Mr. Justice Field,

after making the foregoing statement of facts, delivered the opinion of the court.

The ordinance- of the Board of Supervisors of the city and county of San Francisco, the legislative authority of that municipality, approved on the 25th of June, 1883, is similar in its main features to the ordinance under consideration at this term in Barbier v. Connolly, ante, page 27. It differs in the designation of the limits of the district of the city and- county within which its provisions are to be enforced, but not otherwise in any essential particular. The fourth section is identical in both. The *708prohibition against labor on Sunday in this section is; not involved here, as it was not in that case; and the provision for the cessation of labor in the laundries within certain prescribed limits of the city and county during certain hours of the night is purely a police regulation, which is, as we there said, within the competency of any municipality possessed of the ordinary powers belonging to such bodies. Besides, the Constitution of California declares that “ any county, city, town, or township may make and enforce within its limits all such local, police, sanitary, and other regulations as are not in conflict with general laws.” Art. XI., § 11. And it is of the utmost consequence in a city subject, as San Francisco is, the greater part of the year, to high winds, and composed principally within the limits designated of wooden buildings, that regulations of a strict character should be adopted to prevent the possibility of fires. That occupations in which continuous fires are necessary should cease at certain hours of the night would seem to be, under such circumstances, a reasonable regulation as a measure of precaution. At any rate, of its necessity for the purpose designated the municipal ¿uthorities are the appropriate judges. Their regulations in this matter are riot subject to any interference by the federal tribunals unless they are made the occasion for invading the substantial rights of persons, and no such invasion is caused by the regulation in question. As we said in Barbier v. .Connolly, “the same municipal authority which directs the cessation of labor must necessarily prescribe the limits within which it shall be enforced, as it does the limits in a city within which wooden buildings cannot be constructed.” No invidious discrimination is made against any one by the measures adopted. All persons engaged in the same business within the prescribed limits are treated alike and subject to similar restrictions.

There is no force in the objection that an unwarrantable discrimination is made against persons engaged in the laundry business, because persons in other kinds of business are not required to cease from their labors during the same hours at night. There may be no risks attending the business of others, certainly not as great as where fires are constantly required to carry them on. The specific regulations for one kind of busi*709ness, which may be necessary for the protection of the public, can never be the just ground of complaint because like restrictions are not imposed upon other business of a different kind. The discriminations which are open to objection are those where persons engaged in the same business are subjected to different restrictions, or are held entitled to different privileges under the same conditions. It is .only then that the discrimination can be said to impair, that equal right which all can claim in the enforcement of the laws.

But counsel in the court below not only objected to the fourth section of the ordinance as discriminating between those engaged in the laundry business, and those engaged in other business, but also as discriminating between different classes engaged in the laundry business itself. This latter ground of objection becomes intelligible only by reference to his brief, in which we are informed that the laundry business, besides the washing and ironing of clothes, involves the fluting, polishing, blueing, and wringing of them; and that these are all different branches, requiring separate and skilled workmen, who are not prohibited from working ,during the hours of night. This fluting, polishing, blueing, and w.mging of clothes, it seems to us, are incidents of the general business, and are embraced within its prohibition. But if not incidents, and they are outside of the prohibition, it is because thére is not the danger from them that would arise from the continuous fires required in washing; and it is not discriminating legislation in any invidious sense that branches of the same business from which danger is apprehended are prohibited during certain hours of the night, whilst other branches involving no such danger are permitted.

The objection that the fourth section is void on the ground that it deprives a man of the. right to work at all times is equally without force. However broad the right of every one to follow such calling and employ his time as he may judge most conducive to his interests, it must be exercised subject to such general rules as are adopted by society for the common welfare. All sorts of restrictions , are imposed upon the actions of men notwithstanding the liberty which is guaranteed to each. It is liberty regulated by just and impartial laws. Bar-*710ties, for example, are free to make any contracts they choose for a lawful purpose, but society says what contracts shall be in writing and what may be verbally made, and on' what days they may be executed, and how long they may be enforced if their terms are not complied with. So, too, with the hours of labor. On few subjects has there been more regulation. How . many hours shall constitute a day’s work in the absence of contract, at what time shops in our cities shall close at night, are constant subjects of legislation. Laws setting aside Sunday as a day of rest are upheld, not from any right of the government to legislate for the promotion of religious observances, but from its right to protect all persons from the physical and moral debasement which comes from uninterrupted labor. Such laws have always been deemed beneficent and merciful laws, especially to the poor and dependent, to the laborers in 1 our factories and workshops and in the heated rooms of our cities; and their validity has been sustained by the highest courts of the States.

The principal objection, however, of the petitioner to the ordinance in question is founded upon the supposed hostile motives of the supervisors in passing it. The petition alleges that it was adopted owing to a feeling of antipathy and hatred prevailing in the city and county of San Francisco against the subjects of the Emperor of China resident therein, and for the purpose of compelling those engaged in the laundry business to abandon their lawful vocation, and residence there, and not for any sanitary, police, or other legitimate purpose. There is nothing, however, in the language of the ordinance, or in the record of its enactment, which in any respect tends to sustain this allegation. And the rule is general with reference to the enactments of all legislative bodies that the courts cannot inquire into the motives of the legislators in passing them, except as they may be disclosed on the face of the acts, or inferrible from their operation, considered with reference to the condition of the country and existing legislation. The motives of the legislators, considered as the purposes they had in view, will always be presumed to be to accomplish that which follows as the natural and reasonable effect of their enactments. Their *711motives, considered as the moral inducements for their votes, will vary with the different members of the legislative body. The diverse character of such motives, and the impossibility of penetrating into the hearts of men and ascertaining the truth,' precludes all such inquiries as impracticable and futile. And in the present case, even if the motives of the supervisors were as alleged, the ordinance would not be thereby changed from a legitimate police regulation, unless in its enforcement it is made to operate only against the class mentioned; and of this there is no pretence.

It follow's that the several questions certified must be answered in the negative and the judgment be affirmed;

And it is so ordered.

Sharpstein, J.

The main question in this case is whether a child “ between six and twenty-one years of age, of Chinese parentage, but who was born and has always lived in the city and county of San Francisco,” is entitled to admission in the public school of the district in which she resides.

The language of the code is as follows:

“ Every school, unless otherwise provided by law, must be. *474open for the-admission of all children between six and twenty-one years of age residing in the district; and the board of trustees, or city board of education, have power to admit adults and children not residing in the district, whenever good reasons exist therefor. Trustees shall have the power to exclude children of filthy or vicious habits, or children suffering from contagious or infectious diseases.” (Political Code, § 1667.)

That is the latest legislative expression on the subject, and was passed as late as 1880. Prior to that time the first clause of the section read, “ Every school, unless otherwise provided by special statute, must be open for the admission of all white children between five and twenty-one years of age, residing in the district.”

As amended, the clause is broad enough to include all children who are not precluded from entering a public school by some provision of law ; and we are-not aware of any law which forbids the entrance of children of any race or nationality. The legislature not only declares who-shall be admitted, but also who may be excluded, and it does not authorize the exclusion of any one on the ground upon which alone the exclusion of the respondent here is sought to be justified. The vicious, the filthy, and those having contagious or infectious diseases, may be excluded, without regard to their race, color or nationality.

This law must be construed as any other would be construed. “ Where a law is plain and unambiguous, whether it be expressed in general or limited terms, the legislature should be intended to mean what they have plainly expressed, and consequently, no room is left for construction.” (Fisher v. Blight, 2 Cranch, 358, 399.) “ When the law is clear and explicit, and its provisions are susceptible of but one interpretation, its consequences, if evil, can only be avoided by a change of the law itself, to be effected by legislative and not judicial- action.” (Bosley v. Mattingly, 14 B. Mon. 73.) This rule is never controverted or doubted, although perhaps sometimes lost sight of. In this case, if effect be given to the intention of the legislature, as indicated by the clear and unambiguous language used by them, respondent here has the same right to enter a public school that any other child has. It is not alleged that she is vicious, or filthy, or that she has a contagious or infectious disease. As the legis*475lature has not denied to the children of any race or nationality the right to enter our public schools, the question whether it might have done so does not arise in this case.

We think the superintendent of schools was improperly joined as a defendant in this action, and that the-court properly dismissed the action as to the board of education. In Ward v. Flood, 48 Cal. 36, the action was against the teacher alone. That it was properly brought, seems to have been conceded.

The board of education has power “ to make, establish, and enforce all necessary and proper rules and regulations not contrary to law,” and none other. (Stats. 1871-2, p. 846.) Teachers cannot justify a violation of law, on the ground that-a resolution of the board of education required them to do so.

The judgment must be modified, so as to make the writ run against the defendant Hurley alone.

In other respects it is affirmed.

Thornton, J., Myrick, J., McKee, J., McKinstry, J., Ross, J., and Morrison, C. J., concurred.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

Reavis, C. J.

Takuji Yamashita, a native of Japan, applies for admission as an attorney and counselor at law in the courts of this state. He shows that he is over twenty-one years of age, has been a resident of this state for more than one year, and that he has the requisite learning and ability qualifying him for admission. The law relating to the qualifications and admission of attorneys and counselors at law is found in the act of March 19, 1895 (Laws 1895, p. 178), together with the amendment in the act of February 16, 1897 (Laws 1897, p. 12). The law *235of 1895 made no provision for admission -without an examination. Sections 2 and 3 of the act provided for holding regular examinations for admission, hut § 6 of the act declared: “No person shall practice as an attorney and counselor at law in any court of this state who does not reside in the state, or who is not a citizen of the United States.” In the act of 1897, § 4 of the former act is so amended in substance as to provide for the admission of attorneys from sister states, upon satisfactory evidence of qualifications, without examination. The amendatory act does not affect § 6 of the original act, which, it may he observed, has been the law since 1881. It is apparent, therefore, that, to entitle the applicant to admission, he must he a citizen of the United States. The qualifications required for admission to the bar are prescribed by law, and they are exclusively within the discretion and policy of the state. One of the conditions required for the applicant is that he must he a citizen of the United States. It is shown by exemplification of the record that an order was entered admitting applicant to citizenship in the superior court of Pierce county on the 14th of May, 1902. It is also urged that such’ superior court was one of competent jurisdiction, and therefore its judgment must be final, and cannot he questioned here. The record of naturalization shows that the applicant is a native of Japan, and that he renounces allegiance as a subject of the Mikado. The naturalization law requires the applicant to declare on oath that he absolutely and entirely renounces and abjures all allegiance and fidelity to every prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty, and particularly, by name, to the prince, potentate, state, or sovereign of which he was before a citizen or subject (Rev. St. U. S., § 2165, subd. 2), and the proceedings must he recorded by the clerk of the court. Thus the transcript of the order admitting him to citizen*236ship shows that he is of the Japanese race. The judgment of the superior court, if acting within its jurisdiction, is conclusive; hut, if the judgment upon its face shows that the court was without authority to pronounce the judgment, the determination is void and must he disregarded. A judgment void upon its face may he attacked at any time and in any proceeding, and the same may he disregarded. Savage v. Sternberg, 19 Wash. 679 (54 Pac. 611, 67 Am. St. Rep. 751). Also, as pertinent and relating to such proceedings in naturalization, see In re Gee Hop, 71 Fed. 274; In re Hong Yen Chang, 84 Cal. 163 (24 Pac. 156).

