, 2007 Leg., 423d Sess. (Md. 2007), crossfiled with S.B. 267, 2007 Leg., 423d Sess. (Md. 2007), whereas in the ten years preceding Harrison (1974-83), the Legislature considered ten independent bills. See H.B. 1007, 1982 Leg., 388th Sess. (Md. 1982); H.B. 633, 1981 Leg., 387th Sess. (Md. 1981); H.B. 98, 1980 Leg., 386th Sess. (Md. 1980); H.B. 1484, 1980 Leg., 386th Sess. (Md. 1980); H.B. 1381, 1979 Leg., 385th Sess. (Md. 1979); H.B. 1386, 1979 Leg., 385th Sess. (Md. 1979); H.B. 2004, 1977 Leg., 383d Sess. (Md. 1977); H.B. 377, 1976 Leg., 382d Sess. (Md. 1976); S.B. 106, 1976 Leg., 382d Sess. (Md. 1976); H.B. 405, 1975 Leg., 380th Sess. (Md. 1975). No favorable committee action has been taken on a comparative negligence bill since 1988. See Department of Legislative Services, Negligence Systems: Contributory Negligence, Comparative Fault, and Joint and Several Liability 31 (2004) (hereinafter "Negligence Systems").

Declining to perpetuate unmindful deference to the Legislature on such a topic would not be without precedent. For example, as noted above, this Court stated repeatedly its intention to defer to legislative action on the topic of interspousal immunity before acting. See Stokes, 248 Md. at 692, 237 A.2d at 763; Ennis, 222 Md. at 543, 161 A.2d at 702; Fernandez, 214 Md. at 524, 135 A.2d at 889. Decades later, after noting the Legislature's continued stasis on the subject, we rescinded our deference and modernized an outdated common law rule. See Bozman, 376 Md. 461, 830 A.2d 450; Boblitz, 296 Md. 242, 462 A.2d 506.

Other states, too, abrogated judicially the doctrine of contributory negligence in spite of legislative inaction on proposed bills of like objective.[17] For example, during 1173*1173 the approximately fifteen years prior to the Kentucky Supreme Court's abrogation of contributory negligence in 1984, the Kentucky Legislature considered a comparative negligence bill "in most, if not all" legislative sessions. Hilen, 673 S.W.2d at 717. Yet, despite legislative consideration of (and inaction on) the issue, the Kentucky Supreme Court abrogated the doctrine, noting its systematic rejection, "first legislatively, and then judicially where the legislature has refused to act." Id. at 716-17. Similarly, the Missouri Supreme Court deferred repeatedly to legislative 1174*1174 consideration and an opportunity to act for over five years, noting that ordinarily the policy considerations implicit in making such a doctrinal change were more appropriate for the legislature, particularly in light of increased legislative interest in the topic. See Steinman v. Strobel, 589 S.W.2d 293, 294 (Mo.1979); Epple v. Western Auto Supply Co., 557 S.W.2d 253, 254 (Mo. 1977). Indeed, even after applying a nudge to the legislature by abandoning "active-passive negligence" in favor of comparative fault principles in cases involving multiple defendants, see Missouri Pac. R.R. Co. v. Whitehead & Kales Co., 566 S.W.2d 466 (Mo.1978), the Missouri Supreme Court continued to express its preference for legislative action. Steinman, 589 S.W.2d at 294. By 1983, however, shortly after our decision in Harrison, the Missouri Supreme Court decided it had waited long enough and abrogated contributory negligence generally by judicial decision, stating, "We have remained quiescent more than five years while waiting for the legislature to act." Gustafson v. Benda, 661 S.W.2d 11, 15 (Mo.1983).

The New Mexico Supreme Court asserted that its legislature's inaction on proposed bills could be "indicative of its belief that it is more appropriate for the judiciary than the legislature to open the door which the judiciary initially closed." Scott, 634 P.2d at 1238-39. It characterized further legislative inaction as resulting from "legislative inertia," rather than from a principled policy decision. Id. The Illinois Supreme Court also noted that a stalemate caused by a "mutual state of inaction in which the court awaits action from the legislature and the legislature awaits guidance from the court" constitutes a "manifest injustice to the public." Alvis, 421 N.E.2d at 896. In such a situation, the court said, "it is the imperative duty of the court to repair that injustice and reform the law to be responsive to the demands of society." Id. Consequently, we should put an end to the staring contest in Maryland and act to conclude the Alphonse & Gaston routine that has settled in between our two branches of government.

Respondent also contends that, the abstract principle of deference to legislative inaction notwithstanding, replacing the doctrine of contributory negligence is a task more appropriate for legislative action because that potential deliberative and comprehensive decision-making process is suited better to resolution of the complex policy considerations involved in adopting comparative fault and its collateral impacts. The Harrison court expressed a particular reluctance to abrogate contributory negligence due to the nature of comparative negligence as not being "a unitary doctrine[,] but one which has been adopted by other states in either a pure or modified form." 295 Md. at 462, 456 A.2d at 904. Characterizing the choice between pure and modified comparative fault as "a policy issue of major dimension," this Court opted in 1983 to leave the choice to the General Assembly. Id. at 463, 456 A.2d at 905. Respondent contends that, because this decision implicates policy considerations and this Court is limited in its consideration of the impact on collateral doctrines and principles by the facts of this case,[18] we should continue to refrain from adopting comparative negligence and disrupting long-settled law to avoid confusion and disarray in our courts. Moreover, Respondent and its Amici argue that abolishing the doctrine of contributory negligence is bad public policy. They contend 1175*1175 that in so doing, we would inject chaos and uncertainty into an area of settled law, and increase litigation, insurance rates, and taxes.[19]

Although the transition from contributory to comparative negligence systems is plainly "a policy issue of major dimension," I do not think that it is an issue on which awaiting legislative catharsis is appropriate any longer. Contributory negligence is a spawn of the court system—and as such, this Court is eminently able and uniquely situated to stay the course. Moreover, as the South Carolina Court of Appeals noted, the potential for a legislative body to affect comprehensively a doctrinal substitution has not proven out uniformly in execution. Langley v. Boyter, 284 S.C. 162, 325 S.E.2d 550, 560 (App. 1984), quashed, 286 S.C. 85, 332 S.E.2d 100 (1984), cited with approval, Nelson v. Concrete Supply Co., 303 S.C. 243, 399 S.E.2d 783, 784 (1991) ("[T]he history of legislative action in the various states which have adopted the doctrine [of comparative negligence] by statute reveals that comprehensive statutes are not usually adopted."). Rather, most states adopting comparative negligence via legislative act have enacted short-form statutes that leave most doctrinal issues to be shaped and developed by the courts. Id.

Additionally, deferring this issue to a future court or legislative session on grounds that the present case offers insufficient facts to reach binding declarations regarding all collateral doctrines and principles does not weigh so heavily as this Court's responsibility to administer justice. As this argument goes, "in essence, ... where a court cannot correct all injustice, it should correct none." Id. I am not persuaded that making the change by judicial decision, necessarily leaving some further development of the doctrine of comparative negligence to another day, will wreak havoc on our system of justice or the State's economy. To the contrary, the experiences of other states, having made an analogous change, "provide an accurate barometer of what can be expected after abrogation." Bozman, 376 Md. at 496, 830 A.2d at 471. In the twelve other states to abrogate by judicial decision the doctrine of contributory negligence, there is scant evidence that the judicial system was thrown into unmanageable disarray. In fact, other courts noted that "the fears of administering the doctrine are greater than the reality," and that the difficulties presumed inherent in the adoption of comparative negligence "are outweighed by the injustices attendant upon any delay in adopting the comparative negligence (fault) rule." Scott, 634 P.2d at 1239, 1241.

1176*1176 I recognize that a shift to comparative fault implicates numerous collateral doctrines. I expect fully that questions will arise about the application of comparative fault in practice in the State of Maryland that cannot be answered conclusively in the present case. This Court would be well-served, however, to place trust in the full array of the Judiciary of this State to administer faithfully the principles of comparative negligence in accordance with this Court's direction. Thus, I reject Respondent's contention that this matter is best left to a legislative enactment that might address all potential applications of the doctrine of comparative negligence in a single coup, rather than trusting to the incremental decisions that follow in the common law tradition, beginning with a seminal action by this Court.

 

III. This Court Should Adopt Pure Comparative Fault

 

Having concluded, as I have, that the doctrine of contributory negligence must fall, the question becomes: what form of comparative negligence should be adopted? Although the precise formulations of comparative fault systems may vary, there are essentially two basic forms: pure and modified.

Under a system of pure comparative fault, damages are apportioned among the parties according to the fact finder's determination of the percentage that each party's negligence contributed to the injury. Cooter & Ulen, supra, at 1076. A plaintiff is permitted to recover from the defendant (or defendants) the portion of his or her damages which the defendant (or defendants) caused—regardless of the quantum of the plaintiff's contributory negligence. 4 Harper, James & Gray, supra, § 22.15 at 458. Thus, even if the plaintiff's degree of fault exceeds that of the defendant (or defendants), the plaintiff may recover damages reduced by the proportion that the plaintiff is at fault. See id.; Digges & Klein, supra, at 280.

Modified comparative fault, by contrast, considers relevant the proportion of the plaintiff's relative fault in varying degrees, depending on the standard adopted. Under such systems, a plaintiff "escapes the contributory negligence bar only if his share of the responsibility falls within a specified limitation." 4 Harper, James & Gray, supra, § 22.15 at 458. States that adopt a modified system generally choose one of two forms, allowing recovery of damages by a plaintiff reduced by the percentage of his or her own fault if either (1) the plaintiff's relative fault is less than the combined fault of all of the defendants;[20] or (2) the plaintiff's relative fault is not greater than the combined fault of all of the defendants.[21],[22]

1177*1177 This Court should adopt for Maryland pure comparative negligence. Pure comparative negligence is favored almost universally by legal scholars and academics. It is "the fairest, most logical and simplest to administer of all available systems." Goetzman, 327 N.W.2d at 754. Because pure comparative negligence emphasizes the relationship of an individual's fault to the ultimate damages, "[n]either party is unjustly enriched[, and] [n]either party escapes liability resulting from his negligent acts or omissions." Alvis, 421 N.E.2d at 897. The shades of gray in jury determinations[23] assigning proportions of fault is not, in a pure system, the difference between substantial recovery and no recovery at all. See Prosser, Comparative Negligence, supra, at 493-94 ("It is obvious that a slight difference in the proportionate fault [under a modified system] may permit a recovery; and there has been much quite justified criticism of a rule under which a plaintiff who is charged with 49 per cent of the total negligence recovers 51 percent of his damages, while one who is charged with 50 per cent recovers nothing at all."). Critics of pure comparative negligence call it a "radical break" from the principles of contributory negligence, and view a modified version instead as a logical evolution away from contributory negligence. See Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co., 163 W.Va. 332, 256 S.E.2d 879, 885 (1979) (noting an unwillingness "to abandon the concept that where a party substantially contributes to his own damages, he should not be permitted to recover for any part of them"). Pure comparative negligence, however, more closely hews to the principle on which comparative fault systems are based—that liability should be commensurate with fault, and that individuals are responsible to the extent that their fault results in injury. See Goetzman, 327 N.W.2d at 753-54; Lande & MacAlister, supra, at 9 ("[O]nly a `pure' system protects all the deserving injured, is fair to defendants, optimally deters negligent behavior, and fosters the greatest sense of justice, fairness, and respect for the law on the part of juries.").

1178*1178 Moreover, although pure comparative negligence is the numerically minority choice nationally,[24] it is the preferred version among states adopting comparative negligence by judicial decision. Nine of the twelve states adopting comparative negligence judicially have chosen a pure system,[25] while three chose a modified version.[26] Modified systems "reintroduce in large measure the very same all-or-nothing feature of contributory negligence that the remedy of comparative negligence is designed to overcome," by establishing a new set point at which recovery for a contributorily negligent plaintiff is barred. 4 Harper, James & Gray, supra, § 22.15 at 463; see also Li, 119 Cal.Rptr. 858, 532 P.2d at 1242 (criticizing a modified system as simply shifting the "lottery aspect" of contributory negligence to a different set point); Alvis, 52 Ill.Dec. 23, 421 N.E.2d at 898 ("There is no better justification for allowing a defendant who is 49% at fault to completely escape liability than there is to allow a defendant who is 99% at fault under the old rule to escape liability."). Maryland courts should apply a system of pure comparative fault in negligence actions.

 

IV. Some Ruminations on the Possible Effect on Collateral Doctrines of the Adoption of Comparative Fault

 

Adopting a system of comparative fault will impact undoubtedly numerous collateral doctrines in the law of torts, as we recognized in Harrison. Indeed, as the Florida Supreme Court acknowledged, "the prospect of a general upheaval in pending tort litigation has always been a deterring influence in considering the adoption of a comparative negligence rule." Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So.2d 431, 439 (Fla. 1973). Although the facts of the present case and Petitioner's questions for which we issued a writ of certiorari do not permit a binding consideration of the possible effects on these collateral doctrines, it is prudent nonetheless to itemize and comment 1179*1179 on here a few, but by no means an exhaustive list, of the potential impacts of a decision to adopt comparative negligence.

Even after the abrogation of contributory negligence, the spirit of that doctrine will remain in some statutory provisions. For example, as Respondent and its Amici point out, the principles of contributory negligence are codified in various limited contexts in the Maryland Code. That remnants of a discarded common law doctrine may remain after its abolition does not provide, however, a reason to retain it in its entirety for all purposes. Cf. Bozman, 376 Md. at 488, 830 A.2d at 466 (acknowledging that despite the Court's abolition of the doctrine of interspousal immunity, remnants of the common law concept upon which the doctrine was based remain in Maryland law). We do not have the authority to overrule any principles of contributory negligence embedded currently in the statutory law of this State. See Md. Const. Decl. of Rts. art. 8. Thus, where the Legislature codified these principles as a complete bar to recovery in those limited contexts, it will continue to serve as a defense in those actions governed by the relevant statute, unless and until the General Assembly decides otherwise. See Md. Code (1977, 2009 Repl. Vol.), Transportation Article § 19-101(b) ("This State or a political subdivision of this State may use the defense of contributory negligence and assert the doctrine of last clear chance in an action brought or defense raised under this section."); Md. Code (1977, 2009 Repl. Vol.), Transportation Article § 19-102(c) ("This State or a political subdivision of this State may use the defense of contributory negligence and assert the doctrine of last clear chance in an action brought or defense raised under subsection (b) of this section."). Where the principles of contributory negligence have not been codified, however, the doctrine of pure comparative negligence, as the common law of this state, should apply henceforth.[27]

Interestingly, concepts of contributory negligence will continue to be embedded in Maryland common law under a comparative fault system. The adoption of comparative fault abolishes the doctrine of contributory negligence as a complete bar to a plaintiff's recovery, but an individual's "contributory negligence" remains relevant as a consideration in determining his or her degree of fault in contributing to his or her injury. Thus, statutes that disallow presently certain conduct from consideration as evidence of contributory negligence may have continued applicability in a comparative fault system,[28] while others 1180*1180 may merit consideration for revision by the General Assembly to make their continued applicability in a comparative fault system, if any, more clear. See, e.g., Md. Code (1973, 2006 Repl. Vol.), Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article, § 3-1607 ("A defendant in an action under this subtitle may not raise a defense of assumption of risk or contributory negligence based on the use of a controlled dangerous substance by the deceased individual."); Md. Code (2007, 2012 Supp.), Human Services Article, § 7-704(b)(2) ("The failure of a blind or visually impaired pedestrian to carry a cane ... does not constitute contributory negligence per se.").

Respondent and its Amici contend further that the adoption of comparative fault will have serious effects on the fiscal health of our State and local government. Because the unavailability of contributory negligence as an absolute bar to recovery will increase the number of "meritless claims presented," they argue, governments will face increased liability. The possibility that state and local governmental liability may increase following the adoption of comparative fault is by no means certain. There is no evidence, and indeed Amici provide none, that other states have experienced skyrocketing governmental liability and fiscal disaster following the adoption of comparative negligence. Moreover, the adoption of comparative fault by no means limits the reactive power of the General Assembly. To the contrary, the Legislature remains in the position to observe the actual impacts of a comparative fault system in Maryland and adopt or amend statutes accordingly, if it deems change necessary.[29] Moreover, if, as Amici contend, the General Assembly intended the defense of contributory negligence to apply to actions brought under the Local Government Tort Claims Act ("LGTCA"), despite failing to codify expressly that defense, see Md. Code (1973, 2006 Repl. Vol.), Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article, § 5-303, the Legislature has the authority to amend explicitly the LGTCA to so provide.

Respondent and its Amici express particular concern over the continued vitality of the principles of joint and several liability, and the attendant issue of contribution among joint tortfeasors, in a comparative fault system. I recognize that, following the adoption of a comparative fault system, the continued vitality and fairness of the doctrine of joint and several liability merits specific attention. Indeed, most states adopting comparative negligence have revisited this issue, see, e.g., McIntyre, 833 S.W.2d at 58 ("Having thus adopted a rule more closely linking liability and fault, it would be inconsistent to simultaneously retain a rule, joint and several liability, which may fortuitously impose a degree of liability that is out of all proportion to fault."), although little consensus among states resulted.[30] Because joint and several 1181*1181 liability is not implicated by the facts of the present case, however, we reserve the evaluation and determination of whether a departure from common law joint and several liability is warranted, and, if so, in what circumstances.

We also recognize that, regardless of the impact of a reconsideration of the applicability of joint and several liability, there may exist at least a theoretical inconsistency between the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act ("UCATA") as codified at Md. Code (1973, 2012 Supp.), Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article, §§ 3-1401-09, and a system of comparative negligence. While the touchstone of a system of comparative negligence is the imposition of liability in direct proportion to one's fault, the current provisions of the UCATA permit one joint tortfeasor to obtain contribution from another joint tortfeasor if he, she, or it has paid more than his, her, or its "pro rata share." Id. at § 3-1402. A pro rata share is understood generally, however, as an equal share of the common liability, rather than a share based on an individual's proportion of fault, and thus may be inconsistent with the foundations of comparative negligence.[31] See Hashmi v. Bennett, 416 Md. 707, 719 n. 13, 7 A.3d 1059, 1066 n. 13 (2010) (quoting Lahocki v. Contee Sand & Gravel Co., 41 Md.App. 579, 616, 398 A.2d 490, 511 (1979), rev'd on other grounds sub nom, General Motors Corp. v. Lahocki, 286 Md. 714, 410 A.2d 1039 (1980)). Abiding future legislative action and/or appellate opinions, however, contribution among joint tortfeasors should continue to apply in pro rata shares.

Another potential issue for future resolution is the determination of which parties should be included in the pool of fault— specifically, how uncharged parties and released tortfeasors are treated under a comparative fault scheme in apportioning fault. The UATRA, for example, compares fault only among those individuals or entities that are actual parties to the litigation, 1182*1182 but does not preclude any defendant from pursuing a nonparty. It contains an exception, however, for released tortfeasors, requiring that the responsibility of released tortfeasors be considered in apportioning fault among non-released parties. States are split on this approach— some follow the UATRA; others that initially adopted the UATRA approach amended their laws later to require apportionment of fault to nonparties; and, still others permit, but do not require, the consideration of nonparties in apportioning fault. See Rules Committee Report, supra, at 19-20.

Although I would decide today to apply a system of pure comparative fault only to negligence actions, other states adopting systems of comparative fault have confronted the breadth with which a system of comparative fault should be applied—in particular, whether to expand the reach of comparative fault to strict liability and intentional torts. The defense of contributory negligence long has been held inapplicable to actions based on strict liability, see Ellsworth v. Sherne Lingerie, Inc., 303 Md. 581, 597, 495 A.2d 348, 356 (1985), and intentional torts. See Tucker v. State, Use of Johnson, 89 Md. 471, 486, 43 A. 778, 783 (1899); State Farm v. Hill, 139 Md.App. 308, 316-18, 775 A.2d 476, 481-82 (2001). Approximately thirty-five states have opted to apply the doctrine of comparative fault to strict liability cases, in additional to negligence actions, although ten do not. See Negligence Systems, supra, at Appendix A, 37-41. Although many states do not endorse the application of comparative fault to intentional torts, see, e.g., Florenzano v. Olson, 387 N.W.2d 168, 176 n. 7 (Minn.1986) ("We ... consider it bad policy to permit an intentional tortfeasor the defense of comparative negligence merely because he or she chooses a gullible or foolish victim."); Davies v. Butler, 95 Nev. 763, 602 P.2d 605, 611 (1979) (declining to apply comparative fault to intentional acts), some do. See, e.g., Alaska Stat. § 09.17.900 (2012) (including intentional conduct in the definition of fault); Blazovic v. Andrich, 124 N.J. 90, 590 A.2d 222, 231 (1991) ("We are unpersuaded by the decisions of other jurisdictions that reject apportionment of fault in actions involving intentional tortfeasors."). Consideration of the expansion of comparative fault beyond negligence actions is a bridge too far at this time.

Additionally, this Court should consider eventually (in the proper case) the continued vitality of the ameliorative doctrine of last clear chance. Most states that abrogate contributory negligence by judicial decision abolished contemporaneously the doctrine of last clear chance. See, e.g., Kaatz, 540 P.2d at 1050; Hoffman, 280 So.2d at 438; Alvis, 52 Ill.Dec. 23, 421 N.E.2d at 898. Because the doctrine of last clear chance is designed to mitigate the harsh results of contributory negligence, it seems likely that it may not survive the abrogation of contributory negligence. The facts giving rise to a traditional application of the doctrine may be relevant, however, in apportioning fault.

As we recognized in Harrison, the handling of set-offs and counterclaims are implicated by a decision to adopt comparative fault. Although Maryland has only a permissive, not compulsory, counterclaim rule, see Md. Rule 2-331; Fairfax Savings, F.S.B. v. Kris Jen Ltd. P'ship, 338 Md. 1, 11-12, 655 A.2d 1265, 1270 (1995), defendants in negligence actions will be able increasingly to raise counterclaims for damages arising from the same injury under a comparative fault rule. Thus, in a comparative negligence scheme, it may be the case that the plaintiff or counter-defendant owes the defendant or counter-plaintiff damages, and vice versa, raising the prospect of set-offs. In Hoffman, the 1183*1183 Florida Supreme Court stated broadly that, in the case of a counterclaim, courts should "enter one judgment in favor of the party receiving the larger verdict, the amount of which should be the difference between the two verdicts." 280 So.2d at 439. As the Florida court later recognized (and disavowed) in Stuyvesant Ins. Co. v. Bournazian, 342 So.2d 471 (Fla.1976), however, a technical application of the Hoffman language resulted in a windfall to insurance liability carriers, as they would be responsible only for the set-off amount, and not the full damages incurred by the insured. Id. at 473-74. Thus, Florida applies set-offs in negligence actions only in instances where both parties are uninsured. Id. at 474. By contrast, some comparative negligence states ban set-offs altogether, see, e.g., R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-20-4.1 (2011), which may result in practical difficulties where only one party is uninsured. See John M. Rogers & Randy Donald Shaw, A Comparative Negligence Checklist to Avoid Future Unnecessary Litigation, 72 Kentucky L.J. 25, 73-79 (1983). Although we cannot decide definitively today how set-offs will operate in a comparative fault system, as appropriate cases work their way to us, lower courts should consider the just compensation of the parties in determining whether set-offs should apply.

I acknowledge that adopting a system of pure comparative fault implicates numerous related doctrines and principles in the law of torts, and a decision to do so is not taken lightly. That many questions will result from such a shift is not, however, a justification for retaining the status quo of contributory negligence. I have confidence that our judicial system will not be thrown into disarray, as Respondent and its Amici contend, based on the experience of, at a minimum, the twelve states that adopted judicially comparative negligence. The collateral issues will be handled readily by our Legislature and/or State's judges until this Court is presented the opportunity to resolve each lingering question.

 

V. Implementation of Pure Comparative Fault Should Apply Prospectively

 

The final decision to undertake in the present case, as I see it, is whether the decision adopting the doctrine of comparative negligence should be applied prospectively or retrospectively (to some extent). I would apply the doctrine of selective prospectivity, which is the "method by which `a court may apply a new rule in the case in which it is pronounced, then return to the old one with respect to all others arising on facts predating the pronouncement.'" Polakoff v. Turner, 385 Md. 467, 486, 869 A.2d 837, 849 (2005)(quoting James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 537, 111 S.Ct. 2439, 115 L.Ed.2d 481 (1991)(plurality opinion)).

Selective prospectivity applies generally in cases where we announce a change in the substantive common law, Polakoff, 385 Md. at 488 n. 14, 869 A.2d at 850 n. 14, rather than in cases changing procedural requirements in the trial courts, Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Zenobia, 325 Md. 420, 470, 601 A.2d 633, 657-58 (1992), or overruling prior cases based on their erroneous interpretation of the law. See Polakoff, 385 Md. at 488, 869 A.2d at 850 (noting that a new interpretation of a statute will apply to "the case before the court and to all cases pending where the issue has been preserved for appellate review"); Houghton v. Cnty. Comm'rs of Kent Cnty., 307 Md. 216, 220, 513 A.2d 291, 293 (1986) ("[T]he question of whether a particular judicial decision should be applied prospectively or retroactively, depends in the first instance on whether or not the decision overrules prior law and declares a new principle of law."). In adopting comparative fault, this Court would "exercise[][its] 1184*1184 constitutional authority to change the common law." See Zenobia, 325 Md. at 469, 601 A.2d at 657. See, e.g., Tracey, 427 Md. at 639-42, 50 A.3d at 1081-83; Julian, 320 Md. at 9-11, 575 A.2d at 739; Kelley v. R.G. Industries, Inc., 304 Md. 124, 140, 497 A.2d 1143, 1150-51 (1985); Boblitz, 296 Md. at 273-75, 462 A.2d at 521-22. Unlike in Zenobia, where we adopted a standard of clear and convincing evidence to justify punitive damages in tort cases, 325 Md. at 469, 601 A.2d at 657, the doctrine of comparative fault is not a procedural rule. See Erie Ins. Exchange v. Heffernan, 399 Md. 598, 635, 925 A.2d 636, 658 (2007) (noting that the doctrine of contributory negligence relates to substantive tort law). Thus, because "[o]rdinarily decisions which change the common law apply prospectively, as well as to the litigants before the court,"[32] Julian, 320 Md. at 10, 575 A.2d at 739 (citing Williams v. State, 292 Md. 201, 217, 438 A.2d 1301, 1309 (1981)), I would apply the doctrine of comparative negligence to all causes of action accruing subsequent to the filing of this opinion, and to the parties in the present case on remand. See Boblitz, 296 Md. at 275, 462 A.2d at 522.

Finally, I would dismiss the writ of certiorari issued in response to the cross-petition filed by the Soccer Association of Columbia, for the same reasons stated for a similar result in the Majority opinion. See Maj. op. at 685 n. 3, 69 A.3d at 1152 n. 3.

