Justice GINSBURG delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case presents a question of time, specifically, time to file a notice of appeal from a district court's judgment. In Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 210-213, 127 S.Ct. 2360, 168 L.Ed.2d 96 (2007), this Court clarified that an appeal filing deadline prescribed by statute will be regarded as "jurisdictional," meaning that late filing of the appeal notice necessitates dismissal of the appeal. But a time limit prescribed only in a court-made rule, Bowles acknowledged, is not jurisdictional; it is, instead, a mandatory claim-processing rule subject to forfeiture if not properly raised by the appellee. Ibid. ;

*17Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 456, 124 S.Ct. 906, 157 L.Ed.2d 867 (2004). Because the Court of Appeals held jurisdictional a time limit specified in a rule, not in a statute, 835 F.3d 761, 763 (C.A.7 2016), we vacate that court's judgment dismissing the appeal.

I

A

"Only Congress may determine a lower federal court's subject-matter jurisdiction." Kontrick, 540 U.S., at 452, 124 S.Ct. 906 (citing U.S. Const. Art. III, § 1 ); Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 370, 98 S.Ct. 2396, 57 L.Ed.2d 274 (1978) ("[I]t is axiomatic that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not create or withdraw federal jurisdiction."). Accordingly, a provision governing the time to appeal in a civil action qualifies as jurisdictional only if Congress sets the time. See Bowles, 551 U.S., at 211-212, 127 S.Ct. 2360 (noting "the jurisdictional distinction between court-promulgated rules and limits enacted by Congress"); Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 10, 61 S.Ct. 422, 85 L.Ed. 479 (1941) (noting "the inability of a court, by rule, to extend or restrict the jurisdiction conferred by a statute"). A time limit not prescribed by Congress ranks as a mandatory claim-processing rule, serving "to promote the orderly progress of litigation by requiring that the parties take certain procedural steps at certain specified times." Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 435, 131 S.Ct. 1197, 179 L.Ed.2d 159 (2011).

This Court and other forums have sometimes overlooked this distinction, "mischaracteriz[ing] claim-processing rules or elements of a cause of action as jurisdictional limitations, particularly when that characterization was not central to the case, and thus did not require close analysis." Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154, 161, 130 S.Ct. 1237, 176 L.Ed.2d 18 (2010). But prevailing precedent makes the distinction critical. Failure to comply with a jurisdictional time prescription, we have maintained, deprives a court of adjudicatory authority over the case, necessitating dismissal-a "drastic" result. Shinseki, 562 U.S., at 435, 131 S.Ct. 1197 ; Bowles, 551 U.S., at 213, 127 S.Ct. 2360 ("[W]hen an 'appeal has not been prosecuted ... within the time limited by the acts of Congress, it must be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.' " (quoting United States v. Curry, 6 How. 106, 113, 12 L.Ed. 363 (1848) )). The jurisdictional defect is not subject to waiver or forfeiture1 and may be raised at any time in the court of first instance and on direct appeal. Kontrick, 540 U.S., at 455, 124 S.Ct. 906.2 In contrast to the ordinary operation of our adversarial system, courts are obliged to notice jurisdictional issues and raise them on their own initiative. Shinseki, 562 U.S., at 434, 131 S.Ct. 1197.

Mandatory claim-processing rules are less stern. If properly invoked, mandatory claim-processing rules must be enforced, but they may be waived or forfeited.

*18Manrique v. United States, 581 U.S. ----, ----, 137 S.Ct. 1266, 1271-1272, 197 L.Ed.2d 599 (2017). "[C]laim-processing rules ... [ensure] relief to a party properly raising them, but do not compel the same result if the party forfeits them." Eberhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 12, 19, 126 S.Ct. 403, 163 L.Ed.2d 14 (2005) (per curiam ).3

B

Petitioner Charmaine Hamer filed a complaint against respondents Neighborhood Housing Services of Chicago and Fannie Mae alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. The District Court granted respondents' motion for summary judgment on September 10, 2015, and entered final judgment on September 14, 2015. In the absence of a time extension, Hamer's notice of appeal would have been due by October 14, 2015. Fed. Rule App. Proc. 4(a)(1)(A).

On October 8, 2015, before the October 14 deadline for filing Hamer's notice of appeal, her attorneys made two motions.4 First, they sought to withdraw as counsel because of their disagreement with Hamer on pursuit of an appeal. Second, they sought a two-month extension of the notice of appeal filing date, so that Hamer would have adequate time to engage new counsel for her appeal. App. to Pet. for Cert. 57-59. The District Court granted both motions on the same day and ordered extension of the deadline for Hamer's notice of appeal from October 14 to December 14, 2015. Id., at 60. Respondents did not move for reconsideration or otherwise raise any objection to the length of the extension.

In the docketing statement respondents filed in the Court of Appeals, they stated: "The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has jurisdiction over this appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, in that on December 11, 2015, [Hamer] filed a timely Notice of Appeal from a final judgment of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois that disposed of all of [Hamer's] claims against [respondents]." Id., at 63. Respondents' statement later reiterated: "On December 11, 2015, [Hamer] timely filed a Notice of Appeal...." Id., at 64. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals, on its own initiative, questioned the timeliness of the appeal and instructed respondents to brief the issue. 835 F.3d, at 762. Respondents did so and, for the first time, asserted that the appeal was untimely, citing the relevant Rule confining extensions to 30 days. Id., at 762-763 (citing Fed. Rule App. Proc. 4(a)(5)(C) ). Concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to reach the merits, the Court of Appeals dismissed Hamer's appeal. 835 F.3d, at 763.5 We granted certiorari.

*19580 U.S. ----, 137 S.Ct. 1203, 197 L.Ed.2d 245 (2017).

II

A

Section 2107 of Title 28 of the U.S. Code, as enacted in 1948, allowed extensions of the time to file a notice of appeal, not exceeding 30 days, "upon a showing of excusable neglect based on failure of a party to learn of the entry of the judgment." Act of June 25, 1948, § 2107, 62 Stat. 963.6 Nothing in the statute provided for extension of the time to file a notice of appeal when, as in this case, the judgment loser did receive notice of the entry of judgment. In 1991, Congress broadened the class of persons who could gain extensions to include all prospective appellants who showed "excusable neglect or good cause." § 12, 105 Stat. 1627. In addition, Congress retained a time prescription covering appellants who lacked notice of the entry of judgment: "[A] party entitled to notice of the entry of a judgment ... [who] did not receive such notice from the clerk or any party within 21 days of [the judgment's] entry" qualifies for a 14-day extension,7 if "no party would be prejudiced [thereby]." § 2107(c). In full, § 2107(c) now provides:

"(c) The district court may, upon motion filed not later than 30 days after the expiration of the time otherwise set for bringing appeal, extend the time for appeal upon a showing of excusable neglect or good cause. In addition, if the district court finds-

"(1) that a party entitled to notice of the entry of a judgment or order did not receive such notice from the clerk or any party within 21 days of its entry, and

"(2) that no party would be prejudiced,

"the district court may, upon motion filed within 180 days after entry of the judgment or order or within 14 days after receipt of such notice, whichever is earlier, reopen the time for appeal for a period of 14 days from the date of entry of the order reopening the time for appeal."

In short, current § 2107(c), like the provision as initially enacted, specifies the length of an extension for cases in which the appellant lacked notice of the entry of judgment.8 For other cases, the statute does not say how long an extension may run.

But Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(5)(C) does prescribe a limit: "No extension [of time for filing a notice of appeal] may exceed 30 days after the prescribed time [for filing a notice of appeal] or 14 days after the date [of] the order granting the [extension] motion ..., whichever is later." Unlike § 2107(c), we note, Rule 4(a)(5)(C) limits extensions of time to file a notice of appeal in all circumstances, not just in cases in which the prospective appellant lacked notice of the entry of judgment.

*20B

Although Rule 4(a)(5)(C)'s limit on extensions of time appears nowhere in the text of § 2107(c), respondents now contend that Rule 4(a)(5)(C) has a "statutory basis" because § 2107(c) once limited extensions (to the extent it did authorize them) to 30 days. Brief for Respondents 17. No matter, respondents submit, that Congress struck the 30-day limit in 1991 and replaced it with a 14-day limit governing, as the 30-day limit did, only lack-of-notice cases; deleting the 30-day prescription, respondents conjecture, was "probably inadverten[t]." Id., at 1. In support of their argument that Congress accidentally failed to impose an all-purpose limit on extensions, respondents observe that the 1991 statute identifies Congress' aim as the enactment of "certain technical corrections in ... provisions of law relating to the courts." 105 Stat. 1623. They also note the caption of the relevant section of the amending statute: "Conformity with Rules of Appellate Procedure." Id., at 1627. Because striking the 30-day limit from § 2107 made the statute less like Rule 4(a)(5)(C), respondents reason, Congress likely erased the relevant paragraph absentmindedly. Hence, respondents conclude, "there is no reason to interpret the 1991 amendment as stripping Rule 4(a)(5)(C) of its jurisdictional significance." Brief for Respondents 2.

Overlooked by respondents, pre-1991 § 2107 never spoke to extensions for reasons other than lack of notice. In any event, we resist speculating whether Congress acted inadvertently. See Henson v. Santander Consumer USA Inc., 582 U.S. ----, ---- - ----, 137 S.Ct. 1718, 1725, 198 L.Ed.2d 177 (2017) ("[W]e will not presume with [respondents] that any result consistent with their account of the statute's overarching goal must be the law but will presume more modestly instead 'that [the] legislature says ... what it means and means ... what it says.' " (quoting Dodd v. United States, 545 U.S. 353, 357, 125 S.Ct. 2478, 162 L.Ed.2d 343 (2005) )); Magwood v. Patterson, 561 U.S. 320, 334, 130 S.Ct. 2788, 177 L.Ed.2d 592 (2010) ("We cannot replace the actual text with speculation as to Congress' intent."). The rule of decision our precedent shapes is both clear and easy to apply: If a time prescription governing the transfer of adjudicatory authority from one Article III court to another appears in a statute, the limitation is jurisdictional, supra, at 15; otherwise, the time specification fits within the claim-processing category, ibid.9

*21In dismissing Hamer's appeal for want of jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals relied heavily on our decision in Bowles . We therefore reiterate what that precedent conveys. There, petitioner Keith Bowles did not receive timely notice of the entry of a postjudgment order and consequently failed to file a timely notice of appeal. Bowles v. Russell, 432 F.3d 668, 670 (C.A.6 2005). When Bowles learned of the postjudgment order, he moved for an extension under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(6), which implements § 2107(c)'s authorization of extensions in lack-of-notice cases. Ibid. The District Court granted Bowles's motion, but inexplicably provided a 17-day extension, rather than the 14-day extension authorized by § 2107(c). Bowles, 551 U.S., at 207, 127 S.Ct. 2360. Bowles filed his notice of appeal within the 17 days allowed by the District Court but outside the 14 days allowed by § 2107(c). Ibid. "Because Congress specifically limited the amount of time by which district courts can extend the notice-of-appeal period in § 2107(c)," we explained, the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction over Bowles's tardy appeal. Id., at 213, 127 S.Ct. 2360.

Quoting Bowles at length, the Court of Appeals in this case reasoned that "[l]ike Rule 4(a)(6), Rule 4(a)(5)(C) is the vehicle by which § 2107(c) is employed and it limits a district court's authority to extend the notice of appeal filing deadline to no more than an additional 30 days." 835 F.3d, at 763. In conflating Rule 4(a)(5)(C) with § 2107(c), the Court of Appeals failed to grasp the distinction our decisions delineate between jurisdictional appeal filing deadlines and mandatory claim-processing rules, and therefore misapplied Bowles .

Several Courts of Appeals,10 including the Court of Appeals in Hamer's case, have tripped over our statement in Bowles that "the taking of an appeal within the prescribed time is 'mandatory and jurisdictional.' " 551 U.S., at 209, 127 S.Ct. 2360 (quoting Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459 U.S. 56, 61, 103 S.Ct. 400, 74 L.Ed.2d 225 (1982) (per curiam )). The "mandatory and jurisdictional" formulation is a characterization left over from days when we were "less than meticulous" in our use of the term "jurisdictional." Kontrick, 540 U.S., at 454, 124 S.Ct. 906.11 The statement was correct as applied in Bowles because, as the Court there explained, the time prescription at issue in Bowles was imposed by Congress. 551 U.S., at 209-213, 127 S.Ct. 2360. But "mandatory and jurisdictional" is erroneous and confounding terminology where, as here, the relevant time prescription is absent from the U.S. Code. Because Rule 4(a)(5)(C), not § 2107, limits the length of the extension granted here, the time prescription is not jurisdictional. See Youkelsone v. FDIC, 660 F.3d 473, 475 (C.A.D.C.2011) (" Rule 4(a)(5)(C)'s thirty-day limit on the length of any extension ultimately granted appears nowhere in the U.S. Code.").