The question presented is whether one of the Japanese race is eligible under the naturalization laws, for admission to citizenship. The federal constitution confers plenary power upon congress to prescribe the qualifications and conditions for naturalization. All the acts of congress relating to the naturalization of aliens, commencing with that of April 14, 1802, to the Revised Statutes, contain the provision that “any alien being a free white person may be admitted to be a citizen,” etc. After the adoption of the 13th and 14th amendments to’the federal constitution, and in the act of July 14, 1870, it was enacted by congress “that the naturalization laws are hereby extended to aliens of African nativity and to persons of African descent.” 16 St. at Large, 256, § 7. This was afterwards revised, and placed in the Revised Statutes, — § 2169 (see 18 St. at Large, 318), — so as to read, “The provisions of this title shall apply to aliens being free white persons and to aliens of African nativity and to persons of African descent.” And this is the existing law. It is plain that the two races -mentioned are now eligible to citizenship under the general naturalization laws; that is, white persons and persons of African (negro) descent and nativity. *237It is clear that within the meaning of these words the applicant is ineligible. When the naturalization law was enacted the word “white” applied to race, commonly referred to the Caucasian race. This is well stated in the case of In re Ah Yup, 5 Sawy. 155 :

“Webster in his dictionary says: ‘The common classification is that of Blumenbach, who makes five. 1. The Caucasian, or white race, to which belong the greater part of the European nations and those of Western Asia; 2. The Mongolian, or yellow race, occupying Tartary, China, Japan, etc.; 3. The Ethiopian or negro (black) race, occupying all Africa, except the north; 4. The American, or red race, containing the Indians of North and South America; and 5. The Malay, or brown race, occupying the islands of the Indian Archipelago,’ etc. This division was adopted from Buffon, with some changes in names, and is founded on the combined characteristics of complexion, hair and skull. Linnaeus makes four divisions, founded on the color of the skin: ‘1. European, whitish; 2. American, coppery; 3. Asiatic, tawny; and, 4. African, black.’ Cuvier makes three: Caucasian, Mongol and Negro. Others make many more, but no one includes the white, or Caucasian, with the Mongolian or yellow race; and no one of those classifications recognizing color as one of the distinguishing characteristics includes the Mongolian in the white or whitish race.’ (See New American Cyclopedia, title ‘Ethnology.’)”

The courts, federal and state, have uniformly determined that Chinese are not eligible to naturalization, because not white persons. In 1880 it was determined that a native of British Columbia, half Indian and half white, could not be naturalized. In re Camille, 6 Fed. 256. In In re Po, 28 N. Y. Supp. 383, a native of British Burmah was denied admission. In In re Kanaka Nian, a Hawaiian, was denied naturalization. 6 Utah, 659 (21 Pac. 993, 4 L. R. A. 726). In In re Saito, 62 Fed. 126, the federal circuit court adjudged that a native of Japan *238was of the Mongolian race, and therefore not eligible to naturalization.

But the applicant earnestly urges that the act of congress specially excluding the Chinese from naturalization implies, when considered with reference to our modem treaties with the empire of Japan, that the Japanese were excepted from the general exclusion of the Mongolian race. He also commends the reasoning in the case of In re Rodriguez, 81 Fed. 337, as persuasive to a more liberal construction in favor of the Japanese. In that ease a native of Mexico, of undefined blood and race, and whose ancestors had for centuries been habitants of Mexico, was naturalized. But such decision was largely controlled by the various treaties with Mexico, and the fact that thousands of Mexicans, without regard to race or color, had been collectively naturalized as citizens of the United States. It is true, the learned judge, in the course of his opinion, suggests other and different views of the meaning of the classification by color contained in the naturalization laws, from those taken by the other authorities heretofore mentioned; but he also seems to concede that the Mongolian race is clearly excluded. It is likewise true that congress has several times collectively conferred citizenship upon bodies of people without reference to race, but the reasons therefor in each instance were plainly special, and such acts cannot be extended beyond the particular instances. The general law, with the single extension made to the African or negro race, has been confined to free white aliens. The law seems to base the classification upon ethnological and racial considerations, rather than in any national distinctions. Whether the classification according to color is technically scientific or natural is not a proper subject of inquiry here. Brom its existence co-extensively *239with the formation, of the American republic, it must be taken to express a settled national will.

The applicant cannot be admitted because he is not a citizen of the United States.

Dunbar, Fullerton, Anders and Mount, JJ., concur.

Mr. Justice Sutherland

delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case presents one of the questions involved in the case of Takao Ozawa v. United States, this day decided,. ante, 178, viz!:' Are the petitioners, being persons of the Japanese race born in-Japan, entitled to naturalization under § 2169 of the Revised Statutes of the United States?

Certificates of naturalization were issued to both petitioners by a Superior Court of the State of Washington prior to 1906, when § 2169 is conceded to have been in full force and effect.

The-respondent, as Secretary of State of the State of Washington, refused to receive and file articles óf incorporation of the Japanese Real Estate Holding Company, executed by petitioners, upon the ground that, being of the Japanese race, they were not at the time of their naturalization and never had been entitled to naturalization. under the laws of the United States, and were therefore not qualified under the laws of the "State of Washington to form the corporation proposed, or to-file articles naming them as sole trustees of said corporation. Thereupon petitioners applied, to the Supreme Court of the State for á writ of mandamus to compel respondent to receive and file the articles of incorporation,- but that court refused and petitioners bring the case here by writ of certiorari.

Upon the authority of. Takao Ozawa v. United States, supra, we must hold that the petitioners were not eligible to naturalization, and as this ineligibility appeared, upon the face of the judgment of the Superior Court, admitting petitioners to citizenship, that court was without juris*201diction and its judgment was void. In re Gee Hop, 71 Fed. 274; In re Yamashita, 30 Wash. 234.

The judgment of the Supreme Court of the State of Washington is therefore

Affirmed.

Mr. Justice Butler

delivered the opinion of the Court.

Appellants brought this spit to enjoin the Attorney General of Washington from enforcing the Anti-Alien Land Law of that State, c. 50, Laws, 1921, on the grounds that it is in conflict with the due process and.equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment; with'the treaty between the United States and Japan, and with certain provisions of the constitution of the State.

The" appellants are residents of Washington. ' The Terraces are citizens of the United States and of Washington. Nakatsuka was born in Japan of Japanese parents and is a subject of the Emperor of Japan. The Terraces are the owners of a tract of land in King County which is particularly adapted to raising vegetables^ and which for a number of years had been devoted to that and other agricultural purposes. The complaint alleges that Nakatsuka' is a capable farmer and will be a désirable tenant of the land; that the Terraces desire to lease their land to him for the period of five years; that he desires to accept such lease, and that the lease would be made but *212for the act complained of. And it' is alleged that the defendant, as Attorney ‘General, has threatened to and will take steps to enforce the act against the appellants if they enter into such lease, and will, treat the leasehold interest as forfeited to the State, and will prosecute the appellants criminally for violation of the act; that the act is so drastic and the penalties attached to its violation are so great that neither of the appellants may make the lease even to test the constitutionality of the act, and that, unless the court shall determine its validity in this suit, the appellants will be compelled to submit to it,- whether valid or invalid, and thereby will be deprived of their ■property without due process of law and denied the equal protection of the laws.

The Attorney General made a motion to dismiss the amended complaint upon the ground that it did not state any matters of equity or facts sufficient to entitle the appellants • to relief. The District Court granted the motion and entered a decree of dismissal on the merits. The case is here on appeal from that decree.

Section 33 1 of Article-II of the Constitution of Washington prohibits the ownership of land by aliens other' •than those who in good faith have declared intention to becbme citizens oí the United States, except in certain *213instances not here involved. The act2 provides in substance that any such alien shall not own, take, have or hold the legal or equitable title, or right to any benefit of any land as defined in the act, and that land conveyed to or for the use of aliens in violation of the state constitution or of the act shall thereby be forfeited to the State. And it is made a gross misdemeanor, punishable by fine or imprisonment or both, knowingly to transfer land or the right to the control, possession or use of land to such an alien. It is also made a gross misdemeanor for any such alien having title to such land or the control,-possession or use thereof, to refuse to disclose to the Attorney General or the prosecuting attorney the nature and extent of his interest in the land. The Attorney General and the prosecuting attorneys of the several counties are charged with the enforcement of the act.

*2141. The Attorney General questions the jurisdiction of the court to grant equitable relief even if the statute be unconstitutional. He contends that the appellants have a plain, adequate and speedy remedy at law; that the case involves but a single transaction, and that, if the proposed lease is made, the only remedy which the State has, so far as civil proceedings are concerned, is an escheat proceeding in which the validity of the law complained of may be finally determined; that an acquittal of the-■Terraces of the criminal offense created by the statute would protect them from further prosecution, and that Nakatsuka is liable criminally only upon his failure to disclose the fact that he holds an interest in the land.

The unconstitutionality of a state law'is not of itself .ground for equitable, relief in the courts of the United States. That a suit in equity does not-lie where there is a plain, adequate and complete remedy at law is so well understood as not to require the citation of authorities. But the legal remedy must be as complete, practical and efficient as that which equity could afford. Boise Artesian Water Co. v. Boise City, 213 U. S. 276, 281; Walla Walla City v. Walla Walla Water Co., 172 U. S. 1, 11, 12. Equity jurisdiction will be exercised to enjoin the threatened enforcement of a state law which contravenes tKe Federal Constitution wherever it is essential in order effectually' tó protect property rights and the rights of-persons against injuries otherwise irremediable; and in such a case a person, who as an officer of the State is clothed with the duty of enforcing its laws and who -threatens andis ábout to commence proceedings, either civil or criminal, to'-enforce such a law against parties affected, may be enjoined from such action by a federal court of equity. Cavanaugh v. Looney, 248 U. S. 453, 456; Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33, 37, 38. See also Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123, 155, 162; Adams v. Tanner, 244 U. S. 590, 592; Greene v. Louisville & Interurban *215 R. R. Co., id. 499, 506; Home Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Los Angeles, 227 U. S. 278, 293; Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U. S. 605, 621; Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Andrews, 216 U. S. 165; Dobbins v. Los Angeles, 195 U. S. 223, 241; Davis & Farnum Manufacturing Co. v. Los Angeles, 189 U. S. 207, 217.