C.J. Bell has authorized me to state he joins in this opinion.

GREENE, J., concurring, which BATTAGLIA, McDONALD and RAKER, JJ., join.

I join the majority opinion in rejecting Petitioner's invitation to change Maryland common law and abrogate the doctrine of contributory negligence. I write separately to explain why I believe, in addition to the reasons advanced in the majority opinion, we should defer to the General Assembly with regard to what would amount to a comprehensive revision of the law in this State. Notably, there is no dispute about whether this Court has the authority to change the common law. Just because we have that power, however, is no good reason to change the law in the face of clear policy reasons, based upon our jurisprudence, directing that we exercise restraint.

We pointed out in Harrison v. Montgomery Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 295 Md. 442, 463, 456 A.2d 894, 905 (1983), that "the contributory negligence principle [is] the valid standard in Maryland negligence cases and that `any change in the established doctrine [was for] the Legislature.'" Majority Opinion, at 685, 69 A.3d at 1152. In support of this conclusion, we acknowledged that the determination of public policy 1185*1185 is generally a legislative prerogative. See Harrison, 295 Md. at 460, 456 A.2d at 903 ("[The] declaration of the public policy of Maryland is normally the function of the General Assembly[.]"). This Court has stated that "[we are] reluctant to alter a common law rule in the face of indications that to do so would be contrary to the public policy of this State." Harrison, 295 Md. at 460, 456 A.2d at 903 (citing Condore v. Prince George's Cnty., 289 Md. 516, 532, 425 A.2d 1011, 1019 (1981)). In my view, this is sound public policy, especially in light of the long-standing adherence in this State to the rule of contributory negligence. Therefore, we should defer to the General Assembly under the circumstances of this case. To do otherwise, we cast ourselves as a Court attempting to impose our will upon the General Assembly.

In Maryland, we operate under a fault-based tort system. Fault also is the test for liability under contributory negligence and comparative negligence. In any given case, the negligence of a plaintiff may play a part in causing his or her injuries and the damages he or she is allowed to recover should, therefore, be diminished to some extent. Of course, contributory negligence completely bars recovery, while comparative negligence prevents the plaintiff from recovering only that portion of his damages for which he is responsible. I am willing to concede that a system premised on comparative negligence for apportioning fault appears to be "a more equitable system of determining liability and a more socially desirable method of loss distribution." See Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So.2d 431, 437 (Fla.1973). Thus, under comparative negligence, losses are apportioned among those whose fault contributed to the occurrence. Hence, if we were writing on a clean slate, I might be persuaded to adopt the comparative negligence standard.

Because I would prefer a system of comparative negligence is neither the test nor the justification for abandoning contributory negligence and adopting comparative negligence in its place. In this case our duty is to construe or interpret the law. It is not our task to invade the province of the General Assembly and enact into law a sweeping revision of an established rule of law. Here the dissenting opinion advocates for a system of pure comparative negligence. Some might, however, prefer a system of modified comparative negligence because of a belief that a plaintiff who was more than 50% at fault should not be entitled to any recovery. Whether Maryland becomes a pure comparative negligence state or a modified comparative negligence state should not be decided by this Court on the basis of the record before us. The General Assembly, in my view, is best suited to make that determination given the current status of our laws and its ability to conduct a comprehensive study of how the changes in the law will affect tort liability and insurance law in Maryland. In addition, as the dissenting opinion concedes, any change of the common law would not affect those statutes in Maryland that have enacted the concept of contributory negligence as a matter of law in some situations. See Dissenting Opinion, at 729-31, 69 A.3d at 1179-80.

Lastly, the General Assembly seems to be in the better position to study and resolve:

1. How comparative negligence will apply in cases of multi-tortfeasors?
2. What will be the impact on the doctrine of joint and several liability if comparative negligence becomes the law?
3. How or should the Uniform Contribution Among Tort-Feasors Act retain any viability?
1186*1186 4. If the last clear chance doctrine is abolished as a result of comparative negligence, should or would the doctrine of assumption of the risk also be abolished?
5. Should Maryland adopt pure comparative negligence or a modified version?

See McIntyre v. Balentine, 833 S.W.2d 52, 57-58 (Tenn.1992). To be certain, the General Assembly is at liberty to consider the opinions of this Court and decide whether to conduct such studies. In my view, the General Assembly may be poised to engage in such a discussion in light of the differing views expressed in this opinion. We would be wise, however, to encourage the General Assembly to do so, rather than to attempt to force it to do so by adopting the doctrine of pure comparative negligence.

I am authorized to state that Judges Battaglia, McDonald and Raker join in the views expressed in this concurring opinion.

[*] Bell, C.J., participated in the hearing of this case, in the conference in regard to its decision and in the adoption of the opinion, but he had retired from the Court prior to the filing of the opinion.

[1] In his first amended complaint, Coleman named four defendants: the Soccer Association of Columbia, the Columbia Soccer Club, the Howard County Government, and the Howard County Board of Education. On August 16, 2010, Coleman filed a notice of voluntary dismissal as to the Howard County Government. Subsequently, on October 5, 2011, the parties stipulated to dismissal with prejudice of the Columbia Soccer Club. On October 24, 2011, the Howard County Board of Education was also dismissed with prejudice from the suit, leaving the Soccer Association of Columbia as the sole remaining defendant during the trial.

[2] The proffered jury instruction read as follows:

"A. Comparative Negligence—Liability

"If you find that more than one party has established his/her burden of proof as to negligence, as defined by the court, you must then compare the negligence of those parties. The total amount of negligence is 100%. The figure that you arrive at should reflect the total percentage of negligence attributed to each party with respect to the happening of the accident. A comparison of negligence is made only if the negligence of more than one party proximately caused the accident."

 

[3] The Soccer Association's cross-appeal was unnecessary, and actually improper, because of the principle that a litigant is not entitled to appeal from a judgment wholly in his or her favor. Any arguments seeking to uphold the judgment on grounds rejected by the trial judge or jury, such as the alleged lack of primary negligence, can be made by the appellee under the principle that a judgment can be upheld on any ground adequately shown by the record. See, e.g., Unger v. State, 427 Md. 383, 400-401 n. 8, 48 A.3d 242, 252 n. 8 (2012); Rush v. State, 403 Md. 68, 103, 939 A.2d 689, 709 (2008); Bowen v. Annapolis, 402 Md. 587, 618, 937 A.2d 242, 260 (2007); Wolfe v. Anne Arundel County, 374 Md. 20, 25 n. 2, 821 A.2d 52, 55 n. 2 (2003).

[4] Some commentators have claimed that the doctrine of contributory negligence originated even earlier, with the case of Bayly v. Merrel, 79 Eng. Rep. 331 (K.B. 1606). Most authorities, however, take the position that the doctrine originated with Butterfield v. Forrester, 11 East 60, 103 Eng. Rep. 926 (K.B. 1809). See, e.g., William L. Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 41 Cal. L.Rev. 1, 3 (1953); Wex S. Malone, The Formative Era of Contributory Negligence, 41 Ill. L.Rev. 151 (1946).

[5] One commentator has written as follows (H. Woods, The Negligence Case: Comparative Fault, § 1:4, at 7-8 (1978), footnotes omitted):

"By 1850, [the country] had become heavily industrialized. This unprecedented development of industry and the general realization that it was related to Britain's continuance as the dominant world power brought out the protective instincts of her judiciary. The English courts eagerly seized upon Lord Ellenborough's holding in Butterfield as a most effective protective device. The American judiciary was no less enthusiastic. A Pennsylvania court in 1854 said this had been the `rule from time immemorial and is not likely to be changed in all the time to come.'"

See also Alvis v. Ribar, 85 Ill.2d 1, 6, 52 Ill.Dec. 23, 421 N.E.2d 886, 888 (1981):

"Judicial concern was particularly evident in the area of personal injury suits by railroad employees against the railroads. The courts realized that, in the pervading public view that saw railroads as `harmful entities with deep pockets'..., juries' sympathies toward plaintiffs could wreak financial disaster upon that burgeoning industry."

In 1906, Congress enacted the Federal Employers' Liability Act ("FELA"), 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60, which applied a comparative negligence standard in cases brought by railroad workers against their employers. The statute states that the "liability of common carriers by railroad," is that "[e]very common carrier by railroad ... shall be liable in damages to any person suffering injury while he is employed by such carrier...." 45 U.S.C. § 51. The FELA specifies that "contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery, but the damages shall be diminished by the jury in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to such employee." 45 U.S.C. § 53. See Collins v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 417 Md. 217, 9 A.3d 56 (2010).

 

[6] See, e.g., House Bill 836 of the 1996 session (withdrawn); House Bill 846 of the 1997 session (unfavorable report of the House Judiciary Committee); Senate Bill 618 of the 1998 Session (unfavorable report of the Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee); House Bill 551 of the 1999 Session (unfavorable report of the House Judiciary Committee); Senate Bill 779 of the 2000 Session (unfavorable report of the Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee); Senate Bill 483 of the 2001 Session (unfavorable report of the Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee); Senate Bill 872 of the 2002 Session (sent to Senate Rules Committee but no further progress); House Bill 110 of the 2007 Session (withdrawn); Senate Bill 267 of the 2007 Session; House Bill 1129 of the 2011 Session.

[1] The Court in Irwin stated, in Maryland's seminal invocation of contributory negligence, that it is

established doctrine ... that although the defendant's misconduct may have been the primary cause of the injury complained of,... the plaintiff cannot recover in a[ negligence action] if the proximate and immediate cause of the damage can be traced to a want of ordinary care and caution on his part. Under such circumstances, he must bear the consequences of his own recklessness or folly.

6 Gill at 205.

 

[2] As this Court acknowledged in Harrison, the creation of the doctrine of last clear change is attributed generally to an attempt to alleviate the harsh results of the doctrine of contributory negligence. 295 Md. at 450, 456 A.2d at 898. Despite general scholarly agreement with this principle, see, e.g., Digges & Klein, supra, at 276; Prosser & Keeton, supra, at 464 ("The real explanation [for the doctrine of last clear chance] would seem to be a fundamental dislike for the harshness of the contributory negligence defense."), the Harrison court stated that "[n]othing in [the adopting case] lends any direct support to this hypothesis." 295 Md. at 450-51, 456 A.2d at 898.

[3] Comparative negligence (in one form or another) is applied in the United States overwhelmingly, with forty-six states abandoning contributory negligence in favor of comparative fault. Only four states—Alabama, Maryland, North Carolina, and Virginia—and the District of Columbia continue to apply contributory negligence in its traditional guise. 2 Dobbs, supra, § 220 at 771-72.

[4] Comparative fault comes in two main forms: pure and modified. Under a pure comparative fault system, a contributorily negligent claimant's damages will be reduced based purely on his or her degree of fault (expressed as relative percentages of 100%), regardless of whether the claimant is as much or more at fault than the defendant. 4 Harper, James & Gray, supra, § 22.15 at 458; Prosser & Keeton, supra, § 67 at 471-72. A modified comparative fault system, by contrast, prohibits a claimant from recovering any damages if his or her relative degree of fault exceeds a certain threshold. 4 Harper, James & Gray, supra, § 22.15 at 458; Prosser & Keeton, supra, § 67 at 473. I will discuss infra in more detail the various forms of comparative fault.

[5] At the time of our decision in Harrison, thirty-nine states had adopted some form of comparative fault in favor of contributory negligence. 295 Md. at 453, 456 A.2d at 899. Of these states, eight adopted comparative negligence judicially, while thirty-one did so legislatively. Id. As of the date of our decision in the present case, twelve of the forty-six states adopting comparative negligence did so initially by judicial decision.

[6] Respondent's Amici include the Local Government Insurance Trust, the Maryland Association of Counties, the Maryland Municipal League, and the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore; the American Tort Reform Association, the Chamber of Commerce for the United States of America, the Coalition for Litigation Justice, Inc., the American Insurance Association, the Property Casualty Insurers Association of America, the National Association of Mutual Insurance Companies, the Physician Insurers Association of America, the American Medical Association, and the NFIB Small Business Legal Center; the Law Offices of Peter G. Angelos, P.C.; Maryland Defense Counsel, Inc.; and the Maryland Chamber of Commerce and the Maryland Tort Reform Coalition.

[7] Striking a similar theme, Judge Eldridge expressed in his dissent in Legislative Redistricting Cases, "[t]he perceived difficulty of the task should not excuse its performance." 331 Md. 574, 635, 629 A.2d 646, 677 (1993) (Eldridge, J., dissenting).

[8] Boblitz was preceded by Lusby v. Lusby, which held that the doctrine of interspousal tort immunity was inapplicable in cases of intentional torts. 283 Md. 334, 358, 390 A.2d 77, 89 (1978). The Lusby court emphasized, however, that we had not ruled explicitly that the immunity doctrine did apply in fact to intentional tort cases, and thus justified its limitation of the doctrine on the lack of direct precedent. Id. at 357-58, 390 A.2d at 88-89. In considering the issue, the Court noted that many states had altered the common law rule, and commentators had been nearly unanimous in their critique of that rule. Id. at 346, 350, 390 A.2d at 83-84.

[9] As the dissent noted, we entreated in prior cases the General Assembly to enact legislation to abrogate the doctrine, and kow-towed repeatedly to the Legislature. Id. at 283, 462 A.2d at 525 (Couch, J., dissenting).

[10] Although twelve states have abrogated contributory negligence by judicial decision, the prospect of judicial abrogation has been considered and rejected in numerous states. These states generally have not based their decisions on the intrinsic value of the rule of contributory negligence, but instead opted to defer to legislative action. See, e.g., Golden v. McCurry, 392 So.2d 815 (Ala. 1980); McGraw v. Corrin, 303 A.2d 641 (Del.1973); Maki v. Frelk, 40 Ill.2d 193, 239 N.E.2d 445 (1968); Epple v. Western Auto Supply Co., 557 S.W.2d 253 (Mo. 1977); Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461, 298 N.E.2d 622 (1973); Krise v. Gillund, 184 N.W.2d 405 (N.D.1971); Peterson v. Culp, 255 Or. 269, 465 P.2d 876 (1970). Indeed, legislatures in most of these states have since adopted comparative negligence. See, e.g., Del.Code Ann. tit. 10, § 8132 (enacted 1984); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 1411 (enacted 1975); N.D. Cent.Code § 9-10-07 (enacted 1973), superseded by N.D. Cent.Code § 32-03.2-02 (enacted 1987); Or. Rev.Stat. § 31.600, renumbered, Or.Rev.Stat. § 18.470 (enacted 1971). See also Steven Gardner, Contributory Negligence, Comparative Negligence, and Stare Decisis in North Carolina, 18 Campbell L.Rev. 1, 66 & n.419 (1996) (stating that, as of 1996, ten of the twelve states that deferred the abrogation of contributory negligence to the legislature later adopted comparative negligence). Two state courts adopted comparative negligence by judicial decision after deciding explicitly to defer to legislative action in an earlier decision. See Alvis v. Ribar, 85 Ill.2d 1, 52 Ill. Dec. 23, 421 N.E.2d 886 (1981); Gustafson v. Benda, 661 S.W.2d 11 (Mo. 1983). By contrast, the Alabama Supreme Court is the only court to revisit the adoption of comparative fault after deferring explicitly to its legislature (which remained inactive) and reaffirm the continued vitality of contributory negligence. The Supreme Court of Alabama stated summarily:

We have heard hours of oral argument; we have read numerous briefs; we have studied cases from other jurisdictions and law review articles; and in numerous conferences we have discussed in depth this issue and all of the ramifications surrounding such a change. After this exhaustive study and these lengthy deliberations, the majority of this Court, for various reasons, has decided that we should not abandon the doctrine of contributory negligence, which has been the law in Alabama for approximately 162 years.

Williams v. Delta Int'l Machinery Corp., 619 So.2d 1330, 1333 (Ala. 1993).

 

[11] As some scholars note, the deterrence rationale of contributory negligence (or comparative fault, for that matter) is dubious at best. "If the prospect of losing life and limb does not make a plaintiff careful, little further inducement to care will be added by speculations as to the outcome of a lawsuit. The same thing is often true of defendants. Yet today those who bear the burden of accident liability are increasingly absentee defendants —corporate and other employers or insurance companies, whose lives and limbs are not at stake in the accident.... Defendants, then, will often lack a powerful incentive to carefulness—self-preservation—that is virtually always present with plaintiffs." 4 Harper, James & Gray, supra, § 22.2 at 340-41.

[12] Further, Respondent and its Amici pointed out in oral argument that this Court reaffirmed the continued vitality of the doctrine recently in post-Harrison cases. See, e.g., Thomas v. Panco Mgmt. of Md., LLC, 423 Md. 387, 417-20, 31 A.3d 583, 601-03 (2011). Our continued adherence to the doctrine of contributory negligence in the cases cited by Respondent do not constitute an endorsement, however, by this Court as to the doctrine's continued value. We decide usually only the questions presented in successful petitions for certiorari or which may (or must) be reached fairly on the record in a given case. See Md. Rule 8-131. Before granting certiorari in the present case, we have not granted certiorari to consider whether to abrogate the doctrine of contributory negligence since our decision in Harrison. Thus, the recent decisions cited by Respondent applying the defense of contributory negligence to bar recovery cannot be construed as a reaffirmation by this Court, as recently as 2011, of the vitality and relevancy of the doctrine of contributory negligence in a modern context.

[13] This would be like urging Dr. Wolf Frankenstein (portrayed by Basil Rathbone) to wait to see if the village's elected officials will kill his monster, before taking matters into his own hands. In the meantime, many villagers will be lost. See Son of Frankenstein (Universal Pictures 1939).

[14] Coincidentally, this is the precise number of jurisdictions that preceded Maryland in abrogating in full the doctrine of interspousal tort immunity. See Bozman, 376 Md. at 487, 830 A.2d at 466. A critical mass has been reached for the adoption of comparative negligence, I submit.

[15] There may be much to learn as well from the evolution of comparative negligence in those states that adopted it initially by legislative act. The subsequent actions by the legislatures (and the courts) in those states will supply insights for how Maryland may address follow-on, collateral issues that are not appropriate to address here because of the limitations of the facts.

[16] As the author of one tort law treatise noted in response to Harrison, "The history [of legislative attempts to abrogate contributory negligence] appears more nearly indicative, it is suggested with respect, of the superior ability of insurers' lobbyists to influence a committee or its chairman in a non-public decision-making than an entire legislative body in an open vote." The author goes on to note that, in the Senate's first opportunity to vote on a comparative negligence bill, it passed 45-1 on the floor before being defeated behind closed doors in the House Judiciary Committee. 4 Harper, James & Gray, supra, § 22.18 at 495 n.1.

[17] States considering the judicial adoption of comparative negligence wrestled generally with the propriety of deferring legislative action versus judicial initiative. Twelve states and the federal government determined that contributory negligence is "a judicially created doctrine which can be altered or totally replaced by the court which created it." Alvis, 52 Ill.Dec. 23, 421 N.E.2d at 895. See United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397, 410, 95 S.Ct. 1708, 44 L.Ed.2d 251 (1975) (holding that it is appropriate to "adopt the proportional fault doctrine without Congressional action"); Kaatz, 540 P.2d 1037, 1049 (Alaska 1975) ("It appears to us that continued adherence to the contributory negligence rule, absent legislative change, represents judicial inertia rather than a reasoned consideration of the intrinsic value of the rule."); Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal.3d 804, 119 Cal.Rptr. 858, 532 P.2d 1226, 1233 (1975) (stating that an argument requiring the court to defer to legislative action regarding the abolition of contributory negligence is "fundamentally misguided"); Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So.2d 431, 436 (Fla.1973) (stating that the court has the "power and authority to reexamine the position [it] has taken in regard to contributory negligence and to alter the rule [it] ha[s] adopted previously"); Alvis v. Ribar, 85 Ill.2d 1, 52 Ill.Dec. 23, 421 N.E.2d 886, 896 (1981) (noting that where a "stalemate" exists between the legislature and the court and "the legislature has, for whatever reason, failed to act to remedy a gap in the common law that results in injustice, it is the imperative duty of the court to repair that injustice and reform the law to be responsive to the demands of society"); Goetzman v. Wichern, 327 N.W.2d 742, 752 (Iowa 1982) ("We believe the arguments for deference to the legislature in the present case are substantially outweighed by the considerations reflected in the decisions of other courts that have addressed the issue, the analyses of the commentators, and the concept of the judicial role exemplified in past decisions of this court."); Hilen v. Hays, 673 S.W.2d 713, 716-17 (Ky.1984) (declining to continue deference to the legislature despite recent legislative consideration of comparative negligence bills); Placek v. City of Sterling Heights, 405 Mich. 638, 275 N.W.2d 511, 518 (1979) ("[W]e find adoption of comparative negligence is consistent with this Court's responsibility to the jurisprudence of this state."); Gustafson v. Benda, 661 S.W.2d 11, 14-15 (Mo.1983) ("We have remained quiescent more than five years while waiting for the legislature to act.... We now are past the time when we should have resolved the uncertainty surrounding comparative fault..."); Scott v. Rizzo, 96 N.M. 682, 634 P.2d 1234, 1239 (1981) (stating that, "since the rule [of contributory negligence] is not one made or sanctioned by the legislature, but ... depends for its origins and continued viability upon the common law, it is a rule peculiarly for the courts to change if it is no longer justified" (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); Nelson v. Concrete Supply Co., 303 S.C. 243, 399 S.E.2d 783, 784 (1991) (determining that comparative negligence is the "more equitable doctrine" and abolishing the "long-standing rule of contributory negligence" with reference to the lengthy discussion in Langley v. Boyter, 284 S.C. 162, 325 S.E.2d 550 (S.C.Ct.App.1984)); McIntyre v. Balentine, 833 S.W.2d 52, 56 (Tenn.1992) ("We recognize that this action could be taken by our General Assembly. However, legislative inaction has never prevented judicial abolition of obsolete common law doctrines, especially those, such as contributory negligence, conceived in the judicial womb."); Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co., 163 W.Va. 332, 256 S.E.2d 879, 884 & n. 14 (1979) (noting that the judiciary is capable of developing and adjusting the common law to grow with and adapt to changes in society). But see, e.g., Golden v. McCurry, 392 So.2d 815, 817 (Ala. 1981) (stating that, "even though this Court has the inherent power to change the common law rule of contributory negligence, it should, as a matter of policy, leave any change of the doctrine of contributory negligence to the legislature"); Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461, 298 N.E.2d 622, 630 (1973) ("With full awareness that the doctrine was of judicial rather than legislative origin, we are nonetheless not prepared at this time to substitute some formula of comparative negligence. In our opinion this is a topic now more appropriate for legislative address.") (comparative negligence enacted legislatively in 1975); Krise v. Gillund, 184 N.W.2d 405, 409 (N.D.1971) ("We believe that the abandonment by the courts of a long-standing rule, which would result in the adoption of any one of a number of interpretations of the comparative-negligence rule, is a change of such magnitude that it should be made by legislative, rather than by judicial, action.") (comparative negligence enacted legislatively in 1973).

[18] The present case does not involve multiple defendants. Thus, there are no joint tortfeasors. There is no governmental defendant here to tee-up questions under governmental tort claims statutes.

[19] Respondent and its Amici cite to numerous studies bemoaning the potential for increased litigation, taxes, and insurance rates if Maryland were to adopt comparative negligence. The research on such topics, however, is highly conflicted, and studies concluding that insurance rates will increase are criticized roundly for "lack of academic rigor" and failing to consider and control for additional variables. See Negligence Systems, supra, at 21, 55-63.

It is recognized generally that no "good data" exists on whether comparative negligence increases insurance rates, due to the difficulty of controlling for all of the variables existing in state automobile insurance markets. As acknowledged in the 2004 Maryland Department of Legislative Services Report, "[i]n the absence of any comprehensive study, it is impossible to state with any certainty the direct and indirect consequences of changing to a comparative negligence system." Id. at 21. The possibility that comparative fault may increase insurance rates is insufficient to justify retention of what is certainly an unjust system. As the Supreme Court of Kentucky stated in response to this very argument, "there are no good economies in an unjust law." Hilen, 673 S.W.2d at 718 (emphasis in original).

 

[20] This is more commonly referred to as the "less than fifty percent," or the "not as great as," approach. Twelve states employ this approach. Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Special Report to [Maryland] Court of Appeals on Aspects of Contributory Negligence and Comparative Fault 9 & n.7 (2011)(hereinafter "Rules Committee Report").

[21] This approach is known generally as the "50%," or the "not greater than," approach. Twenty-one states employ this approach. Rules Committee Report, supra, at 9 & n. 8.

[22] In both types of modified comparative fault, there is some inconsistency regarding whether a plaintiff's proportionate fault is to be judged against each defendant individually, or all defendants collectively. Three states—Idaho (not as great as), Minnesota (not greater than), and Wisconsin (not greater than)—employ the individual approach, requiring the plaintiff's proportion of fault to be judged against each defendant's fault to determine if the plaintiff can recover against that particular defendant. Rules Committee Report, supra, at 21-22.

[23] For those familiar only with the application of contributory negligence, it may be difficult to comprehend specifically how a jury is to reach a determination of relative fault in exact percentages. As the Supreme Court of Illinois stated, "[t]he simple and obvious answer ... is that in [46] jurisdictions of the United States such apportionment is being accomplished by juries," and is "no more difficult or sophisticated for jury determination than others in a jury's purview, such as compensation for pain and suffering." Alvis, 52 Ill.Dec. 23, 421 N.E.2d at 893. Or, as Petitioner asserted in oral argument, this is, quite simply, what juries do. See, e.g., Lande & MacAlister, supra, at 7 (noting that juries decide complex questions routinely).

I agree with the Supreme Court of Tennessee that, while "it is impossible to formulate an exhaustive set of guidelines for apportioning fault that will adequately cover the manifold circumstances in which negligence actions may arise, ... trial courts and juries must have some guidance, however imprecise and imperfect, in discharging their respective duties in apportioning fault." Eaton v. McLain, 891 S.W.2d 587, 591 (Tenn.1994). Juries should continue to be guided by the tenets of our traditional negligence law—for example, the relevant standard of care owed by the parties and the causal relationship between the parties' actions and the harm caused—as well as other tort doctrines that may, or may not, be subsumed by a shift to comparative fault, such as assumption of the risk and the doctrine of last clear chance. See Eaton, 891 S.W.2d at 592 (directing consideration of traditional common law negligence principles such as implied assumption of the risk, remote contributory negligence, last clear chance, the sudden emergency doctrine, and the rescue doctrine); National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Uniform Comparative Fault Act § 2 Comment (1977) (hereinafter "UCFA"). Relative degrees of fault are dependent upon the circumstances and facts of each case, and juries should "rely upon their common sense and ordinary experience in apportioning fault." Eaton, 891 S.W.2d at 593.

