Mr. Justice Douglas

delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case presents important questions concerning the construction of R. S. § 1979, 42 U. S. C. § 1983, which reads as follows:

“Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any *169citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.”

The complaint alleges that 13 Chicago police officers broke into petitioners’ home in the early morning, routed them from bed, made them stand naked in the living room, and ransacked every room, emptying drawers and ripping mattress covers. It further alleges that Mr. Monroe was then taken to the police station and detained on “open” charges for 10 hours, while he was interrogated about a two-day-old murder, that he was not taken before a magistrate, though one was accessible, that he was not permitted to call his family or attorney, that he was subsequently released without criminal charges being preferred against him. It is alleged that the officers had no search warrant and no arrest warrant and that they acted “under color of the statutes, ordinances, regulations, customs and usages” of Illinois and of the City of Chicago. Federal jurisdiction was asserted under R. S. § 1979, which we have set out above, and 28 U. S. C. § 13431 and 28 U. S. C. § 1331.2

*170The City of Chicago moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it is not liable under the Civil Rights Acts nor for acts committed in performance of its governmental functions. All defendants moved to dismiss, alleging that the complaint alleged no cause of action under those Acts or under the Federal Constitution. The District Court dismissed the complaint. The Court of Appeals affirmed, 272 F. 2d 365, relying on its earlier decision, Stift v. Lynch, 267 F. 2d 237. The case is here on a writ of certiorari which we granted because of a seeming conflict of that ruling with our prior cases. 362 U. S. 926.

I.

Petitioners claim that the invasion of their home and the subsequent search without a warrant and the arrest and detention of Mr. Monroe without a warrant and without arraignment constituted a deprivation of their “rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution” within the meaning of R. S. § 1979. It has been said that when 18 U. S. C. § 241 made criminal a conspiracy “to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any citizen in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution,” it embraced only rights that an individual has by reason of' his relation to the central government, not to state governments. United States v. Williams, 341 U. S. 70. Cf. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542; Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U. S. 651; Guinn v. United States, 238 U. S. 347. But the history of the section of the Civil Rights Act presently involved does not permit such a narrow interpretation.

*171Section 1979 came onto the books as § 1 of the Ku Klux Act of April 20, 1871. 17 Stat. 13. It was one of the means whereby Congress exercised the power vested in it by § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to enforce the provisions of that Amendment.3 Senator Edmunds, Chairman of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, said concerning this section:

“The first section is one that I believe nobody objects to, as defining the rights secured by the Constitution of the United States when they are assailed by any State law or under color of any State law, and it is merely carrying out the principles of the civil rights bill,4 which has since become a part of the Constitution,”5 viz., the Fourteenth Amendment.

Its purpose is plain from the title of the legislation, “An Act to enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and for other Purposes.” 17 Stat. 13. Allegation of facts constituting a deprivation under color of state authority of a right guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment satisfies to that extent the requirement of R. S. § 1979. See Douglas v. Jeannette, 319 U. S. 157, 161-162. So far petitioners are on solid ground. For the guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures contained in the Fourth Amendment has been made applicable to the States by' reason of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25; Elkins v. United States, 364 U. S. 206, 213.

II.

There can be no doubt at least since Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339, 346-347, that Congress has the power to *172enforce provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment against those who carry a badge of authority of a State and represent it in some capacity, whether they act in accordance with their authority or misuse it. See Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Los Angeles, 227 U. S. 278, 287-296. The question with which we now deal is the narrower one of whether Congress, in enacting § 1979, meant to give a remedy to parties deprived of constitutional rights, privileges and immunities by an official’s abuse of his position. Cf. Williams v. United States, 341 U. S. 97; Screws v. United States, 325 U. S. 91; United States v. Classic, 313 U. S. 299. We conclude that it did so intend.

It is argued that “under color of” enumerated state authority excludes acts of an official or policeman who can show no authority under state law, state custom, or state usage to do what he did. In this case it is said that these policemen, in breaking into petitioners’ apartment, violated the Constitution6 and laws of Illinois. It is pointed out that under Illinois law a simple remedy is offered for that violation and that, so far as it appears, the courts of Illinois are available to give petitioners that full redress which the common law affords for violence done to a person; and it is earnestly argued that ho “statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage” of Illinois bars that redress.

The Ku Klux Act grew out of a message sent to Congress by President Grant on March 23, 1871, reading:

“A condition of affairs now exists in some States of the Union rendering life and property insecure and *173the carrying of the mails and the collection of the revenue dangerous. The proof that such a condition of affairs exists in some localities is now before the Senate. That the power to correct these evils is beyond the control of State authorities I do not doubt; that the power of the Executive of the United States, acting within the limits of existing laws, is sufficient for present emergencies is not clear. Therefore, I urgently recommend such legislation as in the judgment of Congress shall effectually secure life, liberty, and property, and the enforcement of law in all parts of the United States. . . .”7

The legislation — in particular the section with which we are now concerned — had several purposes. There are threads of many thoughts running through the debates. One who reads them in their entirety sees that the present section had three main aims.

First, it might, of course, override certain kinds of state laws. Mr. Sloss of Alabama, in opposition, spoke of that object and emphasized that it was irrelevant because there were no such laws:8

“The first section of this bill prohibits any invidious legislation by States against the rights or privileges of citizens of the United States. The object of this section is not very clear, as it is not pretended by its advocates on this floor that any State has passed any laws endangering the rights or privileges of the colored people.”

Second, it provided a remedy where state law was inadequate. That aspect of the legislation was summed up as follows by Senator Sherman of Ohio:

“. . . it is said the reason is that any offense may be committed upon a negro by a white man, and a *174negro cannot testify in any case against a white man, so that the only way by which any conviction can be had in Kentucky in those cases is in the United States courts, because the United States courts enforce the United States laws by which negroes may testify.” 9

But the purposes were much broader. The third aim was to provide a federal remedy where the state remedy, though adequate in theory, was not available in practice. The opposition to the measure complained that “It overrides the reserved powers of the States,” 10 just as they argued that the second section of the bill “absorb [ed] the entire jurisdiction of the States over their local and domestic affairs.” 11

This Act of April 20, 1871, sometimes called “the third ‘force bill,’ ” was passed by a Congress that had the Klan “particularly in mind.” 12 The debates are replete with references to the lawless conditions existing in the South in 1871. There was available to the Congress during these debates a report, nearly 600 pages in length, dealing with the activities of the Klan and the inability of the state governments to cope with it.13 This report was drawn on by many of the speakers.14 It was not the unavailability of state remedies but the failure of certain States to enforce the laws with an equal hand that fur*175nished the powerful momentum behind this “force bill.” Mr. Lowe of Kansas said:

“While murder is stalking abroad in disguise, while whippings and lynchings and banishment have been visited upon unoffending American citizens, the local administrations have been found inadequate or unwilling to apply the proper corrective. Combinations, darker than the night that hides them, conspiracies, wicked as the worst of felons could devise, have gone unwhipped of justice. Immunity is given to crime, and the records of the public tribunals are searched in vain for any evidence of effective redress.” 15

Mr. Beatty of Ohio summarized in the House the case for the bill when he said:

“. . . certain States have denied to persons within their jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. The proof on this point is voluminous and unquestionable. . . . [M]en were murdered, houses were burned, women were outraged, men were scourged, and officers of the law shot down; and the State made no successful effort to bring the guilty to punishment or afford protection or redress to the outraged and innocent. The State, from lack of power or inclination, practically denied the equal protection of the law to these persons.” 16

While one main scourge of the evil — perhaps the leading one — was the Ku Klux Klan,17 the remedy created was *176not a remedy against it or its members but against those who representing a State in some capacity were unable or unwilling to enforce a state law. Senator Osborn of Florida put the problem in these terms: 18

“That the State courts in the several States have been unable to enforce the criminal laws of their respective States or to suppress the disorders existing, and in fact that the preservation of life and property in many sections of the country is beyond the power o'f the State government, is a sufficient reason why Congress should, so far as they have authority under the Constitution, enact the laws necessary for the protection of citizens of the United States. The question of the constitutional authority for the requisite legislation has been sufficiently discussed.”

There was, it was said, no quarrel with the state laws on the books. It was their lack of enforcement that was the nub of the difficulty. Speaking of conditions in Virginia, Mr. Porter of that State said: 19

“The outrages committed upon loyal men there are under the forms of law.”

Mr. Burchard of Illinois pointed out that the statutes of a State may show no discrimination: 20

“If the State Legislature pass a law discriminating against any portion of its citizens, or if it fails to enact provisions equally applicable to every class for the protection of their person and property, it will be admitted that the State does not afford the equal protection. But if the statutes show no discrimina*177tion, yet in its judicial tribunals one class is unable to secure that enforcement of their rights and punishment for their infraction which is accorded to another, or if secret combinations of men are allowed by the Executive to band together to deprive one class of citizens of their legal rights without a proper effort to discover, detect, and punish the violations of law and order, the State has not afforded to all its citizens the equal protection of the laws.”

Mr. Hoar of Massachusetts stated: 21

“Now, it is an effectual denial by a State of the equal protection of the laws when any class of officers charged under the laws with their administration permanently and as a rule refuse to extend that protection. If every sheriff in South Carolina refuses to serve a writ for a colored man and those sheriffs are kept in office year after year by the people of South Carolina, and no verdict against them for their failure of duty can be obtained before a South Carolina jury, the State of South Carolina, through the class of officers who are its representatives to afford the equal protection of the laws to that class of citizens, has denied that protection. If the jurors of South Carolina constantly and as a rule refuse to do justice between man and man where the rights of a particular class of its citizens are concerned, and that State affords by its legislation no remedy, that is as much a denial to that class of citizens of the equal protection of the laws as if the State itself put on its statute-book a statute enacting that no verdict should be rendered in the courts of that State in favor of this class of citizens.”

*178Senator Pratt of Indiana spoke of the discrimination against Union sympathizers and Negroes in the actual enforcement of the laws: 22

“Plausibly and sophistically it is said the laws of North Carolina do not discriminate against them; that the provisions in favor of rights and liberties are general; that the courts are open to all; that juries, grand and petit, are commanded to hear and redress without distinction as to color, race, or political sentiment.

“But it is a fact, asserted in the report, that of the hundreds of outrages committed upon loyal people through the agency of this Ku Klux organization not one has been punished. This defect in the administration of the laws does not extend to other cases. Vigorously enough are the laws enforced against Union people. They only fail in efficiency when a man of known Union sentiments, white or black, invokes their aid. Then Justice closes the door of her temples.”

It was precisely that breadth of the remedy which the opposition emphasized. Mr. Kerr of Indiana referring to the section involved in the present litigation said:

“This section gives to any person who may have been injured in any of his rights, privileges, or immunities of person or property, a civil action for damages against the wrongdoer in the Federal courts. The offenses committed against him may be the common violations of the municipal law of his State. It may give rise to numerous vexations and outrageous prosecutions, inspired by mere mercenary considerations, prosecuted in a spirit of plunder, aided by the crimes of perjury and subornation of perjury, more reckless and dangerous to society than the alleged *179offenses out of which the causé of action may have arisen. It is a covert attempt to transfer another large portion of jurisdiction from the State tribunals, to which it of right belongs, to those of the United States. It is neither authorized nor expedient, and is not calculated to bring peace, or order, or domestic content and prosperity to the disturbed society of the South. The contrary will certainly be its effect.” 23

Mr. Voorhees of Indiana, also speaking in opposition, gave it the same construction: 24

“And now for a few moments let us inspect the provisions of this bill, inspired as it is by the waning and decaying fortunes of the party in power, and called for, as I have shown, by no public necessity whatever. The first and second sections are designed to transfer all criminal jurisdiction from the courts of the States to the courts of the United States. This is to be done upon the assumption that the courts of the southern States fail and refuse to do their duty in the punishment of offenders against the law.”

Senator Thurman of Ohio spoke in the same vein about the section we are now considering: 25

“It authorizes any person who is deprived of any right, privilege, or immunity secured to him by the *180Constitution of the United States, to bring an action against the wrong-doer in the Federal courts, and that without any limit whatsoever as to the amount in controversy. The deprivation may be of the slightest conceivable character, the damages in the estimation of any sensible man may not be five dollars or even five cents; they may be what lawyers call merely nominal damages; and yet by this section jurisdiction of that civil action is given to the Federal courts instead of its being prosecuted as now in the courts of the States.”

The debates were long and extensive. It is abundantly clear that one reason the legislation was passed was to afford a federal right in federal courts because, by reason of prejudice, passion, neglect, intolerance or otherwise, state laws might not be enforced and the claims of citizens to the enjoyment of rights,, privileges, and immunities guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment might be denied by the state agencies.

Much is made of the history of § 2 of the proposed legislation. As introduced § 2 was very broad:

. . if two or more persons shall, within the limits of any State, band, conspire, or combine together to do any act in violation of the rights, privileges, or immunities of any person, to which he is entitled under the Constitution and laws of the United States, which, committed within a place under the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, would, under any law of the United States then in force, constitute the crime of either murder, manslaughter, mayhem, robbery, assault and battery, perjury, subornation of perjury, criminal obstruction of legal process or resistance of officers in discharge of official duty, arson, or larceny; and if one or more of the parties to said conspiracy or combination shall do *181any act to effect the object thereof, all the parties to or engaged in said conspiracy or combination, whether principals or accessories, shall be deemed guilty of a felony . . .

It was this provision that raised the greatest storm. It was § 2 that was rewritten so as to be in the main confined to conspiracies to interfere with a federal or state officer in the performance of his duties. 17 Stat. 13. Senator Trumbull said: 26

“Those provisions were changed, and as the bill passed the House of Representatives, it was understood by the members of that body to go no further than to protect persons in the rights which were guarantied to them by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and it did not undertake to furnish redress for wrongs done by one person upon another in any of the States of the Union in violation of their laws, unless he also violated some law of the United States, nor to punish one person for an ordinary assault and battery committed on another in a State.”

But § 1 — the section with which we are here concerned — was not changed as respects any feature with which we are presently concerned.27 The words “under *182color of” law were in the legislation from the beginning to the end. The changes hailed by the opposition — indeed the history of the evolution of § 2 much relied upon now— are utterly irrelevant to the problem before us, viz., the meaning of “under color of” law. The vindication of States’ rights which was hailed in the amendments to § 2 raises no implication as to the construction to be given to “color of any law” in § 1. The scope of § 1 — under any construction — is admittedly narrower than was the scope of the original version of § 2. Opponents of the Act, however, did not fail to note that by virtue of § 1 federal courts would sit in judgment on the misdeeds of state officers.28 Proponents of the Act, on the other hand, were aware of the extension of federal power contemplated by every section of the Act. They found justification, however, for this extension in considerations such as those advanced by Mr. Hoar: 29

“The question is not whether a majority of the people in a majority of the States are likely to be attached to and able to secure their own liberties. The question is not whether the majority of the people in every State are not likely to desire to secure their own rights. It is, whether a majority of the people in every State are sure to be so attached to the principles of civil freedom and civil justice as to be as much desirous of preserving the liberties of others as their own, as to insure that under no temptation of party spirit, under no political excitement, under *183no jealousy of race or caste, will the majority either in numbers or strength in any State seek to deprive the remainder of the population of their civil ■rights.”

Although the legislation was enacted because of the conditions that existed in the South at that time, it is cast in general language and is as applicable to Illinois as it is to the States whose names were mentioned over and again in the debates. It is no answer that the State has a law which if enforced would give relief. The federal remedy is supplementary to the state remedy, and the latter need not be first sought and refused before the federal one is invoked. Hence the fact that Illinois by its constitution and laws outlaws unreasonable searches and seizures is no barrier to the present suit in the federal court.

We had before us in United States v. Classic, supra, § 20 of the Criminal Code, 18 U. S. C. § 242,30 which provides a criminal punishment for anyone who “under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom” subjects any inhabitant of a State to the deprivation of “any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States.” Section 242 first came into the law as § 2 of the Civil Rights Act, Act of April 9, 1866, 14 Stat. 27. After passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, this provision was re-enacted and amended by §§ 17, 18, Act of May 31, 1870, 16 Stat. 140, 144.31 The right involved in the Classic case was the right of voters in a primary to have their votes counted. The laws of Louisiana required the defendants “to count the ballots, to record the result of the count, and *184to certify the result of the election.” United States v. Classic, supra, 325-326. But according to the indictment they did not perform their duty. In an opinion written by Mr. Justice (later Chief Justice) Stone, in which Mr. Justice Roberts, Mr. Justice Reed, and Mr. Justice Frankfurter joined, the Court ruled, “Misuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law, is action taken ‘under color of’ state law.” Id., 326. There was a dissenting opinion; but the ruling as to the meaning of “under color of” state law was not questioned.

That view of the meaning of the words “under color of” state law, 18 U. S. C. § 242, was reaffirmed in Screws v. United States, supra, 108-113. The acts there complained of were committed by state officers in performance of their duties, viz., making an arrest effective. It was urged there, as it is here, that “under color of” state law should not be construed to duplicate in federal law what was an offense under state law. Id. (dissenting opinion) 138-149, 157-161. It was said there, as it is here, that the ruling in the Classic case as to the meaning of “under color of” state law was not in focus and was ill-advised. Id. (dissenting opinion) 146-147. It was argued there, as it is here, that “under color of” state law included only action taken by officials pursuant to state law. Id. (dissenting opinion) 141-146. We rejected that view. Id., 110-113 (concurring opinion) 114-117. We stated:

“The construction given § 20 [18 U. S. C. § 242] in the Classic case formulated a rule of law which has become the basis of federal enforcement in this important field. The rule adopted in that case was formulated after mature consideration. It should be good for more than one day only. We do not have here a situation comparable to Mahnich v. Southern S. S. Co., 321 U. S. 96, where we *185overruled a decision demonstrated to be a sport in the law and inconsistent with what preceded and what followed. The Classic case was not the product of hasty action or inadvertence. It was not out of line with the cases which preceded. It was designed to fashion the governing rule of law in this important field. We are not dealing with constitutional interpretations which throughout the history of the Court have wisely remained flexible and subj ect to frequent re-examination. The meaning which the Classic case gave to the phrase 'under color of any law’ involved only a construction of the statute. Hence if it states a rule undesirable in its consequences, Congress can change it. We add only to the instability and uncertainty of the law if we revise the meaning of § 20 [18 U. S. C. § 242] to meet the exigencies of each case coming before us.” Id., 112-113.

We adhered to that view in Williams v. United States, supra, 99.

Mr. Shellabarger, reporting out the bill which became the Ku Klux Act, said of the provision with which we now deal:

“The model for it will be found in the second section of the act of April 9, 1866, known as the ‘civil rights act.’. . . This section of this bill, on the same state of facts, not only provides a civil remedy for persons whose former condition may have been that of slaves, but also to all people where, under color of State law, they or any of them may be deprived of rights . . . .”32

Thus, it is beyond doubt that this phrase should be accorded the same construction in both statutes — in § 1979 and in 18 U. S. C. § 242.

*186Since the Screws and Williams decisions, Congress has had several pieces of civil rights legislation before it. In 1956 one bill reached the floor of the House. This measure had at least one provision in it penalizing actions taken “under color of law or otherwise.” 33 A vigorous minority-report was filed attacking, inter alia, the words “or otherwise.” 34 But not a word of criticism of the phrase “under color of” state law as previously construed by the Court is to be found in that report.

Section 131 (c) of the Act of September 9,1957, 71 Stat. 634, 637, amended 42 U. S. C. § 1971 by adding a new subsection which provides that no person “whether acting under color of law or otherwise” shall intimidate any other person in voting as he chooses for federal officials. A vigorous minority report was filed 35 attacking the wide scope of the new subsection by reason of the words “or otherwise.” It was said in that minority report that those words went far beyond what this Court had construed “under color of law” to mean.36 But there was not a word of criticism directed to the prior construction given by this Court to the words “under color of” law.

The Act of May 6, 1960, 74 Stat. 86, uses “under color of” law in two contexts, once when § 306 defines “officer of election” and next when § 601 (a) gives a judicial remedy on behalf of a qualified voter denied the opportunity to register. Once again there was a Committee report containing minority views.37 Once again no one challenged the scope given by our prior decisions to the phrase “under color of” law.

*187If the results of our construction of “under color of” law were as horrendous as now claimed, if they were as disruptive of our federal scheme as now urged, if they were such an unwarranted invasion of States’ rights as pretended, surely the voice of the opposition would have been heard in those Committee reports. Their silence and the new uses to which “under color of” law have recently been given reinforce our conclusion that our prior decisions were correct on this matter of construction.

We conclude that the meaning given “under color of” law in the Classic case and in the Screws and Williams cases was the correct one; and we adhere to it.

In the Screws case we dealt with a statute that imposed criminal penalties for acts “wilfully” done. We construed that word in its setting to mean the doing of an act with “a specific intent to deprive a person of a federal right.” 325 U. S., at 103. We do not think that gloss should be placed on § 1979 which we have here. The word “wil-fully” does not appear in § 1979. Moreover, § 1979 provides a civil remedy, while in the Screws case we dealt with a criminal law challenged on the ground of vagueness. Section 1979 should be read against the background of tort liability that makes a man responsible for the natural consequences of his actions.

So far, then, the complaint states a cause of action. There remains to consider only a defense peculiar to the City of Chicago.

III.

The City of Chicago asserts that it is not liable under § 1979. We do not stop to explore the whole range of questions tendered us on this issue at oral argument and in the briefs. For we are of the opinion that Congress did not undertake to bring municipal corporations within the ambit of § 1979.

*188When the bill that became the Act of April 20, 1871, was being debated in the Senate, Senator Sherman of Ohio proposed an amendment which would have made “the inhabitants of the county, city, or parish” in which certain acts of violence occurred liable “to pay full compensation” to the person damaged or his widow or legal representative.38 The amendment was adopted by the Senate.39 The House, however, rejected it.40 The Conference Committee reported another version.41 The *189House rejected the Conference report.42 In a second conference the Sherman amendment was dropped and in its place § 6 of the Act of April 20, 1871, was substi*190tuted.43 This new section, which is now R. S. § 1981, 42 U. S. C. § 1986, dropped out all provision for municipal liability and extended liability in damages to “any person or persons, having knowledge that any” of the specified wrongs are being committed. Mr. Poland, speaking for the House Conferees about the Sherman proposal to make municipalities liable, said:

“We informed the conferees on the part of the Senate that the House had taken a stand on that subject and would not recede from it; that that section imposing liability upon towns and counties must go out or we should fail to agree.” 44

The objection to the Sherman amendment stated by Mr. Poland was that “the House had solemnly decided that in their judgment Congress had no constitutional power to impose any obligation upon county and town organizations, the mere instrumentality for the administration of state law.” 45 The question of constitutional power of Congress to impose civil liability on municipalities was vigorously debated with powerful arguments advanced in the affirmative.46

Much reliance is placed on the Act of February 25,1871, 16 Stat. 431, entitled “An Act prescribing the Form of the enacting and resolving Clauses of Acts and Resolutions of Congress, and Rules for the Construction thereof.” Section 2 of this Act provides that “the word ‘person’ may extend and be applied to bodies politic and corporate.” 47 *191It should be noted, however, that this definition is merely an allowable, not a mandatory, one. It is said that doubts should be resolved in favor of municipal liability because private remedies against officers for illegal searches and seizures are conspicuously ineffective,48 and because municipal liability will not only afford plaintiffs responsible defendants but cause those defendants to eradicate abuses that exist at the police level.49 We do not reach those policy considerations. Nor do we reach the constitutional question whether Congress has the power to make municipalities liable for acts of its officers that violate the civil rights of individuals.

The response of the Congress to the proposal to make municipalities liable for certain actions being brought within federal purview by the Act of April 20, 1871, was so antagonistic that we cannot believe that the word "person” was used in this particular Act to include them.50 *192Accordingly we hold that the motion to dismiss the complaint against the City of Chicago was properly granted. But since the complaint should not have been dismissed against the officials the judgment must be and is

Reversed.

Mr. Justice Harlan,

concurring.

Were this case here as one of first impression, I would find the “under color of any statute” issue very close indeed. However, in Classic 1 and Screws2 this Court considered a substantially identical statutory phrase to have a meaning which, unless we now retreat from it, requires that issue to go for the petitioners here.

From my point of view, the policy of stare decisis, as it should be applied in matters of statutory construction, and, to a lesser extent, the indications of congressional acceptance of this Court’s earlier interpretation, require that it appear beyond doubt from the legislative history of the 1871 statute that Classic and Screws misapprehended the meaning of the controlling provision,3 before a departure from what was decided in those cases would be justified. Since I can find no such justifying indication in that legislative history, I join the opinion of the Court. However, what has been written on both sides of the matter makes some additional observations appropriate.

*193Those aspects of Congress’ purpose which are quite clear in the earlier congressional debates, as quoted by my Brothers Douglas and Frankfurter in turn, seem to me to be inherently ambiguous when applied to the case of an isolated abuse of state authority by an official. One can agree with the Court’s opinion that:

“It is abundantly clear, that one reason the legislation was passed was to afford a federal right in federal courts because, by reason of prejudice, passion, neglect, intolerance or otherwise, state laws might not be enforced and the claims of citizens to the enjoyment of rights, privileges, and immunities guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment might be denied by the state agencies. . . .”

without being certain that Congress meant to deal with anything other than abuses so recurrent as to amount to “custom, or usage.” One can agree with my Brother Frankfurter, in dissent, that Congress had no intention of taking over the whole field of ordinary state torts and crimes, without being certain that the enacting Congress would not have regarded actions by an official, made possible by his position, as far more serious than an ordinary state tort, and therefore as a matter of federal concern. If attention is directed at the rare specific references to isolated abuses of state authority, one finds them neither so clear nor so disproportionately divided between favoring the positions of the majority or the dissent as to make either position seem plainly correct.4

Besides the inconclusiveness I find in the legislative history, it seems to me by no means evident that a posi*194tion favoring departure from Classic and Screws fits better that with which the enacting Congress was concerned than does the position the Court adopted 20 years ago. There are apparent incongruities in the view of the dissent which may be more easily reconciled in terms of the earlier holding in Classic.

The dissent considers that the “under color of” provision of § 1983 distinguishes between unconstitutional actions taken without state authority, which only the State should remedy, and unconstitutional actions authorized by the State, which the Federal Act was to reach. If so, then the controlling difference for the enacting legislature must have been either that the state remedy was more adequate for unauthorized actions than for authorized ones or that there was, in some sense, greater harm from unconstitutional actions authorized by the full panoply of state power and approval than from unconstitutional actions not so authorized or acquiesced in by the State. I find less than compelling the evidence that either distinction was important to that Congress.

I.

If the state remedy was considered adequate when the official’s unconstitutional act was unauthorized, why should it not be thought equally adequate when the unconstitutional act was authorized? For if one thing is very clear in the legislative history, it is that the Congress of 1871 was well aware that no action requiring state judicial enforcement could be taken in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment without that enforcement being declared void by this Court on direct review from the state courts. And presumably it must also have been understood that there would be Supreme Court review of the denial of a state damage remedy against an official on grounds of state authorization of the unconstitutional *195action. It therefore seems to me that the same state remedies would, with ultimate aid of Supreme Court review, furnish identical relief in the two situations. This is the point Senator Blair made when, having stated that the object of the Fourteenth Amendment was to prevent any discrimination by the law of any State, he argued that:

“This being forbidden by the Constitution of the United States, and all the judges, State and national, being sworn to support the Constitution of the United States, and the Supreme Court of the United States having power to supervise and correct the action of the State courts when they violated the Constitution of the United States, there could be no danger of the violation of the right of citizens under color of the laws of the States.” Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., at App. 231.

Since the suggested narrow construction of § 1983 presupposes that state measures were adequate to remedy unauthorized deprivations of constitutional rights and since the identical state relief could be obtained for state-authorized acts with the aid of Supreme Court review, this narrow construction would reduce the statute to having merely a jurisdictional function, shifting the load of federal supervision from the Supreme Court to the lower courts and providing a federal tribunal for fact findings in cases involving authorized action. Such a function could be justified on various grounds. It could, for example, be argued that the state courts would be less willing to find a constitutional violation in cases involving “authorized action” and that therefore the victim of such action would bear a greater burden in that he would more likely have to carry his case to this Court, and once here, might be bound by unfavorable state court findings. But' the legislative debates do not disclose con*196gressional concern about the burdens of litigation placed upon the victims of “authorized” constitutional violations contrasted to the victims of unauthorized violations. Neither did Congress indicate an interest in relieving the burden placed on this Court in reviewing such cases.

The statute becomes more than a jurisdictional provision only-if one attributes to the enacting legislature the view that á deprivation of a constitutional right is significantly different from and more serious than a violation of a state right and therefore deserves a different remedy even though the same act may constitute both a state tort and the deprivation of a constitutional right. This view, by no means unrealistic as a common-sense matter,5 is, I believe, more consistent with the flavor of the legislative history than is a view that the primary purpose of the statute was to grant a lower court forum for fact findings. For example, the tone is surely one of overflowing protection of constitutional rights, and there is not a hint of concern about the administrative burden on the Supreme Court, when Senator Frelinghuysen says:

“As to the civil remedies, for a violation of these privileges, we know that when the courts of a State *197violate the provisions of the Constitution or the law of the United States there is now relief afforded by a review in the Federal courts. And since the 14th Amendment forbids any State from making or enforcing any law abridging these privileges and immunities, as you cannot reach the Legislatures, the injured party should have an original action in our Federal courts, so that by injunction or by the recovery of damages he could have relief against the party who under color of such law is guilty of infringing his rights. As to the civil remedy no one, I think, can object.” Id., at 501.

And Senator Carpenter reflected a similar belief that the protection granted by the statute was to be very different from the relief available on review of state proceedings:

“The prohibition in the old Constitution that no State should pass a law impairing the. obligation of contracts was a negative prohibition laid upon the State. Congress was not authorized to interfere in case the State violated that provision. It is true that when private rights were affected by such a State law, and that was brought before the judiciary, either of the State or nation, it was the duty of the court to pronounce the act void; but there the matter ended. Under the present Constitution, however, in regard to those rights which are secured by the fourteenth amendment, they are not left as the right of the citizen in regard to laws impairing the obligation of contracts was left, to be disposed of by the courts as the cases should arise between man and man, but Congress is clothed with the affirmative power and jurisdiction to correct the evil.

“I think there is one of the fundamental, one of the great, the tremendous revolutions effected in our Government by that article of the Constitution. It *198gives Congress affirmative power to protect the rights of the citizen, whereas before no such right was given to save the citizen from the violation of any of his rights by State Legislatures, and the only remedy was a judicial one when the case arose.” Id., at 577.

In my view, these considerations put in serious doubt the conclusion that § 1983 was limited to state-authorized unconstitutional acts, on the premise that state remedies respecting them were considered less adequate than those available for unauthorized acts.

II.

I think this limited interpretation of § 1983 fares no better when viewed from the other possible premise for it, namely that state-approved constitutional deprivations were considered more offensive than those not so approved. For one thing, the enacting Congress was not unaware of the fact that there was a substantial overlap between the protections granted by state constitutional provisions and those granted by the Fourteenth Amendment. Indeed one opponent of the bill, Senator Trumbull, went so far as to state in a debate with Senators Carpenter and Edmunds that his research indicated a complete overlap in every State, at least as to the protections of the Due Process Clause.6 Thus, in one very significant sense, there was no ultimate state approval of a large portion of otherwise authorized actions depriving a person of due-process rights. I hesitate to assume that the proponents of the present statute, who regarded it as necessary even though they knew that the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment were self-executing, would have thought the remedies unnecessary whenever there were self-executing provisions of state constitutions also forbidding what the Fourteenth Amendment forbids. The only alternative is *199to disregard the possibility that a state court would find the action unauthorized on grounds of the state constitution. But if the defendant official is denied the right to defend in the federal court upon the ground that a state court would find his action unauthorized in the light of the state constitution, it is difficult to contend that it is the added harmfulness of state approval that justifies a different remedy for authorized than for unauthorized actions of state officers. Moreover, if indeed the legislature meant to distinguish between authorized and unauthorized acts and yet did not mean the statute to be inapplicable whenever there was a state constitutional provision which, reasonably interpreted, gave protection similar to that of a provision of the Fourteenth Amendment, would there not have been some explanation of this exception to the general rule? The fact that there is none in the legislative history at least makes more difficult a contention that these legislators were in fact making-a distinction between use and misuse of state power.

There is a further basis for doubt that it was the additional force of state approval which justified a distinction between authorized and unauthorized actions. No one suggests that there is a difference in the showing the plaintiff must make to assert a claim under § 1983 depending upon whether he is asserting a denial of rights secured by the Equal Protection Clause or a denial of rights secured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. If the same Congress which passed what is now § 1983 also provided remedies against two or more non-officials who conspire to prevent an official from granting equal protection of the laws, see 42 U. S. C. § 1985, then it would seem almost untenable to insist that this Congress would have hesitated, on the grounds of lack of full state approval of the official’s act, to provide similar remedies against an official who, unauthorized, denied that equal protection of the laws on his own initiative. For *200there would be no likely state approval of or even acquiescence in a conspiracy to coerce a state official to deny equal protection. Indeed it is difficult to attribute to a Congress which forbad two private citizens from hindering an official’s giving of equal protection an intent to leave that official free to deny equal protection of his own accord.7

We have not passed upon the question whether 42 U. S. C. § 1985,8 which was passed as the second section of the Act that included § 1983, was intended to reach only the Ku Klux Klan or other substantially organized group activity, as distinguished from what its words seem to include, any conspiracy of two persons with “the purpose of preventing or hindering the constituted authorities of any State . . . from giving or securing to all persons within such State . . . the equal protection of the laws . ..." 9 Without now deciding the question, I think *201it is sufficient to note that the legislative history is not without indications that what the words of the statute seem to state was in fact the meaning assumed by Congress.10

*202These difficulties in explaining the basis of a distinction between authorized and unauthorized deprivations of constitutional rights fortify my view that the legislative history does not bear the burden which stare decisis casts upon it. For this reason and for those stated in the opinion of the Court, I agree that we should not now depart from the holdings of the Classic and Screws cases.

Mr. Justice Frankfurter,

dissenting except insofar as the Court holds that this action cannot be maintained against the City of Chicago.

Abstractly stated, this case concerns a matter of statutory construction. So stated, the problem before the Court is denuded of illuminating concreteness and thereby of its far-reaching significance for our federal system. Again abstractly stated, this matter of statutory construction is one upon which the Court has already passed. But it has done so under circumstances and in settings that negative those considerations of social policy upon which the doctrine of stare decisis, calling for the controlling application of prior statutory construction, rests.

This case presents the. question of the sufficiency of petitioners’ complaint in a civil action for damages brought under the Civil Rights Act, R. S. § 1979, *20342 U. S. C. § 1983.1 The complaint alleges that on October 29, 1958, at 5:45 a. m., thirteen Chicago police officers, led by Deputy Chief of Detectives Pape, broke through two doors of the Monroe apartment, woke the Monroe couple with flashlights, and forced them at gunpoint to leave their bed and stand naked in the center of the living room; that the officers roused the six Monroe children and herded them into the living room; that Detective Pape struck Mr. Monroe several times with his flashlight, calling him “nigger” and “black boy”; that another officer pushed Mrs. Monroe; that other officers hit and kicked several of the children and pushed them to the floor; that the police ransacked every room, throwing clothing from closets to the floor, dumping drawers, ripping mattress covers; that Mr. Monroe was then taken to the police station and detained on “open” charges for ten hours, during which time he was interrogated about a murder 2 and exhibited in lineups; that he was not brought before a magistrate, although numerous magistrate’s courts were accessible; that he was not advised of his procedural rights; that he was not permitted to call his family or an attorney; that he was subsequently released without criminal charges having been filed against him. It is also alleged that the actions of the officers throughout were without authority of a search warrant or an arrest warrant; that those actions constituted arbitrary and unreasonable conduct; that the *204officers were employees of the City of Chicago, which furnished each of them with a badge and an identification card designating him as a member of the Police Department; that the officers were agents of the city, acting in the course of their employment and engaged in the performance of their duties; and that it is the custom of the Department to arrest and confine individuals for prolonged periods on “open” charges for interrogation, with the purpose of inducing incriminating statements, exhibiting its prisoners for identification, holding them incommunicado while police officers investigate their activities, and punishing them by imprisonment without judicial trial. On the basis of these allegations various members of the Monroe family seek damages against the individual police officers and against the City of Chicago. The District Court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim and the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed. 272 F. 2d 365.

Petitioners base their claim to relief in the federal courts on what was enacted as § 1 of the “Ku Klux Act” of April 20, 1871, “An Act to enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and for other Purposes.” 17 Stat. 13.- It became, with insignificant rephrasing, § 1979 of the Revised Statutes. As now set forth in 42 U. S. C. § 1983, it is, in relevant part, as follows:

“Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.”

*205I.

In invoking § 1979 (the old designation will be used hereafter), petitioners contend that its protection of “rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution” encompasses what “due process of law” and “the equal protection of the laws” of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee against action by the States. In this contention they are supported both by the title of the Act of 1871 and by its legislative history. See the authoritative statement of Mr. Edmunds, reporting the bill from the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 568. See also id., at 332-334, App. 83-85, 310. It is true that a related phrase, “any right or privilege secured ... by the Constitution or laws,” in § 241 of Title 18, U. S. C., was said by a plurality of the Court in United States v. Williams, 341 U. S. 70, to comprehend only the rights arising immediately from the relationship of the individual to the central government. And see United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542.3 But this construction was demanded by § 241, which penalizes conspiracies of private individuals acting as such, while § 1979 applies only to action taken “under color of any statute,” etc. Different problems of statutory meaning are presented by two enactments deriving from different *206constitutional sources. See the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S. 3. Compare United States v. Williams, supra, with Screws v. United States, 325 U. S. 91. If petitioners have alleged facts constituting a deprivation under color of state authority of a right assured them by the Fourteenth Amendment, they have brought themselves within § 1979. Douglas v. Jeannette, 319 U. S. 157; Hague v. C. I. O., 307 U. S. 496, 525-526 (opinion of Stone, J.).4

To be sure, Screws v. United States, supra, requires a finding of specific intent in order to sustain a conviction under the cognate penal provisions of 18 U. S. C. § 2425— “an intent to deprive a person of a right which has been made specific either by the express terms of the Constitution or laws of the United States or by decisions interpreting them.” 325 U. S., at 104. Petitioners’ complaint here alleges no such specific intent. But, for a number of reasons, this requirement of Screws should not be carried over and applied to civil actions under § 1979. First, the word “willfully” in 18 U. S. C. § 242 from which the requirement of intent was derived in Screws does not appear in § 1979. Second, § 1979, by the very fact that it is a civil provision, invites treatment different from that to be given its criminal analogue. The constitutional scruples concerning vagueness which were deemed to compel the Screws construction have less force in the context of a civil proceed*207ing,6 and § 1979, insofar as it creates an action for damages, must be read in light of the familiar basis of tort liability that a man is responsible for the natural consequences of his acts. Third, even in the criminal area, the specific intent demanded by Screws has proved to be an abstraction serving the purposes of a constitutional need without impressing any actual restrictions upon the nature of the crime which the jury tries. The Screws opinion itself said that “The fact that the defendants may not have been thinking in constitutional terms is not material where their aim was not to enforce local law but to deprive a citizen of a right and that right was protected by the Constitution.” 325 U. S., at 106. And lower courts in applying the statute have allowed inference of the requisite specific intent from evidence, it would appear, of malevolence alone.7 But if intent to infringe “specific” constitutional rights comes in practice to mean no more than intent without justification to bring about the circumstances which infringe those rights, then the consequence of introducing the specific intent issue into a litigation is, in effect, to require fictional pleading, needlessly burden jurors with abstruse instructions, and lessen the degree of control which federal courts have over jury vagaries.

If the courts are to enforce § 1979, it is an unhappy form of judicial disapproval to surround it with doctrines which partially and unequally obstruct its operation. Specific intent in the context of the section would cause *208such embarrassment without countervailing justification. Petitioners’ allegations that respondents in fact did the acts which constituted violations of constitutional rights are sufficient.

II.

To show such violations, petitioners invoke primarily the Amendment’s Due Process Clause.8 The essence of their claim is that the police conduct here alleged offends those requirements of decency and fairness which, because they are “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,” are imposed by the Due Process Clause upon the States. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319, 325. When we apply to their complaint that standard of a “principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental,” 9 which has been the touchstone for this Court’s enforcement of due process,10 the merit of this constitutional claim is evident. The conception expressed in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25, 27, that “The security of one’s privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police . . . is basic to a free society,” was not an innovation of Wolf. The tenet that there exists a realm of sanctuary surrounding every individual and infrangible, save in a very limited class of circumstances, by the agents of government, had informed the decision of the King’s Bench two centuries earlier in Entick v. Carrington, 2 Wils. 275, had been the basis of Otis’ cotemporary speech against the Writ of *209Assistance, see Gray’s notes in Quincy’s Massachusetts Reports, App. I, at 471; Tudor, Life of James Otis (1823) 63, and has in the intervening years found expression not only in the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, but also in the fundamental law of every State.11 Modern totalitarianisms have been a stark reminder, but did not newly teach, that the kicked-in door is the symbol of a rule of fear and violence fatal to institutions founded on respect for the integrity of man.

The essence of the liberty protected by the common law and by the American constitutions was “the right to shut the door on officials of the state unless their entry is under proper authority of law”; particularly, “the right to resist unauthorized entry which has as its design the securing of information to fortify the coercive power of the state against the individual.” Frank v. Maryland, 359 U. S. *210360, 365.12 Searches of the dwelling house were the special object of this universal condemnation of official intrusion.13 Night-time search was the evil in its most obnoxious form.14 Few reported cases have presented all of the manifold aggravating circumstances which petitioners here allege — intrusion en masse, by dark, by force, unauthorized by warrant, into an occupied private home, without even the asserted justification of belief by the intruders that the inhabitants were presently committing some criminal act within; physical abuse and the calculated degradation of insult and forced nakedness; sacking and disordering of personal effects throughout the home; arrest and detention against the background terror of threatened criminal proceedings. Wherever similar conduct has appeared, the courts have unanimously condemned police entries as lawless.15

*211If the question whether due process forbids this kind of police invasion were before us in isolation, the answer would be quick. If, for example, petitioners had sought damages in the state courts of Illinois and if those courts had refused redress on the ground that the official character of the respondents clothed them with civil immunity, we would be faced with the sort of situation to which the language in the Wolf opinion was addressed: “we have no hesitation in saying that were a State affirmatively to sanction such police incursion into privacy it would run counter to the guaranty of the Fourteenth Amendment.” 338 U. S., at 28. If that issue is not reached in this case it is not because the conduct which the record here presents can be condoned. But by bringing their action in a Federal District Court petitioners cannot rest on the Fourteenth Amendment simpliciter. They invoke the protection of a specific statute by which Congress restricted federal judicial enforcement of its guarantees to particular enumerated circumstances. They must show not only that their constitutional rights have been infringed, but that they have been infringed “under color of [state] statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,” as that phrase is used in the relevant congressional enactment.

III.

Of course, if Congress by appropriate statutory language attempted to reach every act which could be attributed to the States under the Fourteenth Amendment’s prohibition: “No State shall . . . ,” the reach of the statute would be the reach of the Amendment itself. Relevant to the enforcement of such a statute would be not only the concept of state action as this Court has developed it, see Nixon v. Condon, 286 U. S. 73, 89, but also considerations of the power of Congress, under the Amendment’s Enforcement Clause, to determine what *212is “appropriate legislation” to protect the rights which the Fourteenth Amendment secures. Cf. United States v. Raines, 362 U. S. 17. Still, in this supposed case we would arrive at the question of what Congress could do only after we had determined what it was that Congress had done. So, in the case before us now, we must ask what Congress did in 1871. We must determine what Congress meant by “under color” of enumerated state authority.16

Congress used that phrase not only in R. S. § 1979, but also in the criminal provisions of § 2 of the First Civil Rights Act of April 9, 1866,14 Stat. 27, from which is derived the present 18 U. S. C. § 242,17 and in both cases used it with the same purpose.18 During the seventy years *213which followed these enactments, cases in this Court in which the “under color” provisions were invoked uniformly involved action taken either in strict pursuance of some specific command of state law19 or within the scope of executive discretion in the administration of state laws.20 *214The same is true, with two exceptions, in the lower federal courts.21 In the first of. these two cases it was held that § 1979 was not directed to instances of lawless police brutality, although the ruling was not put on “under color” *215grounds.22 In the second, an indictment charging a county tax collector with depriving one Ah Koo of a federally secured right under color of a designated California law, set forth in the indictment, was held insufficient against a demurrer. United States v. Jackson, 26 Fed. Cas. 563, No. 15,459 (C. C. D. Cal. 1874). The court wrote:

“The indictment contains no averment that Ah Koo was a foreign miner, and within the provisions of the state law. If this averment be unnecessary . . . the act of congress would then be held to apply to a case of illegal extortion by a tax collector from any person, *216though such exaction might be wholly unauthorized by the law under which the officer pretended to act.

“We are satisfied that it was not the design of congress to prevent or to punish such abuse of authority by state officers. The object of the act was, not to prevent illegal exactions, but to forbid the execution of state laws, which, by the act itself, are made void. . . .

“It would seem, necessarily, to follow, that the person from whom the tax was exacted must have been a person from whom, under the provisions of the state law, the officer was authorized to exact it. The statute requires that a party shall be subjected to a deprivation of right secured by the statute under color of some law, statute, order or custom; but if this exaction, although made'by a tax collector, has been levied upon a person not within the provisions of the state law, the exaction cannot be said to have been made ‘under color of law,’ any more than a similar exaction from a Chinese miner, made by a person wholly unauthorized, and under the pretense of being a tax collector.” Id., at 663-564.

Throughout this period, the only indication of this Court’s views on the proper interpretation of the “under color” language is a dictum in the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S. 3. There, in striking down other Civil Rights Act provisions which, as the Court regarded them, attempted to reach private conduct not attributable to state authority, Mr. Justice Bradley contrasted those provisions with § 2 of the Act of 1866: “This [latter] law is clearly corrective in its character, intended to counteract and furnish redress against State laws and proceedings, and customs having the force of law, which sanction the wrongful acts specified.” Id., at 16.

A sharp change from this uniform application of seventy years was made in 1941, but without acknowledgment or *217indication of awareness of the revolutionary turnabout from what had been established practice. The opinion in United States v. Classic, 313 U. S. 299, accomplished this. The case presented an indictment under § 242 charging certain local Commissioners of Elections with altering ballots cast in a primary held to nominate candidates for Congress. Sustaining the sufficiency of the indictment in an extensive opinion concerned principally with the question whether the right to vote in such a primary was a right secured by the Constitution,23 Mr. Justice Stone wrote that the alteration of the ballots was “under color” of state law. This holding was summarily announced without exposition; it had been only passingly argued.24 Of the three authorities cited to support it, two did not involve the “under color” statutes,25 and the third, Hague v. C. I. O., 307 U. S. 496, was a case in which high-ranking municipal officials claimed authorization for their actions under municipal ordinances (here held unconstitu*218tional) and under the general police powers of the State.26 All three of these cases had dealt with “State action” problems, and it is “State action,” not the very different question of the “under color” clause, that Mr. Justice Stone appears to have considered.27 (I joined in this opinion without having made an independent examination of the legislative history of the relevant legislation or of the authorities drawn upon for the Classic construction. Acquiescence so founded does not preclude the responsible recognition of error disclosed by subsequent study.) When, however, four years later the Court was called on to review the conviction under § 242 of a Georgia County Sheriff who had beaten a Negro prisoner to death, the opinion of four of the six Justices who believed that the statute applied merely invoked Classic and stare decisis and did not reconsider the meaning which that case had uncritically assumed was to be attached to the language, “under color” of state authority. Screws v. United States, 325 U. S. 91. The briefs in the Screws ease did *219not examine critically the legislative history of the Civil Rights Acts.28 The only reference to this history in the plurality opinion, insofar as it bears on the interpretation of the clause “under color of . . . law,” is contained in a pair of sentences discounting two statements by Senators Trumbull and Sherman regarding the Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and 1870, cited by the minority.29 The bulk of the plurality opinion’s treatment of the issue consists of the argument that “under color” had been construed in Classic and that the construction there put on the words should not be abandoned or revised. 325 U. S., at 109-113. The case of Williams v. United States, 341 U. S. 97, reaffirmed Screws and applied it to circumstances of third-degree brutality practiced by a private detective who held a special police officer’s card and was accompanied by a regular policeman.30

*220Thus, although this Court has three times found that conduct of state officials which is forbidden by state law may be “under color” of state law for purposes of the Civil Rights Acts, it is accurate to say that that question has never received here the consideration which its importance merits. That regard for controlling legislative history which is conventionally observed by this Court in determining the true meaning of important legislation that does not construe itself31 has never been applied to the “under color” provisions; particularly, there has never been canvassed the full record of the debates preceding passage of the 1871 Act with which we are concerned in this case. Neither Classic nor Screws nor Williams warrants refusal now to take account of those debates and the illumination they afford. While we may well decline to re-examine recent cases which derive from the judicial' process exercised under its adequate safeguards — documenting briefs and adequate arguments on both sides as foundation for due deliberation — the relevant demands of stare decisis do not preclude considering, for the first time thoroughly and in the light of the best available evidence of congressional purpose, a statutory *221interpretation which started as an unexamined assumption on the basis of inapplicable citations and has the claim of a dogma solely through reiteration. Particularly is this so when that interpretation, only recently made, was at its inception a silent reversal of the judicial history of the Civil Rights Acts for three quarters of a century.