The Terraces’ property rights in the land include the right to use, lease arid dispose of it for lawful purposes (Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U. S. 60, 74), and the Constitution protects these essential attributes of property (Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366, 391), and also protects Nakatsuka in his right to earn a livelihood by following the ordinary occupations of life. Truax v. Raich, supra; Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390. If, as claimed, the state act is repugnant to the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, then its enforcement will deprive, the owners of. their right to-lease their land to Nakatsuka, and deprive him of his right to pursue the occupation of farmer, and the threat to enforce it constitutes a continuing unlawful restriction upon and infringement of the rights of appellants, as to which they have no remedy at law which is,as practical, efficient or adequate as the remedy in equity. And assuming, as suggested by the Attorney General, that after the making of the lease the validity of the law might be determined in proceedings to declare- a forfeiture of the property to the State or in criminal proceedings to punish ■the owners, it does not follow that they may not appeal to equity for i-*ief. No action at law can be initiated against them until after the consummation of the proposed lease. The threatened enforcement of the law deters them. In order to 'obtain a remedy at law, the owners, even if they would take the risk of fine, imprisonment and'loss of property, must continue to suffer deprivation of their right to dispose of or lease their land to any such alien until one is found who will join them *216in violating the terms of the enactment and take the risk of forfeiture. Similarly Nakatsuka must continue to.be deprived of his right to follow his occupation as farmer until a land owner is found who is willing to make a forbidden transfer of land and take the risk of punishment. The owners have an interest in the freedom of the alien, and he has an interest in their freedom, to make the lease. The state act purports to operate directly upon the consummation of the proposed transaction between them, and the threat and purpose of the Attorney General to enforce the punishments and forfeiture prescribed prevent each from dealing with the other. Truax v. Raich, supra. They are not obligéd to take the risk of prosecution, finés and imprisonment and loss of property in order to secure an adjudication of their rights. , The complaint, presents a case in which equitable relief may be had, if the law complained of is shown to be in contravention of the Federal Constitution.

2. Is the act repugnant to the due process clause or the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

Appellants contend that the act contravenes the due process clause in that it prohibits the owners from making lawful disposition or use of their land, and makes it a criminal offense for them to lease it to the alien, and prohibits him from following the occupation of farmer; and they contend that it is repugnant to the equal protection clause in that aliens are divided into two classes, — those who may and those who may not become citizens, one class being permitted, while the other is forbidden, to own land as defined.

Alien inhabitants of a State, as well as all other persons within its jurisdiction, may invoke the protection of these clauses. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 369; Truax v. Raich, supra, 39. The Fourteenth Amendment, as against the arbitrary and capricious or unjustly discriminatory action of the State, protects the owners in their *217right to lease and dispose of their land for lawful purposes and the alien resident in his right to earn a living by following ordinary occupations of the community, but it does not take away from the State those powers of police that were reserved at the time of the adoption of. the Constitution. Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27, 31; Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623, 663; Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U. S. 678, 683; In re Kemmler, 136 U. S. 436, 449; Lawton v. Steel, 152 U. S. 133, 136; Phillips v. Mobile, 208 U. S. 472, 479; Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U. S. 610, 622, 623. And in the exercise of such powers the State has wide discretion in determining its own public policy and what measures are necessary for its own protection and properly to promote the safety, peace and good order of its people.

And, while Congress has exclusive jurisdiction over immigration, naturalization and the disposal of the public domain, each State, in the absence of any treaty provision to the contrary, has power to deny to aliens the right to own land within its borders. Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U. S. 483, 484, 488; Blythe v. Hinckley, 180 U. S. 333, 340. Mr. Justice Field, speaking for this Court (Phillips v. Moore, 100 U. S. 208) said (p. 212):

“ By the common law, an alien cannot acquire real property by operation of law, but may take it by act of the grantor, and hold it until office found; that is, until the fact of alienage is authoritatively established by a public officer, upon an inquest held at the instance of the government.” 3

*218State' legislation applying alike and equally to i '.1 aliens, withholding from them the right to own land, cannot be said to be capricious or to amount to an arbitrary deprivation of liberty or property, or to transgress the due process clause.

This brings us to a consideration of appellants’ contention that the act contravenes the equal protection clause. That clause secures equal protection to all in the enjoyment of their rights under like circumstances. In re Kemmler, supra; Giozza v. Tiernan, 148 U. S. 657, 662. But this does not forbid every distinction in the law of a State between citizens and aliens resident therein. In Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312, this Court said (p. 337):

“ In adjusting legislation to the need of the people of a State, the legislature has a wide discretion and it may be fully conceded that perfect uniformity of treatment of all persons is neither practical nor desirable, that classification of persons is constantly necessary. . . Classification is the most inveterate of our reasoning processes. We can scarcely think or speak without consciously or unconsciously exercising it. It must therefore obtain in and determine legislation; but it must regard real resemblances and real differences between things, and persons, and class them in accordance with their pertinence to the purpose in hand.”

The rights, privilege's and duties of aliens differ widely from those of citizens; and those of alien declarants differ substantially from those of nondeclarants. Formerly in many of the States the right to vote and hold office was extended to declarants, and many important offices have been held by them. But these rights have not been granted to nondeclarants. By various acts of Congress,4 *219declarants have been made liable to military duty, but no act has imposed that' duty on nondeclarants. The fourth paragraph of Article I of the treaty invoked by the appellants, provides that the citizens or subjects of each shall be exempt in the territories of the other from compulsory military service either on land or sea, in the regular forces, or in the national guard, or in the militia; also from all contributions ijnposed in lieu of personal service, and from all forced loans or military exactions or contributions. The alien’s formally declared bona fide intention to renounce forever all allegiance and fidelity to the sovereignty to which he lately has been a subject, and to become a citizen of the United States and permanently to reside therein 5 markedly distinguishes him from an ineligible alien or an eligible alien who has not so declared.

By the statute in question all aliens who have not in good faith declared intention to become citizens of the United States, as specified in § 1 (a), are called “aliens,” and it is provided that they shall not “ own ” “ land,” as defined in plauses (d) and (b) of § 1 respectively. The class so created includes all, but is not limited to, aliens not eligible to become citizens. Eligible aliens who have not declared their intention to become citizens are included, and the act provides that unless declarants be admitted to citizenship within seven years after the declaration is made, bad faith will be presumed. This leaves the class permitted so to own land made up of citizens and aliens who may, and who intend to, become citizens, and who in good faith have made the declaration required by the naturalization laws. The inclusion of good faith declarants in the same class with citizens does not unjustly discriminate against aliens who are ineligible or *220against eligible alien» who have failed to -declare their intention. The classification is based on eligibility and purpose to naturalize. Eligible aliens are free white persons and persons of African nativity or descent.6 Congress is not trammeled, and it may grant or withhold the privilege of naturalization upon any grounds' or without any reason, as it sees fit. But it is not to be supposed that its acts defining eligibility are arbitrary or unsupported by reasonable considerations of public policy. The State properly may assume that the considerations upon which Congress made such - classification are. substantial and reasonable. -Generally speaking, the natives of .European countries are eligible. Japanese, Chinese and Malays are not. Appellants’ contention that the state act discriminates arbitrarily against Nakatsuka and other ineligible aliens because of their race and color is without foundation. All persons of whatever color or race who have not declared their intention in good faith to become citizens are prohibited from so owning agricultural lands. • Two classes of aliens inevitably result from the naturalization laws, — -those who may and those who may not become citizens. The rule established by Congress on this subject, in and of itself, furnishes a reasonable • basis for classification in a state law withholding from aliens the privilege of land ownership as defined in the act. We agree with the court'below (274 Fed. 841, 849) that:

■. “ It is obvious that one who is not a citizen and cannot become one lacks an interest in, and- the power to effectually work for the welfare of, the state, and, so lacking, the state may rightfully deny him the right to own and lease real estate within its boundaries. If one incapable of citizenship may lease or own real estate, it is within the *221realm of possibility that every foot of land within the state might pass to the ownership or possession of non-citizens.”

And we think it is clearly within the power of the State to include nondeclarant eligible aliens and ineligible aliens in the same prohibited class. Reasons supporting discrimination against aliens who may but who will not naturalize are obvious.

Truax v. Raich, supra, does not support the appellants’ contention. In that case, the Court held to be repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment an act of the legislature of Arizona making it a criminal offense for an employer of more than five workers at any one time, regardless of kind or class of work, or sex of workers, to employ less than eighty per cent, qualified, electors or native born citizens of the United States. In the opinion it was pointed out that the legislation there in question did not relate to the devolution of real property, but that the discrimination was imposed upon the conduct of ordinary private enterprise covering the entire field of industry-with the exception of enterprises that were relatively very small. It was said that the right to work for a living in the common occupations of the community is a part of the freedom which it was the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment to secure.

In the case before us, the thing forbidden is very different. It is not an opportunity to earn a living in common occupations of the community, but it is the privilege of owning or controlling' agricultural land within the State. The quality and allegiance of those who own, occupy and use the farm lands within its borders are matters of highest importance and affect the safety and power of the State itself.

The Terraces, who are citizens, have no right safeguarded by the Fourteenth Amendment to lease their land to aliens lawfully forbidden to take or have such lease. *222The state act is not repugnant .to the equal' protection clause and does not contravene the Fourteenth Amenu • ment.

3. The state act, in our opinion, is not in conflict with the treaty7 between the United States and Japan. The preamble declares it to be “ a treaty of commerce and navigation ”, and indicates that it was entered into for the purpose of establishing the rules to govern commercial intercourse between the countries.

The only provision that relates to owning or leasing land' is in the first paragraph of Article I, which is as follows:

“ The citizens or subjects of each of the High Contracting Parties shall have, liberty to enter, travel and reside in' the territories of the other to carry on trade, wholesale and retail, .to.own or lease and occupy houses, manufac-tories, warehouses and' shops, to employ agents of their choice,- to lease land for residential and commercial purposes, and generally to do anything incident to or necessary for trade upon the same terms as native citizens or subjects, submitting themselves to the laws and regulations'there established.”

For the purpose of bringing Nakatsuka within the protection of the treaty, the amended complaint alleges that, in addition to being a capable farmer, he is engaged in the business of trading, wholesale and'retail, in farm products and shipping the same in intrastate, interstate and foreign commerce; and, instead of purchasing such farm-products, he has produced, and desires to continue to produce, his own farm products for the. purpose of selling them in such wholesale and retail trade, and if he is prevented from leasing land for the purpose of producing farm products for such trade he will be prevented from ■ engaging in,-trade and the incidents to trade, as he is authorized td-do under the treaty.

*223To prevail oil this point, appellants must show conflict between the state act and the treaty. Each State, in the absence of any treaty provision conferring the right, may enact laws prohibiting aliens from owning land within its borders. Unless the right to own or lease land is given by the treaty, no question of conflict can arise. We think that the treaty not only contains no provision giving Japanese the right to own or lease land for agricultural purposes, but, when viewed in the light of the negotiations leading up to its consummation, the language shows that the high contracting parties respectively intended to withhold a treaty grant of that right to the citizens or subjects of either in the territories of the other. .The right .to “ carry on trade ” or “ to own or lease and occupy houses, manufactories, warehouses and shops ”, or “ to lease'land for residential and commercial purposes ”, or “ to do anything incident to or necessary for trade ” cannot be said to include the right to own or lease or to have any title to or interest in land for agricultural purposes. The enumeration of rights to own or lease for other specified .purposes impliedly negatives the right to own or lease land for these purposes. A careful reading of the treaty suffices in our opinion to negative the claim asserted by appellants that it conflicts with the state act.