 

[24] Twelve of the forty-six comparative fault states employ pure comparative fault, while thirty-three apply a form of modified fault. Rules Committee Report at 9-10. South Dakota, although considered to be a comparative fault jurisdiction, applies neither a pure nor modified system. Instead, it applies a slight negligence standard. Christopher J. Robinette & Paul G. Cherland, Contributory or Comparative: Which is the Optimal Negligence Rule?, 24 N. Ill. U.L.Rev. 41, 44 (2003).

[25] See Kaatz v. State, 540 P.2d 1037, 1049 (Alaska 1975); Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal.3d 804, 119 Cal.Rptr. 858, 532 P.2d 1226, 1242 (1975); Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So.2d 431, 438 (Fla. 1973); Alvis v. Ribar, 85 Ill.2d 1, 52 Ill.Dec. 23, 421 N.E.2d 886, 898 (1981); Goetzman v. Wichern, 327 N.W.2d 742, 753 (Iowa 1982); Hilen v. Hays, 673 S.W.2d 713, 719 (Ky.1984); Placek v. City of Sterling Heights, 405 Mich. 638, 275 N.W.2d 511, 519 (1979); Gustafson v. Benda, 661 S.W.2d 11, 15 (Mo. 1983); Scott v. Rizzo, 96 N.M. 682, 634 P.2d 1234, 1241 (1981). In two of the states that adopted judicially pure comparative fault, the legislature codified later a form of modified comparative fault. See 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 5/2-1116 (2012) (abrogating Alvis v. Ribar, 85 Ill.2d 1, 52 Ill.Dec. 23, 421 N.E.2d 886 (1981) in favor of a modified comparative fault system); Iowa Code § 668.3 (2011) (abrogating Goetzman v. Wichern, 327 N.W.2d 742 (Iowa 1982) in favor of a modified comparative fault system).

[26] See Nelson v. Concrete Supply Co., 303 S.C. 243, 399 S.E.2d 783, 784 (1991); McIntyre v. Balentine, 833 S.W.2d 52, 57 (Tenn.1992); Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co., 163 W.Va. 332, 256 S.E.2d 879, 885 (1979). Most states adopting modified comparative fault have done so through legislative action. Scholars and commentators disagree generally with modified comparative fault. See, e.g., 4 Harper, James & Gray, supra, § 22.15 at 459-61 ("It is difficult to demonstrate a rational reason [for the adoption by legislatures of modified comparative fault]. A common explanation, in terms of pressures on legislators by lobbyists for defense interests, is not implausible.").

[27] What I mean by "henceforth" will be amplified shortly in this opinion.

[28] See, e.g., Md. Code (1977, 2009 Reply. Vol.), Transportation Article, § 21-1306(e)(1)(i)-(ii) ("The failure of an individual to wear protective headgear required under subsection (b) of this section may not: (i) Be considered evidence of negligence; (ii) Be considered evidence of contributory negligence"); Md.Code (1977, 2012 Supp.), Transportation Article, § 21-1306.1(e)(1)(i)-(ii) (same); Md.Code (1977, 2009 Repl.Vol.), Transportation Article, § 22-201.2(c)(1)(i)-(ii) ("If a person is convicted under this section, the conviction may not: (i) Be considered evidence of negligence; (ii) Be considered evidence of contributory negligence"); Md. Code (1977, 2009 Repl.Vol.), Transportation Article, § 22-412.2(i) ("A violation of this section is not contributory negligence and may not be admitted as evidence in the trial of any civil action."); Md.Code (1977, 2009 Repl. Vol.), Transportation Article, § 22-412.3(h)(1)(i)-(ii) ("Failure of an individual to use a seat belt in violation of this section may not: (i) Be considered evidence of negligence; (ii) Be considered evidence of contributory negligence"); Md.Code (1977, 2009 Repl. Vol.), Transportation Article, § 22-412.4(c)(1)(i)-(ii) ("The failure of a person to use a seat belt or restraining device required under this section may not: (i) Be considered evidence of negligence; (ii) Be considered evidence of contributory negligence"); Md. Code (2002, 2012 Repl.Vol.), Criminal Law Article, § 4-104(e)(1)(i)-(ii) ("A violation of this section may not: (i) be considered evidence of negligence; (ii) be considered evidence of contributory negligence").

[29] Indiana, for example, does not apply its comparative fault doctrine to suits against governmental entities, applying instead the doctrine of contributory negligence. See Penn Harris Madison Sch. Corp. v. Howard, 861 N.E.2d 1190, 1193 (Ind.2007).

[30] As noted by the 2004 Maryland Department of Legislative Services study, only eight of the states employing comparative fault retain joint and several liability in its entirety, although, conversely, only ten abolished it completely. The remaining twenty-eight states employ joint and several liability in specified instances. Negligence Systems, supra, at 17. For example, joint and several liability is retained generally where multiple tortfeasors act in concert; some states apply the doctrine where multiple tortfeasors commit environmental harm; and some apply it where there is no contributory fault on the part of the claimant. Rules Committee Report, supra, at 23-24; National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Uniform Apportionment of Tort Responsibility Act at 4-5 (2003) (hereinafter "UATRA").

Although the Uniform Comparative Fault Act retained joint and several liability completely, see UCFA § 4, Comment, the more recent relevant uniform act, the Uniform Apportionment of Tort Responsibility Act ("UATRA"), limits the application of the doctrine. The UATRA abolishes joint and severally liability generally, but retains it in four instances: (1) where two or more tortfeasors act in concert with intent to cause personal injury or harm to property; (2) where one party fails to prevent another party from intentionally causing personal injury or harm to property; (3) where the liability of one defendant is based on the act or omission of another party; and (4) where another statute requires the judgment to be entered jointly and severally. UATRA § 6(a). As the Rules Committee noted in considering the potential modification of joint and several liability, "[t]here is a smorgasbord from which to choose." Rules Committee Report, supra, at 24. See also Lande & MacAlister, supra, at 10-13 (arguing that a pure comparative fault system, in conjunction with joint and several liability, "preserves joint and several liability's many virtues while properly deducting from a plaintiff's recovery a percentage commensurate with his or her breach of the duty to look out for his or her own safety.").

Additionally, states abolishing joint and several liability confront the attendant issue of whether, and, if so, how to reallocate among remaining parties an uncollectible share of liability.

 

[31] Massachusetts has long applied a pro rata contribution scheme in conjunction with a system of comparative fault. See Shantigar Found. v. Bear Mountain Builders, 441 Mass. 131, 804 N.E.2d 324, 332 (2004).

[32] Although we recognize that the doctrine of selective prospectivity may be criticized as treating similarly situated litigants inequitably, as we recognized in Julian, the reasons for doing so are "well stated, though in a slightly different context, by Justice Brennan...:

Sound policies of decision-making, rooted in the command of Article III of the Constitution that we resolve issues solely in concrete cases or controversies, and in the possible effect upon the incentive of counsel to advance contentions requiring a change in the law, militate against denying [these litigants] the benefit of today's decisions. Inequity arguably results from according the benefit of a new rule to the parties in the case in which it is announced but not to other litigants similarly situated in the trial or appellate process who have raised the same issue. But we regard the fact that the parties involved are chance beneficiaries as an insignificant cost for adherence to sound principles of decision-making."

Julian, 320 Md. at 13, 575 A.2d at 741 (quoting Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 301, 87 S.Ct. 1967, 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 (1967)) (alterations in original).

2.5 Wright v. Norfolk & Western Railway Co. 2.5 Wright v. Norfolk & Western Railway Co.

Mattie B. Wright, et al., etc. v. Norfolk and Western Railway Company

Record No. 921018

February 26, 1993

Present: All the Justices

*162 Thomas L. Phillips, Jr.; S. J. Thompson, Jr. (Thomas L. Phillips; Joy Lee Price; Phillips, Phillips, Phillips & Morrison; Caskie & Frost, on briefs), for appellants.

John D. Eure (James F. Johnson; Joseph A. Matthews, Jr.; Johnson Ayers & Matthews, on brief), for appellee.

JUSTICE COMPTON

delivered the opinion of the Court.

On May 12, 1988, Riley E. Wright was severely injured in a collision between the dump truck he was operating and a Norfolk and Western Railway Company train at a public crossing. Wright’s guardians filed this negligence action against N & W seeking damages on behalf of their ward, a disabled person. A jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs for $4 million.

Sustaining a post-trial motion, the court below set the verdict aside and entered judgment for the defendant. We awarded the plaintiffs an appeal and also agreed to consider the defendant’s assignments of cross-error. The principal issue on appeal, however, is whether the trial court correctly ruled that Wright was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law.

Although the trial court set the verdict aside, we shall accord the plaintiffs, the recipients of the jury verdict, the benefit of any substantial conflicts in the evidence and of all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts. Holland v. Shively, 243 Va. 308, 309, 415 S.E.2d 222, 223 (1992). The evidence is virtually undisputed.

The accident occurred in the town of Brookneal where Maddox Street crosses N & W’s main line. The track runs north and south, and the two-way street runs generally east and west. U.S. Highway *163 501, a north-south roadway, closely parallels the track to the east. At the crossing, Maddox Street intersects Route 501 about 20 feet east of the track and ends there.

At the scene, the terrain generally is level, and the track is straight for 2,150 feet north from the crossing. Maddox Street is not perpendicular to the track; it angles to the southwest from its intersection with Route 501.

The crossing was marked by crossbucks (signal boards) and an advance railroad warning sign (“a yellow sign that had RR on it”). There were no other signals, warning devices, or traffic controls in place at or near the crossing.

The collision took place on a Thursday about 12:45 p.m. The weather was clear, hot, and humid. The roadways were dry.

At the time, the train, composed of 17 cars loaded with wood chips and pulpwood, was moving southbound through Brookneal. Travelling approximately 34 miles per hour, the train approached the crossing with the headlight burning on the engine. Also, an air-operated bell was ringing continuously. In addition, an air-operated whistle was sounding “two longs, a short and a long.”

At the same time, Wright, who was operating his employer’s truck alone, was proceeding southbound on Route 501 approaching the crossing. Wright’s destination was a lumber yard located just west of the crossing on Maddox Street.

The vehicle was a tandem dump truck with ‘ ‘front axles and ... a dual axle at the back.” Its overall length was “around 25 feet.” The unit included a solid metal dump body that “sits approximately two inches behind the cab” preventing the operator from seeing “out of” the rear cab window. The vehicle had “regular West Coast” rear view mirrors “set to show what’s behind the truck.” The truck, in good operating condition, was equipped with an air conditioner, an AM/FM stereo radio, and a CB radio. It had a capacity of 53,500 pounds and was loaded with gravel.

Wright, age 36 and an experienced dump truck operator, had lived less than a mile from the crossing for ten years. On the day of the accident, he “had hauled . . . four loads of gravel” over the crossing to the lumber yard prior to the incident; the previous day, he had delivered five loads to the same destination.

Eyewitness testimony revealed that Wright approached the crossing behind another southbound dump truck. The first truck turned from Route 501 and stopped on Maddox Street east of the crossing. Wright stopped his truck behind the first vehicle. After the first *164 truck moved over the crossing, clearing the track, Wright drove his truck onto the track in front of the train when the train’s engine was less than ten feet from the truck. The truck travelled at a slow, steady speed, less than five miles per hour, to a point where the train engine struck the truck in the center of its right side, demolishing it and injuring Wright.

One eyewitness pointed out that there was “a slight incline from 501 up to the crossing.” He stated that “as the truck was coming off of 501 onto Maddox the front end of the truck sort of shifted downward as if he were [braking] or changing gears.” The witness said, ‘ T had the thought he was going to stop and then the truck, the front end, raised up as he accelerated onto the tracks.” The train engineer testified that “just before hitting the edge of the crossing, like six feet, the truck whipped in front of me. It was no time to do anything.”

The witnesses did not see any brake lights “come on” on the truck before the impact. The window on the right side of the truck’s cab was closed at the time of the collision. Although Wright did not testify due to his disability, his employer testified that Wright, whose hobby was country music, normally operated the truck’s air conditioner on hot days and normally “kept his radio on and CB on.”

Expert testimony offered by the plaintiffs established that the crossing was not “reasonably safe’’ and that it was “ultradangerous, or an ultrahazardous crossing.” This opinion was based upon ‘ ‘the sight distance available to the motorist, the geometry of the crossing, the type and mix of the traffic that uses the crossing, the speed of the trains, the condition of the tracks and crossing.” According to the expert, “All of those in conjunction with the type of protection afforded at the crossing, which is essentially the cross bucks, made it an ultrahazardous crossing.”

Another expert opined that, because of the angle of Maddox Street relative to the track, the length of the truck, and the radius of the turn, Wright’s view north on the track was severely limited as he turned onto the crossing. This was because the driver was unable, without making a wide turn across the center line of Maddox Street, to bring the truck to a position perpendicular to the track to have a clear view north. Instead, because of the “geometry of that crossing,” Wright could only lean forward in his driver’s seat and try to look through the right side window, his view through the rear window of the cab being completely blocked.

*165 The expert also measured scientifically the sound level inside a similar truck’s cab. He determined, using various assumptions (e.g. air conditioner off or on) that ‘ ‘because of the limited field of view to the right-hand side from this truck and the distances involved and the geometry of the crossing, it was physically impossible for Riley Wright to have heard or seen that train as he approached the crossing in time to avoid the collision, assuming that they both happened to be there at the time, which they did, of course.”

Prior to trial, the defendant filed a motion contending that federal law preempted the plaintiffs’ claim that the Maddox Street crossing was equipped with inadequate crossing protection devices. The trial court took this motion under advisement.

During trial, the defendant moved the court to strike the plaintiffs’ evidence at the conclusion of the plaintiffs’ case-in-chief. The grounds of the motion were that the plaintiffs failed to establish, prima facie, the-defendant’s primary negligence, and that the plaintiffs’ own evidence established Wright was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. This motion was overruled. The trial court, after stating, “I’m very troubled, very troubled by Mr. Wright’s conduct,” decided to allow the contributory negligence issue to go to the jury. The trial court noted this Court’s admonition: ‘ ‘It is a drastic measure to strike the evidence at the end of a plaintiff’s case.” Higgins v. Bowdoin, 238 Va. 134, 141, 380 S.E.2d 904, 908 (1989). The trial court also mentioned that plaintiffs’ counsel had represented that approximately $45,000 had been expended in connection with the preparation and trial of the case. Additionally, the court noted that it still had the preemption issue under advisement.

At that stage of the trial, the court also ruled there was no merit to the plaintiffs’ claim that the defendant was guilty of willful and wanton misconduct; the court stated it would not instruct on that issue.

At the conclusion of all the evidence, the plaintiffs moved to strike the defendant’s evidence on the ground that primary negligence had been proved as a matter of law. The defendant renewed its previous motion to strike. The trial court overruled both motions, stating “there’s a strong likelihood of contributory negligence, but I’m not certain of that.”

After verdict, the court considered memoranda of law and oral argument on defendant’s motion to set aside. For the first time, during a hearing on the post-trial motion held three and one-half *166 months after verdict, the plaintiffs asserted that the defendant had waived its right to rely on the proposition that Wright was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. After further briefing, the trial court, in a letter opinion, sustained the defendant’s motion. The court ruled that no waiver had occurred and that Wright was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. In addition, the court ruled against the defendant on the preemption issue.

On appeal, the plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred in its ruling on the contributory negligence issue, erred in failing to find waiver, erred in refusing to instruct on willful and wanton negligence, and erred in excluding evidence that the defendant had actual notice that the crossing was ultrahazardous. The defendant assigned cross-error to the trial court’s refusal to strike the plaintiffs’ evidence on the contributory negligence issue both at the conclusion of the plaintiffs’ case-in-chief and at the conclusion of all the evidence. The defendant also assigned cross-error to the trial court’s refusal to hold that federal preemption applied.

Initially, we must dispose of the waiver issue, the focus of which is on the granting of Instruction IB. The issue arises in the following manner.

The sequence of the procedural events in this case is important to the consideration of waiver. During the fourth day of a five-day trial, after the trial court had denied the defendant’s motion to strike made at the conclusion of the plaintiffs’ case-in-chief, and in the midst of the presentation of the defendant’s evidence, the trial court commenced consideration of proposed instructions tendered by the parties. This was an effort to expedite the trial and to accommodate scheduling of some witnesses.

During this discussion, plaintiffs’ counsel tendered a two-paragraph instruction labelled “IB,” dealing with the burden o'f proof on the issue of contributory negligence and, in the second paragraph, stating that the defendant could not rely on contributory negligence as a defense if it was guilty of willful and wanton negligence.

Because of its previous decision not to instruct on willful and wanton negligence, the trial judge stated: “So paragraph one will stay in IB and that would be the only part I would give over objection.” Plaintiffs’ counsel said: “But, Judge, we want to offer it as is.” The court responded: “Oh, sure. I’m going to refuse it ... . Refuse the second paragraph.” A brief discussion ensued about *167 another instruction after which the trial judge asked one of defendant’s counsel: “Do you quarrel with Instruction IB, paragraph one?” to which counsel responded: “No, sir.”

Later, during the same interruption of the taking of evidence, Instruction IB had been retyped without the second paragraph and the trial judge distributed copies of the retyped instruction to counsel. The judge, addressing plaintiffs’ counsel said: “Now, other than the objections noted to my striking paragraph two, Mr. Phillips, you offer this?” Plaintiffs’ counsel answered: “Yes, sir.” The judge said: “I’ll give that then.” Addressing the defendant’s attorney, the judge said: “You don’t have any objection to it as given, do you, IB?” to which the defendant’s attorney responded: “No, sir. My objection was to the second paragraph.”

As given, Instruction IB provided:

“The Railroad claims contributory negligence as a defense. It has the burden of proving by the greater weight of the evidence that Riley Wright was negligent and that this negligence was a proximate cause of Riley Wright’s injuries. Contributory negligence may be shown by the Railroad’s evidence or by Riley Wright’s evidence.”

After this initial discussion of the instructions, the evidentiary portion of the trial continued, at the conclusion of which there was a further discussion of the instructions. When this discussion terminated, and before the trial court instructed the jury, the defendant renewed its motion to strike the plaintiffs’ evidence made at the conclusion of the plaintiffs’ case, one ground being that Wright was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law.

The plaintiffs argue that the “trial court erred in failing to hold that the defendant waived the defense of contributory negligence as a matter of law by failing to object to Instruction IB.” We do not agree. Waiver has not been established.

Recently, we addressed procedural waiver in a context similar to this case. In Weidman v. Babcock, 241 Va. 40, 400 S.E.2d 164 (1991), in which a party had endorsed a final order merely as “Seen,” we rejected a procedural waiver argument. There we said: “The main purpose of requiring timely specific objections is to afford the trial court an opportunity to rule intelligently on the issues presented, thus avoiding unnecessary appeals and reversals.” *168 Id. at 44, 400 S.E.2d at 167. We pointed out: “In addition, a specific, contemporaneous objection gives the opposing party the opportunity to meet the objection at that stage of the proceeding.” Id. (citing Hilton v. Fayen, 196 Va. 860, 866, 86 S.E.2d 40, 43 (1955)).

The sequence of the procedural events and the circumstances of the present case clearly demonstrate that the trial court was afforded the opportunity to rule intelligently on the issue of Wright’s contributory negligence. Likewise, plaintiffs were given adequate opportunity to address that issue.

From the beginning of this litigation, when the defendant pled the affirmative defense that Wright’s negligence was the sole proximate cause of the accident, the defendant consistently has maintained that no jury issue was presented on that question. This position was taken throughout the trial, including when the motions to strike were made during trial, one made after the discussions on the instructions, and in the motion to set the verdict aside. Taken in context, the responses of the defendant’s attorney clearly indicate that he voiced no objection to the form of Instruction IB, and did not indicate any waiver of the issue.

As we have said, the purpose of the waiver rule, as applied to procedural steps during a trial, as well as the purpose of our contemporaneous objection rule, Rule 5:25, mainly is to afford the trial court an opportunity to rule intelligently on the issues presented, thus avoiding unnecessary appeals and reversals. This is what this trial judge, for whose very benefit the rule is enforced, had to say in ruling there had been no waiver: “It was clear to me that the issue of contributory negligence was of paramount importance throughout the trial, and I believe it was spoken to at every meaningful stage of the trial.” Continuing, the judge said that when he overruled the defendant’s motions to strike, “I stated unequivocally that while I felt that the defendant was probably correct, the case would be submitted to the jury on the issue of contributory negligence and would be subject to further review by me, if necessary, after jury verdict.” The judge further stated, “Contrary to the language in Hilton v. Fayen, ... I do not believe that the defendant invited this court to commit error and now complains of it. For me to rule that defendant waived objection to the contributory negligence issue would require the harshest and most technically narrow interpretation of the law of waiver.” We are fully in accord with the trial court’s comments. See Jimenez v. Commonwealth, 241 Va. 244, 402 S.E.2d 678 *169 (1991); Smith v. Combined Ins. Co., 202 Va. 758, 120 S.E.2d 267 (1961).

The plaintiffs contend that the “situation presented by this appeal is indistinguishable from that in” Spitzli v. Minson, 231 Va. 12, 341 S.E.2d 170 (1986). We disagree; Spitzli is not controlling.

In Spitzli, a legal malpractice action seeking damages as the result of the defendant’s negligence in failing to register certain condominium units owned by the plaintiffs, this Court affirmed a judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. Relying on Hilton v. Faven, supra, and Godsey v. Tucker, 196 Va. 469, 84 S.E.2d 435 (1954), we held that the defendant waived “any contention that the trial court erred in not ruling as a matter of law upon the issues of contributory negligence and proximate cause.” Spitzli, 231 Va. at 18, 341 S.E.2d at 173. There, those issues were submitted to the jury “under instructions granted the plaintiffs without any objection from the defendant.” Id. at 17, 341 S.E.2d at 173. In that case, the defendant moved to strike the evidence both at the conclusion of the plaintiffs’ case and at the close of all the evidence, and moved to set aside the verdict in favor of the plaintiffs.

We analyze Spitzli against the background of the cases upon which we then relied. In Hilton, a defendant both agreed and failed to object to rulings of the trial court and to the granting of a crucial instruction. On appeal, the defendant contended that the trial court committed error in granting the instruction. This Court said that ‘ ‘parties cannot invite the court to commit an error, and then complain of it. Right or wrong, the instruction given in this case became the law of the case on that point, and was binding upon both the parties and the jury.” Hilton, 196 Va. at 867, 86 S.E.2d at 43. The Court also said that “when defendant failed to object to the instruction submitting the entire case to the jury, and failed to move the court to set aside the verdict and grant a new trial, she waived her right to assign error under Rule of Court 1:8 [now Rule 5:25].” Id. at 867, 86 S.E.2d at 43-44.

In Godsey, defendant contended on appeal that the trial court erred in refusing to set aside a verdict in a damage suit arising from a motor vehicle collision. The plaintiff husband, as personal representative of his wife’s estate, brought the action for his wife’s wrongful death in a collision between vehicles operated by the husband, in which the wife was riding, and the defendant. The defendant argued that the trial court should have set aside a verdict in favor of the husband because the husband was guilty of contributory *170 negligence and thus barred from participating in any recovery for his wife’s death. The trial court had granted an instruction permitting the jury to include the husband in the apportionment of the verdict. Noting that the defendant made no objection to the instruction, this Court said the “instruction, therefore, became the law of the case on that point’ ’ and that defendant ‘ ‘cannot now be heard to say that a verdict arrived at in accordance with it must be set aside.” Godsey, 196 Va. at 475, 84 S.E.2d at 439.

The consistent thread that runs through Spitzli, Godsey, and Hilton is that a litigant will not be permitted to invite a trial court to commit error, either through agreeing or failing to object, and then be permitted to successfully complain of such error on appeal. But that is not what happened here. This record affirmatively establishes, unlike the three cases just discussed, that the defendant did not invite the trial court to commit error. Indeed, after the discussion of the instructions and before the trial court charged the jury, the defendant renewed its motion to strike the plaintiffs’ evidence on the ground that Wright was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. And, in none of the three cases reviewed, as here, was there a positive expression from the very person for whose benefit the rule is established, the trial judge, that the defendant had not invited error.

We turn now to the merits of the contributory negligence issue, the jury having settled the issue of primary negligence against the defendant. At trial, a defendant has the burden to prove by the greater weight of the evidence that the plaintiff was negligent and that such negligence was a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries. Contributory negligence, however, may be shown by the defendant’s evidence or by the plaintiff’s own evidence.

On appeal, a defendant’s burden is heavier; the defendant must show that there is no conflict in the evidence on contributory negligence, and that there is no direct and reasonable inference to be drawn from the evidence as a whole to sustain a conclusion that the plaintiff was free from contributory negligence. Kelly v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 238 Va. 32, 39, 381 S.E.2d 219, 222-23 (1989).

As he approached the crossing, Wright “had the duty to look and listen with reasonable care; he did not have the absolute duty to discover the presence of the train, unless by so looking and listening he was bound to have discovered it.” Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Greenfield, 219 Va. 122, 132, 244 S.E.2d 781, 786-87 *171 (1978). Repeatedly, we have said that a railroad track is a proclamation of danger and the operator of a vehicle approaching a grade crossing “is required to look and listen at a time and place when both looking and listening will be effective,” intelligently using both eyes and ears. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Epling, 189 Va. 551, 557, 53 S.E.2d 817, 820 (1949). Trains run on fixed tracks and their course cannot be altered; no such steel-bound limitation controls the movement of motor vehicles. Id. When a vehicle operator “drives blindly upon a grade crossing, whether his view is obstructed or unobstructed, and takes no precaution for his own safety and is injured, his negligence precludes recovery.” Id. Indeed, “the greater the danger at a particular crossing, the greater the vigilance which is required by the public highway traveler.” Greenfield, 219 Va. at 133, 244 S.E.2d at 787.

There is no conflict in the evidence on the issue of contributory negligence. And, there are no direct and reasonable inferences to be drawn from the whole evidence to sustain a conclusion that Wright was free of contributory negligence. Rather, when the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, reasonable persons could not differ in concluding that Wright was guilty of negligence as a matter of law that proximately contributed to the accident and his injuries.

Wright was thoroughly familiar with the crossing, both as the result of living near it and from having traversed it in his truck on nine occasions during a two-day period before the accident. He was aware of the fact that he would have to rely on his senses of sight and hearing to be aware of an approaching train, because of the absence of automatically operated warning devices to remind him. He was aware of the limitations to sight and hearing posed by the configuration of the cab of his truck and by the angle at which Maddox Street ran southwest from Route 501. Yet, despite all these hazards confronting him, Wright drove his truck from a stopped position of safety onto the crossing directly in front of the train when its engine was less than ten feet away.