“The rule of stare decisis, though one tending to consistency and uniformity of decision, is not inflexible.” Hertz v. Woodman, 218 U. S. 205, 212. It is true, of course, that the reason for the rule is more compelling in cases involving inferior law, law capable of change by Congress, than in constitutional cases, where this Court— although even in such cases a wise consciousness of the limitations of individual vision has impelled it always to give great weight to prior decisions — nevertheless bears the ultimate obligation for the development of the law as institutions develop. See, e. g., Smith v. Allwright, 321 U. S. 649. But the Court has not always declined to re-examine cases whose outcome Congress might have changed. See Mr. Justice Brandéis, dissenting, in Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U. S. 393, 406-407, n. 1. Decisions involving statutory construction, even decisions which Congress has persuasively declined to overrule, have been overruled here. See Girouard v. United States, 328 U. S. 61, overruling United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U. S. 644, United States v. Macintosh, 283 U. S. 605, and United States v. Bland, 283 U. S. 636; see also Commissioner v. Estate of Church, 335 U. S. 632, overruling May v. Heiner, 281 U. S. 238.

And with regard to the Civil Rights Acts there are reasons of particular urgency which authorize the Court— indeed, which make it the Court’s responsibility — to reappraise in the hitherto skimpily considered context of R. S. § 1979 what was decided in Classic, Screws and Williams. This is not an area of commercial law in which, presumably, individuals may have arranged their affairs in *222reliance on the expected stability of decision. Compare National Bank v. Whitney, 103 U. S. 99; Vail v. Arizona, 207 U. S. 201; Walling v. Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co., 331 U. S. 17; United States v. South Buffalo R. Co., 333 U. S. 771. Nor is it merely a mine-run statutory question involving a narrow compass of individual rights and duties. The issue in the present case concerns directly a basic problem of American federalism: the relation of the Nation to the States in the critically important sphere of municipal law administration. In this aspect, it has significance approximating constitutional dimension. Necessarily, the construction of the Civil Rights Acts raises issues fundamental to our institutions. This imposes on this Court a corresponding obligation to exercise its power within the fair limits of its judicial discretion. “We recognize that stare decisis embodies an important social policy. It represents an element of continuity in law, and is rooted in the psychologic need to satisfy reasonable expectations. But stare decisis is a principle of policy and not a mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision, however recent and questionable . . . .” Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U. S. 106, 119.

Now, while invoking the prior decisions which have given “under color of [law]” a content that ignores the meaning fairly comported by the words of the text and confirmed by the legislative history, the Court undertakes a fresh examination of that legislative history. The decision in this case, therefore, does not rest on stare decisis, and the true construction of the statute may be thought to be as free from the restraints of that doctrine as though the matter were before us for the first time. Certainly, none of the implications which the Court seeks to draw from silences in the minority reports of congressional committees in 1956, 1957, and 1960, or from the use of “under color” language in the very different context of the Act of May 6, 1960, *22374 Stat. 86 — concerned, in relevant part, with the preservation of election records and with the implementation of the franchise — serves as an impressive bar to re-examination of the true scope of R. S. § 1979 itself in its pertinent legislative setting.32

*224IV.

This case squarely presents the question whether the intrusion of a city policeman for which that policeman can show no such authority at state law as could be successfully interposed in defense to a state-law action against him, is nonetheless to be regarded as “under color” of state authority within the meaning of R. S. § 1979. Respondents, in breaking into the Monroe apartment, violated the laws of the State of Illinois.33 Illinois law *225appears to offer a civil remedy for unlawful searches;34 petitioners do not claim that none is available. Rather they assert that they have been deprived of due process of law and of equal protection of the laws under color of state law, although from all that appears the courts of Illinois are available to give them the fullest redress which the common law affords for the violence done them, nor does any “statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage” of the State of Illinois bar that redress. Did the enactment by Congress of § 1 of the Ku Klux Act of 1871 encompass such a situation?

That section, it has been noted, was patterned on the similar criminal provision of § 2, Act of April 9, 1866. The earlier Act had as its primary object the effective nullification of the Black Codes, those statutes of the Southern legislatures which had so burdened and disqualified the Negro as to make his emancipation appear illusory.35 The Act had been vetoed by President Johnson, whose veto message describes contemporary understanding of its second section; the section, he wrote,

“seems to be designed to apply to some existing or future law of a State or Territory which may conflict with the provisions of the bill .... It provides for counteracting such forbidden legislation by imposing fine and imprisonment upon the legislators who may pass such conflicting laws, or upon the officers or agents who shall put, or attempt to put, them into execution. It means an official offense, not a com*226mon crime committed against law upon the persons or property of the black race. Such an act may deprive the black man of his property, but not of the right to hold property. It means a deprivation of the right itself, either by the State judiciary or the State Legislature.” 36

And Senator Trumbull, then Chairman of .the Senate Judiciary Committee,37 in his remarks urging its passage over the veto, expressed the intendment of the second section as those who voted for it read it: ■

“If an offense is committed against a colored person simply because he is colored, in a State where the law affords him the same protection as if he were white, this act neither has nor was intended to have anything to do with his case, because he has adequate remedies in the State courts; but if he is discriminated against under color of State laws because he is colored, then it becomes necessary to interfere for his protection.” 38

Section 2 of the 1866 Act was re-enacted in substance in 1870 as part of “An Act to enforce the Right of Citizens ... to vote in the several States . . . ,” 16 Stat. 140, *227144. The following colloquy on that occasion is particularly revealing:

“Mr. Sherman. . . . My colleague cannot deny that we can by appropriate legislation prevent any private person from, shielding himself under a State regulation, and thus denying to a person the right to vote ....

“Mr. Casserly. I should like to ask the Senator from Ohio how a State can be said to abridge the right of a colored man to vote when some irresponsible person in the streets is the actor in that wrong?

“Mr. Sherman. If the offender, who may be a loafer, the meanest man in the streets, covers himself under the protection or color of a law or regulation or constitution of a State, he may be punished for doing it.

“Mr. Casserly. Suppose the State law authorizes the colored man to vote; what then?

“Mr. Sherman. That is not the case with which we are dealing. . . . This bill only proposes to deal with offenses committed by officers or persons under color of existing State law, under color of existing State constitutions. No man could be convicted under this bill reported by the Judiciary Committee unless the denial of the right to vote was done under color or pretense of State regulation. The whole bill shows that. . . . [T]he first and second sections of the bill . . . simply punish officers as well as persons for discrimination under color of State laws or constitutions; and it so provides all the way through.” 39

*228The original text of the present § 1979 contained words, left out in the Revised Statutes, which clarified the objective to which the provision was addressed:

“That any person who, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State, shall subject, or cause to be subjected, any person within the jurisdiction of the United States to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution of the United States, shall, any such law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of the State to the contrary notwithstanding, be liable to the party injured . . . 40

Representative Shellabarger, reporting the section, explained it to the House as “in its terms carefully confined to giving a civil action for such wrongs against citizenship as are done under color of State laws which abridge these rights.” 41 Senator Edmunds, steering the measure through the Senate, found constitutional sanction for it in the Fourteenth Amendment, explaining that state action may consist in executive nonfeasance as well as malfeasance, so that any offenses against a citizen in a *229State are susceptible of federal protection “unless the criminal who shall commit those offenses is punished and the person who suffers receives that redress which the principles and spirit of the laws entitle him to have.” 42 And James A. Garfield supported the bill in the House as “so guarded as to preserve intact the autonomy of the States, the machinery of the State governments, and the municipal organizations established under State laws.” 43

Indeed, the Ku Klux Act as a whole encountered in the course of its passage strenuous constitutional objections which focused precisely upon an assertedly unauthorized extension of federal judicial power into areas of exclusive state competence.44 A special target was § 2 of the bill as reported to the House, providing criminal penalties:

“if two or more persons shall, within the limits of any State, band, conspire, or combine together to do *230any act in violation of the rights, privileges, or immunities of any person, to which he is entitled under the Constitution and laws of the United States, which, committed within a place under the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, would, under any law of the United States then in force, constitute the crime of either murder, manslaughter, mayhem, robbery, assault and battery, perjury, subornation of perjury, criminal obstruction of legal, process [sic] or resistance of officers in discharge of official duty, arson, or larceny . . . 45

In vain the proponents of this section argued its propriety, seeking to support it by argument ex necessitate from the complete failure of state judicial and executive organs to control the depredations of the Klan.46 Even *231in the Reconstruction Congress, the majority party split. Many balked at legislation which they regarded as establishing a general federal jurisdiction for the protection of person and property in the States.47 Only after a com-*232píete rewriting of the section to meet these constitutional objections could the bill be passed.48 Yet almost none of those who had decried § 2 as undertaking impermissibly to make the national courts tribunals of concurrent jurisdiction for the punishment of state-law offenses expressed similar objections to § 1, later § 1979.49 One of the most *233vehement of those who could find no constitutional sanction for federal judicial control of conduct already proscribed by state law, and who therefore opposed original § 2 as reaching beyond the limits of congressional competence, expressly supported § 1 as affording “further redress for violations under State authority of constitutional rights.”50

The general understanding of the legislators unquestionably was that, as amended, the Ku Klux Act did “not undertake to furnish redress for wrongs done by one person upon another in any of the States ... in violation of their laws, unless he also violated some law of the United States, nor to punish one person for an ordinary assault and battery ...” 51 Even those who — opposing the constitutional objectors — found sufficient congressional power in the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to give this kind of redress, deemed inexpedient the exercise of any such power: “Convenience and courtesy to the States suggest a sparing use, and never so far as to supplant the State authorities except in cases of extreme necessity, and when the State governments criminally refuse or neglect those duties which are imposed *234upon them.” 52 Extreme Radicals, those who believed that the remedy for the oppressed Unionists in the South was a general expansion of federal judicial jurisdiction so that “loyal men could have the privilege of having their causes, civil and criminal, tried in the Federal courts,” were disappointed with the Act as passed.53

Finally, it is significant that the opponents of the Act, exhausting ingenuity to discover constitutional objections to every provision of it, also construed § 1 as addressed only to conduct authorized by state law, and therefore within the admitted permissible reach of Fourteenth Amendment federal power. “The first section of this bill prohibits any invidious legislation by States against the rights or privileges of citizens of the United States,” one such opponent paraphrased the provision.54 And Senator Thurman, who insisted vociferously on the absence of federal power to penalize a conspiracy of individuals to violate state law (“that is a case of mere individual violence, having no color whatsoever of authority of law, either Federal or State; and to say that you can punish men for that mere conspiracy, which is their individual act, and which is a crime against the State laws themselves, punishable by the State laws, is simply to wipe out all the State jurisdiction over crimes and transfer it bodily to the Congress”),55 admitted without question the constitutionality of § 156 (“It refers to a deprivation under color of law, either statute law or ‘custom or usage’ which has become common law”).57

*235The Court now says, however, that “It was not the unavailability of state remedies but the failure of certain States to enforce the laws with an equal hand that furnished the powerful momentum behind this 'force bill.’ ” Of course, if the notion of “unavailability” of remedy is limited to mean an absence of statutory, paper right, this is in large part true.58 Insofar as the Court undertakes to demonstrate — as the bulk of its opinion seems to do— that § 1979 was meant to reach some instances of action not specifically authorized by the avowed, apparent, written law inscribed in the statute books of the States, the argument knocks at an open door. No one would or could deny this, for by its express terms the statute comprehends deprivations of federal rights under color of any “statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage” of a State. (Emphasis added.) The question is, what class of cases other than those involving state statute law were meant to be reached. And, with respect to this question, the Court’s conclusion is undermined by the very portions of the legislative debates which it cites. For surely the misconduct of individual municipal police officers, subject to the effective oversight of appropriate state administrative and judicial authorities, presents a situation which differs toto coelo from one in which “Immunity is given to crime, and the records of the public tribunals are searched in vain for any evidence of effective redress,”59 or in which murder rages while a State makes *236“no successful effort to bring the guilty to punishment or afford protection or redress/’60 or in which the “State courts . . . [are] unable to enforce the criminal laws . . . or to suppress the disorders existing,”61 or in which, in a State’s “judicial tribunals one class is unable to secure that enforcement of their rights and punishment for their infraction which is accorded to another,” 62 or “of . . . hundreds of outrages . . . not one [is] punished,” 63 or “the courts of the . . . States fail and refuse to do their duty in the punishment of offenders against the law,” 64 or in which a “class of officers charged under the laws with their administration permanently and as a rule refuse to extend [their] protection.”65 These statements indicate that Congress — made keenly aware by the post-bellum conditions in the South that States through their authorities could sanction offenses against the individual by settled practice which established state law as truly as written codes — designed § 1979 to reach, as well, official conduct which, because engaged in “permanently and as a rule,” or “systematically,”66 came through acceptance by law-administering officers to constitute “custom, or usage” having the cast of law. See Nashville, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Browning, 310 U. S. 362, 369. They do not indicate an attempt to reach, nor does the statute by its terms include, instances of acts in defiance of state law and which no settled state practice, no systematic pattern of official action or inaction,' no “custom, or usage, of any State,” insulates from effective and adequate reparation . by the State’s authorities.

*237Rather, all the evidence converges to the conclusion that Congress by § 1979 created a civil liability enforceable in the federal courts only in instances of injury for which redress was barred in the state courts because some “statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage” sanctioned the grievance complained of. This purpose, manifested even by the so-called “Radical” Reconstruction Congress in 1871, accords with the presuppositions of our federal system. The jurisdiction which Article III of the Constitution conferred on the national judiciary reflected the assumption that the state courts, not the federal courts, would remain the primary guardians of that - fundamental security of person and property which the long evolution of the common law had secured to one individual as against other individuals. , The Fourteenth Amendment did not alter this basic aspect of our federalism.67

Its commands were addressed to the States. Only when the States, through their responsible organs for the formulation and administration of local policy, sought to deny or impede access by the individual to the central government in connection with those enumerated functions assigned to it, or to deprive the individual of a certain minimal fairness in the exercise of the coercive forces of the State, or without reasonable justification to treat him differently than other persons subject to their jurisdiction, was an overriding federal sanction imposed. As between individuals, no corpus of substantive rights was guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, but only “due process of law” in the ascertainment and enforcement of rights and equality in the enjoyment of rights and safeguards that the States afford. This was the base of the distinction between federal citizenship and state *238citizenship drawn by the Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36. This conception begot the “State action” principle on which, from the time of the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S. 3, this Court has relied in its application of Fourteenth Amendment, guarantees. As between individuals, that body of mutual rights and duties which constitute the civil personality of a man remains essentially the creature of the legal institutions of the States.

But, of course, in the present case petitioners argue that the wrongs done them were committed not by individuals but by the police as state officials. There are two senses in which this might be true. It might be true if petitioners alleged that the redress which state courts offer them against the respondents is different than that which those courts would offer against other individuals, guilty of the same conduct, who were not the police. This is not alleged. It might also be true merely because the respondents are the police — because they are clothed’ with an appearance of official authority which is in itself a factor of significance in dealings between individuals. Certainly the night-time intrusion of the man with a star and a police revolver is a different phenomenon than the night-time intrusion of a burglar. The aura of power which.a show of authority carries with it has been created by state government. For this reason the national legislature, exercising its power to implement the Fourteenth Amendment, might well attribute responsibility for the intrusion to the State and legislate to protect against such intrusion. The pretense of authority alone might seem to Congress sufficient basis for creating an exception to the ordinary rule that it is to the state tribunals that individuals within, a State must look for redress against other individuals within that State. The same pretense of authority might suffice to sustain congressional legislation creating the exception. See Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339. But until Congress has *239declared its purpose to shift the ordinary distribution of judicial power for the determination of causes between co-citizens of a State, this Court should not make the shift. Congress has not in § 1979 manifested that intention.

The unwisdom of extending federal criminal jurisdiction into areas of conduct conventionally punished by state penal law is perhaps more obvious than that of extending federal civil jurisdiction into the traditional realm of state tort law. But the latter, too, presents its problems of policy appropriately left to Congress. Suppose that a state legislature or the highest court of a State should determine that within its territorial limits no damages should be recovered in tort for pain and suffering, or for mental anguish, or that no punitive damages should be recoverable. Since the federal courts went out of the business of making “general law,” Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, such decisions of local policy have admittedly been the exclusive province of state lawmakers. Should the civil liability for police conduct which can claim no authority under local law, which is actionable as common-law assault or trespass in the local courts, comport different rules? Should an unlawful intrusion by a policeman in Chicago entail different consequences than an unlawful intrusion by a hoodlum? These are matters of policy in its strictly legislative sense, not for determination by this Court. And if it be, as it is, a matter for congressional choice, the legislative evidence is overwhelming that § 1979 is not expressive of that choice. Indeed, its precise limitation to acts “under color” of state statute, ordinance or other authority appears on its face designed to leave all questions of the nature and extent of liability of individuals to the laws of the several States except when a State seeks to shield those individuals under the special barrier of state authority. To extend Civil Rights Act liability beyond that point is *240to interfere in areas of state policymaking where Congress has not determined to interfere.

Nor will such interference be negligible. One argument urged in Screws in favor of the result which that case reached was the announced policy of self-restraint of the Department of Justice in the prosecution of cases under 18 U. S. C. § 242. See 325 U. S., at 159-160. Experience indicates that private litigants cannot be expected to show the same consideration for the autonomy of local administration which the Department purportedly shows.68

Relevant also are the effects upon the institution of federal constitutional adjudication of sustaining under § 1979 damage actions for relief against conduct allegedly violative of federal constitutional rights, but plainly *241violative of state law. Permitting such actions necessitates the immediate decision of federal constitutional issues despite the admitted availability of state-law remedies which would avoid those issues.69 This would make inroads, throughout a large area, upon the principle of federal judicial self-limitation which has become a significant instrument in the efficient functioning of the national judiciary. See Railroad Comm’n of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U. S. 496, and cases following. Self-limitation is not a matter of technical nicety, nor judicial timidity. It reflects the recognition that to no small degree the effectiveness of the legal order depends upon the infrequency with which it solves its problems by resorting to determinations of ultimate power. Especially-is this true where the circumstances under which those ultimate determinations must be made are not conducive to the most mature deliberation and decision. If § 1979 is made a vehicle of constitutional litigation in cases where state officers have acted lawlessly at state law, difficult questions of the federal constitutionality of certain official practices — lawful perhaps in some States, unlawful in others — may be litigated between private parties without the participation of responsible state authorities which is obviously desirable to protect legitimate state interests, but also to better guide adjudication by competent record-making and argument.

Of course, these last considerations would be irrelevant to our duty if Congress had demonstrably meant to reach by § 1979 activities like those of respondents in this case. But where it appears that Congress plainly did not have that understanding, respect for principles which this Court has long regarded as critical to the most effective func*242tioning of our federalism should avoid extension of a statute beyond its manifest area of operation into applications which invite conflict with the administration of local policies. Such an extension makes the extreme limits of federal constitutional power a law to regulate the quotidian business of every traffic policeman, every registrar of elections, every city inspector or investigator, every clerk in every municipal licensing bureau in this country. The text of the statute, reinforced by its history, precludes such a reading.

In concluding that police intrusion in violation of state law is not a wrong remediable under R. S. § 1979, the pressures which urge an opposite 'result are duly felt. The difficulties which confront private citizens who seek to vindicate in traditional common-law actions their state-created rights against lawless invasion of their privacy by local policemen are obvious,70 and obvious is the need for more effective modes of redress. The answer to these urgings must be regard for our federal system which presupposes a wide range of regional autonomy in the kinds of protection local residents receive. If various common-law concepts make it possible for a policeman — but no more possible for a policeman than for any individual hoodlum intruder — to escape without liability when he has vandalized a home, that is an evil. But, surely, its remedy devolves, in the first instance, on the States. Of course, if the States afford less protection against the police, as police, than against the hoodlum — if under authority of state “statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage” the police are specially shielded— *243§ 1979 provides a remedy which dismissal of petitioners’ complaint in the present case does not impair. Otherwise, the protection of the people from local delinquencies and shortcomings depends, as in general it must, upon the active consciences of state executives, legislators and judges.71 Federal intervention, which must at best be limited to securing those minimal guarantees afforded by the evolving concepts of due process and equal protection, may in the long run do the individual a disservice by deflecting responsibility from the state lawmakers, who hold the power of providing a far more comprehensive scope of protection. Local society, also, may well be the loser, by relaxing its sense of responsibility and, indeed, perhaps resenting what may appear to it to be outside interference where local authority is ample and more appropriate to supply needed remedies.

This is not to say that there may not exist today, as in 1871, needs which call for congressional legislation to protect the civil rights of individuals in the States. Strong contemporary assertions of these needs have been expressed. Report of the President’s Committee on Civil Rights, To Secure These Rights (1947); Chafee, Safeguarding Fundamental Human Rights: The Tasks of States and Nation, 27 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 519 (1959). But both the insistence of the needs and the delicacy of the issues involved in finding appropriate means for their satisfaction demonstrate that their *244demand is for legislative, not judicial, response. We cannot expect to create an effective means of protection for human liberties by torturing an 1871 statute to meet the problems of 1960.

Of an enactment like the Civil Rights Act, dealing with the safeguarding and promotion of individual freedom, it is especially relevant to be mindful that, since it is projected into the future, it is ambulatory in its scope, the statute properly absorbing the expanding reach of its purpose to the extent that the words with which that purpose is conveyed fairly bear such expansion. But this admissible expansion of meaning through the judicial process does not entirely unbind the courts and license their exercise of what is qualitatively a different thing, namely, the formulation of policy through legislation. In one of the last writings by that tough-minded libertarian, who was also no friend of narrow construction, Professor Zechariah Chafee, Jr., he admonished against putting the Civil Rights Act to dubious new uses even though, as a matter of policy, they might be desirable in the changed climate nearly a hundred years after its enactment: “At all events, we can be sure of one thing. If federal protection be desirable, we ought to get it by something better than a criminal statute of antiquated uncertainties and based on the out-moded Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. . . . It is very queer to try to protect human rights in the middle of the Twentieth Century by a left-over from the days of General Grant.” Id., at 529. It is not a work for courts to melt and recast this statute. “Under color” of law meant by authority of law in the nineteenth century. No judicial sympathy, however strong, for needs now felt can give the phrase — a phrase which occurs in a statute, not in a constitution — any different meaning in the twentieth. Compare Mr. Justice Holmes’ varying approaches to construction of the same word in a statute *245and in the Constitution, Towne v. Eisner, 245 U. S. 418, and Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U. S. 189, 219 (dissenting).

This meaning, no doubt, poses difficulties for the case-by-case application of § 1979. Manifestly the applicability of the section in an action for damages cannot be made to turn upon the actual availability or unavailability of a state-law remedy for each individual plaintiff’s situation. Prosecution to adverse judgment of a state-court damage claim cannot be made prerequisite to § 1979 relief. In the first place, such a requirement would effectively nullify § 1979 as a vehicle for recovering damages.72 In the second place, the conclusion that police activity which violates state law is not “under color” of state law does not turn upon the existence of a state tort remedy. Rather, it recognizes the freedom of the States to fashion their own laws of torts in their own way under no threat of federal intervention save where state law makes determinative of a plaintiff’s rights the particular circumstance that defendants are acting by state authority. Section 1979 was not designed to cure and level all the possible imperfections of local common-law doctrines, but to provide for the case of the defendant who can claim that some particular dispensation of state authority immunizes him from the ordinary processes of the law.

*246It follows that federal courts in actions at law under § 1979 would have to determine whether defendants’ conduct is in violation of, or under color of, state law often with little guidance from earlier state decisions. Such a determination will sometimes be difficult, of course. But Federal District Courts sitting in diversity cases are often called upon to determine as intricate and uncertain questions of local law as whether official authority would cloak a given practice of the police from liability in a state-court suit. Certain fixed points of reference will be available. If a plaintiff can show that defendant is acting pursuant to the specific terms of a state statute or of a municipal ordinance, § 1979 will apply. See Lane v. Wilson, 307 U. S. 268. If he can show that defendant’s conduct is within the range of executive discretion in the enforcement of a state statute, or municipal ordinance, § 1979 will apply. See Hague v. C. I. O., 307 U. S. 496. Beyond these cases will lie the admittedly more difficult ones in which he seeks to show some “ ‘custom or usage’ which has become common law.” 73

*247Y.

My Brother Harlan’s concurring opinion deserves separate consideration. It begins by asking what is its essential question: Why would the Forty-second Congress, which clearly provided tort relief in the federal courts for violations of constitutional rights by acts of a policeman acting pursuant to state authority, not also have provided the same relief for violations of constitutional rights by a policeman acting in violation of state authority? What, it inquires, would cause a Congress to distinguish between the two .situations? Examining a first possible differentiating factor — the differing degrees of adequacy of protection of person and property already available in the state courts — it reasons that this could not have been significant in view of Congress’ purpose in 1871, for that purpose was not to enact a statute having “merely a jurisdictional function, shifting the load of federal supervision from the Supreme Court to the lower courts and providing a federal tribunal for fact findings.” *248Examining the other possible distinction — the difference between injuries to individuals from isolated acts of abuse of authority by state officers and injuries to individuals from acts sanctioned by the dignity of state law — it finds that this, too, could not have been important, especially to a Congress which was aware of the existence of state constitutional guarantees of protection to the individual, and which enacted the conspiracy statute which became R. S. § 1980 and is now 42 U. S. C. § 1985.

To ask why a Congress which legislated to reach a state officer enforcing an unconstitutional law or sanctioned usage did not also legislate to reach the same officer acting unconstitutionally without authority is to abstract this statute from its historical context. The legislative process of the post-bellum Congresses which enacted the several Civil Rights Acts was one of struggle and compromise in which the power of the National Government was expanded piece by piece against bitter resistance; the Radicals of 1871 had to yield ground and bargain over detail in order to keep the moderate Republicans in line.74 This was not an endeavor for achieving legislative patterns of analytically satisfying symmetry. It was a contest of large sallies and small retreats in which as much ground was occupied, at any time, as the temporary coalescences of forces strong enough to enroll a prevailing vote could agree upon. To assume that if Congress reached one situation it would also have reached another situation involving not dissimilar problems — assuming, arguendo, that the problems, viewed in intellectual abstraction, are not dissimilar — ignores the temper of the times which produced the Ku Klux Act. This approach would be persuasive only if the two situations, that of a *249state officer acting pursuant to state authority and that of a state officer acting without state authority, were so entirely similar that they would not, in 1871, have been perceived as two different situations at all. In view of the fierce debate which occupied the Forty-second Congress as to whether the Fourteenth Amendment had been intended to do more than invalidate state legislation offensive on its face,75 this supposition must be ruled out. Contrariwise, it is historically persuasive that the Forty-second Congress, which was not thinking in neat abstract categories, designed a statute to protect federal constitutional rights from an immediate evil perceived to be grave — the evil described by the statute’s sponsor, Mr. Shellabarger, “such wrongs ... as are done under color of State laws which abridge these rights,” 76 — but did not, by the same measure, seek to control unconstitutional action abusive of a state authority which did not, itself, “abridge these rights.”

Moreover, even under the most rigorous analysis the two situations argumentatively deemed not dissimilar are indeed dissimilar, and dissimilar in both of the two relevant aspects. As to the adequacy of state-court protection of person and property, there seems a very sound distinction, as a class, between injuries sanctioned by state law (as to which there can never be state-court redress, if at all, unless (1) the state courts are sufficiently receptive to a federal claim to declare their own law unconstitutional, or (2) the litigant persists through a tortuous and protracted process of appeals, after a state trial court has found the facts, through the state-court system to this Court) and injuries not sanctioned by state law. To make this line of distinction determine the incidence of Civil Rights legislation serves to cover the bulk of cases where *250federal judicial protection would be needed. To be sure, this leaves certain cases unprotected, namely, the few instances of federal constitutional violations not authorized by state statute, custom or usage and which concern interests wholly unrecognized by state statute or common law. But the cost of ignoring the distinction in order to cover those cases — the cost, that is, of providing a federal judicial remedy for every constitutional violation — involves pre-emption by the National Government, in the larger class of cases in which rights secured • by the Fourteenth Amendment relate to interests of person and property having a state-law origin, of matters of intimate concern to state and local governments. One of the most persistently recurring motifs in the legislative history of the Ku Klux Act is precisely a reluctance to invade these regions of state and local concern except insofar as absolutely necessary for effective assurance of the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantees. Therefore, the line of distinction between state-authorized and unauthorized actions, as a line of compromise among positions concerning which the legislative evidence is clear that Congress wanted to, and did, compromise, is the most probable for the Act’s draftsmen to have selected.

To attribute significance to this line of distinction is not to reduce the Ku Klux Act to having "merely a jurisdictional function, shifting the load of federal supervision from the Supreme Court” to an original federal tribunal. First, there are certain classes of cases where § 1979, construed as reaching only unconstitutional conduct authorized by state law, will accord “substantive” relief that would not have been available through the means of state-law, state-court litigation subject to the commands of the Supremacy Clause and to Supreme Court review. This would be the case, for example, if a Negro were to bring an action for damages against a state election official who had denied him the right to vote pursuant to discriminatory *251state franchise provisions77 in a State which did not recognize a common-law action for deprivation of the right to vote.' Similarly, one whose home had been searched by state police acting under a state statute, regulation, custom or usage which authorized an unconstitutional intrusion could recover by a § 1979 action a measure of relief determined, as a “substantive” matter, by federal law, whereas Supreme-Court-reviewed state-court suit might have availed him only damages for technical trespass. And, second, with reference to the more numerous classes of cases in which the redress which a federal trial court might give would be approximately the same, “substantively,” as that which could be recovered by state-court suit, the theory that the Reconstruction Congress could not have meant § 1979 principally as a “jurisdictional” provision granting access to an original federal forum in lieu of the slower, more costly, more hazardous route of federal appeal from fact-finding state courts, forgets how important providing a federal trial court was among the several purposes of the Ku Klux Act.78 One may agree that in one sense § 1979 is not “merely” jurisdictional — not jurisdictional in the sense, for example, that § 3 of the 1866 Civil Rights Act was jurisdictional.79 Section 1979 does *252create a “substantive” right to relief. But this does not negative the fact that a powerful impulse behind the creation of this “substantive” right was the purpose that it be available in, and be shaped through, original federal tribunals.

In truth, to deprecate thé purposes of this 1871 statute in terms of analysis which refers to “merely . . . jurisdictional” effects, to “shifting the load of federal supervision,” and to the “administrative burden on the Supreme Court,” is to attribute twentieth century conceptions of the federal judicial system to the Reconstruction Congress. If today Congress were to devise a comprehensive scheme for the most effective protection of federal constitutional rights, it might conceivably think in terms of defining those classes of cases in which Supreme Court review of state-court decision was most appropriate, and those in which original federal jurisdiction was most appropriate, fitting all cases into one or the other category. The Congress of 1871 certainly did not think in such terms. Until 1875 there was no original “federal question” jurisdiction in the federal courts,80 and the ordinary mode of protection of federal constitutional rights' was Supreme Court review.81 In light of the then prevailing notions of the appropriate relative spheres of jurisdiction of state and *253federal courts of first impression, any allowance of Federal District and Circuit Court competence to adjudicate causes between co-citizens of a State was a very special case, a rarity.82 To ask why, when such a special case was created to redress deprivations of federal rights under authority of state laws which abridged thosé rights, a special case was not also created to cover other deprivations of federal rights whose somewhat similar nature might have made the same redress appropriate, disregards the dominant jurisdictional thought of the day and neglects consideration of the fact that redress in a federal trial court was then to be very sparingly afforded. To extend original federal jurisdiction only in the class of cises in which, constitutional violation being sanctioned by state law, state judges would be less likely than federal judges to be sympathetic to a plaintiff’s claim, is a purpose quite consistent with the “overflowing protection of constitutional rights” which, assuredly, § 1979 manifests.83

*254Finally, it seems not unreasonable to reject the suggestion that state-sanctioned constitutional violations are no more offensive than violations not sanctioned by the majesty of state authority. Degrees of offensiveness, perhaps, lie largely in the eye of the person offended, but is it implausible to conclude that there is something more reprehensible, something more dangerous, in the action of the custodian of a public building who turns out a Negro pursuant to a local ordinance than in the action of the same custodian who turns out the same Negro, in violation of state law, to vent a personal bias? Or something *255more reprehensible about the public officer who beats a criminal suspect under orders from the Captain of Detectives, pursuant to a systematic and accepted custom of third-degree practice, than about the same officer who, losing his temper, breaks all local regulations and beats the same suspect? If it be admitted that there is a significant difference between the situation of the individual injured by another individual and who, although the latter is an agent of the State, can claim from the State’s judicial or administrative processes the same protection and redress against him as would be available against any other individual, and the situation of one who, injured under the sanction of a state law which shields the offender, is left alone and helpless in the face of the asserted dignity of the State, then, certainly, it was the latter of these two situations — that of the unprotected Southern Negroes and Unionists — about which Congress was concerned in 1871.84

*256Again, an analysis which supposes that Congress, by §§ 1 and 2 85 of the Ku Klux Act, was attempting to provide comprehensive coverage of a single problem and, therefore, may not be supposed to have left any aspect of the problem unprovided for, ignores that these two sections were in fact designed to cope with two wholly different problems — two wholly diverse evils. Section 2 was newly drafted in 1871, not, like § 1, taken over from the 1866 Act. It was both civil and criminal, not, like § 1, merely civil. It aimed exclusively at conspiracies, as § 1 did not. And, most important, it sought to protect only the federal right of equal protection, not, like § 1, all Fourteenth Amendment rights.86 Because of its limited scope in this latter respect, those who drafted it and voted for it thought that it could constitutionally'be made to reach instances of action having more tenuous connection with the lawfully asserted authority of the State than could a statute which also reached due process violations.87 For the same reason, it does not reach isolated *257instances of misuse of state authority, but only such as possess the character of “purposeful discrimination” 88 which amounts to a denial of equal protection. The evil that § 2 meant to stamp out was the evil of conspiracy— more particularly, the evil of the Klan, “a conspiracy, so far-flung and embracing such numbers, with a purpose to dominate and set at naught the ‘carpetbag’ and ‘scalawag’ governments of the day,” that it appeared “able effectively to deprive Negroes of their legal rights and to close all avenues of redress or vindication.” Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U. S. 651, 662.89 The enormity and the power of this organization were what made it dangerous.90 Section 1 aimed at another evil, the evil not of combinations dedicated to purposeful and systematic discrimination, but of violation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution through the authority, enhanced by the majesty and dignity, of the States. Here it was precisely this authorization, this assurance that behind a constitutional violation lay the whole power of the State, that was the danger. One can agree that these two statutory sections may overlap unevenly rather than *258dovetail, but surely it is more plausible to regard this uneven overlap as a result of the diverse origins and purposes of the sections than to derive from it the justification for a construction of § 1979 which distorts the section by stretching it to cover a class of cases presenting neither the evil with which § 1, nor the evil with which § 2, of the Ku Klux Act was designed to cope.

VI.

The present case comes here from a judgment sustaining a motion to dismiss petitioners’ complaint. That complaint, insofar as it describes the police intrusion, makes no allegation that that intrusion was authorized by state law other than the conclusory and unspecific claim that “During all times herein mentioned the individual defendants and each of them were acting under color of the statutes, ordinances, regulations, customs and usages of the State of Illinois, of the County of Cook and of the defendant City of Chicago.” In the face of Illinois decisions holding such intrusions unlawful and in the absence of more precise factual averments to support its conclusion, such a complaint fails to state a claim under § 1979.

However, the complaint does allege, as to the ten-hour detention of Mr. Monroe, that “it was, and it is now, the custom or usage of the Police Department of the City of Chicago to arrest and confine individuals in the police stations and jail cells of the said department for long periods of time on ‘open’ charges.” These confinements, it is alleged, are for the purpose of interrogating and investigating the individuals arrested, in the aim of inducing incriminating statements, permitting possible identification of suspects in lineups, holding suspects incommunicado while police conduct field investigations of their associates and background, and punishing the arrested persons without trial. Such averments do pre*259sent facts which, admitted as true for purposes of a motion to dismiss, seem to sustain petitioners’ claim that Mr. Monroe’s detention — as contrasted with the night-time intrusion into the Monroe apartment — was “under color” of state authority. Under the few relevant Illinois decisions it is impossible to say with certainty that a detention incommunicado for ten hours is unlawful per se,91 or that the courts of that State would hold that the lawless circumstances surrounding Mr. Monroe’s arrest made his subsequent confinement illegal. On this record, then, petitioners’ complaint suffices to raise, the narrow issue of whether the detention incommunicado, considered alone, violates due process.92

Since the majority’s disposition of the case causes the Court not to reach that constitutional issue, it is neither necessary nor appropriate to discuss it here.

Justice Rehnquist

delivered the opinion of the Court.

In Parrott v. Taylor, 451 U. S. 527 (1981), a state prisoner sued under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, claiming that prison officials had negligently deprived him of his property without due process of law. After deciding that § 1983 contains no independent state-of-mind requirement, we concluded that although petitioner had been “deprived” of property within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the State’s postdeprivation tort remedy provided the process that was due. Petitioner’s claim in this case, which also rests on an alleged Fourteenth Amendment “deprivation” caused by the negligent conduct of a prison official, leads us to reconsider our statement in Parrott that “the alleged loss, even though negligently caused, amounted to a deprivation.” Id., at 536-537. We conclude that the Due Process Clause is simply not implicated by a negligent act of an official causing unintended loss of or injury to life, liberty, or property.

In this § 1983 action, petitioner seeks to recover damages for back and ankle injuries allegedly sustained when he fell on a prison stairway. He claims that, while an inmate at the city jail in Richmond, Virginia, he slipped on a pillow negligently left on the stairs by respondent, a correctional deputy stationed at the jail. Respondent’s negligence, the argument runs, “deprived” petitioner of his “liberty” interest in freedom from bodily injury, see Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651, 673 (1977); because respondent maintains that he is entitled to the defense of sovereign immunity in a state tort suit, petitioner is without an “adequate” state remedy, cf. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U. S. 517, 534-536 (1984). Accordingly, the deprivation of liberty was without “due process of law.”

*329The District Court granted respondent’s motion for summary judgment. A panel of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed, concluding that even if respondent could make out an immunity defense in state court, petitioner would not be deprived of a meaningful opportunity to present his case. 720 F. 2d 792 (1983). On rehearing, the en banc Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the District Court, but under reasoning different from that of the panel. 748 F. 2d 229 (1984). First, a 5-4 majority ruled that negligent infliction of bodily injury, unlike the negligent loss of property in Parratt, does not constitute a deprivation of any interest protected by the Due Process Clause. The majority therefore believed that the postdeprivation process mandated by Parratt for property losses was not required. Second, the en banc court unanimously decided that even if a prisoner is entitled to some remedy for personal injuries attributable to the negligence of state officials, Parratt would bar petitioner’s claim if the State provided an adequate postdeprivation remedy. Finally, a 6-3 majority concluded that petitioner had an adequate remedy in state court, even though respondent asserted that he would rely on sovereign immunity as a defense in a state suit. The majority apparently believed that respondent’s sovereign immunity defense would fail under Virginia law.

Because of the inconsistent approaches taken by lower courts in determining when tortious conduct by state officials rises to the level of a constitutional tort, see Jackson v. Joliet, 465 U. S. 1049, 1050 (1984) (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (collecting cases), and the apparent lack of adequate guidance from this Court, we granted certiorari. 469 U. S. 1207 (1985). We now affirm.

In Parratt v. Taylor, we granted certiorari, as we had twice before, “to decide whether mere negligence will support a claim for relief under §1983.” 451 U. S., at 532. After examining the language, legislative history, and prior interpretations of the statute, we concluded that § 1983, un*330like its criminal counterpart, 18 U. S. C. §242, contains no state-of-mind requirement independent of that necessary to state a violation of the underlying constitutional right. Id., at 534-535. .We adhere to that conclusion. But in any given § 1983 suit, the plaintiff must still prove a violation of the underlying constitutional right; and depending on the right, merely negligent conduct may not be enough to state a claim. See, e. g., Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U. S. 252 (1977) (invidious discriminatory purpose required for claim of racial discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U. S. 97, 105 (1976) (“deliberate indifference” to prisoner’s serious illness or injury sufficient to constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment).

In Parratt, before concluding that Nebraska’s tort remedy provided all the process that was due, we said that the loss of the prisoner’s hobby kit, “even though negligently caused, amounted to a deprivation [under the Due Process Clause].” 451 U. S., at 536-537. Justice Powell, concurring in the result, criticized the majority for “pass[ing] over” this important question of the state of mind required to constitute a “deprivation” of property. Id., at 547. He argued that negligent acts by state officials, though causing loss of property, are not actionable under the Due Process Clause. To Justice Powell, mere negligence could not “wor[k] a deprivation in the constitutional sense.” Id., at 548 (emphasis in original). Not only does the word “deprive” in the Due Process Clause connote more than a negligent act, but we should not “open the federal courts to lawsuits where there has been no affirmative abuse of power.” Id., at 548-549; see also id., at 545 (Stewart, J., concurring) (“To hold that this kind of loss is a deprivation of property within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment seems not only to trivialize, but grossly to distort the meaning and intent of the Constitution”). Upon reflection, we agree and overrule Parratt to the extent that it states that mere lack of due care by a state *331official may “deprive” an individual of life, liberty, or property under the Fourteenth Amendment.

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides: “[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” Historically, this guarantee of due process has been applied to deliberate decisions of government officials to deprive a person of life, liberty, or property. E. g., Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97 (1878) (assessment of real estate); Rochin v. California, 342 U. S. 165 (1952) (stomach pumping); Bell v. Burson, 402 U. S. 535 (1971) (suspension of driver’s license); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651 (1977) (paddling student); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U. S. 517 (1984) (intentional destruction of inmate’s property). No decision of this Court before Parratt supported the view that negligent conduct by a state official, even though causing injury, constitutes a deprivation under the Due Process Clause. This history reflects the traditional and common-sense notion that the Due Process Clause, like its forebear in the Magna Carta, see Corwin, The Doctrine of Due Process of Law Before the Civil War, 24 Harv. L. Rev. 366, 368 (1911), was “‘intended to secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of government,’” Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516, 527 (1884) (quoting Bank of Columbia v. Okely, 4 Wheat. 235, 244 (1819)). See also Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U. S. 539, 558 (1974) (“The touchstone of due process is protection of the individual against arbitrary action of government, Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U. S. 114, 123 (1889)”); Parratt, supra, at 549 (Powell, J., concurring in result). By requiring the government to follow appropriate procedures when its agents decide to “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,” the Due Process Clause promotes fairness in such decisions. And by barring certain government actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them, e. g., Rochin, supra, it serves to prevent governmental power from being “used for purposes of oppression,” Murray’s Les*332see v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 18 How. 272, 277 (1856) (discussing Due Process Clause of Fifth Amendment).

We think that the actions of prison custodians in leaving a pillow on the prison stairs, or mislaying an inmate’s property, are quite remote from the concerns just discussed. Far from an abuse of power, lack of due care suggests no more than a failure to measure up to the conduct of a reasonable person. To hold that injury caused by such conduct is a deprivation within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment would trivialize the centuries-old principle of due process of law.

The Fourteenth Amendment is a part of a Constitution generally designed to allocate governing authority among the Branches of the Federal Government and between that Government and the States, and to secure certain individual rights against both State and Federal Government. When dealing with a claim that such a document creates a right in prisoners to sue a government official because he negligently created an unsafe condition in the prison, we bear in mind Chief Justice Marshall’s admonition that “we must never forget, that it is a constitution we are expounding,” McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 407 (1819) (emphasis in original). Our Constitution deals with the large concerns of the governors and the governed, but it does not purport to supplant traditional tort law in laying down rules of conduct to regulate liability for injuries that attend living together in society. We have previously rejected reasoning that “‘would make of the Fourteenth Amendment a font of tort law to be superimposed upon whatever systems may already be administered by the States,’” Paul v. Davis, 424 U. S. 693, 701 (1976), quoted in Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U. S., at 544.

The only tie between the facts of this case and anything governmental in nature is the fact that respondent was a sheriff’s deputy at the Richmond city jail and petitioner was an inmate confined in that jail. But while the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment obviously speaks to some facets of this relationship, see, e. g., Wolff v. McDon*333nell, swpra, we do not believe its protections are triggered by lack of due care by prison officials. “Medical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner,” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U. S. 97, 106 (1976), and “false imprisonment does not become a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment merely because the defendant is a state official.” Baker v. McCollan, 443 U. S. 137, 146 (1979). Where a government official’s act causing injury to life, liberty, or property is merely negligent, “no procedure for compensation is constitutionally required.” Parratt, swpra, at 548 (Powell, J., concurring in result) (emphasis added).1

That injuries inflicted by governmental negligence are not addressed by the United States Constitution is not to say that they may not raise significant legal concerns and lead to the creation of protectible legal interests. The enactment of tort claim statutes, for example, reflects the view that injuries caused by such negligence should generally be redressed.2 It is no reflection on either the breadth of the United States Constitution or the importance of traditional tort law to say that they do not address the same concerns.

In support of his claim that negligent conduct can give rise to a due process “deprivation,” petitioner makes several arguments, none of which we find persuasive. He states, for example, that “it is almost certain that some negligence claims are within § 1983,” and cites as an example the failure of a State to comply with the procedural requirements of Wolff v. McDonnell, supra, before depriving an inmate of good-time credit. We think the relevant action of the prison *334officials in that situation is their deliberate decision to deprive the inmate of good-time credit, not their hypothetically negligent failure to accord him the procedural protections of the Due Process Clause. But we need not rule out the possibility that there are other constitutional provisions that would be violated by mere lack of care in order to hold, as we do, that such conduct does not implicate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Petitioner also suggests that artful litigants, undeterred by a requirement that they plead more than mere negligence, will often be able to allege sufficient facts to support a claim of intentional deprivation. In the instant case, for example, petitioner notes that he could have alleged that the pillow was left on the stairs with the intention of harming him. This invitation to “artful” pleading, petitioner contends, would engender sticky (and needless) disputes over what is fairly pleaded. What’s more, requiring complainants to allege something more than negligence would raise serious questions about what “more” than negligence — intent, recklessness, or “gross negligence” — is required,3 and indeed about what these elusive terms mean. See Reply Brief for Petitioner 9 (“what terms like willful, wanton, reckless or gross negligence mean” has “left the finest scholars puzzled”). But even if accurate, petitioner’s observations do not carry the day. In the first place, many branches of the law abound in nice distinctions that may be troublesome but have been thought nonetheless necessary:

“I do not think we need trouble ourselves with the thought that my view depends upon differences of degree. The whole law does so as soon as it is civilized.” *335LeRoy Fibre Co. v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 232 U. S. 340, 354 (1914) (Holmes, J., partially concurring).

More important, the difference between one end of the spectrum — negligence—and the other — intent—is abundantly clear. See 0. Holmes, The Common Law 3 (1923). In any event, we decline to trivialize the Due Process Clause in an effort to simplify constitutional litigation.

Finally, citing South v. Maryland, 18 How. 396 (1856), petitioner argues that respondent’s conduct, even if merely negligent, breached a sheriff’s “special duty of care” for those in his custody. Reply Brief for Petitioner 14. The Due Process Clause, petitioner notes, “was intended to give Americans at least the protection against governmental power that they had enjoyed as Englishmen against the power of the crown.” Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S., at 672-673. And South v. Maryland suggests that one such protection was the right to recover against a sheriff for breach of his ministerial duty to provide for the safety of prisoners in his custody. 18 How., at 402-403. Due process demands that the State protect those whom it incarcerates by exercising reasonable care to assure their safety and by compensating them for negligently inflicted injury.

We disagree. We read South v. Maryland, supra, an action brought under federal diversity jurisdiction on a Maryland sheriff’s bond, as stating no more than what this Court thought to be the principles of common law and Maryland law applicable to that case; it is not cast at all in terms of constitutional law, and indeed could not have been, since at the time it was rendered there was no due process clause applicable to the States. Petitioner’s citation to Ingraham v. Wright does not support the notion that all common-law duties owed by government actors were somehow constitutionalized by the Fourteenth Amendment. Jailers may owe a special duty of care to those in their custody under state tort law, see Restatement (Second) of Torts § 314A(4) (1965), but for the reasons previously stated we reject the contention that the *336Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment embraces such a tort law concept. Petitioner alleges that he was injured by the negligence of respondent, a custodial official at the city jail. Whatever other provisions of state law or general jurisprudence he may rightly invoke, the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution does not afford him a remedy.

Affirmed.

Justice Marshall concurs in the result.

Justice Blackmun, concurring in the judgment.