*22For the reasons stated, the Court of Appeals erroneously treated as jurisdictional Rule 4(a)(5)(C)'s 30-day limitation on extensions of time to file a notice of appeal. We therefore vacate that court's judgment and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We note, in this regard, that our decision does not reach issues raised by Hamer, but left unaddressed by the Court of Appeals, including: (1) whether respondents' failure to raise any objection in the District Court to the overlong time extension, by itself, effected a forfeiture, see Brief for Petitioner 21-22; (2) whether respondents could gain review of the District Court's time extension only by filing their own appeal notice, see id., at 23-27; and (3) whether equitable considerations may occasion an exception to Rule 4(a)(5)(C)'s time constraint, see id., at 29-43.

It is so ordered.

*739 Mr. Justice Rehnquist

delivered the opinion of the Court.

Respondents filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania in which they asserted that petitioner’s employee insurance benefits and maternity leave regulations discriminated against women in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253, as amended by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e et seq. (1970 ed. and Supp. IV). The District Court ruled in favor of respondents on the issue of petitioner’s liability under that Act, and petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. That court held that it had jurisdiction of petitioner’s appeal under 28 U. S. C. § 1291, and proceeded to affirm on the merits the judgment of the District Court. We *740 granted certiorari, 421 U. S. 987 (1975), and heard argument on the merits. Though neither party has questioned the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals to entertain the appeal, we are obligated to do so on our own motion if a question thereto exists. Mansfield, Coldwater & Lake Michigan R. Co. v. Swan, 111 U. S. 379 (1884). Because we conclude that the District Court’s order was not appealable to the Court of Appeals, we vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals with instructions to dismiss petitioner’s appeal from the order of the District Court.

Respondents’ complaint, after alleging jurisdiction and facts deemed pertinent to their claim, prayed for a judgment against petitioner embodying the following relief:

“(a) requiring that defendant establish non-discriminatory hiring, payment, opportunity, and promotional plans and programs;

“(b) enjoining the continuance by defendant of the illegal acts and practices alleged herein ;

“(c) requiring that defendant pay over to plaintiffs and to the members of the class the damages sustained by plaintiffs and the members of the class by reason of defendant’s illegal acts and practices, including adjusted backpay, with interest, and an additional equal amount as liquidated damages, and exemplary damages;

“(d) requiring that defendant pay to plaintiffs and to the members of . the class the costs of this suit and a reasonable attorneys’ fee, with interest; and

“(e) such other and further relief as the Court deems appropriate.” App. 19.

After extensive discovery, respondents moved for partial summary judgment only as to the issue of liability. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 56 (c). The District Court on January 9, 1974, finding no issues of material fact in dis *741 pute, entered an order to the effect that petitioner’s pregnancy-related policies violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. It also ruled that Liberty Mutual’s hiring and promotion policies violated Title VII. 1 Petitioner thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the District Court. Its order of February 20, 1974, denying the motion for reconsideration, contains the following concluding language:

“In its Order the court stated it would enjoin the continuance of practices which the court found to be in violation of Title VII. The Plaintiffs were invited to submit the form of the injunction order and the Defendant has filed Notice of Appeal and asked for stay of any injunctive order. Under these circumstances the court will withhold the issuance of the injunctive order and amend the Order previously issued under the provisions of Fed. R. Civ. P. 54 (b), as follows:

“And now this 20th day of February, 1974, it is directed that final judgment be entered in favor of Plaintiffs that Defendant’s policy of requiring female employees to return to work within three months of delivery of a child or be terminated is in violation of the provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; that Defendant’s policy of denying disability income protection plan benefits to female employees for disabilities related to pregnancies or childbirth are [sic] in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and that it is expressly directed that Judgment be entered for the *742 Plaintiffs upon these claims of Plaintiffs’ Complaint; there being no just reason for delay.” 372 F. Supp. 1146, 1164.

It is obvious from the District Court’s order that respondents, although having received a favorable ruling on the issue of petitioner’s liability to them, received none of the relief which they expressly prayed for in the portion of their complaint set forth above. They requested an injunction, but did not get one; they requested damages, but were not awarded any; they requested attorneys’ fees, but received none.

Counsel for respondents when questioned during oral argument in this Court suggested that at least the District Court’s order of February 20 amounted to a declaratory judgment on the issue of liability pursuant to the provisions of 28 U. S. C. § 2201. Had respondents sought only a declaratory judgment, and no other form of relief, we would of course have a different case. But even if we accept respondents’ contention that the District Court’s order was a declaratory judgment on the issue of liability, it nonetheless left unresolved respondents’ requests for an injunction, for compensatory and exemplary damages, and for attorneys’ fees. It finally disposed of none of respondents’ prayers for relief.

The District Court and the Court of Appeals apparently took the view that because the District Court made the recital required by Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 54 (b) that final judgment be entered on the issue of liability, and that there was no just reason for delay, the orders thereby became appealable as a final decision pursuant to 28 U. S. C. 11291. We cannot agree with this application of the Rule and statute in question.

Rule 54 (b) 2 “does not apply to a single claim *743 action .... It is limited expressly to multiple claims actions in which 'one or more but less than all’ of the multiple claims have been finally decided and are found otherwise to be ready for appeal.” Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U. S. 427, 435 (1956). 3 Here, however, respondents set forth but a single claim: that petitioner’s employee insurance benefits and maternity leave regulations discriminated against its women employees in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. They prayed for several different types of relief in the event that they sustained the allegations of their complaint, see Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 8 (a)(3), but their complaint advanced a single legal theory which was applied to only one set of facts. 4 Thus, despite the fact that the District Court undoubtedly made the findings required *744 under the Rule, had it been applicable, those findings do not in a case such as this make the order appealable pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1291. See Mackey, supra, at 437-438.

We turn to consider whether the District Court’s order might have been appealed by petitioner to the Court of Appeals under any other theory. The order, viewed apart from its discussion of Rule 54 (b), constitutes a grant of partial summary judgment limited to the issue of petitioner’s liability. Such judgments are by their terms interlocutory, see Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 56 (c), and where assessment of damages or awarding of other relief remains to be resolved have never been considered to be “final” within the meaning of 28 U. S. C. § 1291. See, e, g., Borges v. Art Steel Co., 243 F. 2d 350 (CA2 1957); Leonidakis v. International Telecoin Corp., 208 F. 2d 934 (CA2 1953); Tye v. Hertz Drivurself Stations, 173 F. 2d 317 (CA3 1949); Russell v. Barnes Foundation, 136 F. 2d 654 (CA3 1943). Thus the only possible authorization for an appeal from the District Court’s order would be pursuant to the provisions of 28 U. S. C. § 1292.

If the District Court had granted injunctive relief but had not ruled on respondents’ other requests for relief, this interlocutory order would have been appealable under § 1292 (a) (1). 5 But, as noted above, the court did not issue an injunction. It might be argued that the order of the District Court, insofar as it failed to include the injunctive relief requested by respondents, is an in *745 terlocutory order refusing an injunction within the meaning of § 1292 (a)(1). But even if this would have allowed respondents to then obtain review in the Court of Appeals, there was no denial of any injunction sought by petitioner and it could not avail itself of that grant of jurisdiction.

Nor was this order appealable pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1292 (b). 6 Although the District Court’s findings made with a view to satisfying Rule 54 (b) might be viewed as substantial compliance wdth the certification requirement of that section, there is no showing in this record that petitioner made application to the Court of Appeals within the 10 days therein specified. And that court’s holding that its jurisdiction was pursuant to § 1291 makes it clear that it thought itself obliged to consider on the merits petitioner’s appeal. There can be no assurance that had the other requirements of § 1292 (b) been complied with, the Court of Appeals would have exercised its discretion to entertain the interlocutory appeal.

Were we to sustain the procedure followed here, we would condone a practice whereby a district court in virtually any case before it might render an interlocutory decision on the question of liability of the defend *746 ant, and the defendant would thereupon be permitted to appeal to the court of appeals without satisfying any of the requirements that Congress carefully set forth. We believe that Congress, in enacting present §§ 1291 and 1292 of Title 28, has been well aware of the dangers of an overly rigid insistence upon a “final decision” for appeal in every case, and has in those sections made ample provision for appeal of orders which are not “final” so as to alleviate any possible hardship. We would twist the fabric of the statute more than it will bear if we were to agree that the District Court’s order of February 20, 1974, was appealable to the Court of Appeals.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore vacated, and the case is remanded with instructions to dismiss the petitioner’s appeal.

It is so ordered.

Mr. Justice Blackmun took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Puget Sound Tug & Barge Company (Puget) was the owner of the tug Mercury. San Diego Marine Construction Company (San Diego) was the builder of the vessel, and General Motors Corporation (GMC) was the manufacturer of the tug’s main propulsion engines. On August 27, 1967, John Niekert, the First Assistant Engineer, died as the consequence of a fire on the Mercury. This wrongful death action was brought against Puget, on allegations of the vessel’s unseaworthiness, against San Diego for defective vessel design and manufacture, and against GMC for defective design and manufacture of the vessel’s starboard main engine.

Puget brought a cross-action against both San Diego and GMC for fire damage to the vessel and for indemnity if it should be held liable to plaintiff for Nickert’s death. San Diego also cross-claimed against GMC for indemnity in the event it should be found liable to plaintiff for Nickert’s death and for indemnity in the event it should be found liable for the fire damage to the tug.

At the conclusion of the trial, the jury returned special verdicts, one on the issues between plaintiff and the three defendants, the other on the issues respecting liability and indemnity under the cross-claims between the three defendants. The first verdict resulted in a judgment for damages for wrongful death in favor of plaintiff and against the three defendants which is final and has been satisfied.

Post-trial motions were filed. San Diego moved for a judgment for indemnity against GMC and for dismissal with prejudice of'Puget’s claim against it for fire damage to the vessel. These motions were granted and the rulings have been affirmed on appeal.

Puget’s motion for a new trial was granted. An attempt by GMC to appeal from this order was dismissed, the order being nonappealable. Thus, the action remained pending in the District Court for retrial of the issues between Puget and GMC concerning the latter’s liability to Puget for indemnity against the Niekert judgment and for fire damage to the tug. Both Puget and GMC presented motions for partial summary judgment. After consideration of the motions, the District Court entered the *1041following order which is the subject of the instant appeal:

“If Puget Sound Tug & Barge Company is found negligent in any manner proximately causing or contributing to the fire or the death of John Nickert, it will be denied any relief on its cross-claim for indemnity.”

The trial judge certified that the ruling involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for a difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal, as authorized by 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), may materially advance the ultimate termination of this litigation. An order of this Court granted the petition of Puget Sound Tug & Barge Co. for leave to appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). We have concluded that the order granting the appeal was improvidently entered. It is, therefore, appropriate to vacate the order granting the interlocutory appeal. Molybdenum Corporation of America v. Kasey, 279 F.2d 216 (9th Cir. 1960); United States Rubber Company v. Wright, 359 F.2d 784 (9th Cir. 1966).

The question involved in the district judge’s pre-trial ruling is this: When a seaman or his representative is not precluded by statute from suing his employer for personal injury or death, does the decision in Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp., 342 U.S. 282, 72 S.Ct. 277, 96 L.Ed. 318 (1952), require that contribution or indemnity be denied among joint tortfeasors?

The trial court answered this question in the affirmative. Other courts have agreed. In re Standard Oil Company, 325 F.Supp. 388 (N.D.Cal.1971) ; American Dredging Co. v. Gulf Oil Corporation, 175 F.Supp. 882 (E.D.Pa.1959). On the other hand, some courts have recently distinguished Halcyon in eases where the proposed indemnitor is not protected by a statute precluding suit against him by his employee. Horton & Horton, Inc. v. T/S J. E. Dyer, 428 F.2d 1131 (5th Cir. 1970); Watz v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 431 F.2d 100 (5th Cir. 1970); In re Seaboard Shipping Corp., 499 F.2d 132 (2nd Cir. 1971).

While the question is an interesting one, which has not been decided by this Circuit Court, the District Court’s pre-trial ruling thereon is not the type of order which will support the jurisdiction of this Court on appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). The trial court’s announcement of its opinion on this question of law, although characterized as partial summary judgment, is nothing more nor less than an hypothetical, advisory opinion. It is subject to revision or reversal at any time by the trial judge to the point where a definitive action has been taken on the question ; for examples, an instruction to the jury, or the adoption of a conclusion of law in a trial to the court. Similarly, an announcement by this Court of its opinion of the trial judge’s tentative opinion would be purely advisory and might place the judge in a difficult, if not untenable position at the time of trial. Assume, for instance, that the Supreme Court had meanwhile expressed itself in terms incompatible with this Court’s ruling, would not the trial court deem itself bound by the pronouncement of this Court as the law of the ease ?

