2 Basics of Pleading and Rule 11 2 Basics of Pleading and Rule 11

This unit covers the first stages of Federal Civil Procedure that initiates a lawsuit—the Complaint, the Service of Process, and the Answer (we postpone an in-depth discussion of the Motion to Dismiss until later in the course). It also teaches you about Rule 11, one of the rules that aims to “keep lawyers honest” in that it imposes sanctions for various forms of bad behavior in the pleading and filing of motions.

Now would be a good time to re-read the capsule descriptions of the Complaint, Answer, and Service of Process in Unit 1 of the course.

 

Here is how this unit is organized.

 

2.1 Introduction to Pleading / Pleading in The “Old” Days (Pre-FRCP) introduces you to what a “Pleading” is and works through the possible functions it could play in a system of procedure. It also educates you very briefly about how Pleadings were handled before the FRCP system came into being in 1938, not because I expect you to be an expert on that earlier period, but because it is useful for building the contrast to how the FRCP system changed things. This sub-unit also introduces you to the basics of civil litigation and motions practice.

 

2.2 Basics of Modern Pleading—The Complaint discusses the Pleading that typically initiates a lawsuit, the Complaint, and the current rules that govern it in the federal system (FRCP 8). I share with you some “forms” that once-upon-a-time were part of the FRCP itself and treated as sufficient under the rules. You can skim these—they are mostly there to show you just how little it was accepted that you could plead and make it into court (this understanding has changed a little bit, a topic we take up in Unit 7 of the course). I provide you with two different sample Complaints to read quickly, both to see how the requirements of FRCP 8 are met and to give you a flavor for different kinds of litigation. An optional video interview in this unit takes you into the strategy behind formulating a Complaint and introduces you to the world of plaintiff-side law firms.

 

2.3 Service of Process teaches you how the Complaint must be provided to the Court and the Defendant(s). Once again, I provide you some of the Forms to show you what this actually looks like in court. This unit introduces a strategic issue that will prove very relevant in this and your other courses: statutes of limitation, which often incentivize or force you to act more quickly as a litigant than you might otherwise be inclined to do. Finally, I use the case of Wyman v. Newhouse to teach you a little about the strategic aspects of all this and the relationship between service of process and personal jurisdiction (Unit 5 of the course).

 

2.4 Responding to the Complaint by Answer (possibly followed by Reply) introduces you to the Answer: one option a Defendant has in responding to the Complaint option (the other option, the motion to dismiss, is taken up in greater depth in Unit 7). We will discuss the relevant FRCPs that define the Answer, and the timing for providing one. A sample Answer, again to be read quickly, let’s you see the rules governing the Answer in action.

 

2.5 Rule 11 and the Truthfulness of Pleadings teaches you about FRCP 11, the rule meant to ensure the truthfulness of the pleadings and other representations to the court. Besides learning the basics of the rule and seeing them deployed in an example case, this sub-unit will give you a close-up picture of how the FRCPs change over time and introduce you to the professional responsibilities of an attorney in the federal civil system—a topic covered more in-depth in other law school courses.

2.1 Introduction to Pleading / Pleading in The “Old” Days (Pre-FRCP) 2.1 Introduction to Pleading / Pleading in The “Old” Days (Pre-FRCP)

2.1.3 Basics of Civil Litigation 2.1.3 Basics of Civil Litigation

 

To help you understand civil litigation, let's go over a few basics.

Definitions:
Claim: Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a “claim” is the group of circumstances for which a court will grant relief (sometimes it is also called a "cause of action").

Element: Each claim is divided into parts, called “elements.”

Prima Facie Case: When the judge asks what a lawyer’s prima facie case is, she may either be asking for the elements of the claim or a short description of the evidence the lawyer has for each of those elements.

Winning in Civil Litigation:
In order to win in civil litigation, a plaintiff has three obligations. The plaintiff must first state a claim for
which they are entitled to relief (and in some cases, state facts underlying the claim). This is sometimes referred to as the "burden of pleading". Second, the plaintiff must meet a "burden of production" by submitting evidence to permit a reasonable person to find each element of the claim. Third, the plaintiff must ultimately meet a "burden of persuasion" by persuading the fact finder that each element is true. The burdens are like successive hurdles in the Olympics with the course of civil litigation being like the race. Once you jump over one you then face the second and then the third.

Sample Claims:
When a claim/cause of action is created by state law, that is where you will find a list of its elements (either by statute or less often by the work of common law judges). When federal law creates the cause of action, that is where you will find the elements. Many of your first-year classes are about learning what these elements are and how they work. To give you an example, here are a few common civil causes of action you may already have encountered.

Assault: (1) intent to cause harmful or offensive contact; and (2) imminent apprehension of such contact.

Defamation: (1) false and defamatory statement; (2) publication not privileged; (3) fault (in some cases
negligence and in some cases malice); (4) injury; and (5) recipient understood communication refers to plaintiff.

Negligence: (1) duty; (2) breach; (3) cause-in-fact; (4) proximate cause; and (5) injury.

Trespass: (1) unauthorized entry by defendant; (2) property possessed by plaintiff; and (3) injury (damage).

2.1.4 Introduction to Motions Practice 2.1.4 Introduction to Motions Practice

 

Under FRCP 12(c), a motion for judgment on the pleadings is a way for a party to challenge the substantive sufficiency of an opposing party’s pleadings.  Under FRCP 12(f), a motion to strike is a way to challenge the substantive sufficiency of defenses in an answer.  For instance, in Biggs v. Pub. Serv. Coordinated Transp., 280 F.2d 311 (3d. Cir. 1960), the court held that the defendant’s general denial of the plaintiff’s jurisdictional allegations could not possibly apply to the allegation that the defendant was a New Jersey corporation, and that the only fair interpretation of the answer is that that allegation must be deemed to be admitted.  A defendant typically can rely on a general denial to say it has denied specific allegations in a plaintiff’s complaint.  Thus, in Ways v. City of Lincoln, 2002 WL 1742664 (D. Neb. 2002), the court found that the defendants had effectively denied certain particular allegations because the defendants had stated in their answer that they “[d]eny that Plaintiff is entitled to any relief at law or in equity as alleged in the Complaint," and that they “[d]eny each and every other allegation contained in Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint except those specifically admitted herein . . . .”  Id. at *23.

Under FRCP 7(a), a plaintiff must reply to an answer that contains counterclaims.  Otherwise, whether to require a reply to an answer is within the discretion of the court. 

Under FRCP 8(b)(6), allegations to which a reply is not required are considered avoided or denied and a plaintiff may controvert them at trial, while allegations to which a reply is required are taken as admitted if not denied in the reply or if a reply is not filed.

2.2 Basics of Modern Pleading: The Complaint 2.2 Basics of Modern Pleading: The Complaint

2.2.1 FRCP 8(a), (d), (e) 2.2.1 FRCP 8(a), (d), (e)

General Rules of Pleading

General Rules of Pleading

(a) Claim for Relief. A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain:

(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction, unless the court already has jurisdiction and the claim needs no new jurisdictional support;

(2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and

(3) a demand for the relief sought, which may include relief in the alternative or different types of relief.

(b) Defenses; Admissions and Denials.

(1) In General. In responding to a pleading, a party must:

(A) state in short and plain terms its defenses to each claim asserted against it; and

(B) admit or deny the allegations asserted against it by an opposing party.

(2) Denials—Responding to the Substance. A denial must fairly respond to the substance of the allegation.

(3) General and Specific Denials. A party that intends in good faith to deny all the allegations of a pleading—including the jurisdictional grounds—may do so by a general denial. A party that does not intend to deny all the allegations must either specifically deny designated allegations or generally deny all except those specifically admitted.

(4) Denying Part of an Allegation. A party that intends in good faith to deny only part of an allegation must admit the part that is true and deny the rest.

(5) Lacking Knowledge or Information. A party that lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of an allegation must so state, and the statement has the effect of a denial.

(6) Effect of Failing to Deny. An allegation—other than one relating to the amount of damages—is admitted if a responsive pleading is required and the allegation is not denied. If a responsive pleading is not required, an allegation is considered denied or avoided.

(c) Affirmative Defenses.

(1) In General. In responding to a pleading, a party must affirmatively state any avoidance or affirmative defense, including:

• accord and satisfaction;

• arbitration and award;

• assumption of risk;

• contributory negligence;

• duress;

• estoppel;

• failure of consideration;

• fraud;

• illegality;

• injury by fellow servant;

• laches;

• license;

• payment;

• release;

• res judicata;

• statute of frauds;

• statute of limitations; and

• waiver.

(2) Mistaken Designation. If a party mistakenly designates a defense as a counterclaim, or a counterclaim as a defense, the court must, if justice requires, treat the pleading as though it were correctly designated, and may impose terms for doing so.

(d) Pleading to Be Concise and Direct; Alternative Statements; Inconsistency.

(1) In General. Each allegation must be simple, concise, and direct. No technical form is required.

(2) Alternative Statements of a Claim or Defense. A party may set out 2 or more statements of a claim or defense alternatively or hypothetically, either in a single count or defense or in separate ones. If a party makes alternative statements, the pleading is sufficient if any one of them is sufficient.

(3) Inconsistent Claims or Defenses. A party may state as many separate claims or defenses as it has, regardless of consistency.

(e) Construing Pleadings. Pleadings must be construed so as to do justice.

2.3 Service of Process 2.3 Service of Process

2.3.1 Service of Process in the Federal System 2.3.1 Service of Process in the Federal System

 

Although connected to notice (a topic we discuss in a later Unit), Service of Process (SOP) is actually its own creature. The former is a constitutional requirement; the latter (in the federal system) is an FRCP requirement. State court systems may use a different form of SOP to satisfy the constitutional requirement.

FRCP 4 and the term “service of process”, to be finicky, is just for the complaint. It gets singled out because it is of particular importance as the first notice (usually) that there is a lawsuit. All other pleadings, motions, discovery requests, etc. fall under the more forgiving requirements of FRCP 5, which allows in person service or even just mailing it to the person’s last known address.

 

A. Basics.

What is the “process” to be served: technically "process" refers to the act of giving the defendant the initial notice of a lawsuit filed against him (a.k.a the summons) with a complaint attached [FRCP 4(a)(1) and 4(c)(1).]

What does the “process” contain?

FRCP 4(a)(1)

Contents. A summons must:

(A) name the court and the parties;

(B) be directed to the defendant;

(C) state the name and address of the plaintiff's attorney or—if unrepresented—of the plaintiff;

(D) state the time within which the defendant must appear and defend;

(E) notify the defendant that a failure to appear and defend will result in a default judgment against the defendant for the relief demanded in the complaint;

(F) be signed by the clerk; and

(G) bear the court's seal.

For an example look at form 3 linked on the online casebook.

How do you do service? There are different rules for individuals v. corporations and other entities. And for inside vs. outside US.

 

For individuals in the U.S.

5 methods. 3 traditional methods in FRCP 4(e)(2):

(A) delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to the individual personally;

(B) leaving a copy of each at the individual's dwelling or usual place of abode with someone of suitable age and discretion who resides there; or

(C) delivering a copy of each to an agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process.

Can you deliver to someone's summer home? No. Can a casual guest accept it under FRCP 4(e)(2)(B)? No.

Notice that the (C) clause is more restrictive than the equivalent clause for corporations below, in that it only allows it to go to agents authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process, not general agents.

What is missing here? Mail. The old system used mail but rulemakers decided it was more hassle than it was worth, so no mail except through the waiver system or if that is authorized by state law system.

Who can be the person who delivers using these options? Anyone over 18 yrs old who is not a party to the action [FRCP 4(c)(2)]

Before 1983, the rule was different and required a U.S. Marshal or someone designated by court. That delayed things a lot, so they scrapped it but at Pl’s request you can still use a marshal [FRCP 4(c)(3)] to, for example, serve a plaintiff for a battery action in a domestic abuse situation. If the plaintiff is a seaman or in forma pauperis the court must do it by marshal.

4th option: Use the method of service of the state in which the federal court in which you are suing in sits [FRCP 4(e)(1)]. For example, if in the Central District of California, you can use California’s service of process rules. This is Pl’s option.

5th option: if the defendant resides outside the state in which the action is commenced, you can use that state’s service rule. [FRCP 4(e)(1)] If you are doing “tag” jurisdiction, you can also serve him with the service rule of the state where you “tag” him (more on this later with Burnham, a case in the Personal Jurisdiction Section). You would not know it but it comes from the words “where service is made” in FRCP 4(e)(1).

Notice that FRCP allows SOP outside of the forum state, which was an innovation of the 1993 amendments. Not all states do.