I concur in the judgment. See my opinion in dissent in Davidson v. Cannon, post, p. 349.

Justice Stevens,

concurring in the judgments.*

Two prisoners raise similar claims in these two cases. Both seek to recover for personal injuries suffered, in part, from what they allege was negligence by state officials. Both characterize their injuries as “deprivations of liberty” and both invoke 42 U. S. C. § 1983 as a basis for their claims.

Prisoner Roy Daniels was injured when he slipped on a newspaper and pillows left on a stairway in the Virginia jail where he is incarcerated; he alleges state negligence in the presence of the objects on the stairs. Prisoner Robert Davidson suffered injury when he was attacked by another inmate in the New Jersey prison where he is incarcerated; he alleges (and proved at trial) state negligence in the failure of prison authorities to prevent the assault after he had written a note expressing apprehension about the inmate who ultimately assaulted him. I agree with the majority that petitioners cannot prevail under § 1983. I do not agree, however, that it is necessary either to redefine the meaning of “deprive” in the Fourteenth Amendment,1 or to repudiate *337the reasoning of Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U. S. 527 (1981), to support this conclusion.

We should begin by identifying the precise constitutional claims that petitioners have advanced. It is not enough to note that they rely on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, for that Clause is the source of three different kinds of constitutional protection. First, it incorporates specific protections defined in the Bill of Rights. Thus, the State, as well as the Federal Government, must comply with the commands in the First2 and Eighth3 Amendments; so too, the State must respect the guarantees in the Fourth,4 Fifth,5 and Sixth6 Amendments. Second, it contains a substantive component, sometimes referred to as “substantive due process,” which bars certain arbitrary government actions “regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them.” Ante, at 331.7 Third, it is a guarantee of fair procedure, sometimes referred to as “procedural due process”: the State may not execute, imprison, or fine a defendant without giving him a fair trial,8 nor may it take property without providing appropriate procedural safeguards.9

The type of Fourteenth Amendment interest that is implicated has important effects on the nature of the constitutional claim and the availability of § 1983 relief. If the claim is in *338the first category (a violation of one of the specific constitutional guarantees of the Bill of Rights), a plaintiff may invoke § 1983 regardless of the availability of a state remedy.10 As explained in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167 (1961), this conclusion derives from the fact that the statute — the Ku Klux Act of 1871 — was intended to provide a federal remedy for the violation of a federal constitutional right. Thus, when the Fourth Amendment is violated, as in Pape, the provision of an independent federal remedy under § 1983 is necessary to satisfy the purpose of the statute.

Similarly, if the claim is in the second category (a violation of the substantive component of the Due Process Clause), a plaintiff may also invoke § 1983 regardless of the availability of a state remedy.11 For, in that category, no less than with the provisions of the Bill of Rights, if the Federal Constitution prohibits a State from taking certain actions “regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them,” the constitutional violation is complete as soon as the prohibited action is taken; the independent federal remedy is then authorized by the language and legislative history of § 1983.

A claim in the third category — a procedural due process claim — is fundamentally different. In such a case, the deprivation may be entirely legitimate — a State may have every right to discharge a teacher or punish a student — but the State may nevertheless violate the Constitution by failing to provide appropriate procedural safeguards. The constitutional duty to provide fair procedures gives the citizen the opportunity to try to prevent the deprivation from happening, but the deprivation itself does not necessarily reflect any *339“abuse” of state power. Similarly, a deprivation may be the consequence of a mistake or a negligent act, and the State may violate the Constitution by failing to provide an appropriate procedural response. In a procedural due process claim, it is not the deprivation of property or liberty that is unconstitutional; it is the deprivation of property or liberty without due process of ¿aw — without adequate procedures.

Thus, even though the State may have every right to deprive a person of his property or his liberty, the individual may nevertheless be able to allege a valid § 1983 due process claim, perhaps because a predeprivation hearing must be held,12 or because the state procedure itself is fundamentally flawed.13 So too, even though a deprivation may be unauthorized, a procedural due process claim may be raised if it challenges the State’s procedures for preventing or redressing the deprivation. However, a complaint does not state a valid procedural due process objection — and a valid §1983 claim — if it does not include a challenge to the fundamental fairness of the State’s procedures. In consequence, when a predeprivation hearing is clearly not feasible,14 when the regime of state tort law provides a constitutionally unobjectionable system of recovery for the deprivation of property or liberty, and when there is no other challenge to the State’s procedures, a valid § 1983 claim is not stated. For, unlike cases in the other two categories —those in which the alleged *340deprivation violates a substantive federal right — if a procedural due process claim lacks a colorable objection to the validity of the State’s procedures, no constitutional violation has been alleged.15

Petitioners’ claims are not of the first kind. Neither Daniels nor Davidson argues in this Court that the prison authorities’ actions violated specific constitutional guarantees incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment. Neither now claims, for instance, that his rights under the Eighth Amendment were violated. Similarly, I do not believe petitioners have raised a colorable violation of “substantive due process.”16 Rather, their claims are of the third kind: Daniels and Davidson attack the validity of the procedures that Virginia and New Jersey, respectively, provide for prisoners who seek redress for physical injury caused by the negligence of corrections officers.

I would not reject these claims, as the Court does, by attempting to fashion a new definition of the term “depriva*341tion” and excluding negligence from its scope. No serious question has been raised about the presence of “state action” in the allegations of negligence,17 and the interest in freedom from bodily harm surely qualifies as an interest in “liberty.” Thus, the only question is whether negligence by state actors can result in a deprivation. “Deprivation,” it seems to me, identifies, not the actor’s state of mind, but the victim’s infringement or loss. The harm to a prisoner is the same whether a pillow is left on a stair negligently, recklessly, or intentionally; so too, the harm resulting to a prisoner from an attack is the same whether his request for protection is ignored negligently, recklessly, or deliberately. In each instance, the prisoner is losing-being “deprived” of — an aspect of liberty as the result, in part, of a form of state action.

Thus, I would characterize each loss as a “deprivation” of liberty. Because the cases raise only procedural due process claims, however, it is also necessary to examine the nature of petitioners’ challenges to the state procedures. To prevail, petitioners must demonstrate that the state procedures for redressing injuries of this kind are constitutionally inadequate. Petitioners must show that they contain a defect so serious that we can characterize the procedures as fundamentally unfair, a defect so basic that we are forced to conclude that the deprivation occurred without due process.

Daniels’ claim is essentially the same as the claim we rejected in Parratt. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit determined that Daniels had a remedy for the claimed negligence under Virginia law. Although Daniels vigorously argues that sovereign immunity would have defeated his claim, the Fourth Circuit found to the contrary, and it is our settled practice to defer to the Courts of Appeals on ques*342tions of state law.18 It is true that Parratt involved an injury to “property” and that Daniels’ case involves an injury to “liberty,” but, in both cases, the plaintiff claimed nothing more than a “procedural due process” violation. In both cases, a predeprivation hearing was definitionally impossible.19 And, in both cases, the plaintiff had state remedies that permitted recovery if state negligence was established. Thus, a straightforward application of Parratt defeats Daniels’ claim.

Davidson’s claim raises a question not specifically addressed in Parratt. According to the Third Circuit, no state remedy was available because a New Jersey statute prohibits prisoner recovery from state employees for injuries inflicted by other prisoners. Thus, Davidson puts the question whether a state policy of noncompensability for certain types of harm, in which state action may play a role, renders a state procedure constitutionally defective. In my judgment, a state policy that defeats recovery does not, in itself, carry that consequence. Those aspects of a State’s tort regime that defeat recovery are not constitutionally invalid, so long as there is no fundamental unfairness in their operation. Thus, defenses such as contributory negligence or statutes of limitations may defeat recovery in particular cases without raising any question about the constitutionality of a State’s procedures for disposing of tort litigation. Similarly, in my judgment, the mere fact that a State elects to provide some of its agents with a sovereign immunity defense in certain cases does not justify the conclusion that its remedial system is constitutionally inadequate. There is no reason to believe that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment *343and the legislation enacted pursuant to §5 of that Amendment should be construed to suggest that the doctrine of sovereign immunity renders a state procedure fundamentally unfair.20 Davidson’s challenge has been only to the fact of sovereign immunity; he has not challenged the difference in treatment of a prisoner assaulted by a prisoner and a non-prisoner assaulted by a prisoner, and I express no comment on the fairness of that differentiation.

Thus, although I believe that the harms alleged by Daniels and proved by Davidson qualify as deprivations of liberty, I am not persuaded that either has raised a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. I therefore concur in the judgments.

*60Justice White

delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case presents the question whether a State, or an official of the State while acting in his or her official capacity, is a “person” within the meaning of Rev. Stat. § 1979, 42 U. S. C. § 1983.

Petitioner Ray Will filed suit in Michigan Circuit Court alleging various violations of the United States and Michigan Constitutions as grounds for a claim under §1983.1 He alleged that he had been denied a promotion to a data systems analyst position with the Department of State Police for an improper reason, that is, because his brother had been a student activist and the subject of a “red squad” file maintained by respondent. Named as defendants were the Department of State Police and the Director of State Police in his official capacity, also a respondent here.2

The Circuit Court remanded the case to the Michigan Civil Service Commission for a grievance hearing. While the grievance was pending, petitioner filed suit in the Michigan *61Court of Claims raising an essentially identical § 1983 claim. The Civil Service Commission ultimately found in petitioner’s favor, ruling that respondents had refused to promote petitioner because of “partisan considerations.” App. 46. On the basis of that finding, the state-court judge, acting in both the Circuit Court and the Court of Claims cases, concluded that petitioner had established a violation of the United States Constitution. The judge held that the Circuit Court action was barred under state law but that the Claims Court action could go forward. The judge also ruled that respondents were persons for purposes of § 1983.

The Michigan Court of Appeals vacated the judgment against the Department of State Police, holding that a State is not a person under § 1983, but remanded the case for determination of the possible immunity of the Director of State Police from liability for damages. The Michigan Supreme Court granted discretionary review and affirmed the Court of Appeals in part and reversed in part. Smith v. Department of Pub. Health, 428 Mich. 540, 410 N. W. 2d 749 (1987). The Supreme Court agreed that the State itself is not a person under § 1983, but held that a state official acting in his or her official capacity also is not such a person.

The Michigan Supreme Court’s holding that a State is not a person under § 1983 conflicts with a number of state- and federal-court decisions to the contrary.3 We granted certio-rari to resolve the conflict. 485 U. S. 1005 (1988).

*62Prior to Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U. S. 668 (1978), the question whether a State is a person within the meaning of § 1983 had been answered by this Court in the negative. In Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167, 187-191 (1961), the Court had held that a municipality was not a person under § 1983. “[T]hat being the case,” we reasoned, § 1983 “could not have been intended to include States as parties defendant.” Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U. S. 446, 452 (1976).

But in Monell, the Court overruled Monroe, holding that a municipality was a person under § 1983. 436 U. S., at 690. Since then, various members of the Court have debated whether a State is a person within the meaning of § 1983, see Hutto v. Finney, 437 U. S. 678, 700-704 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring); id., at 708, n. 6 (Powell, J., concurring in *63part and dissenting in part), but this Court has never expressly dealt with that issue.4

Some courts, including the Michigan Supreme Court here, have construed our decision in Quern v. Jordan, 440 U. S. 332 (1979), as holding by implication that a State is not a person under § 1983. See Smith v. Department of Pub. Health, supra, at 581, 410 N. W. 2d, at 767. See also, e. g., State v. Green, 633 P. 2d 1381, 1382 (Alaska 1981); Woodbridge v. Worcester State Hospital, 384 Mass. 38, 44-45, n. 7, 423 N. E. 2d 782, 786, n. 7 (1981); Edgar v. State, 92 Wash. 2d 217, 221, 595 P. 2d 534, 537 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U. S. 1077 (1980). Quern held that §1983 does not override a State’s Eleventh Amendment immunity, a holding that the concurrence suggested was “patently dicta” to the effect that a State is not a person, 440 U. S., at 350 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment).

Petitioner filed the present § 1983 actions in Michigan state court, which places the question whether a State is a person under § 1983 squarely before us since the Eleventh Amend*64ment does not apply in state courts. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U. S. 1, 9, n. 7 (1980). For the reasons that follow, we reaffirm today what we had concluded prior to Monell and what some have considered implicit in Quern: that a State is not a person within the meaning of § 1983.

We observe initially that if a State is a “person” within the meaning of § 1983, the section is to be read as saying that “every person, including a State, who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects . . . .” That would be a decidedly awkward way of expressing an intent to subject the States to liability. At the very least, reading the statute in this way is not so clearly indicated that it provides reason to depart from the often-expressed understanding that “fin common usage, the term ‘person’ does not include the sovereign, [and] statutes employing the [word] are ordinarily construed to exclude it.’” Wilson v. Omaha Tribe, 442 U. S. 653, 667 (1979) (quoting United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U. S. 600, 604 (1941)). See also United States v. Mine Workers, 330 U. S. 258, 275 (1947).

This approach is particularly applicable where it is claimed that Congress has subjected the States to liability to which they had not been subject before. In Wilson v. Omaha Tribe, supra, we followed this rule in construing the phrase “white person” contained in 25 U. S. C. § 194, enacted as Act of June 30, 1834, 4 Stat. 729, as not including the “sovereign States of the Union.” 442 U. S., at 667. This common usage of the term “person” provides a strong indication that “person” as used in § 1983 likewise does not include a State.5

*65The language of § 1983 also falls far short of satisfying the ordinary rule of statutory construction that if Congress intends to alter the “usual constitutional balance between the States and the Federal Government,” it must make its intention to do so “unmistakably clear in the language of the statute.” Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U. S. 234, 242 (1985); see also Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U. S. 89, 99 (1984). Atascadero was an Eleventh Amendment case, but a similar approach is applied in other contexts. Congress should make its intention “clear and manifest” if it intends to pre-empt the historic powers of the States, Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U. S. 218, 230 (1947), or if it intends to impose a condition on the grant of federal moneys, Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U. S. 1, 16 (1981); South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U. S. 203, 207 (1987). “In traditionally sensitive areas, such as legislation affecting the federal balance, the requirement of clear statement assures that the legislature has in fact faced, and intended to bring into issue, the critical matters involved in the judicial decision.” United States v. Bass, 404 U. S. 336, 349 (1971).

Our conclusion that a State is not a “person” within the meaning of § 1983 is reinforced by Congress’ purpose in en*66acting the statute. Congress enacted § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 17 Stat. 13, the precursor .to § 1983, shortly after the end of the Civil War “in response to the widespread deprivations of civil rights in the Southern States and the inability or unwillingness of authorities in those States to protect those rights or punish wrongdoers.” Felder v. Casey, 487 U. S. 131, 147 (1988). Although Congress did not establish federal courts as the exclusive forum to remedy these deprivations, ibid., it is plain that “Congress assigned to the federal courts a paramount role” in this endeavor, Patsy v. Board of Regents of Florida, 457 U. S. 496, 503 (1982).

Section 1983 provides a federal forum to remedy many deprivations of civil liberties, but it does not provide a federal forum for litigants who seek a remedy against a State for alleged deprivations of civil liberties. The Eleventh Amendment bars such suits unless the State has waived its immunity, Welch v. Texas Dept. of Highways and Public Transportation, 483 U. S. 468, 472-473 (1987) (plurality opinion), or unless Congress has exercised its undoubted power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to override that immunity. That Congress, in passing § 1983, had no intention to disturb the States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity and so to alter the federal-state balance in that respect was made clear in our decision in Quern. Given that a principal purpose behind the enactment of § 1983 was to provide a federal forum for civil rights claims, and that Congress did not provide such a federal forum for civil rights claims against States, we cannot accept petitioner’s argument that Congress intended nevertheless to create a cause of action against States to be brought in state courts, which are precisely the courts Congress sought to allow civil rights claimants to avoid through § 1983.

This does not mean, as petitioner suggests, that we think that the scope of the Eleventh Amendment and the scope of § 1983 are not separate issues. Certainly they are. But in deciphering congressional intent as to the scope of § 1983, the *67scope of the Eleventh Amendment is a consideration, and we decline to adopt a reading of § 1983 that disregards it.6

Our conclusion is further supported by our holdings that in enacting §1983, Congress did not intend to override well-established immunities or defenses under the common law. “One important assumption underlying the Court’s decisions in this area is that members of the 42d Congress were familiar with common-law principles, including defenses previously recognized in ordinary tort litigation, and that they likely intended these common-law principles to obtain, absent specific provisions to the contrary.” Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U. S. 247, 258 (1981). Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U. S. 349, 356 (1978); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232, 247 (1974); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U. S. 547, 554 (1967); and Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U. S. 367, 376 (1951), are also to this effect. The doctrine of sovereign immunity was a familiar doctrine at common law. “The principle is elementary that a State cannot be sued in its own courts without its consent.” Railroad Co. v. Tennessee, 101 U. S. 337, 339 (1880). It is an “established principle of jurisprudence” that the sovereign cannot be sued in its own courts without its consent. Beers v. Arkansas, 20 How. 527, 529 (1858). We cannot conclude that § 1983 was intended to disregard the well-established immunity of a State from being sued without its consent.7

*68The legislative history of § 1983 does not suggest a different conclusion. Petitioner contends that the congressional debates on § 1 of the 1871 Act indicate that § 1983 was intended to extend to the full reach of the Fourteenth Amendment and thereby to provide a remedy “ ‘against all forms of official violation of federally protected rights.”’ Brief for Petitioner 16 (quoting Monell, 436 U. S., at 700-701). He refers us to various parts of the vigorous debates accompanying the passage of § 1983 and revealing that it was the failure of the States to take appropriate action that was undoubtedly the motivating force behind § 1983. The inference must be drawn, it is urged, that Congress must have intended to subject the States themselves to liability. But the intent of Congress to provide a remedy for unconstitutional state action does not without more include the sovereign States among those persons against whom § 1983 actions would lie. Construing § 1983 as a remedy for “official violation of federally protected rights” does no more than confirm that the section is directed against state action — action “under color of” state law. It does not suggest that the State itself was a person that Congress intended to be subject to liability.

Although there were sharp and heated debates, the discussion of § 1 of the bill, which contained the present § 1983, was not extended. And although in other respects the impact on state sovereignty was much talked about, no one suggested that § 1 would subject the States themselves to a damages suit under federal law. Quern, 440 U. S., at 343. There was complaint that § 1 would subject state officers to damages liability, but no suggestion that it would also expose the States themselves. Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., *69366, 385 (1871). We find nothing substantial in the legislative history that leads us to believe that Congress intended that the word “person” in § 1983 included the States of the Union. And surely nothing in the debates rises to the clearly expressed legislative intent necessary to permit that construction.

Likewise, the Act of Feb. 25, 1871, §2, 16 Stat. 431 (the “Dictionary Act”),8 on which we relied in Monell, supra, at 688-689, does not counsel a contrary conclusion here. As we noted in Quern, that Act, while adopted prior to § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, was adopted after §2 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, from which § 1 of the 1871 Act was derived. 440 U. S., at 341, n. 11. Moreover, we disagree with Justice Brennan that at the time the Dictionary Act was passed “the phrase ‘bodies politic and corporate’ was understood to include the States.” Post, at 78. Rather, an examination of authorities of the era suggests that the phrase was used to mean corporations, both private and public (municipal), and not to include the States.9 In our view, the *70Dictionary Act, like § 1983 itself and its legislative history, fails to evidence a clear congressional intent that States be held liable.

Finally, Monell itself is not to the contrary. True, prior to Monell the Court had reasoned that -if municipalities were not persons then surely States also were not. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U. S., at 452. And Monell overruled Monroe, undercutting that logic. But it does not follow that if municipalities are persons then so are States. States are protected by the Eleventh Amendment while municipalities are not, Monell, 436 U. S., at 690, n. 54, and we consequently limited our holding in Monell “to local government units which are not considered part of the State for Eleventh Amendment purposes,” ibid. Conversely, our holding here does not cast any doubt on Monell, and applies only to States or governmental entities that are considered “arms of the State” for Eleventh Amendment purposes. See, e. g., Mt. Healthy Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U. S. 274, 280 (1977).

Petitioner asserts, alternatively, that state officials should be considered “persons” under § 1983 even though acting in their official capacities. In this case, petitioner named as defendant not only the Michigan Department of State Police but also the Director of State Police in his official capacity.

*71Obviously, state officials literally are persons. But a suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official’s office. Brandon v. Holt, 469 U. S. 464, 471 (1985). As such, it is no different from a suit against the State itself. See, e. g., Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U. S. 159, 165-166 (1985); Monell, supra, at 690, n. 55. We see no reason to adopt a different rule in the present context, particularly when such a rule would allow petitioner to circumvent congressional intent by a mere pleading device.10

We hold that neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are “persons” under § 1983. The judgment of the Michigan Supreme Court is affirmed.

It is so ordered.

Justice Brennan,

dissenting.

Because this case was brought in state court, the Court concedes, the Eleventh Amendment is inapplicable here. See ante, at 63-64. Like the guest who would not leave, *72however, the Eleventh Amendment lurks everywhere in today’s decision and, in truth, determines its outcome.

1 — (

Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U. S. C. § 1983, renders certain “persons” liable for deprivations of constitutional rights. The question presented is whether the word “person” in this statute includes the States and state officials acting in their official capacities.

One might expect that this statutory question would generate a careful and thorough analysis of the language, legislative history, and general background of § 1983. If this is what one expects, however, one will be disappointed by today’s decision. For this case is not decided on the basis of our ordinary method of statutory construction; instead, the Court disposes of it by means of various rules of statutory interpretation that it summons to its aid each time the question looks close. Specifically, the Court invokes the following interpretative principles: the word “persons” is ordinarily construed to exclude the sovereign; congressional intent to affect the federal-state balance must be “clear and manifest”; and intent to abrogate States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity must appear in the language of the statute itself. The Court apparently believes that each of these rules obviates the need for close analysis of a statute’s language and history. Properly applied, however, only the last of these interpretative principles has this effect, and that principle is not pertinent to the case before us.

The Court invokes, first, the “often-expressed understanding” that “ ‘in common usage, the term “person” does not include the sovereign, [and] statutes employing the [word] are ordinarily construed to exclude it.’” Ante, at 64, quoting Wilson v. Omaha Tribe, 442 U. S. 653, 667 (1979). This rule is used both to refute the argument that the language of §1983 demonstrates an intent that States be included as defendants, ante, at 64, and to overcome the argu*73ment based on the Dictionary Act’s definition of “person” to include bodies politic and corporate, ante, at 69-70. It is ironic, to say the least, that the Court chooses this interpretive rule in explaining why the Dictionary Act is not decisive, since the rule is relevant only when the word “persons” has no statutory definition. When one considers the origins and content of this interpretive guideline, moreover, one realizes that it is inapplicable here and, even if applied, would defeat rather than support the Court’s approach and result.

The idea that the word “persons” ordinarily excludes the sovereign can be traced to the “familiar principle that the King is not bound by any act of Parliament unless he be named therein by special and particular words.” Dollar Savings Bank v. United States, 19 Wall. 227, 239 (1874). As this passage suggests, however, this interpretive principle applies only to “the enacting sovereign.” United States v. California, 297 U. S. 175, 186 (1936). See also Jefferson County Pharmaceutical Assn., Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories, 460 U. S. 150, 161, n. 21 (1983). Furthermore, as explained in United States v. Herron, 20 Wall. 251, 255 (1874), even the principle as applied to the enacting sovereign is not without limitations: “Where an act of Parliament is made for the public good, as for the advancement of religion and justice or to prevent injury and wrong, the king is bound by such act, though not particularly named therein; but where a statute is general, and thereby any prerogative, right, title, or interest is divested or taken from the king, in such case the king is not bound, unless the statute is made to extend to him by express words.” It would be difficult to imagine a statute more clearly designed “for the public good,” and “to prevent injury and wrong,” than § 1983.

Even if this interpretive principle were relevant to this case, the Court’s invocation of it to the exclusion of careful statutory analysis is in error. As we have made clear, this principle is merely “an aid to consistent construction of statutes of the enacting sovereign when their purpose is in *74doubt, but it does not require that the aim of a statute fairly to be inferred be disregarded because not explicitly stated.” United States v. California, supra, at 186. Indeed, immediately following the passage quoted by the Court today, ante, at 64, to the effect that statutes using the word “person” are “ordinarily construed to exclude” the sovereign, we stated:

“But there is no hard and fast rule of exclusion. The purpose, the subject matter, the context, the legislative history, and the executive interpretation of the statute are aids to construction which may indicate an intent, by the use of the term, to bring state or nation within the scope of the law.

“Decision is not to be reached by a strict construction of the words of the Act, nor by the application of artificial canons of construction. On the contrary, we are to read the statutory language in its ordinary and natural sense, and if doubts remain, resolve them in the light, not only of the policy intended to be served by the enactment, but, as well, by all other available aids to construction.” United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U. S. 600, 604-605 (1941).

See also Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe, supra, at 667 (“There is . . . ‘no hard and fast rule of exclusion,’ United States v. Cooper Corp., [312 U. S. 600,] 604-605 [(1941)]; and much depends on the context, the subject matter, legislative history, and executive interpretation”); Pfizer Inc. v. India, 434 U. S. 308, 315-318 (1978); Guarantee Title & Trust Co. v. Title Guaranty & Surety Co., 224 U. S. 152, 155 (1912); Lewis v. United States, 92 U. S. 618, 622 (1875); Green v. United States, 9 Wall. 655, 658 (1870).

The second interpretive principle that the Court invokes comes from cases such as Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U. S. 218, 230 (1947); Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U. S. 1, 16 (1981); South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U. S. 203, 207-208 (1987); and United States v. *75Bass, 404 U. S. 336, 349 (1971), which require a “clear and manifest” expression of congressional intent to change some aspect of federal-state relations. Ante, at 65. These cases do not, however, permit substitution of an absolutist rule of statutory construction for thorough statutory analysis. Indeed, in each of these decisions the Court undertook a careful and detailed analysis of the statutory language and history under consideration. Rice is a particularly inapposite source for the interpretive method that the Court today employs, since it observes that, according to conventional pre-emption analysis, a “clear and manifest” intent to pre-empt state legislation may appear in the “scheme” or “purpose” of the federal statute. See 331 U. S., at 230.

The only principle of statutory construction employed by the Court that would justify a perfunctory and inconclusive analysis of a statute’s language and history is one that is irrelevant to this case. This is the notion “that if Congress intends to alter the ‘usual constitutional balance between the States and the Federal Government,’ it must make its intention to do so ‘unmistakably clear in the language of the statute.’” Ante, at 65, quoting Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U. S. 234, 242 (1985). As the Court notes, Atascadero was an Eleventh Amendment case; the “constitutional balance” to which Atascadero refers is that struck by the Eleventh Amendment as this Court has come to interpret it. Although the Court apparently wishes it were otherwise, the principle of interpretation that Atascadero announced is unique to cases involving the Eleventh Amendment.

Where the Eleventh Amendment applies, the Court has devised a clear-statement principle more robust than its requirement of clarity in any other situation. Indeed, just today, the Court has intimated that this clear-statement principle is not simply a means of discerning congressional intent. See Dellmuth v. Muth, post, at 232 (concluding that one may not rely on a “permissible inference” from a statute’s language and structure in finding abrogation of immunity); post, *76at 238-239 (Brennan, J., dissenting); but see Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., ante, p. 1. Since this case was brought in state court, however, this strict drafting requirement has no application here. The Eleventh Amendment can hardly be “a consideration,” ante, at 67, in a suit to which it does not apply.

That this Court has generated a uniquely daunting requirement of clarity in Eleventh Amendment cases explains why Quern v. Jordan, 440 U. S. 332 (1979), did not decide the question before us today. B ecause only the Eleventh Amendment permits use of this clear-statement principle, the holding of Quern v. Jordan that § 1983 does not abrogate States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity tells us nothing about the meaning of the term “person” in § 1983 as a matter of ordinary statutory construction. Quern’s conclusion thus does not compel, or even suggest, a particular result today.

The singularity of this Court’s approach to statutory interpretation in Eleventh Amendment cases also refutes the Court’s argument that, given Quern’s holding, it would make no sense to construe § 1983 to include States as “persons.” See ante, at 66. This is so, the Court suggests, because such a construction would permit suits against States in state but not federal court, even though a major purpose of Congress in enacting § 1983 was to provide a federal forum for litigants who had been deprived of their constitutional rights. See, e. g., Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167 (1961). In answering the question whether § 1983 provides a federal forum for suits against the States themselves, however, one must apply the clear-statement principle reserved for Eleventh Amendment cases. Since this principle is inapplicable to suits brought in state court, and inapplicable to the question whether States are among those subject to a statute, see Employees v. Missouri Dept. of Public Health and Welfare, 411 U. S. 279, 287 (1973); Atascadero, supra, at 240, n. 2, the answer to the question whether §1983 provides a federal forum for suits against the States may be, and most often will *77be, different from the answer to the kind of question before us today. Since the question whether Congress has provided a federal forum for damages suits against the States is answered by applying a uniquely strict interpretive principle, see supra, at 75, the Court should not pretend that we have, in Quern, answered the question whether Congress intended to provide a federal forum for such suits, and then reason backwards from that “intent” to the conclusion that Congress must not have intended to allow such suits to proceed in state court.

In short, the only principle of statutory interpretation that permits the Court to avoid a careful and thorough analysis of § 1983’s language and history is the clear-statement principle that this Court has come to apply in Eleventh Amendment cases — a principle that is irrelevant to this state-court action. In my view, a careful and detailed analysis of § 1983 leads to the conclusion that States are “persons” within the meaning of that statute.

II

Section 1983 provides:

“Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.”

Although § 1983 itself does not define the term “person,” we are not without a statutory definition of this word. “Any analysis of the meaning of the word ‘person’ in § 1983 . . . must begin . . . with the Dictionary Act.” Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U. S. 658, 719 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Passed just two months be*78fore § 1983, and designed to “suppl[y] rules of construction for all legislation,” ibid., the Dictionary Act provided:

“That in all acts hereafter passed . . . the word ‘person’ may extend and be applied to bodies politic and corporate . . . unless the context shows that such words were intended to be used in a more limited sense . . . Act of Feb. 25, 1871, §2, 16 Stat. 431.

In Monell, we held this definition to be not merely allowable but mandatory, requiring that the word “person” be construed to include “bodies politic and corporate” unless the statute under consideration “by its terms called for a deviation from this practice.” 436 U. S., at 689-690, n. 53. Thus, we concluded, where nothing in the “context” of a particular statute “call[s] for a restricted interpretation of the word ‘person,’ the language of that [statute] should prima facie be construed to include ‘bodies politic’ among the entities that could be sued.” Ibid.

Both before and after the time when the Dictionary Act and § 1983 were passed, the phrase “bodies politic and corporate” was understood to include the States. See, e. g., J. Bouvier, 1 A Law Dictionary Adapted to the Constitution and Laws of the United States of America 185 (11th ed. 1866); W. Shumaker & G. Longsdorf, Cyclopedic Dictionary of Law 104 (1901); Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dali. 419, 447 (1793) (Iredell, J.); id., at 468 (Cushing, J.); Cotton v. United States, 11 How. 229, 231 (1851) (“Every sovereign State is of necessity a body politic, or artificial person”); Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U. S. 270, 288 (1885); McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U. S. 1, 24 (1892); Heim v. McCall, 239 U. S. 175, 188 (1915). See also United States v. Maurice, 2 Brock. 96, 109 (CC Va. 1823) (Marshall, C. J.) (“The United States is a government, and, consequently, a body politic and corporate”); Van Brocklin v. Tennessee, 117 U. S. 151, 154 (1886) (same). Indeed, the very legislators who passed § 1 referred to States in these terms. See, e. g., Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., 661-662 (1871) (Sen. Vickers) (“What is a State? Is *79it not a body politic and corporate?”); id., at 696 (Sen. Ed-munds) (“A State is a corporation”).

The reason why States are “bodies politic and corporate” is simple: just as a corporation is an entity that can act only through its agents, “[t]he State is a political corporate body, can act only through agents, and can command only by laws.” Poindexter v. Greenhow, supra, at 288. See also Black’s Law Dictionary 159 (5th ed. 1979) (“[B]ody politic or corporate”: “A social compact by which the whole people covenants with each citizen, and each citizen with the whole people, that all shall be governed by certain laws for the common good”). As a “body politic and corporate,” a State falls squarely within the Dictionary Act’s definition of a “person.”

While it is certainly true that the phrase “bodies politic and corporate” referred to private and public corporations, see ante, at 69, and n. 9, this fact does not draw into question the conclusion that this phrase also applied to the States. Phrases may, of course, have multiple referents. Indeed, each and every dictionary cited by the Court accords a broader realm — one that comfortably, and in most cases explicitly, includes the sovereign — to this phrase than the Court gives it today. See 1 B. Abbott, Dictionary of Terms and Phrases Used in American or English Jurisprudence 155 (1879) (“[T]he term body politic is often used in a general way, as meaning the state or the sovereign power, or the city government, without implying any distinct express incorporation”); W. Anderson, A Dictionary of Law 127 (1893) (“[B]ody politic”: “The governmental, sovereign power: a city or a State”); Black’s Law Dictionary 143 (1891) (“[Bjody politic”: “It is often used, in a rather loose way, to designate the state or nation or sovereign power, or the government of a county or municipality, without distinctly connoting any express and individual corporate charter”); 1 A. Burrill, A Law Dictionary and Glossary 212 (2d ed. 1871) (“[B]ody politic”: “A body to take in succession, framed by policy”', “[pjarticu-*80larly applied, in the old books, to a corporation sole”); id., at 383 (“[Corporation sole” includes the sovereign in England).

Because I recognize that both uses of this phrase were deemed valid when § 1983 and the Dictionary Act were passed, the Court accuses me of “confusing] [the] precise definition of [this] phrase with its use ‘in a rather loose way,’ ” “to refer to the state (as opposed to a State).” Ante, at 70, n. 9, quoting Black, supra, at 143. It had never occurred to me, however, that only “precise” definitions counted as valid ones. Where the question we face is what meaning Congress attached to a particular word or phrase, we usually — and properly — are loath to conclude that Congress meant to use the word or phrase in a hypertechnical sense unless it said so. Nor does the Court’s distinction between “the state” and “a State” have any force. The suggestion, I take it, is that the phrase “bodies politic and corporate” refers only to nations rather than to the states within a nation; but then the Court must explain why so many of the sources I have quoted refer to states in addition to nations. In an opinion so utterly devoted to the rights of the States as sovereigns, moreover, it is surprising indeed to find the Court distinguishing between our sovereign States and our sovereign Nation.

In deciding what the phrase “bodies politic and corporate” means, furthermore, I do not see the relevance of the meaning of the term “public corporation.” See ante, at 69-70, n. 9. That is not the phrase chosen by Congress in the Dictionary Act, and the Court’s suggestion that this phrase is coterminous with the phrase “bodies politic and corporate” begs the question whether the latter one includes the States. Nor do I grasp the significance of this Court’s decision in United States v. Fox, 94 U. S. 315 (1877), in which the question was whether the State of New York, by including “persons” and “corporations” within the class of those to whom land could be devised, had intended to authorize devises to the United States. Ante, at 69-70, n. 9. Noting that “[t]he question is to be determined by the laws of [New York],” the *81Court held that it would require “an express definition” to hold that the word “persons” included the Federal Government, and that under state law the term “corporations” applied only to corporations created under the laws of New York. 94 U. S., at 320-321. The pertinence of these state-law questions to the issue before us today escapes me. Not only do we confront an entirely different, federal statute, but we also have an express statement, in the Dictionary Act, that the word “person” in §1 includes “bodies politic and corporate.” See also Pfizer Inc. v. India, 434 U. S., at 315, n. 15.

The relevance of the fact that § 2 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27, — the model for § 1 of the 1871 Act — was passed before the Dictionary Act, see ante, at 69, similarly eludes me. Congress chose to use the word “person” in the 1871 Act even after it had passed the Dictionary Act, presumptively including “bodies politic and corporate” within the category of “persons.” Its decision to do so — and its failure to indicate in the 1871 Act that the Dictionary Act’s presumption was not to apply — demonstrate that Congress did indeed intend “persons” to include bodies politic and corporate. In addition, the Dictionary Act’s definition of “person” by no means dropped from the sky. Many of the authorities cited above predate both the Dictionary Act and the 1866 Act, indicating that the word “persons” in 1866 ordinarily would have been thought to include “bodies politic and corporate,” with or without the Dictionary Act.

This last point helps to explain why it is a matter of small importance that the Dictionary Act’s definition of “person” as including bodies politic and corporate was retroactively withdrawn when the federal statutes were revised in 1874. See T. Durant, Report to Joint Committee on Revision of Laws 2 (1873). Only two months after presumptively designating bodies politic and corporate as “persons,” Congress chose the word “person” for § 1 of the Civil Rights Act. For the purpose of determining Congress’ intent in using this *82term, it cannot be decisive that, three years later, it withdrew this presumption. In fact, both the majority and dissent in Monell emphasized the 1871 version of the Dictionary Act, but neither saw fit even to mention the 1874 revision of this statute. 436 U. S., at 688-689, and nn. 51, 53 (opinion for the Court); id., at 719 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Even in cases, moreover, where no statutory definition of the word “persons” is available, we have not hesitated to include bodies politic and corporate within that category. See Stanley v. Schwalby, 147 U. S. 508, 517 (1893) (“[T]he word ‘person’ in the statute would include [the States] as a body politic and corporate”); Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U. S. 360, 370 (1934); United States v. Shirey, 359 U. S. 255, 257, n. 2 (1959).

Thus, the question before us is whether the presumption that the word “person” in § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 included bodies politic and corporate — and hence the States — is overcome by anything in the statute’s language and history. Certainly nothing in the statutory language overrides this presumption. The statute is explicitly directed at action taken “under color of” state law, and thus supports rather than refutes the idea that the “persons” mentioned in the statute include the States. Indeed, for almost a century — until Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167 (1961) — it was unclear whether the statute applied at all to action not authorized by the State, and the enduring significance of the first cases construing the Fourteenth Amendment, pursuant to which § 1 was passed, lies in their conclusion that the prohibitions of this Amendment do not reach private action. See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S. 3 (1883). In such a setting, one cannot reasonably deny the significance of § 1983’s explicit focus on state action.

Unimpressed by such arguments, the Court simply asserts that reading “States” where the statute mentions “person” would be “decidedly awkward.” Ante, at 64. The Court does not describe the awkwardness that it perceives, but I take it that its objection is that the under-color-of-law *83requirement would be redundant if States were included in the statute because States necessarily act under color of state law. But § 1983 extends as well to natural persons, who do not necessarily so act; in order to ensure that they would be liable only when they did so, the statute needed the under-color-of-law requirement. The only way to remove the redundancy that the Court sees would have been to eliminate the catchall phrase “person” altogether, and separately describe each category of possible defendants and the circumstances under which they might be liable. I cannot think of a situation not involving the Eleventh Amendment, however, in which we have imposed such an unforgiving drafting requirement on Congress.

Taking the example closest to this case, we might have observed in Monell that § 1983 was clumsily written if it included municipalities, since these, too, may act only under color of state authority. Nevertheless, we held there that the statute does apply to municipalities. 436 U. S., at 690. Similarly, we have construed the statutory term “white persons” to include “‘corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as well as individuals,’” see Wilson v. Omaha Tribe, 442 U. S., at 666, quoting 1 U. S. C. § 1, despite the evident awkwardness in doing so. Indeed, virtually every time we construe the word “person” to include corporate or other artificial entities that are not individual, flesh-and-blood persons, some awkwardness results. But given cases like Monell and Wilson, it is difficult to understand why mere linguistic awkwardness should control where there is good reason to accept the “awkward” reading of a statute.

The legislative history and background of the statute confirm that the presumption created by the Dictionary Act was not overridden in § 1 of the 1871 Act, and that, even without such a presumption, it is plain that “person” in the 1871 Act must include the States. I discussed in detail the legislative history of this statute in my opinion concurring in the judg*84ment in Quern v. Jordan, 440 U. S., at 357-365, and I shall not cover that ground again here. Suffice it to say that, in my view, the legislative history of this provision, though spare, demonstrates that Congress recognized and accepted the fact that the statute was directed at the States themselves. One need not believe that the statute satisfies this Court’s heightened clear-statement principle, reserved for Eleventh Amendment cases, in order to conclude that the language and legislative history of § 1983 show that the word “person” must include the States.

As to the more general historical background of §1, we too easily forget, I think, the circumstances existing in this country when the early civil rights statutes were passed. “[V]iewed against the events and passions of the time,” United States v. Price, 383 U. S. 787, 803 (1966), I have little doubt that § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 included States as “persons.” The following brief description of the Reconstruction period is illuminating:

“The Civil War had ended in April 1865. Relations between Negroes and whites were increasingly turbulent. Congress had taken control of the entire governmental process in former Confederate States. It had declared the governments in 10 ‘unreconstructed’ States to be illegal and had set up federal military administrations in their place. Congress refused to seat representatives from these States until they had adopted constitutions guaranteeing Negro suffrage, and had ratified the Fourteenth Amendment. Constitutional conventions were called in 1868. Six of the 10 States fulfilled Congress’ requirements in 1868, the other four by 1870.

“For a few years ‘radical’ Republicans dominated the governments of the Southern States and Negroes played a substantial political role. But countermeasures were swift and violent. The Ku Klux Klan was organized by southern whites in 1866 and a similar organization appeared with the romantic title of the Knights of the *85White Camellia. In 1868 a wave of murders and assaults was launched including assassinations designed to keep Negroes from the polls. The States themselves were helpless, despite the resort by some of them to extreme measures such as making it legal to hunt down and shoot any disguised man.

“Within the Congress pressures mounted in the period between the end of the war and 1870 for drastic measures. A few months after the ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment on December 6, 1865, Congress, on April 9, 1866, enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1866 .... On June 13, 1866, the Fourteenth Amendment was proposed, and it was ratified in July 1868. In February 1869 the Fifteenth Amendment was proposed, and it was ratified in February 1870. On May 31, 1870, the Enforcement Act of 1870 was enacted.” Id., at 803-805 (footnotes omitted).

This was a Congress in the midst of altering the “ ‘balance between the States and the Federal Government.’” Ante, at 65, quoting Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U. S., at 242. It was fighting to save the Union, and in doing so, it transformed our federal system. It is difficult, therefore, to believe that this same Congress did not intend to include States among those who might be liable under § 1983 for the very deprivations that were threatening this Nation at that time.

Ill

To describe the breadth of the Court’s holding is to demonstrate its unwisdom. If States are not “persons” within the meaning of § 1983, then they may not be sued under that statute regardless of whether they have consented to suit. Even if, in other words, a State formally and explicitly consented to suits against it in federal or state court, no § 1983 plaintiff could proceed against it because States are not within the statute’s category of possible defendants.

*86This is indeed an exceptional holding. Not only does it depart from our suggestion in Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U. S. 781, 782 (1978), that a State could be a defendant under § 1983 if it consented to suit, see also Quern v. Jordan, supra, at 340, but it also renders ineffective the choices some States have made to permit such suits against them. See, e. g., Della Grotta v. Rhode Island, 781 F. 2d 343 (CA1 1986). I do not understand what purpose is served, what principle of federalism or comity is promoted, by refusing to give force to a State’s explicit consent to suit.

The Court appears to be driven to this peculiar result in part by its view that “in enacting § 1983, Congress did not intend to override well-established immunities or defenses under the common law.” Ante, at 67. But the question whether States are “persons” under §1983 is separate and distinct from the question whether they may assert a defense of common-law sovereign immunity. In our prior decisions involving common-law immunities, we have not held that the existence of an immunity defense excluded the relevant state actor from the category of “persons” liable under § 1983, see, e. g., Forrester v. White, 484 U. S. 219 (1988), and it is a mistake to do so today. Such an approach entrenches the effect of common-law immunity even where the immunity itself has been waived.

For my part, I would reverse the judgment below and remand for resolution of the question whether Michigan would assert common-law sovereign immunity in defense to this suit and, if so, whether that assertion of immunity would preclude the suit.

Given the suggestion in the court below that Michigan enjoys no common-law immunity for violations of its own Constitution, Smith v. Department of Public Health, 428 Mich. 540, 641-642, 410 N. W. 2d 749, 793-794 (1987) (Boyle, J., concurring), there is certainly a possibility that that court would hold that the State also lacks immunity against § 1983 suits for violations of the Federal Constitution. *87Moreover, even if that court decided that the State’s waiver of immunity did not apply to § 1983 suits, there is a substantial question whether Michigan could so discriminate between virtually identical causes of action only on the ground that one was a state suit and the other a federal one. Cf. Testa v. Katt, 330 U. S. 386 (1947); Martinez v. California, 444 U. S. 277, 283, n. 7 (1980). Finally, even if both of these questions were resolved in favor of an immunity defense, there would remain the question whether it would be reasonable to attribute to Congress an intent to allow States to decide for themselves whether to take cognizance of § 1983 suits brought against them. Cf. Martinez, supra, at 284, and n. 8; Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U. S. 622, 647-648 (1980).

Because the court below disposed of the case on the ground that States were not “persons” within the meaning of § 1983, it did not pass upon these difficult and important questions. I therefore would remand this case to the state court to resolve these questions in the first instance.

Justice Stevens,

dissenting.

Legal doctrines often flourish long after their raison d’etre has perished.1 The doctrine of sovereign immunity rests on the fictional premise that the “King can do no wrong.”2 Even though the plot to assassinate James I in 1605, the exe*88cution of Charles I in 1649, and the Colonists’ reaction to George Ill’s stamp tax made rather clear the fictional character of the doctrine’s underpinnings/ British subjects found a gracious means of compelling the King to obey the law rather than simply repudiating the doctrine itself. They held his advisers and his agents responsible.3

In our administration of § 1983, we have also relied on fictions to protect the illusion that a sovereign State, absent consent, may not be held accountable for its delicts in federal court. Under a settled course of decision, in contexts ranging from school desegregation to the provision of public *89assistance benefits to the administration of prison systems and other state facilities, we have held the States liable under § 1983 for their constitutional violations through the artifice of naming a public officer as a nominal party. Once one strips away the Eleventh Amendment overlay applied to actions in federal court, it is apparent that the Court in these cases has treated the State as the real party in interest both for the purposes of granting prospective and ancillary relief and of denying retroactive relief. When suit is brought in state court, where the Eleventh Amendment is inapplicable, it follows that the State can be named directly as a party under § 1983.

An official-capacity suit is the typical way in which we have held States responsible for their duties under federal law. Such a suit, we have explained, “ ‘generally represents] only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.’” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U. S. 159, 165 (1985) (quoting Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U. S. 658, 690, n. 55 (1978)); see also Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U. S. 89, 101 (1984). In the peculiar Eleventh Amendment analysis we have applied to such cases, we have recognized that an official-capacity action is in reality always against the State and balanced interests to determine whether a particular type of relief is available. The Court has held that when a suit seeks equitable relief or money damages from a state officer for injuries suffered in the past, the interests in compensation and deterrence are insufficiently weighty to override the State’s sovereign immunity. See Papasan v. Attain, 478 U. S. 265, 278 (1986); Green v. Mansour, 474 U. S. 64, 68 (1985); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 668 (1974). On the other hand, although prospective relief awarded against a state officer also “implicate[s] Eleventh Amendment concerns,” Mansour, 474 U. S., at 68, the interests in “end[ing] a continuing violation of federal law,” ibid., outweigh the interests in state sovereignty and justify *90an award under § 1983 of an injunction that operates against the State’s officers or even directly against the State itself. See, e. g., Papasan, supra, at 282; Quern v. Jordan, 440 U. S. 332, 337 (1979); Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U. S. 267, 289 (1977).

In Milliken v. Bradley, supra, for example, a unanimous Court upheld a federal-court order requiring the State of Michigan to pay $5,800,000 to fund educational components in a desegregation decree “notwithstanding [its] direct and substantial impact on the state treasury.” Id., at 289 (emphasis added).4 As Justice Powell stated in his opinion concurring in the judgment, “the State [had] been adjudged a participant in the constitutional violations, and the State therefore may be ordered to participate prospectively in a remedy otherwise appropriate.” Id., at 295. Subsequent decisions have adhered to the position that equitable relief — even “a remedy that might require the expenditure of state funds,” Papasan, supra, at 282 — may be awarded to ensure future compliance by a State with a substantive federal question determination. See also Quern v. Jordan, 440 U. S., at 337.