An announcement by a trial court of its then opinion on an abstract question of law prior to the taking of final, definitive action affecting the substantial rights of the parties is not an “order” under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) which will support an interlocutory appeal. Such an announcement is purely advisory, hypothetical and tentative on an issue which may never arise. Cf. United States v. Woodbury, 263 F.2d 784 (9th Cir. 1959); Control Data Corp. v. International Business Machines Corp., 421 F.2d 323 (8th Cir. 1970).

The order heretofore entered granting the interlocutory appeal is vacated.

McKEAGUE, J., delivered the order of the court in which WHITE, J. and HOOD, D.J., joined. WHITE, J. (pg. 953), delivered a separate concurring opinion.

ORDER

McKEAGUE, Circuit Judge.

At a campaign rally in Louisville, Kentucky, on March 1, -2016, then-presidential candidate Donald J. Trump responded to protesters by stating, “Get ’em out of here,” followed closely by, “Don’t hurt ’em—if I say go ‘get ’em,’ I get in trouble with the press.” .Apparently, the latter admonition either went unheeded or came too late. Allegedly in response to Trump’s 'initial statement, three protesters were assaulted by three Trump supporters. Those three protesters, now plaintiffs in this action, filed a complaint in Kentucky state court against several defendants, including Trump. Trump removed this action to federal district court.

The district court denied in part Trump’s motion to dismiss, holding the complaint stated a plausible claim for “incitement to riot” under Kentucky law.1 Ordinarily, such an order is not appealable. However, this petition comes to us under a well-established exception because the district court certified its order for interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). Thus, the issue before us is whether, in our discretion, we should permit the appeal so that this court can consider the merits of the district- court’s order before the case proceeds.2 For the reasons that follow, we grant the petition for leave to appeal.

⅜ ⅛ ⅜ ⅜ ⅜

The relevant statutory section provides: (b) When a district judge, in making in a civil action an' order not otherwise appealable under this section, shall be of - the opinion that Such order involves a - controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from -the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation, he shall so state in writing in such order. The Court of Appeals which would have jurisdiction of an. appeal of such action may thereupon, in its discretion, permit an appeal to be taken from such order, if application is made to it within, ten days after the entry, of the order....

28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).

The district court may certify an order for interlocutory appeal if it is “of the opinion” that three conditions exist: “[1] the order involves a controlling question of law to which there is [2] substantial ground for difference of opinion and ... [3] an immediate appeal may materially advance the termination of the litigation.” 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (emphases added).

This court has, at times characterized these conditions as “requirements” on appeal, perhaps giving the wrong impression that we review the district court’s certification of the conditions de novo. See, e.g., In re City of Memphis, 293 F.3d 345, 360 (6th Cir. 2002). However, where, as here, the district court certifies its order and a timely petition follows,3 we must decide whether to exercise our “discretion,” as a prudential matter, to “permit an appeal to be taken from such order.” 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). Since “the district court has made an order, the .three factors that justify interlocutory appeal should be treated as guiding criteria rather than jurisdictional requisites.” 16 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller,.Federal Practice and Procedure § 3930 (3d ed. 2002) (emphasis added). These criteria, along with other prudential factors, guide..our discretion to permit an appeal of the district court’s order in this case.

1. Whether “the order involves a controlling question of law”

The district, court’s order, below involves a 1) “question of law” that is 2) “controlling.” 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).

-. First, “[t]he sufficiency of ,a complaint is a question of law.” Ctr. for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc., v. Napolitano, 648 F.3d 365, 369 (6th Cir. 2011). The district court’s order holding that the allegations of the complaint stated a facially valid claim for “incitement to riot” under §§ 525.040 and 467.070 of the Kentucky Revised Statutes-falls comfortably within the category of an “order {that] involves a ... question of law.” 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b); see, e.g., Nw. Ohio Adm’rs, Inc. v. Walcher & Fox, Inc., 270 F.3d 1018, 1025 (6th Cir. 2001) (granting petition to hear interlocutory appeal after certification and affirming denial of motion to dismiss and partial motion for summary judgment). Further, the application and import of Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 89 S.Ct. 1827, 23 L.Ed.2d 430 (1969) are also questions of law.

Second, these questions of law— whether the complaint states a facially valid claim, .and if so, whether the First Amendment applies to bar the claim here—are undoubtedly “controlling” because their resolution “could materially affect the outcome of the case.” In re City of Memphis, 293 F.3d at 361; see, e.g., In re Baker & Getty Fin. Servs., Inc., 954 F.2d 1169, 1172 n.8 (6th Cir. 1992) (citing Arizona v. Ideal Basic Indus., 673 F.2d 1020, 1026 (9th Cir. 1981)).

2. Whether “there is substantial ground for difference in opinion”

The district court found that its order gives rise to “substantial ground for difference of opinion.” 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). We agree.

“A substantial ground for, difference of opinion exists where reasonable jurists might disagree on an issue’s resolution, not merely where they have already disagreed.” Reese v. BP Exploration, Inc., 643 F.3d 681, 688 (9th Cir. 2011). “Stated another way, when novel legal issues are presented, on which fair-minded jurists might reach contradictory conclusions, a novel issue may be certified for interlocutory appeal without first awaiting development of contradictory precedent.” Id. We agree that “fair-minded jurists might reach contradictory conclusions.” Id.

3. Whether “an immediate appeal may materially advance the termination of the litigation”

The petition “may materially advance the termination of the litigation.” 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (emphasis added). If a panel of this court were to find the complaint fails to state an incitement claim under Kentucky law or that Brandenburg applies to bar the claim, litigation would end. See supra note 3.

4. Whether other prudential factors guide our discretion to “permit an appeal”

Finally, we pause to ask whether other factors support permitting an appeal of the district court’s order.

Some prior case law suggests that review is only appropriate “in exceptional cases.” Kraus v. Bd. of Cty. Rd. Comm’rs for Kent Cty., 364 F.2d 919, 922 (6th Cir. 1966). Whether this case so qualifies depends on how one conceptualizes “exceptional.” Several cases certified for appeal do not immediately stand out in certain ways as “exceptional,” see, e.g., Nw. Ohio Adm’rs, 270 F.3d at 1018, but a panel in each case felt interlocutory review was appropriate.

While an interlocutory appeal from a denial of a motion to dismiss should not be granted cavalierly, we think this case is exceptional in many ways. As it stands, the President of the United States must answer for a state-law claim that presents a novel question. The practical and political consequences of such a case are readily apparent. Prior to certification, Plaintiffs apparently sought expansive discovery, encompassing the President’s tax returns and medical records, and sought to take the President’s deposition—in Kentucky. In the name of public policy, we have afforded at least as much caution in cases involving public officials, from police watchmen to presidential aides, for decades. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 813, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982) (noting public policy mandates qualified immunity). While the president does not enjoy immunity under the circumstances presented here, an interlocutory appeal is hardly imprudent given the exceptional nature of this case.

Finally, petitions do not arise under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) unless the district court first certifies its order for an interlocutory appeal. In most cases, certified orders already stand out as “exceptional” by virtue of another Article III judge’s opinion. District courts do not make a habit of certifying their own orders for interlocutory appeal. There is little risk that this order— read in its context—will open the floodgates.

In short, we are convinced that a panel of this court should ensure that the Kentucky claim rests on a solid footing before permitting litigation to continue. It may, or it may not.

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The petition for permission to appeal is GRANTED, and the mandamus petition is DISMISSED AS MOOT.

CONCURRENCE

HELENE N. WHITE, Circuit Judge,

concurring.

I agree that the petition for leave to appeal should be granted because Petitioner President Trump has shown that the certified order meets the standards for granting interlocutory appeal.

I write separately to state that we should not use a published order granting leave as a vehicle to clarify or change the law as stated in a published opinion when no such clarification or development is necessary to address the petition for leave.

Further, I do not agree that orders certified for interlocutory appeal are intrinsically “exceptional” because they are rare, or that there is a presumption in favor of granting petitions for leave to appeal when “another Article III judge” certifies an order. The fact that a district judge certified the order for interlocutory appeal is simply a necessary prerequisite present in all cases in which a petition is brought under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).

Justice Souter

delivered the opinion of the Court.

The authority of the Courts of Appeals to review “all final decisions of the district courts,” 28 U. S. C. § 1291, includes appellate jurisdiction over “a narrow class of decisions that do not terminate the litigation,” but are sufficiently important and collateral to the merits that they should “nonetheless be treated as final,” Digital Equipment Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U. S. 863, 867 (1994) (internal quotation marks omitted). The issue here is whether a refusal to apply the judgment bar of the Federal Tort Claims Act is open to collateral appeal. We hold it is not.

I

The complaint alleges that Susan Hallock owned a computer software business that she and her husband, Richard, operated from home. After information about Richard Hal-lock’s credit card was stolen and used to pay the subscription fee for a child pornography Web site, agents of the United States Customs Service, investigating the Web site, traced *348 the payment to Richard Hallock’s card and got a warrant to search the Halloeks’ residence. With that authority, they seized the Halloeks’ computer equipment, software, and disk drives. No criminal charges were ever brought, but the Government’s actions produced a different disaster. When the computer equipment was returned, several of the disk drives were damaged, all of the stored data (including trade secrets and account files) were lost, and the Halloeks were forced out of business.

In July 2002, Susan Hallock and her company brought an action against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act, invoking the waiver of sovereign immunity, 28 U. S. C. § 1346, and alleging negligence by the customs agents in executing the search. The merits of the claim were never addressed, for the District Court granted the Government’s motion to dismiss, holding that the agents’ activities occurred in the course of detaining goods and thus fell within an exception to the Act’s waiver of sovereign immunity, § 2680(e). Hallock v. United States, 253 F. Supp. 2d 361 (NDNY 2003).

While the suit against the Government was still pending, Susan Hallock filed this action against the individual agents under Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388 (1971), alleging in her complaint that the agents had damaged her computers and thus deprived her of property including business income in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. After the District Court dismissed the first suit against the Government, the agents moved for judgment in the Bivens action, citing the judgment bar of the Tort Claims Act, that “the judgment in an action under [§] 1346(b) of this title shall constitute a complete bar to any action by the claimant, by reason of the same subject matter, against the employee of the government whose act or omission gave rise to the claim.” § 2676.

The District Court denied the motion, holding that dismissal of the action against the. Government under the Tort *349 Claims Act was solely on a procedural ground, and thus failed to raise the judgment bar. Hallock v. Bonner, 281 F. Supp. 2d 425, 427 (NDNY 2008). The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed, after first finding jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine. Hallock v. Bonner, 387 F. 3d 147 (2004). We granted certiorari to consider the judgment bar, 545 U. S. 1103 (2005), but now vacate for want of appellate jurisdiction on the part of the Court of Appeals.

II

The collateral order doctrine, identified with Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U. S. 541 (1949), is “best understood not as an exception to the ‘final decision’ rule laid down by Congress in § 1291, but as a ‘practical construction’ of it.” Digital Equipment, supra, at 867 (quoting Cohen, supra, at 546). Whereas 28 U. S. C. § 1291 “gives courts of appeals jurisdiction over ‘all final decisions’ of district courts” that are not directly appealable to us, Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U. S. 299, 305 (1996), the collateral order doctrine accommodates a “small class” of rulings, not concluding the litigation, but conclusively resolving “claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action,” ibid, (internal quotation marks omitted). The claims are “too important to be denied review and too independent of the cause itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated.” Cohen, supra, at 546.

The requirements for collateral order appeal have been distilled down to three conditions: that an order “ ‘[1] conclusively determine the disputed question, [2] resolve an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action, and [3] be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.’ ” Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U. S. 139, 144 (1993) (quoting Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U. S. 463, 468 (1978)). The conditions are “stringent,” Digital Equipment, supra, *350 at 868 (citing Midland Asphalt Corp. v. United States, 489 U. S. 794, 799 (1989)), and unless they are kept so, the underlying doctrine will overpower the substantial finality interests § 1291 is meant to further: judicial efficiency, for example, and the “sensible policy ‘of avoiding] the obstruction to just claims that would come from permitting the harassment and cost of a succession of separate appeals from the various rulings to which a litigation may give rise.’” Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U. S. 368, 374 (1981) (quoting Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U. S. 323, 325 (1940)).