 

For individuals outside the U.S.

There are special rules for serving individuals outside the U.S. [FRCP 4(f)]. Different countries use widely different methods of SOP. The rule allows “internationally agreed means of service that is reasonably calculated to give notice, such as those authorized by the Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents." That convention requires each contracting state to establish a central authority which receives and executes requests for service or process from other contracting states and makes sure that certification of service of process is effective. [Don’t worry about the details]

Note that this rule leaves open the possibility that a method that would be good enough in the USA would not be good enough elsewhere. (This is covered in the Private International Law class).

 

For corporations, partnerships, associations inside the U.S.

4 methods

FRCP 4(h)(1)(a): Directs you to the two options in FRCP 4(e)(1) (service by the method of the state where the case is filed, or where the corp can be served) [but note, you’d use the equivalent state law method for serving a corporation, not serving individuals]

FRCP 4(h)(1)(B) adds a third and fourth method:

by delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to an officer, a managing or general agent,

or [by delivering it to] any other agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process and—if the agent is one authorized by statute and the statute so requires—by also mailing a copy of each to the defendant.

The third: Officers are officially appointed as a matter of corporate law and usually required to be identified with forms you file with the state in chartering your corporation.

The fourth one is meant to be for a case where a contract specifies an agent for service of process (e.g., "for action on this contract about candlestick sales, Jean Valjean will receive service) [“by appointment”], or a case where a state designates an agent by statute (e.g., as we'll see in the Hess case later, MA passed a law that said if you drive in Massachusetts you authorize service on the department of motor vehicles for any suit arising from an accident) [“by law”].

On the option of delivering to officer, managing, or general agent….

Insurance Co of North America v. S/S Hellenic Challenger (SDNY) (found a little later in the casebook and discussed in class).

 

For corporations, partnerships, associations outside the U.S.

FRCP 4(h)(2) directs you to the same methods in FRCP 4(f) for individuals—except personal delivery under FRCP 4(f)(2)(C)(i): where there is no internationally agreed upon method you cannot use the (i) delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to the individual personally. This is a level of detail not worth bothering yourself about.

 

B. Waiver of Service

A different way of satisfying the rule, without doing service.

FRCP 4(d): Waiver of service is encouraged: Pl notifies Def in writing (“by first class mail or other reliable means”) that he wants him to waive service with pertinent info (spelled out in rules), the complaint, two copies of a waiver of service form [look at Form 5 and 6 in Canvas] and prepaid envelope asking him to waive service and giving him at least 30 days to respond (60 if outside U.S.). If Def fails to waive service without good cause, the Def has to pay the expenses of service along with any expenses relating to collecting those expenses. YOU STILL NEED TO SERVE DEF.

If Pl uses this method and Def agrees to waive, the Def gets 60 days from the day the request for waiver (and complaint) was sent (90 if outside the U.S.) to file answer or 12(b)(6) motion.

So two carrots for Def: you don’t have to pay for the service and you get extra time to respond.

Waiving service is not a waiver of objections to venue or personal jurisdiction.

Notice how the waiver idea solves any notice concern, if you waive you obviously got it.  If you don’t we just go back to personal service, the default method.

 

C. Timing, AKA the consequence of bad service

FRCP 4(m): For service in the U.S., if Pl fails to serve w/in 90 days of filing complaint, the court can dismiss without prejudice (unless Pl shows good cause for delay).

It is a dismissal without prejudice, so no preclusion effects [we will discuss preclusion later in the course].

 

D. Challenging Bad Service

FRCP 12(b) How to Present Defenses. Every defense to a claim for relief in any pleading must be asserted in the responsive pleading if one is required. But a party may assert the following defenses by motion:

. . .

(4) insufficient process;

(5) insufficient service of process;

. . .

What is the difference between the two provisions? A motion to dismiss under FRCP 12(b)(4) attacks the sufficiency of process, thus challenging the form of the summons itself. A defect in the form of the summons results from “noncompliance with the provision of [FRCP] 4(b) or any applicable provision incorporated by FRCP 4(b) that deals specifically with the content of the summons.” Most defects in the form of the summons are considered technical in nature (e.g., incorrect name of the defendant).  Thus, dismissal is generally not appropriate unless the moving party can establish some actual prejudice.

By contrast, a Rule 12(b)(5) motion, which is based on insufficiency of the service of process, does not challenge the form of the summons, but the service of the summons on the defendants. A Rule 12(b)(5) motion is the proper vehicle for challenging the lack of delivery or the failure to comply with the provisions of FRCP 4(d)-(m), which outline various requirements of service.

The failure to properly serve defendants grants the court broad discretion to dismiss an action pursuant to Rule 12(b)(5) or quash service of process in the alternative and allow them to re-serve.

 

E. Return of Service

After the process-server has delivered the papers, she must file a return, which should disclose enough facts to demonstrate that defendant actually has been served and given notice to appear in court. Proper return is ordinarily necessary for the trial court to conclude it has jurisdiction. Specific forms differ from state to state. Usually an affidavit by the person who performed the service or sworn statement of marshal, sheriff, if they did it. That is the federal rule in FRCP 4(l) (an affidavit required unless it is US marshal serving),

Once a return has been filed, there is a strong presumption that the Rule was satisfied, a presumption that can be overcome but is very hard to do. The defendant’s own testimony is not enough and you need something to corroborate it.

For example, in the Miedrich case, the Supreme Court upheld a mortgage foreclosure action even though the person was never served; the sheriff just lied and said he did serve. The rationale? The party serving the complaint did everything they were supposed to. The Court notes that when the return is falsely made, under that state’s law, the aggrieved could proceed against the sheriff who has to post a bond.

2.3.2 FRCP 3 2.3.2 FRCP 3

Commencing an Action

Commencing an Action

A civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court.

2.3.3 FRCP 4(a)-(f), (h), (m) 2.3.3 FRCP 4(a)-(f), (h), (m)

Summons

Commencing an Action

(a) Contents; Amendments.

(1) Contents. A summons must:

(A) name the court and the parties;

(B) be directed to the defendant;

(C) state the name and address of the plaintiff's attorney or—if unrepresented—of the plaintiff;

(D) state the time within which the defendant must appear and defend;

(E) notify the defendant that a failure to appear and defend will result in a default judgment against the defendant for the relief demanded in the complaint;

(F) be signed by the clerk; and

(G) bear the court's seal.

(2) Amendments. The court may permit a summons to be amended.

(b) Issuance. On or after filing the complaint, the plaintiff may present a summons to the clerk for signature and seal. If the summons is properly completed, the clerk must sign, seal, and issue it to the plaintiff for service on the defendant. A summons—or a copy of a summons that is addressed to multiple defendants—must be issued for each defendant to be served.

(c) Service.

(1) In General. A summons must be served with a copy of the complaint. The plaintiff is responsible for having the summons and complaint served within the time allowed by Rule 4(m) and must furnish the necessary copies to the person who makes service.

(2) By Whom. Any person who is at least 18 years old and not a party may serve a summons and complaint.

(3) By a Marshal or Someone Specially Appointed. At the plaintiff's request, the court may order that service be made by a United States marshal or deputy marshal or by a person specially appointed by the court. The court must so order if the plaintiff is authorized to proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. §1915 or as a seaman under 28 U.S.C. §1916.

(d) Waiving Service.

(1) Requesting a Waiver. An individual, corporation, or association that is subject to service under Rule 4(e), (f), or (h) has a duty to avoid unnecessary expenses of serving the summons. The plaintiff may notify such a defendant that an action has been commenced and request that the defendant waive service of a summons. The notice and request must:

(A) be in writing and be addressed:

(i) to the individual defendant; or

(ii) for a defendant subject to service under Rule 4(h), to an officer, a managing or general agent, or any other agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process;

(B) name the court where the complaint was filed;

(C) be accompanied by a copy of the complaint, 2 copies of the waiver form appended to this Rule 4, and a prepaid means for returning the form;

(D) inform the defendant, using the form appended to this Rule 4, of the consequences of waiving and not waiving service;

(E) state the date when the request is sent;

(F) give the defendant a reasonable time of at least 30 days after the request was sent—or at least 60 days if sent to the defendant outside any judicial district of the United States—to return the waiver; and

(G) be sent by first-class mail or other reliable means.

(2) Failure to Waive. If a defendant located within the United States fails, without good cause, to sign and return a waiver requested by a plaintiff located within the United States, the court must impose on the defendant:

(A) the expenses later incurred in making service; and

(B) the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, of any motion required to collect those service expenses.

(3) Time to Answer After a Waiver. A defendant who, before being served with process, timely returns a waiver need not serve an answer to the complaint until 60 days after the request was sent—or until 90 days after it was sent to the defendant outside any judicial district of the United States.

(4) Results of Filing a Waiver. When the plaintiff files a waiver, proof of service is not required and these rules apply as if a summons and complaint had been served at the time of filing the waiver.

(5) Jurisdiction and Venue Not Waived. Waiving service of a summons does not waive any objection to personal jurisdiction or to venue.

(e) Serving an Individual Within a Judicial District of the United States. Unless federal law provides otherwise, an individual—other than a minor, an incompetent person, or a person whose waiver has been filed—may be served in a judicial district of the United States by:

(1) following state law for serving a summons in an action brought in courts of general jurisdiction in the state where the district court is located or where service is made; or

(2) doing any of the following:

(A) delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to the individual personally;

(B) leaving a copy of each at the individual's dwelling or usual place of abode with someone of suitable age and discretion who resides there; or

(C) delivering a copy of each to an agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process.

(f) Serving an Individual in a Foreign Country. Unless federal law provides otherwise, an individual—other than a minor, an incompetent person, or a person whose waiver has been filed—may be served at a place not within any judicial district of the United States:

(1) by any internationally agreed means of service that is reasonably calculated to give notice, such as those authorized by the Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents;

(2) if there is no internationally agreed means, or if an international agreement allows but does not specify other means, by a method that is reasonably calculated to give notice:

(A) as prescribed by the foreign country's law for service in that country in an action in its courts of general jurisdiction;

(B) as the foreign authority directs in response to a letter rogatory or letter of request; or

(C) unless prohibited by the foreign country's law, by:

(i) delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to the individual personally; or

(ii) using any form of mail that the clerk addresses and sends to the individual and that requires a signed receipt; or

(3) by other means not prohibited by international agreement, as the court orders.

(g) Serving a Minor or an Incompetent Person. A minor or an incompetent person in a judicial district of the United States must be served by following state law for serving a summons or like process on such a defendant in an action brought in the courts of general jurisdiction of the state where service is made. A minor or an incompetent person who is not within any judicial district of the United States must be served in the manner prescribed by Rule 4(f)(2)(A), (f)(2)(B), or (f)(3).

(h) Serving a Corporation, Partnership, or Association. Unless federal law provides otherwise or the defendant's waiver has been filed, a domestic or foreign corporation, or a partnership or other unincorporated association that is subject to suit under a common name, must be served:

(1) in a judicial district of the United States:

(A) in the manner prescribed by Rule 4(e)(1) for serving an individual; or

(B) by delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to an officer, a managing or general agent, or any other agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process and—if the agent is one authorized by statute and the statute so requires—by also mailing a copy of each to the defendant; or

(2) at a place not within any judicial district of the United States, in any manner prescribed by Rule 4(f) for serving an individual, except personal delivery under (f)(2)(C)(i).

(i) Serving the United States and Its Agencies, Corporations, Officers, or Employees.

(1) United States. To serve the United States, a party must:

(A)(i) deliver a copy of the summons and of the complaint to the United States attorney for the district where the action is brought—or to an assistant United States attorney or clerical employee whom the United States attorney designates in a writing filed with the court clerk—or

(ii) send a copy of each by registered or certified mail to the civil-process clerk at the United States attorney's office;

(B) send a copy of each by registered or certified mail to the Attorney General of the United States at Washington, D.C.; and

(C) if the action challenges an order of a nonparty agency or officer of the United States, send a copy of each by registered or certified mail to the agency or officer.

(2) Agency; Corporation; Officer or Employee Sued in an Official Capacity. To serve a United States agency or corporation, or a United States officer or employee sued only in an official capacity, a party must serve the United States and also send a copy of the summons and of the complaint by registered or certified mail to the agency, corporation, officer, or employee.

(3) Officer or Employee Sued Individually. To serve a United States officer or employee sued in an individual capacity for an act or omission occurring in connection with duties performed on the United States’ behalf (whether or not the officer or employee is also sued in an official capacity), a party must serve the United States and also serve the officer or employee under Rule 4(e), (f), or (g).