Our treatment of States as “persons” under § 1983 is also exemplified by our decisions holding that ancillary relief, such as attorney’s fees, may be awarded directly against the State. We have explained that “liability on the merits and responsibility for fees go hand in hand; where a defendant has not been prevailed against, either because of legal immunity *91or on the merits, § 1988 does not authorize a fee award against that defendant.” Kentucky v. Graham, supra, at 165. Nonetheless, we held in Hutto v. Finney, 437 U. S. 678 (1978), a case challenging the administration of the Arkansas prison system, that a Federal District Court could award attorney’s fees directly against the State under § 1988,5 id,., at 700; see Brandon v. Holt, 469 U. S. 464, 472 (1985), and could assess attorney’s fees for bad-faith litigation under § 1983 “ ‘to be paid out of Department of Corrections funds.’” 437 U. S., at 692. In Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 446 U. S. 719, 739 (1980), Justice White reaffirmed for a unanimous Court that an award of fees could be entered against a State or state agency, in that case a State Supreme Court, in an in-junctive action under § 1983.6 In suits commenced in state court, in which there is no independent reason to require parties to sue nominally a state officer, we have held that attor*92ney’s fees can be awarded against the State in its own name. See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U. S. 1, 10-11 (1980).7

The Civil Rights Act of 1871 was “intended to provide a remedy, to be broadly construed, against all forms of official violation of federally protected rights.” Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U. S., at 700-701. Our holdings that a § 1983 action can be brought against state officials in their official capacity for constitutional violations properly recognize and are faithful to that profound mandate.' If prospective relief can be awarded against state officials under § 1983 and the State is the real party in interest in such suits, the State must be a “person” which can be held liable under § 1983. No other conclusion is available. Eleventh Amendment principles may limit the State’s capacity to be sued as such in federal court. See Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U. S. 781 (1978). But since those principles are not applicable to suits in state court, see Thiboutot, supra, at 9, n. 7; Nevada v. Hall, 440 U. S. 410 (1979), there is no need to resort to the fiction of an official-capacity suit and the State may and should be named directly as a defendant in a § 1983 action.

The Court concludes, however, that “a state official in his or her official capacity, when sued for injunctive relief, would be a person under § 1983,” ante, at 71, n. 10, while that same party sued in the same official capacity is not a person when the plaintiff seeks monetary relief. It cites in support of this.,, proposition cases such as Osborn v. Bank of United States, 9 Wheat. 738 (1824), in which the Court through Chief Justice Marshall held that an action against a state auditor to recover taxes illegally collected did not constitute an action against the State. This line of authority, the Court states, “would *93not have been foreign to the 19th-century Congress that enacted § 1983." Ante, at 71, n. 10.

On the Court’s supposition, the question would be whether the complaint against a state official states a claim for the type of relief sought, not whether it will have an impact on the state treasury. See, e. g., Governor of Georgia v. Madrazo, 1 Pet. 110, 124 (1828). At least for actions in state court, as to which there could be no constitutional reason to look to the effect on the State, see Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651 (1974), the Court’s analysis would support actions for the recovery of chattel and real property against state officials both of which were well known in the 19th century. See Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U. S. 270 (1884); United States v. Lee, 106 U. S. 196 (1882). Although the conclusion that a state officer sued for damages in his or her official capacity is not a “person” under § 1983 would not quite follow,8 it might nonetheless be permissible to assume that the 1871 Congress did not contemplate an action for damages payable not by the officer personally but by the State.

The Court having constructed an edifice for the purposes of the Eleventh Amendment on the theory that the State is always the real party in interest in a § 1983 official-capacity action against a state officer, I would think the majority would be impelled to conclude that the State is a “person” under § 1983. As Justice Brennan has demonstrated, there is also a compelling textual argument that States are persons under § 1983. In addition, the Court’s construction draws an illogical distinction between wrongs committed by county or municipal officials on the one hand, and those committed by state officials on the other. Finally, there is no necessity to *94import into this question of statutory construction doctrine created to protect the fiction that one sovereign cannot be sued in the courts of another sovereign. Aside from all of these reasons, the Court’s holding that a State is not a person under § 1983 departs from a long line of judicial authority based on exactly that premise.

I respectfully dissent.

Justice O’Connor

delivered the opinion of the Court.

In Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U. S. 58 (1989), we held that state officials “acting in their official capacities” are outside the class of “persons” subject to liability *23 under Rev. Stat. § 1979, 42 U. S. C. § 1983. 491 U. S., at 71. Petitioner takes this language to mean that § 1983 does not authorize suits against state officers for damages arising from official acts. We reject this reading of Will and hold that state officials sued in their individual capacities are “persons” for purposes of § 1983.

I

In 1988, petitioner Barbara Hafer sought election to the post of auditor general of Pennsylvania. Respondents allege that during the campaign United States Attorney James West gave Hafer a list of 21 employees in the auditor general’s office who secured their jobs through payments to a former employee of the office. App. 10. They further allege that Hafer publicly promised to fire all employees on the list if elected. Ibid.

Hafer won the election. Shortly after becoming auditor general, she dismissed 18 employees, including named respondent James Melo, Jr., on the basis that they “bought” their jobs. Melo and seven other terminated employees sued Hafer and West in Federal District Court. They asserted state and federal claims, including a claim under § 1983, and sought monetary damages. Carl Gurley and the remaining respondents in this case also lost their jobs with the auditor general soon after Hafer took office. These respondents allege that Hafer discharged them because of their Democratic political affiliation and support for her opponent in the 1988 election. Id., at 28, 35, 40. They too filed suit against Hafer, seeking monetary damages and reinstatement under § 1983.

After consolidating the Melo and Gurley actions, the District Court dismissed all claims. In relevant part, the court held that the § 1983 claims against Hafer were barred because, under Will, she could not be held liable for employment decisions made in her official capacity as auditor general.

*24 The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed this portion of the District Court’s decision. 912 F. 2d 628 (1990). As to claims for reinstatement brought against Hafer in her official capacity, the court rested on our statement in Will that state officials sued for injunctive relief in their official capacities are “persons” subject to liability under § 1983. See Will, supra, at 71, n. 10. Turning to respondents’ monetary claims, the court found that six members of the Gurley group had expressly sought damages from Hafer in her personal capacity. The remaining plaintiffs “although not as explicit, signified a similar intent.” 912 F. 2d, at 636. * The court found this critical. While Hafer’s power to hire and fire derived from her position as auditor general, it said, a suit for damages based on the exercise of this authority could be brought against Hafer in her personal capacity. Because Hafer acted under color of state law, respondents could maintain a § 1983 individual-capacity suit against her.

We granted certiorari, 498 U. S..1H8 (1991), to address the question whether state officers may be held personally liable for damages under § 1983 based upon actions taken in their official capacities.

*25 II

In Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U. S. 159 (1985), the Court sought to eliminate lingering confusion about the distinction between personal- and official-capacity suits. We emphasized that official-capacity suits “‘generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.’ ” Id., at 165 (quoting Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U. S. 658, 690, n. 55 (1978)). Suits against state officials in their official capacity therefore should be treated as suits against the State. 473 U. S., at 166. Indeed, when officials sued in this capacity in federal court die or leave office, their successors automatically assume their roles in the litigation. See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 25(d)(1); Fed. Rule App. Proc. 43(c)(1); this Court’s Rule 35.3. Because the real party in interest in an official-capacity suit is the governmental entity and not the named official, “the entity’s ‘policy or custom’ must have played a part in the violation of federal law.” Graham, supra, at 166 (quoting Monell, supra, at 694). For the same reason, the only immunities available to the defendant in an official-capacity action are those that the governmental entity possesses. 473 U. S., at 167.

Personal-capacity suits, on the other hand, seek to impose individual liability upon a government officer for actions taken under color of state law. Thus, “[o]n the merits, to establish personal liability in a § 1983 action, it is enough to show that the official, acting under color of state law, caused the deprivation of a federal right.” Id., at 166. While the plaintiff in a personal-capacity suit need not establish a connection to governmental “policy or custom,” officials sued in their personal capacities, unlike those sued in their official capacities, may assert personal immunity defenses such as objectively reasonable reliance on existing law. Id., at 166-167.

Our decision in Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U. S. 58 (1989), turned in part on these differences between *26 personal- and official-capacity actions. The principal issue in Will was whether States are “persons” subject to suit under § 1983. Section 1983 provides, in relevant part:

“Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured . . . .”

The Court held that interpreting the words “[ejvery person” to exclude the States accorded with the most natural reading of the law, with its legislative history, and with the rule that Congress must clearly state its intention to alter “ ‘the federal balance’” when it seeks to do so. Will, supra, at 65 (quoting United States v. Bass, 404 U. S. 336, 349 (1971)).

The Court then addressed the related question whether state officials, sued for monetary relief in their official capacities, are persons under § 1983. We held that they are not. Although “state officials literally are persons,” an official-capacity suit against a state officer “is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official’s office. As such it is no different from a suit against the State itself.” 491 U. S., at 71 (citation omitted).

Summarizing our holding, we said: “[NJeither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons’ under § 1983.” Ibid. Hafer relies on this recapitulation for the proposition that she may not be held personally liable under § 1983 for discharging respondents because she “act[ed]” in her official capacity as auditor general of Pennsylvania. Of course, the claims considered in Will were official-capacity claims; the phrase “acting in their official capacities” is best understood as a reference to the capacity in which the state officer is sued, not the capacity in which the officer inflicts the alleged injury. To the extent that Will *27 allows the construction Hafer suggests, however, we now eliminate that ambiguity.

A

Will itself makes clear that the distinction between official-capacity suits and personal-capacity suits is more than “a mere pleading device.” Ibid. State officers sued for damages in their official capacity are not “persons” for purposes of the suit because they assume the identity of the government that employs them. Ibid. By contrast, officers sued in their personal capacity come to court as individuals. A government official in the role of personal-capacity defendant thus fits comfortably within the statutory term “person.” Cf. id., at 71, n. 10 (“[A] state official in his or her official capacity, when sued for injunctive relief, would be a person under § 1983 because ‘official-capacity actions for prospective relief are not treated as actions against the State’ ”) (quoting Graham, 473 U. S., at 167, n. 14).

Hafer seeks to overcome the distinction between official- and personal-capacity suits by arguing that §1983 liability turns not on the capacity in which state officials are sued, but on the capacity in which they acted when injuring the plaintiff. Under Will, she asserts, state officials may not be held liable in their personal capacity for actions they take in their official capacity. Although one Court of Appeals has endorsed this view, see Cowan v. University of Louisville School of Medicine, 900 F. 2d 936, 942-943 (CA6 1990), we find it both unpersuasive as an interpretation of § 1983 and foreclosed by our prior decisions.

Through § 1983, Congress sought “to give a remedy to parties deprived of constitutional rights, privileges and immunities by an official’s abuse of his position.” Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167, 172 (1961). Accordingly, it authorized suits to redress deprivations of civil rights by persons acting “under color of any [state] statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage.” 42 U. S. C. § 1983. The requirement of action under color of state law means that Hafer may be liable for *28 discharging respondents precisely because of her authority as auditor general. We cannot accept the novel proposition that this same official authority insulates Hafer from suit.

In an effort to limit the scope of her argument, Hafer distinguishes between two categories of acts taken under color of state law: those outside the official’s authority or not essential to the operation of state government, and those both within the official’s authority and necessary to the performance of governmental functions. Only the former group, she asserts, can subject state officials to personal liability under § 1983; the latter group (including the employment decisions at issue in this case) should be considered acts of the State that cannot give rise to a personal-capacity action.

The distinction Hafer urges finds no support in the broad language of § 1983. To the contrary, it ignores our holding that Congress enacted § 1983 “ ‘to enforce provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment against those who carry a badge of authority of a State and represent it in some capacity, whether they act in accordance with their authority or misuse it.’ ” Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232, 243 (1974) (quoting Monroe v. Pape, supra, at 171-172). Because of that intent, we have held that in § 1983 actions the statutory requirement of action “under color of” state law is just as broad as the Fourteenth Amendment’s “state action” requirement. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U. S. 922, 929 (1982).

Furthermore, Hafer’s distinction cannot be reconciled with our decisions regarding immunity of government officers otherwise personally liable for acts done in the course of their official duties. Her theory would absolutely immunize state officials from personal liability for acts within their authority and necessary to fulfilling governmental responsibilities. Yet our cases do not extend absolute immunity to all officers who engage in necessary official acts. Rather, immunity from suit under § 1983 is “predicated upon a considered inquiry into the immunity historically accorded the relevant *29 official at common law and the interests behind it,” Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U. S. 409, 421 (1976), and officials seeking absolute immunity must show that such immunity is justified for the governmental function at issue, Burns v. Reed, 500 U. S. 478, 486-487 (1991).

This Court has refused to extend absolute immunity beyond a very limited class of officials, including the President of the United States, legislators carrying out their legislative functions, and judges carrying out their judicial functions, “whose special functions or constitutional status requires complete protection from suit.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 800, 807 (1982). State executive officials are not entitled to absolute immunity for their official actions. Scheuer v. Rhodes, supra. In several instances, moreover, we have concluded that no more than a qualified immunity attaches to administrative employment decisions, even if the same official has absolute immunity when performing other functions. See Forrester v. White, 484 U. S. 219 (1988) (dismissal of court employee by state judge); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, supra (discharge of Air Force employee, allegedly orchestrated by senior White House aides) (action under Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388 (1971)); Davis v. Passman, 442 U. S. 228 (1979) (dismissal of congressional aide) (Bivens action). That Hafer may assert personal immunity within the framework of these cases in no way supports her argument here.

B

Hafer further asks us to read Will’s language concerning suits against state officials as establishing the limits of liability under the Eleventh Amendment. She asserts that imposing personal liability on officeholders may infringe on state sovereignty by rendering government less effective; thus, she argues, the Eleventh Amendment forbids personal-capacity suits against state officials in federal court.

*30 Most certainly, Will’s holding does not rest directly on the Eleventh Amendment. Whereas the Eleventh Amendment bars suits in federal court “by private parties seeking to impose a liability which must be paid from public funds in the state treasury,” Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 663 (1974), Will arose from a suit in state court. We considered the Eleventh Amendment in Will only because the fact that Congress did not intend to override state immunity when it enacted § 1983 was relevant to statutory construction: “Given that a principal purpose behind the enactment of § 1983 was to provide a federal forum for civil rights claims,” Congress’ failure to authorize suits against States in federal courts suggested that it also did not intend to authorize such claims in state courts. 491 U. S., at 66.

To the extent that Hafer argues from the Eleventh Amendment itself, she makes a claim that failed in Scheuer v. Rhodes, supra. In Scheuer, personal representatives of the estates of three students who died at Kent State University in May 1970 sought damages from the Governor of Ohio and other state officials. The District Court dismissed their complaints on the theory that the suits, although brought against state officials in their personal capacities, were in substance actions against the State of Ohio and therefore barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

We rejected this view. “[S]ince Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908),” we said, “it has been settled that the Eleventh Amendment provides no shield for a state official confronted by a claim that he had deprived another of a federal right under the color of state law.” Scheuer, supra, at 237. While the doctrine of Ex parte Young does not apply where a plaintiff seeks damages from the public treasury, damages awards against individual defendants in federal courts “are a permissible remedy in some circumstances notwithstanding the fact that they hold public office.” 416 U. S., at 238. That is, the Eleventh Amendment does not erect a barrier *31 against suits to impose “individual and personal liability” on state officials under § 1983. Ibid.

To be sure, imposing personal liability on state officers may hamper their performance of public duties. But such concerns are properly addressed within the framework of our personal immunity jurisprudence. See Forrester v. White, supra, at 223. Insofar as respondents seek damages against Hafer personally, the Eleventh Amendment does not restrict their ability to sue in federal court.

We hold that state officials, sued in their individual capacities, are “persons” within the meaning of § 1983. The Eleventh Amendment does not bar such suits, nor are state officers absolutely immune from personal liability under § 1983 solely by virtue of the “official” nature of their acts.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is

Affirmed.

Justice Thomas took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

Mr. Justice Reed

delivered the opinion of the Court.

This writ of certiorari brings here for review a claim for damages in the sum of $5,000 on the part of petitioner, a Negro citizen of the 48th precinct of Harris County, Texas, *651 for the refusal of respondents, election and associate election judges respectively of that precinct, to give petitioner a ballot or to permit him to cast a ballot in the primary election of July 27,1940, for the nomination of Democratic candidates for the United States Senate and House of Representatives, and Governor and other state officers. The refusal is alleged to have been solely because of the race and color of the proposed voter.

The actions of respondents are said to violate §§31 and 43 of Title 8 1 of the United States Code in that petitioner was deprived of rights secured by §§ 2 and 4 of Article 1 2 and the Fourteenth, Fifteenth and Seventeenth Amend *652 ments to the United States Constitution. 3 The suit was filed in the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of Texas, which had jurisdiction under Judicial Code § 24, subsection 14. 4

The District Court denied the relief sought and the Circuit Court of Appeals quite properly affirmed its action on the authority of Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U. S. 45. 5 We granted the petition for certiorari to resolve a claimed inconsistency between the decision in the Grovey case and that of United States v. Classic, 313 U. S. 299. 319 U. S. 738.

The State of Texas by its Constitution and statutes provides that every person, if certain other requirements are met which are not here in issue, qualified by residence *653 in the district or county “shall be deemed a qualified elector.” Constitution of Texas, Article VI, § 2; Vernon’s Civil Statutes (1939 ed.), Article 2955. Primary elections for United States Senators, Congressmen and state officers are provided for by Chapters Twelve and Thirteen of the statutes. Under these chapters, the Democratic party was required to hold the primary which was the occasion of the alleged wrong to petitioner. A summary of the state statutes regulating primaries appears in the footnote. 6 These nominations are to be made by the qualified voters of the party. Art. 3101.

*654 The Democratic party of Texas is held by the Supreme Court of that State to be a “voluntary association,” Bell v. Hill, 123 Tex. 531, 534, protected by § 27 of the Bill of Rights, Art. 1, Constitution of Texas, from interference by the State except that:

“In the interest of fair methods and a fair expression by their members of their preferences in the selection of their *655 nominees, the State may regulate such elections by proper laws.” p. 545.

That court stated further:

“Since the right to organize and maintain a political party is one guaranteed by the Bill of Rights of this State, it necessarily follows that every privilege essential or reasonably appropriate to the exercise of that right is likewise *656 guaranteed,—including, of course, the privilege of determining the policies of the party and its membership. Without the privilege of determining the policy of a political association and its membership, the right to organize such an association would be a mere mockery. We think these rights,—that is, the right to determine the membership of a political party and to determine its policies, of necessity are to be exercised by the state convention of such party, and cannot, under any circumstances, be conferred upon a state or governmental agency.” p. 546. Cf. Waples v. Marrast, 108 Tex. 5, 184 S. W. 180.

The Democratic party on May 24, 1932, in a state convention adopted the following resolution, which has not since been “amended, abrogated, annulled or avoided”:

“Be it resolved that all white citizens of the State of Texas who are qualified to vote under the Constitution and laws of the State shall be eligible to membership in the *657 Democratic party and, as such, entitled to participate in its deliberations.”

It was by virtue of this resolution that the respondents refused to permit the petitioner to vote.

Texas is free to conduct her elections and limit her electorate as she may deem wise, save only as her action may be affected by the prohibitions of the United States Constitution or in conflict with powers delegated to and exercised by the National Government. 7 The Fourteenth Amendment forbids a State from making or enforcing any law which abridges the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States and the Fifteenth Amendment specifically interdicts any denial or abridgement by a State of the right of citizens to vote on account of color. Respondents appeared in the District Court and the Circuit Court of Appeals and defended on the ground that the Democratic party of Texas is a voluntary organization with members banded together for the purpose of selecting individuals of the group representing the common political beliefs as candidates in the general election. As such a voluntary organization, it was claimed, the Democratic party is free to select its own membership and limit to whites participation in the party primary. Such action, the answer asserted, does not violate the Fourteenth, Fifteenth or Seventeenth Amendment as officers of government cannot be chosen at primaries and the Amendments are applicable only to general elections where governmental officers are actually elected. Primaries, it is said, are political party affairs, handled by party, not governmental, officers. No appearance for respondents is made in this Court. Arguments presented here by the Attorney General of Texas and the Chairman of the State Democratic Executive Committee of Texas, as amici *658 curiae, urged substantially the same grounds as those advanced by the respondents.

The right of a Negro to vote in the Texas primary has been considered heretofore by this Court. The first case was Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U. S. 536. At that time, 1924, the Texas statute, Art. 3093a, afterwards numbered Art. 3107 (Rev. Stat. 1925) declared “in no event shall a Negro be eligible to participate in a Democratic Party primary election in the State of Texas.” Nixon was refused the right to vote in a Democratic primary and brought a suit for damages against the election officers under R. S. §§ 1979 and 2004, the present §§43 and 31 of Title 8, U. S. C., respectively. It was urged to this Court that the denial of the franchise to Nixon violated his Constitutional rights under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. Without consideration of the Fifteenth, this Court held that the action of Texas in denying the ballot to Negroes by statute was in violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and reversed the dismissal of the suit.

The legislature of Texas reenacted the article but gave the State Executive Committee of a party the power to prescribe the qualifications of its members for voting or other participation. This article remains in the statutes. The State Executive Committee of the Democratic party adopted a resolution that white Democrats and none other might participate in the primaries of that party. Nixon was refused again the privilege of voting in a primary and again brought suit for damages by virtue of § 31, Title 8, U. S. C. This Court again reversed the dismissal of the suit for the reason that the Committee action was deemed to be state action and invalid as discriminatory under the Fourteenth Amendment. The test was said to be whether the Committee operated as representative of the State in the discharge of the State’s authority. Nixon v. Condon, 286 U. S. 73. The question of the inherent power *659 of a political party in Texas “without restraint by any law to determine its own membership” was left open. Id., 84-85. '

In Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U. S. 45, this Court had before it another suit for damages for the refusal in a primary of a county clerk, a Texas officer with only public functions to perform, to furnish petitioner, a Negro, an absentee ballot. The refusal was solely on the ground of race. This case differed from Nixon v. Condon, supra, in that a state convention of the Democratic party had passed the resolution of May 24, 1932, hereinbefore quoted. It was decided that the determination by the state convention of the membership of the Democratic party made a significant change from a determination by the Executive Committee. The former was party action, voluntary in character. The latter, as had been held in the Condon case, was action by authority of the State. The managers of the primary election were therefore declared not to be state officials in such sense that their action was state action. A state convention of a party was said not to be an organ of the State. This Court went on to announce that to deny a vote in a primary was a mere refusal of party membership with which “the State need have no concern,” loe. cit. at 55, while for a State to deny a vote in a general election on the ground of race or color violated the Constitution. Consequently, there was found no ground for holding that the county clerk’s refusal of a ballot because of racial ineligibility for party membership denied the petitioner any right under the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendment.

Since Grovey v. Townsend and prior to the present suit, no case from Texas involving primary elections has been before-this Court. We did decide, however, United States v. Classic, 313 U. S. 299. We there held that § 4 of Article I of the Constitution authorized Congress to regulate primary as well as general elections, 313 U. S. at 316, 317, *660 “where the primary is by law made an integral part of the election machinery.” 313 U. S. at 318. Consequently, in the Classic case, we upheld the applicability to frauds in a Louisiana primary of §§ 19 and 20 of the Criminal Code. Thereby corrupt acts of election officers were subjected to Congressional sanctions because that body had power to protect rights of federal suffrage secured by the Constitution in primary as in general elections. 313 U. S. at 323. This decision depended, too, on the determination that under the Louisiana statutes the primary was a part of the procedure for choice of federal officials. By this decision the doubt as to whether or not such primaries were a part of “elections” subject to federal control, which had remained unanswered since Newberry v. United States, 256 U. S. 232, was erased. The Nixon Cases were decided under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment without a determination of the status of the primary as a part of the electoral process. The exclusion of Negroes from the primaries by action of the State was held invalid under that Amendment. The fusing by the Classic case of the primary and general elections into a single instrumentality for choice of officers has a definite bearing on the permissibility under the Constitution of excluding Negroes from primaries. This is not to say that the Classic case cuts directly into the rationale of Grovey v. Townsend. This latter case was not mentioned in the opinion. Classic bears upon Grovey v. Townsend not because exclusion of Negroes from primaries is any more or less state action by reason of the unitary character of the electoral process but because the recognition of the place of the primary in the electoral scheme makes clear that state delegation to a party of the power to fix the qualifications of primary elections is delegation of a state function that may make the party’s action the action of the State. When Grovey v. Townsend was written, the Court looked upon the denial of a vote in a primary as a *661 mere refusal by a party of party membership. 296 U. S. at 65. As the Louisiana statutes for holding primaries are similar to those of Texas, our ruling in Classic as to the unitary character of the electoral process calls for a reexamination as to whether or not the exclusion of Negroes from a Texas party primary was state action.

The statutes of Texas relating to primaries and the resolution of the Democratic party of Texas extending the privileges of membership to white citizens only are the same in substance and effect today as they were when Grovey v. Townsend was decided by a unanimous Court. The question as to whether the exclusionary action of the party was the action of the State persists as the determinative factor. In again entering upon consideration of the inference to be drawn as to state action from a substantially similar factual situation, it should be noted that Grovey v. Townsend upheld exclusion of Negroes from primaries through the denial of party membership by a party convention. A few years before, this Court refused approval of exclusion by the State Executive Committee of the party. A different result was reached on the theory that the Committee action was state authorized and the Convention action was unfettered by statutory control. Such a variation in the result from so slight a change in form influences us to consider anew the legal validity of the distinction which has resulted in barring Negroes from participating in the nominations of candidates of the Democratic party in Texas. Other precedents of this Court forbid the abridgement of the right to vote. United States v. Reese, 92 U. S. 214, 217; Neal v. Delaware, 103 U. S. 370, 388; Guinn v. United States, 238 U. S. 347, 361; Myers v. Anderson, 238 U. S. 368, 379; Lane v. Wilson, 307 U. S. 268.

It may now be taken as a postulate that the right to vote in such a primary for the nomination of candidates without discrimination by the State, like the right to vote *662 in a general election, is a right secured by the Constitution. United States v. Classic, 313 U. S. at 314; Myers v. Anderson, 238 U. S. 368; Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U. S. 651, 663 et seq. By the terms of the Fifteenth Amendment that right may not be abridged by any State on account of race. Under our Constitution the great privilege of the ballot may not be denied a man by the State because of his color.

We are thus brought to an examination of the qualifications for Democratic primary electors in Texas, to determine whether state action or private action has excluded Negroes from participation. Despite Texas' decision that the exclusion is produced by private or party action, Bell v. Hill, supra, federal courts must for themselves appraise the facts leading to that conclusion. It is only by the performance of this obligation that a final and uniform interpretation can be given to the Constitution, the “supreme Law of the Land.” Nixon v. Condon, 286 U. S. 73, 88; Standard Oil Co. v. Johnson, 316 U. S. 481, 483; Bridges v. California, 314 U. S. 252; Lisenba v. California, 314 U. S. 219, 238; Union Pacific R. Co. v. United States, 313 U. S. 450, 467; Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Co., 312 U. S. 287, 294; Chambers v. Florida, 309 U. S. 227, 228. Texas requires electors in a primary to pay a poll tax. Every person who does so pay and who has the qualifications of age and residence is an acceptable voter for the primary. Art. 2955. As appears above in the summary of the statutory provisions set out in note 6, Texas requires by the law the election of the county officers of a party. These compose the county executive committee. The county chairmen so selected are members of the district executive committee and choose the chairman for the district. Precinct primary election officers are named by the county executive committee. Statutes provide for the election by the voters of precinct *663 delegates to the county convention of a party and the selection of delegates to the district and state conventions by the county convention. The state convention selects the state executive committee. No convention may place in platform or resolution any demand for specific legislation without endorsement of such legislation by the voters in a primary. Texas thus directs the selection of all party officers.

Primary elections are conducted by the party under state statutory authority. The county executive committee selects precinct election officials and the county, district or state executive committees, respectively, canvass the returns. These party committees or the state convention certify the party’s candidates to the appropriate officers for inclusion on the official ballot for the general election. No name which has not been so certified may appear upon the ballot for the general election as a candidate of a political party. No other name may be printed on the ballot which has not been placed in nomination by qualified voters who must take oath that they did not participate in a primary for the selection of a candidate for the office for which the nomination is made.

The state courts are given exclusive original jurisdiction of contested elections and of mandamus proceedings to compel party officers to perform their statutory duties.

We think that this statutory system for the selection of party nominees for inclusion on the general election ballot makes the party which is required to follow these legislative directions an agency of the State in so far as it determines the participants in a primary election. The party takes its character as a state agency from the duties imposed upon it by state statutes; the duties do not become matters of private law because they are performed by a political party. The plan of the Texas primary follows substantially that of Louisiana, with the exception that in *664 Louisiana the State pays the cost of the primary while Texas assesses the cost against candidates. In numerous instances, the Texas statutes fix or limit the fees to be charged. Whether paid directly by the State or through state requirements, it is state action which compels. When primaries become a part of the machinery for choosing officials, state and national, as they have here, the same tests to determine the character of discrimination or abridgement should be applied to the primary as are applied to the general election. If the State requires a certain electoral procedure, prescribes a general election ballot made up of party nominees so chosen and limits the choice of the electorate in general elections for state offices, practically speaking, to those whose names appear on such a ballot, it endorses, adopts and enforces the discrimination against Negroes, practiced by a party entrusted by Texas law with the determination of the qualifications of participants in the primary. This is state action within the meaning of the Fifteenth Amendment. Guinn v. United States, 238 U. S. 347, 362.

The United States is a constitutional democracy. Its organic law grants to all citizens a right to participate in the choice of elected officials without restriction by any State because of race. This grant to the people of the opportunity for choice is not to be nullified by a State through casting its electoral process in a form which permits a private organization to practice racial discrimination in the election. Constitutional rights would be of little value if they could be thus indirectly denied. Lane v. Wilson, 307 U. S. 268, 275.

The privilege of membership in a party may be, as this Court said in Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U. S. 45, 55, no concern of a State. But when, as here, that privilege is also the essential qualification for voting in a primary to select nominees for a general election, the State makes the action *665 of the party the action of the State. In reaching, this conclusion we are not unmindful of the desirability of continuity of decision in constitutional questions. 8 However, when convinced of former error, this Court has never felt constrained to follow precedent. In constitutional questions, where correction depends upon amendment and not upon legislative action this Court throughout its history has freely exercised its power to reexamine the basis of its constitutional decisions. This has long been accepted practice, 9 and this practice has continued to this day. 10 This is particularly true when the decision believed erroneous is the application of a constitutional principle rather *666 than an interpretation of the Constitution to extract the principle itself. 11 Here we are applying, contrary to the recent decision in Orovey v. Townsend, the well-established principle of the Fifteenth Amendment, forbidding the abridgement by a State of a citizen’s right to vote. Orovey v. Townsend is overruled.

Judgment reversed.

Mr. Justice Roberts :

In Mahnich v. Southern Steamship Co., 321 U. S. 96, 105, I have expressed my views with respect to the present policy of the court freely to disregard and to overrule considered decisions and the rules of law announced in them. This tendency, it seems to me, indicates an intolerance for what those who have composed this court in the past have conscientiously and deliberately concluded, and involves an assumption that knowledge and wisdom reside in us which was denied to our predecessors. I shall not repeat what I there said for I consider it fully applicable to the instant decision, which but points the moral anew.

A word should be said with respect to the judicial history forming the background of Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U. S. 45, which is now overruled.

In 1923 Texas adopted a statute which declared that no negro should be eligible to participate in a Democratic primary election in that State. A negro, a citizen of' the United States and of Texas, qualified to vote, except for the provisions of the statute, was denied the opportunity to vote in a primary election at which candidates were to be chosen for the offices of senator and representative in the Congress of the United States. He brought action against the judges of election in a United States court for *667 damages for their refusal to accept his ballot. This court unanimously reversed a judgment dismissing the complaint and held that the judges acted pursuant to state law and that the State of Texas, by its statute, had denied the voter the equal protection secured by the Fourteenth Amendment. Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U. S. 636 (1927).

In 1927 the legislature of Texas repealed the provision condemned by this court and enacted that every political party in the State might, through its Executive Committee, prescribe the qualifications of its own members and determine in its own way who should be qualified to vote or participate in the party, except that no denial of participation could be decreed by reason of former political or other affiliation. Thereupon the State Executive Committee of the Democratic party in Texas adopted a resolution that white Democrats, and no other, should be allowed to participate in the party’s primaries.

A negro, whose primary ballot was rejected pursuant to the resolution, sought to recover damages from the judges who had rejected it. The United States District Court dismissed his action, and the Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed; but this court reversed the judgment and sustained the right of action by a vote of 5 to 4. Nixon v. Condon, 286 U. S. 73 (1932).

The opinion was written with care. The court refused to decide whether a political party in Texas had inherent power to determine its membership. The court said, however: “Whatever inherent power a state political party has to determine the content of its membership resides in the state convention,” and referred to the statutes of Texas to demonstrate that the State had left the Convention free to formulate the party faith. Attention was directed to the fact that the statute under attack did not leave to the party convention the definition of party membership but placed it in the party’s State Executive Committee which could not, by any stretch of reasoning, be *668 held to constitute the party. The court held, therefore, that the State Executive Committee acted solely by virtue of the statutory mandate and as delegate of state power, and again struck down the discrimination against negro voters as deriving force and virtue from state action,— that is, from statute.

In 1932 the Democratic Convention of Texas adopted a resolution that “all white citizens of the State of Texas who are qualified to vote under the Constitution and laws of the State shall be eligible to membership in the Democratic party and as such entitled to participate in its deliberations.”

A negro voter qualified to vote in a primary election, except for the exclusion worked by the resolution, demanded an absentee ballot which he was entitled to mail to the judges at a primary election except for the resolution. The county clerk refused to furnish him a ballot. He brought an action for damages against the clerk in a state court. That court, which was the tribunal having final jurisdicion under the laws of Texas, dismissed his complaint and he brought the case to this court for review. After the fullest consideration by the whole court 1 an opinion was written representing its unanimous views and affirming the judgment. Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1935).

I believe it will not be gainsaid the case received the attention and consideration which the questions involved demanded and the opinion represented the views of all the justices. It appears that those views do not now commend themselves to the court. I shall not restate them. They are exposed in the opinion and must stand or fall on their merits. Their soundness, however, is not a matter which presently concerns me.

*669 The reason for my concern is that the instant decision, overruling that announced about nine years ago, tends to bring adjudications of this tribunal into the same class as a restricted railroad ticket, good for this day and train only. I have no assurance, in view of current decisions, that the opinion announced today may not shortly be repudiated and overruled by justices who deem they have new light on the subject. In the present term the court has overruled three cases.

In the present case, as in Mahnich v. Southern S. S. Co., supra, the court below relied, as it was bound to, upon our previous decision. As that court points out, the statutes of Texas have not been altered since Grovey v. Townsend was decided. The same resolution is involved as was drawn in question in Grovey v. Townsend. Not a fact differentiates that case from this except the names of the parties.

It is suggested that Grovey v. Townsend was overruled sub silentio in United States v. Classic, 313 U. S. 299. If so, the situation is even worse than that exhibited by the outright repudiation of an earlier decision, for it is the fact that, in the Classic case, Grovey v. Townsend was distinguished in brief and argument by the Government without suggestion that it was wrongly decided, and was relied on by the appellees, not as a controlling decision, but by way of analogy. The case is not mentioned in either of the opinions in the Classic case. Again and again it is said in the opinion of the court in that case that the voter who was denied the right to vote was a fully qualified voter. In other words, there was no question of his being a person entitled under state law to vote in the primary. The offense charged was the fraudulent denial of his conceded right by an election officer because of his race. Here the question is altogether different. It is whether, in a Democratic primary, he who tendered his vote was a member of the Democratic party.

*670 I do not stop to call attention to the material differences between the primary election laws of Louisiana under consideration in the Classic case and those of Texas which are here drawn in question. These differences were spelled out in detail in the Government’s brief in the Classic case and emphasized in its oral argument. It is enough to say that the Louisiana statutes required the primary to be conducted by state officials and made it a state election, whereas, under the Texas statute, the primary is a party election conducted at the expense of members of the party and by officials chosen by the party. If this court’s opinion in the Classic case discloses its method of overruling earlier decisions, I can only protest that, in fairness, it should rather have adopted the open and frank way of saying what it was doing than, after the event, characterize its past action as overruling Grovey v. Townsend though those less sapient never realized the fact.

It is regrettable that in an era marked by doubt and confusion, an era whose greatest need is steadfastness of thought and purpose, this court, which has been looked to as exhibiting consistency in adjudication, and a steadiness which would hold the balance even in the face of temporary ebbs and flows of opinion, should now itself become the breeder of fresh doubt and confusion in the public mind as to the stability of our institutions.

Justice White

delivered the opinion of the Court.

The Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution provides in part:

“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the *924United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”

Because the Amendment is directed at the States, it can be violated only by conduct that may be fairly characterized as “state action.”

Title 42 U. S. C. § 1983 provides a remedy for deprivations of rights secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States when that deprivation takes place “under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory . . . ,”1 This case concerns the relationship between the § 1983 requirement of action under color of state law and the Fourteenth Amendment requirement of state action.

I

In 1977, petitioner, a lessee-operator of a truckstop in Virginia, was indebted to his supplier, Edmondson Oil Co., Inc. Edmondson sued on the debt in Virginia state court. Ancillary to that action and pursuant to state law, Edmondson sought prejudgment attachment of certain of petitioner’s property. Va. Code §8.01-533 (1977).2 The prejudgment attachment procedure required only that Edmondson allege, in an ex parte petition, a belief that petitioner was disposing of or might dispose of his property in order to defeat his creditors. Acting upon that petition, a Clerk of the state court issued a writ of attachment, which was then executed by the County Sheriff. This effectively sequestered petitioner’s *925property, although it was left in his possession. Pursuant to the statute, a hearing on the propriety of the attachment and levy was later conducted. Thirty-four days after the levy, a state trial judge ordered the attachment dismissed because Edmondson had failed to establish the statutory grounds for attachment alleged in the petition.3

Petitioner subsequently brought this action under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 against Edmondson and its president, His complaint alleged that in attaching his property respondents had acted jointly with the State to deprive him of his property without due process of law. The lower courts construed the complaint as alleging a due process violation both from a misuse of the Virginia procedure and from the statutory procedure itself.4 He sought compensatory and punitive damages for specified financial loss allegedly caused by the improvident attachment.

Relying on Flagg Brothers, Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U. S. 149 (1978), the District Court held that the alleged actions of the respondents did not constitute state action as required by the Fourteenth Amendment and that the complaint therefore did not state a claim upon which relief could be granted under §1983. Petitioner appealed; the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, sitting en banc, affirmed, with three dissenters.5 639 F. 2d 1058 (1981).

*926The Court of Appeals rejected the District Court’s reliance on Flagg Brothers in finding that the requisite state action was missing in this case. The participation of state officers in executing the levy sufficiently distinguished this case from Flagg Brothers. The Court of Appeals stated the issue as follows:

“[Wjhether the mere institution by a private litigant of presumptively valid state judicial proceedings, without any prior or subsequent collusion or concerted action by that litigant with the state officials who then proceed with adjudicative, administrative, or executive enforcement of the proceedings, constitutes action under color of state law within contemplation of § 1983.” 639 F. 2d, at 1061-1062 (footnote omitted).

The court distinguished between the acts directly chargeable to respondents and the larger context within which those acts occurred, including the direct levy by state officials on petitioner’s property. While the latter no doubt amounted to state action, the former was not so clearly action under color of state law. The court held that a private party acts under color of state law within the meaning of § 1983 only when there is a usurpation or corruption of official power by the private litigant or a surrender of judicial power to the private litigant in such a way that the independence of the enforcing officer has been compromised to a significant degree. Because the court thought none of these elements was present here, the complaint failed to allege conduct under color of state law.

Because this construction of the under-color-of-state-law requirement appears to be inconsistent with prior decisions of this Court, we granted certiorari. 452 U. S. 937 (1981).

II

Although the Court of Appeals correctly perceived the importance of Flagg Brothers to a proper resolution of this case, *927it misread that case.6 It also failed to give sufficient weight to that line of cases, beginning with Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U. S. 337 (1969), in which the Court considered constitutional due process requirements in the context of garnishment actions and prejudgment attachments. See North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U. S. 601 (1975); Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U. S. 600 (1974); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U. S. 67 (1972). Each of these cases involved a finding of state action as an implicit predicate of the application of due process standards. Flagg Brothers distinguished them on the ground that in each there was overt, official involvement in the property deprivation; there was no such overt action by a state officer in Flagg Brothers. 436 U. S., at 157. Although this case falls on the Sniadach, and not the Flagg Brothers, side of this distinction, the Court of Appeals thought the garnishment and attachment cases to be irrelevant because none but Fuentes arose under 42 U. S. C. §1983 and because Fuentes was distinguishable.7 *928It determined that it could ignore all of them because the issue in this case was not whether there was state action, but rather whether respondents acted under color of state law.

As we see it, however, the two concepts cannot be so easily disentangled. Whether they are identical or not, the state-action and the under-color-of-state-law requirements are obviously related.8 Indeed, until recently this Court did not distinguish between the two requirements at all.

A

In United States v. Price, 383 U. S. 787, 794, n. 7 (1966), we explicitly stated that the requirements were identical: “In cases under § 1983, ‘under color’ of law has consistently been treated as the same thing as the ‘state action’ required under the Fourteenth Amendment.”9 In support of this proposition the Court cited Smith v. Allwright, 321 U. S. 649 (1944), and Terry v. Adams, 345 U. S. 461 (1953).10 In both of these *929cases black voters in Texas challenged their exclusion from party primaries as a violation of the Fifteenth Amendment and sought relief under 8 U. S. C. §43 (1946 ed.).11 In each case, the Court understood the problem before it to be whether the discriminatory policy of a private political association could be characterized as “state action within the meaning of the Fifteenth Amendment.” Smith, supra, at 664.12 Having found state action under the Constitution, there was no further inquiry into whether the action of the political associations also met the statutory requirement of action “under color of state law.”

Similarly, it is clear that in a § 1983 action brought against a state official, the statutory requirement of action “under color of state law” and the “state action” requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment are identical. The Court’s conclusion in United States v. Classic, 313 U. S. 299, 326 (1941), that “[m]isuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law, is action taken ‘under color of’ state law,” was founded on the rule announced in Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339, 346-347 (1880), that the actions of a state officer who exceeds the limits of his authority constitute state action for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment.13

*930The decision of the Court of Appeals rests on a misreading of Flagg Brothers. In that case the Court distinguished two elements of a § 1983 action:

“[Plaintiffs] are first bound to show that they have been deprived of a right ‘secured by the Constitution and the laws’ of the United States. They must secondly show that Flagg Brothers deprived them of this right acting ‘under color of any statute’ of the State of New York. It is clear that these two elements denote two separate areas of inquiry. Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U. S. 144, 150 (1970).’’ 436 U. S., at 155-156.

Plaintiffs’ case foundered on the first requirement. Because a due process violation was alleged and because the Due Process Clause protects individuals only from governmental and not from private action, plaintiffs had to demonstrate that the sale of their goods was accomplished by state action. The Court concluded that the sale, although authorized by state law, did not amount to state action under the Fourteenth Amendment, and therefore set aside the Court of Appeals’ contrary judgment.

There was no reason in Flagg Brothers to address the question whether there was action under color of state law. The Court expressly eschewed deciding whether that requirement was satisfied by private action authorized by state law. Id., at 156. Although the state-action and under-color-of-state-law requirements are “separate areas of inquiry,” Flagg Brothers did not hold nor suggest that state action, if present, might not satisfy the § 1983 requirement of conduct under color of state law. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals relied on Flagg Brothers to conclude in this case that state action under the Fourteenth Amendment is not necessarily action under color of state law for purposes of § 1983. We do not agree.

The two-part approach to a §1983 cause of action, referred to in Flagg Brothers, was derived from Adickes v. *931S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U. S. 144, 150 (1970). Adickes was a §1983 action brought against a private party, based on a claim of racial discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Although stating that the § 1983 plaintiff must show both that he has been deprived “of a right secured by the ‘Constitution and laws’ of the United States” and that the defendant acted “under color of any statute ... of any State,” ibid., we held that the private party’s joint participation with a state official in a conspiracy to discriminate would constitute both “state action essential to show a direct violation of petitioner’s Fourteenth Amendment equal protection rights” and action “‘under color’ of law for purposes of the statute.” Id., at 152.14 In *932support of our conclusion that a private party held to have violated the Fourteenth Amendment “can be liable under §1983,” ibid., we cited that part of United States v. Price, 383 U. S., at 794, n. 7, in which we had concluded that state action and action under color of state law are the same (quoted supra, at 928). Adickes provides no support for the Court of Appeals’ novel construction of § 1983.15

B

The decision of the Court of Appeals is difficult to reconcile with the Court’s garnishment and prejudgment attachment cases and with the congressional purpose in enacting § 1983.

Beginning with Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U. S. 337 (1969), the Court has consistently held that constitutional requirements of due process apply to garnishment and prejudgment attachment procedures whenever officers *933of the State act jointly with a creditor in securing the property in dispute. Sniadach and North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U. S. 601 (1975), involved state-created garnishment procedures; Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U. S.. 600 (1974), involved execution of a vendor’s lien to secure disputed property. In each of these cases state agents aided the creditor in securing the disputed property; but in each case the federal issue arose in litigation between creditor and debtor in the state courts and no state official was named as a party. Nevertheless, in each case the Court entertained and adjudicated the defendant-debtor’s claim that the procedure under which the private creditor secured the disputed property violated federal constitutional standards of due process. Necessary to that conclusion is the holding that private use of the challenged state procedures with the help of state officials constitutes state action for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U. S. 67 (1972), was a § 1983 action brought against both a private creditor and the State Attorney General. The plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief, on due process grounds, from continued enforcement of state statutes authorizing prejudgment replevin. The plaintiff prevailed; if the Court of Appeals were correct in this case, there would have been no § 1983 cause of action against the private parties. Yet they remained parties, and judgment ran against them in this Court.16

*934If a defendant debtor in state-court debt collection proceedings can successfully challenge, on federal due process grounds, the plaintiff creditor’s resort to the procedures authorized by a state statute, it is difficult to understand why that same behavior by the state-court plaintiff should not provide a cause of action under § 1983. If the creditor-plaintiff violates the debtor-defendant’s due process rights by seizing his property in accordance with statutory procedures, there is little or no reason to deny to the latter a cause of action under the federal statute, § 1983, designed to provide judicial redress for just such constitutional violations.

To read the “under color of any statute” language of the Act in such a way as to impose a limit on those Fourteenth Amendment violations that may be redressed by the § 1983 cause of action would be wholly inconsistent with the purpose of § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 17 Stat. 13, from which § 1983 is derived. The Act was passed “for the express purpose of ‘enforc[ing] the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment.’” Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U. S. 538, 545 (1972). The history of the Act is replete with statements indicating that Congress thought it was creating a remedy as broad as the protection that the Fourteenth Amendment affords the individual. Perhaps the most direct statement of this was that of Senator Edmunds, the manager of the bill in the Senate: “[Section 1 is] so very simple and really reenact[s] the Constitution.” Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., 569 (1871). Representative Bingham similarly stated that the bill’s purpose was “the enforcement... of the Constitution on behalf of every individual citizen of the Republic ... to the extent of the rights guarantied to him by the Constitution.” Id., App. 81.17

*935In sum, the line drawn by the Court of Appeals is inconsistent with our prior cases and would substantially undercut the congressional purpose in providing the § 1983 cause of action. If the challenged conduct of respondents constitutes state action as delimited by our prior decisions, then that conduct was also action under color of state law and will support a suit under § 1983.18

*936HH hH

As a matter of substantive constitutional law the state-action requirement reflects judicial recognition of the fact that “most rights secured by the Constitution are protected only against infringement by governments,” Flagg Brothers, 436 U. S., at 156. As the Court said in Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U. S. 345, 349 (1974):

“In 1883, this Court in the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S. 3, affirmed the essential dichotomy set forth in [the Fourteenth] Amendment between deprivation by the State, subject to scrutiny under its provisions, and private conduct, ‘however discriminatory or wrongful,’ against which the Fourteenth Amendment offers no shield.”

Careful adherence to the “state action” requirement preserves an area of individual freedom by limiting the reach of federal law and federal judicial power. It also avoids imposing on the State, its agencies or officials, responsibility for conduct for which they cannot fairly be blamed. A major consequence is to require the courts to respect the limits of *937their own power as directed against state governments and private interests. Whether this is good or bad policy, it is a fundamental fact of our political order.

Our cases have accordingly insisted that the conduct allegedly causing the deprivation of a federal right be fairly attributable to the State. These cases reflect a two-part approach to this question of “fair attribution.” First, the deprivation must be caused by the exercise of some right or privilege created by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by the State or by a person for whom the State is responsible. In Sniadach, Fuentes, W. T. Grant, and North Georgia, for example, a state statute provided the right to garnish or to obtain prejudgment attachment, as well as the procedure by which the rights could be exercised. Second, the party charged with the deprivation must be a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor. This may be because he is a state official, because he has acted together with or has obtained significant aid from state officials, or because his conduct is otherwise chargeable to the State. Without a limit such as this, private parties could face constitutional litigation whenever they seek to rely on some state rule governing their interactions with the community surrounding them.

Although related, these two principles are not the same. They collapse into each other when the claim of a constitutional deprivation is directed against a party whose official character is such as to lend the weight of the State to his decisions. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167, 172 (1961). The two principles diverge when the constitutional claim is directed against a party without such apparent authority, i. e., against a private party. The difference between the two inquiries is well illustrated by comparing Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U. S. 163 (1972), with Flagg Brothers, supra.

