Note on People v. Casassa

What is it, exactly, that Casassa is arguing in this case? Is he saying that because he was suffering from extreme mental or emotional distress his conduct should be reduced to manslaughter without consideration of the reasonableness of that distress? Or is he saying that there should be a reasonableness determination, but that it should be made from his point of view? What point of view is that, exactly?

Answering these questions requires us to resolve important issues regarding what voluntary manslaughter and its MPC analogy are for. If they are to excuse defendants for being temporarily not themselves, should it matter whether there's a reasonable explanation or excuse for the emotional disturbance? Shouldn't someone's conduct always be mitigated if they are suffering emotional disturbance? But if the point is that some defendants have a good reason, what we might call a partial justification for their conduct, then we would have to scrutinize the reasons for the emotional disturbance more closely.

These issues in turn raise even broader questions. Consider again the facts of Anderson. Is there a clearer case in the book of someone suffering from extreme mental or emotional disturbance? Isn't there a contradiction at work here? Doesn't it seem that there is an inverse relationship between the defendant's culpability and the perversity of his crimes? That is, if voluntary manslaughter is meant to partially excuse those operating under mental or emotional strain, who has demonstrated that more clearly than Anderson?