But if the language left the meaning of its provisions doubtful or obscure, the circumstances of the making of the treaty, as set forth in the opinion of the District Court (supra, 844, .845), would resolve all doubts against the appellants’ contention. The letter of Secretary of State Bryan to Viscount Chinda, July 16, 1913, shows-that, in accordance with the desire of Japan, the right to own land was not conferred. And it appears that the right to lease land for other than residential and commercial purposes was deliberately withheld by substituting the words of the treaty, “ to lease land for residential and commercial purposes” for a more comprehensive clause *224contained in an earlier draft of the instrument, namely, “ to lease land for residential, commercial, industrial, manufacturing and other lawful purposes.”

4. The act complained of is not repugnant to § 33 of Article II of the state constitution.

That section provides that “ the ownership of lands by aliens ... is prohibited in .this State . . .”. Appellants assert that the proposed lease of farm land for five .years is not “ ownership ”, and is not prohibited by that clause of the state constitution and cannot be forbidden by the state legislature. That position is untenable. In State v. O’Connell, 121 Wash. 542, a suit for the purpose of escheating to' the State an undivided one-half interest in land, or the proceeds thereof, held in trust for the benefit of an alien, a subject of the British Empire, decided since this appeal was taken, the Supreme Court of Washington held that the statute in question did not contravene this provision of the constitution of that State. The question whether or not a state statute conflicts with the constitution of the State is settled by the decision of its highest court. Carstairs v. Cochran, 193 U. S. 10, 16. This Court “ is without authority to review and revise the construction affixed .to a' state statute as to a state matter by the court of last resort of the State ”. Quong Ham Wah Co. v. Industrial Commission, 255 U. S. 445, 448, and cases cited.

The decree of the District Court is affirmed.

Mr. Justice McReynolds and Mr. Justice Brandéis think there is no justiciable question involved and that the ease should have been dismissed on that ground.

Mr. Justice Sutherland took no part in the cpusideration or decision of this case.

MORROW, Circuit Judge

(orally). Having reached a conclusion as to the disposition to be made oí the order to show cause in this case, I deem the circumstances of such a character as to justify an announcement of that conclusion at this time, without the delay incident to the preparation of a written opinion, which will be filed hereafter.

On the 28th day of May, 1900, the board of health of the city and county of San Francisco adopted the following resolution:

“Resolved, that it is the sense of tnis board that, in consequence of the discoveries in the district bounded by Broadway, Stockton, California, and Kearney streets, of nine deaths due to bubonic plague, which were verified by microscopical and animal inoculation tests, this board fears that there is still danger of the spread of this disease over a larger area, and therefore requests the board of supervisors to declare said district infected, and authorize the board of health to quarantine said district.”

*12• Thereafter, on the said. 28th day of May, 1900, said resolution was filed in the office of the board of supervisors, and thereupon the board of supervisors passed the following ordinance:

“Be it ordainea by tbe people of the city and county of San Francisco, as follows:

“Section 1. The board of health of this city and county is hereby authorized and empowered to quarantine persons, houses, places, and districts within this city and county, when in its judgment it is deemed necessary to prevent the spreading of contagious or infectious diseases.”

This ordinance was approved by the mayor of the city, and thereafter transmitted to the board of health; and immediately thereafter, on the 29th day of May, 1900, at a special meeting of the board of health, a resolution was passed, which, after stating the passage by the board of supervisors of the foregoing ordinance, provided as follows:

“And whereas, after a careful and minute investigation had during a period of three months last past, and from the result of investigation made by Drs. Kellogg, bacteriologist to the board of health', Montgomery, of the University of California, Ophult, of the Cooper Medical College, and J. J. Kinyoun, of the TJ. S. marine hospital service, each and all of whom have reported to this board that bubonic plague has existed in the district hereafter mentioned, and that nine deaths have occurred within said period within said’ district from said disease; and whereas, this board has reason to believe and does believe that danger does éxist to the health of the citizens of the city and county of San Francisco by reason of the existence of germs of the said disease remaining in the district hereafter mentioned: Now, therefore, be it resolved: That the health officer be and is hereby instructed to place in quarantine until further notice that particular district of the city bounded north by Broadway, northeast by Montgomery avenue, east by Kearney, south by California, and west by Stockton streets; and that the chief of police is hereby requested to furnish such assistance as may be necessary to establish and maintain said quarantine. These lines may be modified by the health officer, or the chief of police, health board to be notified of the same. This resolution to take effect immediately.”

Thereafter, on May 31, 1900, the board of supervisors passed another ordinance, which, after reciting the filing in the office of the resolution of the board of health of May 28, 1900, provided for the establishment of quarantine regulations in the district named, and directed the chief of police to furnish such assistance as might be necessary to establish and maintain this quarantine.

The complainant in this case, Jew Ho, alleges, among other things, that he resides at Ho. 926 Stockton street, within the limits of said quarantined district, and is engaged in the business of conducting a grocery store, as the proprietor and manager thereof, at his said place of residence, and that a great number of the patrons and customers of his said business reside at various places in the city and county of San Francisco outside the boundaries of said quarantined district, and are now, and ever since the 29th day of May, 1900, have been, prevented and prohibited by the • defendants from visiting, patronizing, and dealing with tbe complainant in his said grocery store; that the compiainant has been prevented and prohibited since the said 29th day of May, 1900, from selling’ his goods, wares, and merchandise, and from otherwise carrying on the business in which he is engaged. The complainant also alleges that although the said *13resolutions of the hoard of supervisors and the defendant board of health are in general terms, and purport to impose the same restrictions, burdens, and limitations upon all persons within the said quarantined district, the said resolution is enforced against persons of the Chinese race and nationality only, and not against persons of other races. In this behalf it is alleged that all stores, residences, and other buildings within the quarantined district as described in the resolution, occupied by persons of races other than Chinese, are not subjected to any of the restrictions or limitations provided for by said resolution, whereas those occupied by Chinese are subjected to said restrictions. It is also alleged that wanton and willful discrimination against the Chinese residents of said district by the defendants is shown by the exclusion from the limits of said districts of all physicians employed by Chinese residents, and by the free permission to other residents of said district to select physicians of their own choice, and the permission to all such physicians to enter and depart from all buildings occupied by persons of races other than Chinese within said quarantined district. The complainant alleges that there is not now, and never has been, any case of bubonic plague within the limits of said quarantined district, nor any germs or bacteria of bubonic plague, and that other diseases caused the illness and death of the persons claimed by defendants to have died of the bubonic plague within the 30 days next preceding the filing of this complaint. It is further alleged that the defendants have failed and neglected to quarantine the houses alleged to be so infected from the remainder of said quarantined district, and have wholly failed and neglected to quarantine or otherwise isolate from the other residents of said quarantined district the persons alleged to have been so exposed to the danger of contagion, and therefore likely to transmit the germs of said bubonic plague to others, but have included in said quarantined district an unreasonably large and populous district, namely, 12 blocks, containing a population of more than 15,000 persons, thereby increasing rather than diminishing the danger of contagion and epidemic, both to the people of said district and to the people of Ban Francisco generally, if there should he any epidemic disease existing in said district; that within said quarantined district are several blocks in which it is not claimed or asserted by the defendants that any case of bubonic plague has existed for 40 days and more next preceding the filing of the complaint, and in which there is not now, and never has been, any danger of contagion or infection. The complainant alleges that he has never had or contracted said bubonic plague; that he has never been at any time exposed to the danger of contracting it, and has never been in any locality where said bubonic plague, or any gems or bacteria thereof, has or have existed; that the action of the defendants in confining and imprisoning the complainant and other Chinese residents within the limits of said quarantined district is a purely arbitrary, unreasonable, unwarranted, wrongful, and- oppressive interference with the personal liberty of the complainant- and the said Chinese residents, and with their right to the pursuit of their lawful business; that said resolution providing for the said quarantine, and designating said quarantine district, is *14wholly unauthorized, invalid, and void, and contrary to the constitution and laws of the United States, and contrary to and in violation of'the laws of the state of California; that it is not enforced against other residents of said district than those of the Chinese race; and that by its enforcement the said Chinese residents of said district are deprived of the equal protection of the laws, and of their rights and liberties under the constitution of the United States, and the laws and treaties passed and adopted in pursuance thereof. The complainant brings this- suit in behalf of the Chinese residents of' said quarantined district, to the number of 10,000 and upward, as well as in his own behalf. The prayer of the bill is that an injunction be granted, enjoining and restraining the defendants from interfering with the personal rights and privileges of the complainant.

Upon the filing of this bill of complaint, together with affidavits supporting the allegations therein contained, the court issued an order to the defendants to show cause why an injunction should not issue to restrain them from committing the acts and carrying into execution the threats set forth in the bill of complaint. To this order, return has been made by answer. In this answer the defendants allege the organization of the board of health, the provisions of the charter of San Francisco, the authority of the board of health, and the authority of the board of supervisors, as derived from the provisions of the charter. They allege that the board of supervisors have passed certain resolutions, to which I have already referred, and that they have acted in pursuance of the authority conferred by the charter, and that in establishing this quarantine district the defendants have been acting under the authority of the resolutions passed by the board of supervisors, and their own resolution in pursuance thereof. As the answer was originally framed, it denied that the complainant was within the quarantine limits as prescribed. But by oral amendment to the answer it is alleged that the particular place of residence of the complainant is included within the quarantined district. The defendants deny that they or any of their agents, in the enforcement of said quarantine regulations, exempt or relieve from all or any restrictions of quarantine all or any store or residence or other building whatever within said district. With regard to the averment that the complainant has never had or contracted the bubonic plague, the defendants state that they have not knowledge, information, or belief sufficient to enable them to answer, but they deny that the complainant has never at any time been exposed to the danger of contracting said bubonic plague, and that he has never'been in any locality where said plague, or any germs or bacteria thereof, has or have existed. On the contrary, the defendants state their belief that the complainant is a Chinese person, and a resident within said quarantined district, where said plague has had its existence.

To this answer the complainant excepted orally on the ground that it did not respond to the equities of the bill, in this: that, with respect to the charges of detention and restriction of the complainant,the defendants’ answer is that they have no information or belief with respect to the matters upon which the restraint is made or effected. It is contended that, the defendants -having failed to answer fully *15and directly as to tlie cause of restraining the complainant of his liberty, the bill must be taken as confessed. The bill of complaint is not a bill of discovery, and cannot be treated in that light. It is true that, after stating the matters of complaint, it concludes with' the prayer that a supoena issue, and that the defendants be required to make full, true, direct, and perfect answer to the matters therein contained. But, under the equity practice, it is not required that the defendants in such a case shall do more than deny or answer the bill of complaint. They are not called upon to make a discovery, or to make specific disclosures concerning the matters therein contained. Moreover, the bill waived an answer under oath, but for the purpose of being used as an affidavit the answer is verified. In that form it has been introduced as a part of the l’eturn, in response to the order to show cause. There is some objection to the form of the answer as an affidavit, because, as an affidavit, it should he specific in reply to the matters charged in the bill of complaint. The equities of the hill are that the complainant is being unlawfully restrained of his liberty, and illegally deprived of the use of his property. The substantial answer to that charge is that the complainant is being restrained of his liberty and deprived of the use of his property by reason of certain quarantine regulations, and that, as to whether or not he has so exposed -himself as to render himself personally subject to the restrictions of quarantine regulations, the defendants have no information or belief. Under the strict rules of equity practice, this answer, as an affidavit, would not he sufficient to meet the equities of the bill. But the court must take notice of the whole case, and it is evident therefrom that the answer of the defendants, averring that they have no knowledge or information or belief concerning the exposure of this complainant to this disease, is a difficulty or weakness that is inherent in the case, and not alone in the pleadings. We find from other portions of the pleadings that there are in this quarantined district some 10,000 people or more. It is quite likely that, with respect to such a large number, in a district of that character, there would be a great number, and perhaps the great majority, concerning which the defendants would have no'knowledge, information, or belief. They could have no information concerning individuals upon which to found any belief, and therefore they have made denial in accordance with the circumstances of the case. Considering the pleading as dealing with a single case or a single fact, it would, of course, he insufficient. But, when it comes to dealing with a .large population,-^-10,000 or more, — the court must recognize that the lack of information on the part of the defendants is an infirmity that belongs to their case on the merits. The court will therefore not sustain the objection to the answer upon the ground that there is a defect in the showing made in the answer, but will consider that the case is inherently weak in this respect upon the actual facts alleged.