In Moose Lodge, the Court held that the discriminatory practices of the appellant did not violate the Equal Protection Clause because those practices did not constitute “state action.” The Court focused primarily on the question of *938whether the admittedly discriminatory policy could in any way be ascribed to a governmental decision.19 The inquiry, therefore, looked to those policies adopted by the State that were applied to appellant. The Court concluded as follows:

“We therefore hold, that with the exception hereafter noted, the operation of the regulatory scheme enforced by the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board does not sufficiently implicate the State in the discriminatory guest policies of Moose Lodge to . . . make the latter ‘state action’ within the ambit of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” 407 U. S., at 177.

In other words, the decision to discriminate could not be ascribed to any governmental decision; those governmental decisions that did affect Moose Lodge were unconnected with its discriminatory policies.20

Flagg Brothers focused on the other component of the state-action principle. In that case, the warehouseman proceeded under New York Uniform Commercial Code, § 7-210, and the debtor challenged the constitutionality of that provision on the grounds that it violated the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Undoubtedly the State was responsible for the statute. The response of the Court, however, focused not on the terms of the statute but on the character of the defendant to the § 1983 *939suit: Action by a private party pursuant to this statute, without something more, was not sufficient to justify a characterization of that party as a “state actor.” The Court suggested that that “something more” which would convert the private party into a state actor might vary with the circumstances of the case. This was simply a recognition that the Court has articulated a number of different factors or tests in different contexts: e. g., the “public function” test, see Terry v. Adams, 345 U. S. 461 (1953); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U. S. 501 (1946); the “state compulsion” test, see Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U. S., at 170; the “nexus” test, see Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U. S. 345 (1974); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U. S. 715 (1961); and, in the case of prejudgment attachments, a “joint action test,” Flagg Brothers, 436 U. S., at 157.21 Whether these different tests are actually different in operation or simply different ways of characterizing the necessarily fact-bound inquiry that confronts the Court in such a situation need not be resolved here. See Burton, supra, at 722 (“Only by sifting facts and weighing circumstances can the non-obvious involvement of the State in private conduct be attributed its true significance”).

IV

Turning to this case, the first question is whether the claimed deprivation has resulted from the exercise of a right or privilege having its source in state authority. The second question is whether, under the facts of this case, respondents, who are private parties, may be appropriately characterized as “state actors.”

*940Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals noted the ambiguous scope of petitioner’s contentions: “There has been considerable confusion throughout the litigation on the question whether Lugar’s ultimate claim of unconstitutional deprivation was directed at the Virginia statute itself or only at its erroneous application to him.” 639 F. 2d, at 1060, n. 1. Both courts held that resolution of this ambiguity was not necessary to their disposition of the case: both resolved it, in any case, in favor of the view that petitioner was attacking the constitutionality of the statute as well as its misapplication. In our view, resolution of this issue is essential to the proper disposition of the ease.

Petitioner presented three counts in his complaint. Count three was a pendent claim based on state tort law; counts one and two claimed violations of the Due Process Clause. Count two alleged that the deprivation of property resulted from respondents’ “malicious, wanton, willful, opressive [sic], [and] unlawful acts.” By “unlawful,” petitioner apparently meant “unlawful under state law.” To say this, however, is to say that the conduct of which petitioner complained could not be ascribed to any governmental decision; rather, respondents were acting contrary to the relevant policy articulated by the State. Nor did they have the authority of state officials to put the weight of the State behind their private decision, i. e., this case does not fall within the abuse of authority doctrine recognized in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167 (1961). That respondents invoked the statute without the grounds to do so could in no way be attributed to a state rule or a state decision. Count two, therefore, does not state a cause of action under § 1983 but challenges only private action.

Count one is a different matter. That count describes the procedures followed by respondents in obtaining the prejudgment attachment as well as the fact that the state court subsequently ordered the attachment dismissed because respondents had not met their burden under state law. Pe*941titioner then summarily states that this sequence of events deprived him of his property without due process. Although it is not clear whether petitioner is referring to the state-created procedure or the misuse of that procedure by respondents, we agree with the lower courts that the better reading of the complaint is that petitioner challenges the state statute as procedurally defective under the Fourteenth Amendment.22

While private misuse of a state statute does not describe conduct that can be attributed to the State, the procedural scheme created by the statute obviously is the product of state action. This is subject to constitutional restraints and properly may be addressed in a § 1983 action, if the second element of the state-action requirement is met as well.

As is clear from the discussion in Part II, we have consistently held that a private party’s joint participation with state officials in the seizure of disputed property is sufficient to characterize that party as a “state actor” for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. The rule in these cases is the same as that articulated in Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., supra, at. 152, in the context of an equal protection deprivation:

“‘Private persons, jointly engaged with state officials in the prohibited action, are acting “under color” of law for purposes of the statute. To act “under color” of law does not require that the accused be an officer of the State. It is enough that he is a willful participant in joint activity with the State or its agents,’” quoting United States v. Price, 383 U. S., at 794.

*942The Court of Appeals erred in holding that in this context “joint participation” required something more than invoking the aid of state officials to take advantage of state-created attachment procedures. That holding is contrary to the conclusions we have reached as to the applicability of due process standards to such procedures. Whatever may be true in other contexts, this is sufficient when the State has created a system whereby state officials will attach property on the ex parte application of one party to a private dispute.

In summary, petitioner was deprived of his property through state action; respondents were, therefore, acting under color of state law in participating in that deprivation. Petitioner did present a valid cause of action under § 1983 insofar as he challenged the constitutionality of the Virginia statute; he did not insofar as he alleged only misuse or abuse of the statute.23

The judgment is reversed in part and affirmed in part, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

So ordered.

*943Chief Justice Burger,

dissenting.

Whether we are dealing with suits under § 1983 or suits brought pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment, in my view the inquiry is the same: is the claimed infringement of a federal right fairly attributable to the State. Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, ante, at 838. Applying this standard, it cannot be said that the actions of the named respondents are fairly attributable to the State.* Respondents did no more than invoke a presumptively valid state prejudgment attachment procedure available to all. Relying on a dubious “but for” analysis, the Court erroneously concludes that the subsequent procedural steps taken by the State in attaching a putative debtor’s property in some way transforms respondents’ acts into actions of the State. This case is no different from the situation in which a private party commences a lawsuit and secures injunctive relief which, even if temporary, may cause significant injury to the defendant. Invoking a judicial process, of course, implicates the State and its officers but does not transform essentially private conduct into actions of the State. Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U. S. 24 (1980). Similarly, one who practices a trade or profession, drives an automobile, or builds a house under a state license is not engaging in acts fairly attributable to the state. In both Dennis and the instant case petitioner’s remedy lies in private suits for damages such as malicious prosecution. The Court’s opinion expands the reach of the statute beyond anything intended by Congress. It may well be a consequence of too casually falling into a semantical trap because of the figurative use of the term “color of state law.”

*944Justice Powell,

with whom Justice Rehnquist and Justice O’Connor join, dissenting.

Today’s decision is a disquieting example of how expansive judicial decisionmaking can ensnare a person who had every reason to believe he was acting in strict accordance with law. The case began nearly five years ago as the outgrowth of a simple suit on a debt in a Virginia state court. Respondent — a small wholesale oil dealer in Southside, Va. — brought suit against petitioner Lugar, a truckstop owner who had failed to pay a debt.1 The suit was to collect this indebtedness. Fearful that petitioner might dissipate his assets before the debt was collected, respondent also filed a petition in state court seeking sequestration of certain of Lugar’s assets. He did so under a Virginia statute, traceable at least to 1819, that permits creditors to seek prejudgment attachment of property in the possession of debtors.2 No court had questioned the validity of the statute, and it remains presumptively valid. The Clerk of the state court duly issued a writ of attachment, and the County Sheriff then executed it. There is no allegation that respondent conspired with the state officials to deny petitioner the fair protection of state or federal law.

*945Respondent ultimately prevailed in his lawsuit. The petitioner Lugar was ordered by a court to pay his debt. A state court did find, however, that Lugar’s assets should not have been attached prior to a judgment on the underlying action.

Following this decision Lugar instituted legal action in the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia. Suing under a federal statute, 42 U. S. C. §1983, Lugar alleged that the respondent — by filing a petition in state court — had acted “under color of law” and had caused the deprivation of constitutional rights under the Fourteenth Amendment — an Amendment that does not create rights enforceable against private citizens, such as one would have assumed respondent to be, but only against the States. Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, ante, at 837; Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U. S. 149, 156 (1978); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U. S. 1, 13 (1948); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S. 3, 11 (1883).3 Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals agreed that petitioner had no cause of action under § 1983. They sensibly found that respondent could not be held responsible for any deprivation of constitutional rights and that the suit did not belong in federal court.

This Court today reverses the judgment of those lower courts. It holds that respondent, a private citizen who did no more than commence a legal action of a kind traditionally initiated by private parties, thereby engaged in “state action.” This decision is as unprecedented as it is implausible. It is plainly unjust to the respondent, and the Court makes no *946argument to the contrary. Respondent, who was represented by counsel, could have had no notion that his filing of a petition in state court, in the effort to secure payment of a private debt, made him a “state actor” liable in damages for allegedly unconstitutional action by the Commonwealth of Virginia. Nor is the Court’s analysis consistent with the mode of inquiry prescribed by our cases. On the contrary, the Court undermines fundamental distinctions between the common-sense categories of state and private conduct and between the legal concepts of “state action” and private action “under color of law.”

I

The plain language of 42 U. S. C. § 1988 establishes that a plaintiff must satisfy two jurisdictional requisites to state an actionable claim. First, he must allege the violation of a right “secured by the Constitution and laws” of the United States. Because “most rights secured by the Constitution are protected only against infringement by governments,” Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 486 U. S., at 156, this requirement compels an inquiry into the presence of state action. Second, a § 1983 plaintiff must show that the alleged deprivation was caused by a person acting “under color” of law. In Flagg Bros., this Court affirmed that “these two elements denote two separate areas of inquiry.” Id., at 155-156. See Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U. S. 144, 152 (1970).

This case demonstrates why separate inquiries are required. Here it is not disputed that the Virginia Sheriff and Clerk of Court, the state officials who sequestered petitioner’s property in the manner provided by Virginia law, engaged in state action. Yet the petitioner, while alleging constitutional injury from this action by state officials, did not sue the State or its agents. In these circumstances the Court of Appeals correctly stated that the relevant inquiry was the second identified in Flagg Bros.: whether the respondent, a private citizen whose only action was to invoke a presumptively valid state attachment process, had acted under color of state law in “causing” the State to deprive peti*947tioner of alleged constitutional rights.4 Consistently with past decisions of this Court, the Court of Appeals concluded that respondent’s private conduct had not occurred under color of law.

Rejecting the reasoning of the Court of Appeals, the Court opinion inexplicably conflates the two inquiries mandated by Flagg Bros. Ignoring that this case involves two sets of actions — one by respondent, who merely filed a suit and accompanying sequestration petition; another by the state officials, who issued the writ and executed the lien — it wrongly frames the question before the Court, not as whether the private respondent acted under color of law in filing the petition, but as “whether . . . respondents, who are private parties, may be appropriately characterized as ‘state actors.’ ” Ante, at 939. It then concludes that they may, on the theory that a private party who invokes “the aid of state officials to take advantage of state-created attachment procedures” is a “joint participant” with the State and therefore a “state actor.” “The rule,” the Court asserts, is as follows:

“Private persons, jointly engaged with state officials in the prohibited action, are acting ‘under color’ of law for purposes of the statute. To act ‘under color’ of law does not require that the accused be an officer of the State. It is enough that he is a willful participant in a joint activity with the State or its agents.” Ante, at 941, quoting Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., supra, at 152, in turn quoting United States v. Price, 383 U. S. 787, 794 (1966).

*948There are at least two fallacies in the Court’s conclusion. First, as is apparent from the quotation, our cases have not established that private “joint participants” with state officials thémselves necessarily become state actors. Where private eitizens interact with state officials in the pursuit of merely private ends, the appropriate inquiry generally is whether the private parties have acted “under color of law.” Second, even when the inquiry is whether an action occurred under color of law, our cases make clear that the “joint participation” standard is not satisfied when a private citizen does no more than invoke a presumptively valid judicial process in pursuit only of legitimate private ends.

HH t — i

As this Court recognized in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167, 172 (1961), the historic purpose of § 1983 was to prevent state officials from using the cloak of their authority under state law to violate rights protected against state infringement by the Fourteenth Amendment.5 The Court accordingly is correct that an important inquiry in a § 1983 suit against a private party is whether there is an allegation of wrongful “conduct that can be attributed to the State. ” Ante, at 941. This is the first question referred to in Flagg Bros. But there still remains the second Flagg Bros, question: whether this state action fairly can be attributed to the respondent, whose *949only action was to invoke a presumptively valid attachment statute. This question, unasked by the Court, reveals the fallacy of its conclusion that respondent may be held accountable for the attachment of property because he was a “state actor.”6 From the occurrence of state action taken by the Sheriff who sequestered petitioner’s property, it does not follow that respondent became a “state actor” simply because the Sheriff was. This Court, until today, has never endorsed this non sequitur.

It of course is true that respondent’s private action was followed by state action, and that the private and the state actions were not unconnected. But “[tjhat the State responds to [private] actions by [taking action of its own] does not render it responsible for those [private] actions.” Blum v. Yaretsky, post, at 1005. See Flagg Bros., 436 U. S., at 164-165; Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U. S. 345, 357 (1974). And where the State is not responsible for a private decision to behave in a certain way, the private action generally cannot be considered “state action” within the meaning of our cases. See, e. g., Blum v. Yaretsky, post, at 1004-1005; Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U. S. 163, 172-173 (1972). As in Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., supra, “[respondent’s exercise of the choice allowed by state law where *950the initiative comes from it and not from the State, does not make its action in doing so ‘state action’ for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment.” 419 U. S., at 357 (footnote omitted).

This Court of course has held that private parties are amenable to suit under § 1983 when “jointly engaged” with state officials in the violation of constitutional rights. See Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U. S. 144 (1970).7 Yet the Court, in advancing its “joint participation” theory, does not cite a single case in which a private decision to invoke a presumptively valid state legal process has been held to constitute state action. Even the quotation on which the Court principally relies for its statement of the applicable “rule,” ante, at 941, does not refer to state action. Rather, it states explicitly that “[pjrivate persons, jointly engaged with state officials in the prohibited action, are acting ‘under color’ of law for purposes of the statute.”

As illustrated by this quotation, our cases have recognized a distinction between “state action” and private action under “color of law.” This distinction is sound in principle. It also is consistent with and supportive of the distinction between “private” conduct and government action that is subject to the procedural limitations of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. As the Court itself notes: “Careful adherence to the ‘state action’ requirement preserves an area of individual freedom by limiting the reach of federal law and federal judicial power. It also avoids imposing on the State, its agencies or officials, responsibility for conduct for which they cannot fairly be blamed.” Ante, at 936.

A “color of law” inquiry acknowledges that private individuals, engaged in unlawful joint behavior with state officials, may be personally responsible for wrongs that they cause to occur. But it does not confuse private actors with the *951State — the fallacy of the analysis adopted today by the Court. In this case involving the private action of the respondent in petitioning the state courts of Virginia, the appropriate inquiry as to respondent’s liability is not whether he was a state actor, but whether he acted under color of law. It is to this question that I therefore turn.

HH I — I

Contrary to the position of the Court, our cases do not establish that a private party’s mere invocation of state legal procedures constitutes “joint participation” or “conspiracy” with state officials satisfying the § 1983 requirement of action under color of law. In Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U. S. 24 (1980), we held that private parties acted under color of law when corruptly conspiring with a state judge in a joint scheme to defraud. In so holding, however, we explicitly stated that “merely resorting to the courts and being on the winning side of a lawsuit does not make a party a co-conspirator or a joint actor with the judge.” Id., at 28. This conclusion is reinforced by our more recent decision in Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U. S. 312 (1981). As we held to be true with respect to the defense of a criminal defendant, invocation of state legal process is “essentially a private function . . . for which state office and authority are not needed.” Id., at 319. These recent decisions make clear that independent, private decisions made in the context of litigation cannot be said to occur under color of law.8 The Court nevertheless advances two principal grounds for its holding to the contrary.

*952A

The Court argues that petitioner’s action under § 1983 is supported by cases in which this Court has applied due process standards to state garnishment and prejudgment attachment procedures. The Court relies specifically on Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U. S. 337 (1969); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U. S. 67 (1972); Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U. S. 600 (1974); and North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U. S. 601 (1975). According to the Court, these cases establish that a private party acts “under color” of law when seeking the attachment of property under an unconstitutional state statute.9 In fact, a careful reading demonstrates that they provide no authority for this proposition.

Of the cases cited by the Court, Sniadach, Mitchell, and Di-Chem all involved attacks on the validity of state attachment or garnishment statutes. None of the cases alleged that the private creditor was a joint actor with the State, and none involved a claim for damages against the creditor. Each case involved a state suit, not a federal action under § 1983. It therefore was unnecessary in any of these cases for this Court to consider whether the creditor, by virtue of instituting the attachment or garnishment, became a state actor or acted under color of state law. There is not one word in any of these cases that so characterizes the private creditor.10 In Fuentes v. Shevin, the Court did consider a *953§ 1983 action against a private creditor as well as the State Attorney General.11 Again, however, the only question before this Court was the validity of a state statute. No claim was made that the creditor was a joint actor with the State or had acted under color of law. No damages were sought from the creditor. Again, there was no occasion for this Court to consider the status under §1983 of the private party, and there is not a word in the opinion that discusses this. As with Sniadach, Mitchell, and Di-Chem, Fuentes thus fails to establish that a private party’s mere invocation of state attachment or garnishment procedures represents action under color of law — even in a case in which those procedures are subsequently held to be unconstitutional.

B

In addition to relying on cases involving the constitutionality of state attachment and garnishment statutes, the Court advances a “joint participation” theory based on Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U. S. 144 (1970). In Adickes the plaintiff sued a private restaurant under § 1983, alleging a conspiracy between the restaurant and local police to deprive her of the right to equal treatment in a place of public accommodation. Id., at 152, 153. Reversing the decision below, this Court upheld the cause of action. It found that the private defendant, in “conspiring” with local police to obtain official enforcement of a state custom of racial segregation, engaged in a “‘joint activity with the State or its agents’” *954and therefore acted under color of law within the meaning of §1983. Id., at 152 (quoting United States v. Price, 383 U. S., at 794).

Contrary to the suggestion of the Court, however, Justice Harlan’s Court opinion in Adickes did not purport to define the term “under color of law.” Attending closely to the facts presented, the Court observed that “[wjhatever else may also be necessary to show that a person has acted under color of [a] statute’for purposes of § 1983,... we think it essential that he act with the knowledge of and pursuant to that statute.” 398 U. S., at 162, n. 23 (emphasis added). As indicated by this choice of language, the Court clearly seems to have contemplated some limiting principle. A citizen summoning the police to enforce the law ordinarily would not be considered to have engaged in a “conspiracy.” Nor, presumably, would such a citizen be characterized as acting under color of law and thereby risking amenability to suit for constitutional violations that subsequently might occur. Surely there is nothing in Adickes to indicate that the Court would have found action under color of law in cases of this kind.

Although Adickes is distinguishable from these hypotheti-cals, the current case is not. The conduct in Adickes occurred in 1964, 10 years after Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483 (1954), and after the decade of publicized litigation that followed in its wake. In view of the intense national focus on issues of racial discrimination, it is virtually inconceivable that a private citizen then could have acted in the innocent belief that the state law and customs involved in Adickes still were presumptively valid. As Justice Harlan wrote, “[f]ew principles of law are more firmly stitched into our constitutional fabric than the proposition that a State must not discriminate against a person because of his race or the race of his companions, or in any way act to compel or encourage segregation.” 398 U. S., at 150-152. Construed as resting on this basis, Adickes establishes that a private *955party acts under color of law when he conspires with state officials to secure the application of a state law so plainly unconstitutional as to enjoy no presumption of validity. In such a context, the private party could be characterized as hiding behind the authority of law and as engaging in “joint participation” with the State in the deprivation of constitutional rights.12 Here, however, petitioner has alleged no conspiracy. Nor has he even alleged that respondent was invoking the aid of a law he should have known to be constitutionally invalid.13 Finally, there is no allegation that respondent’s decision to invoke legal process was in any way *956compelled by the law or custom of the State in which he lived. In this context Adickes simply is inapposite.

Today’s decision therefore is ás unprecedented as it is unjust.14

*314Justice Powell

delivered the opinion of the Court.

The question in this case is whether a public defender acts “under color of state law” when representing an indigent defendant in a state criminal proceeding.

HH

This case arose when the respondent Russell Richard Dodson filed a pro se complaint in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa. Dodson brought the action in federal court under 42 U. S. C. § 1983. As the factual basis for his lawsuit Dodson alleged that Martha Shepard, an attorney in the Polk County Offender Advocate’s Office, had failed to represent him adequately in an appeal to the Iowa Supreme Court.1

A full-time employee of the county, Shepard had been assigned to represent Dodson in the appeal of a conviction for robbery. After inquiring into the case, however, she moved for permission to withdraw as counsel on the ground that Dodson’s claims were wholly frivolous.2 Shepard accompanied her motion with an affidavit explaining this conclusion. *315She also filed a memorandum summarizing Dodson’s claims and the supporting legal arguments. On November 9, 1979, the Iowa Supreme Court granted the motion to withdraw and dismissed Dodson’s appeal.

In his complaint in the District Court the respondent alleged that Shepard’s actions, especially her motion to withdraw, had deprived him of his right to counsel, subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment, and denied him due process of law.3 He sought injunctive relief as well as damages in the amount of $175,000. To establish that Shepard acted “under color of state law,” a jurisdictional requisite for a §1983 action, Dodson relied on her employment by the county. Dodson also sued Polk County, the Polk County Offender Advocate, and the Polk County Board of Supervisors. He alleged that the Offender Advocate and the Board of Supervisors had established the rules and procedures that Shepard was bound to follow in handling criminal appeals.

The District Court dismissed Dodson’s claims against all defendants. 483 F. Supp. 347 (1979). It held that the relevant actions by Shepard had not occurred under color of state law. Canvassing the leading authorities, it reasoned that a public defender owes a duty of undivided loyalty to his client. A public defender therefore could not be sued as an agent of the State. The District Court dismissed the Offender Advocate from the suit on the same theory. It also held *316that Dodson’s complaint failed to allege the requisite personal involvement to state a § 1983 claim against Polk County and the Board of Supervisors.

The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed. 628 F. 2d 1104 (1980). Like the District Court, it assumed that a public defender owed his client the same responsibility as any other attorney. In its view, however, the “dispos-itive point” was that Iowa Offender Advocates were “employees of the County,” which was “merely a creature of the State.” Whether public defenders received instructions from county officials was “beside the point.” “Public defenders receive their power not because they are selected by their clients, but because they are employed by the County to represent a certain class of clients, who likely have little or no choice in selecting the lawyer who will defend them.” Id., at 1106. In holding as it did on this issue, the court recognized that its decision conflicted with the holdings of a number of other Courts of Appeals. Reasoning that Dodson’s pro se complaint should be liberally construed, the court also ordered reinstatement of the § 1983 claims against the Offender Advocate and the Board of Supervisors. The question of their involvement was left for factual development in the District Court. In addition, the court ordered that Dodson be given an opportunity on remand to state his claim against the county with greater specificity. Finally, the court rejected the argument that a public defender should enjoy the same immunity provided to judges and prosecutors. It held that the defendants were entitled to a defense of “good faith,” but not of “absolute,” immunity.

One member of the panel filed a dissent. The dissent argued that a person acts under color of state law only when exercising powers created by the authority of the State. In this case, it reasoned, the alleged wrongs were not made possible only because the defendant was a public defender. In *317essence the complaint asserted an ordinary malpractice claim, which would be equally maintainable against a retained attorney or appointed counsel. The dissent also argued that public defenders should be entitled to absolute immunity from suit.

We granted certiorari to resolve the division among the Courts of Appeals over whether a public defender acts under color of state law when providing representation to an indigent client.4 450 U. S. 963 (1981). We now reverse.

HH HH

In United States v. Classic, 313 U. S. 299, 326 (1941), this Court held that a person acts under color of state law only when exercising power “possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the *318authority of state law.”5 In this case the Offender Advocate for Polk County assigned Martha Shepard to represent Russell Dodson in the appeal of his criminal conviction. This assignment entailed functions and obligations in no way dependent on state authority. From the moment of her appointment, Shepard became Dodson’s lawyer, and Dodson became Shepard’s client. Except for the source of payment, their relationship became identical to that existing between any other lawyer and client. “Once a lawyer has undertaken the representation of an accused, the duties and obligations are the same whether the lawyer is privately retained, appointed, or serving in a legal aid or defender program.” ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 4-3,9 (2d ed. 1980).6

Within the context of our legal system, the duties of a defense lawyer are those of a personal counselor and advocate. It is often said that lawyers are “officers of the court.” But the Courts of Appeals are agreed that a lawyer representing a client is not, by virtue of being an officer of the court, a state actor “under color of state law” within the meaning of § 1983.7 In our system a defense lawyer characteristically opposes the designated representatives of the State. The system assumes that adversarial testing will ultimately advance the public interest in truth and fairness. But it posits that a defense lawyer best serves the public, not by acting on behalf of the State or in concert with it, but rather by advanc*319ing “the undivided interests of his client.”8 This is essentially a private function, traditionally filled by retained counsel, for which state office and authority are not needed.9

H-1 » — 1

The respondent argues that a public defender’s employment relationship with the State, rather than his function, should determine whether he acts under color of state law. We take a different view.

A

In arguing that the employment relationship establishes that the public defender acts under color of state law, Dodson relies heavily on two cases in which this Court assumed that physicians, whose relationships with their patients have not traditionally depended on state authority, could be held liable under § 1983. See O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U. S. 563 (1975); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U. S. 97 (1976). These cases, he argues, are analytically identical to this one. Like the physicians in O’Connor and Estelle, a public defender is paid by the State. Further, like the institutionalized patients in *320those cases, an indigent convict is unable to choose the professional who will render him traditionally private services. These factors, it is argued, establish that public defenders— like physicians in state hospitals — act under color of state law and are amenable to suit under § 1983.

In our view O’Connor and Estelle are distinguishable from this case. O’Connor involved claims against a psychiatrist who served as the superintendent at a state mental hospital. Although a physician with traditionally private obligations to his patients, he was sued in his capacity as a state custodian and administrator. Unlike a lawyer, the administrator of a state hospital owes no duty of “undivided loyalty” to his patients. On the contrary, it is his function to protect the interest of the public as well as that of his wards. Similarly, Estelle involved a physician who was the medical director of the Texas Department of Corrections and also the chief medical officer of a prison hospital. He saw his patients in a custodial as well as a medical capacity.

Because of their custodial and supervisory functions, the state-employed doctors in O’Connor and Estelle faced their employer in a very different posture than does a public defender. Institutional physicians assume an obligation to the mission that the State, through the institution, attempts to achieve. With the public defender it is different. As argued in the dissenting opinion in the Court of Appeals, it is the function of the public defender to enter “not guilty” pleas, move to suppress State’s evidence, object to evidence at trial, cross-examine State’s witnesses, and make closing arguments in behalf of defendants.10 All of these are adversarial functions. We find it peculiarly difficult to detect any color of state law in such activities.

B

Despite the public defender’s obligation to represent his clients against the State, Dodson argues — and the Court of Appeals concluded — that the status of the public defender *321differs materially from that of other defense lawyers. Because public defenders are paid by the State, it is argued that they are subject to supervision by persons with interests unrelated to those of indigent clients. Although the employment relationship is certainly a relevant factor, we find it insufficient to establish that a public defender acts under color of state law within the meaning of § 1983.

First, a public defender is not amenable to administrative direction in the same sense as other employees of the State. Administrative and legislative decisions undoubtedly influence the way a public defender does his work. State decisions may determine the quality of his law library or the size of his caseload. But a defense lawyer is not, and by the nature of his function cannot be, the servant of an administrative superior. Held to the same standards of competence and integrity as a private lawyer, see Moore v. United States, 432 F. 2d 730 (CA3 1970), a public defender works under canons of professional responsibility that mandate his exercise of independent judgment on behalf of the client. “A lawyer shall not permit a person who recommends, employs, or pays him to render legal services for another to direct or regulate his professional judgment in rendering such legal services.” DR 5-107 (B), ABA Code of Professional Responsibility (1976).11

Second, and equally important, it is the constitutional obligation of the State to respect the professional independence *322of the public defenders whom it engages.12 This Court’s decision in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335 (1963), established the right of state criminal defendants to the “ ‘guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against [them].”’ Id., at 345, quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45, 69 (1932). Implicit in the concept of a “guiding hand” is the assumption that counsel will be free of state control. There can be no fair trial unless the accused receives the services of an effective and independent advocate. See, e. g., Gideon v. Wainwright, supra; Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U. S. 475 (1978). At least in the absence of pleading and proof to the contrary, we therefore cannot assume that Polk County, having employed public defenders to satisfy the State’s obligations under Gideon v. Wainwright, has attempted to control their action in a manner inconsistent with the principles on which Gideon rests.13

C

The respondent urges a different view of the public defender’s relationships to his clients and to the State. Whatever *323their ethical obligations, public defenders do not, he argues, characteristically extend their clients the same undivided loyalty tendered by privately retained attorneys. In support of this argument Dodson notes that the public defender moved to be dismissed from his case against the client’s wishes. Dodson claims to have suffered prejudice from this act. He insists that such action would not have been taken by a privately retained attorney.

Dodson’s argument assumes that a private lawyer would have borne no professional obligation to refuse to prosecute a frivolous appeal. This is error. In claiming that a public defender is peculiarly subject to divided loyalties, Dodson confuses a lawyer’s ethical obligations to the judicial system with an allegiance to the adversary interests of the State in a criminal prosecution. Although a defense attorney has a duty to advance all colorable claims and defenses, the canons of professional ethics impose limits on permissible advocacy. It is the obligation of any lawyer — whether privately retained or publicly appointed — not to clog the courts with frivolous motions or appeals.14 Dodson has no legitimate complaint that his lawyer refused to do so.

*324As a matter of empirical fact, it may or may not be true that the professional obligation to withdraw from frivolous appeals will be invoked with disproportionate frequency in cases involving indigent prisoners. The recent burgeoning of postconviction remedies has undoubtedly subjected the legal system to unprecedented strains, including increased demands for legal assistance.15 The State of Iowa has responded by authorizing the provision of greater representation than the Constitution requires. Its system of public defenders contemplates the extension of legal assistance through the various tiers of postconviction review, incorporating only the general ethical limitation that counsel should withdraw from frivolous cases.16

In this context Dodson argues that public defenders making withdrawal decisions are viewed by indigent prisoners as hostile state actors. We think there is little justification for this view, if indeed it is widely held.17

<

In concluding that Shepard did not act under color of state law in exercising her independent professional judgment in a criminal proceeding, we do not suggest that a public defender *325never acts in that role. In Branti v. Finkel, 445 U. S. 507 (1980), for example, we found that a public defender so acted when making hiring and firing decisions on behalf of the State. It may be — although the question is not present in this case — that a public defender also would act under color of state law while performing certain administrative and possibly investigative functions. Cf. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U. S. 409, 430-431, and n. 33 (1976). And of course we intimate no views as to a public defender’s liability for malpractice in an appropriate case under state tort law. See Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U. S. 193, 198 (1979).18 With respect to Dodson’s §1983 claims against Shepard, we decide only that a public defender does not act under color of state law when performing a lawyer’s traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding.19 Because it was based on such activities, the complaint against Shepard must be dismissed.

V

In his complaint in the District Court, Dodson also asserted § 1983 claims against the Offender Advocate, Polk County, and the Polk County Board of Supervisors.' Section 1983 will not support a claim based on a respondeat superior theory of liability. Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U. S. 658, 694 (1978). To the extent that Dodson’s claims rest on this basis, they fail to present a federal claim.

*326The Court of Appeals apparently read Dodson’s pro se complaint as susceptible of another construction. It found an actionable claim in the bald allegation that Shepard had injured him while acting pursuant to administrative “rules and procedures for . . . handling criminal appeals” and that her employers were therefore responsible for her actions. 628 F. 2d, at 1108. We also have noted an allegation in respondent’s complaint that the county “retains and maintains, advocates out of law school” who have on numerous occasions moved to withdraw from appeals of criminal convictions.

The question is whether either allegation describes a constitutional tort actionable under § 1983. We conclude not. In Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, supra, we held that official policy must be “the moving force of the constitutional violation” in order to establish the liability of a government body under §1983. Id., at 694. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U. S. 362, 370-377 (1976) (general allegation of administrative negligence fails to state a constitutional claim cognizable under § 1983). In this case the respondent failed to allege any policy that arguably violated his rights under the Sixth, Eighth, or Fourteenth Amendments. He did assert that assistant public defenders refused to prosecute certain appeals on grounds of their frivolity. But a policy of withdrawal from frivolous cases would not violate the Constitution. Anders v. California, 386 U. S. 738 (1967). And respondent argued the existence of no impermissible policy pursuant to which the withdrawals might have occurred. Respondent further asserted that he personally was deprived of a Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel. Again, however, he failed to allege that this deprivation was caused by any constitutionally forbidden rule or procedure.

When Dodson’s complaint is viewed against the standards of our cases, even in light of the sympathetic pleading requirements applicable to pro se petitioners, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U. S. 519 (1972) (per curiam), we do not believe *327he has alleged unconstitutional action by the Offender Advocate, Polk County, or the Polk County Board of Supervisors. Accordingly, his claims against them must be dismissed.

HH >

For the reasons stated in this opinion, the decision of the Court of Appeals is

Reversed.

Chief Justice Burger,

concurring.

I join the Court’s opinion, but it is important to emphasize that in providing counsel for an accused the governmental participation is very limited. Under Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335 (1963), and Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U. S. 25 (1972), the government undertakes only to provide a professionally qualified advocate wholly independent of the government. It is the independence from governmental control as to how the assigned task is to be performed that is crucial. The advocate, as an officer of the court which issued the commission to practice, owes an obligation to the court to repudiate any external effort to direct how the obligations to the client are to be carried out. The obligations owed by the attorney to the client are defined by the professional codes, not by the governmental entity from which the defense advocate’s compensation is derived. Disciplinary Rule 5-107 (B) of the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility* succinctly states the rule:

*328“(B) A lawyer shall not permit a person who recommends, employs, or pays him to render legal services for another to direct or regulate his professional judgment in rendering such legal services.”

Moreover, it is elementary that every advocate has an obligation to eschew proceedings considered to be professionally improper or irresponsible. Once counsel in this case reached a considered judgment on the merits of the claim sought to be put forward, her actions were consistent with the highest traditions of the Bar.

Justice Blackmun,

dissenting.

One perhaps should be particularly circumspect when he finds himself in solitary dissent. See Commissioner v. “Americans United” Inc., 416 U. S. 752, 763 (1974) (dissenting opinion). On careful reflection, however, I am convinced that my position is a valid one, and I therefore set forth my views in opposition to those of the Court.

When a full-time state employee, working in an office fully funded and extensively regulated by the State and acting to fulfill a state obligation, violates a person’s constitutional rights, the Court consistently has held that the employee acts “under color of” state law, within the meaning and reach of 42 U. S. C. § 1983. Because I conclude that the Court’s decision in this case is contrary to its prior rulings on the meaning of “under color of” state law, and because the Court charts new territory by adopting a functional test in determining liability under the statute, I respectfully dissent.

I

The Court holds for the first time today that a government official’s “employment relationship” is no more than a “relevant factor” in determining whether he acts under color of state law within the meaning of § 1983. Ante, at 321. Only *329last Term, in Parrott v. Taylor, 451 U. S. 527 (1981), the Court noted that defendant-prison officials unquestionably satisfied the under-color-of-state-law requirement because they “were, after all, state employees in positions of considerable authority.” Id., at 535-536. Thus began, and ended, the Court’s discussion of the color-of-law question in that case. As in Taylor, the county employee sued in this action presumptively acts under color of state law. See also Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U. S. 149, 157, n. 5 (1978).

The definition of “under color of” state law relied upon by the Court here and articulated in United States v. Classic, 313 U. S. 299 (1941), requires that the defendants in a § 1983 action have committed the challenged acts “in the course of their performance of duties” and have misused power “possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law . . . .” Id., at 325-326. See also Screws v. United States, 325 U. S. 91, 110 (1945) (plurality opinion).

Respondent’s allegations place this case squarely within both components of that definition. Respondent challenges action taken by petitioner Shepard, a full-time county employee, while acting in her official capacity and while exercising her responsibilities pursuant to Iowa law. See generally Iowa Code §§336A.3.2, 336A.6 (1981). The Court implicitly concedes that the Offender Advocate’s assignment of Shepard to handle respondent’s appeal was action under color of law. But the Court then fails to recognize that it was by virtue of that assignment that Shepard had the authority to represent respondent and to seek permission to withdraw as his counsel, thereby allegedly violating his constitutional rights. The authority of a privately retained attorney to represent his clients is derived from the client’s selection of the lawyer. A public defender’s power, however, is possessed by virtue of the State’s selection of the attorney and his official employment.

*330The Court insists that public defenders, unlike other state employees, are free from state control because they are not subject to administrative direction — both because ethical standards require that their professional judgment not be sacrificed to the interests of their employers and because the State is obligated to provide indigent defendants with independent advocates.1 This distinction ignores both precedent and reality. The Court long has held that a state official acts under color of law when the State does not authorize, or even know of, his conduct. See, e. g., Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U. S. 144, 152 (1970); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167 (1961). That the State did not instruct Shepard to withdraw from respondent’s case is therefore irrelevant to the question whether she acted under color of state law in so doing.

Moreover, the present case is indistinguishable from Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U. S. 97 (1976). There the Court held that a prison doctor’s deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s medical needs is prohibited by the Eighth Amendment and may be the subject of a § 1983 claim. The prisoner’s § 1983 *331complaint in Gamble stated claims against Dr. Gray in his capacity both as medical director for the Texas Department of Corrections and as treating physician. Gray was sued because he allegedly had given the plaintiff substandard medical care — the doctor’s duty to the public and his custodial and supervisory functions were not at issue.2 If the Court had determined that Gray acted under color of state law only in his capacity as a custodian and administrator, it would have dismissed the claims against him for want of subject-matter jurisdiction, rather than on the merits.

The Court today holds that a public defender cannot act under color of state law because of his independent ethical obligations to his client. Yet Gamble cannot be distinguished on this ground. An individual physician has a professional and ethical obligation to his patient just as an attorney has to his client. Like a public defender, an institutional doctor’s responsibilities to a patient may conflict with institutional policies and practices. Moreover, Dr. Gray was fulfilling the State’s duty to supply medical care to prison inmates; similarly, the public defender is dedicated to satisfying the State’s obligation to provide representation to indigent defendants. Finally, like respondent, who had no say in the selection of Shepard as his attorney, inmate Gamble had no role in the choice of Gray as his doctor. The Gamble Court did not find that color of state law evaporated in the face of a professional’s independent ethical obligations. I cannot see why this case is different.

As is demonstrated by the pervasive involvement of the county in the operations of the Offender Advocate’s Office, *332the Court, in my view, unduly minimizes the influence that the government actually has over the public defender. The public defender is not merely paid by the county; he is totally dependent financially on the County Board of Supervisors, which fixes the compensation for the public defender and his staff and provides the office with equipment and supplies. See Iowa Code §§336A.5, 336A.9 (1981).

The Board likewise is statutorily empowered to determine “indigency” and to prescribe the number of assistant attorneys and other staff members considered necessary for the public defender. See §§336A.4, 336A.5. The county’s control over the size of and funding for the public defender’s office, as well as over the number of potential clients, effectively dictates the size of an individual attorney’s caseload and influences substantially the amount of time the attorney is able to devote to each case. The public defender’s discretion in handling individual cases — and therefore his ability to provide effective assistance to his clients — is circumscribed to an extent not experienced by privately retained attorneys. See, e. g., Robinson v. Bergstrom, 579 F. 2d 401, 402-403 (CA7 1978) (public defender delayed five and one-half years in filing appellate brief because of “an error in his judgment regarding his caseload,” which was 600 to 900 cases per year). Similarly, authority over the appointment of the public defender and his staff, see Iowa Code §§336A.3, 336A.5 (1981), gives the State substantial influence over the quality of the representation indigents receive.

In addition, the public defender is directed to file an annual report with the judges of the district court of any county he serves, the State’s Attorney General, and each county’s Board of Supervisors, setting forth in detail all cases handled by the defender’s office during the preceding year. §336A. 8. This requirement suggests that the government has some supervisory control over the public defender’s office, or at least that the public defender will be wary of antagonizing the officials to whom he must report, and to *333whom he owes his appointment and the very existence of the office. See §§336A.3, 336A.1. And surely the public defender’s staff must conform to whatever policies and regulations the office or the State imposes, including those aimed at ensuring the effectiveness of representation. In this case, for example, while the county may not have directed petitioner Shepard to withdraw from respondent’s case,3 it certainly could have established general guidelines describing the factors a public defender should consider in determining which appeals are frivolous and the proper treatment of such appeals.4

On the basis of the Court’s opinion in Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U. S. 97 (1976), and the county’s pervasive involvement with the Offender Advocate’s Office in this case, I necessarily conclude that the presumption that a state employee acts *334under color of state law when exercising his official duties is not overridden by the public defender’s ethical obligations to his client.5

II

Although holding that petitioner Shepard may not be held liable under § 1983 for withdrawing from respondent’s appeal, the Court limits its ruling to cases where the public defender performs “a lawyer’s traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding.” Ante, at 325. The Court appears to concede that a public defender may act under color of state law when performing unspecified administrative and investigative functions, or even when acting as an advocate — if his conduct is “nontraditional,” or if the plaintiff pleads and proves that the State influenced the attorney’s representation. See ante, at 325, and n. 19, and 322. These attempts to draw distinctions based on function are unconvincing.

*335The Court never before has held that a government employee acts under color of state law while performing some of his official duties but not while performing others. The Court drew no such distinctions in Estelle v. Gamble, supra, although it could have adopted the Court’s approach today and held that an institutional physician acts under color of state law when acting in his custodial and administrative roles, but not when treating a patient. I can only conclude that the Court creates this artificial distinction in order to avoid a conflict with Branti v. Finkel, 445 U. S. 507 (1980), where the Court did not pause to question whether the defendant-public defender acted under color of state law.

Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U. S. 409 (1976), cited by the Court, ante, at 325, does not support such line-drawing. Based on policy considerations that are inapplicable here, see n. 8, infra, the Court held in Imbler that the prosecutor enjoys absolute immunity for actions taken in his role as an advocate. The Court refused to decide, however, whether the same policies require immunity for prosecutors acting in their administrative or investigative roles. Not only did the Imbler Court therefore fail to endorse the functional test adopted here, but it pointed to the difficulties it foresaw in implementing such a test. See 424 U. S., at 431, n. 33.

*336Moreover, the question of immunity — what type of affirmative defense is to be afforded a state official sued under § 1983 — is completely different from the issue whether an employee acts under color of state law — a determination that goes to a federal court’s subject-matter jurisdiction over a complaint. If a defendant does not act under color of state law, a federal court has no power to entertain a § 1983 complaint against him. The immunity doctrine, which is based on common-law traditions and policy considerations, is a defense that must be pleaded and is not relevant to a court’s power to consider the case. Even officials protected by absolute immunity act under color of state law, and Imbler did not indicate to the contrary; in fact, absolute immunity protects a prosecutor from § 1983 liability only as long as his actions are within the scope of the immunity. See Imbler, 424 U. S., at 419, n. 13. The Court nowhere suggested in Imbler that the functional test could properly be used in any other context.

The Court also disclaims any intent to disturb cases in which public defenders have been prosecuted under the criminal counterpart of §1983, 18 U. S. C. §242, for extorting payment from clients’ friends or relatives, ante, at 325, n. 19, citing United States v. Senak, 477 F. 2d 304 (CA7), cert. denied, 414 U. S. 856 (1973), apparently because the Court does not consider such conduct a “traditional” function of an attorney.6 Yet the Court of Appeals’ holding in Senak that the attorney acted under color of law is inconsistent with the *337Court’s line-drawing here.7 As the final loophole, the Court apparently leaves open the possibility that an indigent defendant could plead and prove that the State so influenced the public defender assigned to his case as to make the public defender liable under § 1983. See ante, at 322. What type of state intervention is sufficient, and how a plaintiff is supposed to allege such facts before discovery, are not specified.

In essence, the Court appears to be holding a public defender exempt from § 1983 liability only when the alleged injury is ineffective assistance of counsel. Not only is it disturbing to see the Court adopt a hierarchy of constitutional rights for purposes of § 1983 actions, but such an approach will be extremely difficult to implement. I envision the Court’s functional analysis as having one of two results— both, in my view, unfortunate. If the federal courts in effect adopt a per se rule and dismiss all § 1983 complaints against public defenders, the most egregious behavior by a public defender, even if unquestionably the result of pressures by the State, will not be cognizable under § 1983. Alternatively, the courts may attempt diligently to implement the Court’s ruling and dismiss only those § 1983 claims based on the public defender’s “traditional” functions as an advocate. The outcome then, I fear, will be lengthy and involved hearings on the merits to determine whether the court has subject-matter jurisdiction — the very result the Court wishes to avoid.

hH I — I

I am sympathetic with the Court’s desire to protect public defenders, who represent indigent defendants in good faith, from a §1983 suit by every dissatisfied client. But the Court’s concern for public defender programs — and its seeming hostility to the merits of respondent’s claims, see ante, at 323-324, and n. 17 — do not justify the approach taken by the *338Court today. To recognize that public defenders act under color of state law would not transform every legal malpractice into a constitutional violation. Cf. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U. S., at 106-106. Presumably, some immunity would be provided public defenders sued under § 1983.8 The Court always has seen fit before to rely on immunity and the procedures available for dismissing meritless complaints in order to protect state officials. See, e. g., Butz v. Economou, 438 U. S. 478, 507-508 (1978); cf. Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U. S. 193, 200, n. 17 (1979). I would do the same here.

I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

Justice White

delivered the opinion of the Court.

In January 1973, a judge of the 229th District Court of Duval County, Tex., enjoined the production of minerals from certain oil leases owned by respondents. In June 1975, the injunction was dissolved by an appellate court as having been illegally issued. Respondents then filed a complaint in the United States District Court purporting to state a cause of action for damages under 42 U. S. C. § 1983. 1 Defendants were the Duval County Ranch Co., Inc., which had obtained the injunction, the sole owner of the corporation, the judge who entered the injunction, and the two individual *26 sureties on the injunction bond, one of whom is now petitioner in this Court. Essentially, the claim was that the injunction had been corruptly issued as the result of a conspiracy between the judge and the other defendants, thus causing a deprivation of property, i. e., two years of oil production, without due process of law.

All defendants moved to dismiss, the judge asserting judicial immunity and the other defendants urging dismissal for failure to allege action “under color” of state law, a necessary component of a § 1983 cause of action. The District Court concluded that because the injunction was a judicial act within the jurisdiction of the state court, the judge was immune from liability in a § 1983 suit, whether or not the injunction had issued as the result of a corrupt conspiracy. Relying on Haldane v. Chagnon, 345 F. 2d 601 (CA9 1965), the District Court also ruled that with the dismissal of the judge the remaining defendants could not be said to have conspired under color of state law within the meaning of § 1983. The action against them was accordingly dismissed “for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”

In a per curiam opinion, a panel of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, agreeing that the judge was immune from suit and that because “the remaining defendants, who are all private citizens, did not conspire with any person against whom a valid § 1983 suit can be stated,” Sparks v. Duval County Ranch Co., 588 F. 2d 124, 126 (1979), existing authorities in the Circuit required dismissal of the claims against these defendants as well. 2 The case was reconsidered en banc, prior Circuit authority was overruled and the District Court judgment was reversed insofar as it had dismissed claims against the defendants other than the judge. Sparks v. Duval County Ranch Co., 604 F. 2d *27 976 (1979). The court ruled that there was no good reason in law, logic, or policy for conferring immunity on private persons who persuaded the immune judge to exercise his jurisdiction corruptly. Because the judgment below was inconsistent with the rulings of other Courts of Appeals 3 and involves an important issue, we granted the petition for certiorari. 445 U. S. 942. We now affirm.

Based on the doctrine expressed in Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335 (1872), this Court has consistently adhered to the rule that “judges defending against § 1983 actions enjoy absolute immunity from damages liability for acts performed in their judicial capacities. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U. S. 547 (1967); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U. S. 349 (1978).” Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union, 446 U. S. 719, 734-735 (1980). The courts below concluded that the judicial immunity doctrine required dismissal of the § 1983 action against the judge who issued the challenged injunction, and as the case comes to us, the judge has been properly dismissed from the suit on immunity grounds. It does not follow, however, that the action against the private parties accused of conspiring with the judge must also be dismissed.

