Note on Drunk Driving and Voluntary Intoxication

Fleming and the excerpt from Washington raise a difficult question we have thusfar avoided: How should the defendant's voluntary intoxication affect his criminal responsibility. For states that adhered to the distinction between general and specific intent crimes, the rule is simple: voluntary intoxication is not a defense to a general intent crime like DUI, but can be a defense to a specific intent crime like burglary (the defendant was unable to form the intent to commit a crime inside the dwelling of another because of his intoxication).

Specific and general intent designations to one side, how should courts deal with the question of voluntary intoxication. Should it be a defense for Flemming to state that he was unable to appreciate the recklessness of his conduct because of his intoxication? Though that resolution is unsatisfying -- it absolves those who chose to get so drunk that they lose control -- how else can we understand holding someone accountable for conduct carried out while extremely intoxicated? Is the California Supreme Court right in stating that the decision to drive a car to a bar where he knew would be drinking sufficient to make Washington a murderer? Is that how ew think of people who drive to bars? Is the Court imposing something like strict liability on people who do so? Is that justified?