The next objection that has been interposed by the complainant to the sufficiency of the answer is that it does not appear therefrom that the ordinance has been passed with the formality required by the charter. I have examined the evidence that has been furnished1 to the court by these affidavits, and I am unable to find any evidence *16sufficient to justify the court in holding that this ordinance has not been passed with the requisite formalities. It may be that the requirements of the charter have not been complied with in every particular in the enactment of the ordinance upon which the complaint is founded. But that fact does not appear from the evidence submitted to the court, and the allegations are such that the court must indulge the presumption that the ordinance has been passed with the requisite formalities.

The next objection interposed on the part of the defendants is that this court has no authority to examine into the questions in controversy; that, it appearing from this return that a duly-constituted department of the municipality of San Francisco has made inquiry as to the situation attending an alleged epidemic of a contagious disease, and has adopted resolutions and taken such steps as it deemed necessary, such action is an adjudication on the part of a department having exclusive jurisdiction and authority over the subject, and this court has no jurisdiction to inquire into the reasonableness or propriety of the acts of the defendants. That objection I understand counsel to make not only to this court as a court of general jurisdiction, but also to this court as a court having jurisdiction to determine federal questions. I will consider the federal aspect of the objection first, namely, the jurisdiction of this court to determine other than federal questions.

The complainant alleges that he is an alien. He invokes the jurisdiction of this court on the ground of diverse citizenship'. Where a cause is brought into this court upon that ground, the court has a concurrent jurisdiction with the state court to determine all the questions involved in the ease. It has the same jurisdiction as the superior court of the state. It may inquire into the regularity and legality of proceedings of a municipality, or in any locality, precisely as would a state court. The cases to which counsel for defendants referred, wherein the federal court denied itself the right to inquire into the legislation of states or municipalities, have arisen where the jurisdiction of the federal court has been invoked on the sole ground that the controversy involved a federal question. In such cases the complainant states the federal question as the matter to be determined. If, for instance, in this case a citizen of the state of California should come into this court and invoke its jurisdiction on the ground that this action of the board of supervisors involved a federal question, and that it was contrary to the fourteenth amendment of the constitution, an allegation.of that character would state the ground of jurisdiction and subject of controversy, and it would be the only question this court would be called upon to examine. The court would not, in such a case, enter into the question of whether or not the action of the board of supervisors was in conformity with the constitution of the state, or whether it was beyond the, municipal powers of the city under its charter. All such questions would in that case be foreign to the investigation, and the court would be confined to the question as to whether or not it was contrary to the provisions of the fourteenth amendment to the constitution of the United States. But in the case at bar the complainant comes into court as an alien, and *17invokes the jurisdiction of the court on the ground of diverse citizenship, and presents also the federal question. The court is therefore not restricted in its jurisdiction to the federal question, hut may inquire into all matters relating to the legality of the restraint imposed upon the complainant.

It is next contended that the acts of the defendants in establishing a quarantine district in San Francisco are authorized by the general police power of the state, intrusted to the city of San Francisco. The defendants rely upon a number of cases in support of this asserted jurisdiction and authority, — among others, the case of Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623, 8 Sup. Ct. 273, 31 L. Ed. 205. In that case it appears that the constitution of Kansas provided “that the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors shall be forever prohibited in this state, except for medical, scientific and mechanical purposes.” The legislature of the state enacted a statute to carry this constitutional provision into effect. Mugler, the proprietor of a brewery, was indicted in one of the courts of the state for violation of this statute, and was tried and convicted and sentenced to pay a fine. The case was appealed to the supreme court of the state, and there affirmed. A writ of error took the case to the supreme court of the United States. The question was whether the prohibition by the slate of Kansas, in its constitution and laws, of the manufacture or sale within the limits of the state of intoxicating liquors for general use in the state as a beverage, was fairly adapted to the end of protecting the community against the evils which result from excessive use of ardent spirits, and whether it was subject to the objection that under the guise of police regulations the state was aiming to deprive the citizen of his constitutional rights. The court, in passing upon this question, said:

“Power to determine such question, so as to bind all, must exist somewhere; else, society will be at the mercy of the few, who, regarding only their own appetites or passions, may he willing to imperil the peace and security of the many, provided only they are permitted to do as they please. Under our system that power is lodged with the legislative branch of the government. It belongs to that department to exert what are known as the ‘police powers’ of the state, and to determine primarily what measures are appropriate or needful for tiie protection of the public morals, the public health, or the public safety.”

But the court did not stop with this declaration. It went further, and explained that the legislative authority was subject to limitations, and that it was for the courts to determine whether such limitations were exceeded when such legislative acts were called in question. The court said:

“It does not at all follow that every statute enacted ostensibly for the promotion of these ends is to he accepted as a legitimate exertion of the police powers of the state. There are, of necessity, limits beyond which legislation cannot rightfully go. While every possible presumption Is to be indulged in favor of the validity of a statute (Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U. S. 700, 718, 25 L. Ed. 496), the courts must obey 1he constitution, rather than the lawmaking department of government, and must, upon their own responsibility, determine whether, in any particular case, these limits have been passed. ‘To what purpose,’ it was said in Marbury v. Madison, 1 Crunch, 137, 176, 2 L. Ed. 60, ‘are powers limited, and to what purpose is that limitation committed to'writing, if those limits may at any time he passed by those intended to he restrained? *18The distinction between a government with limited and unlimited powers* is abolished, if those limits do not confine the persons on whom they are imposed, and if acts prohibited and acts allowed are of equal obligation.’ The courts are not bound by mere forms, nor are they to be misled by mere pretenses. They are at liberty — indeed, are under a solemn duty — to look at the substance of things, whenever they enter upon the inquiry1 whether the legislature has transcended the limits of its authority. If, therefore, a statute purporting to have been enacted to protect the public health, the public morals, or the public safety, has no real or substantial relation to those objects, or is a palpable invasion of rights secured by the fundamental law, it is the duty of the courts to so adjudge, and thereby give effect to the constitution.”

And in the case of Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U. S. 275, 280, 23 L. Ed. 550, the same court, speaking of the right of a state, in the absence of legislation by congress, to protect herself by necessary and proper laws, said:

“Such a right can only arise from a vital necessity for its exercise, and cannot be carried beyond the scope of that necessity.”

In Ex parte Whitwell, 98 Cal. 73, 78, 32 Pac. 870, 19 L. R. A. 727, the petitioner was imprisoned by the sheriff of San Mateo county upon a charge of maintaining within the boundaries of that county a hospital for the treatment of insane persons, without having procured a license so to do, as required by an ordinance adopted by the board of supervisors of that county March 16, 1892. The ordinance referred to purported to be one—

“To license for purpose of regulation and revenue, the business of keeping * * * within the county of San Mateo * * * hospitals, asylums, homes, retreats or places for the care or treatment of insane persons or persons of unsound mind, or inebriates, or persons affected by or suffering from any mental or nervous disease, or who are suffering from the effects of the excessive use of alcoholic liquors.”

The ordinance made it unlawful to maintain within the county of San Mateo any hospital, asylum, or place for the care or treatment, for reward, of any insane person, or persons belonging to either of the classes mentioned in the title of the ordinance, unless the keeper of such hospital or asylum, should have first procured a license therefor. The ordinance provided, however, that no license should be granted unless the board was satisfied that the building was fireproof, by reason of being constructed of brick and iron or stone and iron; that the building should not be more than two stories in height, and that the same, and the land used in connection therewith, or such part of said land as any of the patients were to have access to, was surrounded by a brick or stone wall not less than 18 inches in thickness and not less than 12 feet in height, and in which wall there was to be one opening, which opening should be closed by a solid iron door, so constructed and fitted into said wall as that the same might be securejy fastened by a combination lock, and said door furnished with a combination lock. The petitioner was a physician and surgeon, and directed his attention to the treatment of persons afflicted as described in the ordinance. He had purchased a tract of land in San Mateo county, and erected a building thereon, prior to the passage of this ordinance, for the accommodation of such persons during treatment, but this building was not of the character designated and required by the ordinance. It was claimed by the petitioner that the ordinance imposed unreasonable restrictions upon his right to prose*19cute a lawful business and to devote Ms property to a lawful use, and that such provisions were in conflict with the constitution of the United States and of the state of California, and for that reason void. Upon the other hand, it was contended that the ordinance was a police regulation, and that the court was not authorized to declare it invalid because in its judgment the ordinance might be deemed unreasonable. Discussing this question, the supreme court, speaking through Mr. Justice De Haven, said:

“The police power — the power to make laws to secure the comfort, convenience, peace, and health of the community — is an extensive one, and in its exercise a very wide discretion as to what is needful or proper for that purpose is necessarily committed to the legislative body in which the power 1o make such laws is vested. Ex parte Tuttle, 91 Cal. 589, 27 Pac. 933. But it is not true that, when this power is exerted for the purpose of regulating a business or occupation which in itself is recognized as innocent and useful to the community, the legislature is the exclusive judge as to what is a reasonable and just restraint upon the constitutional right of the citizen to pursue such business or profession. As the right of the citizen to engage in such a business or follow such a profession is protected by the constitution, it is always a judicial question whether any particular regulation of such right is a valid exercise of legislative power. Tied. Lim. §§ 85, 194; Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v. Mayor, etc., of Jersey City, 47 N. J. Law, 286; Com. v. Robertson, 5 Cush. 438; Austin v. Murray, 16 Pick. 121. * * * And tills necessary limitation upon the power of the legislature to interfere with the fundamental rights of the citizen in the enactment of police regulations was recognized by this court in Ex parte Sing Lee. 96 Cal. 354, 31 Pac. 245, 24 L. R. A. 195, in which ease we said that the personal liberty of the citizen and his rights of property cannot be invaded under the disguise of a police regulation. This power of the courts, however, to declare invalid what they may deem an unreasonable legislative regulation of a business or occupation which the citizen has the constitutional right to follow, although undoubted, must, from the nature of the power, be exercised with the utmost caution, and only when it is clear that the ordinance or law so declared void passes entirely beyond the limits which bound the police power, and infringes upon rights secured by the fundamental law. The true rule upon this subject is thus expressed by the supreme court of the state of Missouri in the case of City of St. Louis v. Weber, 44 Mo. 547: ‘In assuming, however, the right to judge of the reasonableness of an exercise of corporate power, courts will not look closely Into mere matters of judgment, where there may be a reasonable difference of opinion. It is not to be expected that every power will always be exercised with the highest discretion, and when it is plainly granted a clear caso should be made to authorize an interference upon the ground of unreasonableness.’ ”

It was held that the ordinance was unreasonable and void, and could not he sustained under the police power of the state.