As the Court of Appeals correctly understood our cases to hold, to act “under color of” state law for § 1983 purposes does not require that the defendant be an officer of the State. It is enough that he is a willful participant in joint action with the State or its agents. Private persons, jointly engaged *28 with state officials in the challenged action, are acting “under color” of law for purposes of § 1983 actions. Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U. S. 144, 152 (1970); United States v. Price, 383 U. S. 787, 794 (1966). 4 Of course, merely resorting to the courts and being on the winning side of a lawsuit does not make a party a co-conspirator or a joint actor with the judge. But here the allegations were that an official act of the defendant judge was the product of a corrupt conspiracy involving bribery of the judge. Under these allegations, the private parties conspiring with the judge were acting under color of state law; and it is of no consequence in this respect that the judge himself is immune from damages liability. Immunity does not change the character of the, judge’s action or that of his co-conspirators. 5 Indeed, his *29 immunity is dependent on the challenged conduct being an official judicial act within his statutory jurisdiction, broadly construed. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U. S. 349, 356 (1978); Bradley v. Fisher, supra, at 352, 357. Private parties who corruptly conspire with a judge in connection with such conduct are thus acting under color of state law within the meaning of § 1983 as it has been construed in our prior cases. The complaint in this case was not defective for failure to allege that the private defendants were acting under color of state law, and the Court of Appeals was correct in rejecting its prior case authority to the contrary.

Petitioner nevertheless insists that unless he is held to have an immunity derived from that of the judge, the latter’s official immunity will be seriously eroded. We are unpersuaded. The immunities of state officials that we have recognized for purposes of § 1983 are the equivalents of those that were recognized at common law, Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U. S. 622, 637-638 (1980); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U. S. 409, 417 (1976); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U. S. 547, 554 (1967), and the burden is on the official claiming immunity to demonstrate his entitlement. Cf. Buts v. Economou, 438 U. S. 478, 506 (1978). Thus, in Owen v. City of Independence, supra, a municipality’s claim that it could assert the immunity of its officers and agents in a § 1983 damages action was rejected since there was no basis for such a right at common law. Here, petitioner has pointed to nothing indicating that, historically, judicial immunity insulated from damages liability those private persons who corruptly conspire with the judge. 6

In Gravel v. United States, 408 U. S. 606 (1972), we recognized that the Speech or Debate Clause conferred im *30 munity upon a Senator’s aide as well as the Senator, but only in those situations where the conduct of the aide would be a protected legislative act if performed by the Senator himself. Id., at 618. Here, there could be no claim that petitioner or any of the other private parties was actually performing a judicial act or was in any sense an official aide of the judge. Not surprisingly, petitioner does not argue that judges must conspire with private parties in order that judicial duties may be properly accomplished.

It is urged that if petitioner and other private co-conspirators of the judge are to be subject to § 1983 damages actions and if a case such as this is to go to trial, the charge of conspiracy and judicial corruption will necessarily be aired and decided, the consequence being that the judge, though not a party and immune from liability, will be heavily involved, very likely as a witness forced to testify about and defend his judicial conduct. It is true that, based on the Speech or Debate Clause, we have held that Members of Congress need not respond to questions about their legislative acts, Gravel v. United States, supra, at 616-617; and, in general, the scope of state legislative immunity for purposes of § 1983 has been patterned after immunity under the Speech or Debate Clause. Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union, 446 U. S., at 732-734. But there is no similar constitutionally based privilege immunizing judges from being required to testify about their judicial conduct in third-party litigation. Nor has any demonstration been made that historically the doctrine of judicial immunity not only protected the judge from liability but also excused him from responding as a witness when his co-conspirators are sued. Even if the judge were excused from testifying, it would not follow that actions against private parties must be dismissed.

Of course, testifying takes time and energy that otherwise might be devoted to judicial duties; and, if cases such as this *31 survive initial challenge and go to trial, the judge’s integrity and that of the judicial process may be at stake in such cases. But judicial immunity was not designed to insulate the judiciary from all aspects of public accountability. Judges are immune from § 1983 damages actions, but they are subject to criminal prosecutions as are other citizens. O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U. S. 488, 503 (1974). Neither are we aware of any rule generally exempting a judge from the normal obligation to respond as a witness when he has information material to a criminal or civil proceeding. 7 Cf. United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 705-707 (1974).

Judicial immunity arose because it was in the public interest to have judges who were at liberty to exercise their independent judgment about the merits of a case without fear of being mulcted for damages should an unsatisfied litigant be able to convince another tribunal that the judge acted not only mistakenly but with malice and corruption. Pierson v. Ray, supra, at 554; Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall., at 349, 350, n. ‡. In terms of undermining a judge’s independence and his judicial performance, the concern that his conduct will be examined in a collateral proceeding against those with whom he allegedly conspired, a proceeding in which he cannot be held liable for damages and which he need not defend, is not of the same order of magnitude as the prospects of being a defendant in a damages action from complaint to verdict with the attendant possibility of being held liable for damages if the factfinder mistakenly upholds the charge of malice or of a corrupt conspiracy with others. These concerns are not insubstantial, either for the judge or for the public, but we agree with the Court of Appeals that the potential harm to the public from denying immunity to private co-conspirators *32 is outweighed by the benefits of providing a remedy against those private persons who participate in subverting the judicial process and in so doing inflict injury on other persons.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is

Affirmed.

Justice Blackmun

delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case presents the question whether a physician who is under contract with the State to provide medical services to inmates at a state-prison hospital on a part-time basis acts “under color of state law,” within the meaning of 42 U. S. C. § 1983, when he treats an inmate.

Petitioner, Quincy West, tore his left Achilles tendon in 1983 while playing volleyball at Odom Correctional Center, the Jackson, N. C., state prison in which he was incarcerated. A physician under contract to provide medical care to Odom inmates examined petitioner and directed that he be *44transferred to Raleigh for orthopedic consultation at Central Prison Hospital, the acute-care medical facility operated by the State for its more than 17,500 inmates. Central Prison Hospital has one full-time staff physician, and obtains additional medical assistance under “Contracts for Professional Services” between the State and area physicians.

Respondent, Samuel Atkins, M. D., a private physician, provided orthopedic services to inmates pursuant to one such contract. Under it, Doctor Atkins was paid approximately $52,000 annually to operate two “clinics” each week at Central Prison Hospital, with additional amounts for surgery.1 Over a period of several months, he treated West’s injury by placing his leg in a series of casts. West alleges that although the doctor acknowledged that surgery would be necessary, he refused to schedule it, and that he eventually discharged West while his ankle was still swollen and painful, and his movement still impeded. Because West was a prisoner in “close custody,” he was not free to employ or elect to see a different physician of his own choosing.2

*45Pursuant to 42 U. S. C. § 1983,3 West, proceeding pro se, commenced this action against Doctor Atkins4 in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina for violation of his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.5 West alleged that Atkins was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs, by failing to provide adequate treatment.

Relying on a decision of its controlling court in Calvert v. Sharp, 748 F. 2d 861 (CA4 1984), cert. denied, 471 U. S. 1132 (1985), the District Court granted Doctor Atkins’ motion for summary judgment. In Calvert, the Fourth Circuit held that a private orthopedic specialist, employed by a nonprofit professional corporation which provided services under contract to the inmates at the Maryland House of Corrections *46and the Maryland Penitentiary, did not act “under color of state law,” a jurisdictional requisite for a § 1983 action. Because Doctor Atkins was a “contract physician,” the District Court concluded that he, too, was not acting under color of state law when he treated West’s injury. App. 37.

A panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit vacated the District Court’s judgment. 799 F. 2d 923 (1986). Rather than considering if Calvert could be distinguished, the panel remanded the case to the District Court for an assessment whether the record permitted a finding of deliberate indifference to a serious medical need, a showing necessary for West ultimately to prevail on his Eighth Amendment claim. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U. S. 97, 104 (1976).

On en banc rehearing, however, a divided Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court’s dismissal of West’s complaint. 815 F. 2d 993 (1987). In declining to overrule its decision in Calvert, the majority concluded:

“Thus the clear and practicable principle enunciated by the Supreme Court [in Polk County v. [Dodson,] 454 U. S. 312 (1981)], and followed in Calvert, is that a professional, when acting within the bounds of traditional professional discretion and judgment, does not act under color of state law, even where, as in Dodson, the professional is a full-time employee of the state. Where the professional exercises custodial or supervisory authority, which is to say that he is not acting in his professional capacity, then a § 1983 claim can be established, provided the requisite nexus to the state is proved.” 815 F. 2d, at 995 (footnote omitted).

The Court of Appeals acknowledged that this rule limits “the range of professionals subject to an Estelle action.” Ibid.6

*47The dissent in the Court of Appeals offered three grounds for holding that service rendered by a prison doctor— whether a permanent member of a prison medical staff, or under limited contract with the prison — constitutes action under color of state law for purposes of § 1983. First, the dissent concluded that prison doctors are as much “state actors” as are other prison employees, finding no significant difference between Doctor Atkins and the physician-employees assumed to be state actors in Estelle, and in O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U. S. 563 (1975). See 815 F. 2d, at 997-998. Second, the dissent concluded that the “public function” rationale applied because, in the prison context, medical care is within “the exclusive prerogative of the State,” in that the State is obligated to provide medical services for its inmates and has complete control over the circumstances and sources of a prisoner’s medical treatment. Id., at 998-999, citing Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U. S. 991, 1011 (1982). Finally, the dissent reasoned that the integral role the prison physician plays within the prison medical system qualifies his actions as under color of state law. 815 F. 2d, at 999, citing United States v. Price, 383 U. S. 787, 794 (1966) (“[W]illful participant in joint activity with the State or its agents” may be liable under §1983); Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U. S. 922, 931-932 (1982); and Tower v. Glover, 467 U. S. 914 (1984).

The Fourth Circuit’s ruling conflicts with decisions of the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, Ancata v. Prison Health Services, Inc., 769 F. 2d 700 (1985), and Ort v. Pinchback, 786 F. 2d 1105 (1986), which are to the effect that a physician who contracts with the State to provide medical care to prison inmates, even if employed by a private entity, acts under color of state law for purposes of §1983.7 We *48granted certiorari to resolve the conflict. 484 U. S. 912 (1987).

II

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U. S. 527, 535 (1981) (overruled in part on other grounds, Daniels v. Williams, 474 U. S. 327, 330-331 (1986)); Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U. S. 149, 155 (1978). Petitioner West sought to fulfill the first requirement by alleging a violation of his rights secured by the Eighth Amendment under Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U. S. 97 (1976). There the Court held that deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious medical needs, whether by a prison doctor or a prison guard, is prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. Id., at 104-105. The adequacy of West’s allegation and the sufficiency of his showing on this element of his § 1983 cause of action are not contested here.8 The only issue be*49fore us is whether petitioner has established the second essential element — that respondent acted under color of state law in treating West’s injury.

A

The traditional definition of acting under color of state law requires that the defendant in a § 1983 action have exercised power “possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law.” United States v. Classic, 313 U. S. 299, 326 (1941). Accord, Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167, 187 (1961) (adopting Classic standard for purposes of § 1983) (overruled in part on other grounds, Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U. S. 658, 695-701 (1978)); Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U. S. 312, 317-318 (1981); id., at 329 (dissenting opinion). In Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., supra, the Court made clear that if a defendant’s conduct satisfies the state-action requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment, “that conduct [is] also action under color of state law and will support a suit under § 1983.” Id., at 935. Accord, Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U. S. 830, 838 (1982); United States v. Price, 383 U. S., at 794, n. 7. In such circumstances, the defendant’s alleged infringement of the plaintiff’s federal rights is “fairly attributable to the State.” Lugar, 457 U. S., at 937.

To constitute state action, “the deprivation must be caused by the exercise of some right or privilege created by the State ... or by a person for whom the State is responsible,” and “the party charged with the deprivation must be a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor.” Ibid. “[S]tate employment is generally sufficient to render the defendant a state actor.” Id., at 936, n. 18; see id., at 937. It is firmly *50established that a defendant in a § 1983 suit acts under color of state law when he abuses the position given to him by the State. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S., at 172. Thus, generally, a public employee acts under color of state law while acting in his official capacity or while exercising his responsibilities pursuant to state law. See, e. g., Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U. S., at 535-536; Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U. S. 144, 152 (1970). See also Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U. S., at 157, n. 5.

Indeed, Polk County v. Dodson, relied upon by the Court of Appeals, is the only case in which this Court has determined that a person who is employed by the State and who is sued under § 1983 for abusing his position in the performance of his assigned tasks was not acting under color of state law. The Court held that “a public defender does not act under color of state law when performing a lawyer’s traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding.” 454 U. S., at 325. In this capacity, the Court noted, a public defender differs from the typical government employee and state actor. While performing his duties, the public defender retains all of the essential attributes of a private attorney, including, most importantly, his “professional independence,” which the State is constitutionally obliged to respect. Id., at 321-322. A criminal lawyer’s professional and ethical obligations require him to act in a role independent of and in opposition to the State. Id., at 318-319, 320. The Court accordingly concluded that when representing an indigent defendant in a state criminal proceeding, the public defender does not act under color of state law for purposes of § 1983 because he “is not acting on behalf of the State; he is the State’s adversary.” Id., at 323, n. 13. See also Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U. S., at 936, n. 18.

B

We disagree with the Court of Appeals and respondent that Polk County dictates a conclusion that respondent did *51not act under color of state law in providing medical treatment to petitioner. In contrast to the public defender, Doctor Atkins’ professional and ethical obligation to make independent medical judgments did not set him in conflict with the State and other prison authorities. Indeed, his relationship with other prison authorities was cooperative. “Institutional physicians assume an obligation to the mission that the State, through the institution, attempts to achieve.” Polk County, 454 U. S., at 320. The Manual governing prison health care in North Carolina’s institutions, which Doctor Atkins was required to observe, declares: “The provision of health care is a joint effort of correctional administrators and health care providers, and can be achieved only through mutual trust and cooperation.”9 Similarly, the American Medical Association Standards for Health Services in Prisons (1979) provide that medical personnel and other prison officials are to act in “close cooperation and coordination” in a “joint effort.” Preface, at i; Standard 102, and Discussion. Doctor Atkins’ professional obligations certainly did not oblige him to function as “the State’s adversary.” Polk County, 454 U. S., at 323, n. 13. We thus find the proffered analogy between respondent and the public defender in Polk County unpersuasive.

Of course, the Court of Appeals did not perceive the adversarial role the defense lawyer plays in our criminal justice system as the decisive factor in the Polk County decision. The court, instead, appears to have misread Polk County as establishing the general principle that professionals do not act under color of state law when they act in their professional capacities. The court considered a professional not to be subject to suit under § 1983 unless he was exercising “custodial or supervisory” authority. 815 F. 2d, at 995. To the extent this Court in Polk County relied on the fact that the public defender is a “professional” in concluding that he *52was not engaged in state action, the case turned on the particular professional obligation of the criminal defense attorney to be an adversary of the State, not on the independence and integrity generally applicable to professionals as a class. Indeed, the Court of Appeals’ reading would be inconsistent with cases, decided before and since Polk County, in which this Court either has identified professionals as state actors, see, e. g., Tower v. Glover, 467 U. S. 914 (1984) (state public defenders), or has assumed that professionals are state actors in §1983 suits, see, e. g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U. S. 97 (1976) (medical director of state prison who was also the treating physician). See also Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U. S. 307, 322-323, and n. 30 (1982) (establishing standards to determine whether decisions of “professional” regarding treatment of involuntarily committed can create liability for a due process violation). Defendants are not removed from the purview of § 1983 simply because they are professionals acting in accordance with professional discretion and judgment.10

*53The Court of Appeals’ approach to determining who is subject to suit under §1983, wholeheartedly embraced by respondent, cannot be reconciled with this Court’s decision in Estelle, which demonstrates that custodial and supervisory functions are irrelevant to an assessment whether the particular action challenged was performed under color of state law. In Estelle, the inmate’s Eighth Amendment claim was brought against the physician-employee, Dr. Gray, in his capacity both as treating physician and as medical director of the state prison system. See 429 U. S., at 107. Gray was sued, however, solely on the basis of allegedly substandard medical treatment given to the plaintiff; his supervisory and custodial functions were not at issue. The Court’s opinion did not suggest that Gray had not acted under color of state law in treating the inmate.11 To the contrary, the infer*54ence to be drawn from Estelle is that the medical treatment of prison inmates by prison physicians is state action. The Court explicitly held that “indifference . . . manifested by prison doctors in their response to the prisoner’s needs . . . states a cause of action under § 1983.” Id., at 104-105; see id., at 104, n. 10 (citing with approval Courts of Appeals’ decisions holding prison doctors liable for Eighth Amendment claims brought under § 1983 without mention of supervisory and custodial duties). The Court of Appeals’ rationale would sharply undermine this holding.12

C

We now make explicit what was implicit in our holding in Estelle: Respondent, as a physician employed by North Carolina to provide medical services to state prison inmates, acted under color of state law for purposes of § 1983 when undertaking his duties in treating petitioner’s injury. Such conduct is fairly attributable to the State.

The Court recognized in Estelle: “An inmate must rely on prison authorities to treat his medical needs; if the authorities fail to do so, those needs will not be met.” 429 U. S., at 103. In light of this, the Court held that the State has a constitutional obligation, under the Eighth Amendment, to provide adequate medical care to those whom it has incarcerated. Id., at 104. See also Spicer v. Williamson, 191 N. C. 487, 490, 132 S. E. 291, 293 (1926) (common law requires *55North Carolina to provide medical care to its prison inmates), cited in Estelle, 429 U. S., at 104, n. 9. North Carolina employs physicians, such as respondent, and defers to their professional judgment, in order to fulfill this obligation. By virtue of this relationship, effected by state law, Doctor Atkins is authorized and obliged to treat prison inmates, such as West.13 He does so “clothed with the authority of state law.” United States v. Classic, 313 U. S., at 326. He is “a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor.” Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U. S., at 937. It is only those physicians authorized by the State to whom the inmate may turn. Under state law, the only medical care West could receive for his injury was that provided by the State. If Doctor Atkins misused his power by demonstrating deliberate indifference to West’s serious medical needs, the resultant deprivation was caused, in the sense relevant for state-action inquiry, by the State’s exercise of its right to punish West by incarceration and to deny him a venue independent of the State to obtain needed medical care.

The fact that the State employed respondent pursuant to a contractual arrangement that did not generate the same benefits or obligations applicable to other “state employees” does not alter the analysis. It is the physician’s function within the state system, not the precise terms of his employment, that determines whether his actions can fairly be at*56tributed to the State. Whether a physician is on the state payroll or is paid by contract, the dispositive issue concerns the relationship among the State, the physician, and the prisoner. Contracting out prison medical care does not relieve the State of its constitutional duty to provide adequate medical treatment to those in its custody, and it does not deprive the State’s prisoners of the means to vindicate their Eighth Amendment rights.14 The State bore an affirmative obligation to provide adequate medical care to West; the State delegated that function to respondent Atkins; and respondent voluntarily assumed that obligation by contract.

Nor does the fact that Doctor Atkins’ employment contract did not require him to work exclusively for the prison make him any less a state actor than if he performed those duties as a full-time, permanent member of the state prison medical staff. It is the physician’s function while working for the State, not the amount of time he spends in performance of those duties or the fact that he may be employed by others to perform similar duties, that determines whether he is acting under color of state law.15 In the State’s employ, respondent *57worked as a physician at the prison hospital fully vested with state authority to fulfill essential aspects of the duty, placed on the State by the Eighth Amendment and state law, to provide essential medical care to those the State had incarcerated. Doctor Atkins must be considered to be a state actor.

III

For the reasons stated above, we conclude that respondent’s delivery of medical treatment to West was state action fairly attributable to the State, and that respondent therefore acted under color of state law for purposes of §1983. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Ap*58peals and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Justice Scalia,

concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.

I agree with the opinion of the Court that respondent acted under color of state law for purposes of § 1988. I do not believe that a doctor who lacks supervisory or other penological duties can inflict “punishment” within the meaning of that term in the Eighth Amendment. Cf. Johnson v. Glick, 481 F. 2d 1028, 1031-1032 (CA2) (Friendly, J.), cert. denied sub nom. John v. Johnson, 414 U. S. 1033 (1973). I am also of the view, however, that a physician who acts on behalf of the State to provide needed medical attention to a person involuntarily in state custody (in prison or elsewhere) and prevented from otherwise obtaining it, and who causes physical harm to such a person by deliberate indifference, violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection against the deprivation of liberty without due process. See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U. S. 307, 315, 324 (1982) (dictum); see generally Daniels v. Williams, 474 U. S. 327, 331 (1986); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651, 672-674, and n. 41 (1977); Rochin v. California, 342 U. S. 165, 169-174 (1952); Johnson, supra, at 1032-1033. I note that petitioner’s pro se complaint merely claimed violation of his rights, and it is the courts that have specified which constitutional provision confers those rights.

Mr. Justice Brennan

delivered the opinion of the Court.

Respondent brought this suit in the District Court for the Southern District of Indiana on behalf of the estate of her deceased son, Joseph Jones, Jr., alleging that he suffered personal injuries from which he died because the petitioners, federal prison officials, violated his due process, equal protection, and Eighth Amendment rights.1 Asserting jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1331 (a), she claimed compensatory and punitive damages for the constitutional violations. Two questions are presented for decision: (1) Is a remedy available directly under the Constitution, given that respondent’s allegations could also support a suit against the United States *17under the Federal Tort Claims Act?2 And (2) if so, is survival of the cause of action governed by federal common law or by state statutes?

I

The District Court held that under Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U. S. 97 (1976), the allegations set out in note 1, supra, pleaded a violation of the Eighth Amendment’s proscription against infliction of cruel and unusual punishment,3 giving rise to a cause of action for damages under Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388 (1971). The court recognized that the decedent could have maintained this action if he had survived, but dismissed the complaint because in its view the damages remedy as a matter of federal law was limited to that provided by Indiana’s survivorship and wrongful-death laws and, as the court construed those laws, the damages available to Jones’ estate failed to meet § 1331 (a)’s $10,000 jurisdictional-amount requirement. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed that an Eighth Amendment violation was pleaded under Estelle and that a cause of action was stated under Bivens, but reversed the holding that § 1331 (a)’s jurisdictional-amount requirement was not met.4 Rather, the Court of Appeals held that *18§ 1331 (a) was satisfied because “whenever the relevant State survival statute would abate a Bivens-type action brought against defendants whose conduct results in death, the federal common law allows survival of the action.” 581 F. 2d 669, 675 (1978). The court reasoned that the Indiana law, if applied, would “subvert” “the policy of allowing complete vindication of constitutional rights” by making it “more advantageous for a tortfeasor to kill rather than to injure.” Id., at 674. We granted certiorari. 442 U. S. 940 (1979). We affirm.

^

Bivens established that the victims of a constitutional violation by a federal agent have a right to recover damages against the official in federal court despite the absence of any statute conferring such a right. Such a cause of action may be defeated in a particular case, however, in two situations. The first is when defendants demonstrate “special factors counselling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress.” 403 U. S., at 396; Davis v. Passman, 442 U. S. 228, 245 (1979). The second is when defendants show that Congress has provided an alternative remedy which it explicitly declared to be a substitute for recovery directly *19under the Constitution and viewed as equally effective. Bivens, supra, at 397; Davis v. Passman, supra, at 245-247.

Neither situation obtains in this case. First, the case involves no special factors counselling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress. Petitioners do not enjoy such independent status in our constitutional scheme as to suggest that judicially created remedies against them might be inappropriate. Davis v. Passman, supra, at 246. Moreover, even if requiring them to defend respondent’s suit might inhibit their efforts to perform their official duties, the qualified immunity accorded them under Butz v. Economou, 438 U. S. 478 (1978), provides adequate protection. See Davis v. Passman, supra, at 246.

Second, we have here no explicit congressional declaration that persons injured by federal officers’ violations of the Eighth Amendment may not recover money damages from the agents but must be remitted to another remedy, equally effective in the view of Congress. Petitioners point to nothing in the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) or its legislative history to show that Congress meant to pre-empt a Bivens remedy or to create an equally effective remedy for constitutional violations.5 FTCA was enacted long before Bivens was decided, but when Congress amended FTCA in 1974 to create a cause of action against the United States for intentional torts committed by federal law enforcement officers, 28 U. S. C. § 2680 (h), the congressional comments accompanying *20that amendment made it crystal clear that Congress views FTCA and Bivens as parallel, complementary causes of action:

“[AJfter the date of enactment of this measure, innocent individuals who are subjected to raids [like that in Bivens] will have a cause of action against the individual Federal agents and the Federal Government. Furthermore, this provision should be viewed as a counterpart to the Bivens case and its progenty [sic], in that it waives the defense of sovereign immunity so as to make the Government independently liable in damages for the same type of conduct that is alleged to have occurred in Bivens (and for which that case imposes liability upon the individual Government officials involved).” S. Rep. No. 93-588, p. 3 (1973) (emphasis supplied).

In the absence of a contrary expression from Congress, § 2680 (h) thus contemplates that victims of the kind of intentional wrongdoing alleged in this complaint shall have an action under FTCA against the United States as well as a Bivens action against the individual officials alleged to have infringed their constitutional rights.

This conclusion is buttressed by the significant fact that Congress follows the practice of explicitly stating when it means to make FTCA an exclusive remedy. See 38 U. S. C. §4116 (a), 42 U. S. C. §233 (a), 42 U. S. C. § 2458a, 10 U. S. C. § 1089 (a), and 22 U. S. C. §817 (a) (malpractice by certain Government, health personnel); 28 U. S. C. § 2679 (b) (operation of motor vehicles by federal employees); and 42 U. S. C. § 247b (k) (manufacturers of swine flu vaccine). Furthermore, Congress has not taken action on other bills that would expand the exclusivity of FTCA. See, e. g., S. 695, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); H. R. 2659, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); S. 3314, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).

Four additional factors, each suggesting that the Bivens remedy is more effective than the FTCA remedy, also support our conclusion that Congress did not intend to limit respond*21ent to an FTCA action. First, the Bivens remedy, in addition to compensating victims, serves a deterrent purpose. See Butz v. Economou, supra, at 505.6 Because the Bivens remedy is recoverable against individuals, it is a more effective deterrent than the FTCA remedy against the United States. It is almost axiomatic that the threat of damages has a deterrent effect,7 Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U. S. 409, 442 (1976) (White, J., concurring in judgment), surely particularly so when the individual official faces personal financial liability.

Petitioners argue that FTCA liability is a more effective deterrent because the individual employees responsible for the Government’s liability would risk loss of employment8 and because the Government would be forced to promulgate corrective policies. That argument suggests, however, that the superiors would not take the same actions when an employee is found personally liable for violation of a citizen’s constitutional rights. The more reasonable assumption is that responsible superiors are motivated not only by concern for the public fisc but also by concern for the Government’s integrity.

Second, our decisions, although not expressly addressing *22and deciding the question, indicate that punitive damages maybe awarded in a Bivens suit. Punitive damages are “a particular remedial mechanism normally available in the federal courts,” Bivens, 403 U. S., at 397, and are especially appropriate to redress the violation by a Government official of a citizen’s constitutional rights. Moreover, punitive damages are available in “a proper” § 1983 action, Carey v. Piphus, 435 U. S. 247, 257, n. 11 (1978) (punitive damages not awarded because District Court found defendants “did not act with a malicious intention to deprive respondents of their rights or to do them other injury”),9 and Butz v. Economou, suggests that the “constitutional design” would be stood on its head if federal officials did not face at least the same liability as state officials guilty of the same constitutional transgression. 438 U. S., at 504. But punitive damages in an FTCA suit are statutorily prohibited. 28 U. S. C. § 2674. Thus FTCA is that much less effective than a Bivens action as a deterrent to unconstitutional acts.

Third, a plaintiff cannot opt for a jury in an FTCA action, 28 U. S. C. § 2402, as he may in a Bivens suit.10 Petitioners argue that this is an irrelevant difference because juries have been biased against Bivens claimants. Reply Brief for Petitioners 7, and n. 6; Brief for Petitioners 30-31, n. 30. Significantly, however, they do not assert that judges trying the claims as FTCA actions would have been more receptive, and *23they cannot explain why the plaintiff should not retain the choice.

Fourth, an action under FTCA exists only if the State in which the alleged misconduct occurred would permit a cause of action for that misconduct to go forward. 28 U. S. C. § 1346 (b) (United States liable “in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred”). Yet it is obvious that the liability of federal officials for violations of citizens’ constitutional rights should be governed by uniform rules. See Part III, infra. The question whether respondent’s action for violations by federal officials of federal constitutional rights should be left to the vagaries of the laws of the several States admits of only a negative answer in the absence of a contrary congressional resolution.

Plainly FTCA is not a sufficient protector of the citizens’ constitutional rights, and without a clear congressional mandate we cannot hold that Congress relegated respondent exclusively to the FTCA remedy.

Ill

Bivens actions are a creation of federal law and, therefore, the question whether respondent’s action survived Jones’ death is a question of federal law. See Burks v. Lasker, 441 U. S. 471, 476 (1979). Petitioners, however, would have us fashion a federal rule of survivorship that incorporates the survivorship laws of the forum State, at least where the state law is not inconsistent with federal law. Respondent argues, on the other hand, that only a uniform federal rule of sur-vivorship is compatible with the goal of deterring federal officials from infringing federal constitutional rights in the manner alleged in respondent’s complaint. We agree with respondent. Whatever difficulty we might have resolving the question were the federal involvement less clear, we hold that only a uniform federal rule of survivorship will suffice to redress the constitutional deprivation here alleged and to protect against repetition of such conduct.

*24In short, we agree with and adopt the reasoning of the Court of Appeals, 581 F. 2d, at 674-675 (footnote omitted):

“The essentiality of the survival of civil rights claims for complete vindication of constitutional rights is buttressed by the need for uniform treatment of those claims, at least when they are against federal officials. As this very case illustrates, uniformity cannot be achieved if courts are limited to applicable state law. Here the relevant Indiana statute would not permit survival of the claim, while in Beard [v. Robinson, 563 F. 2d 331 (CA7 1977),] the Illinois statute permitted survival of the Bivens action. The liability of federal agents for violation of constitutional rights should not depend upon where the violation occurred. ... In sum, we hold that whenever the relevant state survival statute would abate a Bivens-type action brought against defendants whose conduct results in death, the federal common law allows survival of the action.”

Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U. S. 584 (1978), holding that a § 1983 action would abate in accordance with Louisiana survivorship law is not to the contrary. There the plaintiff’s death was not caused by the acts of the defendants upon which the suit was based.11 Moreover, Robertson expressly *25recognized that to prevent frustrations of the deterrence goals of § 1983 (which in part also underlie Bivens actions, see Part II, supra) “[a] state official contemplating illegal activity must always be prepared to face the prospect of a i 1983 action being filed against him.” 436 U. S., at 592. A federal official contemplating unconstitutional conduct similarly must be prepared to face the prospect of a Bivens action. A uniform rule that claims such as respondent’s survive the decedent’s death is essential if we are not to “frustrate in [an] important way the achievement” of the goals of Bivens actions. Auto Workers v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U. S. 696, 702 (1966).12

Affirmed.

Me. Justice Powell,

concurring in the judgment.

Although I join the judgment, I do not agree with much of the language in the Court’s opinion. The Court states the principles governing Bivens actions as follows:

“Bivens established that the victims of a constitutional *26violation ... have a right to recover damages.... Such a cause of action may be defeated ... in two situations. The first is when defendants demonstrate 'special factors counselling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress.’ . . . The second • is when defendants show that Congress has provided an alternative remedy which it explicitly declared to be a substitute for recovery directly under the Constitution and viewed as equally effective. . . .” Ante, at 18-19 (emphasis in original).

The foregoing statement contains dicta that go well beyond the prior holdings of this Court.

I

We are concerned here with inferring a right of action for damages directly from the Constitution. In Davis v. Passman, 442 U. S. 228, 242 (1979), the Court said that persons who have “no [other] effective means” of redress “must be able to invoke the existing jurisdiction of the courts for the protection of their justiciable constitutional rights.” The Davis rule now sets the boundaries of the “principled discretion” that must be brought to bear when a court is asked to infer a private cause of action not specified by the enacting authority. Id., at 252 (Powell, J., dissenting). But the Court’s opinion, read literally, would restrict that discretion dramatically. Today we are told that a court must entertain a Bivens suit unless the action is “defeated” in one of two specified ways.

Bivens recognized that implied remedies may be unnecessary when Congress has provided “equally effective” alternative remedies. Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388, 397 (1971); see Davis v. Passman, supra, at 248. The Court now volunteers the view that a defendant cannot defeat a Bivens action simply by showing that there are adequate alternative avenues of relief. The defendant also must show that Congress “explicitly declared [its rem*27edy] to be a substitute for recovery directly under the Constitution and viewed [it] as equally effective.” Ante, at 18-19 (emphasis in original). These are unnecessarily rigid conditions. The Court cites no authority and advances no policy reason — indeed no reason at all — for imposing this threshold burden upon the defendant in an implied remedy case.

The Court does implicitly acknowledge that Congress possesses the power to enact adequate alternative remedies that would be exclusive. Yet, today’s opinion apparently will permit Bivens plaintiffs to ignore entirely adequate remedies if Congress has not clothed them in the prescribed linguistic garb. No purpose is served by affording plaintiffs a choice of remedies in these circumstances. Nor is there any precedent for requiring federal courts to blind themselves to congressional intent expressed in language other than that which we prescribe.

A defendant also may defeat the Bivens remedy under today’s decision if “special factors” counsel “hesitation.” But the Court provides no further guidance on this point. The opinion states simply that no such factors are present in this case. The Court says that petitioners enjoy no “independent status in our constitutional scheme” that would make judicially created remedies inappropriate. Ante, at 19. But the implication that official status may be a “special factor” is withdrawn in the sentence that follows, which concludes that qualified immunity affords all the protection necessary to ensure the effective performance of official duties. No other factors relevant to the purported exception are mentioned.

One is left to wonder whether judicial discretion in this area will hereafter be confined to the question of alternative remedies, which is in turn reduced to the single determination that congressional action does or does not comport with the specifications prescribed by this Court. Such a drastic curtailment of discretion would be inconsistent with the Court’s longstanding recognition that Congress is ultimately the appropriate body to create federal remedies. See ante, at 19-20; *28Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, supra, at 397. A plaintiff who seeks his remedy directly under the Constitution asks the federal courts to perform an essentially legislative task. In this situation, as Mr. Justice Harlan once said, a court should “take into account [a range of policy considerations] at least as broad as the range of those a legislature would consider with respect to an express statutory authorization of a traditional remedy.” Bivens, supra, at 407. The Court does not explain why this discretion should be limited in the manner announced today.

The Court’s absolute language is all the more puzzling because it comes in a case where the implied remedy is plainly appropriate under any measure of discretion. The Federal Tort Claims Act, on which petitioners rely, simply is not an adequate remedy.1 And there are reasonably clear indications that Congress did not intend that statute to displace Bivens claims. See ante, at 19-20. No substantial contrary policy has been identified, and I am aware of none. I therefore agree that a private damages remedy properly is inferred from the Constitution in this case. But I do not agree that Bivens plaintiffs have a “right” to such a remedy whenever the defendant fails to show that Congress has “provided an [equally effective] alternative remedy which it explicitly *29declared to be a substitute. . . .” In my view, the Court’s willingness to infer federal causes of action that cannot be found in the Constitution or in a statute denigrates the doctrine of separation of powers and hardly comports with a rational system of justice. Cf. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677, 730-749 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting).2

II

In Part III of its opinion, the Court holds that “ ‘whenever the relevant state survival statute would abate a Bivens-type action brought against defendants whose conduct results in death, the federal common law allows survival of the action.’ ” Ante, at 24, quoting 581 P. 2d 669, 675 (CA7 1978). I agree that the relevant policies require the application of federal common law to allow survival in this case.

It is not “obvious” to me, however, that “the liability of federal officials for violations of citizens’ constitutional rights should be governed by uniform rules” in every case. Ante, at 23; see ante, at 23-24. On the contrary, federal courts routinely refer to state law to fill the procedural gaps in national remedial schemes. The policy against invoking the federal common law except where necessary to the vitality of a federal claim is codified in 42 U. S. C. § 1988, which directs that state law ordinarily will govern those aspects of § 1983 actions not covered by the “laws of the United States.”

The Court’s opinion in this case does stop short of mandating uniform rules to govern all aspects of Bivens actions. Ante, at 24-25, n. 11. But the Court also says that the preference for state law embodied in § 1988 is irrelevant to the selection of rules that will govern actions against federal officers under Bivens. Ibid. I see no basis for this view. In *30Butz v. Economou, 438 U. S. 478, 498-504, and n. 25 (1978), the Court thought it unseemly that different rules should govern the liability of federal and state officers for similar constitutional wrongs. I would not disturb that understanding today.

Mr. Chief Justice Burger,

dissenting.

Although I would be prepared to join an opinion giving effect to Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388 (1971) — which I thought wrongly decided — I cannot join today’s unwarranted expansion of that decision. The Federal Tort Claims Act provides an adequate remedy for prisoners’ claims of medical mistreatment. For me, that is the end of the matter.

TJnder the test enunciated by the Court the adequacy of the Tort Claims Act remedy is an irrelevancy. The sole inquiry called for by the Court’s new test is whether “Congress has provided an alternative remedy which it explicitly declared to be a substitute for recovery directly under the Constitution.” Ante, at 18-19 (first emphasis added).1 That test would seem to permit a person whose constitutional rights have been violated by a state officer to bring suit under Bivens even though Congress in 42 U. S. C. § 1983 has already fashioned an equally effective remedy. Cf. Turpin v. Mailet, 591 F. 2d 426 (CA2 1979) (en banc). After all, there is no “explicit congressional declaration,” ante, at 19, that § 1983 was meant to pre-empt a Bivens remedy. Taken to its logical conclusion, the Court’s test, coupled with its holding on survivorship, ante, at 23, and n. 11, suggests that the plaintiff in Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U. S. 584 (1978), might have *31escaped the impact of that decision by filing a separate Bivens-type claim. And the Court’s test throws into doubt the decision in Brown v. GSA, 425 U. S. 820 (1976), where we held that § 717 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides the exclusive remedy for claims of discrimination in federal employment. In enacting § 717 Congress did not say the magic words which the Court now seems to require.2

Until today, I had thought that Bivens was limited to those circumstances in which a civil rights plaintiff had no other effective remedy. See 403 U. S., at 410 (Harlan, J., concurring in judgment); Davis v. Passman, 442 U. S. 228, 245, and n. 23 (1979). Now it would seem that implication of a Bivens-type remedy is permissible even though a victim of unlawful official action may be fully recompensed under an existing statutory scheme. I have difficulty believing that the Court has thought through, and intends the natural consequences of, this novel test; I cannot escape the conclusion that in future cases the Court will be obliged to retreat from the language of today’s decision.3

Mr. Justice Rehwquist,

dissenting.

The Court today adopts a formalistic procedural approach for inferring private damages remedies from constitutional *32provisions that in my view still further highlights the wrong turn this Court took in Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388 (1971). Although ordinarily this Court should exercise judicial restraint in attempting to attain a wise accommodation between liberty and order under the Constitution, to dispose of this case as if Bivens were rightly decided would in the words of Mr. Justice Frankfurter be to start with an “unreality.” Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U. S. 77, 89 (1949) (concurring opinion). Bivens is a decision “by a closely divided court, unsupported by the confirmation of time,” and, as a result of its weak precedential and doctrinal foundation, it cannot be viewed as a check on “the living process of striking a wise balance between liberty and order as new cases come here for adjudication.” Cf. 336 U. S., at 89; B. & W. Taxicab Co. v. B. & Y. Taxicab Co., 276 U. S. 518, 532-533 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U. S. 507 (1976), overruling Food Employees v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U. S. 308 (1968).1

The Court concludes that Congress intended a Bivens action under the Eighth Amendment to exist concurrently with actions under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) because Congress did not indicate that it meant the FTCA “to preempt a Bivens remedy or to create an equally effective *33remedy for constitutional violations,” ante, at 19, nor are there any “ 'special factors counselling [judicial] hesitation.’ ” Ante, at 18.2 The Court’s opinion otherwise lacks even an arguably principled basis for deciding in what circumstances an inferred constitutional damages remedy is appropriate and for defining the contours of such a remedy. And its “practical” conclusion is all the more anomalous in that Congress in 1974 amended the FTCA to. permit private damages recoveries for intentional torts committed by federal law enforcement officers, thereby enabling persons injured by such officers’ violations of their federal constitutional rights in many cases to obtain redress for their injuries.3

*34In my view, it is “an exercise of power that the Constitution does not give us” for this Court to infer a private civil damages remedy from the Eighth Amendment or any other constitutional provision. Bivens, 403 U. S., at 428 (Black, J., dissenting). The creation of such remedies is a task that is more appropriately viewed as falling within the legislative sphere of authority. Ibid.

I

Prior to Bivens, this Court in Bell v. Hood, 327 U. S. 678 (1946), held that an individual who brought suit against federal agents for an alleged violation of his constitutional rights had in a strictly procedural sense stated a claim that “arises” under the Constitution and must be entertained by federal courts. Id., at 681-682. The Court did not, however, hold that the Constitution confers a substantive right to damages in this context. Rather, it merely decided that the proper disposition of the suit was a ruling on the merits, not dismissal for want of jurisdiction.4

*35Despite the lack of a textual constitutional foundation or any precedential or other historical support, Bivens inferred a constitutional damages remedy from the Fourth Amendment, authorizing a party whose constitutional rights had been infringed by a federal officer to recover damages from that officer. Davis v. Passman, 442 U. S. 228 (1979), subsequently held that such a remedy could also be inferred from the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. And the Court today further adds to the growing list of Amendments from which a civil damages remedy may be inferred. In so doing, the Court appears to be fashioning for itself a legislative role resembling that once thought to be the domain of Congress, when the latter created a damages remedy for individuals whose constitutional rights had been violated by state officials, 42 U. S. C. § 1983, and separately conferred jurisdiction on federal courts to hear such actions, 28 U. S. C. § 1343. See Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Organization, 441 U. S. 600 (1979).

A

In adding to the number of Amendments from which causes of actions may be inferred, the Court does not provide any guidance for deciding when a constitutional provision permits an inference that an individual may recover damages and when it does not. For example, the Eighth Amendment, from which the Court infers a cause of action today, also provides that “[ejxcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed. . . ” If a cause of action be inferred for violations of these and other constitutional rights — such as the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial, the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial, and the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination — I think there is an ever-increasing likelihood that the attention of *36federal courts will be diverted from needs that in this policy-making context might well be considered to be more pressing. As observed by Mr. Justice Black at the time this Court “inferred” a cause of action under only the Fourth Amendment:

“My fellow Justices on this Court and our brethren throughout the federal judiciary know only too well the time-consuming task of conscientiously poring over hundreds of thousands of pages of factual allegations of misconduct by police, judicial, and corrections officials. Of course, there are instances of legitimate grievances, but legislators might well desire to devote judicial resources to other problems of a more serious nature.” 403 U. S., at 428 (dissenting opinion).

Because the judgments that must be made here involve many “competing policies, goals, and priorities” that are not well suited for evaluation by the Judicial Branch, in my view “[t]he task of evaluating the pros and eons of creating judicial remedies for particular wrongs is a matter for Congress and the legislatures of the States.” Id., at 429.

B

It is clear under Art. Ill of the Constitution that Congress has broad authority to establish priorities for the allocation of judicial resources in defining the jurisdiction of federal courts. Ex parte McCardle, 7 Wall. 506 (1869); Sheldon v. Sill, 8 How. 441 (1850). Congress thus may prevent the federal courts from deciding cases that it believes would be an unwarranted expenditure of judicial time or would impair the ability of federal courts to dispose of matters that Congress considers to be more important. In reviewing Congress' judgment in this area, “[w]e are not at liberty to inquire into the motives of the legislature. We can only examine into its power under the Constitution. . . .” Ex parte McCardle, *37supra, at 514. As stated by Mr. Justice Chase in Turner v. Bank of North America, 4 Dall. 8, 10, n. (1799):

“The notion has frequently been entertained, that the federal Courts derive their judicial power immediately from the constitution; but the political truth is, that the disposal of the judicial power, (except in a few specified instances) belongs to congress. If congress has given the power to this Court, we posess [sic] it, not otherwise: and if congress has not given the power to us, or to any other Court, it still remains at the legislative disposal. Besides, congress is not bound, and it would, perhaps, be inexpedient, to enlarge the jurisdiction of federal Courts, to every subject, in every form, which the constitution might warrant.”

See also Sheldon v. Sill, supra, at 449.

While it is analytically correct to view the question of jurisdiction as distinct from that of the appropriate relief to be granted, see Davis v. Passman, supra, at 239-240, n. 18, congressional authority here may all too easily be undermined when the judiciary, under the guise of exercising its authority to fashion appropriate relief, creates expansive damages remedies that have not been authorized by Congress. Just as there are some tasks that Congress may not impose on an Art. III court, Gordon v. United States, 2 Wall. 561 (1865); United States v. Klein, 13 Wall. 128 (1872), there are others that an Art. Ill court may not simply seize for itself without congressional authorization. This concern is initially reflected in the notion that federal courts do not have the authority to act as general courts of common law absent congressional authorization.

In Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U. S. 647, 651 (1963), the Court observed that “[a]s respects the creation by the federal courts of common-law rights, it is perhaps needless to state that we are not in the free-wheeling days antedating Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64 [1938].” Erie expressly rejected the *38view, previously adopted in Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1 (1842), that federal courts may declare rules of general common law in civil fields. And it has long been established that federal courts lack the authority to create a common law of crimes. United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 7 Cranch 32 (1812). Hudson & Goodwin rested on the notion that:

“The powers of the general Government are made up of concessions from the several states — whatever is not expressly given to the former, the latter expressly reserve. The judicial power of the United States is a constituent part of those concessions — that power is to be exercised by Courts organized for the purpose, and brought into existence by an effort of the legislative power of the Union. Of all the Courts which the United States may, under their general powers, constitute, one only, the Supreme Court, possesses jurisdiction derived immediately from the constitution, and of which the legislative power cannot deprive it. All other Courts created by the general Government possess no jurisdiction but what is given them by the power that creates them, and can be vested with none but what the power ceded to the general Government will authorize them to confer.” Id., at 33.

Thus, the Court in Hudson concluded:

“It is not necessary to inquire whether the general Government, in any and what extent, possesses the power of conferring on its Courts a jurisdiction in cases similar to the present; it is enough that such jurisdiction has not been conferred by any legislative act, if it does not result to those Courts as a consequence of their creation.” Ibid.

In my view the authority of federal courts to fashion remedies based on the “common law” of damages for constitutional violations likewise falls within the legislative domain, and does not exist where not conferred by Congress.

*39The determination by federal courts of the scope of such a remedy involves the creation' of a body of common law analogous to that repudiated in Erie and Hudson <& Goodwin. This determination raises such questions as the types of damages recoverable, the injuries compensable, the degree of intent required for recovery, and the extent to which official immunity will be available as a defense. And the creation of such a remedy by federal courts has the effect of diverting judicial resources from areas that Congress has explicitly provided for by statute. It thereby may impair the ability of federal courts to comply with judicial priorities established by Congress.

Congress’ general grant of jurisdiction to federal courts under 28 U. S. C. § 1331 does not permit those courts to create a remedy for the award of damages whenever an individual’s constitutional rights have been violated. While § 1331 grants federal courts jurisdiction to hear cases that arise under the Constitution, it makes no provision whatsoever for the award of such damages, nor, as noted above, is there any precedential or other historical support for such a remedy prior to Bivens.5 *40By contrast, it is obvious that when Congress has wished to authorize federal courts to grant damages relief, it has known how to do so and has done so expressly. For example, in 42 U. S. C. § 1983 Congress explicitly provided for federal courts to award damages against state officials who violate an individual’s constitutional rights.6 With respect to federal officials, however, it has never provided for these types of damages awards.7 Rather, it chose a different route in 1974 by elimi*41nating the immunity of federal officials under the FTCA. See n. 2, supra.

Congress has also created numerous express causes of actions for damages in other areas. See, e. g., Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U. S. C. § 216 (b); Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U. S. C. § 3612 (c); Federal Employers’ Liability Act, 45 U. S. C. §§ 51-60. While the injuries for which such damages have been authorized may seem less important than violations of constitutional rights by federal officials, Congress has nonetheless said that it wants federal courts to hear the former, and has not similarly spoken with respect to the latter.

In my view, absent a clear indication from Congress, federal courts lack the authority to grant damages relief for constitutional violations. Although Congress surely may direct federal courts to grant relief in Bivens-type actions, it is enough that it has not done so. As stated by this Court in Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U. S., at 652, which declined to create an implied cause of action for federal officials’ abuse of their statutory authority to issue subpoenas:

“Over the years Congress has considered the problem of state civil and criminal actions against federal officials many times. . . . But no general statute making federal officers liable for acts committed 'under color,’ but in violation, of their federal authority has been passed. . . . That state law governs the cause of action alleged is shown by the fact that removal is possible in a nondiver-sity case such as this one only because the interpretation of a federal defense makes the case one 'arising under’ *42the Constitution or laws of the United States. ... [I]t is not for us to fill any hiatus Congress has left in this area.”