(4) Extending Time. The court must allow a party a reasonable time to cure its failure to:

(A) serve a person required to be served under Rule 4(i)(2), if the party has served either the United States attorney or the Attorney General of the United States; or

(B) serve the United States under Rule 4(i)(3), if the party has served the United States officer or employee.

(j) Serving a Foreign, State, or Local Government.

(1) Foreign State. A foreign state or its political subdivision, agency, or instrumentality must be served in accordance with 28 U.S.C. §1608.

(2) State or Local Government. A state, a municipal corporation, or any other state-created governmental organization that is subject to suit must be served by:

(A) delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to its chief executive officer; or

(B) serving a copy of each in the manner prescribed by that state's law for serving a summons or like process on such a defendant.

(k) Territorial Limits of Effective Service.

(1) In General. Serving a summons or filing a waiver of service establishes personal jurisdiction over a defendant:

(A) who is subject to the jurisdiction of a court of general jurisdiction in the state where the district court is located;

(B) who is a party joined under Rule 14 or 19 and is served within a judicial district of the United States and not more than 100 miles from where the summons was issued; or

(C) when authorized by a federal statute.

(2) Federal Claim Outside State-Court Jurisdiction. For a claim that arises under federal law, serving a summons or filing a waiver of service establishes personal jurisdiction over a defendant if:

(A) the defendant is not subject to jurisdiction in any state's courts of general jurisdiction; and

(B) exercising jurisdiction is consistent with the United States Constitution and laws.

(l) Proving Service.

(1) Affidavit Required. Unless service is waived, proof of service must be made to the court. Except for service by a United States marshal or deputy marshal, proof must be by the server's affidavit.

(2) Service Outside the United States. Service not within any judicial district of the United States must be proved as follows:

(A) if made under Rule 4(f)(1), as provided in the applicable treaty or convention; or

(B) if made under Rule 4(f)(2) or (f)(3), by a receipt signed by the addressee, or by other evidence satisfying the court that the summons and complaint were delivered to the addressee.

(3) Validity of Service; Amending Proof. Failure to prove service does not affect the validity of service. The court may permit proof of service to be amended.

(m) Time Limit for Service. If a defendant is not served within 90 days after the complaint is filed, the court—on motion or on its own after notice to the plaintiff—must dismiss the action without prejudice against that defendant or order that service be made within a specified time. But if the plaintiff shows good cause for the failure, the court must extend the time for service for an appropriate period. This subdivision (m) does not apply to service in a foreign country under Rule 4(f), 4(h)(2), or 4(j)(1), or to service of a notice under Rule 71.1(d)(3)(A).

(n) Asserting Jurisdiction over Property or Assets.

(1) Federal Law. The court may assert jurisdiction over property if authorized by a federal statute. Notice to claimants of the property must be given as provided in the statute or by serving a summons under this rule.

(2) State Law. On a showing that personal jurisdiction over a defendant cannot be obtained in the district where the action is brought by reasonable efforts to serve a summons under this rule, the court may assert jurisdiction over the defendant's assets found in the district. Jurisdiction is acquired by seizing the assets under the circumstances and in the manner provided by state law in that district.

2.3.4 FRCP 12(b)(4), (5) 2.3.4 FRCP 12(b)(4), (5)

Defenses and Objections: When and How Presented; Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings; Consolidating Motions; Waiving Defenses; Pretrial Hearing

Summons

(a) Time to Serve a Responsive Pleading.

(1) In General. Unless another time is specified by this rule or a federal statute, the time for serving a responsive pleading is as follows:

(A) A defendant must serve an answer:

(i) within 21 days after being served with the summons and complaint; or

(ii) if it has timely waived service under Rule 4(d), within 60 days after the request for a waiver was sent, or within 90 days after it was sent to the defendant outside any judicial district of the United States.

(B) A party must serve an answer to a counterclaim or crossclaim within 21 days after being served with the pleading that states the counterclaim or crossclaim.

(C) A party must serve a reply to an answer within 21 days after being served with an order to reply, unless the order specifies a different time.

(2) United States and Its Agencies, Officers, or Employees Sued in an Official Capacity. The United States, a United States agency, or a United States officer or employee sued only in an official capacity must serve an answer to a complaint, counterclaim, or crossclaim within 60 days after service on the United States attorney.

(3) United States Officers or Employees Sued in an Individual Capacity. A United States officer or employee sued in an individual capacity for an act or omission occurring in connection with duties performed on the United States’ behalf must serve an answer to a complaint, counterclaim, or crossclaim within 60 days after service on the officer or employee or service on the United States attorney, whichever is later.

(4) Effect of a Motion. Unless the court sets a different time, serving a motion under this rule alters these periods as follows:

(A) if the court denies the motion or postpones its disposition until trial, the responsive pleading must be served within 14 days after notice of the court's action; or

(B) if the court grants a motion for a more definite statement, the responsive pleading must be served within 14 days after the more definite statement is served.

(b) How to Present Defenses. Every defense to a claim for relief in any pleading must be asserted in the responsive pleading if one is required. But a party may assert the following defenses by motion:

(1) lack of subject-matter jurisdiction;

(2) lack of personal jurisdiction;

(3) improper venue;

(4) insufficient process;

(5) insufficient service of process;

(6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; and

(7) failure to join a party under Rule 19.

A motion asserting any of these defenses must be made before pleading if a responsive pleading is allowed. If a pleading sets out a claim for relief that does not require a responsive pleading, an opposing party may assert at trial any defense to that claim. No defense or objection is waived by joining it with one or more other defenses or objections in a responsive pleading or in a motion.

(c) Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. After the pleadings are closed—but early enough not to delay trial—a party may move for judgment on the pleadings.

(d) Result of Presenting Matters Outside the Pleadings. If, on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c), matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56. All parties must be given a reasonable opportunity to present all the material that is pertinent to the motion.

(e) Motion for a More Definite Statement. A party may move for a more definite statement of a pleading to which a responsive pleading is allowed but which is so vague or ambiguous that the party cannot reasonably prepare a response. The motion must be made before filing a responsive pleading and must point out the defects complained of and the details desired. If the court orders a more definite statement and the order is not obeyed within 14 days after notice of the order or within the time the court sets, the court may strike the pleading or issue any other appropriate order.

(f) Motion to Strike. The court may strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter. The court may act:

(1) on its own; or

(2) on motion made by a party either before responding to the pleading or, if a response is not allowed, within 21 days after being served with the pleading.

(g) Joining Motions.

(1) Right to Join. A motion under this rule may be joined with any other motion allowed by this rule.

(2) Limitation on Further Motions. Except as provided in Rule 12(h)(2) or (3), a party that makes a motion under this rule must not make another motion under this rule raising a defense or objection that was available to the party but omitted from its earlier motion.

(h) Waiving and Preserving Certain Defenses.

(1) When Some Are Waived. A party waives any defense listed in Rule 12(b)(2)–(5) by:

(A) omitting it from a motion in the circumstances described in Rule 12(g)(2); or

(B) failing to either:

(i) make it by motion under this rule; or

(ii) include it in a responsive pleading or in an amendment allowed by Rule 15(a)(1) as a matter of course.

(2) When to Raise Others. Failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, to join a person required by Rule 19(b), or to state a legal defense to a claim may be raised:

(A) in any pleading allowed or ordered under Rule 7(a);

(B) by a motion under Rule 12(c); or

(C) at trial.

(3) Lack of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction. If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.

(i) Hearing Before Trial. If a party so moves, any defense listed in Rule 12(b)(1)–(7)—whether made in a pleading or by motion—and a motion under Rule 12(c) must be heard and decided before trial unless the court orders a deferral until trial.

2.3.6 Insurance Co. of North America v. S/S "Hellenic Challenger" 2.3.6 Insurance Co. of North America v. S/S "Hellenic Challenger"

31 FR Serv2d 846
88 FRD 545

INSURANCE CO. OF NORTH AMERICA
v.
S/S "HELLENIC CHALLENGER"

US Dist Ct, SDNY, August 27, 1980
No. 79 Civ 2702 (CBM)

MOTLEY, District Judge.

Defendant, Hellenic Lines Limited, has moved for an order of this court to set aside the default judgment entered on February 14, 1980, awarding to plaintiff, Insurance Company of North America, damages of $33,352.02 with interest and costs for cargo damages, shortage, loss and non-delivery. Defendant advances two grounds in support of this motion: 1) defective service of process on defendant pursuant to Rule 4(d) (3), (7) of the [847] Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; and 2)·defendant's excusable neglect, mistake or inadvertence pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Finally, and in the alternative, defendant seeks to have the. default judgment set aside to the extent of the amount of damages awarded, and requests an inquest to determine separately the amount of damages to which plaintiff is entitled. The motion to set aside this judgment on the basis of improper service of process and defendant's excusable neglect is denied. Defendant's motion to set aside the damages award and request for an evidentiary hearing on the issue of damages is hereby granted.

On May 29, 1979, a United States Marshal deposited plaintiff's summons and complaint with a claims adjuster at the office of defendant. The complaint stated an admiralty and maritime claim for $33,352.02 for non-delivery, shortage, loss and damage of a shipment of pickled sheepskins shipped from Port Sudan to New York aboard defendant's vessel, the S/S Hellenic Challenger. Subsequently, the summons and complaint were misplaced and thus were never brought to the attention of the appropriate authorities.

The adjuster who had accepted service of the summons· and complaint is not expressly authorized by defendant to accept service of process; the only employees 'endowed with express authority to accept service of process on behalf of· defendant are all titled officers and the Claims Manager. At the time of service' of the Summons and Complaint, the<·Claims Manager was absent due to' illness and the adjuster, an assistant to the Claims Manager, accepted service.

Since the adjuster misplaced the summons and complaint, defendant remained unaware of the pendency of the lawsuit until March 10, 1980, when defendant's bank informed it that defendant's bank account had been attached by plaintiff. It was at this time that defendant first learned that plaintiff's counsel had filed a default judgment and that a writ of execution had been issued on the judgment for $36,392.06.

First, defendant argues that the default judgment should be set aside because service of the :summons and complaint was defective under Rules 4(d) (3), (7) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; and thus rendering the subsequent judgment void on jurisdictional grounds. This court, however, rejects this contention since it finds that service on defendant was properly executed in accordance with Rules 4(d) (3), (7).

Rule 4 (d) (3) provides in relevant part:

"Service shall be made as follows:

"(3) Upon a domestic or foreign corporation or upon a partnership or other unincorporated association which is subject to suit under a common name, by delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to an officer, a managing or general agent, or to any other agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process and, if the agent is one... authorized by statute to receive service and the statute so requires, by also mailing a copy to the defendant."

Rule 4(d) (7) provides in relevant part:

"(7) Upon a defendant of any class referred to in paragraph (1) or (3) of this subdivision of this Rule, it is also sufficient if the summons and complaint are served in the manner prescribed by the statute of the United States or in the manner prescribed by the law of the state in which the district court is held for the service of summons or other like process upon any such defendant in an action brought in the courts of general jurisdiction of that state."

[848] Rule 4(d)(3) has been liberally construed by the courts and, as interpreted, does not ,require rigid formalism. To be valid, service of process is not limited solely to officially designated officers, managing agents or agents appointed by law for the receipt of process. Rather, "[r]ules governing service of process [are] to be construed in a manner reasonably calculated to effectuate their primary purpose: to give the defendant adequate notice that an action is pending . . . [T]he rule does not require that service be made solely on a restricted class of formally titled officials, but rather permits it to be made 'upon a representative so integrated with the organization that he will know what to do with the papers. Generally, service is sufficient when made upon an individual who stands in such a position as to render it fair, reasonable and just to imply the authority on his part to receive services.'" Top Form Mills, Inc. v. Sociedad Nationale Industria Applicazioni Viscosa, 428 F Supp 1237, 1251 (SDNY 1977) (quoting Montclair Electronics, Inc. v. Electra/Midland Corp., 326 F Supp 839 (SDNY 1971)).