Accordingly, we have not mentioned applying the collateral order doctrine recently without emphasizing its modest scope. See, e. g., Digital Equipment, 511 U. S., at 868 (“[T]he ‘narrow’ exception should stay that way and never be allowed to swallow the general rule that a party is entitled to a single appeal, to be deferred until final judgment has been entered ...” (citation omitted)). And we have meant what we have said; although the Court has been asked many times to expand the “small class” of collaterally appeal-able orders, we have instead kept it narrow and selective in its membership.

A

Prior cases mark the line between rulings within the class and those outside. On the immediately appealable side are orders rejecting absolute immunity, Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 731, 742 (1982), and qualified immunity, Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U. S. 511, 530 (1985). A State has the benefit of the doctrine to appeal a decision denying its claim to Eleventh Amendment immunity, Puerto Rico Aqueduct, supra, at 144-145, and a criminal defendant may collaterally appeal an adverse ruling on a defense of double jeopardy, Abney v. United States, 431 U. S. 651, 660 (1977).

The examples admittedly raise the lawyer’s temptation to generalize. In each case, the collaterally appealing party was vindicating or claiming a right to avoid trial, in satisfaction of the third condition: unless the order to stand trial was *351 immediately appealable, the right would be effectively lost. Those seeking immediate appeal therefore naturally argue that any order denying a claim of right to prevail without trial satisfies the third condition. But this generalization is too easy to be sound and, if accepted, would leave , the final order requirement of § 1291 in tatters. We faced this prospect in Digital Equipment, supra, an appeal from an order rescinding a settlement agreement: Petitioner asserted a “ ‘right not to stand trial’ requiring protection by way of immediate appeal,” analogizing the rescission to a denial of immunity. Id., at 869. We said no, however, lest “every right that could be enforced appropriately by pretrial dismissal [be] loosely ... described as conferring a ‘right not to stand trial.’” Id., at 873. Otherwise, “almost every pretrial or trial order might be called ‘effectively unreviewable’ in the sense that relief from error can never extend to rewriting history.” Id., at 872.

“Allowing immediate appeals to vindicate every such right would move § 1291 aside for claims that the district court lacks personal jurisdiction, that the statute of limitations has run, that the movant has been denied his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial, that an action is barred on claim preclusion principles, that no material fact is in dispute and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, or merely that the com: plaint fails to state a claim. Such motions can be made in virtually every case.” Id., at 873 (citations omitted).

B

Since only some orders denying an asserted right to avoid the burdens of trial qualify, then, as orders that cannot be reviewed “effectively” after a conventional final judgment, the cases have to be combed for some further characteristic that merits appealability under Cohen; and as Digital Equipment explained, that something further boils down to “a judgment about the value of the interests that would be *352 lost through rigorous application of. a final judgment requirement.” 511 U. S., at 878-879 (citing Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U. S. 517, 524 (1988)). See also Lauro Lines s.r.l. v. Chasser, 490 U. S. 495, 502 (1989) (SCALIA, J., concurring) (“The importance of the right asserted has always been a significant part of our collateral order doctrine”).

Thus, in Nixon, supra, we stressed the “compelling public ends,” id., at 758, “rooted in . . . the separation of powers,” id., at 749, that would be compromised by failing to allow immediate appeal of a denial of absolute Presidential immunity, id., at 743, 752, n. 32. In explaining collateral order treatment when a qualified immunity claim was at issue in Mitchell, supra, we spoke of the threatened disruption of governmental functions, and fear of inhibiting able people from exercising discretion in public service if a full trial were threatened whenever they acted reasonably in the face of law that is not “clearly established.” Id., at 526. Puerto Rico Aqueduct, 506 U. S. 139, explained the immediate ap-pealability of an order denying a claim of Eleventh Amendment immunity by adverting not only to the burdens of litigation but to the need to ensure vindication of a State’s dignitary interests. Id., at 146. And although the double jeopardy claim given Cohen treatment in Abney, supra, did not implicate a right to be free of all proceedings whatsoever (since prior jeopardy is essential to the defense), we described the enormous prosecutorial power of the Government to subject an individual “to embarrassment, expense and ordeal . . . compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety,” id., at 661-662 (internal quotation marks omitted); the only way to alleviate these consequences of the Government’s superior position was by collateral order appeal.

In each case, some particular value of a high order was marshaled in support of the interest in avoiding trial: honoring the separation of powers, preserving the efficiency of government and the initiative of its officials, respecting a State’s dignitary interests, and mitigating the government’s *353 advantage over the individual. That is, it is not mere avoidance of a trial, but avoidance of a trial that would imperil a substantial public interest, that counts when asking whether an order is “effectively” unreviewable if review is to be left until later. Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U. S., at 468 (internal quotation marks omitted).

C

Does the claim of the customs agents in this case serve such a weighty public objective that the judgment bar should be treated as an immunity demanding the protection of a collateral order appeal? One can argue, of course, that if the Bivens action goes to trial the efficiency of Government will be compromised and the officials burdened and distracted, as in the qualified immunity case: if qualified immunity gets Cohen treatment, so should the judgment bar to further litigation in the aftermath of the Government’s success under the Tort Claims Act. But the cases are different. Qualified immunity is not the law simply to save trouble for the Government and its employees; it is recognized because the burden of trial is unjustified in the face of a colorable claim that the law on point was not clear when the official took action, and the action was reasonable in light of the law as it was. The nub of qualified immunity is the need to induce officials to show reasonable initiative when the relevant law is not “clearly established,” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 800, 818 (1982); ef. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U. S. 194, 202 (2001); a quick resolution of a qualified immunity claim is essential.

There is, however, no such public interest at stake simply because the judgment bar is said to be applicable. It is not the preservation of initiative but the avoidance of litigation for its own sake .that supports the judgment bar, and if simply abbreviating litigation troublesome to Government employees were important enough for Cohen treatment, collateral order appeal would be a matter of right whenever the Government lost a motion to dismiss under the Tort *354 Claims Act, or a federal officer lost one on a Bivens action, or a state official was in that position in a case under 42 U. S. C. §1983, or Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908). In effect, 28 U. S. C. § 1291 would fade out whenever the Government or an official lost an early round that could have ended the fight.

Another difference between qualified immunity and the judgment bar lies in the bar’s essential procedural element. While a qualified immunity claim is timely from the moment an official is served with a complaint, the judgment bar can be raised only after a case under the Tort Claims Act has been resolved in the Government’s favor. If a Bivens action alone is brought, there will be no possibility of a judgment bar, nor will there be so long as a Bivens action against officials and a Tort Claims Act against the Government are pending simultaneously (as they were for a time here). In the present case, if Susan Hallock had brought her Bivens action and no other, the agents could not possibly have invoked the judgment bar in claiming a right to be free of trial. The closer analogy to the judgment bar, then, is not immunity but the defense of claim preclusion, or res judicata.

Although the statutory judgment bar is arguably broader than traditional res judicata, it functions in much the same way, with both rules depending on a prior judgment as a condition precedent * and neither reflecting a. policy that a defendant should be scot free of any liability. The concern behind both rules is a different one, of avoiding duplicative litigation, “multiple suits on identical entitlements or obligations between the same parties.” 18 C. Wright, A. Miller, & *355 E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4402, p. 9 (2d ed. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). But this rule of respecting a prior judgment by giving a defense against relitigation has not been thought to protect values so great that only immediate appeal can effectively vindicate them. As we indicated in Digital Equipment, in the usual case, absent particular reasons for discretionary appeal by leave of the trial court, a defense of claim preclusion is fairly subordinated to the general policy of deferring appellate review to the moment of final judgment. 511 U. S., at 873.

The judgment bar at issue in this case has no claim to greater importance than the typical defense of claim preclusion; and we hold true to form in deciding what Digital Equipment implied, that an order rejecting the defense of judgment bar under 28 U. S. C. § 2676 cries for no immediate appeal of right as a collateral order.

We vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case with instructions to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

It is so ordered.

*103Justice Sotomayor

delivered the opinion of the Court.

Section 1291 of the Judicial Code confers on federal courts of appeals jurisdiction to review “final decisions of the district courts.” 28 U. S. C. § 1291. Although “final decisions” typically are ones that trigger the entry of judgment, they also include a small set of prejudgment orders that are “collateral to” the merits of an action and “too important” to be denied immediate review. Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U. S. 541, 546 (1949). In this case, petitioner Mohawk Industries, Inc., attempted to bring a collateral order appeal after the District Court ordered it to disclose certain confidential materials on the ground that Mohawk had waived the attorney-client privilege. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction.

The question before us is whether disclosure orders adverse to the attorney-client privilege qualify for immediate appeal under the collateral order doctrine. Agreeing with the Court of Appeals, we hold that they do not. Postjudgment appeals, together with other review mechanisms, suffice to protect the rights of litigants and preserve the vitality of the attorney-client privilege.

I

In 2007, respondent Norman Carpenter, a former shift supervisor at a Mohawk manufacturing facility, filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, alleging that Mohawk had terminated him in violation of 42 U. S. C. § 1985(2) and various Georgia laws. According to Carpenter’s complaint, his termination came after he informed a member of Mohawk’s human resources department in an e-mail that the company was employing undocumented immigrants. At the time, unbeknownst to Carpenter, Mohawk stood accused in a pending class-action lawsuit of conspiring to drive down the wages of its legal employees by knowingly hiring undocumented workers in violation of federal and state racketeering laws. See Wil*104liams v. Mohawk Indus., Inc., No. 4:04-cv-00003-HLM (ND Ga., Jan. 6, 2004). Company officials directed Carpenter to meet with the company’s retained counsel in the Williams case, and counsel allegedly pressured Carpenter to recant his statements. When he refused, Carpenter alleges, Mohawk fired him under false pretenses. App. 57a-64a.

After learning of Carpenter’s complaint, the plaintiffs in the Williams case sought an evidentiary hearing to explore Carpenter’s allegations. In its response to their motion, Mohawk described Carpenter’s accusations as “pure fantasy” and recounted the “true facts” of Carpenter’s dismissal. App. 208a. According to Mohawk, Carpenter himself had “engaged in blatant and illegal misconduct” by attempting to have Mohawk hire an undocumented worker. Id., at 209a. The company “commenced an immediate investigation,” during which retained counsel interviewed Carpenter. Id., at 210a. Because Carpenter’s “efforts to cause Mohawk to circumvent federal immigration law” “blatantly violated Mohawk policy,” the company terminated him. Ibid.

As these events were unfolding in the Williams case, discovery was underway in Carpenter’s case. Carpenter filed a motion to compel Mohawk to produce information concerning his meeting with retained counsel and the company’s termination decision. Mohawk maintained that the requested information was protected by the attorney-client privilege.

The District Court agreed that the privilege applied to the requested information, but it granted Carpenter’s motion to compel disclosure after concluding that Mohawk had implicitly waived the privilege through its representations in the Williams case. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 51a. The court declined to certify its order for interlocutory appeal under 28 U. S. C. § 1292(b). But, recognizing “the seriousness of its [waiver] finding,” it stayed its ruling to allow Mohawk to explore other potential “avenues to appeal . . . , such as a *105petition for mandamus or appealing this Order under the collateral order doctrine.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 52a.

Mohawk filed a notice of appeal and a petition for a writ of mandamus to the Eleventh Circuit. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1291, holding that the District Court’s ruling did not qualify as an immediately appealable collateral order within the meaning of Cohen, 337 U. S. 541. “Under Cohen,” the Court of Appeals explained, “an order is appealable if it (1) conclusively determines the disputed question; (2) resolves an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action; and (3) is effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.” 541 F. 3d 1048, 1052 (2008) (per curiam). According to the court, the District Court’s waiver ruling satisfied the first two of these requirements but not the third, because “a discovery order that implicates the attorney-client privilege” can be adequately reviewed “on appeal from a final judgment.” Ibid. The Court of Appeals also rejected Mohawk’s mandamus petition, finding no “clear usurpation of power or abuse of discretion” by the District Court. Id., at 1055. We granted certiorari, 555 U. S. 1152 (2009), to resolve a conflict among the Circuits concerning the availability of collateral appeals in the attorney-client privilege context.1

*106II

A

By statute, courts of appeals “have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States, . . . except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court.” 28 U. S. C. § 1291. A “final decisio[n]” is typically one “by which a district court disassociates itself from a case.” Swint v. Chambers County Comm’n, 514 U. S. 35, 42 (1995). This Court, however, “has long given” § 1291 a “practical rather than a technical construction.” Cohen, 337 U. S., at 546. As we held in Cohen, the statute encompasses not only judgments that “terminate an action,” but also a “small class” of collateral rulings that, although they do not end the litigation, are appropriately deemed “final.” Id., at 545-546. “That small category includes only decisions that are conclusive, that resolve important questions separate from the merits, and that are effectively unreviewable on appeal from the final judgment in the underlying action.” Swint, 514 U. S., at 42.