Because Congress also has never provided for a Bwens-type damages award, I think the appropriate course is for federal courts to dismiss such actions for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Congress did not even grant to federal courts a general jurisdiction to entertain cases arising under the Constitution until 1875. Act of Mar. 3, 1875, § 1, 18 Stat. 470. It thus would seem that the most reasonable explanation for Congress’ failure explicitly to provide for damages in Bivens actions is that Congress intended to leave this responsibility to state courts in the application of their common law, or to put it conversely to preclude federal courts from granting such relief.

The authority of federal courts “to adjust their remedies so. as to grant the necessary relief,” Bell v. Hood, 327 U. S., at 684; Bivens, 403 U. S., at 392; Davis v. Passman, 442 U. S., at 245, does not suggest a contrary conclusion. While federal courts have historically had broad authority to fashion equitable remedies,8 it does not follow that absent congressional authorization they may also grant damages awards for constitutional violations that would traditionally be regarded as remedies at law. The broad power of federal courts to grant equitable relief for constitutional violations has long been established. As this Court observed in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U. S. 1, 15 (1971):

“Once a right and a violation have been shown, the scope *43of a district court’s equitable powers to remedy past wrongs is broad, for breadth and flexibility are inherent in equitable remedies.

“ The essence of equity jurisdiction has been the power of the Chancellor to do equity and to mould each decree to the necessities of the particular case. Flexibility rather than rigidity has distinguished it. The qualities of mercy and practicality have made equity the instrument for nice adjustment and reconciliation between the public interest and private needs as well as between competing private claims.’ Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U. S. 321, 329-330 (1944), cited in Brown [v. Board of Education, 349 U. S. 294, 300 (1955)].”

Thus, for example, in Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908), it was held that a federal court may enjoin a state officer from enforcing penalties and remedies provided by an unconstitutional statute. See also, e. g., Osborn v. United States Bank, 9 Wheat. 738, 838-846, 859 (1824).

No similar authority of federal courts to award damages for violations of constitutional rights had ever been recognized prior to Bivens.9 And no statutory grant by Congress supports the exercise of such authority by federal courts. The Rules of Decision Act, for example, provides that “[t]he laws of the several states, except where the Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where they apply.” 28 U. S. C. § 1652. And the All Writs Act authorizes this Court and lower federal courts to “issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.” 28 U. S. C. § 1651. Neither these statutes, nor 28 U. S. C. § 1331, authorizes fed*44eral courts to create a body of common-law damages remedies for constitutional violations or any other legal wrong. And as previously discussed, federal courts do not have the authority to act as general courts of common law absent authorization by Congress.

In light of the absence of any congressional authorization or historical support, I do not think the equitable authority of federal courts to grant “the necessary relief” provides a foundation for inferring a body of common-law damages remedies from various constitutional provisions. I believe my conclusion here is further supported by an examination of the difficulties that arise in attempting to delimit the contours of the damages remedy that the Court has held should be available when an individual’s constitutional rights are violated.

II

The Court concludes, as noted above, that respondent may recover damages as a result of an inferred remedy under the Eighth Amendment because “nothing in the Federal Tort Claims (FTCA) or its legislative history . . . show[s] that Congress meant to pre-empt a Bivens remedy or to create an equally effective remedy for constitutional violations,” ante, at 19, nor are there any “ 'special factors counselling [judicial] hesitation.’ ” Ante, at 18. After observing that Congress did not explicitly state in the FTCA or its legislative history that the FTCA was intended to provide such a remedy, the Court points to “[f]our additional factors” that suggest a “Bivens remedy is more effective than the FTCA remedy” in attempting to ascertain congressional intention here. Ante, at 20. The first is that the Bivens remedy is recoverable against individuals whereas the FTCA remedy is against the United States, and thus the Bivens remedy more effectively serves the deterrent purpose articulated in Bivens.

The Court not only fails to explain why the Bivens remedy is effective in the promotion of deterrence, but also does not provide any reason for believing that other sanctions on fed*45eral employees — such as a threat of deductions in pay, reprimand, suspension, or firing — will be ineffective in promoting the desired level of deterrence, or that Congress did not consider the marginal increase in deterrence here to be outweighed by other considerations. See, e. g., Bell, Proposed Amendments to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 16 Harv. J. on Leg. 1, 13 (1979). And while it may be generally true that the extent to which a sanction is imposed directly on a wrongdoer will have an impact on the effectiveness of a deterrent remedy,10 there are also a number of other factors that must be taken into account — such as the amount of damages necessary to offset the benefits of the objectionable conduct, the risk that the wrongdoer might escape liability, the clarity with which the objectionable conduct is defined, and the perceptions of the individual who is a potential wrongdoer. In a Bivens action, however, there is no relationship whatsoever between the damages awarded and the benefits from infringing the individual’s rights because the damages award focuses *46solely on the loss to the plaintiff. The damages in such an action do not take into account the risk that the wrongdoer will escape liability altogether. In addition, it is often not clear what conduct violates the Constitution, see, e. g., Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U. S. 622 (1980);11 California v. Minjares, 443 U. S. 916, 917-919 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of stay). In many cases the uncertainty as to what constitutes a constitutional violation will impair the deterrent impact of a Bivens remedy.12 Finally, the perceptions of the potential wrongdoer as to the above considerations may also detract from the deterrent effect of a Bivens action. The Court makes no attempt to assess these factors or to examine them in relation to an FTCA action. In my view, its assertion that the Bivens remedy is a more effective deterrent than the FTCA remedy, and that this is a reason for concluding that Congress intended Bivens actions to exist concurrently with FTCA actions, remains an unsupported assertion.13

*47In addition, there are important policy considerations at stake here that Congress may decide outweigh the interest in deterrence promoted by personal liability of federal officials. Indeed, the fear of personal liability may “dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute, or the most irresponsible, in the unflinching discharge of their duties.” Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F. 2d 579, 581 (CA2 1949) (L. Hand). And, as one commentator has observed: “Despite the small odds an employee will actually be held liable in a civil suit, morale within the federal services has suffered as employees have been dragged through drawn-out lawsuits, many of which are frivolous.” Bell, 16 Harv. J. on Leg., supra, at 6.

The Court next argues that Congress did not intend the FTCA to displace the Bivens remedy because it did not provide for punitive damages in the FTCA. As the Court observes, we have not “expressly address [ed] and decid [ed] the question” whether punitive damages may be awarded in a Bivens suit. Ante, at 21-22. And despite the Court’s assertion to the contrary, we have also not done so with respect to § 1983 actions. In Carey v. Piphus, 435 U. S. 247, 257, n. 11 (1978), this Court explicitly stated that “we imply no approval or disapproval of any of [the] cases” that have awarded punitive damages in § 1983 actions. Because this Court has never reached the question whether punitive damages may be awarded in either a Bivens or § 1983 action, I think serious doubts arise as to the Court’s claim that an FTCA action is not as effective as a Bivens action because the FTCA does not permit punitive damages awards. Indeed, this Court in Carey also stated that “[t]o the extent that Congress intended that [damages] awards under § 1983 should deter the deprivation of constitutional rights, there is no evidence that it meant to establish a deterrent more formidable than that inherent in the award of compensatory damages.” 435 U. S., at 256-257.

Even if punitive damages were appropriate in a Bivens action, such damages are typically determined by reference *48to factors such as the character of the wrong, the amount necessary to “punish” the defendant, etc., and the jury has a great deal of discretion in deciding both whether such damages should be awarded and the amount of the punitive award. See, e. g., C. McCormick, Law of Damages § 85 (1935). The determination whether this or some other remedy — such as a fixed fine, a threat of being reprimanded, suspended, or fired, or simply compensatory damages — provides the desired level of deterrence is one for Congress. This Court should defer to Congress even when Congress has not explicitly stated that its remedy is a substitute for a Bivens action.

The third factor relied on by the Court to support its conclusion that Congress did not intend the FTCA to serve as a substitute for a Bivens action is that a plaintiff cannot opt for a jury in a FTCA action while he can in a Bivens suit. The Court, however, offers no reason why a judge is preferable to a jury, or vice versa, in this context. Rather, the Court merely notes that petitioners cannot explain why plaintiffs should not retain the choice between a judge and jury. Ante, at 23, and n. 9. I do not think the fact that Congress failed to specify that the FTCA was a substitute for a Bivens action supports the conclusion that Congress viewed the plaintiff's ability to choose between a judge and a jury as a reason for retaining a Bivens action in addition to an action under the FTCA.

Finally, I do not think it is obvious, as the Court states, that liability of federal officials for violations of constitutional rights should be governed by uniform rules absent an explicit statement by Congress indicating a contrary intention. The importance of federalism in our constitutional system has been recognized both by this Court, see, e. g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37 (1971), and by Congress, see, e. g., 42 U. S. C. § 1988, and in accommodating the values of federalism with other constitutional principles and congressional statutes, this Court has often deferred to state rules. See, e. g., Rob*49ertson v. Wegmann, 436 U. S. 584 (1978); Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U. S. 454 (1975). As observed by Mr. Justice Powell, “federal courts routinely refer to state law to fill the procedural gaps in national remedial schemes.” Ante, at 29 (opinion concurring in judgment).14 Indeed, the Rules of Decision Act would seem ordinarily to require it. 28 U. S. C. § 1652.

Once we get past the level of a high-school civics text, it is simply not self-evident to merely assert that here we have a federal cause of action for violations of federal rights by federal officials, and thus the question whether reference to state procedure is appropriate “admits of only a negative answer in the absence of a contrary congressional resolution.” Ante, at 23. The Court articulates no solid basis for concluding that there is any interest in uniformity that should generally be viewed as significant. Although the Court identifies “deterrence” as an objective of a Bivens action, a § 1983 action, which is also a creation of federal law, has been recognized by this Court as having a similar objective in the promotion of deterrence. See, e. g., Carey v. Piphus, supra, at 257; Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U. S., at 592; Imbler v. Pachtman, supra, at 442 (White, J., concurring in judgment).15 *50And with respect to such actions state procedural rules are generally controlling, see, e. g., Robertson v. Wegmann, supra. As observed in Robertson, supra, at 593:

“It is true that § 1983 provides ‘a uniquely federal remedy against incursions under the claimed authority of state law upon rights secured by the Constitution and laws of the Nation.' Mitchum v. Foster, [407 U. S. 225,] 239. That a federal remedy should be available, however, does not mean that a § 1983 plaintiff (or his representatives) must be allowed to continue an action in disregard of the state law to which § 1988 refers us. A state statute cannot be considered 'inconsistent’ with federal law merely because the statute causes the plaintiff to lose the litigation. If success of the § 1983 action were the only benchmark, there would be no reason at all to look to state law, for the appropriate rule would then always be the one favoring the plaintiff, and its source would be essentially irrelevant.”16

I think the congressional determination to defer to state procedural rules in the § 1983 context indicates the weak foundation upon which the Court’s analysis here rests.17

*51In my view, the fact that Congress has created a tort remedy against federal officials at all, as it has done here under the FTCA, is dispositive. The policy questions at issue in the creation of any tort remedies, constitutional or otherwise, involve judgments as to diverse factors that are more appropriately made by the legislature than by this Court in an attempt to fashion a constitutional common law. This Court stated in TVA v. Hill, 437 U. S. 153, 194 (1978):

“Our system of government is, after all, a tripartite one, with each branch having certain defined functions delegated to it by the Constitution. While ‘[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is,’ Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803), it is equally — and emphatically — the exclusive province of the Congress not only to formulate legislative policies and mandate programs and projects, but also to establish their relative priority for the Nation. Once Congress, exercising its delegated powers, has decided the order of priorities in a given area, it is for the Executive to administer the laws and for the courts to enforce them when enforcement is sought.”

Here Congress has provided no indication that it believes sound policy favors damages awards against federal officials for violations of constitutional rights.

Ill

I think the Court acknowledges the legislative nature of the determinations involved here when it states that such a *52remedy may be defeated when “Congress has indicated that it intends the statutory remedy to replace, rather than to complement, the Bivens remedy.” Ante, at 19, n. 5. Here Congress did not do so because in the Court’s words: “In the absence of a contrary expression from Congress, § 2680 (h) ... contemplates that victims of the kind of intentional wrongdoing alleged in this complaint shall have an action under FTCA against the United States as well as a Bivens action against the individual officials alleged to have infringed their constitutional rights.” Ante, at 20. But under the Court’s rationale if Congress had made clear that it intended the FTCA to displace judicially inferred remedies under the Constitution, this Court must defer to that legislative judgment.18 This principle was also recognized in Bivens, wherein the Court noted that Congress had given no indication that it viewed any other remedy to be as effective as the damages remedy inferred by the Court from the Fourth Amendment. 403 U. S., at 397. See also Davis v. Passman, 442 U. S., at 245, 246-247; Butz v. Economou, 438 U. S. 478, 504 (1978).

I agree with the Court that Congress is free to devise whatever remedy it sees fit to redress violations of constitutional rights sued upon in Art. Ill courts, and to have that *53remedy altogether displace any private civil damages remedies that this Court may devise. I disagree, however, that, unless “special factors” counsel hesitation, Congress must make some affirmative showing that it intends its action to provide such redress before this Court will deem Congress’ action to be an adequate substitute for an inferred remedy.19 The requirement of such congressional action is a formal procedural device that not only serves little useful purpose, but also subverts the policymaking authority vested by the Constitution in the Legislative Branch. Its application in this case, through the Court’s attempt to ascertain congressional intention by examining whether the FTCA or a Bivens action is “more effective,” in my view demonstrates that the creation of constitutional damages remedies involves policy considerations that are more appropriately made by the Legislative rather than the Judicial Branch of our Government.

IV

I think the Court’s formalistic procedural approach to this problem is flawed for one additional reason. As noted above, the approach adopted by the Court in Bivens and reaffirmed today is one that permits Congress to displace this Court in fashioning a constitutional common law of its choosing merely by indicating that it intends to do so. Ante, at 19, n. 5. Otherwise, unless special factors counsel “hesitation,” it will be presumed under the Court’s analysis that Congress intended any remedy it creates to be enforced simultaneously by federal courts with a Bivens action. The Court provides no justification for this canon of divining legislative intention. Presumably when Congress creates and defines the limits of a cause of action, it has taken into account competing considerations and struck what it considers to be an appropriate balance among them. In my view it is wholly at odds with traditional *54principles for interpretation of legislative intention and with the constitutional notion of separation of powers to conclude that because Congress failed to indicate that it did not intend the cause of action and its limitations- to be defined otherwise, it intended for this Court to exercise free rein in fashioning additional rules for recovery of damages under the guise of an inferred constitutional damages action.

For the foregoing reasons I dissent, and would reverse the judgment.

Justice KENNEDY delivered the opinion of the Court, except as to Part IV-B.

After the September 11 terrorist attacks in this country, and in response to the deaths, destruction, and dangers they caused, the United States Government ordered hundreds of illegal aliens to be taken into custody and held. Pending a determination whether a particular detainee had connections to terrorism, the custody, under harsh conditions to be described, continued. In many instances custody lasted for days and weeks, then stretching into months. Later, some of the aliens who had been detained filed suit, leading to the cases now before the Court.

The complaint named as defendants three high executive officers in the Department of Justice and two of the wardens at the facility where the detainees had been held. Most of the claims, alleging various constitutional violations, sought damages *1852 under the implied cause of action theory adopted by this Court in Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 , 91 S.Ct. 1999 , 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971). Another claim in the complaint was based upon the statutory cause of action authorized and created by Congress under Rev. Stat. § 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (3). This statutory cause of action allows damages to persons injured by conspiracies to deprive them of the equal protection of the laws.

The suit was commenced in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. After this Court's decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 , 129 S.Ct. 1937 , 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009), a fourth amended complaint was filed; and that is the complaint to be considered here. Motions to dismiss the fourth amended complaint were denied as to some defendants and granted as to others. These rulings were the subject of interlocutory appeals to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Over a dissenting opinion by Judge Raggi with respect to the decision of the three-judge panel-and a second unsigned dissent from the court's declining to rehear the suit en banc, joined by Judge Raggi and five other judges-the Court of Appeals ruled that the complaint was sufficient for the action to proceed against the named officials who are now before us. See Turkmen v. Hasty, 789 F.3d 218 (2015) (panel decision); Turkmen v. Hasty, 808 F.3d 197 (2015) (en banc decision).

The Court granted certiorari to consider these rulings. 580 U.S. ---- (2016). The officials who must defend the suit on the merits, under the ruling of the Court of Appeals, are the petitioners here. The former detainees who seek relief under the fourth amended complaint are the respondents. The various claims and theories advanced for recovery, and the grounds asserted for their dismissal as insufficient as a matter of law, will be addressed in turn.

I

Given the present procedural posture of the suit, the Court accepts as true the facts alleged in the complaint. See Iqbal, 556 U.S., at 678 , 129 S.Ct. 1937 .

A

In the weeks following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks-the worst in American history-the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) received more than 96,000 tips from members of the public. See id., at 667 , 129 S.Ct. 1937 . Some tips were based on well-grounded suspicion of terrorist activity, but many others may have been based on fear of Arabs and Muslims. FBI agents "questioned more than 1,000 people with suspected links to the [September 11] attacks in particular or to terrorism in general." Ibid .

While investigating the tips-including the less substantiated ones-the FBI encountered many aliens who were present in this country without legal authorization. As a result, more than 700 individuals were arrested and detained on immigration charges. Ibid. If the FBI designated an alien as not being "of interest" to the investigation, then he or she was processed according to normal procedures. In other words the alien was treated just as if, for example, he or she had been arrested at the border after an illegal entry. If, however, the FBI designated an alien as "of interest" to the investigation, or if it had doubts about the proper designation in a particular case, the alien was detained subject to a "hold-until-cleared policy." The aliens were held without bail.

Respondents were among some 84 aliens who were subject to the hold-until-cleared policy and detained at the Metropolitan *1853 Detention Center (MDC) in Brooklyn, New York. They were held in the Administrative Maximum Special Housing Unit (or Unit) of the MDC. The complaint includes these allegations: Conditions in the Unit were harsh. Pursuant to official Bureau of Prisons policy, detainees were held in " 'tiny cells for over 23 hours a day.' " 789 F.3d, at 228 . Lights in the cells were left on 24 hours. Detainees had little opportunity for exercise or recreation. They were forbidden to keep anything in their cells, even basic hygiene products such as soap or a toothbrush. When removed from the cells for any reason, they were shackled and escorted by four guards. They were denied access to most forms of communication with the outside world. And they were strip searched often-any time they were moved, as well as at random in their cells.

Some of the harsh conditions in the Unit were not imposed pursuant to official policy. According to the complaint, prison guards engaged in a pattern of "physical and verbal abuse." Ibid. Guards allegedly slammed detainees into walls; twisted their arms, wrists, and fingers; broke their bones; referred to them as terrorists; threatened them with violence; subjected them to humiliating sexual comments; and insulted their religion.

B

Respondents are six men of Arab or South Asian descent. Five are Muslims. Each was illegally in this country, arrested during the course of the September 11 investigation, and detained in the Administrative Maximum Special Housing Unit for periods ranging from three to eight months. After being released respondents were removed from the United States.

Respondents then sued on their own behalf, and on behalf of a putative class, seeking compensatory and punitive damages, attorney's fees, and costs. Respondents, it seems fair to conclude from the arguments presented, acknowledge that in the ordinary course aliens who are present in the United States without legal authorization can be detained for some period of time. But here the challenge is to the conditions of their confinement and the reasons or motives for imposing those conditions. The gravamen of their claims was that the Government had no reason to suspect them of any connection to terrorism, and thus had no legitimate reason to hold them for so long in these harsh conditions.

As relevant here, respondents sued two groups of federal officials in their official capacities. The first group consisted of former Attorney General John Ashcroft, former FBI Director Robert Mueller, and former Immigration and Naturalization Service Commissioner James Ziglar. This opinion refers to these three petitioners as the "Executive Officials." The other petitioners named in the complaint were the MDC's warden, Dennis Hasty, and associate warden, James Sherman. This opinion refers to these two petitioners as the "Wardens."

Seeking to invoke the Court's decision in Bivens, respondents brought four claims under the Constitution itself. First, respondents alleged that petitioners detained them in harsh pretrial conditions for a punitive purpose, in violation of the substantive due process component of the Fifth Amendment. Second, respondents alleged that petitioners detained them in harsh conditions because of their actual or apparent race, religion, or national origin, in violation of the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment. Third, respondents alleged that the Wardens subjected them to punitive strip searches unrelated to any legitimate penological interest, in violation of the *1854 Fourth Amendment and the substantive due process component of the Fifth Amendment. Fourth, respondents alleged that the Wardens knowingly allowed the guards to abuse respondents, in violation of the substantive due process component of the Fifth Amendment.

Respondents also brought a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (3), which forbids certain conspiracies to violate equal protection rights. Respondents alleged that petitioners conspired with one another to hold respondents in harsh conditions because of their actual or apparent race, religion, or national origin.

C

The District Court dismissed the claims against the Executive Officials but allowed the claims against the Wardens to go forward. The Court of Appeals affirmed in most respects as to the Wardens, though it held that the prisoner abuse claim against Sherman (the associate warden) should have been dismissed. 789 F.3d, at 264-265 . As to the Executive Officials, however, the Court of Appeals reversed, reinstating respondents' claims. Ibid. As noted above, Judge Raggi dissented. She would have held that only the prisoner abuse claim against Hasty should go forward. Id., at 295, n. 41, 302 (opinion concurring in part in judgment and dissenting in part). The Court of Appeals declined to rehear the suit en banc, 808 F.3d, at 197 ; and, again as noted above, Judge Raggi joined a second dissent along with five other judges, id., at 198 . This Court granted certiorari. 580 U.S. ---- (2016).

II

The first question to be discussed is whether petitioners can be sued for damages under Bivens and the ensuing cases in this Court defining the reach and the limits of that precedent.

A

In 1871, Congress passed a statute that was later codified at Rev. Stat. § 1979, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 . It entitles an injured person to money damages if a state official violates his or her constitutional rights. Congress did not create an analogous statute for federal officials. Indeed, in the 100 years leading up to Bivens, Congress did not provide a specific damages remedy for plaintiffs whose constitutional rights were violated by agents of the Federal Government.

In 1971, and against this background, this Court decided Bivens . The Court held that, even absent statutory authorization, it would enforce a damages remedy to compensate persons injured by federal officers who violated the prohibition against unreasonable search and seizures. See 403 U.S., at 397 , 91 S.Ct. 1999 . The Court acknowledged that the Fourth Amendment does not provide for money damages "in so many words." Id., at 396 , 91 S.Ct. 1999 . The Court noted, however, that Congress had not foreclosed a damages remedy in "explicit" terms and that no "special factors" suggested that the Judiciary should "hesitat[e]" in the face of congressional silence. Id., at 396-397 , 91 S.Ct. 1999 . The Court, accordingly, held that it could authorize a remedy under general principles of federal jurisdiction. See id., at 392 , 91 S.Ct. 1999 (citing Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 , 684, 66 S.Ct. 773 , 90 L.Ed. 939 (1946) ).

In the decade that followed, the Court recognized what has come to be called an implied cause of action in two cases involving other constitutional violations. In Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 , 99 S.Ct. 2264 , 60 L.Ed.2d 846 (1979), an administrative assistant sued a Congressman for firing her because she was a woman. The Court held that the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause gave her a damages remedy *1855 for gender discrimination. Id., at 248-249 , 99 S.Ct. 2264 . And in Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 , 100 S.Ct. 1468 , 64 L.Ed.2d 15 (1980), a prisoner's estate sued federal jailers for failing to treat the prisoner's asthma. The Court held that the Eighth Amendment Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause gave him a damages remedy for failure to provide adequate medical treatment. See id., at 19 , 100 S.Ct. 1468 . These three cases- Bivens,Davis, and Carlson -represent the only instances in which the Court has approved of an implied damages remedy under the Constitution itself.

B

To understand Bivens and the two other cases implying a damages remedy under the Constitution, it is necessary to understand the prevailing law when they were decided. In the mid-20th century, the Court followed a different approach to recognizing implied causes of action than it follows now. During this " ancien regime, " Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 , 287, 121 S.Ct. 1511 , 149 L.Ed.2d 517 (2001), the Court assumed it to be a proper judicial function to "provide such remedies as are necessary to make effective" a statute's purpose, J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 , 433, 84 S.Ct. 1555 , 12 L.Ed.2d 423 (1964). Thus, as a routine matter with respect to statutes, the Court would imply causes of action not explicit in the statutory text itself. See, e.g., id., at 430-432 , 84 S.Ct. 1555 ; Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 , 557, 89 S.Ct. 817 , 22 L.Ed.2d 1 (1969) ; Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 , 239, 90 S.Ct. 400 , 24 L.Ed.2d 386 (1969) ("The existence of a statutory right implies the existence of all necessary and appropriate remedies").

These statutory decisions were in place when Bivens recognized an implied cause of action to remedy a constitutional violation. Against that background, the Bivens decision held that courts must "adjust their remedies so as to grant the necessary relief" when "federally protected rights have been invaded." 403 U.S., at 392 , 91 S.Ct. 1999 (quoting Bell, supra, at 678 , 66 S.Ct. 773 ); see also 403 U.S., at 402 , 91 S.Ct. 1999 (Harlan, J., concurring) (discussing cases recognizing implied causes of action under federal statutes). In light of this interpretive framework, there was a possibility that "the Court would keep expanding Bivens until it became the substantial equivalent of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ." Kent, Are Damages Different?: Bivens and National Security, 87 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1123 , 1139-1140 (2014).

C

Later, the arguments for recognizing implied causes of action for damages began to lose their force. In cases decided after Bivens, and after the statutory implied cause-of-action cases that Bivens itself relied upon, the Court adopted a far more cautious course before finding implied causes of action. In two principal cases under other statutes, it declined to find an implied cause of action. See Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc., 430 U.S. 1 , 42, 45-46, 97 S.Ct. 926 , 51 L.Ed.2d 124 (1977) ; Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 , 68-69, 95 S.Ct. 2080 , 45 L.Ed.2d 26 (1975). Later, in Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 , 99 S.Ct. 1946 , 60 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), the Court did allow an implied cause of action; but it cautioned that, where Congress "intends private litigants to have a cause of action," the "far better course" is for Congress to confer that remedy in explicit terms. Id., at 717 , 99 S.Ct. 1946 .

Following this expressed caution, the Court clarified in a series of cases that, when deciding whether to recognize an implied cause of action, the "determinative" question is one of statutory intent.

*1856 Sandoval, 532 U.S., at 286 , 121 S.Ct. 1511 . If the statute itself does not "displa[y] an intent" to create "a private remedy," then "a cause of action does not exist and courts may not create one, no matter how desirable that might be as a policy matter, or how compatible with the statute." Id ., at 286-287, 121 S.Ct. 1511 ; see also Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 , 15-16, 23-24, 100 S.Ct. 242 , 62 L.Ed.2d 146 (1979) ; Karahalios v. Federal Employees, 489 U.S. 527 , 536-537, 109 S.Ct. 1282 , 103 L.Ed.2d 539 (1989). The Court held that the judicial task was instead "limited solely to determining whether Congress intended to create the private right of action asserted." Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 , 568, 99 S.Ct. 2479 , 61 L.Ed.2d 82 (1979). If the statute does not itself so provide, a private cause of action will not be created through judicial mandate. See Transamerica, supra, at 24, 100 S.Ct. 242 .

The decision to recognize an implied cause of action under a statute involves somewhat different considerations than when the question is whether to recognize an implied cause of action to enforce a provision of the Constitution itself. When Congress enacts a statute, there are specific procedures and times for considering its terms and the proper means for its enforcement. It is logical, then, to assume that Congress will be explicit if it intends to create a private cause of action. With respect to the Constitution, however, there is no single, specific congressional action to consider and interpret.

Even so, it is a significant step under separation-of-powers principles for a court to determine that it has the authority, under the judicial power, to create and enforce a cause of action for damages against federal officials in order to remedy a constitutional violation. When determining whether traditional equitable powers suffice to give necessary constitutional protection-or whether, in addition, a damages remedy is necessary-there are a number of economic and governmental concerns to consider. Claims against federal officials often create substantial costs, in the form of defense and indemnification. Congress, then, has a substantial responsibility to determine whether, and the extent to which, monetary and other liabilities should be imposed upon individual officers and employees of the Federal Government. In addition, the time and administrative costs attendant upon intrusions resulting from the discovery and trial process are significant factors to be considered. In an analogous context, Congress, it is fair to assume, weighed those concerns in deciding not to substitute the Government as defendant in suits seeking damages for constitutional violations. See 28 U.S.C. § 2679 (b)(2)(A) (providing that certain provisions of the Federal Tort Claims Act do not apply to any claim against a federal employee "which is brought for a violation of the Constitution").

For these and other reasons, the Court's expressed caution as to implied causes of actions under congressional statutes led to similar caution with respect to actions in the Bivens context, where the action is implied to enforce the Constitution itself. Indeed, in light of the changes to the Court's general approach to recognizing implied damages remedies, it is possible that the analysis in the Court's three Bivens cases might have been different if they were decided today. To be sure, no congressional enactment has disapproved of these decisions. And it must be understood that this opinion is not intended to cast doubt on the continued force, or even the necessity, of Bivens in the search-and-seizure context in which it arose. Bivens does vindicate the Constitution by allowing some redress for injuries, and it provides *1857 instruction and guidance to federal law enforcement officers going forward. The settled law of Bivens in this common and recurrent sphere of law enforcement, and the undoubted reliance upon it as a fixed principle in the law, are powerful reasons to retain it in that sphere.

Given the notable change in the Court's approach to recognizing implied causes of action, however, the Court has made clear that expanding the Bivens remedy is now a "disfavored" judicial activity. Iqbal, 556 U.S., at 675 , 129 S.Ct. 1937 . This is in accord with the Court's observation that it has "consistently refused to extend Bivens to any new context or new category of defendants." Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61 , 68, 122 S.Ct. 515 , 151 L.Ed.2d 456 (2001). Indeed, the Court has refused to do so for the past 30 years.

For example, the Court declined to create an implied damages remedy in the following cases: a First Amendment suit against a federal employer, Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367 , 390, 103 S.Ct. 2404 , 76 L.Ed.2d 648 (1983) ; a race-discrimination suit against military officers, Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296 , 297, 304-305, 103 S.Ct. 2362 , 76 L.Ed.2d 586 (1983) ; a substantive due process suit against military officers, United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669 , 671-672, 683-684, 107 S.Ct. 3054 , 97 L.Ed.2d 550 (1987) ; a procedural due process suit against Social Security officials, Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412 , 414, 108 S.Ct. 2460 , 101 L.Ed.2d 370 (1988) ; a procedural due process suit against a federal agency for wrongful termination, FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471 , 473-474, 114 S.Ct. 996 , 127 L.Ed.2d 308 (1994) ; an Eighth Amendment suit against a private prison operator, Malesko, supra, at 63 , 122 S.Ct. 515 ; a due process suit against officials from the Bureau of Land Management, Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537 , 547-548, 562, 127 S.Ct. 2588 , 168 L.Ed.2d 389 (2007) ; and an Eighth Amendment suit against prison guards at a private prison, Minneci v. Pollard, 565 U.S. 118 , 120, 132 S.Ct. 617 , 181 L.Ed.2d 606 (2012).

When a party seeks to assert an implied cause of action under the Constitution itself, just as when a party seeks to assert an implied cause of action under a federal statute, separation-of-powers principles are or should be central to the analysis. The question is "who should decide" whether to provide for a damages remedy, Congress or the courts? Bush, 462 U.S., at 380, 103 S.Ct. 2404 .

The answer most often will be Congress. When an issue " 'involves a host of considerations that must be weighed and appraised,' " it should be committed to " 'those who write the laws' " rather than " 'those who interpret them.' " Ibid. (quoting United States v. Gilman, 347 U.S. 507 , 512-513, 74 S.Ct. 695 , 98 L.Ed. 898 (1954) ). In most instances, the Court's precedents now instruct, the Legislature is in the better position to consider if " 'the public interest would be served' " by imposing a " 'new substantive legal liability.' " Schweiker, supra, at 426-427 , 108 S.Ct. 2460 (quoting Bush, supra, at 390 , 103 S.Ct. 2404 ). As a result, the Court has urged "caution" before "extending Bivens remedies into any new context." Malesko, supra, at 74 , 122 S.Ct. 515 . The Court's precedents now make clear that a Bivens remedy will not be available if there are " 'special factors counselling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress.' " Carlson, 446 U.S., at 18 , 100 S.Ct. 1468 (quoting Bivens, 403 U.S., at 396 , 91 S.Ct. 1999 ).

This Court has not defined the phrase "special factors counselling hesitation." The necessary inference, though, is that the inquiry must concentrate on *1858 whether the Judiciary is well suited, absent congressional action or instruction, to consider and weigh the costs and benefits of allowing a damages action to proceed. Thus, to be a "special factor counselling hesitation," a factor must cause a court to hesitate before answering that question in the affirmative.

It is not necessarily a judicial function to establish whole categories of cases in which federal officers must defend against personal liability claims in the complex sphere of litigation, with all of its burdens on some and benefits to others. It is true that, if equitable remedies prove insufficient, a damages remedy might be necessary to redress past harm and deter future violations. Yet the decision to recognize a damages remedy requires an assessment of its impact on governmental operations systemwide. Those matters include the burdens on Government employees who are sued personally, as well as the projected costs and consequences to the Government itself when the tort and monetary liability mechanisms of the legal system are used to bring about the proper formulation and implementation of public policies. These and other considerations may make it less probable that Congress would want the Judiciary to entertain a damages suit in a given case.

Sometimes there will be doubt because the case arises in a context in which Congress has designed its regulatory authority in a guarded way, making it less likely that Congress would want the Judiciary to interfere. See Chappell, supra, at 302 , 103 S.Ct. 2362 (military); Stanley, supra, at 679 , 107 S.Ct. 3054 (same); Meyer, supra, at 486 , 114 S.Ct. 996 (public purse); Wilkie, supra, at 561-562 , 127 S.Ct. 2588 (federal land). And sometimes there will be doubt because some other feature of a case-difficult to predict in advance-causes a court to pause before acting without express congressional authorization. In sum, if there are sound reasons to think Congress might doubt the efficacy or necessity of a damages remedy as part of the system for enforcing the law and correcting a wrong, the courts must refrain from creating the remedy in order to respect the role of Congress in determining the nature and extent of federal-court jurisdiction under Article III.

In a related way, if there is an alternative remedial structure present in a certain case, that alone may limit the power of the Judiciary to infer a new Bivens cause of action. For if Congress has created "any alternative, existing process for protecting the [injured party's] interest" that itself may "amoun[t] to a convincing reason for the Judicial Branch to refrain from providing a new and freestanding remedy in damages." Wilkie, supra, at 550 , 127 S.Ct. 2588 ; see also Bush, supra, at 385-388 , 103 S.Ct. 2404 (recognizing that civil-service regulations provided alternative means for relief); Malesko, 534 U.S., at 73-74 , 122 S.Ct. 515 (recognizing that state tort law provided alternative means for relief); Minneci, supra, at 127-130 , 132 S.Ct. 617 (same).

III

It is appropriate now to turn first to the Bivens claims challenging the conditions of confinement imposed on respondents pursuant to the formal policy adopted by the Executive Officials in the wake of the September 11 attacks. The Court will refer to these claims as the "detention policy claims." The detention policy claims allege that petitioners violated respondents' due process and equal protection rights by holding them in restrictive conditions of confinement; the claims further allege that the Wardens violated the Fourth and Fifth Amendments by subjecting respondents to frequent strip searches. The term "detention *1859 policy claims" does not include respondents' claim alleging that Warden Hasty allowed guards to abuse the detainees. That claim will be considered separately, and further, below. At this point, the question is whether, having considered the relevant special factors in the whole context of the detention policy claims, the Court should extend a Bivens -type remedy to those claims.

A

Before allowing respondents' detention policy claims to proceed under Bivens, the Court of Appeals did not perform any special factors analysis at all. 789 F.3d, at 237 . The reason, it said, was that the special factors analysis is necessary only if a plaintiff asks for a Bivens remedy in a new context. 789 F.3d, at 234 . And in the Court of Appeals' view, the context here was not new. Id., at 235 .

To determine whether the Bivens context was novel, the Court of Appeals employed a two-part test. First, it asked whether the asserted constitutional right was at issue in a previous Bivens case. 789 F.3d, at 234 . Second, it asked whether the mechanism of injury was the same mechanism of injury in a previous Bivens case. 789 F.3d, at 234 . Under the Court of Appeals' approach, if the answer to both questions is "yes," then the context is not new and no special factors analysis is required. Ibid.

That approach is inconsistent with the analysis in Malesko . Before the Court decided that case, it had approved a Bivens action under the Eighth Amendment against federal prison officials for failure to provide medical treatment. See Carlson, 446 U.S., at 16, n. 1, 18-19 , 100 S.Ct. 1468 . In Malesko, the plaintiff sought relief against a private prison operator in almost parallel circumstances. 534 U.S., at 64 , 122 S.Ct. 515 . In both cases, the right at issue was the same: the Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. And in both cases, the mechanism of injury was the same: failure to provide adequate medical treatment. Thus, if the approach followed by the Court of Appeals is the correct one, this Court should have held that the cases arose in the same context, obviating any need for a special factors inquiry.

That, however, was not the controlling analytic framework in Malesko . Even though the right and the mechanism of injury were the same as they were in Carlson, the Court held that the contexts were different. 534 U.S., at 70 , and n. 4, 122 S.Ct. 515 . The Court explained that special factors counseled hesitation and that the Bivens remedy was therefore unavailable. 534 U.S., at 74 , 122 S.Ct. 515 .

For similar reasons, the holding of the Court of Appeals in the instant suit is inconsistent with this Court's analytic framework in Chappell . In Davis, decided before the Court's cautionary instructions with respect to Bivens suits, see supra, at 1856 - 1858, the Court had held that an employment-discrimination claim against a Congressman could proceed as a Bivens- type action. Davis, 442 U.S., at 230-231 , 99 S.Ct. 2264 . In Chappell, however, the cautionary rules were applicable; and, as a result, a similar discrimination suit against military officers was not allowed to proceed. It is the Chappell framework that now controls; and, under it, the Court of Appeals erred by holding that this suit did not present a new Bivens context.

The proper test for determining whether a case presents a new Bivens context is as follows. If the case is different in a meaningful way from previous Bivens cases decided by this Court, then the context is new. Without endeavoring to create an exhaustive list of differences that are meaningful enough to make a given context *1860 a new one, some examples might prove instructive. A case might differ in a meaningful way because of the rank of the officers involved; the constitutional right at issue; the generality or specificity of the official action; the extent of judicial guidance as to how an officer should respond to the problem or emergency to be confronted; the statutory or other legal mandate under which the officer was operating; the risk of disruptive intrusion by the Judiciary into the functioning of other branches; or the presence of potential special factors that previous Bivens cases did not consider.

In the present suit, respondents' detention policy claims challenge the confinement conditions imposed on illegal aliens pursuant to a high-level executive policy created in the wake of a major terrorist attack on American soil. Those claims bear little resemblance to the three Bivens claims the Court has approved in the past: a claim against FBI agents for handcuffing a man in his own home without a warrant; a claim against a Congressman for firing his female secretary; and a claim against prison officials for failure to treat an inmate's asthma. See Bivens, 403 U.S. 388 , 91 S.Ct. 1999 , 29 L.Ed.2d 619 ; Davis, 442 U.S. 228 , 99 S.Ct. 2264 , 60 L.Ed.2d 846 ; Chappell, 462 U.S. 296 , 103 S.Ct. 2362 , 76 L.Ed.2d 586 . The Court of Appeals therefore should have held that this was a new Bivens context. Had it done so, it would have recognized that a special factors analysis was required before allowing this damages suit to proceed.

B

After considering the special factors necessarily implicated by the detention policy claims, the Court now holds that those factors show that whether a damages action should be allowed is a decision for the Congress to make, not the courts.

With respect to the claims against the Executive Officials, it must be noted that a Bivens action is not "a proper vehicle for altering an entity's policy." Malesko, supra, at 74 , 122 S.Ct. 515 . Furthermore, a Bivens claim is brought against the individual official for his or her own acts, not the acts of others. "The purpose of Bivens is to deter the officer ." Meyer, 510 U.S., at 485 , 114 S.Ct. 996 . Bivens is not designed to hold officers responsible for acts of their subordinates. See Iqbal, 556 U.S., at 676 , 129 S.Ct. 1937 ("Government officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior ").

Even if the action is confined to the conduct of a particular Executive Officer in a discrete instance, these claims would call into question the formulation and implementation of a general policy. This, in turn, would necessarily require inquiry and discovery into the whole course of the discussions and deliberations that led to the policies and governmental acts being challenged. These consequences counsel against allowing a Bivens action against the Executive Officials, for the burden and demand of litigation might well prevent them-or, to be more precise, future officials like them-from devoting the time and effort required for the proper discharge of their duties. See Cheney v. United States Dist. Court for D. C., 542 U.S. 367 , 382, 124 S.Ct. 2576 , 159 L.Ed.2d 459 (2004) (noting "the paramount necessity of protecting the Executive Branch from vexatious litigation that might distract it from the energetic performance of its constitutional duties").

A closely related problem, as just noted, is that the discovery and litigation process would either border upon or directly implicate *1861 the discussion and deliberations that led to the formation of the policy in question. See Federal Open Market Comm. v. Merrill, 443 U.S. 340 , 360, 99 S.Ct. 2800 , 61 L.Ed.2d 587 (1979) (noting that disclosure of Executive Branch documents "could inhibit the free flow of advice, including analysis, reports, and expression of opinion within an agency"). Allowing a damages suit in this context, or in a like context in other circumstances, would require courts to interfere in an intrusive way with sensitive functions of the Executive Branch. See Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 , 701, 117 S.Ct. 1636 , 137 L.Ed.2d 945 (1997) (recognizing that " '[e]ven when a branch does not arrogate power to itself ... the separation-of-powers doctrine requires that a branch not impair another in the performance of its constitutional duties' " (quoting Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748 , 757, 116 S.Ct. 1737 , 135 L.Ed.2d 36 (1996) )). These considerations also counsel against allowing a damages claim to proceed against the Executive Officials. See Cheney, supra, at 385 , 124 S.Ct. 2576 (noting that "special considerations control" when a case implicates "the Executive Branch's interests in maintaining the autonomy of its office and safeguarding the confidentiality of its communications").

In addition to this special factor, which applies to the claims against the Executive Officials, there are three other special factors that apply as well to the detention policy claims against all of the petitioners. First, respondents' detention policy claims challenge more than standard "law enforcement operations." United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 , 273, 110 S.Ct. 1056 , 108 L.Ed.2d 222 (1990). They challenge as well major elements of the Government's whole response to the September 11 attacks, thus of necessity requiring an inquiry into sensitive issues of national security. Were this inquiry to be allowed in a private suit for damages, the Bivens action would assume dimensions far greater than those present in Bivens itself, or in either of its two follow-on cases, or indeed in any putative Bivens case yet to come before the Court.

National-security policy is the prerogative of the Congress and President. See U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8; Art. II, § 1, § 2. Judicial inquiry into the national-security realm raises "concerns for the separation of powers in trenching on matters committed to the other branches." Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403 , 417, 122 S.Ct. 2179 , 153 L.Ed.2d 413 (2002). These concerns are even more pronounced when the judicial inquiry comes in the context of a claim seeking money damages rather than a claim seeking injunctive or other equitable relief. The risk of personal damages liability is more likely to cause an official to second-guess difficult but necessary decisions concerning national-security policy.

For these and other reasons, courts have shown deference to what the Executive Branch "has determined ... is 'essential to national security.' " Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 , 24, 26, 129 S.Ct. 365 , 172 L.Ed.2d 249 (2008). Indeed, "courts traditionally have been reluctant to intrude upon the authority of the Executive in military and national security affairs" unless "Congress specifically has provided otherwise." Department of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518 , 530, 108 S.Ct. 818 , 98 L.Ed.2d 918 (1988). Congress has not provided otherwise here.

There are limitations, of course, on the power of the Executive under Article II of the Constitution and in the powers authorized by congressional enactments, even with respect to matters of national security. See, e.g., *1862 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 , 527, 532-537, 124 S.Ct. 2633 , 159 L.Ed.2d 578 (2004) (plurality opinion) ("Whatever power the United States Constitution envisions for the Executive ... in times of conflict, it most assuredly envisions a role for all three branches when individual liberties are at stake"); Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 , 798, 128 S.Ct. 2229 , 171 L.Ed.2d 41 (2008) ("Liberty and security can be reconciled; and in our system they are reconciled within the framework of the law"). And national-security concerns must not become a talisman used to ward off inconvenient claims-a "label" used to "cover a multitude of sins." Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 , 523, 105 S.Ct. 2806 , 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985). This " 'danger of abuse' " is even more heightened given " 'the difficulty of defining' " the " 'security interest' " in domestic cases. Ibid. (quoting United States v. United States Dist. Court for Eastern Dist. of Mich., 407 U.S. 297 , 313-314, 92 S.Ct. 2125 , 32 L.Ed.2d 752 (1972) ).

Even so, the question is only whether "congressionally uninvited intrusion" is "inappropriate" action for the Judiciary to take. Stanley, 483 U.S., at 683 , 107 S.Ct. 3054 . The factors discussed above all suggest that Congress' failure to provide a damages remedy might be more than mere oversight, and that congressional silence might be more than "inadvertent." Schweiker, 487 U.S., at 423 , 108 S.Ct. 2460 . This possibility counsels hesitation "in the absence of affirmative action by Congress." Bivens, 403 U.S., at 396 , 91 S.Ct. 1999 .

Furthermore, in any inquiry respecting the likely or probable intent of Congress, the silence of Congress is relevant; and here that silence is telling. In the almost 16 years since September 11, the Federal Government's responses to that terrorist attack have been well documented. Congressional interest has been "frequent and intense," Schweiker, supra, at 425 , 108 S.Ct. 2460 and some of that interest has been directed to the conditions of confinement at issue here. Indeed, at Congress' behest, the Department of Justice's Office of the Inspector General compiled a 300-page report documenting the conditions in the MDC in great detail. See 789 F.3d, at 279 (opinion of Raggi, J.) (noting that the USA PATRIOT Act required "the Department's Inspector General to review and report semi-annually to Congress on any identified abuses of civil rights and civil liberties in fighting terrorism"). Nevertheless, "[a]t no point did Congress choose to extend to any person the kind of remedies that respondents seek in this lawsuit." Schweiker, 487 U.S., at 426 , 108 S.Ct. 2460 .

This silence is notable because it is likely that high-level policies will attract the attention of Congress. Thus, when Congress fails to provide a damages remedy in circumstances like these, it is much more difficult to believe that "congressional inaction" was "inadvertent." Id., at 423 , 108 S.Ct. 2460 .

It is of central importance, too, that this is not a case like Bivens or Davis in which "it is damages or nothing." Bivens, supra, at 410 , 91 S.Ct. 1999 (Harlan, J., concurring in judgment); Davis, 442 U.S., at 245 , 99 S.Ct. 2264 . Unlike the plaintiffs in those cases, respondents do not challenge individual instances of discrimination or law enforcement overreach, which due to their very nature are difficult to address except by way of damages actions after the fact. Respondents instead challenge large-scale policy decisions concerning the conditions of confinement imposed on hundreds of prisoners. To address those kinds of decisions, detainees may seek injunctive relief. And in addition to that, we have left open the question whether they might be able to challenge their confinement *1863 conditions via a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 , 526, n. 6, 99 S.Ct. 1861 , 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979) ("[W]e leave to another day the question of the propriety of using a writ of habeas corpus to obtain review of the conditions of confinement"); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 , 499, 93 S.Ct. 1827 , 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973) ("When a prisoner is put under additional and unconstitutional restraints during his lawful custody, it is arguable that habeas corpus will lie to remove the restraints making custody illegal").

Indeed, the habeas remedy, if necessity required its use, would have provided a faster and more direct route to relief than a suit for money damages. A successful habeas petition would have required officials to place respondents in less-restrictive conditions immediately; yet this damages suit remains unresolved some 15 years later. (As in Bell and Preiser, the Court need not determine the scope or availability of the habeas corpus remedy, a question that is not before the Court and has not been briefed or argued.) In sum, respondents had available to them " 'other alternative forms of judicial relief.' " Minneci, 565 U.S., at 124 , 132 S.Ct. 617 . And when alternative methods of relief are available, a Bivens remedy usually is not. See Bush, 462 U.S., at 386-388 , 103 S.Ct. 2404 ; Schweiker, supra, at 425-426 , 108 S.Ct. 2460 ; Malesko, 534 U.S., at 73-74 , 122 S.Ct. 515 ; Minneci, supra, at 125-126 , 132 S.Ct. 617 .

There is a persisting concern, of course, that absent a Bivens remedy there will be insufficient deterrence to prevent officers from violating the Constitution. In circumstances like those presented here, however, the stakes on both sides of the argument are far higher than in past cases the Court has considered. If Bivens liability were to be imposed, high officers who face personal liability for damages might refrain from taking urgent and lawful action in a time of crisis. And, as already noted, the costs and difficulties of later litigation might intrude upon and interfere with the proper exercise of their office.