Plaintiff's method of service of the summons and complaint was indeed "reasonably calculated" to alert defendants to the initiation of the suit. Mr. Syed, the adjuster served with the summons and complaint, can be categorized as a representative of defendant "well-integrated" into the organization and quite familiar with the formalities associated with the receipt of service of summonses and complaints. He had accepted service of summonses and complaints on behalf of defendant on at least two previous occasions (PI Exhs L, M) in connection with his ordinary duties of receiving and investigating new claims against. defendant. Furthermore, it may be inferred from the facts presented on this motion that Mr., Syed had easy access to Mr. Diamond, the claims manager officially authorized to accept service of process, since the two men are separated from each other only by Mr. Diamond's glass-walled office. In view of these facts, this court concludes that Mr. Syed was sufficiently acquainted with the procedure associated with receipt of service of process to render it fair and just for this court to imply authority on his part to receive service of the summons and complaint. Mr. Syed's familiarity with service of process negates any and all suspicion that the U. S. Marshal delivered the summons and complaint to a representative of defendant who had infrequent contact with summonses and complaints and whose unfamiliarity with service of process increased the risk of careless or improper handling. See Goetz v. Interlake S. S. Co., 47 F2d 753 (SDNY 1931).

Next, defendant argues that the default judgment should be set aside for the reason that the loss of the summons and complaint constitutes "excusable neglect" pursuant to Rule 60(b) (1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 60(b)(l) provides:

"On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect . . .''

While Rule 60(b) (1) is designed to grant relief for the .mistakes and excusable neglect of a party who seeks to vacate a default judgment, this remedy has been utilized by courts to rectify mistakes of attorneys but not those of clients. 'Fischer v. Dover Steamship Co., 218 F2d 682 (2d Cir 1955); Greenspun v. Bogan, 492 F2d 375 (1st Cir 1974). ''[T]he liberal construction is usually reserved for instances where error is due to failure of attorneys or other agents to act on behalf of their clients, not where the client's own internal procedures [849] are at fault." Id. at 382. See Horn v. :Intelectron Corp., 294 F Supp 1153 (SDNY 1968).

In the case at hand, the adjuster's loss of the summons and complaint clearly cannot be ascribed to· any carelessness on the part of defendant's counsel. The procedure for handling the receipt of summonses and complaints is clearly an "internal procedure" of defendant. The adjuster's loss of the summons and complaint is a mistake in the ordinary course of the internal operations of defendant's business and thus does not merit remedial relief pursuant to Rule 60(b) (1).[1]

Finally, defendant requests an inquest to determine the amount of damages for the cargo loss and damage, claiming that the judgment was not based upon a "sum certain" as required by Rule 55(b) (1) of the Federal Rules of, Civil Procedure. It is well-established that a default judgment may· be entered only for a "sum certain." A "sum certain" is a sum which is susceptible to reliable computation or determined by the court after an accounting. See Flaks v. Koegel, 504 F2d 702 (2d Cir 1974); Ace Grain Co. v. American Eagle Fire Ins., 11 FRD 364 (SDNY 1951). Plaintiff's estimate of the cargo damage cannot be labeled as a "sum certain."

Plaintiff's damage award is based upon a report of a surveyor who assigned percentages of damage from excessive heat to each batch ·.of the cargo of pickled sheepskin. This estimate was arrived at by visual examination of the extent of damage to the cargo. This method of ascertaining the damage to cargo and arriving at a monetary estimation of the amount of damages is not a "sum certain" within the ambit of Rule 55(b)(1). It has been held that a surveyor's estimate as to the extent of cargo damage does not represent a liquidated sum certain suitable for the entry of a default judgment. "The surveyor's findings [with respect to the cargo damage] represent an opinion as to the value and other factors which the defendant is not required to accept or it is concluded thereby even though it retained the surveyor . . . . The claim, cargo damage under an insurance policy, is unliquidated and is not converted into one for a liquidated amount or a 'sum certain' by a surveyor's report intended for adjust­ mentor trial purposes. The defendant has the right to a judicial determination of the extent of. the damages claimed by plaintiff and the appropriate method for determining this issue is either by the court or upon a reference in accordance with Rule 55(b) (2)." Ace Grain Co., supra at 365-366.

In the instant case, the surveyor's estimate of the damage to the cargo is not. a binding, final determination of damages for the purposes of entry of the default judgment. ·The court concludes that the default judgment entered in this action is not based upon a sum certain and, accordingly, vacates the default judgment to the extent of the damage award.

For. the above stated reasons, defendant's motions under Rules 4(d)(3), (7) and 60 (b)(1), ( 6) are denied. Defendant's request for an inquest to . determine. the amount of damages recoverable by plaintiff is granted.

[1] Defendant has also failed to show good cause for relief, under Rule 60(b)(6), from entry of the default judgment. See International Controls Corp. v. Vesco, 556 F2q .665 (2d Cir 1977), cert denied, 434 US 1014, 98 S Ct 730, 54 L Ed2d 758(1978)

2.3.8 Wyman v. Newhouse 2.3.8 Wyman v. Newhouse

93 F.2d 313 (1937)

WYMAN
v.
NEWHOUSE.

No. 90.

Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

December 6, 1937.

C. C. Daniels, of New York City (Lelia Russell, Carson & Petteway, of Miami, Fla., of counsel), for appellant.

Max D. Steuer, of New York City, for respondent.

Before MANTON, L. HAND, and SWAN, Circuit Judges.

MANTON, Circuit Judge.

This appeal is from a judgment entered dismissing the complaint on motion before trial. The action is on a judgment entered by default in a Florida state court, a jury having assessed the damages. The recovery there was for money loaned, money advanced for appellee, and for seduction under promise of marriage.

Appellee's answer pleads facts supporting his claim that he was fraudulently enticed into the Florida jurisdiction, appellant's state of residence, for the sole purpose of service of process. A motion by the plaintiff-appellant to strike out this defense and for summary judgment, pursuant to rule 113 of the New York Rules of Civil Practice, [314] was denied. For the purpose of such a motion, the facts alleged in the answer are deemed to be true. Rules 109, 112. Affidavits were submitted in support of and in opposition to these motions, and thereupon appellee moved to dismiss the complaint. The motion was granted.

Appellant and appellee were both married, but before this suit appellant's husband died. They had known each other for some years and had engaged in meretricious relations.

The affidavits submitted by the appellee deemed to be true for the purpose of testing the alleged error of dismissing the complaint established that he was a resident of New York and never lived in Florida. On October 25, 1935, while appellee was in Salt Lake City, Utah, he received a telegram from the appellant, which read: "Account illness home planning leaving. Please come on way back. Must see you." Upon appellee's return to New York he received a letter from appellant stating that her mother was dying in Ireland; that she was leaving the United States for good to go to her mother; that she could not go without seeing the appellee once more; and that she wanted to discuss her affairs with him before she left. Shortly after the receipt of this letter, they spoke to each other on the telephone, whereupon the appellant repeated, in a hysterical and distressed voice, the substance of her letter. Appellee promised to go to Florida in a week or ten days and agreed to notify her when he would arrive. This he did, but before leaving New York by plane he received a letter couched in endearing terms and expressing love and affection for him, as well as her delight at his coming. Before leaving New York, appellee telegraphed appellant, suggesting arrangements for their accommodations together while in Miami, Fla. She telegraphed him at a hotel in Washington, D. C., where he was to stop en route, advising him that the arrangements requested had been made. Appellee arrived at 6 o'clock in the morning at the Miami Airport and saw the appellant standing with her sister some 75 feet distant. He was met by a deputy sheriff who, upon identifying appellee, served him with process in a suit for $500,000. A photographer was present who attempted to take his picture. Thereupon a stranger introduced himself and offered to take appellee to his home, stating that he knew a lawyer who was acquainted with the appellant's attorney. The attorney whom appellee was advised to consult came to the stranger's home and seemed to know about the case. The attorney invited appellee to his office, and upon his arrival he found one of the lawyers for the appellant there. Appellee did not retain the Florida attorney to represent him. He returned to New York by plane that evening and consulted his New York counsel, who advised him to ignore the summons served in Florida. He did so, and judgment was entered by default. Within a few days after the service of process, the appellant came to New York and sought an interview with the appellee. It resulted in their meeting at the home of the appellee's attorney. She was accompanied by her Florida counsel.

These facts and reasonable deductions therefrom convincingly establish that the appellee was induced to enter the jurisdiction of the state of Florida by a fraud perpetrated upon him by the appellant in falsely representing her mother's illness, her intention to leave the United States, and her love and affection for him, when her sole purpose and apparent thought was to induce him to come within the Florida jurisdiction so as to serve him in an action for damages. Appellant does not deny making these representations. All her statements of great and undying love were disproved entirely by her appearance at the airport and participation in the happenings there. She never went to Ireland to see her mother, if indeed the latter was sick at all.

In asking for judgment based on these Florida proceedings, appellant relies upon article 4, section 1, of the United States Constitution, providing that "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and Judicial Proceedings of every other State." Congress has provided that judicial proceedings duly authenticated, "shall have such faith and credit given to them in every court within the United States as they have by law or usage in the courts of the State from which they are taken." 28 U.S.C.A. § 687. The first inquiry is what faith and credit would be given to this judgment within the state of Florida. On these facts, the service of process was fraudulent, and under the circumstances we think would have been vacated there. We are referred neither to any statutory provision of Florida, governing the vacation of service of process when affected by fraud, nor to any controlling Florida decision. We are, therefore, free [315] to apply the law of the forum where the service would have been set aside as fraudulent. Blandin v. Ostrander, 239 F. 700 (C.C.A.2); Neotex Mfg. Co. v. Eidinger, 250 App.Div. 504, 294 N.Y.S. 767 (1st Dept.); Skillman v. Toulson, 211 App.Div 336, 207 N.Y.S. 296.

This judgment is attacked for fraud perpetrated upon the appellee which goes to the jurisdiction of the Florida court over his person. A judgment procured fraudulently, as here, lacks jurisdiction and is null and void. Lucy v. Deas, 59 Fla. 552, 52 So. 515. Thompson v. Thompson, 226 U.S. 551, 33 S.Ct. 129, 57 L.Ed. 347. A fraud affecting the jurisdiction is equivalent to a lack of jurisdiction. Dunlap & Co. v. Cody, 31 Iowa 260, 7 Am.Rep. 129; Duringer v. Moschino, 93 Ind. 495, 498; Abercrombie v. Abercrombie, 64 Kan. 29, 67 P. 539. The appellee was not required to proceed against the judgment in Florida. His equitable defense in answer to a suit on the judgment is sufficient. A judgment recovered in a sister state, through the fraud of the party procuring the appearance of another, is not binding on the latter when an attempt is made to enforce such judgment in another state. Gray v. Richmond Bicycle Co., 167 N.Y. 348, 355, 60 N.E. 663, 82 Am.St.Rep. 720. There is a dictum to the contrary in Capwell v. Sipe, 51 F. 667, 668 (C.C.N.D.Ohio), where the defendant was sued in the foreign court while within the jurisdiction attending another case. His objection to service of process was overruled. There is authority to like effect in Vastine v. Bast, 41 Mo. 493. But we think the weight of authority is against such view. In Jaster v. Currie, 198 U.S. 144, 25 S.Ct. 614, 49 L.Ed. 988, to which appellant refers, the court decided only that the defendant had not been enticed into the jurisdiction by fraud and, therefore, that case is not helpful. Smith v. Apple, 6 F.2d 559 (C.C.A.8) and Cragin v. Lovell, 109 U.S. 194, 3 S.Ct. 132, 27 L.Ed. 903, deal with irregularities in procedure not voiding the judgment.

The appellee was not required to make out a defense on the merits to the suit in Florida. We are not here concerned with such rule, applicable to alleged fraud in the proceedings after valid jurisdiction of the person and the subject matter has been obtained. Here the court did not duly acquire jurisdiction and no such defense to the merits need be shown. An error made in entering judgment against a party over whom the court had no jurisdiction permits a consideration of the jurisdictional question collaterally. The complaint was properly dismissed.

Judgment affirmed.

2.4 Responding to the Complaint by Answer (possibly followed by Reply) 2.4 Responding to the Complaint by Answer (possibly followed by Reply)

2.4.1 FRCP 7 2.4.1 FRCP 7

Pleadings Allowed; Form of Motions and Other Papers

(a) Pleadings. Only these pleadings are allowed:

(1) a complaint;

(2) an answer to a complaint;

(3) an answer to a counterclaim designated as a counterclaim;

(4) an answer to a crossclaim;

(5) a third-party complaint;

(6) an answer to a third-party complaint; and

(7) if the court orders one, a reply to an answer.

(b) Motions and Other Papers.

(1) In General. A request for a court order must be made by motion. The motion must:

(A) be in writing unless made during a hearing or trial;

(B) state with particularity the grounds for seeking the order; and

(C) state the relief sought.

(2) Form. The rules governing captions and other matters of form in pleadings apply to motions and other papers.

2.4.2 FRCP 12(a) 2.4.2 FRCP 12(a)

Defenses and Objections: When and How Presented; Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings; Consolidating Motions; Waiving Defenses; Pretrial Hearing

(a) Time to Serve a Responsive Pleading.

