Burnham v. Superior Court

Just as the developments in in personam jurisdiction doctrine could not be constrained and had implications for the development of quasi-in-rem and in-rem doctrine, neither could the implications of Shaffer be constrained to quasi-in-rem and in-rem.  In particular, lower courts struggled to know how seriously to take the Shaffer majority's statement, "We therefore conclude that all assertions of state-court jurisdiction must be evaluated according to the standards set forth in International Shoe and its progeny." Taking this statement seriously would mean that a court could not exercise quasi-in-rem jurisdiction over property in its geographic boundaries when the property had no relationship to the subject matter of the dispute (as was frequently the case in quasi-in-rem lawsuits), unless the court under the Shoe test could otherwise exercise in personam jurisdiction over the defendant (under either a general or a specific IPJ theory). That would be a significant change in law in quasi-in-rem law. And on the IPJ side, where ALL traditional bases for exercising IPJ, including any not discussed explicitly in International Shoe or its progeny, now unconstitutional?

With respect to the spillover into IPJ law:  Some courts had held for some time (the majority and the concurrence in the case that folllows dispute how long) that even though precursors to International Shoe discarded Pennoyer's holding that an in-state tag was NECESSARY for an in personam case to proceed, courts continued to hold that an in-state tag was still SUFFICIENT by itself to allow a court to exercise personal jurisdiction.  Few courts questioned this sufficiency after International Shoe.  After Shaffer, however, questions did arise because few courts believed that a tag, by itself, could pass the International Shoe tests; an in-jurisdiction tag, by itself could hardly be said to provide "minimal contacts".