In applying Cohen’s collateral order doctrine, we have stressed that it must “never be allowed to swallow the general rule that a party is entitled to a single appeal, to be deferred until final judgment has been entered.” Digital Equipment Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U. S. 863, 868 (1994) (citation omitted); see also Will v. Hallock, 546 U. S. 345, 350 (2006) (“emphasizing [the doctrine’s] modest scope”). Our admonition reflects a healthy respect for the virtues of the final-judgment rule. Permitting piecemeal, prejudgment appeals, we have recognized, undermines “efficient judicial administration” and encroaches upon the prerogatives of district court judges, who play a “special role” in managing ongoing litigation. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U. S. 368, 374 (1981); see also Richardson-Merrell Inc. v. Koller, 472 U. S. 424, 436 (1985) (“[T]he district judge can better exercise [his or her] responsibility [to *107police the prejudgment tactics of litigants] if the appellate courts do not repeatedly intervene to second-guess prejudgment rulings”).

The justification for immediate appeal must therefore be sufficiently strong to overcome the usual benefits of deferring appeal until litigation concludes. This requirement finds expression in two of the three traditional Cohen conditions. The second condition insists upon “important questions separate from the merits.” Swint, 514 U. S., at 42 (emphasis added). More significantly, “the third Cohen question, whether a right is ‘adequately vindicable’ or ‘effectively reviewable,’ simply cannot be answered without a judgment about the value of the interests that would be lost through rigorous application of a final judgment requirement.” Digital Equipment, 511 U. S., at 878-879. That a ruling “may burden litigants in ways that are only imperfectly reparable by appellate reversal of a final district court judgment... has never sufficed.” Id., at 872. Instead, the decisive consideration is whether delaying review until the entry of final judgment “would imperil a substantial public interest” or “some particular value of a high order.” Will, 546 U. S., at 352-353.

In making this determination, we do not engage in an “individualized jurisdictional inquiry.” Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U. S. 463, 473 (1978). Rather, our focus is on “the entire category to which a claim belongs.” Digital Equipment, 511 U. S., at 868. As long as the class of claims, taken as a whole, can be adequately vindicated by other means, “the chance that the litigation at hand might be speeded, or a ‘particular injustic[e]’ averted,” does not provide a basis for jurisdiction under § 1291. Ibid, (quoting Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U. S. 517, 529 (1988); alteration in original).

B

In the present case, the Court of Appeals concluded that the District Court’s privilege-waiver order satisfied the first *108two conditions of the collateral order doctrine — conclusiveness and separateness — but not the third — effective unreviewability. Because we agree with the Court of Appeals that collateral order appeals are not necessary to ensure effective review of orders adverse to the attorney-client privilege, we do not decide whether the other Cohen requirements are met.

Mohawk does not dispute that “we have generally denied review of pretrial discovery orders.” Firestone, 449 U. S., at 377; see also 15B C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure §3914.23, p. 123 (2d ed. 1992) (hereinafter Wright & Miller) (“[T]he rule remains settled that most discovery rulings are not final”). Mohawk contends, however, that rulings implicating the attorney-client privilege differ in kind from run-of-the-mill discovery orders because of the important institutional interests at stake. According to Mohawk, the right to maintain attorney-client confidences — the sine qua non of a meaningful attorney-client relationship — is “irreparably destroyed absent immediate appeal” of adverse privilege rulings. Brief for Petitioner 23.

We readily acknowledge the importance of the attorney-client privilege, which “is one of the oldest recognized privileges for confidential communications.” Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U. S. 399, 403 (1998). By assuring confidentiality, the privilege encourages clients to make “full and frank” disclosures to their attorneys, who are then better able to provide candid advice and effective representation. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U. S. 383, 389 (1981). This, in turn, serves “broader public interests in the observance of law and administration of justice.” Ibid.

The crucial question, however, is not whether an interest is important in the abstract; it is whether deferring review until final judgment so imperils the interest as to justify the cost of allowing immediate appeal of the entire class of relevant orders. We routinely require litigants to wait until *109after final judgment to vindicate valuable rights, including rights central to our adversarial system. See, e.g., Richardson-Merrell, 472 U. S., at 426 (holding an order disqualifying counsel in a civil case did not qualify for immediate appeal under the collateral order doctrine); Flanagan v. United States, 465 U. S. 259, 260 (1984) (reaching the same result in a criminal case, notwithstanding the Sixth Amendment rights at stake). In Digital Equipment, we rejected an assertion that collateral order review was necessary to promote “the public policy favoring voluntary resolution of disputes.” 511 U. S., at 881. “It defies common sense,” we explained, “to maintain that parties’ readiness to settle will be significantly dampened (or the corresponding public interest impaired) by a rule that a district court’s decision to let allegedly barred litigation go forward may be challenged as a matter of right only on appeal from a judgment for the plaintiff’s favor.” Ibid.

We reach a similar conclusion here. In our estimation, postjudgment appeals generally suffice to protect the rights of litigants and ensure the vitality of the attorney-client privilege. Appellate courts can remedy the improper disclosure of privileged material in the same way they remedy a host of other erroneous evidentiary rulings: by vacating an adverse judgment and remanding for a new trial in which the protected material and its fruits are excluded from evidence.

Dismissing such relief as inadequate, Mohawk emphasizes that the attorney-client privilege does not merely “prohibi[t] use of protected information at trial”; it provides a “right not to disclose the privileged information in the first place.” Brief for Petitioner 25. Mohawk is undoubtedly correct that an order to disclose privileged information intrudes on the confidentiality of attorney-client communications. But deferring review until final judgment does not meaningfully reduce the ex ante incentives for full and frank consultations between clients and counsel.

*110One reason for the lack of a discernible chill is that, in deciding how freely to speak, clients and counsel are unlikely to focus on the remote prospect of an erroneous disclosure order, let alone on the timing of a possible appeal. Whether or not immediate collateral order appeals are available, clients and counsel must account for the possibility that they will later be required by law to disclose their communications for a variety of reasons — for example, because they misjudged the scope of the privilege, because they waived the privilege, or because their communications fell within the privilege’s crime-fraud exception. Most district court rulings on these matters involve the routine application of settled legal principles. They are unlikely to be reversed on appeal, particularly when they rest on factual determinations for which appellate deference is the norm. See, e. g., Richardson-Merrell, 472 U. S., at 434 (“Most pretrial orders of district judges are ultimately affirmed by appellate courts”); Reise v. Board of Regents, 957 F. 2d 293, 295 (CA7 1992) (noting that “almost all interlocutory appeals from discovery orders would end in affirmance” because “the district court possesses discretion, and review is deferential”). The breadth of the privilege and the narrowness of its exceptions will thus tend to exert a much greater influence on the conduct of clients and counsel than the small risk that the law will be misapplied.2

Moreover, were attorneys and clients to reflect upon their appellate options, they would find that litigants confronted with a particularly injurious or novel privilege ruling have several potential avenues of review apart from collateral order appeal. First, a party may ask the district court to certify, and the court of appeals to accept, an interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1292(b). The preconditions for § 1292(b) review — “a controlling question of law,” the *111prompt resolution of which “may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation” — are most likely to be satisfied when a privilege ruling involves a new legal question or is of special consequence, and district courts should not hesitate to certify an interlocutory appeal in such cases. Second, in extraordinary circumstances — i. e., when a disclosure order “amount[s] to a judicial usurpation of power or a clear abuse of discretion,” or otherwise works a manifest injustice — a party may petition the court of appeals for a writ of mandamus. Cheney v. United States Dist. Court for D. C., 542 U. S. 367, 390 (2004) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Firestone, 449 U. S., at 378-379, n. 13.3 While these discretionary review mechanisms do not provide relief in every case, they serve as useful “safety valve[s]” for promptly correcting serious errors. Digital Equipment, 511 U. S., at 883.

Another long-recognized option is for a party to defy a disclosure order and incur court-imposed sanctions. District courts have a range of sanctions from which to choose, including “directing that the matters embraced in the order or other designated facts be taken as established for purposes of the action,” “prohibiting the disobedient party from supporting or opposing designated claims or defenses,” or “striking pleadings in whole or in part.” Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 37(b)(2)(A)(i)-(iii). Such sanctions allow a party to obtain post judgment review without having to reveal its privileged information. Alternatively, when the circumstances warrant it, a district court may hold a noncomplying party in contempt. The party can then appeal directly from that ruling, at least when the contempt citation can be characterized as a criminal punishment. See, e. g., Church of Scientology of Cal. v. United States, 506 U. S. 9, 18, n. 11 (1992); Firestone, 449 U. S., at 377; Cobbledick v. United States, 309 *112U. S. 323, 328 (1940); see also Wright & Miller §3914.23, at 140-155.

These established mechanisms for appellate review not only provide assurances to clients and counsel about the security of their confidential communications; they also go a long way toward addressing Mohawk’s concern that, absent collateral order appeals of adverse attorney-client privilege rulings, some litigants may experience severe hardship. Mohawk is no doubt right that an order to disclose privileged material may, in some situations, have implications beyond the case at hand. But the same can be said about many categories of pretrial discovery orders for which collateral order appeals are unavailable. As with these other orders, rulings adverse to the privilege vary in their significance; some may be momentous, but others are more mundane. Section 1292(b) appeals, mandamus, and appeals from contempt citations facilitate immediate review of some of the more consequential attorney-client privilege rulings. Moreover, protective orders are available to limit the spillover effects of disclosing sensitive information. That a fraction of orders adverse to the attorney-client privilege may nevertheless harm individual litigants in ways that are “only imperfectly reparable” does not justify making all such orders immediately appealable as of right under §1291. Digital Equipment, 511 U. S., at 872.

In short, the limited benefits of applying “the blunt, categorical instrument of §1291 collateral order appeal” to privilege-related disclosure orders simply cannot justify the likely institutional costs. Id., at 883. Permitting parties to undertake successive, piecemeal appeals of all adverse attorney-client rulings would unduly delay the resolution of district court litigation and needlessly burden the courts of appeals. See Wright & Miller §3914.23, at 123 (“Routine appeal from disputed discovery orders would disrupt the orderly progress of the litigation, swamp the courts of appeals, and substantially reduce the district court’s ability to con*113trol the discovery process”); cf. Cunningham v. Hamilton County, 527 U. S. 198, 209 (1999) (expressing concern that allowing immediate appeal as of right from orders fining attorneys for discovery violations would result in “the very sorts of piecemeal appeals and concomitant delays that the final judgment rule was designed to prevent”). Attempting to downplay such concerns, Mohawk asserts that the three Circuits in which the collateral order doctrine currently applies to adverse privilege rulings have seen only a trickle of appeals. But this may be due to the fact that the practice in all three Circuits is relatively new and not yet widely known. Were this Court to approve collateral order appeals in the attorney-client privilege context, many more litigants would likely choose that route. They would also likely seek to extend such a ruling to disclosure orders implicating many other categories of sensitive information, raising an array of line-drawing difficulties.4

C

In concluding that sufficiently effective review of adverse attorney-client privilege rulings can be had without resort to the Cohen doctrine, we reiterate that the class of collaterally appealable orders must remain “narrow and selective in its membership.” Will, 546 U. S., at 350. This admonition has acquired special force in recent years with the enactment of legislation designating rulemaking, “not expansion by court decision,” as the preferred means for determining whether and when prejudgment orders should be immediately appealable. Swint, 514 U. S., at 48. Specifically, Congress in 1990 amended the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U. S. C. § 2071 et seq., to authorize this Court to adopt rules “defin[ing] *114when a ruling of a district court is final for the purposes of appeal under section 1291.” § 2072(c). Shortly thereafter, and along similar lines, Congress empowered this Court to “prescribe rules, in accordance with [§ 2072], to provide for an appeal of an interlocutory decision to the courts of appeals that is not otherwise provided for under [§ 1292].” § 1292(e). These provisions, we have recognized, “warran[t] the Judiciary’s full respect.” Swint, 514 U. S., at 48; see also Cunningham, 527 U. S., at 210.

Indeed, the rulemaking process has important virtues. It draws on the collective experience of bench and bar, see 28 U. S. C. § 2073, and it facilitates the adoption of measured, practical solutions. We expect that the combination of standard postjudgment appeals, § 1292(b) appeals, mandamus, and contempt appeals will continue to provide adequate protection to litigants ordered to disclose materials purportedly subject to the attorney-client privilege. Any further avenue for immediate appeal of such rulings should be furnished, if at all, through rulemaking, with the opportunity for full airing it provides.