In the ease of Health Department of City of New York v. Rector, etc., of Trinity Church, 145 N. Y. 32, 39 N. E. 833, the question was with respect to the regulations concerning the introduction of water into tenement houses. The decision is by Judge Pcckham, now of the supreme court of the United States. The ordinance was sustained by the court, hut in doing so the court declared very clearly the limitation upon the police power of the state, as follows:

“It has frequently beeD said that it is difficult to give any exact definition which shall properly limit and describe such power. It must be exercised subject to Ihe provisions of both the federal and state constitutions, and the law passed in the exercise of such power must tend, in a degree that is perceptible and clear, towards the preservation of the lives, the health, the morals, or the welfare of the community, as those words have been used and construed in many-cases heretofore decided,” — citing a number of cases.

*20In the case of In re Smith, 140 N. Y. 68, 40 N. E. 497, 28 L. R. A. 820, there was involved the quarantine of a house in which a person was charged with being exposed to the smallpox. There the court said:

“I think no one will dispute the right of the legislature to enact such measures as will protect all persons from the impending calamity of a pestilence, and to vest in local authorities such comprehensive powers as will enable them to act competently and effectively. That those powers would be' conferred without regulating or controlling their exercise •< is not to be supposed, and the legislature has not relieved officials from the responsibility of showing that the exercise of their powers was' justified by the facts of the case. The question here is not whether the legislature had the power to enact the provisions of section 24 of the health law, but whether the respondent has shown, that a state of facts existed, warranting the exercise of the extraordinary authority conferred upon him. Like all enactments which may affect the liberty of the person, this one must be construed strictly, with the saving consideration, however, that, as the legislature contemplated an extraordinary and dangerous emergency for the exercise of the power conferred, some latitude of a reasonable discretion is to be allowed to the local authorities upon the facts of a case.”

The ease of Lawton v. Steele, 152 U. S. 133, 14 Sup. Ct. 499, 38 L. Ed. 385, had relation to a regulation concerning the fisheries. The court said with respect to the police power of the state:

“The extent and limits of what is known as the ‘police power’ have been a fruitful subject of discussion in the appellate courts of nearly every state in the Union. It is universally conceded to include everything essential to the public safety, health, and morals, and to justify the destruction or abatement by summary proceedings of whatever may be regarded as a public nuisance. Under this power it has been held that the state may order the destruction of a house falling to decay, or otherwise endangering the lives of passers-by; the demolition of such as are in the path of a conflagration; the slaughter of diseased cattle; the destruction of decayed or unwholesome food; the prohibition of wooden buildings in cities; the regulation of railways and other means of public conveyance, and of interment in burial grounds; the restriction of objectionable trades to certain localities; the compulsory vaccination of children; the confinement of the insane or those afflicted with contagious diseases; the restraint of vagrants, .beggars, and habitual drunkards; the suppression of obscene publications and houses of ill fame; and the prohibition of gambling houses and places where intoxicating liquors are sold. Beyond this, however, the state may interfere wherever the public interests demand it; and in this particular a large discretion is necessarily vested in the legislature to determine, not only what the interests of the public require, but what measures are necessary for the protection of such interests. Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27, 5 Sup. Ct. 357, 28 L. Ed. 923; Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U. S. 1, 9 Sup. Ct. 6, 32 L. Ed. 346. To justify the state in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear — Eirst, that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such interference; and, second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. The legislature may not, under the guise of protecting the public interests, arbitrarily interfere with private business, or impose, unusual and unnecessary' restrictions upon lawful occupations. In other words, its determination as to what is a proper exercise of its police powers is not final or conclusive, but is subject to the supervision of the courts.”

This I find to be the law as established in the various states of the Union, as well as by the supreme court of the United States. These cases, determine that this is a subject for judicial investigation, and the question therefore arises as to whether or not the quarantine established by the defendants in this case is reasonable, and whether *21it is necessary, under the circumstances of this case. As I had occasion to say in the former case (Wong Wai v. Williamson [C. C.] 103 Fed. 1), this court will, of course, uphold any reasonable regulation that may he imposed for the purpose of protecting the people of the city from the invasion of epidemic disease. In the presence of a great calamity, the court will go to the greatest extent, and give the widest discretion, in construing the regulations that may be adopted by tbe board of health or the board of supervisors. But is the regulation in this case a reasonable one? Is it a proper regulation, directed to accomplish the purpose that appears to have been in view? That is a question for this court to determine.

Affidavits have been tiled on behalf of the complainant in this ease. — one of them by Dr. J. I. Stephen, to which I will refer. Dr. Stephen says:

“I am ii regular physician and surgeon, licensed to practice medicine and surgery in the state of California. I obtained my medical education and diplomas in London, England, arid in Dublin, Ireland. I have been in the active practice of medicine and surgery for the past twenty years, — for several years, in London, England, where 1 held various official positions, such as surgeon to the police, medical officer of health, parish medical officer, and public vaccinator, and for the past thirteen years in the state of California. I have given much time and study to the literature of the bubonic plague, and am familiar with ihe nature, symptoms, and characteristics of said disease. * * * The bubonic plague is a, virulent, contagious disease, and under favorable conditions spreads with great rapidity. Those conditions are overcrowding and unsanitary surroundings. The above defendants claim to have discovered since the said month of March, 1900, at varying intervals, seven, eight, or nine dead bodies of Chinese whose deaih said defendants attribute to said bubonic plague. Bearing in mind ihe nature, symptoms, and characteristics of said disease, and the conditions generally prevailing in said district known as ‘Chinatown,’ and now under quarantine, it is impossible to believe that these persons died of such disease. Tf said disease had existed in the form and under the conditions claimed by said defendants, hundreds, perhaps thousands, of cases would have developed, and many deaths ensued therefrom; for I further aver that no proper or scientific precautions have been taken by said defendants to prevent the spread of said disease. Assuming that the. said deceased persons died of said disease, it is my opinion, and I further aver, that said defendants have proceeded from erroneous theories to still more erroneous and unscientific practices and methods of dealing with the same; for, instead of quarantining the supposedly infected rooms or houses in which said deceased persons lived and died, and the persons who had been brought in contact with and been directly exposed to said disease, said defendants have quarantined, and are now-maintaining a quarantine over, a large area of territory, and indiscriminately confining therein between ten and twenty thousand people, thereby exposing, and they are now exposing, to the infection of the said disease said large number of persons. Notwithstanding- said lack of proper quarantining and said exposure of over ten to twenty thousand persons to infection during a period commencing in the early part of said month of March, 3900, there has not been found a single living case of said disease.”

I read that affidavit for the purpose of showing the method adopted by the board of health for the suppressing of this so-called plague, namely, the quarantining of a large territory in the city of San Francisco, — some 10 or 12 blocks, — in which there are located about 10,000 people. It must necessarily follow that, where so many have been quarantined, the danger of the spread of the disease would not diminish. The purpose of quarantine and health laws and regulations with respect to contagious and infectious diseases is directed prima.*22rily to'preventing the spread of such diseases among the inhabitants of localities. In this respect these laws and regulations come under the police power of the state, and may be enforced by quarantine and health officers, in the exercise of a large discretion, as circumstances may require. The more densely populated the community, the greater danger there is that the disease will spread, and hence the necessity for effectual methods of protection. To accomplish this purpose, persons afflicted with such diseases are confined to their own domiciles until they have so far recovered as not to be liable to communicate the disease to-others. The same restriction is imposed upon victims of such diseases found traveling. The object of' all such rules and regulations is to confine the disease to the smallest possible number of people; and hence when a vessel in a harbor, a car on a railroad, or a house on land, is found occupied by persons afflicted with such a disease, the- vessel, the car, or the house, as the case may be, is cut off from all communication with the inhabitants of adjoining houses or contiguous territory, that the spread of the disease may be arrested at once, and confined to the least possible territory. This is a system of quarantine that is well recognized in all communities, and is provided by the laws of the various-states and municipalities: That, when a contagious or infectious disease breaks out in a place, they quarantine the house or houses first; the purpose being to restrict the disease to the smallest number possible, and that it may not spread to other people in the same locality. It must necessarily follow that, if a large section or a large territory is quarantined, intercommunication of the people within that territory will rather tend to spread the disease than to restrict it. If you place 10,000 persons in one territory, and confine them there, as they have been in prisons and other places, the spread of disease, of course, becomes increased, and the danger of such spread of disease is increased, sometimes in an-alarming degree, because it is the constant communication of people that are. so restrained or imprisoned that causes the spread of the disease. If we are to suppose that this bubonic plague has existed in San Francisco since the 6th day of March, and that there has been danger of- its spreading over the city, the most dangerous thing that could have been done was to quarantine the whole city, as to the Chinese, as was substantially done in the first instance. ' The next most dangerous thing to do was to quarantine any considerable portion of the city, and not restrict intercommunication within the quarantined district. •' The quarantined district comprises' 12 blocks. It is not claimed that in all the 12 blocks of the quarantined district the disease has been discovered. There are, I believe, 7 or 8 blocks in which it is claimed that deaths have occurred on account of what is said to be 'this disease. In 2 or 3 blocks it has not appeared at all. Yet this quarantine has been thrown around the entire-district. The people therein obtain their food and other supplies, and communicate freely with each other in all their affairs. They are permitted to go from a place where it is said that the disease has appeared, freely among the .'other 10,006 people in that district. It would necessarily follow that; if- the disease is there, every facility has been offered' by this species'- of 'quarantine to enlarge its sphere and increase its danger *23and its destructive force. I need not enlarge upon this feature of the ease. It is set forth fully by the affidavits in the case, by the original complaint, and by the opinions of the physicians who have furnished evidence to the court. The court cannot ignore this evidence and the condition it describes. The court cannot but see the practical quesfion that is presented to it as to the ineffectiveness of this method of quarantine against such a disease as this. So, upon that ground,' the court must hold that this quarantine is not a reasonable regulation to accomplish the purposes sought. It is not in harmony with the declared purpose of the board of health or of the board of supervisors.

