Note on Luparello

The natural and probable consequences doctrine described in Luparello is a powerful tool for the prosecution, but it can also be overstated. Luparello does not stand for the proposition that one who encourages bad behavior is responsible for any result that might follow. Rather, the natural and probable consequences doctrine is an extension of accomplice liability. It doesn't create liability where it would not otherwise exist.

So, for example, the natural and probable consequences doctrine does not mean that a defendant is liable when the principal commits a crime that is the natural and probable consequence of the defedant's conduct. It must still be shown that the defendant is an accomplice of the principal -- that is that he has encouraged and intended to encourage the principal's criminal conduct. All the Luparello doctrine does is extend that liability to all crimes that are foreseeable given that the defendant is already an accomplice. What crimes would Luparello be an accomplice to that could give rise to his liability for murder?

Finally, did you find convincing the dissent's argument that the natural and probable consequences doctrine makes the defendant's culpability turn on factors beyond his control? Does that criticism apply as well to other doctrines we have encountered this semester?