(1) In General. Unless another time is specified by this rule or a federal statute, the time for serving a responsive pleading is as follows:

(A) A defendant must serve an answer:

(i) within 21 days after being served with the summons and complaint; or

(ii) if it has timely waived service under Rule 4(d), within 60 days after the request for a waiver was sent, or within 90 days after it was sent to the defendant outside any judicial district of the United States.

(B) A party must serve an answer to a counterclaim or crossclaim within 21 days after being served with the pleading that states the counterclaim or crossclaim.

(C) A party must serve a reply to an answer within 21 days after being served with an order to reply, unless the order specifies a different time.

(2) United States and Its Agencies, Officers, or Employees Sued in an Official Capacity. The United States, a United States agency, or a United States officer or employee sued only in an official capacity must serve an answer to a complaint, counterclaim, or crossclaim within 60 days after service on the United States attorney.

(3) United States Officers or Employees Sued in an Individual Capacity. A United States officer or employee sued in an individual capacity for an act or omission occurring in connection with duties performed on the United States’ behalf must serve an answer to a complaint, counterclaim, or crossclaim within 60 days after service on the officer or employee or service on the United States attorney, whichever is later.

(4) Effect of a Motion. Unless the court sets a different time, serving a motion under this rule alters these periods as follows:

(A) if the court denies the motion or postpones its disposition until trial, the responsive pleading must be served within 14 days after notice of the court's action; or

(B) if the court grants a motion for a more definite statement, the responsive pleading must be served within 14 days after the more definite statement is served.

(b) How to Present Defenses. Every defense to a claim for relief in any pleading must be asserted in the responsive pleading if one is required. But a party may assert the following defenses by motion:

(1) lack of subject-matter jurisdiction;

(2) lack of personal jurisdiction;

(3) improper venue;

(4) insufficient process;

(5) insufficient service of process;

(6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; and

(7) failure to join a party under Rule 19.

A motion asserting any of these defenses must be made before pleading if a responsive pleading is allowed. If a pleading sets out a claim for relief that does not require a responsive pleading, an opposing party may assert at trial any defense to that claim. No defense or objection is waived by joining it with one or more other defenses or objections in a responsive pleading or in a motion.

(c) Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. After the pleadings are closed—but early enough not to delay trial—a party may move for judgment on the pleadings.

(d) Result of Presenting Matters Outside the Pleadings. If, on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c), matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56. All parties must be given a reasonable opportunity to present all the material that is pertinent to the motion.

(e) Motion for a More Definite Statement. A party may move for a more definite statement of a pleading to which a responsive pleading is allowed but which is so vague or ambiguous that the party cannot reasonably prepare a response. The motion must be made before filing a responsive pleading and must point out the defects complained of and the details desired. If the court orders a more definite statement and the order is not obeyed within 14 days after notice of the order or within the time the court sets, the court may strike the pleading or issue any other appropriate order.

(f) Motion to Strike. The court may strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter. The court may act:

(1) on its own; or

(2) on motion made by a party either before responding to the pleading or, if a response is not allowed, within 21 days after being served with the pleading.

(g) Joining Motions.

(1) Right to Join. A motion under this rule may be joined with any other motion allowed by this rule.

(2) Limitation on Further Motions. Except as provided in Rule 12(h)(2) or (3), a party that makes a motion under this rule must not make another motion under this rule raising a defense or objection that was available to the party but omitted from its earlier motion.

(h) Waiving and Preserving Certain Defenses.

(1) When Some Are Waived. A party waives any defense listed in Rule 12(b)(2)–(5) by:

(A) omitting it from a motion in the circumstances described in Rule 12(g)(2); or

(B) failing to either:

(i) make it by motion under this rule; or

(ii) include it in a responsive pleading or in an amendment allowed by Rule 15(a)(1) as a matter of course.

(2) When to Raise Others. Failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, to join a person required by Rule 19(b), or to state a legal defense to a claim may be raised:

(A) in any pleading allowed or ordered under Rule 7(a);

(B) by a motion under Rule 12(c); or

(C) at trial.

(3) Lack of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction. If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.

(i) Hearing Before Trial. If a party so moves, any defense listed in Rule 12(b)(1)–(7)—whether made in a pleading or by motion—and a motion under Rule 12(c) must be heard and decided before trial unless the court orders a deferral until trial.

2.4.3 FRCP 8(b), (c), (e) 2.4.3 FRCP 8(b), (c), (e)

General Rules of Pleading

(a) Claim for Relief. A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain:

(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction, unless the court already has jurisdiction and the claim needs no new jurisdictional support;

(2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and

(3) a demand for the relief sought, which may include relief in the alternative or different types of relief.

(b) Defenses; Admissions and Denials.

(1) In General. In responding to a pleading, a party must:

(A) state in short and plain terms its defenses to each claim asserted against it; and

(B) admit or deny the allegations asserted against it by an opposing party.

(2) Denials—Responding to the Substance. A denial must fairly respond to the substance of the allegation.

(3) General and Specific Denials. A party that intends in good faith to deny all the allegations of a pleading—including the jurisdictional grounds—may do so by a general denial. A party that does not intend to deny all the allegations must either specifically deny designated allegations or generally deny all except those specifically admitted.

(4) Denying Part of an Allegation. A party that intends in good faith to deny only part of an allegation must admit the part that is true and deny the rest.

(5) Lacking Knowledge or Information. A party that lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of an allegation must so state, and the statement has the effect of a denial.

(6) Effect of Failing to Deny. An allegation—other than one relating to the amount of damages—is admitted if a responsive pleading is required and the allegation is not denied. If a responsive pleading is not required, an allegation is considered denied or avoided.

(c) Affirmative Defenses.

(1) In General. In responding to a pleading, a party must affirmatively state any avoidance or affirmative defense, including:

• accord and satisfaction;

• arbitration and award;

• assumption of risk;

• contributory negligence;

• duress;

• estoppel;

• failure of consideration;

• fraud;

• illegality;

• injury by fellow servant;

• laches;

• license;

• payment;

• release;

• res judicata;

• statute of frauds;

• statute of limitations; and

• waiver.

(2) Mistaken Designation. If a party mistakenly designates a defense as a counterclaim, or a counterclaim as a defense, the court must, if justice requires, treat the pleading as though it were correctly designated, and may impose terms for doing so.

(d) Pleading to Be Concise and Direct; Alternative Statements; Inconsistency.

(1) In General. Each allegation must be simple, concise, and direct. No technical form is required.

(2) Alternative Statements of a Claim or Defense. A party may set out 2 or more statements of a claim or defense alternatively or hypothetically, either in a single count or defense or in separate ones. If a party makes alternative statements, the pleading is sufficient if any one of them is sufficient.

(3) Inconsistent Claims or Defenses. A party may state as many separate claims or defenses as it has, regardless of consistency.

(e) Construing Pleadings. Pleadings must be construed so as to do justice.

2.4.4 FRCP 6 2.4.4 FRCP 6

Computing and Extending Time; Time for Motion Papers

SKIM THIS

Computing and Extending Time; Time for Motion Papers

(a) Computing Time. The following rules apply in computing any time period specified in these rules, in any local rule or court order, or in any statute that does not specify a method of computing time.

(1) Period Stated in Days or a Longer Unit. When the period is stated in days or a longer unit of time:

(A) exclude the day of the event that triggers the period;

(B) count every day, including intermediate Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays; and

(C) include the last day of the period, but if the last day is a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, the period continues to run until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday.

(2) Period Stated in Hours. When the period is stated in hours:

(A) begin counting immediately on the occurrence of the event that triggers the period;

(B) count every hour, including hours during intermediate Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays; and

(C) if the period would end on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, the period continues to run until the same time on the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday.

(3) Inaccessibility of the Clerk's Office. Unless the court orders otherwise, if the clerk's office is inaccessible:

(A) on the last day for filing under Rule 6(a)(1), then the time for filing is extended to the first accessible day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday; or

(B) during the last hour for filing under Rule 6(a)(2), then the time for filing is extended to the same time on the first accessible day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday.

(4) “Last Day” Defined. Unless a different time is set by a statute, local rule, or court order, the last day ends:

(A) for electronic filing, at midnight in the court's time zone; and

(B) for filing by other means, when the clerk's office is scheduled to close.

(5) “Next Day” Defined. The “next day” is determined by continuing to count forward when the period is measured after an event and backward when measured before an event.

(6) “Legal Holiday” Defined. “Legal holiday” means:

(A) the day set aside by statute for observing New Year's Day, Martin Luther King Jr.'s Birthday, Washington's Birthday, Memorial Day, Independence Day, Labor Day, Columbus Day, Veterans’ Day, Thanksgiving Day, or Christmas Day;

(B) any day declared a holiday by the President or Congress; and

(C) for periods that are measured after an event, any other day declared a holiday by the state where the district court is located.

(b) Extending Time.

(1) In General. When an act may or must be done within a specified time, the court may, for good cause, extend the time:

(A) with or without motion or notice if the court acts, or if a request is made, before the original time or its extension expires; or

(B) on motion made after the time has expired if the party failed to act because of excusable neglect.

(2) Exceptions. A court must not extend the time to act under Rules 50(b) and (d), 52(b), 59(b), (d), and (e), and 60(b).

(c) Motions, Notices of Hearing, and Affidavits.

(1) In General. A written motion and notice of the hearing must be served at least 14 days before the time specified for the hearing, with the following exceptions:

(A) when the motion may be heard ex parte;

(B) when these rules set a different time; or

(C) when a court order—which a party may, for good cause, apply for ex parte—sets a different time.

(2) Supporting Affidavit. Any affidavit supporting a motion must be served with the motion. Except as Rule 59(c) provides otherwise, any opposing affidavit must be served at least 7 days before the hearing, unless the court permits service at another time.

(d) Additional Time After Certain Kinds of Service. When a party may or must act within a specified time after being served and service is made under Rule 5(b)(2)(C) (mail), (D) (leaving with the clerk), or (F) (other means consented to), 3 days are added after the period would otherwise expire under Rule 6(a).

2.4.6 Note on Responding to a Complaint 2.4.6 Note on Responding to a Complaint

 

The Answer: Some Basics

When faced with a complaint, defense lawyers have a variety of tools they can use to respond. An Answer to a complaint can contain four different types of responses. First, it can contain admissions and denials to the particular points made in the plaintiff’s complaint (see the Catalona Answer as an example). Second, it can contain defenses under FRCP 12(b) (e.g., lack of subject matter or personal jurisdiction, improper venue, or failure to state a claim). Third, the Answer can contain affirmative defenses under FRCP 8(c). Finally, the Answer can contain counterclaims and cross-claims under FRCP 13 that were not mentioned in the complaint (we will discuss both in a later portion of the course). Defense counsel can also choose to add an additional defendant to a counterclaim or can choose to otherwise add parties. One of the major purposes of the Answer in the FRCP system is to help narrow the issues that will be litigated and allow the court and the other party to understand which controversies are “live” ones.

 

Admissions and Denials

Under FRCP 8(b), a party is required to admit or deny each averment in the complaint, except when the party “lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of an allegation.” The Answer may deny specific allegations, whole paragraphs, or the entire complaint. FRCP 11, which we will study shortly, is what keeps defendants honest in their Answer. Defendants are often reluctant to admit anything in a complaint—particularly legal conclusions (e.g., Def was negligent)—because doing so causes those conclusions to be binding for the rest of the trial unless the Answer is amended.

Defense counsel should be especially cautious in admitting and denying an entire sentence in a complaint when they only mean to deny portions of it. In Zielinski v. Philadelphia Piers, Inc., 139 F. Supp. 408 (D.C. Pa. 1956), the plaintiff alleged that a vehicle “owned, operated, and controlled” by the defendant was negligently caused to come into contact with the plaintiff and to injure him. The defendant denied the entire paragraph of averments, when he easily could have admitted that the accident happened, that the defendant owned the vehicle, and that there was some injury to the plaintiffs. Did the defendant lie when he denied that he “owned, operated, and controlled” the vehicle when he did own the vehicle? It is a close question; technically, you could argue that he denied the conjunction of the three verbs. In this case the plaintiff sued the wrong defendant and by the time the plaintiff realized the statute of limitations had already run. To punish the defendant for what it viewed as a surreptitious use of the denial mechanism, the court ruled that the defendant should be treated as though it had admitted operation and control of the vehicle in question. That is pretty harsh medicine, and few courts would go so far to punish a defendant who technically plead the truth. Nonetheless, the case is illustrative of how important choosing when to admit and when to deny can be in the Answer. There is also a lesson to be learned for the plaintiff who drafted that complaint: never put an “and” into a single line of the complaint where the denial could be read as denying merely the conjunction. It would have been better to plead in the complaint separate statements about ownership, operation, and control.