The expert testified that it was ‘ ‘impossible’ ’ for Wright to have heard or seen the train. But, he was not forced to approach the crossing with his right window closed, and presumably with his air conditioner and radio operating. He could have opened his window after his truck had been loaded and before he left the quarry, knowing the dangers to be encountered at the crossing. He could have moved onto Maddox Street and the crossing by making a wider *172 right turn, thus bringing his truck to an attitude with relation to the crossing that he could see clearly north along the track. Obviously, Wright did none of these things, and caused this unfortunate accident.

The only conclusion to be drawn from the whole evidence is that Wright either failed to look and listen with reasonable care, or if he did so look and listen, he failed to discover the immediate presence of the train. In either event, he was the architect of his own misfortune. Thus, we hold that the trial court properly set the verdict aside on the ground that Wright was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law.

In conclusion, we reject the plaintiffs’ contentions that the trial court erroneously refused to instruct on willful and wanton negligence, and that the trial court erroneously excluded evidence that the defendant had actual notice of the ultrahazardous nature of the crossing. The evidence was insufficient to support an instruction on willful and wanton misconduct. On the notice question, the plaintiffs sought to present data collected pursuant to a federal grade crossing safety program. Federal law specifically precludes use of such data in state and federal courts. 23 U.S.C. § 409 (Supp. 1992).

And, because we have ruled in favor of the defendant on the contributory negligence issue, we do not reach the federal preemption question.

Accordingly, we hold that the trial court committed no error, and the judgment below will be

Affirmed.

2.6 Jackson v. Axelrad ("The Spider Man Meme Case") 2.6 Jackson v. Axelrad ("The Spider Man Meme Case")

Dr. Richard JACKSON, Petitioner, v. David and Carolyn AXELRAD, Respondents.

No. 04-0923.

Supreme Court of Texas.

Argued Feb. 16, 2006.

Decided April 20, 2007.

*651 R. Brent Cooper, Diana L. Faust, Cooper & Scully, P.C., Dallas, Erin E. Lunce-ford, Joel Randal Sprott, Munisteri, Sprott, Rigby, Newsom & Robbins, P.C., Houston, for Petitioner.

Darrin M. Walker, Law Office of Darrin Walker, Kingwood, George Chandler, Michael Kirk Mathis, Chandler Law Offices, Lufkin, Walter Perry Zivley Jr., Law Offices of W. Perry Zivley Jr., Houston, for Respondents.

Justice BRISTER

delivered the opinion of the Court.

In this unusual medical malpractice case, both physician and patient were doc *652 tors. Each claimed the other was negligent, and a jury agreed both were. As the jury assessed slightly more fault to the plaintiff (51 percent) than the defendant (49 percent), the trial court entered a take-nothing judgment. 1

A divided court of appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial, disregarding the finding of the plaintiffs negligence because laymen generally have no duty to volunteer information during medical treatment. 2 But the plaintiff here was not a layman, and jurors judging his actions could consider his expertise, especially as he emphasized it throughout the trial. Because there was some evidence the plaintiff doctor failed to report a critical symptom when he should have, we reverse the court of appeals’ judgment and reinstate the jury’s verdict.

I. Background

This suit was brought by Dr. David Ax-elrad, a psychiatrist, against Dr. Richard Jackson, an internist. Like the court of appeals, we will refer only to the latter by his title to avoid confusion.

After months of intermittent abdominal cramps and diarrhea, Axelrad sought treatment from Dr. Jackson after an abrupt onset of acute pain. Dr. Jackson prescribed a laxative and enema for fecal impaction. As it turned out, Axelrad was suffering from diverticulitis. It is undisputed an enema should not be prescribed in such circumstances due to the risk of a perforated colon.

Returning home, Axelrad followed his doctor’s orders and immediately felt severe abdominal pain with nausea, rigors, and chills. His wife took him to an emergency room, and he was hospitalized for further testing. Based on those tests, another doctor operated two days later for what was thought to be appendicitis, but turned out to be diverticulitis and a perforated colon. A portion of the colon was removed and a temporary colostomy constructed. Axelrad’s subsequent course of treatment included surgery to reconnect the colon, complicated by a severe drug reaction.

While the foregoing is undisputed, the parties disagree about much else, including (1) what medical history Axelrad reported, (2) when colon perforation occurred, (3) whether it was caused by Axelrad’s disease or Dr. Jackson’s treatment, (4) why Dr. Jackson did not come to the emergency room, and (5) whether Axelrad’s course would have been different had Dr. Jackson’s treatment been different. But the only conflict relevant to this appeal is the first. Although he alleged several grounds of contributory negligence at trial, 3 Dr. Jackson now argues only that the court of appeals erred in disregarding evidence supporting one — that Axelrad neglected to report where his abdominal pain began.

The evidence showed that particular diseases are associated with pain in particular places in the abdomen — gallbladder disease in the right upper quadrant, appendicitis in the right lower quadrant, and diverticulitis in the left lower quadrant. While conceding a patient with diverticulitis should not be treated with enemas, Dr. Jackson testified he did not suspect diverticulitis as it is normally associated with fever, constipation, and pain in the left lower quadrant, while Axelrad reported no *653 fever, diarrhea, and pain throughout his abdomen.

A patient cannot, of course, be negligent because his symptoms fail to fit the usual pattern. But at trial, Axelrad insisted he told Dr. Jackson his pain started in the left lower quadrant. The latter flatly denied it, and argued Axelrad made this claim for the first time at trial. In none of the histories taken by medical personnel during his treatment did Axelrad ever report that his pain began in the left lower quadrant, nor did he say so at his pretrial deposition.

It was up to the jurors to resolve this conflict in the testimony. But as the issues were submitted in broad form, how they decided it depends on what presumption applies when jurors issue a split verdict like they did here.

II. Presumptions Concerning a Split Verdict

As we said in City of Keller v. Wilson, when there are conflicts in testimony we must presume “jurors decided all of them in favor of the verdict if reasonable human beings could do so.” 4 But we also noted that evidence “may support one part of a verdict but not another.” 5 Here, one version (that Axelrad reported where his pain began) supports the verdict against Dr. Jackson, while the other version (that he did not) supports the verdict against Axelrad. Reasonable jurors could not have believed both — Axelrad either did or did not report where his pain began. But because either answer would support part of the verdict, which one must we presume jurors believed?

The answer turns on the purpose of the presumption. It is not a prediction about what jurors actually did, as they often do not decide all conflicts one way. Here, for example, each party asserted several reasons why the other was negligent, so jurors did not have to agree on any one reason so long as they agreed on the result. 6

Instead, the presumption serves to protect jury verdicts from second-guessing on appeal. As a result, it operates in favor of any jury finding a litigant asks an appellate court to set aside. Here, the court of appeals set aside only one jury finding— that Axelrad was negligent. To ensure that the appellate court did not substitute its own judgment for that of the jury, we must presume the jury decided all conflicts in favor of this finding. 7

There are some cases in which this general rule will not apply. Courts cannot presume findings in favor of one part of a verdict if doing so creates an irreconcilable conflict with another. 8 But that is not the case here, as there was evidence Dr. Jackson was negligent even if Axelrad failed to report all his symptoms. Accordingly, we must presume jurors found Axelrad did not report where his abdominal pain began.

III. Do Patients Have a Duty to Cooperate in Diagnosis?

We have never addressed whether a patient’s failure to give an accurate medical *654 history can constitute negligence. But in Elbaor v. Smith, we recognized “a duty of cooperation which patients owe treating physicians who assume the duty to care for them.” 9 There, we held the plaintiffs refusal to take prescribed antibiotics should have been submitted as a question of contributory negligence, not just a failure to mitigate damages. 10 While Elbaor concerned cooperation with treatment rather than diagnosis, nothing in the opinion suggests a patient’s duty to cooperate applies to only one aspect of medical care.

A medical history, like many aspects of health care, is a cooperative venture requiring active participation by both doctor and patient. A patient’s statements to a doctor are critical, so critical they are protected by a privilege and made an exception to the hearsay rule. 11 In most cases, medical care will never even occur unless patients present themselves for treatment and say what hurts. Patients have no duty to diagnose themselves (as doctors are licensed and paid to do that), but neither can they demand treatment for a condition they refuse to disclose. All the trial experts agreed patients have a duty to cooperate in diagnosis by giving an accurate medical history.

Of course, there are cases in which a patient’s condition is so obvious that cooperation is unnecessary, or so debilitating that it is impossible. But such cases do not suggest there should be no duty to cooperate; they suggest only that a patient’s condition may discharge it. Like any reasonable-person standard, a patient’s duty to cooperate requires only ordinary care under all the surrounding circumstances. 12

The court of appeals attempted to limit a patient’s duty to cooperate in diagnosis to two instances: (1) responding truthfully to a physician’s questions, and (2) volunteering information known to be both significant and unknown to the doctor. 13 While we agree a patient’s duty of cooperation could arise in those situations, we do not think it can be limited to them.

We have rejected similar efforts to compartmentalize negligence in rigid categories. For example, we have discarded categories like imminent-peril, last-clear-chance, and assumption-of-the-risk in favor of a general submission of comparative negligence. 14 In products cases, we have refused to limit all allegations of a plaintiffs negligence to assumption of the risk or mere failure to discover a defect, as other kinds of negligence can fall in between. 15

*655 Given the infinite variety of patients, diseases, and circumstances surrounding medical care, an exhaustive list defining a patient’s duty to cooperate cannot be made. The specificity of a doctor’s questions and a patient’s responses will necessarily depend on many factors — the language skills of each, their specialized knowledge, the length of their relationship, the urgency of the situation, the frequency of previous examinations, the patient’s current condition, and so on.

Doctors are paid for their expertise, so diagnosis will always be primarily their responsibility. Thus, we agree with the court of appeals that in most cases an ordinary patient’s failure to report the origin of pain will be no evidence of negligence. But we disagree with the effort to confine this duty to precise categories, and turn next to whether this was an ordinary patient.

IV. Do Physicians As Patients Have a Different Duty?

The primary dispute between the parties in this appeal is whether Axelrad’s medical training should be taken into account in evaluating the history he gave. Axelrad did not object to the admission of such evidence; indeed he offered most of it himself. But he argues it cannot be considered in evaluating legal sufficiency because a physician as patient “should not be required to exercise any heightened degree of care above that of an ordinary person.”

This argument represents a misunderstanding of the nature of the physician-of-ordinary-prudence standard. It is not a higher standard of care (like strict liability, or the high-degree-of-care standard for common carriers 16 ) or a lower standard of care (like gross negligence, or the willful-and-wanton standard for emergency care 17 ). It is instead the ordinary-care standard, modified to instruct jurors that “under the same or similar circumstances” means they must consider a physician’s training. We said so in Hood v. Phillips, our seminal case defining a physician’s standard of care:

The burden of proof is on the patient-plaintiff to establish that the physician-defendant has undertaken a mode or form of treatment which a reasonable and prudent member of the medical profession would not have undertaken under the same or similar circumstances. The circumstances to be considered include, but are not limited to, the expertise of and means available to the physician-defendant, the health of the patient, and the state of medical knowledge. Unless the mode or form of treatment is a matter of common knowledge or is within the experience of the layman, expert testimony will be required to meet this burden of proof.... Although the trial court refused to submit an issue regarding ordinary negligence, [the] evidence would raise a question of fact for the jury on the issue of ordinary negligence and such issue should have been submitted. 18

The same point is made by the Restatement. Both the First and Second Restatements of Torts summarize the traditional reasonable-person standard as one taking into account both the knowledge *656 and skills of an ordinary person and “such superior attention, perception, memory, knowledge, intelligence, and judgment as the actor himself has.” 19 Both Restatements include an illustration specifically applying this standard to physicians, even when they are not acting in that capacity:

A is a physician. His child exhibits symptoms which A, because of his previous training and experience, should recognize as indicating that the child has scarlet fever. A fails to recognize them, and permits his child to go to school, where the child communicates the disease to B, another pupil. A is negligent in not recognizing the risk, although if he were a layman he might not be negligent. 20

This principle — that ordinary prudence under the same or similar circumstances includes a party’s expertise — is not limited to physicians. As Prosser and Keeton note, it applies to many other skills:

[I]f a person in fact has knowledge, skill, or even intelligence superior to that of the ordinary person, the law will demand of that person conduct consistent with it. Experienced milk haulers, hockey coaches, expert skiers, construction inspectors, and doctors must all use care which is reasonable in light of their superior learning and experience, and any special skills, knowledge or training they may personally have over and above what is normally possessed by persons in the field. 21

In the “expert skiers” case Prosser and Keeton mention, the federal Tenth Circuit noted that an expert-of-ordinary-prudence is merely an application of the reasonable-person standard, not a different one:

It would appear then that in order to satisfy the standard of care, a person having special knowledge must exercise a quantum of care which is commensurate with the circumstances, one of which is his or her special skill and training. An instruction of this kind is not easy to expound in a charge to a jury for the reason that it is capable of creating the impression that a double standard of care exists. In truth there is but one standard, that of reasonable prudence under the circumstances. The decision must be made on the basis of the surrounding circumstances, including the fact that the person involved is an expert. 22

*657 We have never applied the physician-of-ordinary-prudence standard to a plaintiffs negligence, but then we have never addressed a medical malpractice claim by a physician. Nor does it appear that any case addressing a patient’s failure to give an accurate medical history has ever done so. 23 But generally “[t]he rules which determine the contributory negligence of a plaintiff are ... the same as those which determine the negligence of the defendant.” 24 As jurors analyzing the “same or similar circumstances” must consider a physician’s special knowledge when a doctor is the defendant, it is hard to see why they should not do so when a doctor is the plaintiff.

Axelrad makes the same mistake in arguing that “the charge held Jackson to the standard of a prudent physician, but Axelrad to the standard of a prudent person.” The jury questions included a physician-of-ordinary-prudence charge as to Dr. Jackson and a person-of-ordinary-prudence charge as to Axelrad. As there was no objection, legal sufficiency must be examined by this charge. 25 But for the reasons already discussed, a charge asking whether Axelrad exhibited ordinary prudence under the same or similar circumstances at least allowed jurors to consider his training, even if it did not instruct them to do so. In its expert-skier case, the Tenth Circuit held a person-of-ordinary-prudence charge was not prejudicial on just this basis. 26 While a charge that prohibited jurors from considering Axel-rad’s special knowledge might require a different result, 27 this charge did not.

Here, jurors could hardly have overlooked Axelrad’s special knowledge, as he emphasized it throughout the trial. Axel-rad designated himself as a testifying expert, and gave several expert opinions to the jury. In the first minute he was on the stand, he opined that Dr. Jackson was “a bad doctor,” explaining that “I felt compelled to bring this lawsuit against him ... because he’s not a good doctor.” Axelrad emphasized to the jury that he had passed judgment on other doctors as a member of state medical boards in both California and Texas. He estimated giving more than 150 depositions as an expert in medical negligence cases. While his practice was limited to psychiatry, he denied any unfamiliarity with abdominal complaints, arguing that during his four years as an emergency room physician he had “a lot of opportunities to examine abdomens.” Having presented himself to jurors as a person with superior knowledge, he cannot complain that jurors might have taken him at his word.

Moreover, Axelrad insisted he had reported that his pain originated in the left lower quadrant, which he acknowledged was a classic sign of diverticulitis. As defense counsel put it with some embell *658 ishment in his opening argument, “our grandmothers could all diagnose diverticulitis if you came in and said, ‘I have left lower quadrant pain.’ ” Taking this position strengthened Axelrad’s case against Dr. Jackson if jurors credited it. But if they did not, it strengthened an inference that he failed to exercise ordinary care when he failed to mention it.

The court of appeals pointed out that Axelrad never admitted knowing the significance of where his abdominal pain started. 28 But of course litigants rarely admit negligence on their own part. The question here is whether there was evidence from which reasonable jurors could infer Axelrad either knew or should, have known he needed to report this information. 29

The court of appeals also found it implausible that a sick patient would fail to report a significant symptom, 30 but it is no more implausible than that a doctor would fail to avoid harming a patient and getting sued. The defense presented evidence that haste and impatience sometimes caused Axelrad to downplay his symptoms, fail to follow doctors’ orders, and testify to checkups that in fact never occurred. Whether plaintiffs or defendants, people sometimes make mistakes, and it is generally up to the jury to decide who did. 31

Again, there will be cases in which a patient is a doctor with no special knowledge of a particular disease, or so sick as to be unable to use it. But whether either was the case here was hotly disputed. While Dr. Jackson asked only general questions about Axelrad’s condition (“Tell me exactly what is going on”), we cannot say he was required to ask a fellow physician the same questions he would ask everyone else. Similarly, while most patients might not be expected to volunteer where the pain began, we cannot say Axel-rad was not required to say something more. As there was evidence from which jurors could have found both doctor and patient were at fault in diagnosing this situation, we hold the court of appeals erred in disregarding one part of the jury’s verdict.

Y. Other Points and Conclusion

Axelrad asserts two cross-points. In the first, he argues there was no evidence any failure to report where his pain began proximately caused his injuries. But Axelrad’s own expert testified “the only reasonable explanation” for the colon perforation and subsequent events was “the administration of that enema.” Dr. Jackson testified had he known Axelrad’s pain began in the left lower quadrant, he would have suspected diverticulitis and not prescribed an enema. Accordingly, jurors could have found a causal connection.

Second, Axelrad argues the trial court erred by admitting unreliable testimony by Dr. Mary Schwartz, a board certified pathologist who holds an endowed chair at Baylor Medical School, that tissue samples from Axelrad’s first surgery showed his bowel perforation had occurred before he ever called Dr. Jackson. While Dr. Schwartz admitted she was unfamiliar with the disease process of diverticulitis, we agree with the court of appeals’ detailed *659 analysis that her opinions were reliable, 32 and thus do not repeat them.

Accordingly, for the reasons stated above we reverse the court of appeals’ judgment and remand to that court for factual sufficiency review.

1

. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code § 33.001 (“In an action to which this chapter applies, a claimant may not recover damages if his percentage of responsibility is greater than 50 percent.”).

2

. 142 S.W.3d 418, 421 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004).

3

. See id. at 427-28.

4

. 168 S.W.3d 802, 819 (Tex.2005).

5

. Id. at 827.

6

. See Dillard v. Texas Elec. Co-op., 157 S.W.3d 429, 434 (Tex.2005) ("Under broad-form submission rules, jurors need not agree on every detail of what occurred so long as they agree on the legally relevant result.”).

7

. See Gen. Motors Corp. v. Sanchez, 997 S.W.2d 584, 595 (Tex.1999) (holding trial court erred in disregarding jury’s contributory negligence finding as some evidence supported it); Lynch v. Ricketts, 158 Tex. 487, 314 S.W.2d 273, 276-77 (1958) (same).

8

. See Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Morris, 981 S.W.2d 667, 677 (Tex.1998).

9

. 845 S.W.2d 240, 245 (Tex. 1992).

10

. Id.

11

. See Tex.R. Evid. 509, 803(4).

12

. See, e.g., State Bar of Tex., Tex. Pattern Jury Charges — General Negligence PJC 3.3 (2006) (providing conduct in emergency is not negligent if it meets standard of ordinary prudence under same or similar circumstances).

13

. 142 S.W.3d 418, 424-25 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004). We reject Dr. Jackson’s argument that Axelrad waived any no-duty argument, as Axelrad’s post-trial objection preserved his no-evidence complaint. See Edward D. Jones & Co. v. Fletcher, 975 S.W.2d 539, 543 (Tex.1998); T.O. Stanley Boot Co. v. Bank of El Paso, 847 S.W.2d 218, 220-21 (Tex. 1992).

14

. See French v. Grigsby, 571 S.W.2d 867, 867 (Tex. 1978) (disapproving of last-clear-chance issues in favor of comparative negligence submission); Davila v. Sanders, 557 S.W.2d 770, 771 (Tex.1977) (same regarding imminent-peril); Farley v. M M Cattle Co., 529 S.W.2d 751, 758 (Tex.1975) (same regarding assumption-of-the-risk).

15

. See Gen. Motors Corp. v. Sanchez, 997 S.W.2d 584, 594 (Tex.1999) (disapproving Keen v. Ashot Ashkelon, Ltd., 748 S.W.2d 91 (Tex.1988)).

16

. See Speed Boat Leasing, Inc. v. Elmer, 124 S.W.3d 210, 212 (Tex.2003) (holding common carriers to higher degree of care exercised by very cautious and prudent persons); see also State Bar of Tex., Tex Pattern Jury Charges— General Negligence PJC 2.2 (2006).

17

. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code § 74.153.

18

. 554 S.W.2d 160, 165-66 (Tex.1977) (emphasis added).

19

See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 289 (1965):

The actor is required to recognize that his conduct involves a risk of causing an invasion of another’s interest if a reasonable man would do so while exercising
(a) such attention, perception of the circumstances, memory, knowledge of other pertinent matters, intelligence, and judgment as a reasonable man would have; and
(b) such superior attention, perception, memory, knowledge, intelligence, and judgment as the actor himself has.

See also Restatement (First) of Torts § 289 (1934).

20

. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 289 cmt. m, illus. 12; see Restatement (First) of Torts § 289 cmt. n, illus. 17.

21

. W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on Torts § 32, p. 185 (5th ed.1984) (citations omitted); see also, e.g., Joseph H. King, Jr., Reconciling the Exercise of Judgment and the Objective Standard of Care in Medical Malpractice, 52 Okla L.Rev. 49, 70 (1999) ("General negligence principles commonly require that a person not only exercise reasonable care, but also apply any superior knowledge or skills that he may possess.”); John M. Logsdon, The Rise and Fall of Bystander Recovery for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress in North Carolina, 21 N.C. Cent. L.J. 319, 338 (1995) ("Under traditional tort concepts, an actor who has superior knowledge is required to exercise that knowledge to avoid risk.”).

22

. La Vine v. Clear Creek Skiing Corp., 557 F.2d 730, 734 (10th Cir.1977).

23

. See Carroll J. Miller, Annotation, Patient’s Failure To Reveal Medical History To Physician As Contributory Negligence or Assumption of The Risk in Defense of Malpractice Action, 33 A.L.R.4* 790 § 3 (1984).

24

. Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 289 cmt. a, 464; see Restatement (First) of Torts §§ 289 cmt. a, 464.

25

. See Osterberg v. Peca, 12 S.W.3d 31, 55 (Tex.2000).

26

. La Vine, 557 F.2d at 734; accord, Sinai v. Polinger Co., 498 A.2d 520, 531-32 (D.C.1985).

27

. See, e.g., Cervelli v. Graves, 661 P.2d 1032, 1037 (Wyo.1983) (holding charge erroneously instructed jurors not to consider defendant’s training as professional truck driver).

28

. 142 S.W.3d 418, 427 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004).

29

. Cf. Caterpillar, Inc. v. Shears, 911 S.W.2d 379, 383 (Tex.1995) (applying standard of what reasonable user should have known, despite plaintiff's denial he knew of danger).

30

. 142 S.W.3d at 429.

31

. City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 819 (Tex.2005) (noting that jurors "may choose to believe one witness and disbelieve another”).

32

. 142 S.W.3d at 433-34.

2.7 Nga Li v. Yellow Cab Co. 2.7 Nga Li v. Yellow Cab Co.

This case is unlike many other cases in this casebook, because it uses an ordinary fact pattern as a jumping off point to radically revise the law. What is the doctrine of contributory negligence, and how does the court change it? What issues does it foresee arising from that change? 

[L.A. No. 30277.

In Bank.

Mar. 31, 1975.]

NGA LI, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. YELLOW CAB COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA et al., Defendants and Respondents.

*807Counsel

Hall, Moore & Norkin and Joseph E. Hall for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Mestad & Sanborn, John B. Mestad, Robert E. Cartwright, Edward I. Pollock, William H. Lally, Stephen I. Zetterberg, Robert G. Beloud, *808David B. Baum and Leonard Sacks as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant.

Hagenbaugh & Murphy, Herbert. F. Blanck and William D. Stewart for Defendants and Respondents.

Ives, Kirwan & Dibble, Martin J. Kirwan, Robert A. Seligson, Gilbert, Kelly, Crowley & Jennett, Roger E. Kelly, Ellis J. Horvitz and Arthur E. Schwimmer as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Respondents.

Opinion

SULLIVAN, J.

this case we address the grave and recurrent question whether we should judicially declare no longer applicable in California courts the doctrine of contributory negligence, which bars all recovery when the plaintiff’s negligent conduct has contributed as a legal cause in any degree to the harm suffered by him, and hold that it must give way to a system of comparative negligence, which assesses liability in direct proportion to fault. As we explain in detail infra, we conclude that we should. In the course of reaching our ultimate decision we conclude that: (1) The doctrine of comparative negligence is preferable to the “all-or-nothing” doctrine of contributory negligence from the point of view of logic, practical experience, and fundamental justice; (2) judicial action in this area is not precluded by the presence of section 1714 of the Civil Code, which has been said to “codify” the “all- or-nothing” rule and to render it immune from attack in the courts except on constitutional grounds; (3) given the possibility of judicial action, certain practical difficulties attendant upon the adoption of comparative negligence should not dissuade us from charting a new course—leaving the resolution of some of these problems to future judicial or legislative action; (4) the doctrine of comparative negligence should be applied in this state in its so-called “pure” form under which the assessment of liability in proportion to fault proceeds in spite of the fact that the plaintiff is equally at fault as or more at fault than the defendant; and finally (5) this new rule should be given a limited retrospective application.

The accident here in question occurred near the intersection of Alvarado Street and Third Street in Los Angeles. At this intersection *809Third Street runs in a generally east-west direction along the crest of a hill, and Alvarado Street, running generally north and south, rises gently to the crest from either direction. At approximately 9 p.m. on November 21, 1968, plaintiff Nga Li was proceeding northbound on Alvarado in her 1967 Oldsmobile. She was in the inside lane, and about 70 feet before she reached the Third Street intersection she stopped and then began a left turn across the three southbound lanes of Alvarado, intending to enter the driveway of a service station. At this time defendant Robert Phillips, an employee of defendant Yellow Cab Company, was driving a company-owned taxicab southbound in the middle lane on Alvarado. He came over the crest of the hill, passed through the intersection, and collided with the right rear portion of plaintiff’s automobile, resulting in personal injuries to plaintiff as well as considerable damage to the automobile.

The court, sitting without a jury, found as facts that defendant Phillips was traveling at approximately 30 miles per hour when he entered the intersection, that such speed was unsafe at that time and place, and that the traffic light controlling southbound traffic at the intersection was yellow when defendant Phillips drove into the intersection. It also found, however, that plaintiff’s left turn across the southbound lanes of Alvarado “was made at a time when a vehicle was approaching from the opposite direction so close as to constitute an immediate hazard.” The dispositive conclusion of law was as follows: “That the driving of Nga Li was negligent, that such negligence was a proximate cause of the collision, and that she is barred from recovery by reason of such contributory negligence.” Judgment for defendants was entered accordingly.