On the other side of the balance, the very fact that some executive actions have the sweeping potential to affect the liberty of so many is a reason to consider proper means to impose restraint and to provide some redress from injury. There is therefore a balance to be struck, in situations like this one, between deterring constitutional violations and freeing high officials to make the lawful decisions necessary to protect the Nation in times of great peril. Cf. Stanley, supra, at 681 , 107 S.Ct. 3054 (noting that the special-factors analysis in that case turned on "how much occasional, unintended impairment of military discipline one is willing to tolerate"). The proper balance is one for the Congress, not the Judiciary, to undertake. For all of these reasons, the Court of Appeals erred by allowing respondents' detention policy claims to proceed under Bivens .

IV

A

One of respondents' claims under Bivens requires a different analysis: the prisoner abuse claim against the MDC's warden, Dennis Hasty. The allegation is that Warden Hasty violated the Fifth Amendment by allowing prison guards to abuse respondents.

The warden argues, as an initial matter, that the complaint does not " 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.' " Iqbal, 556 U.S., at 678 , 129 S.Ct. 1937 (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 , 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955 , 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). Applying its precedents, the Court of Appeals held that the *1864 substantive standard for the sufficiency of the claim is whether the warden showed "deliberate indifference" to prisoner abuse. 789 F.3d, at 249-250 . The parties appear to agree on this standard, and, for purposes of this case, the Court assumes it to be correct.

The complaint alleges that guards routinely abused respondents; that the warden encouraged the abuse by referring to respondents as "terrorists"; that he prevented respondents from using normal grievance procedures; that he stayed away from the Unit to avoid seeing the abuse; that he was made aware of the abuse via "inmate complaints, staff complaints, hunger strikes, and suicide attempts"; that he ignored other "direct evidence of [the] abuse, including logs and other official [records]"; that he took no action "to rectify or address the situation"; and that the abuse resulted in the injuries described above, see supra, at 1853. These allegations-assumed here to be true, subject to proof at a later stage-plausibly show the warden's deliberate indifference to the abuse. Consistent with the opinion of every judge in this case to have considered the question, including the dissenters in the Court of Appeals, the Court concludes that the prisoner abuse allegations against Warden Hasty state a plausible ground to find a constitutional violation if a Bivens remedy is to be implied.

Warden Hasty argues, however, that Bivens ought not to be extended to this instance of alleged prisoner abuse. As noted above, the first question a court must ask in a case like this one is whether the claim arises in a new Bivens context, i.e., whether "the case is different in a meaningful way from previous Bivens cases decided by this Court." Supra, at 1859.

It is true that this case has significant parallels to one of the Court's previous Bivens cases, Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 , 100 S.Ct. 1468 , 64 L.Ed.2d 15 . There, the Court did allow a Bivens claim for prisoner mistreatment-specifically, for failure to provide medical care. And the allegations of injury here are just as compelling as those at issue in Carlson . This is especially true given that the complaint alleges serious violations of Bureau of Prisons policy. See 28 C.F.R. § 552.20 (2016) (providing that prison staff may use force "only as a last alternative after all other reasonable efforts to resolve a situation have failed" and that staff may "use only that amount of force necessary to [ensure prison safety and security]"); § 552.22(j) ("All incidents involving the use of force ... must be carefully documented"); § 542.11 (requiring the warden to investigate certain complaints of inmate abuse).

Yet even a modest extension is still an extension. And this case does seek to extend Carlson to a new context. As noted above, a case can present a new context for Bivens purposes if it implicates a different constitutional right; if judicial precedents provide a less meaningful guide for official conduct; or if there are potential special factors that were not considered in previous Bivens cases. See supra at 1858.

The constitutional right is different here, since Carlson was predicated on the Eighth Amendment and this claim is predicated on the Fifth. See 446 U.S., at 16 , 100 S.Ct. 1468 . And the judicial guidance available to this warden, with respect to his supervisory duties, was less developed. The Court has long made clear the standard for claims alleging failure to provide medical treatment to a prisoner-"deliberate indifference to serious medical needs." Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 , 104, 97 S.Ct. 285 , 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976). The standard for a claim alleging that a warden *1865 allowed guards to abuse pre-trial detainees is less clear under the Court's precedents.

This case also has certain features that were not considered in the Court's previous Bivens cases and that might discourage a court from authorizing a Bivens remedy. As noted above, the existence of alternative remedies usually precludes a court from authorizing a Bivens action. Supra, at 1858 - 1859. And there might have been alternative remedies available here, for example, a writ of habeas corpus, Wolfish, 441 U.S., at 526, n. 6 , 99 S.Ct. 1861 ; an injunction requiring the warden to bring his prison into compliance with the regulations discussed above; or some other form of equitable relief.

Furthermore, legislative action suggesting that Congress does not want a damages remedy is itself a factor counseling hesitation. See supra, at 1858 - 1859. Some 15 years after Carlson was decided, Congress passed the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, which made comprehensive changes to the way prisoner abuse claims must be brought in federal court. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e. So it seems clear that Congress had specific occasion to consider the matter of prisoner abuse and to consider the proper way to remedy those wrongs. This Court has said in dicta that the Act's exhaustion provisions would apply to Bivens suits. See Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516 , 524, 122 S.Ct. 983 , 152 L.Ed.2d 12 (2002). But the Act itself does not provide for a standalone damages remedy against federal jailers. It could be argued that this suggests Congress chose not to extend the Carlson damages remedy to cases involving other types of prisoner mistreatment.

The differences between this claim and the one in Carlson are perhaps small, at least in practical terms. Given this Court's expressed caution about extending the Bivens remedy, however, the new-context inquiry is easily satisfied. Some differences, of course, will be so trivial that they will not suffice to create a new Bivens context. But here the differences identified above are at the very least meaningful ones. Thus, before allowing this claim to proceed under Bivens, the Court of Appeals should have performed a special factors analysis. It should have analyzed whether there were alternative remedies available or other "sound reasons to think Congress might doubt the efficacy or necessity of a damages remedy" in a suit like this one. Supra, at 1859.

B

Although the Court could perform that analysis in the first instance, the briefs have concentrated almost all of their efforts elsewhere. Given the absence of a comprehensive presentation by the parties, and the fact that the Court of Appeals did not conduct the analysis, the Court declines to perform the special factors analysis itself. The better course is to vacate the judgment below, allowing the Court of Appeals or the District Court to do so on remand.

V

One issue remains to be addressed: the claim that petitioners are subject to liability for civil conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (3). Unlike the prisoner abuse claim just discussed, this claim implicates the activities of all the petitioners-the Executive Officials as well as the Wardens-in creating the conditions of confinement at issue here.

The civil-conspiracy prohibition contained in § 1985(3) was enacted as a significant part of the civil rights legislation passed in the aftermath of the Civil War. See Carpenters v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825 , 834-837, 103 S.Ct. 3352 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1049 (1983) (detailing the legislative history of § 1985(3) );

*1866 Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 , 99-101, 91 S.Ct. 1790 , 29 L.Ed.2d 338 (1971) (same); Great American Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366 , 379, 99 S.Ct. 2345 , 60 L.Ed.2d 957 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring) (describing § 1985(3) as a "Civil War Era remedial statute"). The statute imposes liability on two or more persons who "conspire ... for the purpose of depriving ... any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws." § 1985(3). In the instant suit, respondents allege that petitioners violated the statute by "agreeing to implement a policy" under which respondents would be detained in harsh conditions "because of their race, religion, ethnicity, and national origin." Assuming these allegations to be true and well pleaded, the question is whether petitioners are entitled to qualified immunity.

A

The qualified immunity rule seeks a proper balance between two competing interests. On one hand, damages suits "may offer the only realistic avenue for vindication of constitutional guarantees." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 , 814, 102 S.Ct. 2727 , 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). "On the other hand, permitting damages suits against government officials can entail substantial social costs, including the risk that fear of personal monetary liability and harassing litigation will unduly inhibit officials in the discharge of their duties." Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 , 638, 107 S.Ct. 3034 , 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987). As one means to accommodate these two objectives, the Court has held that Government officials are entitled to qualified immunity with respect to "discretionary functions" performed in their official capacities. Ibid. The doctrine of qualified immunity gives officials "breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments about open legal questions." Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731 , 743, 131 S.Ct. 2074 , 179 L.Ed.2d 1149 (2011).

The Court's cases provide additional instruction to define and implement that immunity. Whether qualified immunity can be invoked turns on the "objective legal reasonableness" of the official's acts. Harlow, supra, at 819 , 102 S.Ct. 2727 . And reasonableness of official action, in turn, must be "assessed in light of the legal rules that were clearly established at the time [the action] was taken." Anderson, supra, at 639 , 107 S.Ct. 3034 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Mitchell, 472 U.S., at 528 , 105 S.Ct. 2806 . This requirement-that an official loses qualified immunity only for violating clearly established law-protects officials accused of violating "extremely abstract rights." Anderson, supra, at 639 , 107 S.Ct. 3034 .

The Fourth Amendment provides an example of how qualified immunity functions with respect to abstract rights. By its plain terms, the Amendment forbids unreasonable searches and seizures, yet it may be difficult for an officer to know whether a search or seizure will be deemed reasonable given the precise situation encountered. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 , 205, 121 S.Ct. 2151 , 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001) ("It is sometimes difficult for an officer to determine how the relevant legal doctrine, here excessive force, will apply to the factual situation the officer confronts"). For this reason, "[t]he dispositive question is 'whether the violative nature of particular conduct is clearly established.' " Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. ----, ----, 136 S.Ct. 305 , 308, 193 L.Ed.2d 255 (2015) ( per curiam ) (quoting Ashcroft, supra, at 742, 129 S.Ct. 1937 ).

It is not necessary, of course, that "the very action in question has previously been held unlawful."

*1867 Anderson, supra, at 640 , 107 S.Ct. 3034 . That is, an officer might lose qualified immunity even if there is no reported case "directly on point." Ashcroft, supra, at 741, 129 S.Ct. 1937 . But "in the light of pre-existing law," the unlawfulness of the officer's conduct "must be apparent." Anderson, supra, at 640 , 107 S.Ct. 3034 . To subject officers to any broader liability would be to "disrupt the balance that our cases strike between the interests in vindication of citizens' constitutional rights and in public officials' effective performance of their duties." Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 , 195, 104 S.Ct. 3012 , 82 L.Ed.2d 139 (1984). For then, both as a practical and legal matter, it would be difficult for officials "reasonably [to] anticipate when their conduct may give rise to liability for damages." Ibid.

In light of these concerns, the Court has held that qualified immunity protects "all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law." Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 , 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092 , 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986). To determine whether a given officer falls into either of those two categories, a court must ask whether it would have been clear to a reasonable officer that the alleged conduct "was unlawful in the situation he confronted." Saucier, supra, at 202 , 121 S.Ct. 2151 . If so, then the defendant officer must have been either incompetent or else a knowing violator of the law, and thus not entitled to qualified immunity. If not, however- i.e., if a reasonable officer might not have known for certain that the conduct was unlawful-then the officer is immune from liability.

B

Under these principles, it must be concluded that reasonable officials in petitioners' positions would not have known, and could not have predicted, that § 1985(3) prohibited their joint consultations and the resulting policies that caused the injuries alleged.

At least two aspects of the complaint indicate that petitioners' potential liability for this statutory offense would not have been known or anticipated by reasonable officials in their position. First, the conspiracy recited in the complaint is alleged to have been between or among officers in the same branch of the Government (the Executive Branch) and in the same Department (the Department of Justice). Second, the discussions were the preface to, and the outline of, a general and far-reaching policy.

As to the fact that these officers were in the same Department, an analogous principle discussed in the context of antitrust law is instructive. The Court's precedent indicates that there is no unlawful conspiracy when officers within a single corporate entity consult among themselves and then adopt a policy for the entity. See Copperweld Corp v . Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 , 769-771, 104 S.Ct. 2731 , 81 L.Ed.2d 628 (1984). Under this principle-sometimes called the intracorporate-conspiracy doctrine-an agreement between or among agents of the same legal entity, when the agents act in their official capacities, is not an unlawful conspiracy. Ibid. The rule is derived from the nature of the conspiracy prohibition. Conspiracy requires an agreement-and in particular an agreement to do an unlawful act-between or among two or more separate persons. When two agents of the same legal entity make an agreement in the course of their official duties, however, as a practical and legal matter their acts are attributed to their principal. And it then follows that there has not been an agreement between two or more separate people. See id., at 771 , 104 S.Ct. 2731 (analogizing to "a multiple team of horses *1868 drawing a vehicle under the control of a single driver").

To be sure, this Court has not given its approval to this doctrine in the specific context of § 1985(3). See Great American, 442 U.S., at 372, n. 11, 99 S.Ct. 2345 . There is a division in the courts of appeals, moreover, respecting the validity or correctness of the intracorporate-conspiracy doctrine with reference to § 1985 conspiracies. See Hull v. Shuck, 501 U.S. 1261 , 1261-1262, 111 S.Ct. 2917 , 115 L.Ed.2d 1080 (1991) (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (discussing the Circuit split); Bowie v. Maddox, 642 F.3d 1122 , 1130-1131 (C.A.D.C.2011) (detailing a longstanding split about whether the intracorporate-conspiracy doctrine applies to civil rights conspiracies). Nothing in this opinion should be interpreted as either approving or disapproving the intracorporate-conspiracy doctrine's application in the context of an alleged § 1985(3) violation. The Court might determine, in some later case, that different considerations apply to a conspiracy respecting equal protection guarantees, as distinct from a conspiracy in the antitrust context. Yet the fact that the courts are divided as to whether or not a § 1985(3) conspiracy can arise from official discussions between or among agents of the same entity demonstrates that the law on the point is not well established. When the courts are divided on an issue so central to the cause of action alleged, a reasonable official lacks the notice required before imposing liability. See Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603 , 618, 119 S.Ct. 1692 , 143 L.Ed.2d 818 (1999) (noting that it would be "unfair" to subject officers to damages liability when even "judges ... disagree"); Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658 , 669-670, 132 S.Ct. 2088 , 182 L.Ed.2d 985 (2012) (same).

In addition to the concern that agents of the same legal entity are not distinct enough to conspire with one another, there are other sound reasons to conclude that conversations and agreements between and among federal officials in the same Department should not be the subject of a private cause of action for damages under § 1985(3). To state a claim under § 1985(3), a plaintiff must first show that the defendants conspired-that is, reached an agreement-with one another. See Carpenters, 463 U.S., at 828 , 103 S.Ct. 3352 (stating that the elements of a § 1985(3) claim include "a conspiracy"). Thus, a § 1985(3) claim against federal officials by necessity implicates the substance of their official discussions.

As indicated above with respect to other claims in this suit, open discussion among federal officers is to be encouraged, so that they can reach consensus on the policies a department of the Federal Government should pursue. See supra, at 1860 - 1861. Close and frequent consultations to facilitate the adoption and implementation of policies are essential to the orderly conduct of governmental affairs. Were those discussions, and the resulting policies, to be the basis for private suits seeking damages against the officials as individuals, the result would be to chill the interchange and discourse that is necessary for the adoption and implementation of governmental policies. See Cheney, 542 U.S., at 383 , 124 S.Ct. 2576 (discussing the need for confidential communications among Executive Branch officials); Merrill, 443 U.S., at 360 , 99 S.Ct. 2800 (same).

These considerations suggest that officials employed by the same governmental department do not conspire when they speak to one another and work together in their official capacities. Whether that contention should prevail need not be decided here. It suffices to say that the question is sufficiently open so that the officials in this suit could not be certain that *1869 § 1985(3) was applicable to their discussions and actions. Thus, the law respondents seek to invoke cannot be clearly established. It follows that reasonable officers in petitioners' positions would not have known with any certainty that the alleged agreements were forbidden by law. See Saucier, 533 U.S., at 202 , 121 S.Ct. 2151 . Petitioners are entitled to qualified immunity with respect to the claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (3).

* * *

If the facts alleged in the complaint are true, then what happened to respondents in the days following September 11 was tragic. Nothing in this opinion should be read to condone the treatment to which they contend they were subjected. The question before the Court, however, is not whether petitioners' alleged conduct was proper, nor whether it gave decent respect to respondents' dignity and well-being, nor whether it was in keeping with the idea of the rule of law that must inspire us even in times of crisis.

Instead, the question with respect to the Bivens claims is whether to allow an action for money damages in the absence of congressional authorization. For the reasons given above, the Court answers that question in the negative as to the detention policy claims. As to the prisoner abuse claim, because the briefs have not concentrated on that issue, the Court remands to allow the Court of Appeals to consider the claim in light of the Bivens analysis set forth above.

The question with respect to the § 1985(3) claim is whether a reasonable officer in petitioners' position would have known the alleged conduct was an unlawful conspiracy. For the reasons given above, the Court answers that question, too, in the negative.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed as to all of the claims except the prisoner abuse claim against Warden Hasty. The judgment of the Court of Appeals with respect to that claim is vacated, and that case is remanded for further proceedings.

It is so ordered.

Justice SOTOMAYOR, Justice KAGAN, and Justice GORSUCH took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases.

Justice THOMAS, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.

I join the Court's opinion except for Part IV-B. I write separately to express my view on the Court's decision to remand some of respondents' claims under Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 , 91 S.Ct. 1999 , 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971), and my concerns about our qualified immunity precedents.

I

With respect to respondents' Bivens claims, I join the opinion of the Court to the extent it reverses the Second Circuit's ruling. The Court correctly applies our precedents to hold that Bivens does not supply a cause of action against petitioners for most of the alleged Fourth and Fifth Amendment violations. It also correctly recognizes that respondents' claims against petitioner Dennis Hasty seek to extend Bivens to a new context. See ante, at 1864.

I concur in the judgment of the Court vacating the Court of Appeals' judgment with regard to claims against Hasty. Ante, at 1867. I have previously noted that " ' Bivens is a relic of the heady days in which this Court assumed common-law powers to create causes of action.' " Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537 , 568, 127 S.Ct. 2588 , 168 L.Ed.2d 389 (2007) (concurring opinion) (quoting Correctional Services *1870 Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61 , 75, 122 S.Ct. 515 , 151 L.Ed.2d 456 (2001) (Scalia, J., concurring)). I have thus declined to "extend Bivens even [where] its reasoning logically applied," thereby limiting " Bivens and its progeny ... to the precise circumstances that they involved." Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). This would, in most cases, mean a reversal of the judgment of the Court of Appeals is in order. However, in order for there to be a controlling judgment in this suit, I concur in the judgment vacating and remanding the claims against petitioner Hasty as that disposition is closest to my preferred approach.

II

As for respondents' claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (3), I join Part V of the Court's opinion, which holds that respondents are entitled to qualified immunity. The Court correctly applies our precedents, which no party has asked us to reconsider. I write separately, however, to note my growing concern with our qualified immunity jurisprudence.

The Civil Rights Act of 1871, of which § 1985(3) and the more frequently litigated § 1983 were originally a part, established causes of action for plaintiffs to seek money damages from Government officers who violated federal law. See §§ 1, 2, 17 Stat. 13 . Although the Act made no mention of defenses or immunities, "we have read it in harmony with general principles of tort immunities and defenses rather than in derogation of them." Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 , 339, 106 S.Ct. 1092 , 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted). We have done so because "[c]ertain immunities were so well established in 1871 ... that 'we presume that Congress would have specifically so provided had it wished to abolish' them." Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259 , 268, 113 S.Ct. 2606 , 125 L.Ed.2d 209 (1993) ; accord, Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325 , 330, 103 S.Ct. 1108 , 75 L.Ed.2d 96 (1983). Immunity is thus available under the statute if it was "historically accorded the relevant official" in an analogous situation "at common law," Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 , 421, 96 S.Ct. 984 , 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976), unless the statute provides some reason to think that Congress did not preserve the defense, see Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914 , 920, 104 S.Ct. 2820 , 81 L.Ed.2d 758 (1984).

In some contexts, we have conducted the common-law inquiry that the statute requires. See Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158 , 170, 112 S.Ct. 1827 , 118 L.Ed.2d 504 (1992) (KENNEDY, J., concurring). For example, we have concluded that legislators and judges are absolutely immune from liability under § 1983 for their official acts because that immunity was well established at common law in 1871. See Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 , 372-376, 71 S.Ct. 783 , 95 L.Ed. 1019 (1951) (legislators); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 , 553-555, 87 S.Ct. 1213 , 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967) (judges). We have similarly looked to the common law in holding that a prosecutor is immune from suits relating to the "judicial phase of the criminal process," Imbler, supra, at 430 , 96 S.Ct. 984 ; Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478 , 489-492, 111 S.Ct. 1934 , 114 L.Ed.2d 547 (1991) ; but see Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118 , 131-134, 118 S.Ct. 502 , 139 L.Ed.2d 471 (1997) (Scalia, J., joined by THOMAS, J., concurring) (arguing that the Court in Imbler misunderstood 1871 common-law rules), although not from suits relating to the prosecutor's advice to police officers, Burns, supra, at 493 , 111 S.Ct. 1934 .

In developing immunity doctrine for other executive officers, we also started off by applying common-law rules. In Pierson, we held that police officers are not absolutely *1871 immune from a § 1983 claim arising from an arrest made pursuant to an unconstitutional statute because the common law never granted arresting officers that sort of immunity. 386 U.S., at 555 , 87 S.Ct. 1213 . Rather, we concluded that police officers could assert "the defense of good faith and probable cause" against the claim for an unconstitutional arrest because that defense was available against the analogous torts of "false arrest and imprisonment" at common law. Id., at 557 , 87 S.Ct. 1213 .

In further elaborating the doctrine of qualified immunity for executive officials, however, we have diverged from the historical inquiry mandated by the statute. See Wyatt, supra, at 170, 112 S.Ct. 1827 (KENNEDY, J., concurring); accord, Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574 , 611, 118 S.Ct. 1584 , 140 L.Ed.2d 759 (1998) (Scalia, J., joined by THOMAS, J., dissenting). In the decisions following Pierson, we have "completely reformulated qualified immunity along principles not at all embodied in the common law." Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 , 645, 107 S.Ct. 3034 , 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987) (discussing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 , 102 S.Ct. 2727 , 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982) ). Instead of asking whether the common law in 1871 would have accorded immunity to an officer for a tort analogous to the plaintiff's claim under § 1983, we instead grant immunity to any officer whose conduct "does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. ----, ---- - ----, 136 S.Ct. 305 , 308, 193 L.Ed.2d 255 (2015) ( per curiam ) (internal quotation marks omitted); Taylor v. Barkes, 575 U.S. ----, ----, 135 S.Ct. 2042 , 2044, 192 L.Ed.2d 78 (2015) (a Government official is liable under the 1871 Act only if " 'existing precedent ... placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate' " (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731 , 741, 131 S.Ct. 2074 , 179 L.Ed.2d 1149 (2011) )). We apply this "clearly established" standard "across the board" and without regard to "the precise nature of the various officials' duties or the precise character of the particular rights alleged to have been violated." Anderson, supra, at 641-643 , 107 S.Ct. 3034 (internal quotation marks omitted). * We have not attempted to locate that standard in the common law as it existed in 1871, however, and some evidence supports the conclusion that common-law immunity as it existed in 1871 looked quite different from our current doctrine. See generally Baude, Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful? 106 Cal. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript, at 7-17), online at https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2896508 (as last visited June 15, 2017).

Because our analysis is no longer grounded in the common-law backdrop against which Congress enacted the 1871 Act, we are no longer engaged in "interpret [ing] the intent of Congress in enacting" the Act. Malley, supra, at 342 , 106 S.Ct. 1092 ; see Burns, supra, at 493 , 111 S.Ct. 1934 . Our qualified immunity precedents instead represent precisely the sort of "freewheeling policy choice[s]" that we have previously disclaimed the power to make. Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356 , 363, 132 S.Ct. 1497 , 182 L.Ed.2d 593 (2012) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Tower, supra, at 922-923 , 104 S.Ct. 2820 ("We do not have a license to establish immunities from" suits brought under *1872 the Act "in the interests of what we judge to be sound public policy"). We have acknowledged, in fact, that the "clearly established" standard is designed to "protec[t] the balance between vindication of constitutional rights and government officials' effective performance of their duties." Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658 , 664, 132 S.Ct. 2088 , 182 L.Ed.2d 985 (2012) (internal quotation marks omitted); Harlow, supra, at 807 , 102 S.Ct. 2727 (explaining that "the recognition of a qualified immunity defense ... reflected an attempt to balance competing values"). The Constitution assigns this kind of balancing to Congress, not the Courts.

In today's decision, we continue down the path our precedents have marked. We ask "whether it would have been clear to a reasonable officer that the alleged conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted," ante, at 1867 (internal quotation marks omitted), rather than whether officers in petitioners' positions would have been accorded immunity at common law in 1871 from claims analogous to respondents'. Even if we ultimately reach a conclusion consistent with the common-law rules prevailing in 1871, it is mere fortuity. Until we shift the focus of our inquiry to whether immunity existed at common law, we will continue to substitute our own policy preferences for the mandates of Congress. In an appropriate case, we should reconsider our qualified immunity jurisprudence.

Justice BREYER, with whom Justice GINSBURG joins, dissenting.

In Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 , 91 S.Ct. 1999 , 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971), this Court held that the Fourth Amendment provides a damages remedy for those whom federal officials have injured as a result of an unconstitutional search or seizure. In Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 , 99 S.Ct. 2264 , 60 L.Ed.2d 846 (1979), the Court held that the Fifth Amendment provides a damages remedy to an individual dismissed by her employer (a Member of Congress) on the basis of her sex in violation of the equal protection component of that Amendment's Due Process Clause. And in Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 , 100 S.Ct. 1468 , 64 L.Ed.2d 15 (1980), the Court held that the Eighth Amendment provides a damages remedy to a prisoner who died as a result of prison official's deliberate indifference to his medical needs, in violation of the Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.

It is by now well established that federal law provides damages actions at least in similar contexts, where claims of constitutional violation arise. Congress has ratified Bivens actions, plaintiffs frequently bring them, courts accept them, and scholars defend their importance. See J. Pfander, Constitutional Torts and the War on Terror (2017) (canvassing the history of Bivens and cataloguing cases). Moreover, the courts, in order to avoid deterring federal officials from properly performing their work, have developed safeguards for defendants, including the requirement that plaintiffs plead "plausible" claims, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 , 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937 , 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009), as well as the defense of "qualified immunity," which frees federal officials from both threat of liability and involvement in the lawsuit, unless the plaintiffs establish that officials have violated " 'clearly established ... constitutional rights,' " id., at 672 , 129 S.Ct. 1937 (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 , 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727 , 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982) ). "[This] Court has been reluctant to extend Bivens liability 'to any new context or new category of defendants.' " Iqbal, supra, at 675 , 129 S.Ct. 1937 (quoting *1873 Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61 , 68, 122 S.Ct. 515 , 151 L.Ed.2d 456 (2001) ). But the Court has made clear that it would not narrow Bivens' existing scope. See FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471 , 485, 114 S.Ct. 996 , 127 L.Ed.2d 308 (1994) (guarding against "the evisceration of the Bivens remedy" so that its "deterrent effects ... would [not] be lost").

The plaintiffs before us today seek damages for unconstitutional conditions of confinement. They alleged that federal officials slammed them against walls, shackled them, exposed them to nonstop lighting, lack of hygiene, and the like, all based upon invidious discrimination and without penological justification. See ante, at 1852 - 1853. In my view, these claims are well-pleaded, state violations of clearly established law, and fall within the scope of longstanding Bivens law. For those reasons, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. I shall discuss at some length what I believe is the most important point of disagreement. The Court, in my view, is wrong to hold that permitting a constitutional tort action here would "extend" Bivens, applying it in a new context. To the contrary, I fear that the Court's holding would significantly shrink the existing Bivens contexts, diminishing the compensatory remedy constitutional tort law now offers to harmed individuals.

I shall explain why I believe this suit falls well within the scope of traditional constitutional tort law and why I cannot agree with the Court's arguments to the contrary. I recognize, and write separately about, the strongest of the Court's arguments, namely, the fact that plaintiffs' claims concern detention that took place soon after a serious attack on the United States and some of them concern actions of high-level Government officials. While these facts may affect the substantive constitutional questions ( e.g., were any of the conditions "legitimate"?) or the scope of the qualified-immunity defense, they do not extinguish the Bivens action itself. If I may paraphrase Justice Harlan, concurring in Bivens : In wartime as well as in peacetime, "it is important, in a civilized society, that the judicial branch of the Nation's government stand ready to afford a remedy" "for the most flagrant and patently unjustified," unconstitutional "abuses of official power." 403 U.S., at 410-411, 91 S.Ct. 1999 (opinion concurring in judgment); cf. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 , 798, 128 S.Ct. 2229 , 171 L.Ed.2d 41 (2008).

I

The majority opinion well summarizes the particular claims that the plaintiffs make in this suit. All concern the conditions of their confinement, which began soon after the September 11, 2001, attacks and "lasted for days and weeks, then stretching into months." Ante, at 1851. At some point, the plaintiffs allege, all the defendants knew that they had nothing to do with the September 11 attacks but continued to detain them anyway in harsh conditions. Official Government policy, both before and after the defendants became aware of the plaintiffs' innocence, led to the plaintiffs being held in "tiny cells for over 23 hours a day" with lights continuously left on, "shackled" when moved, often "strip searched," and "denied access to most forms of communication with the outside world." Ante, at 1853 (internal quotation marks omitted). The defendants detained the plaintiffs in these conditions on the basis of their race or religion and without justification.

Moreover, the prison wardens were aware of, but deliberately indifferent to, certain unofficial activities of prison guards involving a pattern of "physical and verbal abuse," such as "slam[ming] detainees into walls; twist[ing] their arms, wrists, and *1874 fingers; [breaking] their bones;" and subjecting them to verbal taunts. Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted).

The plaintiffs' complaint alleges that all the defendants-high-level Department of Justice officials and prison wardens alike-were directly responsible for the official confinement policy, which, in some or all of the aspects mentioned, violated the due process and equal protection components of the Fifth Amendment. The complaint adds that, insofar as the prison wardens were deliberately indifferent to the unofficial conduct of the guards, they violated the Fourth and the Fifth Amendments.

I would hold that the complaint properly alleges constitutional torts, i.e.,Bivens actions for damages.

A

The Court's holdings in Bivens, Carlson, and Davis rest upon four basic legal considerations. First, the Bivens Court referred to longstanding Supreme Court precedent stating or suggesting that the Constitution provides federal courts with considerable legal authority to use traditional remedies to right constitutional wrongs. That precedent begins with Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 , 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803), which effectively placed upon those who would deny the existence of an effective legal remedy the burden of showing why their case was special. Chief Justice John Marshall wrote for the Court that

"[t]he very essence of civil liberty [lies] in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury." Id., at 163 .

The Chief Justice referred to Blackstone's Commentaries stating that there

" 'is a general and indisputable rule, that where there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy ... [and that] it is a settled and invariable principle in the laws of England, that every right, when withheld, must have a remedy, and every injury its proper redress.' " 1 Cranch, at 163.

The Chief Justice then wrote:

"The government of the United States has been emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of men. It will [not] deserve this high appellation, if the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal right." Ibid.

He concluded for the Court that there must be something "peculiar" ( i.e., special) about a case that warrants "exclu[ding] the injured party from legal redress ... [and placing it within] that class of cases which come under the description of damnum absque injuria- a loss without an injury." Id., at 163-164; but cf. id., at 164 (placing "political" questions in the latter, special category).

Much later, in Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 , 684, 66 S.Ct. 773 , 90 L.Ed. 939 (1946), the Court wrote that,

"where federally protected rights have been invaded, it has been the rule from the beginning that courts will be alert to adjust their remedies so as to grant the necessary relief."

See also Bivens, 403 U.S., at 392 , 91 S.Ct. 1999 (citing opinions of Justices Cardozo and Holmes to similar effect).

The Bivens Court reiterated these principles and confirmed that the appropriate remedial "adjust[ment]" in the case before it was an award of money damages, the "remedial mechanism normally available in the federal courts." Id., at 392, 397 , 91 S.Ct. 1999 . Justice Harlan agreed, adding that, since Congress' "general" statutory "grant of jurisdiction" authorized courts to grant equitable relief in cases arising under federal jurisdiction, courts likewise had the authority to award damages-the "traditional remedy at law"-in order to "vindicate the interests of the individual"

*1875 protected by the Bill of Rights. Id., at 405-407 , 91 S.Ct. 1999 (opinion concurring in judgment).

Second, our cases have recognized that Congress' silence on the subject indicates a willingness to leave this matter to the courts. In Bivens, the Court noted, as an argument favoring its conclusion, the absence of an "explicit congressional declaration that persons injured by a federal officer's violation of the Fourth Amendment may not recover money damages from the agents." Id., at 397 , 91 S.Ct. 1999 . Similarly, in Davis v. Passman, the Court stressed that there was "no evidence ... that Congress meant ... to foreclose" a damages remedy. 442 U.S., at 247, 99 S.Ct. 2264 . In Carlson, the Court went further, observing that not only was there no sign "that Congress meant to pre-empt a Bivens remedy," but there was also "clear" evidence that Congress intended to preserve it. 446 U.S., at 19-20 , 100 S.Ct. 1468 .

Third, our Bivens cases acknowledge that a constitutional tort may not lie when "special factors counse[l] hesitation" and when Congress has provided an adequate alternative remedy. 446 U.S., at 18-19 , 100 S.Ct. 1468 . The relevant special factors in those cases included whether the court was faced "with a question of 'federal fiscal policy,' " Bivens, supra, at 396 , 91 S.Ct. 1999 or a risk of "deluging federal courts with claims," Davis, supra, at 248, 99 S.Ct. 2264 (internal quotation marks omitted). Carlson acknowledged an additional factor-that damages suits "might inhibit [federal officials'] efforts to perform their official duties"-but concluded that "the qualified immunity accorded [federal officials] under [existing law] provides adequate protection." 446 U.S., at 19 , 100 S.Ct. 1468 .

Fourth, as the Court recognized later in Carlson, a Bivens remedy was needed to cure what would, without it, amount to a constitutional anomaly. Long before this Court incorporated many of the Bill of Rights' guarantees against the States, see Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 Yale L.J. 1193 (1992), federal civil rights statutes afforded a damages remedy to any person whom a state official deprived of a federal constitutional right, see 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ; Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 , 171-187, 81 S.Ct. 473 , 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961) (describing this history). But federal statutory law did not provide a damages remedy to a person whom a federal official had deprived of that same right, even though the Bill of Rights was at the time of the founding primarily aimed at constraining the Federal Government. Thus, a person harmed by an unconstitutional search or seizure might sue a city mayor, a state legislator, or even a Governor. But that person could not sue a federal agent, a national legislator, or a Justice Department official for an identical offense. "[Our] 'constitutional design,' " the Court wrote, "would be stood on its head if federal officials did not face at least the same liability as state officials guilty of the same constitutional transgression." Carlson, supra, at 22 , 100 S.Ct. 1468 (quoting Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 , 504, 98 S.Ct. 2894 , 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978) ).

The Bivens Court also recognized that the Court had previously inferred damages remedies caused by violations of certain federal statutes that themselves did not explicitly authorize damages remedies. 403 U.S., at 395-396, 91 S.Ct. 1999 . At the same time, Bivens, Davis, and Carlson treat the courts' power to derive a damages remedy from a constitutional provision not as included within a power to find a statute-based damages remedy but as flowing from those statutory cases a fortiori.

*1876 As the majority opinion points out, this Court in more recent years has indicated that " expanding the Bivens remedy is now a ' disfavored' judicial activity." Ante, at 1857 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S., at 675 , 129 S.Ct. 1937 ; emphasis added). Thus, it has held that the remedy is not available in the context of suits against military officers, see Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296 , 298-300, 103 S.Ct. 2362 , 76 L.Ed.2d 586 (1983) ; United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669 , 683-684, 107 S.Ct. 3054 , 97 L.Ed.2d 550 (1987) ; in the context of suits against privately operated prisons and their employees, see Minneci v. Pollard, 565 U.S. 118 , 120, 132 S.Ct. 617 , 181 L.Ed.2d 606 (2012) ; Malesko, 534 U.S., at 70-73 , 122 S.Ct. 515 ; in the context of suits seeking to vindicate procedural, rather than substantive, constitutional protections, see Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412 , 423, 108 S.Ct. 2460 , 101 L.Ed.2d 370 (1988) ; and in the context of suits seeking to vindicate two quite different forms of important substantive protection, one involving free speech, see Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367 , 368, 103 S.Ct. 2404 , 76 L.Ed.2d 648 (1983), and the other involving protection of land rights, see Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537 , 551, 127 S.Ct. 2588 , 168 L.Ed.2d 389 (2007). Each of these cases involved a context that differed from that of Bivens, Davis, and Carlson with respect to the kind of defendant, the basic nature of the right, or the kind of harm suffered. That is to say, as we have explicitly stated, these cases were " fundamentally different from anything recognized in Bivens or subsequent cases." Malesko, supra, at 70, 122 S.Ct. 515 (emphasis added). In each of them, the plaintiffs were asking the Court to " 'authoriz[e] a new kind of federal litigation.' " Wilkie, supra, at 550 , 127 S.Ct. 2588 (emphasis added).

Thus the Court, as the majority opinion says, repeatedly wrote that it was not "expanding" the scope of the Bivens remedy. Ante, at 1856 - 1857. But the Court nowhere suggested that it would narrow Bivens ' existing scope. In fact, to diminish any ambiguity about its holdings, the Court set out a framework for determining whether a claim of constitutional violation calls for a Bivens remedy. See Wilkie, supra, at 549-550 , 127 S.Ct. 2588 . At Step One, the court must determine whether the case before it arises in a "new context," that is, whether it involves a "new category of defendants," Malesko, supra, at 68 , 122 S.Ct. 515 or (presumably) a significantly different kind of constitutional harm, such as a purely procedural harm, a harm to speech, or a harm caused to physical property. If the context is new, then the court proceeds to Step Two and asks "whether any alternative, existing process for protecting the interest amounts to a convincing reason for the Judicial Branch to refrain from providing a new and freestanding remedy in damages." Wilkie, 551 U.S., at 550 , 127 S.Ct. 2588 . If there is none, then the court proceeds to Step Three and asks whether there are " 'any special factors counselling hesitation before authorizing a new kind of federal litigation.' " Ibid .

Precedent makes this framework applicable here. I would apply it. And, doing so, I cannot get past Step One. This suit, it seems to me, arises in a context similar to those in which this Court has previously permitted Bivens actions.

B

1

The context here is not "new," Wilkie, supra, at 550 , 127 S.Ct. 2588 or "fundamentally different" than our previous Bivens cases, Malesko, supra, at 70 , 122 S.Ct. 515 . First, the plaintiffs are civilians, not members of the military. They are not citizens, but the Constitution protects *1877 noncitizens against serious mistreatment, as it protects citizens. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 , 271, 110 S.Ct. 1056 , 108 L.Ed.2d 222 (1990) ("[A]liens receive constitutional protections when they have come within the territory of the United States and developed substantial connections with this country"). Some or all of the plaintiffs here may have been illegally present in the United States. But that fact cannot justify physical mistreatment. Nor does anyone claim that that fact deprives them of a Bivens right available to other persons, citizens and noncitizens alike.

Second, the defendants are Government officials. They are not members of the military or private persons. Two are prison wardens. Three others are high-ranking Department of Justice officials. Prison wardens have been defendants in Bivens actions, as have other high-level Government officials. One of the defendants in Carlson was the Director of the Bureau of Prisons; the defendant in Davis was a Member of Congress. We have also held that the Attorney General of the United States is not entitled to absolute immunity in a damages suit arising out of his actions related to national security. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 , 520, 105 S.Ct. 2806 , 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985).

Third, from a Bivens perspective, the injuries that the plaintiffs claim they suffered are familiar ones. They focus upon the conditions of confinement. The plaintiffs say that they were unnecessarily shackled, confined in small unhygienic cells, subjected to continuous lighting (presumably preventing sleep), unnecessarily and frequently strip searched, slammed against walls, injured physically, and subject to verbal abuse. They allege that they suffered these harms because of their race or religion, the defendants having either turned a blind eye to what was happening or themselves introduced policies that they knew would lead to these harms even though the defendants knew the plaintiffs had no connections to terrorism.

These claimed harms are similar to, or even worse than, the harms the plaintiffs suffered in Bivens (unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment), Davis (unlawful discrimination in violation of the Fifth Amendment), and Carlson (deliberate indifference to medical need in violation of the Eighth Amendment). Indeed, we have said that, "[i]f a federal prisoner in a [Bureau of Prisons] facility alleges a constitutional deprivation, he may bring a Bivens claim against the offending individual officer, subject to the defense of qualified immunity." Malesko, 534 U.S., at 72, 122 S.Ct. 515 ; see also Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 , 832, 114 S.Ct. 1970 , 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994) ( Bivens case about prisoner abuse). The claims in this suit would seem to fill the Bivens' bill. See Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 , 193, 123 S.Ct. 2174 , 156 L.Ed.2d 197 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[A] [ Bivens ] action ... is available to federal pretrial detainees challenging the conditions of their confinement").

It is true that the plaintiffs bring their "deliberate indifference" claim against Warden Hasty under the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause, not the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, as in Carlson . But that is because the latter applies to convicted criminals while the former applies to pretrial and immigration detainees. Where the harm is the same, where this Court has held that both the Fifth and Eighth Amendments give rise to Bivens' remedies, and where the only difference in constitutional scope consists of a circumstance (the absence of a conviction) that makes the violation here worse, it cannot be maintained *1878 that the difference between the use of the two Amendments is "fundamental." See City of Revere v. Massachusetts Gen. Hospital, 463 U.S. 239 , 244, 103 S.Ct. 2979 , 77 L.Ed.2d 605 (1983) ("due process rights" of an unconvicted person "are at least as great as the Eighth Amendment protections available to a convicted prisoner"); Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. ----, ---- - ----, 135 S.Ct. 2466 , 2475, 192 L.Ed.2d 416 (2015) ("pretrial detainees (unlike convicted prisoners) cannot be punished at all"); Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 , 721, 121 S.Ct. 2491 , 150 L.Ed.2d 653 (2001) (KENNEDY, J., dissenting) (detention "incident to removal ... cannot be justified as punishment nor can the confinement or its conditions be designed in order to punish"). See also Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352 , 372 (C.A.3 2012) (permitting Bivens action brought by detainee in administrative segregation); Thomas v. Ashcroft, 470 F.3d 491 , 493, 496-497 (C.A.2 2006) (detainee alleging failure to provide adequate medical care); Magluta v. Samples, 375 F.3d 1269 , 1271, 1275-1276 (C.A.11 2004) (detainee in solitary confinement); Papa v. United States, 281 F.3d 1004 , 1010-1011 (C.A.9 2002) (due process claims arising from death of immigration detainee); Loe v. Armistead, 582 F.2d 1291 , 1293-1296 (C.A.4 1978) (detainee's claim of deliberate indifference to medical need). If an arrestee can bring a claim of excessive force ( Bivens itself), and a convicted prisoner can bring a claim for denying medical care ( Carlson ), someone who has neither been charged nor convicted with a crime should also be able to challenge abuse that causes him to need medical care.

Nor has Congress suggested that it wants to withdraw a damages remedy in circumstances like these. By its express terms, the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA) does not apply to immigration detainees. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(h) ("[T]he term 'prisoner' means any person incarcerated or detained in any facility who is accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law ..."); see also Agyeman v. INS, 296 F.3d 871 , 886 (C.A.9 2002) ("[W]e hold that an alien detained by the INS pending deportation is not a 'prisoner' within the meaning of the PLRA"); LaFontant v. INS, 135 F.3d 158 , 165 (C.A.D.C.1998) (same); Ojo v. INS, 106 F.3d 680 , 683 (C.A.5 1997) (same). And, in fact, there is strong evidence that Congress assumed that Bivens remedies would be available to prisoners when it enacted the PLRA- e.g., Congress continued to permit prisoners to recover for physical injuries, the typical kinds of Bivens injuries. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (b)(2) ; Pfander, Constitutional Torts, at 105-106.

If there were any lingering doubt that the claim against Warden Hasty arises in a familiar Bivens context, the Court has made clear that conditions-of-confinement claims and medical-care claims are subject to the same substantive standard. See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1 , 8, 112 S.Ct. 995 , 117 L.Ed.2d 156 (1992) ("[ Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 , 303, 111 S.Ct. 2321 , 115 L.Ed.2d 271 (1991) ] extended the deliberate indifference standard applied to Eighth Amendment claims involving medical care to claims about conditions of confinement"). Indeed, the Court made this very point in a Bivens case alleging that prison wardens were deliberately indifferent to an inmate's safety. See Farmer, supra, at 830, 834 , 114 S.Ct. 1970 .

I recognize that the Court finds a significant difference in the fact that the confinement here arose soon after a national-security emergency, namely, the September 11 attacks. The short answer to this argument, in respect to at least some of the claimed harms, is that some plaintiffs continued to suffer those harms up to *1879 eight months after the September 11 attacks took place and after the defendants knew the plaintiffs had no connection to terrorism. See App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 15-1359, p. 280a. But because I believe the Court's argument here is its strongest, I will consider it at greater length below. See Part III-C, infra.

Because the context here is not new, I would allow the plaintiffs' constitutional claims to proceed. The plaintiffs have adequately alleged that the defendants were personally involved in imposing the conditions of confinement and did so with knowledge that the plaintiffs bore no ties to terrorism, thus satisfying Iqbal 's pleading standard. See 556 U.S., at 679 , 129 S.Ct. 1937 (claims must be "plausible"); see also id., at 699-700 , 129 S.Ct. 1937 (BREYER, J., dissenting). And because it is clearly established that it is unconstitutional to subject detainees to punitive conditions of confinement and to target them based solely on their race, religion, or national origin, the defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity on the constitutional claims. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 , 535-539, and n. 20, 99 S.Ct. 1861 , 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979) ; Davis, 442 U.S., at 236 , 99 S.Ct. 2264 ("It is equally clear ... that the Fifth Amendment confers on petitioner a constitutional right to be free from illegal discrimination"). (Similarly, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals with respect to the plaintiffs' statutory claim, namely, that the defendants conspired to deprive the plaintiffs of equal protection of the laws in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (3). See Turkmen v. Hasty, 789 F.3d 218 , 262-264 (C.A.2 2015). I agree with the Court of Appeals that the defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity on this claim. See ibid. )

2

Even were I wrong and were the context here "fundamentally different," Malesko, 534 U.S., at 70 , 122 S.Ct. 515 the plaintiffs' claims would nonetheless survive Step Two and Step Three of the Court's framework for determining whether Bivens applies, see supra, at 1876 - 1877. Step Two consists of asking whether "any alternative, existing process for protecting the interest amounts to a convincing reason for the Judicial Branch to refrain from providing a new and freestanding remedy in damages." Wilkie, 551 U.S., at 550 , 127 S.Ct. 2588 . I can find no such "alternative, existing process" here.

The Court does not claim that the PLRA provides plaintiffs with a remedy. Ante, at 1874 - 1875. Rather, it says that the plaintiffs may have "had available to them" relief in the form of a prospective injunction or an application for a writ of habeas corpus. Ante, at 1863. Neither a prospective injunction nor a writ of habeas corpus, however, will normally provide plaintiffs with redress for harms they have already suffered. And here plaintiffs make a strong claim that neither was available to them-at least not for a considerable time. Some of the plaintiffs allege that for two or three months they were subject to a "communications blackout"; that the prison "staff did not permit them visitors, legal or social telephone calls, or mail"; that their families and attorneys did not know where they were being held; that they could not receive visits from their attorneys; that subsequently their lawyers could call them only once a week; and that some or all of the defendants "interfered with the detainees' effective access to legal counsel." Office of Inspector General (OIG) Report, App. 223, 293, 251, 391; see App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 15-1359, at 253a (incorporating the OIG report into the complaint). These claims make it virtually impossible to say that here there is an "elaborate, comprehensive" alternative remedial scheme similar to schemes that, *1880 in the past, we have found block the application of Bivens to new contexts. Bush, 462 U.S., at 385, 103 S.Ct. 2404 . If these allegations are proved, then in this suit, it is "damages or nothing." Bivens, 403 U.S., at 410 , 91 S.Ct. 1999 (Harlan, J., concurring in judgment).

There being no "alternative, existing process" that provides a "convincing reason" for not applying Bivens, we must proceed to Step Three. Wilkie, supra, at 550 , 127 S.Ct. 2588 . Doing so, I can find no "special factors [that] counse[l] hesitation before authorizing" this Bivens action. 551 U.S., at 550 , 127 S.Ct. 2588 . I turn to this matter next.

II

A

The Court describes two general considerations that it believes argue against an "extension" of Bivens. First, the majority opinion points out that the Court is now far less likely than at the time it decided Bivens to imply a cause of action for damages from a statute that does not explicitly provide for a damages claim. See ante, at 1855 - 1856. Second, it finds the "silence" of Congress "notable" in that Congress, though likely aware of the "high-level policies" involved in this suit, did not "choose to extend to any person the kind of remedies" that the plaintiffs here "seek." Ante, at 1861 - 1862 (internal quotation marks omitted). I doubt the strength of these two general considerations.