Note on judicial interpretation of the felony murder rule

As you see in Auman, the Court defers to the legislature's decision to impose the felony murder rule. Even when courts are dubious about the rule's value, they generally defer to the legislature's intent up to the point that they believe the rule impinges on the constitutional rights of defendants. So, for example, the Supreme Court has held that the death penalty cannot be imposed for felony murderers who both did not kill themselves and did not have a culpable mental state with regard to death. See Enmund v. Florida, 458 US 782 (1982) and Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987). Even if the legislators' intent was to impose such liability, the Court has held that doing so is not consistent with the Constitution.

Short of that, however, the courts are generally deferential to the intent of the legislature, both with respect to felony murder and more generally. Nonetheless, many judges express both skepticism about the wisdom of the felony murder and an unwillingness to extend it beyond the specific provisions enacted by the legislature. We see this play out in some of the cases that follow; in assessing the scope of the felony murder statute, courts will give the felony murder the scope, but only the scope, that they believe the legislature enacted. See if you can detect that approach in the cases that follow.