I

“Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the plaintiff which falls below the standard to which he should conform for his own protection, and which is a legally contributing cause cooperating with the negligence of the defendant in bringing about the plaintiff’s harm.” (Rest. 2d Torts, § 463.) Thus the American Law Institute, in its second restatement of the law, describes the kind of conduct on the part of one seeking recovery for damage caused by negligence which renders him subject to the doctrine of contributory negligence. What the effect of such conduct will be is left to a further section, which states the doctrine in its clearest essence: “Except where the defendant has the last clear chance, the plaintiff’s contributory negligence bars recovery against a *810defendant whose negligent conduct would otherwise make him liable to the plaintiff for the harm sustained by him.” (Rest. 2d Torts, § 467.) (Italics added.)

This rule, rooted in the long-standing principle that one should not recover from another for damages brought upon oneself (see Baltimore & P.R. Co. v. Jones (1877) 95 U.S. 439, 442 [24 L.Ed. 506, 507]; Buckley v. Chadwick (1955) 45 Cal.2d 183, 192 [288 P.2d 12, 289 P.2d 242]), has been the law of this state from its beginning. (See Innis v. The Steamer Senator (1851) 1 Cal. 459, 460-461; Griswold v. Sharpe (1852) 2 Cal. 17, 23-24; Richmond v. Sacramento Valley Railroad Company (1861) 18 Cal. 351, 356-358; Gay v. Winter (1867) 34 Cal. 153, 162-163; Needham v. S. F. &S.J. R. Co. (1869) 37 Cal. 409, 417-423.) Although criticized almost from the outset for the harshness of its operation, it has weathered numerous attacks, in both the legislative1 and the judicial2 arenas, seeking its amelioration or repudiation. We have undertaken a thorough reexamination of the matter, giving particular attention to the common law and statutory sources of the subject doctrine in this state. As we have indicated, this reexamination leads us to the conclusion that the “all-or-nothing” rule of contributory negligence can be and ought to be superseded by a rule which assesses liability in proportion to fault.

It is unnecessary for us to catalogue the enormous amount of critical comment that has been directed over the years against the “all- or-nothing” approach of the doctrine of contributory negligence. The essence of that criticism has been constant and clear: the doctrine is inequitable in its operation because it fails to distribute responsibility in proportion to fault.3 Against this have been raised several arguments in *811justification, but none have proved even remotely adequate to the task.4 The basic objection to the doctrine—grounded in the primal concept that in a system in which liability is based on fault, the extent of fault should govern the extent of liability—remains irresistible to reason and all intelligent notions of fairness.

Furthermore, practical experience with the application by juries of the doctrine of contributory negligence has added its weight to analyses of its inherent shortcomings: “Every trial lawyer is well aware that juries often do in fact allow recovery in cases of contributory negligence, and that the compromise in the jury room does result in some diminution of the damages because of the plaintiff’s fault. But the process is at best a haphazard and most unsatisfactory one.” (Prosser, Comparative Negligence, supra, p. 4; fn. omitted.) (See also Prosser, Torts, supra, § 67, pp. 436-437; Comments of Malone and Wade in Comments on Maki v. *812 Frelk—Comparative v. Contributory Negligence: Should the Court or Legislature Decide? (1968) 21 Vand.L.Rev. 889, at pp. 934, 943; Ulman, A Judge Takes the Stand (1933) pp. 30-34; cf. Comment of Kalven, 21 Vand.L.Rev. 889, 901-904.) It is manifest that this state of affairs, viewed from the standpoint of the health and vitality of the legal process, can only detract from public confidence in the ability of law and legal institutions to assign liability on a just and consistent basis. (See Keeton, Creative Continuity in the Lmv of Torts (1962) 75 Harv.L.Rev. 463, 505; Comment of Keeton in Comments on Maki v. Frelk, supra, 21 Vand.L.Rev. 889, at p. 916;5 Note (1974) 21 U.C.L.A. L.Rev. 1566, 1596-1597.)

It is in view of these theoretical and practical considerations that to this date .25 states,6 have abrogated the “all-or-nothing” rule of contributory negligence and have enacted in its place general apportionment statutes calculated in one manner or another to assess liability in proportion to fault. In 1973 these states were joined by Florida, which effected the same result by judicial decision. (Hoffman v. Jones (Fla. 1973) 280 So.2d 431.) We are likewise persuaded that logic, practical experience, and fundamental justice counsel against the retention of the *813doctrine rendering contributory negligence a complete bar to recovery —and that it should be replaced in this state by a system under which liability for damage will be borne by those whose negligence caused it in direct proportion to their respective fault.6a

The foregoing conclusion, however, clearly takes us only part of the way. It is strenuously and ably urged by defendants and two of the amici curiae that whatever our views on the relative merits of contributory and comparative negligence, we are precluded from making those views the law of the state by judicial decision. Moreover, it is contended, even if we are not so precluded, there exist considerations of a practical nature "which should dissuade us from embarking upon the course which we have indicated. We proceed to take up these two objections in order.

II

It is urged that any change in the law of contributory negligence must be made by the Legislature, not by this court. Although the doctrine of contributory negligence is of judicial origin—its genesis being traditionally attributed to the opinion of Lord Ellenborough in Butterfield v. Forrester (K.B. 1809) 103 Eng. Rep. 926—the enactment of section 1714 of the Civil Code7 in 1872 codified the doctrine as it stood at that date and, the argument continues, rendered it invulnerable to attack in the courts except on constitutional grounds. Subsequent cases of this court, it is pointed out, have unanimously affirmed that—barring the appearance of some constitutional infirmity—the “all-or-nothing” rule is the law of this state and shall remain so until the Legislature directs otherwise. The fundamental constitutional doctrine of separation of powers, the argument concludes, requires judicial abstention.

We are further urged to observe that a basic distinction exists between the situation obtaining in Florida prior to the decision of that state’s Supreme Court abrogating the doctrine (Hoffman v. Jones, supra, 280 So.2d 431), and the situation now confronting this court. There, to be sure, the Florida court was also faced with a statute, and the dissenting justice considered that fact sufficient to bar judicial change of the rule. The statute there in question, however, merely declared that the general *814English common and statute law in effect on July 4, 1776, was to be in force in Florida except to the extent it was inconsistent with federal constitutional and statutory law and acts of the state legislature. (Fla. Stat., § 2.01, F.S.A.) The majority simply concluded that there was no clear-cut common law rule of contributory negligence prior to the 1809 Butterfield decision (Butterfield v. Forrester, supra, 103 Eng. Rep. 926), and that therefore that rule was not made a part of Florida law by the statute.8 (280 So.2d at pp. 434-435.) In the instant case, defendants and the amici curiae who support them point out, the situation is quite different: here the Legislature has specifically enacted the rule of contributory negligence as the law of this state. In these circumstances, it is urged, the doctrine of separation of powers requires that any change must come from the Legislature.

We have concluded that the foregoing argument, in spite of its superficial appeal, is fundamentally misguided. As we proceed to point out and elaborate below, it was not the intention of the Legislature in enacting section 1714 of the Civil Code, as well as other sections of that code declarative of the common law, to insulate the matters therein expressed from further judicial development; rather it was the intention of the Legislature to announce and formulate existing common law principles and definitions for purposes of orderly and concise presentation and with a distinct view toward continuing judicial evolution.

Before turning our attention to section 1714 itself we make some observations concerning the 1872 Civil Code as a whole. Professor Arvo Van Alstyne, in an excellent and instructive article entitled The California Civil Code which appears as the introductory commentary to West’s Annotated Civil Code (1954), has carefully and authoritatively traced the history and examined the development of this, the first code of substantive law to be adopted in this state. Based upon the ill-fated draft Civil Code prepared under the direction and through the effort of David Dudley Field for adoption in the state of New York, the California code found acceptance for reasons largely related to the temperament and needs of an emerging frontier society. “In the young and growing commonwealth of California, the basically practical views of Field commanded wider acceptance than the more theoretic and philosophic arguments of the jurists of the historic school. In 1872, the advantages of *815codification of the unwritten law, as well as of a systematic revision of statute law, loomed large, since that law, drawing heavily upon the judicial traditions of the older states of the Union, was still in a formative stage. The possibility of widely dispersed popular knowledge of basic legal concepts comported well with the individualistic attitudes of the early West.” (Van Alstyne, supra, p. 6.)

However, the extreme consciseness and brevity of expression which was characteristic of the 1872 code, although salutary from the point of view of popular access to basic legal concepts, early led to uncertainty and dispute as to whether it should be regarded as the exclusive or primary source of the law of private rights. Due largely to the influence of a series of articles on the subject by Professor John Norton Pomeroy, this problem of interpretation was soon resolved, and by 1920 this court was able to state with confidence: “The Civil Code was not designed to embody the whole law of private and civil relations, rights, and duties; it is incomplete and partial; and except in those instances where its language clearly and unequivocally discloses an intention to depart from, alter, or abrogate the common-law rule concerning a particular subject matter, a section of the code purporting to embody such doctrine or rule will be construed in light of common-law decisions on the same subject.” (Estate of Elizalde (1920) 182 Cal. 427, 433 [188 P. 560]; see also Van Alstyne, supra, pp. 29-35.)

In addition, the code itself provides explicit guidance as to how such construction shall proceed. “The rule of the common law, that statutes in derogation thereof are to be strictly construed, has no application to this Code. The Code establishes the law of this State respecting the subjects to which it relates, and its provisions are to be liberally construed with a view to effect its objects and to promote justice.” (Civ. Code (1872) § 4.) Also, “[t]he provisions of this Code, so far as they are substantially the same as existing statutes or the common law, must be construed as continuations thereof, and not as new enactments.” (Civ. Code 1872) § 5; italics added.) The effect of these sections was early expressed by us in In re Jessup (1889) 81 Cal. 408, 419 [21 P. 976, 22 P. 742, 1028], in the following terms: “[E]ven as to the code, ‘liberal construction’ does not mean enlargement or restriction of a plain provision of a written law. If a provision of the code is plain and unambiguous, it is the duty of the court to enforce it as it is written. If it is ambiguous or doubtful, or susceptible of different constructions or interpretations, then such liberality of construction is to be indulged in as, within the fair interpretation of its language, will effect its apparent object and promote justice.” (See also *816 Baxter v. Shanley-Furness Co. (1924) 193 Cal. 558, 560 [226 P. 391]; see generally 45 Cal.Jur.2d, Statutes, § 162, pp. 663-667.)

The foregoing view of the character, function, and proper mode of interpretation of the Civil Code has imbued it with admirable flexibility from the standpoint of adaptation to changing circumstances and conditions. As Professor Van Alstyne states the matter: “[The code’s] incompleteness, both in scope and in detail[,] have provided ample room for judicial development of important new systems of rules, frequently built upon Code foundations. In the field of torts, in particular, which the Civil Code touches upon only briefly and sporadically, the courts have been free from Code restraint in evolving the details of such currently vital rules as those pertaining to last clear chance; the right of privacy, res ipsa loquitur, unfair competition, and the ‘impact rule’ in personal injury cases .... [H] In short, the Civil Code has not, as its critics had predicted, restricted the orderly development of the law in its most rapidly changing areas along traditional patterns. That this is true is undoubtedly due in large measure to the generality of Code treatment of its subject matter, stress being placed upon basic principles rather than a large array of narrowly drawn rules. In addition, the acceptance of Professor Pomeroy’s concept of the Civil Code as a continuation of the common law created an atmosphere in which Code interpretation could more easily partake of common law elasticity.” (Van Alstyne, supra, pp. 36-37.)

It is with these general precepts in mind that we turn to a specific consideration of section 1714. That section, which we have already quoted in full (fn. 7, ante), provides in relevant part as follows: “Everyone is responsible, not only for the result of his willful acts, but also (or an injury occasioned to another by his want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his property or person, except so far as the latter has, willfully or by want of ordinary care, brought the injury upon himself. ” (Italics added.)

The present-day reader of the foregoing language is immediately struck by the fact that it seems to provide in specific terms for a rule of comparative rather than contributory negligence—i.e., for a rule whereby plaintiff’s recovery is to be diminished to the extent that his own actions have been responsible for his injuries. The use of the compound conjunction “except so far as”—rather than some other conjunction setting up a wholly disqualifying condition—clearly seems to indicate an intention on the part of the Legislature to adopt a system other than one wherein contributory fault on the part of the plaintiff would operate to *817 bar recovery.9 Thus it could be argued—as indeed it has been argued with great vigor by plaintiff and the amici curiae who support her position—that no change in the law is necessary in this case at all. Rather, it is asserted, all that is here required is a recognition by this court that section 1714 announced a rule of comparative negligence in this state in 1872 and a determination to brush aside all of the misguided decisions which have concluded otherwise up to the present day. (See also Bodwell, It’s Been Comparative Negligence For Seventy-Nine Years (1952) 27 L.A. Bar Bull. 247.)

Our consideration of this arresting contention—and indeed of the whole question of the true meaning and intent of section 1714—cannot proceed without reference to the Code Commissioners’ Note which appeared immediately following section 1714 in the 1872 code.10 That note provided in full as follows: “Code La., § 2295; Code Napoleon, § 1383; Austin vs. Hudson River R.R. Co., 25 N.Y., p. 334; Jones vs. Bird, 5 B. & Ald., p. 837; Dodd vs. Holmes, 1 Ad. & El., p. 493. This section modifies the law heretofore existing.—See 20 N.Y., p. 67; 10 M. & W., p. 546; 5 C. B. (N. S.), p. 573. This class of obligations imposed by law seems to be laid down in the case of Baxter vs. Roberts, July Term, 1872, Sup. Ct. Cal. Roberts employed Baxter to perform a service which he (Roberts) knew to be perilous, without giving Baxter any notice of its perilous character; Baxter was injured. Held: that Roberts was responsible in damages for the injury which Baxter sustained. (See facts of case.)” (1 Annot. Civ. Code (Haymond & Burch 1874 ed.) p. 519; italics added.)

Each of the parties and amici in this case has applied himself to the task of legal cryptography which the interpretation of this note involves. The variety of answers which has resulted is not surprising. We first address ourselves to the interpretation advanced by plaintiff and the amici curiae in support of her contention set forth above, that section 1714 in fact announced a rule of comparative rather than contributory negligence.

*818The portion of the note which is relevant to our inquiry extends from its beginning up to the series of three cases cited following the italicized sentence: “This section modifies the law heretofore existing. ” Plaintiff and her allies point out that the first authorities cited are two statutes from civil law jurisdictions, Louisiana and France; then comes the italicized sentence; finally there are cited three cases which state the common law of contributory negligence modified by the doctrine of last clear chance. The proper interpretation, they urge, is this: Civil law jurisdictions, they assert, uniformly apportion damages according to fault. The citation to statutes of such jurisdictions, followed by a sentence indicating that a change is intended, followed in turn by the citation of cases expressing the common law doctrine—these taken together, it is urged, support the clear language of section 1714 by indicating the rejection of the common law “all-or-nothing” rule and the adoption in its place of civil law principles of apportionment.

This argument fails to withstand close scrutiny. The civil law statutes cited in the note, like the common law cases cited immediately following them, deal not with “defenses” to negligence but with the basic concept of negligence itself.11 In fact the Code Commissioners’ Note to the parallel section of the Field draft cites the very same statutes and the very same cases in direct support of its statement of the basic rule.12 Moreover, in 1872, when section 1714 was enacted and the Code Commissioners’ Note, was written, neither France nor Louisiana applied concepts of comparative negligence. The notion of “faute commune” did not become firmly rooted in French law until 1879 and was not codified until 1915. (See Turk, Comparative Negligence on the March (1950) 28 Chi.-Kent L.Rev. 189, 239-240.) Louisiana, in spite of an 1825 statute *819which appeared to establish comparative negligence,13 firmly adhered to the “all-or-nothing” common law rule in 1872 and has done so ever since. (See Schwartz, supra, § 1.3, p. 10, fn. 76; Turk, supra, at pp. 318-326.) In fact, in 1872 there was no American jurisdiction applying concepts of true comparative negligence for general purposes,14 and the only European jurisdictions doing so were Austria and Portugal. (Turk, supra, at p. 241.) Among those jurisdictions applying such concepts in the limited area in which they have traditionally been applied, to wit, admiralty, was California itself: in section 973 of the very Civil Code which we are now considering (now Harb. & Nav. Code, § 292) apportionment was provided for when the negligence of the plaintiff was slight. Yet the Code Commissioners’ Note did not advert to this section.

In view of all of the foregoing we think that it would indeed be surprising if the 1872 Legislature, intending to accomplish the marked departure from common law which the adoption of comparative negligence would represent, should have chosen to do so in language which differed only slightly from that used in the Field draft to describe the common law rule. (See fn. 12, ante; see also Buckley v. Chadwick, supra, 45 Cal.2d 183, 192-193.) It would be even more surprising if the Code Commissioners, in stating the substance of the intended change, should fail to mention the law of any jurisdiction, American or foreign, which then espoused the new doctrine in any form, and should choose to cite in their note the very statutes and decisions which the New York Code Commissioners had cited in support of their statement of the common law rule. (See fn. 12, ante, and accompanying text.) It is in our view manifest that neither the Legislature nor the Code Commissioners harbored any such intention—and that the use of the words “except so far as” in section 1714 manifests an intention other than that of declaring comparative negligence the law of California in 1872.15

*820That intention, we have concluded, was simply to insure that the rule of contributory negligence, as applied in this state, would not be the harsh rule then applied in New York but would be mitigated by the doctrine of last clear chance. The New York rule, which did not incorporate the latter doctrine, had been given judicial expression several years before in the case of Johnson v. The Hudson River Railroad Company (1859) 20 N.Y. 65. It is apparent from the Code Commissioners’ Note that this rule was considered too harsh for adoption in California, and that the Legislature therefore determined to adopt a provision which would not have the effect of barring a negligent plaintiff from recovery without regard to the quantity or quality of his negligence.16

Turning to the text of the note, we observe that, as indicated above (fn. 11, ante, and accompanying text), the first group of citations, both statutory and decisional, deal with defining the basic concept of negligence and announcing a rule of recovery therefor. Then appears the sentence “This section modifies the law heretofore existing,” followed immediately by the citation of three cases. The first of these, as we have indicated, is Johnson v. The Hudson River Railroad Company, supra, 20 N.Y. 65; that case represented the strict New York rule of contributoiy negligence, derived directly from the 1809 Butterfield case, under which any negligence on the part of the plaintiff barred recovery; and it had been specifically cited for that proposition in the Field draft section 853. (See fn. 12, ante.) The second and third cases cited by the California commissioners were Davies v. Mann (1842) 10 M.&W. 546, and Tuff v. Warman (1858) 5 C.B. (N.S.) 573; these cases stated the emerging doctrine of last clear chance, which the English courts had begun to apply in order to ameliorate the harsh Butterfield rule. Interestingly, the last cited of these cases contains language which might well have been the source of the term “except so far as” which the California Legislature used to indicate its parting of the ways with the New York rule: “It appears to us that the proper question for the jury in this case, and indeed in all others of the like kind, is, whether the damage was occasioned entirely by the negligence or improper conduct of the defendant, or whether the plaintiff himself so far contributed to the *821misfortune by his own negligence or want of ordinary and common care and caution, that, but for such negligence or want of ordinary care and caution on his part, the misfortune would not have happened.” (Tuff v. Warman, supra, 5 C.B. (N.S.) 573, 585; italics added.)17

We think that the foregoing establishes conclusively that the intention of the Legislature in enacting section 1714 of the Civil Code was to state the basic rule of negligence together with the defense of contributory negligence modified, by the emerging doctrine of last clear chance. It remains to determine whether by so doing the Legislature intended to restrict the courts from further development of these concepts according to evolving standards of duty, causation, and liability.

This question must be answered in the negative. As we have explained above, the peculiar nature of the 1872 Civil Code as an avowed continuation of the common law has rendered it particularly flexible and adaptable in its response to changing circumstances and conditions. To reiterate the words of Professor Van Alstyne, “[the code’s] incompleteness, both in scope and detail[,] have provided ample room for judicial *822development of important new systems of rules, frequently built upon Code foundations.” (Van Alstyne, supra, at p. 36.) Section 1714 in particular has shown great adaptability in this respect. For example, the statute by its express language speaks of causation only in terms of actual cause or cause in fact (“Everyone is responsible ... for an injury occasioned to another by his want of ordinary care.”), but this has not prevented active judicial development of the twin concepts of proximate causation and duty of care. (See, e.g., Vesely v. Sager (1971) 5 Cal.3d 153, 158-167 [95 Cal.Rptr. 623, 486 P.2d 151]; Connor v. Great Western Sav. & Loan Assn. (1968) 69 Cal.2d 850, 865-868 [73 Cal.Rptr. 369, 447 P.2d 609, 39 A.L.R.3d 224]; Dillon v. Legg (1968) 68 Cal.2d 728, 739-748 [69 Cal.Rptr. 72, 441 P.2d 912, 29 A.L.R.3d 1316]; Stewart v. Cox (1961) 55 Cal.2d 857, 861-863 [13 Cal.Rptr. 521, 362 P.2d 345]; Biakanja v. Irving (1958) 49 Cal.2d 647 [320 P.2d 16, 65 A.L.R.2d 1358]; Richards v. Stanley (1954) 43 Cal.2d 60, 63-66 [271 P.2d 23].) Conversely, the presence of this statutory language has not hindered the development of rules which, in certain limited circumstances, permit a finding of liability in the absence of direct evidence establishing the defendant’s negligence as the actual cause of damage. (See Summers v. Tice (1948) 33 Cal.2d 80 [199 P.2d 1, 5 A.L.R.2d 91]; Ybarra v. Spangard (1944) 25 Cal.2d 486 [154 P.2d 687, 162 A.L.R. 1258].) By the same token we do not believe that the general language of section 1714 dealing with defensive considerations should be construed so as to stifle the orderly evolution of such considerations in light of emerging techniques and concepts. On the contrary we conclude that the rule of liberal construction made applicable to the code by its own terms (Civ. Code, § 4, discussed ante) together with the code’s peculiar character as a continuation of the common law (see Civ. Code, § 5, also discussed ante) permit if not require that section 1714 be interpreted so as to give dynamic expression to the fundamental precepts which it summarizes.

The aforementioned precepts are basically two. The first is that one whose negligence has caused damage to another should be liable therefor. The second is that one whose negligence has contributed to his own injury should not be permitted to cast the burden of liability upon another. The problem facing the Legislature in 1872 was how to accommodate these twin precepts in a manner consonant with the then progress of the common law and yet allow for the incorporation of future developments. The manner chosen sought to insure that the harsh accommodation wrought by the New York rule—i.e., barring recovery to one guilty of any negligence—would not take root in this state. Rather the Legislature wished to encourage a more humane rule—one holding out the hope of recovery to the negligent plaintiff in some circumstances.

*823The resources of the common law at that time (in 1872) did not include techniques for the apportionment of damages strictly according to fault—a fact which this court had lamented three years earlier (see fn. 17, ante). They did, however, include the nascent doctrine of last clear chance which, while it too was burdened by an “all-or-nothing” approach, at least to some extent avoided the often unconscionable results which could and did occur under the old rule precluding recovery when any negligence on the part of the plaintiff contributed in any degree to the harm suffered by him. Accordingly the Legislature sought to include the concept of last clear chance in its formulation of a rule of responsibility. We are convinced, however, as we have indicated, that in so doing the Legislature in no way intended to thwart future judicial progress toward the humane goal which it had embraced. Therefore, and for all of the foregoing reasons, we hold that section 1714 of the Civil Code was not intended to and does not preclude present judicial action in furtherance of the purposes underlying it.

Ill

We are thus brought to the second group of arguments which have been advanced by defendants and the amici curiae supporting their position. Generally speaking, such arguments expose considerations of a practical nature which, it is urged, counsel against the adoption of a rule of comparative negligence in this state even if such adoption is possible by judicial means.

The most serious of these considerations are those attendant upon the administration of a rule of comparative negligence in cases involving multiple parties. One such problem may arise when all responsible parties are not brought before the court: it may be difficult for the jury to evaluate relative negligence in such circumstances, and to compound this difficulty such an evaluation would not be res judicata in a subsequent suit against the absent wrongdoer. Problems of contribution and indemnity among joint tortfeasors lurk in the background. (See generally Prosser, Comparative Negligence, supra, 41 Cal.L.Rev. 1, 33-37; Schwartz, Comparative Negligence, supra, §§ 16.1-16.9, pp. 247-274.)

A second and related major area of concern involves the administration of the actual process of fact-finding in a comparative negligence system. The assigning of a specific percentage factor to the amount of negligence attributable to a particular party, while in theory a matter of little difficulty, can become a matter of perplexity in the face of hard facts.

*824The temptation for the jury to resort to a quotient verdict in such circumstances can be great. (See Schwartz, supra, § 17.1, pp. 275-279.) These inherent difficulties are not, however, insurmountable. Guidelines might be provided the juiy which will assist it in keeping focussed upon the true inquiry (see, e.g., Schwartz, supra, § 17.1, pp. 278-279), and the utilization of special verdicts18 or jury interrogatories can be of invaluable assistance in assuring that the jury has approached its sensitive and often complex task with proper standards and appropriate reverence. (See Schwartz, supra, § 17.4, pp. 282-291; Prosser, Comparative Negligence, supra, 41 Cal.L.Rev., pp. 28-33.)

The third area of concern, the status of the doctrines of last clear chance and assumption of risk, involves less the practical problems of administering a particular form of comparative negligence than it does a definition of the theoretical outline of the specific form to be adopted. Although several states which apply comparative negligence concepts retain the last clear chance doctrine (see Schwartz, supra, § 7.2, p. 134), the better reasoned position seems to be that when true comparative negligence is adopted, the need for last clear chance as a palliative of the hardships of the “all-or-nothing” rule disappears and its retention results only in a windfall to the plaintiff in direct contravention of the principle of liability in proportion to fault. (See Schwartz, supra, § 7.2, pp. 137-139; Prosser, Comparative Negligence, supra, 41 Cal.L.Rev., p. 27.) As for assumption of risk, we have recognized in this state that this defense overlaps that of contributory negligence to some extent and in fact is made up of at least two distinct defenses. “To simplify greatly, it has been observed . . . that in one kind of situation, to wit, where a plaintiff unreasonably undertakes to encounter a specific known risk imposed by a defendant’s negligence, plaintiff’s conduct, although he may encounter that risk in a prudent manner, is in reality a form of contributory negligence .... Other kinds of situations within the doctrine of assumption of risk are those, for example, where plaintiff is held to agree to relieve defendant of an obligation of reasonable conduct toward him. *825Such a situation would not involve contributory negligence, but rather a reduction of defendant’s duty of care.” (Grey v. Fibreboard Paper Products Co. (1966) 65 Cal.2d 240, 245-246 [53 Cal.Rptr. 545, 418 P.2d 153]; see also Fonseca v. County of Orange (1972) 28 Cal.App.3d 361, 368-369 [104 Cal.Rptr. 566]; see generally, 4 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law, Torts, § 723, pp. 3013-3014; 2 Harper & James, The Law of Torts, supra, § 21.1, pp. 1162-1168; cf. Prosser, Torts, supra, § 68, pp. 439-441.) We think it clear that the adoption of a system of comparative negligence should entail the merger of the defense of assumption of risk into the general scheme of assessment of liability in proportion to fault in those particular cases in which the form of assumption of risk involved is no more than a variant of contributory negligence. (See generally, Schwartz, supra, ch. 9, pp. 153-175.)