* * *

In sum, we conclude that the collateral order doctrine does not extend to disclosure orders adverse to the attorney-client privilege. Effective appellate review can be had by other means. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.

It is so ordered.

Justice Thomas,

concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.

I concur in the judgment and in Part II-C of the Court’s opinion because I wholeheartedly agree that “Congress’s designation of the rulemaking process as the way to define or refine when a district court ruling is ‘final’ and when an interlocutory order is appealable warrants the Judiciary’s *115full respect.” Swint v. Chambers County Comm’n, 514 U. S. 35, 48 (1995); ante, at 114 (quoting Swint, supra; citing Cunningham v. Hamilton County, 527 U. S. 198, 210 (1999)). It is for that reason that I do not join the remainder of the Court’s analysis.

The scope of federal appellate jurisdiction is a matter the Constitution expressly commits to Congress, see Art. I, § 8, cl. 9, and that Congress has addressed not only in 28 U. S. C. §§ 1291 and 1292, but also in the Rules Enabling Act amendments to which the Court refers. See ante, at 113-114 (citing §§2072-2073). The Court recognizes that these amendments “designat[e] rulemaking, ‘not expansion by court decision,’ as the preferred means for determining whether and when prejudgment orders should be immediately appealable.” Ante, at 113 (quoting Swint, supra, at 48). Because that designation is entitled to our full respect, and because the privilege order here is not on all fours with orders we previously have held to be appealable under the collateral order doctrine, see Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U. S. 541 (1949), I would affirm the Eleventh Circuit’s judgment on the ground that any “avenue for immediate appeal” beyond the three avenues addressed in the Court’s opinion must be left to the “rulemaking process.” Ante, at 114; see ante, at 110-113 (discussing certification under 28 U. S. C. § 1292(b), petitions for mandamus, and appeals from contempt orders).

We need not, and in my view should not, further justify our holding by applying the Cohen doctrine, which prompted the rulemaking amendments in the first place. In taking this path, the Court needlessly perpetuates a judicial policy that we for many years have criticized and struggled to limit. See, e. g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U. S. 662, 671-675 (2009); Will v. Hallock, 546 U. S. 345, 349 (2006); Sell v. United States, 539 U. S. 166, 177 (2003); Cunningham, supra, at 210; Digital Equipment Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U. S. 863, 884 (1994); Swint, supra, at 48; Lauro Lines s.r.l. v. *116Chasser, 490 U. S. 495, 498-501 (1989); Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U. S. 517, 527 (1988). The Court’s choice of analysis is the more ironic because applying Cohen to the facts of this case requires the Court to reach conclusions on, and thus potentially prejudice, the very matters it says would benefit from “the collective experience of bench and bar” and the “opportunity for full airing” that rulemaking provides. Ante, at 114.

“Finality as a condition of review is an historic characteristic of federal appellate procedure” that was incorporated in the first Judiciary Act and that Congress itself has “departed from only when observance of it would practically defeat the right to any review at all.” Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U. S. 323, 324-325 (1940). Until 1949, this Court’s view of the appellate jurisdiction statute reflected this principle and the statute’s text. See, e.g., Catlin v. United States, 324 U. S. 229, 233 (1945) (holding that § 128 of the Judicial Code (now 28 U. S. C. § 1291) limits review to decisions that “en[d] the litigation on the merits and leav[e] nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment”). Cohen changed all that when it announced that a “small class” of collateral orders that do not meet the statutory definition of finality nonetheless may be immediately appealable if they satisfy certain criteria that show they are “too important to be denied review.” 337 U. S., at 546.

Cohen and the early decisions applying it allowed § 1291 appeals of interlocutory orders concerning the posting of a bond, see id., at 545-547, the attachment of a vessel in admiralty, see Swift & Co. Packers v. Compania Colombiana Del Caribe, S. A., 339 U. S. 684, 688-689 (1950), and the imposition of notice costs in a class action, see Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U. S. 156, 170-172 (1974). As the Court’s opinion notes, later decisions sought to narrow Cohen lest its exception to § 1291 “ ‘swallow’ ” the final judgment rule. Ante, at 106 (quoting Digital Equipment, supra, at 868); see generally Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U. S. 463, 467-*117468 (1978). The Court has adhered to that narrowing approach, principally by raising the bar on what types of interests are “important enough” to justify collateral order appeals. See, e. g., Will, supra, at 352-353 (explaining that an interlocutory order typically will be “important” enough to justify Cohen review only where “some particular value of a high order,” such as “honoring the separation of powers, preserving the efficiency of government . . . , [or] respecting a State’s dignitary interests,” is “marshaled in support of the interest in avoiding trial” and the Court determines that denying review would “imperil” that interest); Digital Equipment, supra, at 878-879 (noting that appealability under Cohen turns on a “judgment about the value of the interests that would be lost through rigorous application of a final judgment requirement,” and that an interest “qualifies as ‘important’ in Cohen’s sense” if it is “weightier than the societal interests advanced by the ordinary operation of final judgment principles”). As we recognized last Term, however, our attempts to contain the Cohen doetrine have not all been successful or persuasive. See Ashcroft, supra, at 672 (“As a general matter, the collateral-order doctrine may have expanded beyond the limits dictated by its internal logic and the strict application of the criteria set out in Cohen”). In my view, this case presents an opportunity to improve our approach.

The privilege interest at issue here is undoubtedly important, both in its own right and when compared to some of the interests (e. g., in bond and notice-cost rulings) we have held to be appealable under Cohen. Accordingly, the Court’s Cohen analysis does not rest on the privilege order’s relative unimportance, but instead on its effective reviewability after final judgment. Ante, at 108-113. Although I agree with the Court’s ultimate conclusion, I see two difficulties with this approach. First, the Court emphasizes that the alternative avenues of review it discusses (which did not prove adequate in this case) would be adequate where the privilege *118ruling at issue is “particularly injurious or novel.” Ante, at 110. If that is right, and it seems to me that it is, then the opinion raises the question why such avenues were not also adequate to address the orders whose unusual importance or particularly injurious nature we have held justified immediate appeal under Cohen. See, e. g., Sell, 539 U. S., at 177. Second, the facts of this particular case seem in several respects to undercut the Court’s conclusion that the benefits of collateral order review “cannot justify the likely institutional costs.” Ante, at 112.* The Court responds that these case-specific arguments miss the point because the focus of the Cohen analysis is whether the “entire category” or “class of claims” at issue merits appellate review under the collateral order doctrine. Ante, at 107 (internal quotation marks omitted). That is exactly right, and illustrates what increasingly has bothered me about making this kind of appealability determination via case-by-case adjudication. The exercise forces the reviewing court to subordinate the realities of each case before it to generalized conclusions about the “likely” costs and benefits of allowing an exception to the final judgment rule in an entire “class of cases.” The Court concedes that Congress, which holds the constitutional reins in this area, has determined that such value judgments *119are better left to the “collective experience of bench and bar” and the “opportunity for full airing” that rulemaking provides. Ante, at 114. This determination is entitled to our full respect, in deed as well as in word. Accordingly, I would leave the value judgments the Court makes in its opinion to the rulemaking process, and in so doing take this opportunity to limit — effectively, predictably, and in a way we should have done long ago — the doctrine that, with a sweep of the Court’s pen, subordinated what the appellate jurisdiction statute says to what the Court thinks is a good idea.

Justice GINSBURG delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case concerns options open to plaintiffs, when denied class-action certification by a district court, to gain appellate review of the district court's order. Orders granting or denying class certification, this Court has held, are "inherently interlocutory," Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463 , 470, 98 S.Ct. 2454 , 57 L.Ed.2d 351 (1978), hence not immediately reviewable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 , which provides for appeals from "final decisions." Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f), promulgated in 1998, however, orders denying or granting class certification may be appealed immediately if the court of appeals so permits. Absent such permission, plaintiffs may pursue their individual claims on the merits to final judgment, at which point the denial of class-action certification becomes ripe for review.

The plaintiffs in the instant case, respondents here, were denied Rule 23(f) permission to appeal the District Court's refusal to grant class certification. Instead of pursuing their individual claims to final judgment on the merits, respondents stipulated *1707 to a voluntary dismissal of their claims "with prejudice," but reserved the right to revive their claims should the Court of Appeals reverse the District Court's certification denial.

We hold that the voluntary dismissal essayed by respondents does not qualify as a "final decision" within the compass of § 1291. The tactic would undermine § 1291's firm finality principle, designed to guard against piecemeal appeals, and subvert the balanced solution Rule 23(f) put in place for immediate review of class-action orders.

I

A

Under § 1291 of the Judicial Code, federal courts of appeals are empowered to review only "final decisions of the district courts." 28 U.S.C. § 1291 . 1 Two guides, our decision in Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463 , 98 S.Ct. 2454 , 57 L.Ed.2d 351 (1978), and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f), control our application of that finality rule here.

1

In Coopers & Lybrand, this Court considered whether a plaintiff in a putative class action may, under certain circumstances, appeal as of right a district court order striking class allegations or denying a motion for class certification. We held unanimously that the so-called "death-knell" doctrine did not warrant mandatory appellate jurisdiction of such "inherently interlocutory" orders. 437 U.S., at 470, 477 , 98 S.Ct. 2454 . Courts of Appeals employing the doctrine "regarded [their] jurisdiction as depending on whether [rejection of class-action status] had sounded the 'death knell' of the action." Id., at 466 , 98 S.Ct. 2454 . These courts asked whether the refusal to certify a class would end a lawsuit for all practical purposes because the value of the named plaintiff's individual claims made it "economically imprudent to pursue his lawsuit to a final judgment and [only] then seek appellate review of [the] adverse class determination." Id., at 469-470 , 98 S.Ct. 2454 . If, in the court of appeals' view, the order would terminate the litigation, the court deemed the order an appealable final decision under § 1291. Id., at 471 , 98 S.Ct. 2454 . If, instead, the court determined that the plaintiff had "adequate incentive to continue [litigating], the order [was] considered interlocutory." Ibid. Consequently, immediate appeal would be denied.

The death-knell theory likely "enhance[d] the quality of justice afforded a few litigants," we recognized. Id., at 473 , 98 S.Ct. 2454 . But the theory did so, we observed, at a heavy cost to § 1291's finality requirement, and therefore to "the judicial system's overall capacity to administer justice." Id., at 473 , 98 S.Ct. 2454 ; see id., at 471 , 98 S.Ct. 2454 ( Section 1291"evinces a legislative judgment that 'restricting appellate review to final decisions prevents the debilitating effect on judicial administration caused by piecemeal appeal disposition.' " (quoting Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 , 170, 94 S.Ct. 2140 , 40 L.Ed.2d 732 (1974) (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted))). First, the potential for multiple interlocutory appeals inhered in the doctrine: When a ruling denying class certification on one ground was reversed on appeal, a death-knell plaintiff might again claim "entitle[ment] to an appeal as a matter of right" if, on remand, the district court denied class certification on a different ground. Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S., at 474 , 98 S.Ct. 2454 .

*1708 Second, the doctrine forced appellate courts indiscriminately into the trial process, thereby defeating a "vital purpose of the final-judgment rule-that of maintaining the appropriate relationship between the respective courts." Id., at 476 , 98 S.Ct. 2454 (internal quotation marks omitted); see id., at 474 , 98 S.Ct. 2454 . The Interlocutory Appeals Act of 1958, 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (b), we explained, had created a two-tiered "screening procedure" to preserve this relationship and to restrict the availability of interlocutory review to "appropriate cases." 437 U.S., at 474 , 98 S.Ct. 2454 . For a party to obtain review under § 1292(b), the district court must certify that the interlocutory order "involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation." The court of appeals may then, "in its discretion, permit an appeal to be taken from such order." The death-knell doctrine, we stressed, "circumvent[ed] [ § 1292(b)'s] restrictions." Id., at 475 , 98 S.Ct. 2454 .

Finally, we observed, the doctrine was one sided: It "operate[d] only in favor of plaintiffs," even though the class-certification question is often "of critical importance to defendants as well." Id., at 476 , 98 S.Ct. 2454 . Just as a denial of class certification may sound the death knell for plaintiffs, "[c]ertification of a large class may so increase the defendant's potential damages liability and litigation costs that he may find it economically prudent to settle and to abandon a meritorious defense." Ibid. 2

In view of these concerns, the Court reached this conclusion in Coopers & Lybrand : "The fact that an interlocutory order may induce a party to abandon his claim before final judgment is not a sufficient reason for considering [the order] a 'final decision' within the meaning of § 1291." Id., at 477 , 98 S.Ct. 2454 . 3

2

After Coopers & Lybrand, a party seeking immediate review of an adverse class-certification order had no easy recourse. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure did not then "contain any unique provisions governing appeals" in class actions, id., at 470 , 98 S.Ct. 2454 so parties had to survive § 1292(b)'s two-level inspection, see id., at 474-475 , and n. 27, 98 S.Ct. 2454 ; supra, at 1707 - 1708, or satisfy the extraordinary-circumstances test applicable to writs of mandamus, see Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90 , 108, 88 S.Ct. 269 , 19 L.Ed.2d 305 (1967) (Black, J., concurring) ("[In] extraordinary circumstances, mandamus may be used to review an interlocutory order which is by no means 'final' and thus appealable under federal statutes."); cf. Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S., at 466, n. 6 , 98 S.Ct. 2454 .