Although defense counsel may state that they “lack knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of an allegation,” pleading that way should not be done lightly. Some jurisdictions specifically prohibit "evasive denials." See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 10-47 ("where any matter of fact is alleged with diverse circumstances, some of which are untruly stated, it shall not be sufficient to deny it as alleged, but so much as is true and material should be stated or admitted, and the rest only denied."). Also consider Greenbaum v. United States, 360 F. Supp. 784 (E.D. Pa. 1973), in which the Government was the defendant:

An answer of lack of knowledge or information will usually be deemed a denial. A party, however, may be held to the duty to exert reasonable effort to obtain knowledge of a fact. . . . In the present case defendant failed to examine available, highly relevant Government documents which would have given a basis for the belief that plaintiff was not a business invitee and that the Court did not have jurisdiction under the FTCA. A fact which is denied for lack of knowledge or information may be deemed admitted if the matter is one to which the party does have knowledge or information. . . . The government will be held to an admission that plaintiff was a business invitee at the time of the accident. . .

 

Affirmative Defenses

Defendants may also make affirmative defenses, in which the defendant makes the claim that even if the plaintiff wins on its claims in the complaint, the defendant still wins the case for another reason. Defendants have the burdens of pleading, production, and persuasion as to all elements of affirmative defenses. For the most part, if a defendant fails to raise an affirmative defense in the Answer, the defendant has waived it unless an amendment of the Answer is allowed. This is particularly so for the list of nineteen affirmative defenses listed in FRCP 8(c). For other affirmative defenses some courts have been less strict, allowing some affirmative defenses that were not plead in the Answer absent a showing of prejudice to the plaintiff. See, e.g., Proctor v. Fluor Enterprises, Inc.,494 F.3d 1337, 1351 (11th Cir. 2007) (“The general rule of waiver is more easily applied when a party fails to set forth one of the nineteen defenses specifically listed in Rule 8(c); waiver becomes less clear when a party fails to assert affirmatively some ‘other matter’ that pre-existing federal case law has not clearly construed as ‘constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense’ under Rule 8(c).”). Still, when you are practicing you never want to put yourself in the position of having to rely on a court to let you slip in an affirmative defense. If it forbids you from doing so at a later date, your client may sue you for legal malpractice!

2.5 Rule 11 and the Truthfulness of Pleadings 2.5 Rule 11 and the Truthfulness of Pleadings

2.5.1 FRCP 11 2.5.1 FRCP 11

Signing Pleadings, Motions, and Other Papers; Representations to the Court; Sanctions

Signing Pleadings, Motions, and Other Papers; Representations to the Court; Sanctions

(a) Signature. Every pleading, written motion, and other paper must be signed by at least one attorney of record in the attorney's name—or by a party personally if the party is unrepresented. The paper must state the signer's address, e-mail address, and telephone number. Unless a rule or statute specifically states otherwise, a pleading need not be verified or accompanied by an affidavit. The court must strike an unsigned paper unless the omission is promptly corrected after being called to the attorney's or party's attention.

(b) Representations to the Court. By presenting to the court a pleading, written motion, or other paper—whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating it—an attorney or unrepresented party certifies that to the best of the person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances:

(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation;

(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law;

(3) the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and

(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if specifically so identified, are reasonably based on belief or a lack of information.

(c) Sanctions.

(1) In General. If, after notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond, the court determines that Rule 11(b) has been violated, the court may impose an appropriate sanction on any attorney, law firm, or party that violated the rule or is responsible for the violation. Absent exceptional circumstances, a law firm must be held jointly responsible for a violation committed by its partner, associate, or employee.

(2) Motion for Sanctions. A motion for sanctions must be made separately from any other motion and must describe the specific conduct that allegedly violates Rule 11(b). The motion must be served under Rule 5, but it must not be filed or be presented to the court if the challenged paper, claim, defense, contention, or denial is withdrawn or appropriately corrected within 21 days after service or within another time the court sets. If warranted, the court may award to the prevailing party the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, incurred for the motion.

(3) On the Court's Initiative. On its own, the court may order an attorney, law firm, or party to show cause why conduct specifically described in the order has not violated Rule 11(b).

(4) Nature of a Sanction. A sanction imposed under this rule must be limited to what suffices to deter repetition of the conduct or comparable conduct by others similarly situated. The sanction may include nonmonetary directives; an order to pay a penalty into court; or, if imposed on motion and warranted for effective deterrence, an order directing payment to the movant of part or all of the reasonable attorney's fees and other expenses directly resulting from the violation.

(5) Limitations on Monetary Sanctions. The court must not impose a monetary sanction:

(A) against a represented party for violating Rule 11(b)(2); or

(B) on its own, unless it issued the show-cause order under Rule 11(c)(3) before voluntary dismissal or settlement of the claims made by or against the party that is, or whose attorneys are, to be sanctioned.

(6) Requirements for an Order. An order imposing a sanction must describe the sanctioned conduct and explain the basis for the sanction.

(d) Inapplicability to Discovery. This rule does not apply to disclosures and discovery requests, responses, objections, and motions under Rules 26 through 37.

2.5.3 Chaplin v. Du Pont Advance Fiber Systems 2.5.3 Chaplin v. Du Pont Advance Fiber Systems

Kevin Lambert CHAPLIN, et. al., Plaintiffs, v. DU PONT ADVANCE FIBER SYSTEMS, Du Pont Spruance, Du Pont Textile & Interiors, Inc., Defendants.

No. CIV. 3:03CV469.

United States District Court, E.D. Virginia, Richmond Division.

Feb. 18, 2004.

*768Thomas Hunt Roberts, Thomas H. Roberts & Associates PC, Richmond, VA, Kirk David Lyons, Black Mountain, NC, Kevin Lambert Chaplin, pro se, Chesterfield, VA, James Philip Jones, pro se, Robert Coleman Lewis, pro se, Marvin L. Oliver, pro se, Lynn Eugene Ritenour, pro se, Richmond, VA, David Eugene Rowlette, pro se, Petersburg, VA, Stephen Jackson Turley, pro se, Chester, VA, for Plaintiffs.

Jonathan Paul Harmon, Robert Francis Holland, McGuireWoods LLP, Richmond, VA, Niall Anthony Paul, James S. Crockett, Jr., Spilman, Thomas & Battle PLLC, Charleston, WV, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

(Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants’ Rule 11 Motion for Sanctions and Granting Defendants’ Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Expenses)

HUDSON, District Judge.

This case is before the Court on Defendants’ Motion for Sanctions Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure [hereinafter “Rule”] 11 and Defendants’ Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Expenses. The parties thoroughly briefed both motions, and on January 30, 2004, the Court heard oral argument. After reviewing the pleadings, memoranda, and affidavits filed in support thereof and considering the arguments and case law offered by counsel, the - Court denied Defendants’ Rule 11 Motion for Sanctions and granted Defendants’ Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Expenses. The Court reserved its ruling on the amount and apportionment of fees to be awarded but announced that it would award fees, under 42 U.S.C. § 2000-e-5(k) against both Plaintiffs and their counsel.

Thereafter, and with leave of Court, the Defendants filed a supplemental memorandum on attorneys’ fees seeking reconsideration of both the Court’s ruling on the Rule 11 motion and its ruling with regard to Title VII fees and costs. On February 13, 2004, Plaintiffs responded. Within their memoranda, both parties alerted the Court to its error in forecasting an award of fees against Plaintiffs’ counsel under 42 U.S.C. § 2000-e-5(k). See Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 761-62, 100 S.Ct. 2455, 65 L.Ed.2d 488 (1980); Corneveaux v. CUNA Mut. Ins. Group, 76 F.3d 1498, 1508-09 (10th Cir.1996); Quiroga v. Hasbro, Inc., 934 F.2d 497, 504 (3rd Cir.) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 940, 112 S.Ct. 376, 116 L.Ed.2d 327 (1991); Durrett v. Jenkins Brickyard, Inc., *769678 F.2d 911, 915 (11th Cir.1982). The Court concedes the error and vacates its ruling on that point. The Court cannot and will not levy Defendants’ fees and costs against Plaintiffs’ counsel under 42 U.S.C. § 2000-e-5(k).

On the other hand, having reflected on the matter for several additional weeks, the Court also vacates its January 30, 2004 bench ruling with respect to Defendants’ Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions. Upon reconsideration, and for the reasons detailed below, the Court now grants Defendants’ Rule 11 motion in part, and denies it in part. The Court maintains the balance of its position with respect to Defendants’ motion for fees and expenses, granting said motion and apportioning the fees appropriately.

I. Defendants’ Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions

Within their Rule 11 motion, Defendants argued that Plaintiffs’ counsel, Kirk Lyons, Esquire (“Lyons”), should be sanctioned (1)for filing an Amended Complaint that contains claims not warranted by existing law, by a non-frivolous extension, modification, or reversal thereof, or by the establishment of new law; and (2) for filing claims that contain allegations and other factual contentions without current or potential future evidentiary support. At an earlier stage, this Court reviewed Defendants’ motion and deferred its ruling pending supplemental briefing on critical sub-issues. Additionally, at that time, the Court raised a third Rule 11 issue, which was whether Lyons’s actions, in filing-pleadings without having the sponsorship of an attorney admitted to practice in the Eastern District of Virginia, comported with Local Rule 83.1. Subsequently, the parties analyzed all three issues in light of the Rule 11 jurisprudence of the Fourth Circuit.

First, as it relates to pleadings in general, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b) states that:

By presenting to the court (whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating) a pleading, written motion, or other paper, an attorney ... is certifying that to the best of the person’s knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances, -
(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation;
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law; [and]
(3) the allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery ....

Fed.R.Civ.P. 11(b). In other words, whether a civil complaint satisfies the requirements of Rule 11 depends upon how it measures up against three criteria. First, the complaint must be filed for a proper purpose. Second, each count of the complaint must have a sufficient basis in law. And third, each of the claims must have a sufficient basis in fact.

With respect to the first factor, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ “crusading,” repeat litigation of identical claims and subject matter, in the face of a number of adverse rulings from various courts and circuits, supports an inference that the immediate litigation was meant to harass DuPont. Under the circumstances of this case, which emphasizes Plaintiffs’ claim of *770national origin discrimination, the Court does not agree.

Rule 11 “is not intended to chill an attorney’s enthusiasm or creativity in pursuing factual or legal theories.” See Fed. R.Civ.P. 11 (notes of advisory committee on 1983 amendment). Likewise, Rule 11 “does not seek to stifle the exuberant spirit of skilled advocacy or to require that a claim be proven before a complaint can be filed.” Cleveland Demolition Co. v. Azcon Scrap Corp., 827 F.2d 984, 988 (4th Cir.1987). “Creative claims, coupled even with ambiguous or inconsequential facts, may merit dismissal, but not punishment.” Davis v. Carl, 906 F.2d 533, 538 (11th Cir.1990).

Here, it is the opinion of the Court that, regardless of the merits of the claims, Lyons’s purpose in filing the immediate lawsuit was not to harass DuPont but, rather, to create or expand Title VII jurisprudence. As the Fourth Circuit has said, “if a complaint is filed to vindicate rights in court, and for some other purpose, a court should not sanction counsel for an intention that the court does not approve, so long as the added purpose is not undertaken in bad faith and is not so excessive as to eliminate a proper purpose. Thus, the purpose to vindicate rights in court must be central and sincere.” In re Kunstler, 914 F.2d 505, 518 (4th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 969, 111 S.Ct. 1607, 113 L.Ed.2d 669 (1991). Whatever Lyons’s collateral intentions were, this Court is convinced that he filed the immediate action, on behalf of the plaintiffs, primarily to broaden the Fourth Circuit’s interpretation of “national origin” protection. Consequently, the Court finds no proof that Lyons filed this action for an improper purpose.

Second, Defendants request sanctions because Lyons filed the immediate case in spite of the contrary Fourth Circuit ruling in Terrill v. Chao, 31 Fed.Appx. 99, 2002 WL 376681 (4th Cir.2002)(per curiam), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 823, 123 S.Ct. 108, 154 L.Ed.2d 32 (2002). In so arguing, Defendants remind this Court that, in Ter-rill, the Fourth Circuit ruled against Lyons when he argued that Title VII included “Confederate Southern American” as a protected class. In light of Terrill, it is Defendants’ position that the immediate case ‘ha[d] absolutely no chance of success under the existing precedent.’ Lewin v. Cooke, 95 F.Supp.2d 513, 527 (E.D.Va.2000)(quoting Brubaker v. City of Richmond, 943 F.2d 1363, 1373 (4th Cir.1991)).