Finally there is the problem of the treatment of willful misconduct under a system of comparative negligence. In jurisdictions following the “all-or-nothing” rule, contributory negligence is no defense to an action based upon a claim of willful misconduct (see Rest. 2d Torts, § 503; Prosser, Torts, supra, § 65, p. 426), and this is the present rule in California. (Williams v. Carr (1968) 68 Cal.2d 579, 583 [68 Cal.Rptr. 305, 440 P.2d 505].)19 As Dean Prosser has observed, “[this] is in reality a rule of comparative fault which is being applied, and the court is refusing to set up the lesser fault against the greater.” (Prosser, Torts, supra, § 65, p. 426.) The thought is that the difference between willful and wanton misconduct and ordinary negligence is one of kind rather than degree in that the former involves conduct of an entirely different order,20 and under this conception it might well be urged that comparative negligence concepts should have no application when one of the parties has been guilty of willful and wanton misconduct. It has been persuasively argued, however, that the loss of deterrent effect that would occur upon *826application of comparative fault concepts to willful and wanton misconduct as well as ordinary negligence would be slight, and that a comprehensive system of comparative negligence should allow for the apportionment of damages in all cases involving misconduct which falls short of being intentional. (Schwartz, supra, § 5.3, p. 108.) The law of punitive damages remains a separate consideration. (See Schwartz, supra, § 5.4, pp. 109-111.)

The existence of the foregoing areas of difficulty and uncertainty (as well as others which we have not here mentioned—see generally Schwartz, supra, § 21.1, pp. 335-339) has not diminished our conviction that the time for a revision of the means for dealing with contributory fault in this state is long past due and that it lies within the province of this court to initiate the needed change by our decision in this case. Two of the indicated areas (i.e., multiple parties and willful misconduct) are not involved in the case before us, and we consider it neither necessary nor wise to address ourselves to specific problems of this nature which might be expected to arise. As the Florida court stated with respect to the same subject, “it is not the proper function of this Court to decide unripe issues, without the benefit of adequate briefing, not involving an actual controversy, and unrelated to a specific factual situation.” (Hoffman v. Jones, supra, 280 So.2d 431, 439.)

Our previous comments relating to the remaining two areas of concern (i.e., the status of the doctrines of last clear chance and assumption of risk, and the matter of judicial supervision of the finder of fact) have provided sufficient guidance to enable the trial courts of this state to meet and resolve particular problems in this area as they arise. As we have indicated, last clear chance and assumption of risk (insofar as the latter doctrine is but a variant of contributory negligence) are to be subsumed under the general process of assessing liability in proportion to fault, and the matter of jury supervision we leave for the moment within the broad discretion of the trial courts.

Our decision in this case is to be viewed as a first step in what we deem to be a proper and just direction, not as a compendium containing the answers to all questions that may be expected to arise. Pending future judicial or legislative developments, we are content for the present to assume the position taken by the Florida court in this matter: “We feel the trial judges of this State are capable of applying [a] comparative negligence rule without our setting guidelines in anticipation of expected problems. The problems are more appropriately resolved at the trial *827level in a practical manner instead of a theoretical solution at the appellate level. The trial judges are granted broad discretion in adopting such procedures as may accomplish the objectives and purposes expressed in this opinion.” (280 So.2d at pp. 439-440.)

It remains to identify the precise form of comparative negligence which we now adopt for application in this state. Although there are many variants, only the two basic forms need be considered here. The first of these, the so-called “pure” form of comparative negligence, apportions liability in direct proportion to fault in all cases. This was the form adopted by the Supreme Court of Florida in Hoffman v. Jones, supra, and it applies by statute in Mississippi, Rhode Island, and Washington. Moreover it is the form favored by most scholars and commentators. (See, e.g., Prosser, Comparative Negligence, supra, 41 Cal.L.Rev. 1, 21-25; Prosser, Torts, supra, § 67, pp. 437-438; Schwartz, supra, § 21.3, pp. 341-348; Comments on Maki v. Frelk—Comparative v. Contributory Negligence: Should the Court or legislature Decide?, supra, 21 Vand.L.Rev. 889 (Comment by Keeton at p. 906, Comment by Leflar at p. 918).) The second basic form of comparative negligence, of which there are several variants, applies apportionment based on fault up to the point at which the plaintiffs negligence is equal to or greater than that of the defendant—when that point is reached, plaintiff is barred from recovery. Nineteen states have adopted this form or one of its variants by statute. The principal argument advanced in its favor is moral in nature: that it is not morally right to permit one more at fault in an accident to recover from one less at fault. Other arguments assert the probability of increased insurance, administrative, and judicial costs if a “pure” rather than a “50 percent” system is adopted, but this has been seriously questioned. (See authorities cited in Schwartz, supra, § 21.3, pp. 344-346; see also Vincent v. Pabst Brewing Co. (1970) 47 Wis.2d 120, 138 [177 N.W.2d 513] (dissenting opn.).)

We have concluded that the “pure” form of comparative negligence is that which'should be adopted in this state. In our view the “50 percent” system simply shifts the lottery aspect of the contributory negligence rule21 to a different ground. As Dean Prosser has noted, under such a *828system “[i]t is obvious that a slight difference in the proportionate fault may permit a recovery; and there has been much justified criticism of a rule under which a plaintiff who is charged with 49 percent of the total negligence recovers 51 percent of his damages, while one who is charged with 50 percent recovers nothing at all.”22 (Prosser, Comparative Negligence, supra, 41 Cal.L.Rev. 1, 25; fns. omitted.) In effect “such a rule distorts the very principle it recognizes, i.e., that persons are responsible for their acts to the extent their fault contributes to an injurious result. The partial rule simply lowers, but does not eliminate, the bar df contributory negligence.” (Juenger, Brief for Negligence Law Section of the State Bar of Michigan in Support of Comparative Negligence as Amicus Curiae, Parsonson v. Construction Equipment Company, supra, 18 Wayne L.Rev. 3, 50; see also Schwartz, supra, § 21.3, p. 347.)

We also consider significant the experience of the State of Wisconsin, which until recently was considered the leading exponent of the “50 percent” system. There that system led to numerous appeals on the narrow but crucial issue whether plaintiff’s negligence was equal to defendant’s. (See Prosser, Comparative Negligence, supra, 41 Cal.L.Rev. 1, 23-25.) Numerous reversals have resulted on this point, leading to the development of arcane classifications of negligence according to quality and category. (See cases cited in Vincent v. Pabst Brewing Co., supra, 47 Wis.2d 120, at p. 137 (dissenting opn.).) This finally led to a frontal attack on the system in the Vincent case, cited above, wherein the state supreme court was urged to replace the statutory “50 percent” rule by a judicially declared “pure” comparative negligence rule. The majority of the court rejected this invitation, concluding that the Legislature had occupied the field, but three concurring justices and one dissenter indicated their willingness to accept it if the Legislature failed to act with reasonable dispatch. The dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Hallows, which has been cited above, stands as a persuasive testimonial in favor of the “pure” system. We wholeheartedly embrace its reasoning. (See also, Hoffman v. Jones, supra, 280 So.2d 431, 438-439.)

For all of the foregoing reasons we conclude that the “all- or-nothing” rule of contributory negligence as it presently exists in this *829state should be and is herewith superseded by a system of “pure” comparative negligence, the fundamental purpose of which shall be to assign responsibility and liability for damage in direct proportion to the amount of negligence of each of the parties. Therefore, in all actions for negligence resulting in injury to person or property, the contributory negligence of the person injured in person or property shall not bar recovery, but the damages awarded shall be diminished in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to the person recovering. The doctrine of last clear chance is abolished, and the defense of assumption of risk is also abolished to the extent that it is merely a variant of the former doctrine of contributory negligence; both of these are to be subsumed under the general process of assessing liability in proportion to negligence. Pending future judicial or legislative developments, the trial courts of this state are to use broad discretion in seeking to assure that the principle stated is applied in the interest of justice and in furtherance of the purposes and objectives set forth in this opinion.

It remains for us to determine the extent to which the rule here announced shall have application to cases other than those which are commenced in the future. It is the rule in this state that determinations of this nature turn upon considerations of fairness and public policy. (Westbrook v. Mihaly (1970) 2 Cal.3d 765, 800 [87 Cal.Rptr. 839, 471 P.2d 487];. Connor v. Great Western Sav. & Loan Assn. (1968) 69 Cal.2d 850, 868 [73 Cal.Rptr. 369, 447 P.2d 609, 39 A.L.R.3d 224]; Forster Shipbldg. Co. v. County of L. A. (1960) 54 Cal.2d 450, 459 [6 Cal.Rptr. 24, 353 P.2d 736]; County of Los Angeles v. Faus (1957) 48 Cal.2d 672, 680-681 [312 P.2d 680].) Upon mature reflection, in view of the very substantial number of cases involving the matter here at issue which are now pending in the trial and appellate courts of this state, and with particular attention to considerations of reliance applicable to individual cases according to the stage of litigation which they have reached, we have concluded that a rule of limited retroactivity should obtain here. Accordingly we hold that the present opinion shall be applicable to all cases in which trial has not begun before the date this decision becomes final in this court, but that it shall not be applicable to any case in which trial began before that date (other than the instant case)—except that if any judgment be reversed on appeal for other reasons, this opinion shall be applicable to any retrial.

As suggested above, we have concluded that this is a case in which the litigant before the court should be given the benefit of the new rule *830announced. Here, unlike in Westbrook v. Mihaly, supra, 2 Cal.3d 765, considerations of fairness and public policy do not dictate that a purely prospective operation be given to our decision.23 To the contrary, sound principles of decision-making compel us to conclude that, in the light of the particular circumstances of the instant case,24 the new rule here announced should be applied additionally to the case at bench so as to provide incentive in future cases for parties who may have occasion to raise “issues involving renovation of unsound or outmoded legal doctrines.” (See Mishkin, Foreword, The Supreme Court 1964 Term (1965) 79 Harv.L.Rev. 56, 60-62.) We fully appreciate that there may be other litigants now in various stages of trial or appellate process who have also raised the issue here before us but who will nevertheless be foreclosed from benefitting from the new standard by the rule of limited retroactivity we have announced in the preceding paragraph. This consideration, however, does not lead us to alter that rule. “Inequity arguably results from according the benefit of a new rule to the parties in the case in which it is announced but not to other litigants similarly situated in the trial or appellate process who have raised the same issue. But we regard the fact that the parties involved are chance beneficiaries as an insignificant cost for adherence to sound principles of decision-making.” (Stovall v. Denno (1967) 388 U.S. 293, 301 [18 L.Ed.2d 1199, 1206, 87 S.Ct. 1967]; fn. omitted.)

In view of the foregoing disposition of this case we have not found it necessary to discuss plaintiff’s additional contention that the rule of contributory negligence is in violation of state and federal constitutional provisions guaranteeing equal protection of the laws.

The judgment is reversed.

Wright, C. J., Tobriner, J., and Burke, J.,* concurred.

MOSK,

I concur in the judgment and agree with the substance of the majority opinion, I dissent from its cavalier treatment of the recurring problem of the manner of applying a new court-made rule.

*831In footnote 24 the opinion denies that the court now “is intending to overrule” the case of Westbrook v. Mihaly (1970) 2 Cal.3d 765 [87 Cal.Rptr. 839, 471 P.2d 487], Whether or not the majority subjectively intend to overrule Westbrook, the result and the text of the opinion indicate beyond any doubt that they have actually done so. Precedent is established not merely by what a court says; it is created primarily by what a court does. (Norris v. Moody (1890) 84 Cal. 143, 149 [24 P. 37]; Childers v. Childers (1946) 74 Cal.App.2d 56, 61 [168 P.2d 218].)

Unfortunately the forthrightness of the majority opinion as a whole is sadly diminished by a curious reluctance to face up to reality by recognizing that this court is finally overruling Westbrook and several other cases on the subject of applying a new court-made rule to the parties at hand.

As recently as People v. Hitch (1974) 12 Cal.3d 641, 654 [117 Cal.Rptr. 9, 527 P.2d 361], the majority of this court, while upholding the appellant’s contentions, denied him relief on a theory that prospectivity should prevail over retroactive application of a new rule; I pointed out in my dissent {id. at p. 655) that “there is a third, and preferable, alternative: applying the new rule to the aggrieved party responsible for bringing the issue to judicial attention, and thereafter prospectively.”

Up to now the majority never deigned to consider the third alternative, but persisted in their erroneous notion that the only choice was between total retroactivity and absolute prospectivity. This occurred in two other cases last year: see my concurring opinion in In re Stewart (1974) 10 Cal.3d 902, 907 [112 Cal.Rptr. 520, 519 P.2d 568], and my dissenting opinion in In re Yurko (1974) 10 Cal.3d 857, 867 [112 Cal.Rptr. 513, 519 P.2d 561],

In retrospect it is clear that Westbrook v. Mihaly, supra, was the point of departure in which the majority first strayed from the accepted doctrine that a prevailing party is to be awarded the fruits of his victory. In my concurring and dissenting opinion in that case (2 Cal.3d at p. 802) and in Hitch (12 Cal.3d at p. 656) I quoted from Stovall v. Denno (1967) 388 U.S. 293 [18 L.Ed.2d 1199, 87 S.Ct. 1967], to the effect that the benefits of a new rule should apply to the parties to the proceeding which results in the new rule. In the instant case, the majority now quote that same portion of Stovall, this time with approval (ante, p. 830).

Also, in Westbrook v. Mihaly (2 Cal.3d at p. 804) I noted that if a new rule is to apply prospectively only, “it will tend to deter counsel from *832presenting ‘issues involving renovation of unsound or outmoded legal doctrines,’ ” citing Mishkin’s foreword to the article on the 1964 term of the Supreme Court in 79 Harvard Law Review 56. The majority now adopt the same point based upon the same quotation (ante, p. 830).

The majority paint their conclusion herein with such broad-brush and standardless terms as “considerations of fairness and public policy” and “sound principles of decision-making,” without giving any clue why application of a new rule is fair to Nga Li, but somehow was unfair as applied over the past several years to Westbrook and to the several other litigants who helped us develop new rules of law only to be deprived of the benefits thereof. The most inexplicable previous result was Larez v. Shannon (1970) 2 Cal.3d 813 [87 Cal.Rptr. 871, 471 P.2d 519], in which, it will be remembered, the plaintiffs prevailed completely on principle, but the majority went so far as to reverse a judgment in their favor.

Nevertheless if is comforting that the majority of the court have finally settled on the third of the three available alternatives in applying a new court-made rule. Despite the majority’s gratuitous disclaimer, the bench and bar will understand that this court is now overruling, insofar as they are inconsistent, the following opinions: Westbrook v. Mihaly, supra, 2 Cal.3d 765; Alhambra City Sch. Dist. v. Mize (1970) 2 Cal.3d 806 [87 Cal.Rptr. 867, 471 P.2d 515]; Larez v. Shannon, supra, 2 Cal.3d 813, Foytik v. Aronson (1970) 2 Cal.3d 818 [87 Cal.Rptr. 873, 471 P.2d 521]; In re Yurko, supra, 10 Cal.3d 857; People v. Hitch, supra, 12 Cal.3d 641.

CLARK, J.

I dissent.

For over á century this court has consistently and unanimously held that Civil Code section 1714 codifies the defense of contributory negligence. Suddenly—after 103 years—the court declares section 1714 shall provide for comparative negligence instead. In my view, this action constitutes a gross departure from established judicial rules and role.

First, the majority’s decision deviates from settled rules of statutory construction. A cardinal rule of construction is to effect the intent of the Legislature.1 The majority concedes “the intention of the Legislature in *833enacting section 1714 of the Civil Code was to state the basic rule of negligence together with the defense of contributory negligence modified by the emerging doctrine of last clear chance.” (Ante, p. 821.) Yet the majority refuses to honor this acknowledged intention—violating established principle.

The majority decision also departs significantly from the recognized limitation upon judicial action—encroaching on the powers constitutionally entrusted to the Legislature. The power to enact and amend our statutes is vested exclusively in the Legislature. (Cal. Const., art. III, § 3; art. IV, § 1.) “This court may not usurp the legislative function to change the statutory law which has been uniformly construed by a long line of judicial decisions.” (Estate of Calhoun (1955) 44 Cal.2d 378, 387 [282 P.2d 880].) The majority’s altering the meaning of section 1714, notwithstanding the original intent of the framers and the century-old judicial interpretation of the statute, represents no less than amendment by judicial fiat. Although the Legislature intended the courts to develop the working details of the defense of contributory negligence enacted in section 1714 (see generally, Commentary, Arvo Van Alstyne, The California Civil Code, 6 West Civ. Code (1954) pp. 1-43), no basis exists—either in history or in logic—to conclude the Legislature intended to authorize judicial repudiation of the basic defense itself at any point we might decide the doctrine no longer serves us.

I dispute the need for judicial—instead of legislative—action in this area. The majority is clearly correct in its observation that our society has changed significantly during the 103-year existence of section 1714. But this social change has been neither recent nor traumatic, and the criticisms leveled by the majority at the present operation of contributory negligence are not new. I cannot conclude our society’s evolution has now rendered the normal legislative process inadequate.

Further, the Legislature is the branch best able to effect transition from contributory to comparative or some other doctrine of negligence. Numerous and differing negligence systems have been urged over the years, yet there remains widespread disagreement among both the commentators and the states as to which one is best. (See Schwartz, Comparative Negligence (1974) Appendix A, pp. 367-369 and § 21.3, fn. 40, pp. 341-342, and authorities cited therein.) This court is not an investigatory body, and we lack the means of fairly appraising the merits of these competing systems. Constrained by settled rules of judicial review, we must consider only matters within the record or susceptible to *834judicial notice. That this court is inadequate to the task of carefully selecting the best replacement system is reflected in the majority’s summary manner of eliminating from consideration all but two of the many competing proposals—including models adopted by some of our sister states.2

Contrary to the majority’s assertions of judicial adequacy, the courts of other states—with near unanimity—have conceded their inability to determine the best system for replacing contributory negligence, concluding instead that the legislative branch is best able to resolve the issue.3

By abolishing this century old doctrine today, the majority seriously erodes our constitutional function. We are again guilty of judicial chauvinism.

McComb, J., concurred.

On April 24, 1975, the opinion was modified to read as printed above.

2.8 McIntyre v. Balentine 2.8 McIntyre v. Balentine

Harry Douglas McINTYRE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Clifford BALENTINE and East-West Motor Freight, Inc., Defendants-Appellees.

Supreme Court of Tennessee, at Jackson.

May 4, 1992.

Rehearing Denied June 1, 1992.

*53 T. Robert Hill, Hill, Boren, Drew & Mar-tindale, P.C., Jackson, John W. Wade, Waller, Lansden, Dortch & Davis, Nashville, Professor Jerry J. Phillips, University of Tennessee, College of Law, J. Anthony Farmer, Ray, Farmer & Eldridge, Knoxville, for plaintiff-appellant.

Robert V. Redding, Waldrop, Breen, Bryant, Crews, Taylor & McLeary, P.A., Jackson, for defendant-appellee Clifford Balentine.

J. Daniel Breen, Waldrop, Breen, Bryant, Crews, Taylor & McLeary, P.A., Jackson, for defendant-appellee East-West Motor Freight, Inc.

Terry L. Hill, James M. Doran, Jr., Donald Capparella, Manier, Herod, Hollabaugh & Smith, Nashville, for amicus curiae Tennessee Defense Lawyers’ Association.

OPINION

DROWOTA, Justice.

In this personal injury action, we granted Plaintiff’s application for permission to appeal in order to decide whether to adopt a system of comparative fault in Tennessee. We are also asked to determine whether the criminal presumption of intoxication is admissible evidence in a civil case. We now replace the common law defense of contributory negligence with a system of comparative fault. Additionally, we hold that the criminal presumption of intoxication established by T.C.A. § 55-10-408(b) (1988) is admissible evidence in a civil case.

In the early morning darkness of November 2, 1986, Plaintiff Harry Douglas McIntyre and Defendant Clifford Balentine were involved in a motor vehicle accident resulting in severe injuries to Plaintiff. The accident occurred in the vicinity of Smith’s Truck Stop in Savannah, Tennessee. As Defendant Balentine was traveling south on Highway 69, Plaintiff entered the highway (also traveling south) from the truck stop parking lot. Shortly after Plaintiff entered the highway, his pickup truck was struck by Defendant’s Peterbilt tractor. At trial, the parties disputed the exact chronology of events immediately preceding the accident.

Both men had consumed alcohol the evening of the accident. After the accident, Plaintiff’s blood alcohol level was measured at .17 percent by weight. Testimony suggested that Defendant was traveling in excess of the posted speed limit.

Plaintiff brought a negligence action against Defendant Balentine and Defendant East-West Motor Freight, Inc. 1 Defendants answered that Plaintiff was con-tributorially negligent, in part due to operating his vehicle while intoxicated. After trial, the jury returned a verdict stating: “We, the jury, find the plaintiff and the defendant equally at fault in this accident; therefore, we rule in favor of the defendant.”

After judgment was entered for Defendants, Plaintiff brought an appeal alleging the trial court erred by (1) refusing to instruct the jury regarding the doctrine of comparative negligence, and (2) instructing the jury that a blood alcohol level greater than .10 percent creates an inference of *54 intoxication. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that (1) comparative negligence is not the law in Tennessee, and (2) the presumption of intoxication provided by T.C.A. § 55-10-408(b) (1988) is admissible evidence in a civil case.

I.

The common law contributory negligence doctrine has traditionally been traced to Lord Ellenborough’s opinion in Butterfield v. Forrester, 11 East 60, 103 Eng.Rep. 926 (1809). There, plaintiff, “riding as fast as his horse would go,” was injured after running into an obstruction defendant had placed in the road. Stating as the rule that “[o]ne person being in fault will not dispense with another’s using ordinary care,” plaintiff was denied recovery on the basis that he did not use ordinary care to avoid the obstruction. See 11 East at 61, 103 Eng.Rep. at 927.

The contributory negligence bar was soon brought to America as part of the common law, see Smith v. Smith, 19 Mass. 621, 624 (1824), and proceeded to spread throughout the states. See H.W. Woods, The Negligence Case: Comparative Fault § 1:4 (1978). This strict bar may have been a direct outgrowth of the common law system of issue pleading; issue pleading posed questions to be answered “yes” or “no,” leaving common law courts, the theory goes, no choice but to award all or nothing. See J.W. Wade, W.K. Crawford, Jr., and J.L. Ryder, Comparative Fault In Tennessee Tort Actions: Past, Present and Future, 41 Tenn.L.Rev. 423, 424-25 (1974). A number of other rationalizations have been advanced in the attempt to justify the harshness of the “all-or-nothing” bar. Among these: the plaintiff should be penalized for his misconduct; the plaintiff should be deterred from injuring himself; and the plaintiffs negligence supersedes the defendant’s so as to render defendant’s negligence no longer proximate. See W. Keeton, Prosser and Keeton On The Law Of Torts, § 65, at 452 (5th ed. 1984); J.W. Wade, supra, at 424.

In Tennessee, the rule as initially stated was that “if a party, by his own gross negligence, brings an injury upon himself, or contributes to such injury, he cannot recover;” for, in such cases, the party “must be regarded as the author of his own misfortune.” Whirley v. Whiteman, 38 Tenn. 610, 619 (1858). In subsequent decisions, we have continued to follow the general rule that a plaintiff’s contributory negligence completely bars recovery. See, e.g., Hudson v. Gaitan, 675 S.W.2d 699, 704 (Tenn.1984); Talbot v. Taylor, 184 Tenn. 428, 432, 201 S.W.2d 1, 3 (1935); Nashville Ry. v. Norman, 108 Tenn. 324, 333, 67 S.W. 479, 481 (1902); Railroad v. Pugh, 97 Tenn. 624, 627, 37 S.W. 555, 557 (1896); Postal Telegraph-Cable Co. v. Zopfi, 93 Tenn. 369, 373, 24 S.W. 633, 634 (1894); East Tennessee V. & G.R.R. v. Conner, 83 Tenn. 254, 258 (1885); Louisville & N.R.R. v. Robertson, 56 Tenn. 276, 282 (1872); Nashville & C.R.R. v. Carroll, 53 Tenn. 347, 366-67 (1871); Cogdell v. Yett, 41 Tenn. 230, 232 (1860).

Equally entrenched in Tennessee jurisprudence are exceptions to the general all- or-nothing rule: contributory negligence does not absolutely bar recovery where defendant’s conduct was intentional, see, e.g., Stagner v. Craig, 159 Tenn. 511, 514, 19 S.W.2d 234, 234-35 (1929); Memphis St. Ry. v. Roe, 118 Tenn. 601, 612-13, 102 S.W. 343, 346 (1907); where defendant’s conduct was “grossly” negligent, see, e.g., Ellithorpe v. Ford Motor Co., 503 S.W.2d 516, 522 (Tenn.1973); Carroll, 53 Tenn. at 366-67; where defendant had the “last clear chance” with which, through the exercise of ordinary care, to avoid plaintiff’s injury, see, e.g., Roseberry v. Lippner, 574 S.W.2d 726, 728 (Tenn.1978); Kansas City, M. & B.R.R. v. Williford, 115 Tenn. 108, 120-21, 88 S.W. 178, 181-82 (1905); Davies v. Mann, 152 Eng.Rep. 588 (1842); or where plaintiff’s negligence may be classified as “remote.” See, e.g., Arnold v. Hayslett, 655 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Tenn.1983); Street v. Calvert, 541 S.W.2d 576, 585 (Tenn.1976); Norman, 108 Tenn. at 333, 67 S.W. at 481; East Tennessee, V. & G. Ry. v. Hull, 88 Tenn. 33, 36, 12 S.W. 419, 419-20 (1889).

In contrast, comparative fault has long been the federal rule in cases involving *55 injured employees of interstate railroad carriers, see Federal Employers’ Liability Act, ch. 149, § 3, 35 Stat. 66 (1908) (codified at 45 U.S.C. § 53 (1988)), and injured seamen. See Death On The High Seas Act, ch. Ill, § 6, 41 Stat. 537 (1920) (codified at 46 U.S.C. § 766 (1988)); Jones Act, ch. 250, § 33, 41 Stat. 1007 (1920) (codified as amended at 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1988)). See generally V. Schwartz, Comparative Negligence § 1.4(A) (2d ed. 1986).