*1709 Another avenue opened in 1998 when this Court approved Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f). Seen as a response to Coopers & Lybrand, see, e.g., Blair v. Equifax Check Services, Inc., 181 F.3d 832 , 834 (C.A.7 1999) ; Solimine & Hines, Deciding To Decide: Class Action Certification and Interlocutory Review by the United States Courts of Appeals Under Rule 23(f), 41 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1531 , 1568 (2000), Rule 23(f) authorizes "permissive interlocutory appeal" from adverse class-certification orders in the discretion of the court of appeals, Advisory Committee's 1998 Note on subd. (f) of Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23, 28 U.S.C.App., p. 815 (hereinafter Committee Note on Rule 23(f) ). The Rule was adopted pursuant to § 1292(e), see Committee Note on Rule 23(f), which empowers this Court, in accordance with the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 , to promulgate rules "to provide for an appeal of an interlocutory decision to the courts of appeals that is not otherwise provided for [in § 1292 ]." § 1292(e). 4 Rule 23(f) reads:

"A court of appeals may permit an appeal from an order granting or denying class-action certification ... if a petition for permission to appeal is filed with the circuit clerk within 14 days after the order is entered. An appeal does not stay proceedings in the district court unless the district judge or the court of appeals so orders." 5

Courts of appeals wield "unfettered discretion" under Rule 23(f), akin to the discretion afforded circuit courts under § 1292(b). Committee Note on Rule 23(f). But Rule 23(f) otherwise "departs from the § 1292(b) model," for it requires neither district court certification nor adherence to § 1292(b)'s other "limiting requirements." Committee Note on Rule 23(f) ; see supra, at 1707 - 1708.

This resolution was the product of careful calibration. By "[r]emoving the power of the district court to defeat any opportunity to appeal," the drafters of Rule 23(f) sought to provide "significantly greater protection against improvident certification decisions than § 1292(b)" alone offered. Judicial Conference of the United States, Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, Minutes of November 9-10, 1995. But the drafters declined to go further and provide for appeal as a matter of right. "[A] right to appeal would lead to abuse" on the part of plaintiffs and defendants alike, the drafters apprehended, "increas[ing] delay and expense" over "routine class certification decisions" unworthy of immediate appeal. Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). See also Brief for Civil Procedure Scholars as Amici Curiae 6-7, 11-14 (" Rule 23(f) was crafted to balance the benefits of immediate review against the costs of interlocutory appeals." (capitalization omitted)). Rule 23(f) therefore commits the decision whether to permit interlocutory appeal from an adverse certification decision to "the sole discretion of the court of appeals." Committee Note *1710 on Rule 23(f) ; see Federal Judicial Center, T. Willging, L. Hooper, & R. Niemic, Empirical Study of Class Actions in Four Federal District Courts: Final Report to the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules 86 (1996) (hereinafter Federal Judicial Center Study) ("The discretionary nature of the proposed rule ... is designed to be a guard against abuse of the appellate process."). 6

The Rules Committee offered some guidance to courts of appeals considering whether to authorize appeal under Rule 23(f). "Permission is most likely to be granted," the Committee Note states, "when the certification decision turns on a novel or unsettled question of law," or when "the decision on certification is likely dispositive of the litigation," as in a death-knell or reverse death-knell situation. Committee Note on Rule 23(f) ; see supra, at 1708, and n. 2. Even so, the Rule allows courts of appeals to grant or deny review "on the basis of any consideration." Committee Note on Rule 23(f) (emphasis added).

B

With this background in mind, we turn to the putative class action underlying our jurisdictional inquiry. The lawsuit is not the first of its kind. A few years after petitioner Microsoft Corporation released its popular videogame console, the Xbox 360, a group of Xbox owners brought a putative class action against Microsoft based on an alleged design defect in the device. See In re Microsoft Xbox 360 Scratched Disc Litigation, 2009 WL 10219350 , *1 (W.D.Wash., Oct. 5, 2009). The named plaintiffs, advised by some of the same counsel representing respondents in this case, asserted that the Xbox scratched (and thus destroyed) game discs during normal game-playing conditions. See ibid. The District Court denied class certification, holding that individual issues of damages and causation predominated over common issues. See id., at *6-*7. The plaintiffs petitioned the Ninth Circuit under Rule 23(f) for leave to appeal the class-certification denial, but the Ninth Circuit denied the request. See 851 F.Supp.2d 1274 , 1276 (W.D.Wash.2012). Thereafter, the Scratched Disc plaintiffs settled their claims individually. 851 F.Supp.2d, at 1276 .

Two years later, in 2011, respondents filed this lawsuit in the same Federal District Court. They proposed a nationwide class of Xbox owners based on the same design defect alleged in Scratched Disc Litigation . See 851 F.Supp.2d, at 1275-1276 . The class-certification analysis in the earlier case did not control, respondents urged, because an intervening Ninth Circuit decision constituted a change in law sufficient to overcome the deference ordinarily due, as a matter of comity, the previous certification denial. Id., at 1277-1278 . The District Court disagreed. Concluding that the relevant Circuit decision had not undermined Scratched Disc Litigation 's causation analysis, the court determined that comity required adherence to the earlier certification denial and *1711 therefore struck respondents' class allegations. 851 F.Supp.2d, at 1280-1281 .

Invoking Rule 23(f), respondents petitioned the Ninth Circuit for permission to appeal that ruling. 7 Interlocutory review was appropriate in this case, they argued, because the District Court's order striking the class allegations created a "death-knell situation": The "small size of [their] claims ma[de] it economically irrational to bear the cost of litigating th[e] case to final judgment," they asserted, so the order would "effectively kil[l] the case." Pet. for Permission To Appeal Under Rule 23(f) in No. 12-80085(CA9), App. 118. The Ninth Circuit denied the petition. Order in No. 12-80085 (CA9, June 12, 2012), App. 121.

Respondents then had several options. They could have settled their individual claims like their Scratched Disc predecessors or petitioned the District Court, pursuant to § 1292(b), to certify the interlocutory order for appeal, see supra, at 1707 - 1708. They could also have proceeded to litigate their case, mindful that the District Court could later reverse course and certify the proposed class. See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23(c)(1)(C) ("An order that grants or denies class certification may be altered or amended before final judgment."); Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S., at 469 , 98 S.Ct. 2454 (a certification order "is subject to revision in the District Court"). Or, in the event the District Court did not change course, respondents could have litigated the case to final judgment and then appealed. Id., at 469 , 98 S.Ct. 2454 ("an order denying class certification is subject to effective review after final judgment at the behest of the named plaintiff").

Instead of taking one of those routes, respondents moved to dismiss their case with prejudice. "After the [c]ourt has entered a final order and judgment," respondents explained, they would "appeal the ... order striking [their] class allegations." Motion To Dismiss in No. 11-cv-00722 (WD Wash., Sept. 25, 2012), App. 122-123. In respondents' view, the voluntary dismissal enabled them "to pursue their individual claims or to pursue relief solely on behalf of the class, should the certification decision be reversed." Brief for Respondents 15. Microsoft stipulated to the dismissal, but maintained that respondents would have "no right to appeal" the order striking the class allegations after thus dismissing their claims. App. to Pet. for Cert. 35a-36a. The District Court granted the stipulated motion to dismiss, id., at 39a, and respondents appealed. They challenged only the District Court's interlocutory order striking their class allegations, not the dismissal order which they invited. See Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants in No. 12-35946(CA9).

The Ninth Circuit held it had jurisdiction to entertain the appeal under § 1291. 797 F.3d 607 , 612 (2015). The Court of Appeals rejected Microsoft's argument that respondents' voluntary dismissal, explicitly engineered to appeal the District Court's interlocutory order striking the class allegations, impermissibly circumvented Rule 23(f). Ibid., n. 3. Because the stipulated dismissal "did not involve a settlement," the court reasoned, it was " 'a sufficiently adverse-and thus appealable-final decision' " under § 1291.

*1712 Id., at 612 (quoting Berger v. Home Depot USA, Inc., 741 F.3d 1061 , 1065 (C.A.9 2014) ); see id., at 1065 (relying on 7B C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1802, pp. 297-298 (3d ed. 2005), for the proposition "that finality for appeal purposes can be achieved in this manner").

Satisfied of its jurisdiction, the Ninth Circuit held that the District Court had abused its discretion in striking respondents' class allegations. 797 F.3d, at 615 . The Court of Appeals "express[ed] no opinion on whether" respondents "should prevail on a motion for class certification," ibid., concluding only that the District Court had misread recent Circuit precedent, see id., at 613-615 , and therefore misapplied the comity doctrine, id., at 615 . Whether a class should be certified, the court said, was a question for remand, "better addressed if and when [respondents] move[d] for class certification." Ibid.

We granted certiorari to resolve a Circuit conflict over this question: Do federal courts of appeals have jurisdiction under § 1291 and Article III of the Constitution to review an order denying class certification (or, as here, an order striking class allegations) after the named plaintiffs have voluntarily dismissed their claims with prejudice? 8 577 U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 890 , 193 L.Ed.2d 783 (2016). Because we hold that § 1291 does not countenance jurisdiction by these means, we do not reach the constitutional question, and therefore do not address the arguments and analysis discussed in the opinion concurring in the judgment.

II

"From the very foundation of our judicial system," the general rule has been that "the whole case and every matter in controversy in it [must be] decided in a single appeal." McLish v. Roff, 141 U.S. 661 , 665-666, 12 S.Ct. 118 , 35 L.Ed. 893 (1891). This final-judgment rule, now codified in § 1291, preserves the proper balance between trial and appellate courts, minimizes the harassment and delay that would result from repeated interlocutory appeals, and promotes the efficient administration of justice. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368 , 374, 101 S.Ct. 669 , 66 L.Ed.2d 571 (1981).

Construing § 1291 in line with these reasons for the rule, we have recognized that "finality is to be given a practical rather than a technical construction." Eisen, 417 U.S., at 171 , 94 S.Ct. 2140 (internal quotation marks omitted). Repeatedly we have resisted efforts to stretch § 1291 to permit appeals of right that would erode the finality principle and disserve its objectives. See, e.g., Mohawk Industries, Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100 , 112, 130 S.Ct. 599 , 175 L.Ed.2d 458 (2009) ; Digital Equipment Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863 , 878-879, 884, 114 S.Ct. 1992 , 128 L.Ed.2d 842 (1994) ; Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323 , 324-325, 330, 60 S.Ct. 540 , 84 L.Ed. 783 (1940) (construing § 1291's predecessor statute). Attempts to secure appeal as of right from adverse class-certification orders fit that bill. See supra, at 1707 - 1708. Because respondents' dismissal device subverts the final-judgment rule and the process Congress has established for refining that rule *1713 and for determining when nonfinal orders may be immediately appealed, see §§ 2072(c) and 1292(e), the tactic does not give rise to a "final decisio[n]" under § 1291.

A

Respondents' voluntary-dismissal tactic, even more than the death-knell theory, invites protracted litigation and piecemeal appeals. Under the death-knell doctrine, a court of appeals could decline to hear an appeal if it determined that the plaintiff "ha[d] adequate incentive to continue" despite the denial of class certification. Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S., at 471 , 98 S.Ct. 2454 . Appellate courts lack even that authority under respondents' theory. Instead, the decision whether an immediate appeal will lie resides exclusively with the plaintiff; she need only dismiss her claims with prejudice, whereupon she may appeal the district court's order denying class certification. And, as under the death-knell doctrine, she may exercise that option more than once, stopping and starting the district court proceedings with repeated interlocutory appeals. See id., at 474 , 98 S.Ct. 2454 (death-knell doctrine offered "no assurance that the trial process [would] not again be disrupted by interlocutory review").