For his part, Lyons concedes that an argument that “has absolutely no chance of success under the existing precedent” may be sanctionable. Hunter v. Earthgrains Co. Bakery, 281 F.3d 144, 153 (4th Cir.2002) (citation omitted). He insists, however, that the precedent precluding the claim must be authoritative. See Goldstein v. Malcolm G. Fries & Assocs., 72 F.Supp.2d 620, 628 (E.D.Va.1999). The Fourth Circuit agrees. In Hogan v. Carter, 85 F.3d 1113 (4th Cir.1996), the Fourth Circuit noted'that:

[SJince unpublished opinions are not even regarded as binding precedent in our circuit, such opinions cannot be considered in deciding whether particular conduct violated clearly established law .We could not allow liability to be imposed ... based upon unpublished opinions that we ourselves have determined will be binding only upon the parties immediately before the court.

Id. at 1118 (refusing to reject qualified immunity based upon an unpublished opinion that was not directly on point). In this case, although the Court has found no authoritative case law anywhere in the nation to support Plaintiffs’ claim of national origin discrimination, neither has it found a single, binding case to the contrary. *771Thus, this Court cannot say that the plaintiffs’ claim is “[unjwarranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 11(b)(2). Thus, Defendants’ motion for sanctions will not be granted on that basis.

On the other hand, when compared with the requirements of Rule 11(b)(3), Lyons’s Amended Complaint gives this Court great pause. According to Rule 11(b)(3), before filing Plaintiffs’ claims, Lyons was required to assure that “the allegations and other factual contentions [therein had] evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, [were] likely to have evidentiary support ....” Fed. R.Civ.P. 11(b)(3). This means that Lyons was required to conduct a reasonable investigation of the factual bases underlying-each of his clients’ claims before filing them. See Cleveland Demolition Co., 827 F.2d at 987. When there is no factual basis for a particular claim, that claim violates Rule 11(b)(3). See In re Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 516.

In this case, Plaintiffs’ amended complaint included three allegations. In sum, it averred that DuPont’s ban on the display of the Confederate flag discriminated against them based upon their national origin, their religion, and their race. With respect to Count I, Plaintiffs provided the Court with voluminous facts, both supported and unsupported, purporting to back their claim of national origin discrimination. Irrespective of the merits of that claim, it marginally satisfies Rule 11(b)(3).

The Court originally deemed Count II a “close call,” denying Defendants’ related motion for sanctions. After further consideration, however, the Court is convinced that Lyons had absolutely no factual foundation upon which to base a claim of religious discrimination. As this Court previously noted, nowhere in the Amended Complaint did Plaintiffs allege that they had both requested and been denied a religious accommodation. Even Plaintiffs’ belated letter-writing effort failed to support such a claim. Accordingly, it is the opinion of this Court that Count II is so lacking in reasonable evidentiary support that the Court must impose Rule 11 sanctions for the filing of that claim.

Likewise, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ Count III racial discrimination claim is neither factually supported nor supportable. The plaintiffs are all Caucasian, but never once did they suggest that DuPont’s policy discriminates, directly or indirectly, against Caucasians. On the contrary, Plaintiffs’ averred class, Southern Confederate Americans, is multiracial. This . fact alone practically eviscerates Plaintiffs’ claim that DuPont discriminated against them on the basis of race. Thus, Plaintiffs’ amended complaint contains no factual basis whatsoever to support an allegation that DuPont’s ban discriminates by race. Lyons’s prefiling inquiry could not have revealed otherwise.

Consequently, as the Court noted on January 30, 2004, it is clear that Count III is both frivolous and unwarranted such that it fails to satisfy the requirements of Rule 11(b)(3). Although the Court previously declined to award sanctions with respect to Count III, upon further consideration the Court vacates its previous ruling and grants the Defendants’ motion for sanctions on that count.

The purposes of Rule 11 are to compensate the victims of the violation, to punish present litigation abuse, to streamline court dockets, to facilitate court management, and to deter future litigation abuse. In re Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 522-23. Whether Counts II and III are the product of bad faith or just poor judgment, it is the opinion of the Court that each is so devoid of merit as to warrant Rule 11 *772sanctions. Consequently, although the Court denies Defendants’ Rule 11 motion for sanctions with respect to Count I of the Amended Complaint, the motion is granted with respect to Counts II and III. Fed. R.Civ.P. 11(b)(3). The Court will determine the appropriate amount of sanctions to award after considering other relevant factors below.

II. Sanctions Based upon Alleged Violation of Local Rule 83.1

Here, although the Court need not rehash the entire procedural history of the case, it is important to repeat some of its most important chronology. Initially, Mr. Lyons was admitted to this Court pro hac vice on the motion of local counsel, Mr. Thomas Roberts. Thereafter, on October 7, 2003, the Court allowed Plaintiffs’ local counsel to withdraw, leaving the plaintiffs with the representation of Mr. Lyons, who operates out of the Southern Legal Resource Center in Black Mountain, North Carolina, but without the sponsorship of an attorney admitted to practice in the Eastern District of Virginia. At that time, Mr. Lyons made repeated efforts to secure new local counsel.

In the meantime, however, on October 14, 2003, Defendants filed a Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss. On October 25, 2003, Mr. Lyons, still without local counsel, sent a letter to the Court requesting that Local Rule 83.1 be waived in order to accommodate his situation.1 Without waiting for the Court to answer, however, on October 27, 2003, Lyons submitted a response to the motion to dismiss, which the Clerk of the Court received but did not file because of Lyons’s pro hac vice status. Lyons submitted the response on the date it would otherwise have been due. Thereafter, on October 31, 2003, Lyon's helped his clients file individual motions, purportedly pro se, in which Plaintiffs urged the Court to adopt Lyons’s response as their own.

Although, on October 17, 2003, Defendants had formally warned Plaintiffs’ counsel that they would eventually file a motion for sanctions unless Plaintiffs chose to dismiss the case, they waited the required 21-day “safe harbor” period,' as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(c)(1)(A), to do so. Then, on November 7, 2003, Defendants filed the Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions that is currently before the Court. Ultimately, on November 19, 2003, after repeated efforts to assist Lyons in securing local counsel, and finding it in the interest of justice to do so, this Court waived Local Rule 83.1 and allowed Lyons to serve as counsel, for the purposes of this case only, without the sponsorship of local counsel.

Sua sponte, in its November 25 Memorandum Opinion, the Court advised the parties that it would consider sanctioning Mr. Lyons for his apparent attempt to circumvent Local Rule 83.1. Of course, Lyons argues that he did not attempt to skirt the Local Rule. He posits that he did what he had to do, under the circumstances, in order to most zealously represent his clients.

The Court understands that Lyons was in a difficult situation. He had no local counsel sponsorship, and as this Court is aware from its own attempts to intervene, a number of qualified local attorneys declined the invitation to assist Lyons. What the Court finds particularly vexatious, however, is that Lyons, who is lum-*773self not admitted to practice in the Eastern District, chose to file pleadings on behalf of his clients and to label them pro se. At the time, Lyons had written a letter to the Court asking for relief from the requirements of Rule 83.1(F). Thus, it is clear that Lyons was aware of the strictures of that Rule. Lyons also knew that the Court was attempting to identify a member of the local bar who might be willing to sponsor him in this case.

Lyons admits that, at the time he assisted his clients with the “pro se ” pleadings, he was aware of the opinion in Laremont-Lopez v. Southeastern Tidewater Opportunity Project, 968 F.Supp. 1075 (E.D.Va.1997), aff'd, 172 F.3d 44, 1999 WL 46845 (4th Cir.1999). Laremont-Lopez makes clear that this Court “considers it improper for lawyers to draft or assist in drafting complaints or other documents submitted to the Court on behalf of litigants designated as pro se.” Id. at 1077. Furthermore, the practice of ghost writing documents “will not be tolerated in this Court.” Id. at 1080.

Lyons tries to distinguish his actions from those of a ghost writer by arguing that, in this case, the Court was fully aware that he wrote the responsive pleading; thus, the Court can assign blame and/or responsibility accordingly. That is true. What Lyons’s argument overlooks, however, is the rationale behind the Local Rule. The Rule exists to provide supervision over those attorneys who practice before the Court.

Lyons contends that he had no other alternative, except to suffer a default. Clearly, that is not true. Lyons had several options. First, he could have waited for the Court to respond to his request for assistance. Second, he could have taken advantage of the “safe harbor” period and dismissed the case until he was prepared to file and prosecute it properly. Lyons argues that, had he taken the voluntary dismissal, he still might have been subjected to Defendants’ threat of sanctions. That may be the case, but just as they had forewarned, Defendants did not file their motion for sanctions until after Plaintiffs refused to dismiss the matter.

In the end, the question is whether Lyons’s conduct, as it relates to the local rule, was so egregious that it merits sanctions. As the Court stated during oral argument, it has found no evidence of intentional or malicious wrongdoing on Lyons’s part. Thus, although Lyons’s actions were improper, it is the Court’s opinion that its public reprimand of Lyons was sufficient so as to serve as a future deterrent. Additional sanctions for such actions are unnecessary.

III. Defendants’ Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Expenses

As a second and separate motion, Defendants ask the Court for $59,989.49 in attorneys’ fees and $2,240.25 in costs under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) provides that, “In any action or proceeding under this subchapter, the Court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party,.other than the Commission or the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee (including expert fees) as part of the costs ....” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). According to the United States Supreme Court, this means that attorneys’ fees should be awarded to the prevailing defendants in a Title VII case upon a finding that the plaintiffs’ action was “frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad faith.” Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421, 98 S.Ct. 694, 54 L.Ed.2d 648 (1978)(emphasis added).

A. An Award of Fees and Costs is Appropriate

For a number of reasons, it is the Court’s opinion that although neither *774Plaintiffs nor Lyons brought Plaintiffs’ national origin count in subjective bad faith, the claim itself was frivolous, unreasonable, and without foundation. In so deciding, the Court first considered the state of the law in both the Fourth Circuit and the nation with respect to what anchors an actionable Title VII claim. To that end, the United States Supreme Court has made abundantly clear, and Plaintiffs concede, that in order to state a cognizable claim, every Title VII claimant must suffer an adverse employment action. See St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S.-502, 524, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993). Plaintiffs, here, did not suffer an adverse employment action, and it was unreasonable for them to argue that they had experienced such adversity.

Second, as the Court discussed in awarding Rule 11 sanctions, Plaintiffs’ religious discrimination count failed to aver that Plaintiffs ever requested an accommodation. Plaintiffs’ eleventh hour attempt to show that they made such a request, many weeks after they sought relief from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, is not only incredible but, frankly, disingenuous. Accordingly, it is the Court’s opinion that Count II is also frivolous, unreasonable, and without foundation.

Finally, and worst of all, is Plaintiffs’ racial discrimination claim. According to the Fourth Circuit, an award of attorneys’ fees is appropriate where “the record ... is devoid of any credible evidence to support a claim' that [plaintiffs were discriminated against] for racial reasons.” Arnold v. Burger King Corp., 719 F.2d 63, 67 (4th Cir.1983). Count III fails to aver, in any way, shape, or form, that Plaintiffs received disparate treatment based upon their race. In fact, inasmuch as Plaintiffs’ group of Confederate Southern Americans seems to include Caucasians, African-Americans, and a Native American, Plaintiffs aver no one, particular race that was affected by DuPont’s ban. Thus, in addition to meriting Rule 11 sanctions, the Court finds Count III to be particularly frivolous and worthy of reimbursement under 42 U.S.C. § 2000-e-5(k).

To reiterate, the Court is not convinced that this lawsuit was inspired by improper motives. By filing this case, it appears that Plaintiffs sought to extend the scope of protection afforded, under Title VII, to a proposed national origin group composed of Confederate Southern Americans. Based on current Civil Rights jurisprudence, however, the likelihood of attaining such a goal is improbable. Thus, while the Court is mindful that Plaintiffs’ ambitions appear to be sincere, it cannot permit them to pursue their foundationally deficient claims at Defendants’ expense. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion for fees and costs is granted.

With respect to the fee calculation and apportionment, the Court’s analysis is complicated by Plaintiffs’ lack of bad faith, coupled with their meager financial means. Accordingly, the truly burdensome questions for this Court are how much of Defendants’ requested fees and costs should be awarded and how the costs should be apportioned among the individual plaintiffs.