Similarly, by the early 1900s, many states, including Tennessee, had statutes providing for the apportionment of damages in railroad injury cases. See V. Schwartz, supra, at § 1.4. While Tennessee’s railroad statute did not expressly sanction damage apportionment, it was soon given that judicial construction. In 1856, the statute was passed in an effort to prevent railroad accidents; it imposed certain obligations and liabilities on railroads “for all damages accruing or resulting from a failure to perform said dut[ies].” Act of Feb. 28, 1856, ch. 94, § 9, 1855-56 Tenn. Acts 104. See generally J.W. Wade, supra, at 431-33. Apparently this strict liability was deemed necessary because “the consequences of carelessness and want of due skill [in the operation of railroads at speeds previously unknown] ... are so frightful and appalling that the most strict and rigid rules of accountability must be applied.” See East Tennessee & G.R.R. v. St. John, 37 Tenn. 524, 527 (1858); Note, Railroads — Precautions Act — Effect of 1959 Amendment, 28 Tenn.L.Rev. 437, 439 (1961). The statute was then judicially construed to permit the jury to consider “[njegligence of the person injured, which caused, or contributed to cause the accident ... in determining the amount of damages proper to be given for the injury.” Louisville & N.R.R. v. Burke, 46 Tenn. 45, 51-52 (1868). This system of comparative fault was utilized for almost a century until 1959 when, trains no longer unique in their “astonishing speeds,” the statute was overhauled, its strict liability provision being replaced by negligence per se and the common law contributory negligence bar. See Act of Mar. 10, 1959, ch. 130, § 2, 1959 Tenn.Pub. Acts 419; Note, supra, 28 Tenn. L.Rev. at 439.

Between 1920 and 1969, a few states began utilizing the principles of comparative fault in all tort litigation. See C. Mutter, Moving to Comparative Negligence in an Era of Tort Reform: Decisions for Tennessee, 57 Tenn.L.Rev. 199, 227 n. 127 (1990). Then, between 1969 and 1984, comparative fault replaced contributory negligence in 37 additional states. Id. at 228. In 1991, South Carolina became the 45th state to adopt comparative fault, see Nelson v. Concrete Supply Co., 303 S.C. 243, 399 S.E.2d 783 (1991), leaving Alabama, 2 Maryland, North Carolina, Virginia, and Tennessee as the only remaining common law contributory negligence jurisdictions.

Eleven states have judicially adopted comparative fault. 3 Thirty-four states *56 have legislatively adopted comparative fault. 4

II.

Over 15 years ago, we stated, when asked to adopt a system of comparative fault:

We do not deem it appropriate to consider making such a change unless and until a case reaches us wherein the pleadings and proof present an issue of contributory negligence accompanied by advocacy that the ends of justice will be served by adopting the rule of comparative negligence.

Street v. Calvert, 541 S.W.2d at 586. Such a case is now before us. After exhaustive deliberation that was facilitated by extensive briefing and argument by the parties, amicus curiae, and Tennessee’s scholastic community, we conclude that it is time to abandon the outmoded and unjust common law doctrine of contributory negligence and adopt in its place a system of comparative fault. Justice simply will not permit our continued adherence to a rule that, in the face of a judicial determination that others bear primary responsibility, nevertheless completely denies injured litigants recompense for their damages.

We recognize that this action could be taken by our General Assembly. However, legislative inaction has never prevented judicial abolition of obsolete common law doctrines, especially those, such as contributory negligence, conceived in the judicial womb. See Hanover v. Ruch, 809 S.W.2d 893, 896 (Tenn.1991) (citing cases). Indeed, our abstinence would sanction “a mutual state of inaction in which the court awaits action by the legislature and the legislature awaits guidance from the court,” Alvis v. Ribar, 85 Ill.2d 1, 52 Ill.Dec. 23, 421 N.E.2d 886, 896 (1981), thereby prejudicing the equitable resolution of legal conflicts.

Nor do we today abandon our commitment to stare decisis. While “[confidence in our courts is to a great extent dependent on the uniformity and consistency engendered by allegiance to stare decisis, ... mindless obedience to this precept can confound the truth and foster an attitude of contempt.” Hanover, 809 S.W.2d at 898.

*57 III.

Two basic forms of comparative fault are utilized by 45 of our sister jurisdictions, these variants being commonly referred to as either “pure” or “modified.” In the “pure” form 5 , a plaintiff’s damages are reduced in proportion to the percentage negligence attributed to him; for example, a plaintiff responsible for 90 percent of the negligence that caused his injuries nevertheless may recover 10 percent of his damages. In the “modified” form 6 , plaintiffs recover as in pure jurisdictions, but only if the plaintiffs negligence either (1) does, not exceed (“50 percent” jurisdictions) or (2) is less than (“49 percent” jurisdictions) the defendant’s negligence. See generally V. Schwartz, supra, at §§ 3.2, 3.5.

Although we conclude that the all-or-nothing rule of contributory negligence must be replaced, we nevertheless decline to abandon totally our fault-based tort system. We do not agree that a party should necessarily be able to recover in tort even though he may be 80, 90, or 95 percent at fault. We therefore reject the pure form of comparative fault.

We recognize that modified comparative fault systems have been criticized as merely shifting the arbitrary contributory negligence bar to a new ground. See, e.g., Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal.3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal.Rptr. 858 (1975). However, we feel the “49 percent rule” ameliorates the harshness of the common law rule while remaining compatible with a fault-based tort system. Accord Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co., 163 W.Va. 332, 256 S.E.2d 879, 887 (1979). We therefore hold that so long as a plaintiff's negligence remains less than the defendant’s negligence the plaintiff may recover; in such a case, plaintiff’s damages are to be reduced in proportion to the percentage of the total negligence attributable to the plaintiff.

In all trials where the issue of comparative fault is before a jury, the trial court shall instruct the jury on the effect of the jury’s finding as to the percentage of negligence as between the plaintiff or plaintiffs and the defendant or defendants. Accord Colo.Rev.Stat. § 13-21-111.5(5) (1987). The attorneys for each party shall be allowed to argue how this instruction affects a plaintiff’s ability to recover.

IV.

Turning to the case at bar, the jury found that “the plaintiff and defendant [were] equally at fault.” Because the jury, without the benefit of proper instructions by the trial court, made a gratuitous apportionment of fault, we find that their “equal” apportionment is not sufficiently trustworthy to form the basis of a final determination between these parties. Therefore, the case is remanded for a new trial in accordance with the dictates of this opinion.

V.

We recognize that today’s decision affects numerous legal principles surrounding tort litigation. For the most part, harmonizing these principles with comparative fault must await another day. However, we feel compelled to provide some guidance to the trial courts charged with implementing this new system.

First, and most obviously, the new rule makes the doctrines of remote contributory negligence and last clear chance obsolete. The circumstances formerly taken into account by those two doctrines will henceforth be addressed when assessing relative degrees of fault.

*58 Second, in cases of multiple tort-feasors, plaintiff will be entitled to recover so long as plaintiff's fault is less than the combined fault of all tortfeasors.

Third, today’s holding renders the doctrine of joint and several liability obsolete. Our adoption of comparative fault is due largely to considerations of fairness: the contributory negligence doctrine unjustly allowed the entire loss to be borne by a negligent plaintiff, notwithstanding that the plaintiffs fault was minor in comparison to defendant’s. Having thus adopted a rule more closely linking liability and fault, it would be inconsistent to simultaneously retain a rule, joint and several liability, which may fortuitously impose a degree of liability that is out of all proportion to fault. 7

Further, because a particular defendant will henceforth be liable only for the percentage of a plaintiff’s damages occasioned by that defendant’s negligence, situations where a defendant has paid more than his “share” of a judgment will no longer arise, and therefore the Uniform Contribution Among Tort-feasors Act, T.C.A. §§ 29-11-101 to 106 (1980), will no longer determine the apportionment of liability between codefendants.

Fourth, fairness and efficiency require that defendants called upon to answer allegations in negligence be permitted to allege, as an affirmative defense, that a nonparty caused or contributed to the injury or damage for which recovery is sought. In cases where such a defense is raised, the trial court shall instruct the jury to assign this nonparty the percentage of the total negligence for which he is responsible. However, in order for a plaintiff to recover a judgment against such additional person, the plaintiff must have made a timely amendment to his complaint and caused process to be served on such additional person. Thereafter, the additional party will be required to answer the amended complaint. The procedures shall be in accordance with the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure.

Fifth, until such time as the Tennessee Judicial Conference Committee on Civil Pattern Jury Instructions promulgates new standard jury instructions, we direct trial courts’ attention to the suggested instructions and special verdict form set forth in the appendix to this opinion.

VI.

The principles set forth today apply to (1) all cases tried or retried after the date of this opinion, and (2) all cases on appeal in which the comparative fault issue has been raised at an appropriate stage in the litigation.

VII.

The remaining issue involves Plaintiff’s assertion that the trial court imper-missibly instructed the jury as to the presumption of intoxication established by T.C.A. § 55-10-408(b) (1988). We find no error.

Section 55-10-408(b) provides that:

Evidence that there was, at the time alleged, ten-hundredths of one percent (.10%), or more, by weight of alcohol in the defendant’s blood, shall create a presumption that the defendant was under the influence of such intoxicant, and that his or her ability to drive was impaired thereby, sufficiently to constitute a violation of § 55-10-401 [the criminal statute prohibiting driving under the influence of an intoxicant].

The results of a properly conducted blood test indicating ten-hundredths of one percent or more in a person’s blood thus creates a presumption which assists a lay jury in determining whether a person was under the -influence of an intoxicant. If the evidence is not rebutted, a jury may then permissibly find that the person was under *59 the influence sufficiently to violate the criminal provisions regarding driving while intoxicated.

In Tennessee, violation of a penal statute is negligence per se, and is admissible evidence in a civil action. See Brookins v. The Round Table, Inc., 624 S.W.2d 547, 550 (Tenn.1981). However, a jury may not base its verdict on this per se negligence unless it affirmatively appears that the statutory violation was a proximate cause of the injury for which recovery is sought. See id.; Barr v. Charley, 215 Tenn. 445, 387 S.W.2d 614, 617 (1964). A trial court does not err when, as here, it instructs the jury accordingly.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed in part and affirmed in part, and the case is remanded to the trial court for a new trial in accordance with the dictates of this opinion. The costs of this appeal are taxed equally to the parties.

REID, C.J., and O’BRIEN, DAUGHTREY and ANDERSON, JJ., concur.

APPENDIX

The following instructions may be used in cases where the negligence of the plaintiff is at issue. These instructions are intended for two-party litigation. Appropriate modifications would be necessary for more complex litigation.

Suggested Jury Instructions

[The following instructions should be preceded by instructions on negligence, proximate cause, damages, etc.]

1. If you find that defendant was not negligent or that defendant’s negligence was not a proximate cause of plaintiff’s injury, you will find for defendant.

2. If you find that defendant was negligent and that defendant’s negligence was a proximate cause of plaintiff’s injury, you must then determine whether plaintiff was also negligent and whether plaintiff’s negligence was a proximate cause of his/her injury.

3. In this state, negligence on the part of a plaintiff has an impact on a plaintiff’s right to recover damages. Accordingly, if you find that each party was negligent and that the negligence of each party was a proximate cause of plaintiff’s damages, then you must determine the degree of such negligence, expressed as a percentage, attributable to each party.

4. If you find from all the evidence that the percentage of negligence attributable to plaintiff was equal to, or greater than, the percentage of negligence attributable to defendant, then you are instructed that plaintiff will not be entitled to recover any damages for his/her injuries. If, on the other hand, you determine from the evidence that the percentage of negligence attributable to plaintiff was less than the percentage of negligence attributable to defendant, then plaintiff will be entitled to recover that portion of his/her damages not caused by plaintiff’s own negligence.

5. The court will provide you with a special verdict form that will assist you in your duties. This is the form on which you will record, if appropriate, the percentage of negligence assigned to each party and plaintiff’s total damages. The court will then take your findings and either (1) enter judgment for defendant if you have found that defendant was not negligent or that plaintiff’s own negligence accounted for 50 percent or more of the total negligence proximately causing his/her injuries or (2) enter judgment against defendant in accordance with defendant’s percentage of negligence.

SPECIAL VERDICT FORM

We, the jury, make the following answers to the questions submitted by the court:

1. Was the defendant negligent?
Answer: _(Yes or No)
(If your answer is “No,” do not answer any further questions. Sign this form and return it to the court.)
2. Was the defendant’s negligence a proximate cause of injury or damage to the plaintiff?
Answer: _(Yes or No)
*60 (If your answer is “No,” do not answer any further questions. Sign this form and return it to the court.)
3. Did the plaintiffs own negligence account for 50 percent or more of the total negligence that proximately caused his/her injuries or damages?
Answer: _(Yes or No)
(If your answer is “Yes,” do not answer any any further questions. Sign this form and return it to the court.)
4. What is the total amount of plaintiff's damages, determined without reference to the amount of plaintiff’s negligence?
Amount in dollars: $_
5. Using 100 percent as the total combined negligence which proximately caused the injuries or damages to the plaintiff, what are the percentages of such negligence to be allocated to the plaintiff and defendant?
Plaintiff_%
Defendant_%
(Total must equal 100%)
Signature of Foreman

OPINION ON PETITION TO REHEAR

Plaintiff has filed a respectful and thoughtful Petition for Rehearing requesting argument on (1) the advisability of retaining joint and several liability in certain limited circumstances, and (2) the Opinion’s treatment of nonparty tort-feasors. Because such further guidance should await an appropriate controversy, the petition is accordingly denied.

REID, C.J., and O’BRIEN, DAUGHTREY and ANDERSON, JJ., concur.
1

. Defendant East-West Motor Freight, Inc., is a party to this action as lessee of the Peterbilt tractor Defendant-Balentine was operating at the time of the accident. Defendant-Balentine is the owner-lessor of the tractor.

2

. While not entirely clear, Alabama may be preparing to abandon contributory negligence. The Alabama Supreme Court recently stated that it would soon select a case and grant review for the sole purpose of considering "when, how, and in what form” comparative negligence should be adopted. See Williams v. Delta Int'l Mach. Corp., No. 1901255 (Ala., Dec. 13, 1991) (1991 WL 261449). However, the Williams opinion was later ordered withdrawn.

3

. In the order of their adoption, these states are Florida, California, Alaska, Michigan, West Virginia, New Mexico, Illinois, Iowa, Missouri, Kentucky, and South Carolina.

Nine courts adopted pure comparative fault: See Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So.2d 431 (Fla.1973); Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal.3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal.Rptr. 858 (1975); Kaatz v. State, 540 P.2d 1037 (Alaska 1975); Placek v. City of Sterling Heights, 405 Mich. 638, 275 N.W.2d 511 (1979); Scott v. Rizzo, 96 N.M. 682, 634 P.2d 1234 (1981); Alvis v. Ribar, 85 Ill.2d 1, 52 Ill.Dec. 23, 421 N.E.2d 886 (1981); Goetzman v. Wichern, 327 N.W.2d 742 (Iowa 1982); Gustafson v. Benda, 661 S.W.2d 11 (Mo.1983); Hilen v. Hays, 673 S.W.2d 713 (Ky.1984). In two of these states, legislatures subsequently enacted a modified form. See Ill.Ann.Stat. ch. 110, para. 2-1116 (Supp.1991); Iowa Code Ann. § 668.3 (West 1987).

Two courts adopted a modified form of comparative fault. See Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co., 163 W.Va. 332, 256 S.E.2d 879 (1979) (plaintiff may recover if his negligence is less than defendants’); Nelson v. Concrete Supply Co., 303 S.C. 243, 399 S.E.2d 783 (1991) (plaintiff may recover if his negligence is not greater than defendants’).

*56 The "pure” and “modified” forms are discussed in Part III infra.

4

. Six states have legislatively adopted pure comparative fault: Mississippi, Rhode Island, Washington, New York, Louisiana, and Arizona; Eight legislatures have enacted the modified “49 percent” rule (plaintiff may recover if plaintiff s negligence is less than defendant’s): Georgia, Arkansas, Maine, Colorado, Idaho, North Dakota, Utah, and Kansas; Eighteen legislatures have enacted the modified “50 percent” rule (plaintiff may recover so long as plaintiffs negligence is not greater than defendant’s): Wisconsin, Hawaii, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Hampshire, Vermont, Oregon, Connecticut, Nevada, New Jersey, Oklahoma, Texas, Wyoming, Montana, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, and Delaware; Two legislatures have enacted statutes that allow a plaintiff to recover if plaintiffs negligence is slight when compared to defendant's gross negligence: Nebraska and South Dakota. See V. Schwartz, supra, at § 2.1.

Following is a list of statutes for those states who have codified their comparative fault systems, including the statutes of those states where comparative fault was initially adopted by judicial action:

See Alaska Stat. § 09.17.060 (Supp.1991); Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 12-2505(A) (Supp.1991); Ark.Stat.Ann. § 16-64-122 (Supp.1991); Colo. Rev.Stat. § 13-21-111 (1987); Conn.Gen.Stat. Ann. § 52-572h (1991); Del.Code Ann. tit. 10, § 8132 (Supp.1990); Fla.Stat.Ann. § 768.81 (West Supp.1992); Ga.Code Ann. § 105-603 (Harrison 1984); Haw.Rev.Stat. § 663-31 (1985); Idaho Code § 6-801 (1990); Ill.Ann. Stat. ch. 110, para. 2-1116 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1991); Ind.Code Ann. § 34-4-33-3, 4 (West Supp.1991); Iowa Code Ann. § 668.3 (West 1987); Kan.Stat.Ann. § 60-258a (Supp.1991); La.Civ.Code Ann. art. 2323 (West Supp.1992); Me.Rev.Stat.Ann. tit. 14, § 156 (1980); Mass. Gen.Laws Ann. ch. 231 § 85 (West 1985); Minn. Stat.Ann. § 604.01(1) (West Supp.1992); Miss. Code Ann. § 11-7-15 (1972); Mont.Code Ann. § 27-1-702 (1991); Neb.Rev.Stat. § 25-21, 185.01 to .06 (Supp.1991); Nev.Rev.Stat. § 41.-141 (1991); N.H.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 507; 7-d (Supp.1991); N.J.Stat.Ann. § 2A: 15-5.1 (West 1987); N.Y.Civ.Prac.L. & R. 1411 (McKinney 1976); N.D.Cent.Code § 32-03.2-01 to -03 (Supp.1991); Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 2315.19 (Anderson 1991); Okla.Stat.Ann. tit. 23, §§ 13, 14 (West 1987); Or.Rev.Stat. § 18.470 (1988); 42 Pa.Cons.Stat.Ann. § 7102 Purdon (1982 & Supp.1991); R.I.Gen.Laws § 9-20-4 (1985); S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 20-9-2 (1987); Tex. Civ.Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. §§ 33.001, 33.012 (Vernon Supp.1992); Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-38 (1992); Vt.Stat.Ann. tit. 12, § 1036 (Supp. 1991); Wash.Rev.Code Ann. § 4.22.005 (1988); Wis.Stat.Ann. § 895.045 (West 1983); Wyo.Stat. § 1-1-109 (1988).

5

. The 13 states utilizing pure comparative fault are Alaska, Arizona, California, Florida, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Michigan, New Mexico, New York, Rhode Island, and Washington. See V. Schwartz, supra, at § 2.1

6

. The 21 states using the "50 percent” modified form: Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, Vermont, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. The 9 states using the "49 percent” form: Arkansas, Colorado, Georgia, Idaho, Kansas, Maine, North Dakota, Utah, and West Virginia. Two states, Nebraska and South Dakota, use a slight-gross system of comparative fault. See V. Schwartz, supra, at § 2.1.

7

. Numerous other comparative fault jurisdictions have eliminated joint and several liability. See, e.g., Alaska Stat. § 09.17.080(d) (Supp. 1991); Colo.Rev.Stat. § 13-21-111.5(1) (1987); Kan.Stat.Ann. § 60-258a(d) (Supp.1991); N.M.Stat.Ann. § 41-3A-1 (1989); N.D.Cent.Code § 32-03.2-02 (Supp.1991); Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-38, -40 (1992); Wyo.Stat.Ann. § 1-1-109(d) (1988).

2.9 Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co. 2.9 Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co.

Brenda Sue Bradley v. Appalachian Power Company Brady Napier v. Elk Grocery Company

(No. 14310)

(No. 14345)

Decided July 10, 1979.

*333 E. Joseph Buffa, Jr., DiTrapano, Jackson & Buffa, for appellant in No. 14310.

W. T. Shaffer, A. L. Emch, Jackson, Kelly, Holt & O’Farrell, for appellee in No. 14310.

Menis E. Ketchum, Greene, Ketchum & Mills, for appellant in No. 14345.

Michael J. Farrell, Jenkins, Fenstermaker, Krieger, Kayes & Farrell, for appellee in No. 14345.

Miller, Justice:

In these two cases, which have been consolidated on appeal, we are asked to re-examine and ameliorate the common law doctrine of contributory negligence.

In each case the plaintiff sought by way of an instruction to utilize the doctrine of comparative negligence to avoid the defense of contributory negligence. The ten *334 dered instruction was rejected and the usual contributory negligence instruction was given, with the jury returning a verdict for the defendant in each case.

I

The doctrine of contributory negligence is generally thought to have originated in the English common law in Butterfield v. Forrester, 11 East 60, 103 Eng. Rep. 926 (K.B. 1809), where the plaintiff, a horseman, was barred from recovery for his injuries when his horse ran into a pole. The pole had been left projecting onto the public road by the defendant, an adjoining landowner who was repairing his house. 1

There can be no doubt that the doctrine of contributory negligence was judicially created. W. Prosser, The Law of Torts (4th ed. 1971), p. 416, et seq.; Annot., 78 A.L.R.3d 339 (1977). The first occasion this Court had to discuss the doctrine of contributory negligence was in Snyder v. Pittsburgh, Cincinnati & St. Louis Ry. Co., 11 W. Va. 14 (1877). There, the Court did not apply the doctrine because it found it insufficiently supported by the facts.

In Morningstar v. Black and Decker Mfg. Co., _ W. Va. _, 253 S.E.2d 666 (1979), we analyzed certain constitutional and statutory language, and stated in Syllabus Point 2 this Court’s role in the development of common law principles:

*335 “Article VIII, Section 13 of the West Virginia Constitution and W. Va. Code, 2-1-1, were not intended to operate as a bar to this Court’s evolution of common law principles, including its historic power to alter or amend the common law.”

There is an almost universal dissatisfaction among leading scholars of tort law with the harshness of the doctrine of contributory negligence. 2 Neither intensive scholarship nor complex legal arguments need be advanced to demonstrate its strictness. A plaintiff can, if the jury is faithful to the contributory negligence instruction it receives, be barred from recovery if his negligence “contributed in the slightest degree” to the accident. Syllabus Point 7, Crum v. Ward, 146 W. Va. 421, 122 S.E.2d 18 (1961); Syllabus Point 3, Morton v. Baber, 118 W. Va. 457, 190 S.E. 767 (1937). Thus, our system of jurisprudence, while based on concepts of justice and fair play, contains an anomaly in which the slightest negligence of a plaintiff precludes any recovery and thereby excuses the defendant from the consequences of all of his negligence, however great it may be.

There have been several judicial modifications of the severity of contributory negligence. Under the doctrine of last clear chance, the plaintiff’s contributory negligence is excused if it can be shown that the defendant had the last opportunity to avoid the accident. Davies v. *336 Mann, 10 M.&W. 546, 152 Eng. Rep. 588 (1842); Barr v. Curry, 137 W. Va. 364, 71 S.E.2d 313 (1952). 3

The defense of contributory negligence is also not available where the defendant is found to be guilty of wanton and wilful misconduct. Stone v. Rudolph, 127 W. Va. 335, 32 S.E.2d 742 (1944); 57 Am. Jur. 2d Negligence § 305 (1971). This result is justified on what is roughly a comparative negligence theory, whereby the intentional tort of the defendant makes trivial the simple negligence of the plaintiff. Perhaps this same explanation may also be the basis for barring contributory negligence where the defendant is subject to strict liability under the doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher, L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868), aff'g L.R. 1 Ex. 265 (1866); 57 Am. Jur. 2d Negligence § 310 (1971).

In some instances the doctrine of contributory negligence is not available where the defendant violates a statute clearly designed for the protection of the plaintiff. Pitzer v. M. D. Tomkies & Sons, 136 W. Va. 268, 67 S.E.2d 437 (1951); 57 Am. Jur. 2d Negligence § 310 (1971).

Legislatures in a number of states have enacted comparative negligence statutes of one variety or another. 4 The basic framework of these statutes is to permit a negligent plaintiff to recover so long as his negligence does not exceed some established percentage, usually 50 percent. 5 Such statutes require that his recovery be reduced by the percentage of contributory negligence found to exist.

*337 Four states — Alaska, 6 California, 7 Florida, 8 and Michigan 9 — have by judicial decision abolished the doctrine of contributory negligence and substituted in its place a “pure” comparative negligence concept. Under this principle, a plaintiff may recover regardless of the degree of his contributory negligence, but the jury is required to reduce his award in proportion to his contributory negligence.

Most commentators 10 and the four courts which have adopted the pure comparative negligence position are critical of the 50 percent approach, primarily on the basis that it involves the drawing of an arbitrary line beyond which contributory negligence can still be asserted as a bar to the plaintiffs action. The basis of this criticism is expressed in Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d *338 804, 827-28, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858, 874-75, 532 P.2d 1226, 1242-43 (1975):

“We have concluded that the ‘pure’ form of comparative negligence is that which should be adopted in this state. In our view the ‘50 percent’ system simply shifts the lottery aspect of the contributory negligence rule to a different ground. As Dean Prosser has noted, under such a system ‘[i]t is obvious that a slight difference in the proportionate fault may permit a recovery; and there has been much justified criticism of a rule under which a plaintiff who is charged with 49 percent of a total negligence recovers 51 percent of his damages, while one who is charged with 50 percent recovers nothing at all.’ ” [Footnotes omitted]

The difficulty with the pure comparative negligence rule, however, is that it focuses solely on the hypothetical “plaintiff” without recognizing that once pure comparative negligence is embraced, all parties whose negligence or fault combined to contribute to the accident are automatically potential plaintiffs unless a particular party is found to be 100 percent at fault.

The fundamental justification for the pure comparative negligence rule is its fairness in permitting everyone to recover to the extent he is not at fault. Thus, the eye of the needle is “no fault,” and we are asked not to think about the larger aspect — the camel representing “fault.” It is difficult, on theoretical grounds alone, to rationalize a system which permits a party who is 95 percent at fault to have his day in court as a plaintiff because he is 5 percent fault-free.