But there is still another feature of this case that has been called to the attention of the court, and that is its discriminating character; that is to say, it is said that this quarantine discriminates against the Chinese population of this city, and in favor of the people of other races. Attention is called to the fact that, while the board of supervisors has quarantined a district hounded by streets, the operation of the quarantine is such as to run along in the rear of certain houses, and that certain houses are excluded, while others are included; that, for instance, upon Stockton street, in the block numbered from 900 to 1,000, there are two places belonging 1o persons of another race, and these persons and places are excluded from (Ms quarantine, although the Chinese similarly situated are included, and although the quarantine, in terms, is imposed upon all the persons within the blocks bounded by such streets. The evidence here is clear tha t this is made to operate against the Chinese population only, and the .reason given for it is that the Chinese may communicate the disease from one to the other. That explanation, in the judgment of the court, is not sufficient. It is, in effect, a discrimination, and it is the discrimination that has been frequently called to the attention of the federal courts where matters of this character have arisen with respect to Chinese. The case of Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 6 Sup. Ct. 1064, 30 L. Ed. 220, arose in this state, out of the operation of an ordinance of this city respecting Chinese Ianndries. The supreme court in that case had been discussing cases where there were simply opportunities for discrimination, not an actual discrimination. The court points this out as not being a case where there was not merely opportunity for discrimination, but where there was an actual discrimination. The court says:

“In the present cases we are not obliged to reason from the probable to the actual, and pass upon the validity of the ordinances complained of, as tried merely by the opportunities which their terms afford of unequal and unjust discrimination in their administration; for the cases present 1he ordinances in actual operation, and the facts shown establish an administration directed so exclusively against a. particular class of persons as to warrant and require the conclusion that, whatever may have been the intent of the ordinances as adopted, they are applied by the public authorities charged with their administration, and thus representing the state itself, with a mind so unequal and oppressive as to amount to a practical denial by the state of that equal protection of the laws which is secured to the petitioners, as to all other persons, by the broad and benign provisions of tho fourteenth amendment to the constitution of the United States. Though the law itself he fair on its face.- and impartial in appearance, yet, if it is applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal discriminations, between persons in similar circumstances, material *24to their rights, the denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition of the constitution. This principle of interpretation has been sanctioned by this court in Henderson v. Mayor of City of New York, 92 U. S. 259, 23 L. Ed. 543; Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U. S. 275, 23 L. Ed. 550; Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339, 25 L. Ed. 676; Neal v. Delaware, 103 U. S. 370, 26 L. Ed. 567; and Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U. S. 703, 5 Sup. Ct. 730, 28 L. Ed. 1145.”

In the ease at bar, assuming that the board of supervisors had just grounds for quarantining the district which has been described, it seems that the board of health, in executing the ordinance, left out certain persons, members of races other than Chinese. This is precisely the point noticed by the supreme court of the United States, namely, the administration of a law “with an evil eye and an unequal hand.” Wherever the courts of the United States have found such an administration of the law, although it may be, upon the face of the act or of the ordinance, such a lack of discrimination as to otherwise justify the ordinance or the law, still, if the court finds that, in its practical operation, — in its enforcement by the state or the municipality, — there is that opportunity, and that it is the purpose to enforce it “with an evil eye and an unequal hand,” then it is the duty of the court to interpose, and to declare the ordinance discriminating in its character, and void under the constitution of the United States. Therefore the court must hold that this ordinance is invalid and cannot be maintained, that it is contrary to the provisions of the fourteenth amendment of the constitution of the United States, and that the board of health has no authority or right to enforce any ordinance in this city that shall discriminate against any class of persons in favor of another.

There is one other feature of this case, and that is as to whether or not the bubonic plague has existed in this city, and whether it does now exist. The complainant alleges in his bill of complaint that k does not exist in San Francisco or in this quarantined district, and the bill is supported by the affidavits of a number of reputable physicians. Dr. J. L Stephen says in this regard;

“I am the regularly appointed physician of the Chinese Empire Reform Association, which numbers several thousand Chinese residents in the state of California, and in the performance of my professional duties have made frequent visits to that portion of said city and county commonly known as ‘Chinatown,’ and which is now under quarantine by order of the above defendants, and am well acquainted with the sanitary condition of said district, and with the people who reside therein. I am aware of the allegation of the' above defendants that bubonic plague has existed within said quarantined district since the month of March, 1900, and am of the opinion, based upon my knowledge of said disease, and familiarity with said district and the people residing therein, that said allegation is based upon totally inadequate evidence. The said defendants have formed their diagnosis upon the alleged recognition of bacilli found in the tissues of certain deceased Chinese persons, and upon incomplete animal experimentations, and have entirely ignored the clinical history of the disease. I further state that the post mortem appearances that the said defendants claim to have found in their autopsies of said deceased persons, and which said defendants claim to be diagnostic of the presence of said disease, are found in many other diseases. I would further state that the said Chinese are particularly subject to enlarged glands due to syphilis aud scrofula, and that the enlarged glands which are claimed to have been found in said deceased persons are not due to bubonic plague, but to the constitutional effects oí either syphilis or scrofula. From these reasons, and facts hereinbefore stated,. I draw the conclusion, and therefore aver, that said disease has not at *25ány time since or during the said month of March existed, and that it does not now exist, within said district under quarantine, or elsewhere in the city and county of San Francisco.”

Dr. E. S. Pillsbury, professor of pathology and bacteriology at the College of Physicians and Surgeons, states that he personally examined and diagnosed all bodies of deceased persons dying within the quarantined district between May 30th and June 7th, save one, and that he does not believe the bubonic plague now exists within the said district, or that it has- existed there within the last four months. Dr. H. D’Arcy Power, employed by the Chinese Six Companies, visited the quarantined district during the 30th and 31st days of May and the 1st and 2d days of June, and saw all the sick persons and dead bodies then in said district. He states that none of the cases visited by him was a case of bubonic plague, and that he does not believe at the time of his visits there was a case of bubonic plague in said district, nor that one has since occurred. Dr. D. A. Hodghead testifies to the same; effect. Dr. George L. Fitch states that he attended one of the Chinese persons said by tbe board of health to have died of the bubonic plague, but that in his opinion tbe said Chinese died of pneumonia. Dr. Fitch states that, from his knowledge, he does not believe there are now any cases of bubonic plague within the district of Chinatown. Dr. E. C. Atterbury was with him on this case, and gives the same testimony. Dr. Lydia J. Wyckoff states that she has practiced her profession during periods of epidemics of bubonic plague in other countries, and, from her knowledge of said disease, she is of the opinion that the cases which the board of health regard as having been bubonic plague were not in fact cases of true bubonic plague. Dr. George A. Cable testifies that he attended three of the cases in the quarantined district now suspicioned by tbe board of health to have been bubonic plague; that such cases were uot, in his opinion, bubonic plague; and that, during the whole period of his practice within said district, he has never at any time seen a case resembling bubonic plague. He states it as bis opinion that bubonic plague does not now exist, nor has it ever existed, within said Chinatown. Dr. Minnie G. Worley states that she attended the case of a Chinese girl on May 11th, who subsequently died, and which case tbe board of health have declared was bubonic plague; that she diagnosed the case as typhoid fever; that no other person, to her knowledge, has contracted the bubonic plague or any disease from the said case, and, in affiant’s opinion, tbe girl did not die from bubonic plague.

The evidence of Dr. Stephen and these other physicians shows that, at most, there have been 11 deaths in the quarantined district which on autopsy have disclosed some of the symptoms of the bubonic plague. But there has been no living case under tbe examination of the physicians from which a clinical history has been obtained, and it does not appear that there has been any transmission of the disease from any of those who have died. From all of which tbe court infers that tbe suspected cases were not contagious or infectious, or, if contagious and infectious, they were but sporadic in their nature, ond had no tendency to spread or disseminate iii the city. If it were within the province of this court to determine this issue, I think, upon *26;|ií¿h, '.tégínnony. as that given by these physicians,' I should be compelled to hold that the plague did not exist and has not existed in San Francisco. But this testimony is contradicted by the physicians of the board of health. They have furnished the testimony of reputable physicians that the bubonic plague has existed, and that the danger of its development does exist. In the face of such testimony the court'does not feel authorized to render a judicial opinion as to whether or not the plague exists or has existed in this city. Indeed, that is one of the questions that courts, under ordinary circumstances, are disposed to leave to boards of health to determine, upon such evidence as their professional skill deems satisfactory. If they believe, or if they have even a suspicion, that there is an infectious or contagious disease existing within the city, it is unquestionably the duty of such boards to act and protect the city against it, not to wait always until the matter shall be established to the satisfaction of all the physicians- or all the persons who may examine into the question. It is the duty of the court to leave such question to be determined primarily by the authority competent for that purpose. So that in this case the court does not feel at liberty to’ decide this question, although, as I have said, personally the evidence in this case seems to be sufficient to establish the fact that the bubonic plague •has not existed, and does not now exist, in San Francisco.

' • It follows from the remarks that I have made that this quarantine cannot be continued, by reason of the fact that it is unreasonable, unjust, and oppressive, and therefore contrary to the laws limiting the police powers of the state and municipality in such matters; and, second, that it is discriminating in its character, and is-contrary to the provisions of the fourteenth amendment of the constitution of the United States. The counsel for complainant will prepare an injunction, which shall, however, permit the board to maintain a quarantine around such places as it may have reason to believe are infected by contagious or infectious diseases, but that the general quarantine of the whole district must not be continued, and that the people residing in that district, so far as they have been restricted or limited in their persons and their business, have that limitation and' restraint removed. With respect to the examination of persons who have died, I have already issued a preliminary restraining order preventing the defendants from interfering with physicians attending upon persons claimed to be afflicted with this disease. It will result, probably, if other suspicious cases are found within San Francisco, in a quarantine immediately being imposed upon the proper locality or house or building. In such a case the physician who has been attending the person afflicted should be permitted to continue to attend, and, in case of a death, such physician as may be selected by the Chinese association mentioned in this case shall have a right to attend any autopsy that may be made. But, as before indicated to •counsel, that privilege should not be abused. There should not be an effort on the part of everybody, out of curiosity and otherwise, to attend upon these autopsies. . There should be -some reasonable limit to such privilege. The board of health is charged with the responsibility of maintaining regulations for the protection of the health of *27this city, and there should be no unreasonable interference with its authority in matters of that kind. The board will have the right to maintain special quarantines in places suspected of having disease, and it has the right to enforce such regulations as it may deem proper, in order to secure an absolute exclusion of such places from the remainder of the community.

I am authorized to say that -Judge DE HAVEN concurs in the conclusions here reached.

FIELD, Circuit Justice.

The plaintiff is a subject of the emperor of China, and the present action is brought to recover damagés for his alleged maltreatment by the defendant, a citizen of the state of California and the sheriff of the city and county of San Francisco. The maltreatment consisted in having wantonly and maliciously cut off the queue of the plaintiff, a queue being worn by all Chinamen, and its deprivation being regarded by them as degrading and as entailing future suffering.-

It appears that in April, 1876, the legislature of California passed an act “concerning lodging-houses and sleeping apartments within the limits of incorporated cities,” declaring. among other things, that any person found sleeping or lodging in a room or an apartment containing less than five hundred cubic feet of space in the clear for each person occupying it, should be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and on conviction thereof be punished by a fine of not less than ten or more than fifty dollars, or imprisonment in the county jail, or by both such fine and imprisonment. Sess. Laws 1875-76, p. 759. Under this act the plaintiff, in April, 1S7S, was convicted and sentenced to pay a fine of ten dollars, or in default of such payment, to be imprisoned five days in the county jail. Failing to pay the fine, he was imprisoned. The defendant, as sheriff of the city and county, had charge of the jail, and during the imprisonment of the plaintiff cut off his queue, as alleged. The complaint avers that it is the custom of Chinamen to shave the hair from the front of the head and to wear the remainder of it braided into a queue; that the deprivation of the queue is regarded by them as a mark of disgrace, and is attended, according to their religious faith, with misfortune and suffering after death; that the defendant knew of this custom and religious faith of the Chinese, and knew also that the plaintiff venerated the custom and held the faith; yet, in disregard of his rights, inflicted the injury complained of; and that the plaintiff has, in consequence of it, suffered great mental anguish, been disgraced in the eyes of his friends and relatives, and ostracised from association with his countrymen; and that hence he has been damaged to the amount of ten thousand dollars.