B. How to Calculate Fees — the Johnson Factors

The Fourth Circuit has identified twelve factors, first. enunciated in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir.1974), that have some bearing on the appropriate amount of attorneys’ fee to award to prevailing plaintiffs. See Barber v. Kimbrell’s, Inc., 577 F.2d 216, 226 (4th Cir.1978); Anderson v. Morris, 658 F.2d 246, 248-49 (4th Cir.1981). To determine the appropriate amount of an award, the Court begins by *775multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended on the ease by the attorneys’ reasonable or customary hourly rate. Allen v. Burke, 690 F.2d 376, 380 (4th Cir.1982); Anderson, 658 F.2d at 249. Once that figure is established, the court should consider the remaining Johnson factors and then adjust the amount accordingly.

Courts have traditionally considered at least twelve factors before awarding fees, including:

(1) the time and labor expended;
(2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions raised;
(3) the skill required to properly perform the legal services rendered;
(4) the attorney’s opportunity costs in pressing the instant litigation;
(5) the customary fee for like work;
(6) the attorney’s expectations at the outset of litigation;
(7) the time limitations imposed by the client or circumstances;
(8) the amount in controversy and the results obtained;
(9) the experience, reputation and ability of the attorney;
(10) the undesirability of the case within the legal community in which the suit arose;
(11) the nature and length of the professional relationship between attorney and client; and
(12) attorneys’ fees awards in similar cases.

Allen, 690 F.2d at 379 (quoting Barber, 577 F.2d at 226). The district court is not required to engage in a lengthy discussion concerning what portion of the award is attributable to each factor. In fact, as the United States Supreme Court noted in Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983), many of the Johnson factors “are subsumed within the initial calculation of hours reasonably expended at a reasonable hourly rate” and need not be further considered at all. Id. at 434 n. 9, 103 S.Ct. 1933; see also Anderson, 658 F.2d at 249.

In addition to the Johnson factors, the district court may consider the relative financial positions of the litigants. Arnold, 719 F.2d at 67. As the Fourth Circuit noted more than twenty years ago:

Indeed, fee awards that callously disregard the financial straits of a losing plaintiff would soon defeat the overarching remedial purposes of Title VII by discouraging all- but the airtight- cases. Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 422, 98 S.Ct. 694. The dual interests of equity and deterrence can be advanced without giving overriding consideration to the punitive value of a fee award, particularly when the reduced award still represents a substantial burden on the plaintiff and the defendant is fully capable of absorbing a reasonable share of its legal fees without hardship.

Arnold, 719 F.2d at 68. Of course, the financial position of the plaintiff is only one factor for the court to consider. Additionally, after determining the reasonable value of the work performed in a case, the trial court may reduce the fee award in light of mitigating factors, such as the difficulty of the case, the motivation of the plaintiffs, and the relative economic status of the parties. Id.

Athough, here, the Defendants clearly satisfied the statutory criteria under Title VII -for recovery of reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs, the task of calculating and apportioning a specific award will require a two-part analysis. First, the Court will determine what constitutes a reasonable fee for the services performed in this case. Next, the Court must balance that number against Plaintiffs’ ability to pay. The final result will demonstrate a reasoned balance of a number of factors, not the least of which are the plaintiffs’ motivation for fil*776ing the case and the potential deterrent effect of the award.

Of course, not all of the Johnson factors apply to the immediate case. Many are absorbed into the initial lodestar calculation. See Anderson, 658 F.2d at 249. Indeed, as counsel for both sides agree, only a few of the Johnson factors are particularly important here. In order to determine how much weight to give to those factors, the Court has reviewed and considered all of the affidavits and supporting information submitted by the parties relating to fees and costs. From that information, the Court has distilled the most important facts and has weighed each accordingly.

1. Time and Labor Expended

First, as the Supreme Court noted in the Hensley case, the starting point in establishing the' proper amount of an award is the number of hours reasonably expended, multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate. 461 U.S. at 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933. Here, Plaintiffs’ counsel concedes that the hourly rate claimed by DuPont’s attorneys is reasonable. The dispute revolves around the quantity of time defense counsel expended on the matter, a matter which Defendants have repeatedly alleged is patently frivolous.

To that end, the Court has made a number of observations. First, the initial Complaint in this case was never served on Defendants, and the Amended Complaint, which was twenty-five (25) pages in length not including several dozen pages of attachments, included only three, basic claims of Title VII employment discrimination. Second, the . Amended Complaint was neither legally nor factually complex. Third, approximately four months from the date of filing, the Amended Complaint was dismissed on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion without the necessity for oral argument. And finally, no discovery was ever taken in this case.

During oral argument on their motion for fees, counsel for the defendants acknowledged that a reasonably competent attorney, reviewing the Amended Complaint, could have discerned its frivolity from a simple reading. To fashion an appropriate response, however, required Defendants to employ the efforts of five attorneys and a paralegal. The combined legal efforts of the defense team resulted in 393 billable hours, $59,989.49 in discounted fees, and $2,240.25 in associated costs. According to their pleadings, this amount included a deduction of approximately $19,000 in additional legal fees, which represents a reduction of an additional 133 hours of attorney time.

Broken down by team member, the Defendants’ claim of $59,989.49 for 393 hours of labor consists of the following:

Attorneys Hours Rate Total

James S. Crockett, Jr. 89.5 $205 $18,347.50

NiallA. Paul 96.8 $172 $16,649.60

Robert F. Holland 38.8 $163 $ 6,355.44

Lisa Bray 103.9 $130 $13,507.00

Mark Glover 41.1 $121 $ 4,973.10

Paralegal Sandra Burch 2.9 $ 75 $ 1,717.50

In support of their fee application, the Defendants filed the affidavit of Robert E. Eicher, Esquire, a senior partner with the law firm of Williams Mullen. Mr. Eicher is a well-known and distinguished member of the Richmond Bar. In Mr. Eicher’s professional opinion, the hours expended by DuPont’s counsel are both reasonable and consistent when compared to the prevailing standards in the Richmond area. On the contrary, Plaintiffs vigorously challenge both the number of attorneys DuPont employed and the number of hours each attorney expended while litigating this matter. Plaintiffs’ argument focuses specifically on the hours the attorneys devoted to reviewing each other’s work, ana*777lyzing material, gathering background information about the plaintiffs, consulting with one another, and refining their work product. Additionally, Plaintiffs note that approximately forty-two percent (42%) of Defendants’ total, claimed hours were devoted to prosecuting their motions for sanctions and attorneys’ fees.

This Court has carefully reviewed the billable hours submitted by the defense team and the specific tasks performed by each attorney in compiling those hours. In so doing, the Court is of the opinion that some pruning is in order. Before determining the number of billable hours to be awarded to each attorney, however, the Court must review the balance of the Johnson factors.

2.Novelty and Difficulty of Questions Raised

The issues involved in this three-count Title VII action were not complex but did require considerable research and analysis. Moreover, as the parties are now acutely aware, the Fourth Circuit has never specifically rejected Plaintiffs’ claims in a published opinion. As Mr. Crockett pointed out during oral argument, this absence of authority' required the defense team to scour the legal landscape to determine what, if any, arguable legal basis existed to support Plaintiffs’ approach to Title VII.

By the same token, however, the defendants spent an exhaustive amount of time briefing their requests for fees and sanctions, neither of which included unprecedented legal issues. In fact, the only related issues therein that even warranted debate were whether Plaintiffs filed the immediate case in bad faith and to what extent their lack of bad faith mitigates a fee award.

3. Skill Required-to Properly Perform Legal Services

Although' the defendants’ legal team provided excellent representation here, the case itself did not require any specialized advocacy skills.

4. Attorneys’ Opportunity Costs in Pressing the Litigation

This was not a significant factor in this case.

5. Customary Fee for Similar Cases

Plaintiffs concede that the hourly billing rates charged by the defense attorneys in this case were reasonable and consistent with those in and around the Richmond legal market. However, Plaintiffs contest the number of hours defense counsel devoted to the case. The Court agrees that some adjustment is appropriate.

6. Attorneys’ Expectations at the Outset of Litigation

This was not a significant factor in this case.

7. Time Limitations Imposed by Client or Circumstances

In accordance with the typical practice in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, counsel were required to brief and argue dispositive motions within a very narrow time frame.

8. Amount in Controversy and Results Obtained

This was not a significant factor in this case.

9. Experience, Reputation, and Ability of the Attorneys

This was not a significant factor in this case.

*77810. Undesirability of the Case within the Legal Community

There was nothing particularly undesirable about defending this case.

11. Nature and Length of Professional Relationship Between Attorney and Client

This is not a significant factor in this case.

12. Awards in Similar Cases

Plaintiffs draw the Court’s attention to Bass v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co., 324 F.3d 761 (4th Cir.2003), as a comparable case involving Title VII claims. The trial court in the Bass case, which granted summary judgment to the defendant, awarded attorneys’ fees in the amount of $10,968.69. Id. at 767. Although the defendant had requested $21,937.39 in fees, which the court found to be reasonable, the district court reduced that amount by one-half because of the plaintiffs financial circumstances. Id. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit ratified the district court’s approach. Likewise, in assessing fees in the immediate case, this Court will apply the valuable logic of Bass.

C. Total Amounts of Reasonable Attorneys’ Fees

Based on the foregoing review, the Court finds that the following fees are reasonable for the legal services performed in this case:

Staff Person Hours Rate Total

Crockett o o H of T — I * L/i! LO © 03 © to

Paul o o w t-T TH (M t— tH © -q

Holland o o ÍO oo W tO t-H tO ©

Bray o o Q o 1 — ( O CO i-i AS*, \/i) CO Co

Glover o o O of H CQ tH TS/JT tO to

Burch o o O, *-5| t lO C— * Sy t \J J [ K) ©

$42,446.00

D. Adjusting the Award

Finally, before it can adjudicate the final award in this case, the Court must consider a number of additional factors and pub-lie policy considerations, and adjust the reasonable rate accordingly. First, although 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) is primarily a reimbursement statute, the Court is required to determine what amount is necessary, in this case, to provide a deterrent effect. Of course, the statute is not intended to defeat the overarching remedial purposes of Title VII or to discourage the filing of all but the most solidly pled cases. See Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 422, 98 S.Ct. 694. The immediate lawsuit, however, evolved from theories as yet unrecognized by established law. Moreover, even if the claims had stated a cause of action, several are so lacking in factual foundation as to be risible. On the other hand, in the balance between equity and deterrence, Plaintiffs’ lack of bad faith and avowed commitment to their cause are each entitled to some weight.

Finally, and perhaps most significantly, the Court is required to consider the relative financial positions of the litigants. “The policy of deterring frivolous suits is not served by forcing the misguided plaintiff into financial ruin simply because he prosecuted a groundless claim.” Arnold, 719 F.2d at 68. Accord DeBauche v. Trani, 191 F.3d 499, 511 (4th Cir.1999). Obviously, DuPont is fully capable of absorbing a reasonable share of its legal fees without suffering a material hardship. The question is what is “reasonable” in the context of an unfounded lawsuit?

Clearly, Plaintiffs are gentlemen of modest means each of whom possesses limited disposable income. Of course, this does not absolve any of them of his responsibility for filing frivolous legal claims. See Bass, 324 F.3d at 767. Consequently, and in light of the financial positions of the parties, the Court will require the plaintiffs to reimburse the defendants for $26,100.00 in attorneys’ fees and $1,450.00 in associated costs, for a total of *779$27,550.00. The Court will apportion the award as follows:2

Plaintiff Portion of Award Payable

Kevin L. Chaplin $ 5,500

James P. Jones $ 3,500

Robert C. Lewis $ 3,500

Marvin L. Oliver $ 2,500

Lynn E. Ritenour $ 5,000

David E. Rowlette $ 4,000

Stephen J. Turley $ 3,550 (Counts 1 & 2 only)

E. Amount of Sanctions against Lyons

Additionally, considering both the foregoing analysis and the circumstances that led up to this determination,3 it is the judgment of the Court that the actions of Kirk D. Lyons, Esquire merit sanctions, pursuant to Rule 11(b)(3), in the amount of $10,000.

F. Conclusion

In sum, the Court awards attorneys’ fees totaling $26,100.00 and costs of $1,450.00, for a total of $27,550.00, payable as indicated above. The Court further sanctions counsel for the plaintiffs in the amount of $10,000. An appropriate Order will accompany this Memorandum Opinion.

Let the Clerk send a copy of this Memorandum to all counsel of record.