The practical result of such a system is that it favors the party who has incurred the most damages regardless of his amount of fault or negligence. To illustrate, a plaintiff who has sustained a moderate injury with a potential jury verdict of $20,000, and who is 90 percent fault-free, may be reluctant to file suit against a defendant who is 90 percent at fault, but who has received severe injuries and whose case carries a potential of *339 $800,000 in damages from a jury verdict. In this situation, even though the defendant’s verdict is reduced by his 90 percent fault to $80,000, it is still far in excess of the plaintiff's potential recovery of $18,000. 11

While it can be conceded that there is an obvious injustice in the current contributory negligence rule which bars recovery no matter how slight the plaintiffs negligence, nevertheless the pure comparative negligence rule seems equally extreme at the other end of the spectrum. None of the courts which have adopted the pure comparative negligence rule have discussed the problems addressed above, and are content to rest their holdings on the following syllogism: (1) the contributory negligence rule is draconian in its operation; (2) the legislative solution of apportioning the plaintiffs fault up to 50 percent is an arbitrary line-drawing lottery; 12 (3) *340 therefore, the pure comparative negligence rule is fairer.

The Michigan court in Kirby v. Larson, 400 Mich. 585, 637-41, 256 N.W.2d 400, 425-27 (1977), besides relying heavily on Li v. Yellow Cab Co., supra, quotes at length from United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397, 95 S.Ct. 1708, 44 L.Ed.2d 251 (1975), where the United States Supreme Court abandoned its divided damages rule in admiralty in favor of apportioned damages based on the respective fault of the involved vessels. It may be seriously questioned whether an admiralty rule involving damage to vessels has much relevance to the common law doctrine of contributory negligence. 13

The history of the common law is one of gradual judicial development and adjustment of the case law to fit the changing conditions of society. 14 We see no practical *341 benefit to be gained by the radical break from the common law’s tort-fault methodology that the pure comparative negligence rule requires. There are basic inequities inherent in the pure comparative negligence rule and its resulting singular emphasis on the amount of damages and insurance coverage as the ultimate touchstone of the viability of instituting a suit. 15

We do not accept the major premise of pure comparative negligence that a party should recover his damages regardless of his fault, so long as his fault is not 100 percent. Without embarking on an extended philosophical discussion of the nature and purpose of our legal system, we do state that in the field of tort law we are not willing to abandon the concept that where a party substantially contributes to his own damages, he should not be permitted to recover for any part of them. We do recognize that the present rule that prohibits recovery to the plaintiff if he is at fault in the slightest degree is manifestly unfair, and in effect rewards the substantial *342 ly negligent defendant by permitting him to escape any responsibility for his negligence.

Our present judicial rule of contributory negligence is therefore modified to provide that a party is not barred from recovering damages in a tort action so long as his negligence or fault does not equal or exceed the combined negligence or fault of the other parties involved in the accident. To the extent that our prior contributory negligence cases are inconsistent with this rule, they are overruled. 16

II

Some explanation is warranted as to how this new rule operates. We do not intend to consider exhaustively all the particular ramifications of the new rule, since they are best resolved within the particular factual framework of the individual case.

We do state what may be the obvious, that the sum of the negligence of all the parties to a given accident cannot exceed 100 percent. Furthermore, it will be the jury’s obligation to assign the proportion or degree of this total negligence among the various parties, beginning with the plaintiff.

The requirements of proximate cause have not been altered by the new rule. Consequently, before any party is entitled to recover, it must be shown that the negligence of the defendant was the proximate cause of the accident and subsequent injuries. The same is true of *343 contributory fault or negligence. Before it can be counted against a plaintiff, it must be found to be the proximate cause of his injuries.

The jury should be required by general verdict to state the total or gross amount of damages of each party whom they find entitled to a recovery, and by special interrogatory the percentage of fault or contributory negligence, if any, attributable to each party. After the verdicts have been accepted, the trial court will calculate the net amount by deducting the party’s percentage of fault from his gross award. To this extent, we follow the mechanics of the jury verdict award employed by the courts which have adopted pure comparative negligence, which is compatible with most of the statutory approaches. 17 V. Schwartz, Comparative Negligence (1974), § 17.4, at 282, et seq.

Our comparative negligence rule has no effect on the plaintiff’s right to sue only one of several joint tortfea-sors. However, as we pointed out in Haynes v. City of Nitro,_W. Va. _, 240 S.E.2d 544 (1977), the joint tortfeasor so sued may implead the other joint tortfea- *344 sors as third-party defendants. Haynes established that there is an inchoate right of contribution between joint tortfeasors in advance of judgment except where the act is malum in se. Thus, while the original defendant may have to respond only to the plaintiff for the latter’s damages, the defendant in the third-party action can have these damages apportioned among the third-party defendants.

Haynes enables a joint tortfeasor to institute a third-party action before judgment in order to bring in the other joint tortfeasors to have them share in any liability that he may be found to have with regard to the plaintiff. 18 Am. Jur. 2d Contribution § 35, et seq.; 18 C.J.S. Contribution § 11. 18 Haynes is designed to moderate the inequity which existed in our law that enabled the plaintiff to cast the entire responsibility for an accident on one of several joint tortfeasors by deciding to sue only him.

Neither our comparative negligence rule nor Haynes is designed to alter our basic law which provides for joint and several liability among joint tortfeasors after judgment. Hardin v. New York Central Railroad, 145 W. Va. 676, 116 S.E.2d 697 (1960); Muldoon v. Kepner, 141 W. Va. 577, 91 S.E.2d 727 (1956). Most courts which have considered the question after either a statutory or judicial adoption of some form of comparative negligence have held that the plaintiff can sue one or more joint tortfeasors, and if more than one is sued and a joint judgment is obtained, he may collect the entire amount from any one of the defendants. See, e.g., American Motorcycle Association v. Superior Court, 20 Cal.3d 578, 588-90, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182, 188-90, 578 P.2d 899, 905-906 (1978); Gazaway v. Nicholson, 190 Ga. 345, 348, 9 S.E.2d 154, 156 *345 (1940); Kelly v. Long Island Lighting Co., 31 N.Y.2d 25, 30, 334 N.Y.S.2d 851, 855, 286 N.E.2d 241, 243 (1972); Seattle First National Bank v. Shoreline Concrete, 91 Wash.2d 230, 588 P.2d 1308, 1313-1314 (1978); Chille v. Howell, 34 Wis. 2d 491, 498-500, 149 N.W.2d 600, 604-605 (1967); V. Schwartz, Comparative Negligence (1974), § 16.4, at 253. Under W. Va. Code, 55-7-13, joint tortfeasors may still obtain contribution after judgment.

Our comparative negligence rule does not change the right of a joint tortfeasor to obtain a pro tanto credit on the plaintiffs judgment for monies obtained by the plaintiff in a settlement with another joint tortfeasor. Tennant v. Craig, 156 W. Va. 632, 195 S.E.2d 727 (1973); Hardin v. New York Central Railroad, 145 W. Va. 676, 116 S.E.2d 697 (1960).

Since we have not completely abolished the doctrine of contributory negligence, we recognize that in appropriate circumstances the doctrine of last clear chance is still available. In the case of an intentional tort, contributory negligence is not a defense. Stone v. Rudolph, 127 W. Va. 335, 32 S.E.2d 742 (1944). Therefore, comparative negligence would not come into play, and the plaintiff would recover his damages undiminished by any contributory negligence.

By way of summary, we believe that moderating the harshness of our contributory negligence rule achieves a more satisfactory balance in the allocation of fault as it relates to recovery in our tort system. Our comparative negligence rule still bars the substantially negligent plaintiff 19 from obtaining a recovery, but it does permit the plaintiff who is more than slightly at fault to recover his injuries diminished by his percentage of contributory negligence. The rule is an intermediate position between *346 the absolute bar of the present contributory negligence rule and the almost total permissiveness of the pure comparative negligence rule. It represents a considerable improvement over the present rule without undertaking a radical change in our present fault-based tort system, as would be the case with pure comparative negligence.

Ill

Finally, we address the question of the applicability of the rule here announced to cases now pending. In Adkins v. Leverette,_W. Va._, 239 S.E.2d 496 (1977), we discussed in some detail the doctrine of retroactivity as applied to a constitutional issue in a criminal case. There, we recognized that: “We do not attempt to state a single answer to questions that may arise on the issue of retroactivity.” [_W. Va. at__, 239 S.E.2d at 499]

Adkins cited Falconer v. Simmons, 51 W. Va. 172, 41 S.E. 193 (1902), which followed the traditional common law view:

“An overruled decision is regarded not law, as never having been the law, but the law as given in the later case is regarded as having been the law, even at the date of the erroneous decision.” [Syllabus Point 2 in part]

However, even Falconer recognized an exception to this rule: Where a prior case has construed a statute and a valid contract has been entered into on reliance upon this construction of the statute, “the later decision does not retroact so as to invalidate such contract.” [Syllabus Point 2 in part]

In an unanimous opinion by Justice Cardozo in Great Northern Railway v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., 287 U.S. 358, 364, 77 L. Ed. 360, 366, 53 S.Ct. 145, 148 (1932), the United States Supreme Court concluded from a federal constitutional standpoint:

“We think the federal constitution has no voice upon the subject. A state in defining the limits of *347 adherence to precedent may make a choice for itself between the principle of forward operation and that of relation backward. It may say that decisions of its highest court, though later overruled, are law none the less for intermediate transactions.”

We do not find any provision in the West Virginia Constitution which addresses this point.

After Sunburst, the Court indicated in Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 14 L. Ed. 2d 601, 85 S.Ct. 1731 (1965), that the general principles of retroactive or prospective application of an overruling decision are essentially the same. In Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106-107, 30 L. Ed. 2d 296, 306, 92 S.Ct. 349, 355 (1971), the Court formulated the following test:

“In our cases dealing with the nonretroactivity question, we have generally considered three separate factors. First, the decision to be applied nonretroactively must establish a new principle of law, either by overruling clear past precedent on which litigants may have relied, see, e.g., Hanover Shoe v United Shoe Machinery Corp., supra, [392 U.S.] at 496, 20 L Ed 2d at 1243, or by deciding an issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed, see, e.g., Allen v State Board of Elections, supra, [393 U.S.] at 572, 22 L Ed 2d at 20. Second, it has been stressed that ‘we must ... weigh the merits and demerits in each case by looking to the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether retrospective operation will further or retard its operation.’ Linkletter v. Walker, supra, [381 U.S.] at 629, 14 L Ed 2d at 608. Finally, we have weighed the inequity imposed by retroactive application, for ‘[w]here a decision of this Court could produce substantial inequitable results if applied retroactively, there is ample basis in our cases for avoiding the “injustice or hardship” by a holding of nopretroac-tivity.’ Cipriano v City of Houma, supra, [395 U.S.] at 706, 23 L Ed 2d at 652.”

*348 Moreover, despite Linkletter’s assertion that the same principles apply to both civil and criminal cases when decisions are overruled, the Supreme Court has at least shifted its emphasis, and in some cases created outright exceptions. See, e.g., Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646, 653, 28 L. Ed. 2d 388, 395, 91 S.Ct. 1148, 1152 (1971) (de-emphasizing good faith reliance as a basis for nonre-troactivity “[w]here the major purpose of new constitutional doctrine is to overcome an aspect of the criminal trial that substantially impairs its truth-finding function.”).

In short, as commentators have noted, while general guidelines can be evolved to determine whether retroactive or prospective application should be given to an overruling decision, it is difficult to etch them with precision so that they will fit all cases. 20

From a practical standpoint, it is perhaps unnecessary to refine the rules relating to retroactive application in great detail. It is an area of the law not frequently encountered, since the outright reversal of a prior case is a rather uncommon occurrence. While the need for accurate guidelines is important in the substantive areas of the law to provide trial courts and the practitioner with the essential element of predictability, it is of diminished importance with regard to the procedural question of whether an overruling case should be made fully retroactive.-

We observe initially that retroactivity considerations in a criminal case presenting constitutional issues involve different policy judgments which may not be present in the ordinary civil case. Certainly an important difference is that full retroactivity in a constitutional criminal case provides an opportunity for collateral at *349 tack by habeas corpus upon all criminal judgments, not merely those judgments for which direct appeal is still available. Furthermore, in the criminal area where federal constitutional rights are involved, as we observed in Adkins, it is likely that “the Supreme Court’s retroactivity rule is binding on the states.” [239 S.E.2d at 499]

In the present case, we are confronted with fashioning a retroactivity rule in regard to a civil case. There are various factors which should be taken into consideration in resolving the question of retroactivity. In any attempt to list factors, it should be stressed that not all factors always carry the same weight, for the weight of any given factor may vary with the facts of a given case.

Retroactivity of an overruling decision is designed to provide equality of application to the overruling decision because its new rule has been consciously designed to correct a flawed area of the law. The more egregious the error, the greater the need to extend the benefits of the overruling decision to others occupying the same status. To some extent, although the policy considerations are different, this initial consideration follows Falconer’s result. 21

Counterbalancing this factor are several considerations. First, the nature of the substantive issue overruled must be determined. If the issue involves a traditionally settled area of law, such as contracts or property as distinguished from torts, and the new rule was not clearly foreshadowed, then retroactivity is less justified. Second, where the overruled decision deals with procedural law rather than substantive, retroactivity ordinarily will be more readily accorded. Third, common law decisions, when overruled, may result in the overruling decision being given retroactive effect, since the substantive issue usually has a narrower impact and is likely to involve fewer parties. Fourth, where, on the other hand, substantial public issues are involved, aris *350 ing from statutory or constitutional interpretations that represent a clear departure from prior precedent, prospective application will ordinarily be favored. Fifth, the more radically the new decision departs from previous substantive law, the greater the need for limiting retro-activity. Finally, we will also look to the precedent of other courts which have determined the retroactive/prospective question in the same area of the law in their overruling decisions.

In the present case, we have altered our judicially created rule that the slightest degree of contributory negligence bars recovery. We have not, however, completely abolished the defense of contributory negligence. The issue falls within the field of tort law, which historically has not been a settled area of the law such as property or contracts, but has been subject to continual change by the courts and legislatures to meet the evolving needs of an increasingly mobile, industrialized and technological society. 22 The issue at hand primarily affects private parties and arises on a case-to-case basis with the cause of action controlled by the limited time period for actions for personal injuries, so that the beneficiaries of the new decision’s retroactivity are a limited class.

In the four states which have adopted pure comparative negligence, a rule which we consider to be a much more radical departure than our new rule, two states have accorded what amounts to full retroactivity to their decision. Kaatz v. State, 540 P.2d 1037, 1050 (Alas. 1975); Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So.2d 431, 439-40 (Fla. 1973). In Kirby v. Larson, 400 Mich. 585, 645, 256 N.W.2d 400, 429 (1977), the Michigan court limited the applicability of its pure comparative negligence rule “to the present case and to those cases filed after the date of this decision.” However, in Placek v. City of Sterling Heights, 275 N.W.2d 511, 521-22 (Mich. 1979), the court acknowledged *351 that the retroactivity rule of Kirby was too restrictive, and decided to extend complete retroactivity to its pure comparative negligence rule. 23

California, in Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal.3d 804, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858, 532 P.2d 1226 (1975), accorded retroactivity of its pure comparative negligence rule to cases which had not reached the trial stage prior to the date of the Li opinion, but denied it as to other cases on appeal.

We thus find that the cases have generally extended retroactivity to the pure comparative negligence rule. See generally Annot., 78 A.L.R.3d 421 (1977). Under the foregoing analysis of retroactivity, we hold that the new rule of comparative negligence is fully retroactive.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment in each case is reversed and the cases are remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

Reversed and remanded.

1

At least one commentator has questioned whether Butterfield v. Forrester, 11 East 60, 103 Eng. Rep. 926 (K.B. 1809), was the first common law contributory negligence case. W. S. Malone in “The Formative Era of Contributory Negligence,” 41 Ill. L. Rev. 151 (1946), states:

“The concise opinions of Bayley and Lord Ellenborough in Butterfield v. Forrester (1809) afford no indication that either of those judges felt at the time that he was charting new paths for the law.”

Justice Roberts, dissenting in Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So.2d 431, 442 (Fla. 1973), makes this assertion:

“Contributory negligence was adopted much earlier as a part of the common law. ... Bayly v. Merrel, Cro.Jac. 386, 79 Eng. Rep. 331 (1606). ...”

2

Aiken, Proportioning Comparative Negligence — Problems of Theory and Special Verdict Formulation, 53 Marq. L. Rev. 293 (1970); George & Walkowiak, Blame and Reparation in Pure Comparative Negligence: The Multi-Party Action, 8 Sw. U. L. Rev. 1 (1976); Haugh, Comparative Negligence: A Reform Long Overdue, 49 Or. L. Rev. 38 (1969); James, Contributory Negligence, 62 Yale L.J. 691 (1953); Leñar, The Declining Defense of Contributory Negligence, 1 Ark. L. Rev. 1 (1947); Levy, Pure Comparative Negligence: Set-Offs, Multiple Defendants and Loss Distribution, 11 U.S.F. L, Rev. 405 (1977); Maloney, From Contributory to Comparative Negligence: A Needed Law Reform, 11 U. Fla. L. Rev. 135 (1958); Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 41 Cal. L. Rev. 1 (1953); Twerski, The Use and Abuse of Comparative Negligence in Products Liability, 10 Ind. L. Rev. 797 (1977).

3

No attempt has been made to formulate all phases of the last clear chance doctrine. See, Donley, Observations on Last Clear Chance in West Virginia, 37 W. Va. L.Q. 362 (1931); Donely, Last Clear Chance — Some Further Observations, 49 W. Va. L.Q. 51 (1942); Prosser, The Law of Torts 427 (4th ed. 1971); 57 Am. Jur. 2d Negligence § 386 (1971).

4

Ark. Stat. Ann. §§ 27-1763 to 1765 (Supp. 1977); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-21-111 (1973); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 52-572h (West Supp. 1979); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 663-31 (1976); Idaho Code §6-801 (1979); Kan. Stat. §60-258a (1976); Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 14, §156 (Supp. 1978); Mass. Gen. *337 Laws Ann. ch. 231, §85 (West Supp. 1979); Minn. Stat. Ann. §604.01 (West Supp. 1979); Miss. Code Ann. § 11-7-15 (1972); Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 58.607.1 (Supp. 1975); Neb. Rev. Stat. ch. 25-1151 (1975 reissue); Nev. Rev. Stat. ch. 41.141 (1977); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 507:7a (Supp. 1977); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A: 15-5.1 (West Sup. 1979); N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law § 1411 (McKinney 1976); N.D. Cent. Code § 9-10-07 (1975); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 23, § 11 (West Supp. 1978); Or. Rev. Stat. § 18.470 (1977); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 17, § 2101 (Purdon Supp. 1978); R.I. Gen. Laws §9-20-4 (Supp. 1978); S.D. Compiled Laws Ann. § 20-9-2 (1969); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 2212a, § 1 (Vernon Supp. 1978); Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-37 (1977); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 1036 (1973); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 4.22.010 (Supp. 1978); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 895.045 (West Supp. 1978); Wyo. Stat. § 1-1-109 (1977).

5

Four states — Mississippi, New York, Rhode Island and Washington — have by statute adopted “pure” comparative negligence, whereby the plaintiff can recover so long as he is not 100 percent negligent.

6

Kaatz v. State, 540 P.2d 1037 (Alas. 1975).

7

Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858, 532 P.2d 1226 (1975).

8

Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So.2d 431 (Fla. 1973).

9

Kirby v. Larson, 400 Mich. 585, 256 N.W.2d 400 (1977).

10

See note 2, supra, at 2.

11

The courts which have adopted the pure comparative negligence rule have not discussed this type of result. They also appear to proceed on the unstated assumption that all accidents will be covered by sufficient insurance to pay all the verdicts stemming from a multi-party accident. This premise is never documented. If we consider the text illustration and assume the plaintiff has a modest insurance limit of $50,000 for any one injury, the potential exposure to an $80,000 net verdict in favor of the 90-percent-at-fault, but seriously damaged defendant, creates a substantial pratical bar to a suit. It is doubtful that a competent attorney would advise the plaintiff to sue, since the plaintiff’s claim has a maximum jury potential of $20,000, which nets $18,000 when reduced by his 10 percent fault or contributory negligence. This leaves the plaintiff with a potential $12,000 uninsured exposure even after he recovers his $18,000 and pays it to the defendant along with his $50,000 worth of insurance to satisfy the defendant’s $80,000 net verdict.

12

The argument that the difference between recovery at 49 percent contributory negligence and no recovery at 50 percent or above is an arbitrary line, is probably more theoretical than real. It is doubtful that any jury will be able to slice contributory negligence so thinly, a point which Prosser notes in his article Comparative Negligence in 41 Cal. L. Rev. at 25. In all probability, when the contributory negligence rises near the 50 percent level the jury will conclude that plaintiff is guilty of such substantial contributory negligence that it will fix his percentage at 50 or higher to bar his recovery.

13

As noted in 2 Am. Jur. 2d Admiralty § 1 (1962), the development of admiralty in England was independent of the common law courts and against their opposition. See also Benedict on Admiralty (7th ed. 1974), § 41, et seq. at 3-1, et seq. Apart from the federal statutory rights noted below, the traditional maritime remedy for injured seamen was a suit for maintenance and cure — basically medical and per diem support — which arises out of neither contract nor tort, but rather as an incident of their status. The only other remedy was under the doctrine of unseaworthiness, a doctrine akin to a breach of warranty action founded on the duty to have a seaworthy vessel, in which negligence was not a factor. Note, The Tangled Seine: A Survey of Maritime Personal Injury Remedies, 57 Yale L.J. 243, 247-56 (1947).

Kirby also quotes note 13 of United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., Inc., 421 U.S. 397, 95 S.Ct. 1708, 44 L. Ed. 2d 251 (1975), where the Supreme Court mentions the statutory comparative negligence rule in the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688, and in the Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. § 766. However, since these statutes give relief only to the injured seaman and are not designed to permit the employer-defendant to countersue, they have no real analogy to the pure comparative negligence rule, whereby the defendant may also be a plaintiff. The same is true under the Federal Employers Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. § 51, et seq.

14

As we demonstrated in Morning star v. Black and Decker Manufacturing Co., supra, by extended citations from other courts and leading legal scholars, the genius of the court-created common law *341 is its evolutionary ability “to grow with and adapt to changing conditions of society.” We quoted the following passage from Dean Pound in The Spirit of the Common Law (1921) at 182:

“ ‘The chief cause of the success of our common-law doctrine of precedents as a form of law is that it combines certainty and power of growth as no other doctrine has been able to do. Certainty is insured within reasonable limits in that the court proceeds by analogy of rules and doctrines in the traditional system and develops a principle for the cause before it according to a known technique. Growth is insured in that the limits of the principle are not fixed authoritatively once for all but are discovered gradually by a process of inclusion and exclusion as cases arise which bring out its practical workings and prove how far it may be made to do justice in its actual operation.’ [253 S.E.2d at 675]
15

We acknowledge that in any legal system permitting recovery of damages, the amount actually recovered ultimately depends on the financial solvency of the defendant. To create, however, as does the pure comparative negligence rule, a system where plaintiffs decision to sue may depend not on the degree to which he is free from fault but on his financial ability to withstand the countersuit, is to emphasize unduly the damage aspect and to obscure the relative fault of the parties.

16

E.g., Kidd v. Norfolk & Western Railway, 156 W. Va. 296, 192 S.E.2d 890 (1972); Graham v. Wriston, 146 W. Va. 484, 120 S.E.2d 713 (1961); Leftwich v. Wesco Corp., 146 W. Va. 196, 119 S.E.2d 401 (1961); Wolfe v. Beatty Motor Express, Inc., 143 W. Va. 238, 101 S.E.2d 81 (1957); McMicken v. Province, 141 W. Va. 273, 90 S.E.2d 348 (1955); Belcher v. Norfolk & Western Railway, 140 W. Va. 848, 87 S.E.2d 616 (1955); Reese v. Lowry, 140 W. Va. 772, 86 S.E.2d 381 (1955); Pritchard v. City Lines of West Virginia, Inc., 136 W. Va. 278, 66 S.E.2d 276 (1951); Smith, Administrator v. Gould, 110 W. Va. 579, 159 S.E. 53 (1931); Washington v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, 17 W. Va. 190 (1880).

17

Both W. Va. Code, 56-6-5, and Rule 49 of the Rules of Civil Procedure permit the use of written interrogatories to accompany the general verdict. Obviously, by having the jury find the gross amount and the percentage of contributory negligence, the court has some ability to monitor the jury’s conclusions. We anticipate that there may be occasions where the interrogatory answers returned by the jury are confusing or inconsistent. Rule 49(b) specifically provides:

“When the answers are consistent with each other but one or more is inconsistent with the general verdict, the [trial] court may direct the entry of judgment in accordance with the answers, notwithstanding the general verdict or may return the jury for further consideration of its answers and verdict or may order a new trial. When the answers are inconsistent with each other and one or more is likewise inconsistent with the general verdict, the court shall not direct the entry of judgment but may return the jury for further consideration of its answers and verdict or may order a new trial.”

See generally 5a J. Moore, Federal Practice (2nd ed. 1977), § 49.04, at 2221.

18

Rule 14(a) of our Rules of Civil Procedure permits the defendant to bring in as a third-party defendant one “who is or may be liable to him for all or part of the plaintiffs claim. ...” See 3 J. Moore, Federal Practice (2nd ed. 1978), § 14.11, at 14-322, et seq., and 6 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil (1971), § 1448, at 263, et seq.

19

From a purely mechanical standpoint, our new rule of comparative negligence means that where plaintiffs contributory negligence is equal to or above 50 percent of the combined negligence of the parties to the accident, he is barred from recovery. This obviously is the meaning of the phrase, “substantially negligent plaintiff.”

20

Beytagh, Ten Years of Non-Retroactivity: A Critique and a Proposal, 61 Ya. L. Rev. 1557 (1975); Currier, Time and Change in Judge-Made Law: Prospective Overruling, 51 Va. L. Rev. 201 (1965); Traynor, Quo Vadis, Prospective Overruling: A Question of Judicial Responsibility, 28 Hastings L.J. 533 (1977); see generally Annot., 10 A.L.R.3d 1371 (1966).

21

We believe the test set out in Falconer v. Simmons, 51 W. Va. 172, 41 S.E. 193 (1902), as to retroactivity, is too narrow.

22

See Green, The Thrust of Tort Law, 64 W. Va. L. Rev. 1, 116 and 241 (1961-62), and the many articles and cases cited therein.

23

The pertinent language in Placek is:

“Therefore, we hold the rule announced today applicable to the instant case and all appropriate cases in which trial commences after the date of this opinion including those in which a retrial is to occur because of remand on any other issue. Further, we find comparative negligence applicable to any case presently pending on appeal in which application of the doctrine was requested at the trial court and the issue preserved for appeal. Finally, comparative negligence shall be the applicable rule in any case commenced but not submitted to the trier of fact prior to the date of this decision, but in no case shall it apply unless there is an appropriate request by counsel prior to submission to the trier of fact.” [275 N.W.2d at 522]