Consider this case. The Ninth Circuit reviewed and rejected only the District Court's application of comity as a basis for striking respondents' class allegations. 797 F.3d, at 615 . The appeals court declined to reach Microsoft's other arguments against class certification. See ibid. It remained open to the District Court, in the Court of Appeals' view, to deny class certification on a different ground, and respondents would be free, under their theory, to force appellate review of any new order denying certification by again dismissing their claims. In designing Rule 23(f)'s provision for discretionary review, the Rules Committee sought to prevent such disruption and delay. See supra, at 1709 - 1710. 9

Respondents nevertheless maintain that their position promotes efficiency, observing that after dismissal with prejudice the case is over if the plaintiff loses on appeal. Brief for Respondents 38-39. Their way, they say, means prompt resolution of many lawsuits and infrequent use of the voluntary-dismissal tactic, for "most appeals lose" and few plaintiffs will "take th[e] risk" of losing their claims for good. Id., at 35-36. Respondents overlook the prospect that plaintiffs with weak merits claims may readily assume that risk, mindful that class certification often leads to a hefty settlement. See Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S., at 476 , 98 S.Ct. 2454 (defendant facing the specter of classwide liability may "abandon a meritorious defense"). Indeed, the same argument-that the case was over if the plaintiff lost on appeal-was evident in the death-knell context, yet this Court determined that the potential for piecemeal litigation was "apparent and serious." Id., at 474 , 98 S.Ct. 2454 . 10 And *1714 that potential is greater still under respondents' theory, where plaintiffs alone determine whether and when to appeal an adverse certification ruling.

B

Another vice respondents' theory shares with the death-knell doctrine, both allow indiscriminate appellate review of interlocutory orders. Ibid . Beyond disturbing the "appropriate relationship between the respective courts," id., at 476 , 98 S.Ct. 2454 (internal quotation marks omitted), respondents' dismissal tactic undercuts Rule 23(f)'s discretionary regime. This consideration is "[o]f prime significance to the jurisdictional issue before us." Swint v. Chambers County Comm'n, 514 U.S. 35 , 46, 115 S.Ct. 1203 , 131 L.Ed.2d 60 (1995) (pendent appellate jurisdiction in collateral-order context would undermine § 1292(b) ); see supra, at 1707 - 1708 (death-knell doctrine impermissibly circumvented § 1292(b) ).

In the Rules Enabling Act, as earlier recounted, Congress authorized this Court to determine when a decision is final for purposes of § 1291, and to provide for appellate review of interlocutory orders not covered by statute. See supra, at 1709, and n. 4. These changes are to come from rulemaking, however, not judicial decisions in particular controversies or inventive litigation ploys. See Swint, 514 U.S., at 48 , 115 S.Ct. 1203 . In this case, the rulemaking process has dealt with the matter, yielding a "measured, practical solutio[n]" to the questions whether and when adverse certification orders may be immediately appealed. Mohawk Industries, 558 U.S., at 114 , 130 S.Ct. 599 . Over years the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure studied the data on class-certification rulings and appeals, weighed various proposals, received public comment, and refined the draft rule and Committee Note. See Solimine & Hines, 41 Wm. & Mary L. Rev., at 1564-1566, and nn. 178-189 ; Federal Judicial Center Study 80-87. Rule 23(f) reflects the rulemakers' informed assessment, permitting, as explained supra, at 1708 - 1710, interlocutory appeals of adverse certification orders, whether sought by plaintiffs or defendants, solely in the discretion of the courts of appeals. That assessment "warrants the Judiciary's full respect." Swint, 514 U.S., at 48 , 115 S.Ct. 1203 ; see Mohawk Industries, 558 U.S., at 118-119 , 130 S.Ct. 599 (THOMAS, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).

Here, however, the Ninth Circuit, after denying respondents permission to appeal under Rule 23(f), nevertheless assumed jurisdiction of their appeal challenging only the District Court's order striking the class allegations. See supra, at 1710 - 1712. According to respondents, even plaintiffs who altogether bypass Rule 23(f) may force an appeal by dismissing their claims with prejudice. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 34. Rule 23(f), respondents say, is irrelevant, for it "address[es] interlocutory orders," whereas this case involves "an actual final judgment." Brief for Respondents 26, 28.

We are not persuaded. If respondents' voluntary-dismissal tactic could yield an appeal of right, Rule 23(f)'s careful calibration-as well as Congress' designation of rulemaking "as the preferred means for determining whether and when prejudgment orders should be immediately appealable," Mohawk Industries, 558 U.S., at 113 , 130 S.Ct. 599 (majority opinion)- *1715 "would be severely undermined," Swint, 514 U.S., at 47 , 115 S.Ct. 1203 . Respondents, after all, "[sought] review of only the [inherently interlocutory] orde[r]" striking their class allegations; they "d[id] not complain of the 'final' orde[r] that dismissed their cas[e]." Camesi v. University of Pittsburgh Medical Center, 729 F.3d 239 , 244 (C.A.3 2013).

Plaintiffs in putative class actions cannot transform a tentative interlocutory order, see supra, at 1710 - 1711, into a final judgment within the meaning of § 1291 simply by dismissing their claims with prejudice-subject, no less, to the right to "revive" those claims if the denial of class certification is reversed on appeal, see Brief for Respondents 45; Tr. of Oral Arg. 31 (assertion by respondents' counsel that, if the appeal succeeds, "everything would spring back to life" on remand). Were respondents' reasoning embraced by this Court, "Congress['] final decision rule would end up a pretty puny one." Digital Equipment Corp., 511 U.S., at 872 , 114 S.Ct. 1992 . Contrary to respondents' argument, § 1291's firm final-judgment rule is not satisfied whenever a litigant persuades a district court to issue an order purporting to end the litigation. Finality, we have long cautioned, "is not a technical concept of temporal or physical termination." Cobbledick, 309 U.S., at 326 , 60 S.Ct. 540 . It is one "means [geared to] achieving a healthy legal system," ibid., and its contours are determined accordingly, see supra, at 1712 - 1713. 11

C

The one-sidedness of respondents' voluntary-dismissal device "reinforce[s] our conclusion that [it] does not support appellate jurisdiction of prejudgment orders denying class certification." Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S., at 476 , 98 S.Ct. 2454 ; see supra, at 1708. Respondents' theory permits plaintiffs only, never defendants, to force an immediate appeal of an adverse certification ruling. Yet the "class issue" may be just as important to defendants, Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S., at 476 , 98 S.Ct. 2454 for "[a]n order granting certification ... may force a defendant to settle rather than ... run the risk of potentially ruinous liability," Committee Note on Rule 23(f) ; see supra, at 1708, and n. 2 (defendants may face a "reverse death knell"). Accordingly, we recognized in Coopers & Lybrand that "[w]hatever similarities or differences there are between plaintiffs and defendants in this context involve questions of policy for Congress." 437 U.S., at 476 , 98 S.Ct. 2454 . Congress chose the rulemaking process to settle the matter, and the rulemakers did so by adopting Rule 23(f)'s evenhanded prescription. It is not the prerogative of litigants or federal courts to disturb that settlement. See supra, at 1713 - 1714.

* * *

For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Justice GORSUCH took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

Justice THOMAS, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and Justice ALITO join, concurring in the judgment.

I agree with the Court that the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction over respondents'

*1716 appeal, but I would ground that conclusion in Article III of the Constitution instead of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 . I therefore concur only in the judgment.

The plaintiffs in this case, respondents here, sued Microsoft, petitioner here, to recover damages after they purchased allegedly faulty video game consoles that Microsoft manufactured. The plaintiffs brought claims for themselves (individual claims) and on behalf of a putative class of similarly situated consumers (class allegations). Early in the litigation, the District Court granted Microsoft's motion to strike the class allegations, effectively declining to certify the class. The Court of Appeals denied permission to appeal that decision under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f), which requires a party to obtain permission from the court of appeals before appealing a decision regarding class certification.

The plaintiffs decided not to pursue their individual claims, instead stipulating to a voluntary dismissal of those claims with prejudice. They then filed a notice of appeal from the voluntary dismissal order. On appeal, they did not ask the Court of Appeals to reverse the District Court's dismissal of their individual claims. They instead asked the Court of Appeals to reverse the order striking their class allegations. The question presented in this case is whether the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to hear the appeal under both § 1291, which grants appellate jurisdiction to the courts of appeals over "final decisions" by district courts, and under Article III of the Constitution, which limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to "cases" and "controversies."

The Court today holds that the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction under § 1291 because the voluntary dismissal with prejudice did not result in a "final decision." I disagree with that holding. A decision is "final" for purposes of § 1291 if it "ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment." Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229 , 233, 65 S.Ct. 631 , 89 L.Ed. 911 (1945). The order here dismissed all of the plaintiffs' claims with prejudice and left nothing for the District Court to do but execute the judgment. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 39a ("direct [ing] the Clerk to enter Judgment ... and close th[e] case").

The Court reaches the opposite conclusion, relying not on the text of § 1291 or this Court's precedents about finality, but on Rule 23(f). Rule 23(f) makes interlocutory orders regarding class certification appealable only with the permission of the court of appeals. The Court concludes that the plaintiffs' "voluntary dismissal" "does not qualify as a 'final decision' " because allowing the plaintiffs' appeal would "subvert the balanced solution Rule 23(f) put in place for immediate review of class-action orders." Ante, at 1707.

The Court's conclusion does not follow from its reasoning. Whether a dismissal with prejudice is "final" depends on the meaning of § 1291, not Rule 23(f). Rule 23(f) says nothing about finality, much less about the finality of an order dismissing individual claims with prejudice. I agree with the Court that the plaintiffs are trying to avoid the requirements for interlocutory appeals under Rule 23(f), but our view of the balance struck in that rule should not warp our understanding of finality under § 1291.

Although I disagree with the Court's reading of § 1291, I agree that the plaintiffs could not appeal in these circumstances. In my view, they could not appeal because the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction under Article III of the Constitution. The "judicial Power" of the United States extends only to "Cases" and "Controversies." Art. III, § 2. This requirement *1717 limits the jurisdiction of the federal courts to issues presented "in an adversary context," Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 , 95, 88 S.Ct. 1942 , 20 L.Ed.2d 947 (1968), in which the parties maintain an "actual" and "concrete" interest, Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 577 U.S. ----, ----, 136 S.Ct. 663 , 669, 193 L.Ed.2d 571 (2016) (internal quotation marks omitted). Put another way, "Article III denies federal courts the power to decide questions that cannot affect the rights of litigants in the case before them, and confines them to resolving real and substantial controversies admitting of specific relief through a decree of a conclusive character." Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp ., 494 U.S. 472 , 477, 110 S.Ct. 1249 , 108 L.Ed.2d 400 (1990) (internal quotation marks, citation, and alteration omitted).

The plaintiffs' appeal from their voluntary dismissal did not satisfy this jurisdictional requirement. When the plaintiffs asked the District Court to dismiss their claims, they consented to the judgment against them and disavowed any right to relief from Microsoft. The parties thus were no longer adverse to each other on any claims, and the Court of Appeals could not "affect the[ir] rights" in any legally cognizable manner. Ibid . Indeed, it has long been the rule that a party may not appeal from the voluntary dismissal of a claim, since the party consented to the judgment against it. See, e.g., Evans v. Phillips, 4 Wheat. 73 , 4 L.Ed. 516 (1819) ; Lord v. Veazie, 8 How. 251 , 255-256, 12 L.Ed. 1067 (1850) ; United States v. Babbitt, 104 U.S. 767 , 26 L.Ed. 921 (1882) ; Deakins v. Monaghan, 484 U.S. 193 , 199-200, 108 S.Ct. 523 , 98 L.Ed.2d 529 (1988).

The plaintiffs contend that their interest in reversing the order striking their class allegations is sufficient to satisfy Article III's case-or-controversy requirement, but they misunderstand the status of putative class actions. Class allegations, without an underlying individual claim, do not give rise to a "case" or "controversy." Those allegations are simply the means of invoking a procedural mechanism that enables a plaintiff to litigate his individual claims on behalf of a class. See Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393 , 408, 130 S.Ct. 1431 , 176 L.Ed.2d 311 (2010) (plurality opinion). Thus, because the Court of Appeals lacked Article III jurisdiction to adjudicate the individual claims, it could not hear the plaintiffs' appeal of the order striking their class allegations.

Plaintiffs' representation that they hope to "revive their [individual] claims should they prevail" on the appeal of the order striking their class allegations does not undermine this conclusion. Brief for Respondents 45. This Court has interpreted Article III "to demand that an actual controversy be extant at all stages of review, not merely at the time the complaint is filed." Campbell-Ewald Co., supra, at ----, 136 S.Ct., at 669 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). And in any event, a favorable ruling on class certification would not "revive" their individual claims: A court's decision about class allegations "in no way touch[es] the merits" of those claims. Gardner v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co ., 437 U.S. 478 , 482, 98 S.Ct. 2451 , 57 L.Ed.2d 364 (1978).

* * *

Because I would hold that the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction under Article III to consider respondents' appeal, I concur in the judgment.