Two defenses to the action are set up by the defendant; the second one being a justification of his conduct under an ordinance of the city and county of San Francisco.- It is upon the sufficiency of the latter defense that the case is before us. The ordinance referred to was passed on the fourteenth of June, 1876, and it declares that every male person imprisoned in the county jail, under the judgment of any court having jurisdiction in criminal cases in the city and county, shall immediately upon his arrival at the jail have the hair of his head “cut or clipped to an uniform length of one inch from the scalp thereof,” and it is made the duty of the sheriff to have this provision enforced. Under this ordinance the defendant cut off the queue of the plaintiff.

The validity of this ordinance is denied by the plaintiff on two grounds: 1. That it exceeds the authority of the board of supervisors, the body in which the legislative power of the city and county is vested; and, 2. That it is special legislation imposing a degrading and cruel punishment upon a class of persons who are entitled, alike with all other persons within the jurisdiction of the United States, to the equal protection of the laws. We are of opinion that both these positions are well taken.

The board of supervisors is limited in its authority by the act consolidating the government of the city and county. It can do nothing unless warrant be found for it there, or in a subsequent statute of the- state. As with all other municipal bodies, its charter— here the consolidation act — is the source and measure of its powers. In looking at this charter, we see that the powers of the board and the subjects upon which they are to operate are all specified. The board has no general powers, and its special power to determine the fines, forfeitures and penalties which may be incurred is limited to two classes of cases: 1. Breaches of regulations established by itself; and, 2. Violations of provisions of the consolidation act, where no penalty is provided by law. It can impose no penalty in any other case; and when a penalty other than that of fine or forfeiture is imposed, it must, by the terms of the act, be in the form of imprisonment It can take no other form. “No penalty to be imposed,” is the language used, “shall exceed the amount of one thousand dollars, or six months imprisonment, or both.” The mode in which a penalty can be inflicted and the extent of it are thus limited in defining the *254,X>ower of the board. In their place nothing ■else can be substituted. No one, for example, would pretend that the board could, for any breach of a municipal regulation or any violation of the consolidation act. declare that a man should be deprived of his right to vote, or to testify, or to sit on a jury, or that he should be punished with stripes, or be ducked in a pond, or be paraded through the streets, or be seated in a pillory, or have his ears cropped or his head shaved.

The cutting off the hair of every male person within an inch of his scalp, on his arrival at the jail, was not intended and cannot be maintained as a measure of discipline ■or as a sanitary regulation. The act by itself has no tendency to promote discipline, and can only be a measure of health in exceptional cases. Had the ordinance contemplated a mere sanitary regulation it would have been limited to such cases and made applicable to females as well as to males, and to persons awaiting trial as well as to persons under conviction. The close cutting of the hair which is practiced upon inmates of the state penitentiary, like dressing them In striped clothing, is partly to distinguish them from others, and thus prevent their escape and facilitate their recapture. They are measures of precaution, as well as parts of a general system of treatment prescribed by the directors of the penitentiary under the authority of the state, for parties convicted •of and imprisoned for felonies. Nothing of the kind is prescribed or would be tolerated with respect to persons confined in a county jail for simple misdemeanors, most of which are not of a very grave character. For the discipline or detention of the plaintiff in this case, who had the option of paying a fine often dollars, or of being imprisoned for five days, no such clipping of the hair was required. It was done to add to the severity of his punishment.

But even if the proceeding could be regarded as a measure of discipline or as a sanitary regulation, the conclusion would not help the defendant, for the board of supervisors had no authority to prescribe the discipline to which persons convicted under the laws of the state should be subjected, or to determine what special sanitary regulations should be enforced with respect to their persons. That is a matter which the legislature had not seen fit to intrust to the wisdom and judgment of that body. It is to the board of health of the city and county that a general supervision of all matters appertaining to the sanitary condition of the county jail is confided; and only in exceptional cases would the preservation of the health of the institution require the cutting of the hair of any of its inmates within an inch of his scalp. Act April 4, 1870 (Sess. Laws 1869-70, p. 717).

The claim, however, put forth that the measure was prescribed as one of health is notoriously a mere pretense. A treatment to which disgrace is attached, and which is not adopted as a means of security against the escape of the prisoner, but merely to aggravate the severity of his confinement, can only be regarded as a punishment additional to that fixed by the sentence. If adopted in consequence of .the sentence it is punishment in addition to that imposed by the court; if adopted without regard to the sentence it is wanton cruelty.

In the present case, the plaintiff was not convicted of any breach of a municipal regulation, nor of violating any provision of the consolidation act. The punishment which the supervisors undertook to add to the fine imposed by the court was without semblance of authority. The legislature had not conferred upon them the right to change or add to the punishments which it deemed sufficient for offenses; nor had it bestowed upon them the right to impose in any case a punishment of the character inflicted in this case. They could no more direct that the queue of the plaintiff should be cut off than that the punishments mentioned should be inflicted. Nor could they order the hair of any one, Mongolian or other person, to be clipped within an inch of his scalp. That measure was beyond their power.2

*255The second objection to the ordinance in question is .equally conclusive. It is special legislation on the part of the supervisors against a class of persons who, under the constitution and laws of the United States, are entitled to the equal protection of the laws. The ordinance was intended only for the Chinese in San Francisco. This was avowed by the supervisors on its passage, and was so understood by every one. The ordinance is known in the community as the ■“Queue Ordinance,” being so designated from Its purpose to reach the queues of the Chinese, and it is not enforced against any other persons. The reason advanced for its adoption, and now urged for its continuance, is, that only the dread of the loss of his queue will induce a Chinaman to pay his fine. That is to say, in order to enforce the payment of a fine imposed upon him, it is necessary that torture should be superadded to imprisonment. Then, it is said, the Chinaman will not accept the alternative, which the law allows, of working out his fine by his imprisonment, and the state or county will be ■saved the expense of keeping him during the imprisonment Probably the bastinado, or the knout, or the thumbscrew, • or the rack, would accomplish the same end; and no doubt the Chinaman would prefer either of these modes of torture to that which entails upon him disgrace among his countrymen and carries with it the constant dread of misfortune and suffering after death. It is not creditable to the humanity and civilization of •our people, much less to their Christianity, that an ordinance of this character was possible.

The class character of this legislation is none the less- manifest because of the general terms in which it is expressed. The statements of supervisors in debate on the passage •of the ordinance cannot, it is true, be resorted to for the purpose of explaining the meaning of the terms used; but they can be resorted to for the purpose of ascertaining the general object of the legislation proposed, and the-mischiefs sought to be remedied. Besides, we cannot shut our eyes to matters of public notoriety and general cognizance. When we take our seats on the bench we are not struck with blindness, and forbidden to know as judges what we see as men; and where an ordinance, though general in its terms, only operates upon a special race, sect or class, it being universally understood that it is to be enforced only against that race, sect or class, we may justly conclude that it was the intention of the body adopting it that it should only have such operation, and treat it accordingly. We may take notice of the limitation given to the general terms of an ordinance by its practical construction as a fact in its history, as we do in some cases that a law has practically become obsolete. If this were not so, the most important provisions of the constitution, intended for the security of personal rights, would, by the general terms of an enactment, often be evaded and practically annulled. Brown v. Piper, 91 U. S. 42; Ohio Life Ins. & Trust Co. v. Debolt, 16 How. [57 U. S.] 435; Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. [60 U. S.] 407. The complaint in this case shows that the ordinance acts with special severity upon Chinese prisoners, inflicting upon them suffering altogether disproportionate to what would be endured by other prisoners if enforced against them. Upon the Chinese prisoners its enforcement operates as “a cruel and unusual punishment.”

Many illustrations might be given where ordinances, general in their terms, would operate only upon a special class, or upon a class, with exceptional severity, and thus incur thé odium and be subject to the legal objection of intended hostile legislation against them. We have, for instance, in our community a large number of Jews. They are a highly intellectual race, and are generally obedient to the laws of the country. But, as is well known, they have peculiar opinions with respect to the use of certain articles of food, which they cannot be forced to disregard without extreme pain and suffering. They look, for example, upon the eating of pork with loathing. It is an offense against their religion, and is associated in their minds with uncleanness and impurity. Now, if they should in some quarter of the city overcrowd their dwellings and thus become amenable, like the Chinese, to the act concerning lodging-houses and sleeping apartments, an ordinance of the supervisors requiring that all prisoners confined in the county jail should be fed on pork would be seen by every one to be leveled at them; and, notwithstanding its general terms, would be regarded as a special law in its purpose and operation.

During various periods of English history, legislation, general in its character, has often been enacted with the avowed purpose of imposing special burdens and restrictions upon Catholics; but that legislation has since been *256regarded as not less odious and obnoxious to animadversion than if the persons at whom it was aimed had been particularly designated.

But in our country hostile and discriminating-legislation by a state against persons of any class, sect, creed or nation, in whatever form it may be expressed, is forbidden by the fourteenth amendment of the constitution. That amendment in its first section declares who are citizens of the United States, and then enacts that no. state shall make or enforce any law • which shall abridge' their privileges and immunities. It further declares that no state shall deprive any person (dropping the distinctive term citizen) of life, liberty or property, without due process of law, nor deny to any person the equal protection of the laws. This inhibition upon the state applies to all the instrumentalities and agencies employed in the administration of its government, to its executive, legislative and judicial departments, and to the subordinate legislative bodies of counties and cities. And the equality of protection thus assured to every one whilst within the United States, from whatever country he may have come, or of whatever race or color he may be, implies not only that the courts of the country shall be open to him on the same terms as to all others for the security of his person or property', the prevention or redress of wrongs and the enforcement of. contracts; but that no charges or burdens shall be laid upon him which are not equally borne by others, and that in the administration of criminal justice he shall suffer for his offenses no greater or different punishment.

Since the adoption of the fourteenth amendment, congress has legislated for the purpose of carrying out its provisions in accordance with these views. The Revised Statutes reenacting provisions of law passed in 1870 declare that “all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every state and territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses and exactions of every kind, and to no other.” Section 1077. They also declare that “every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage of any state or territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States, or other person within the jurisdiction thereof, to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity or other proper proceeding for redress.” Section 1979.

It is certainly something in which a citizen of the United States may -feel a generous pride that the government of his country extends protection to all persons within its jurisdiction; and that every blow aimed at any of them, however humble, come iron* what quarter it may, is “caught upon the broad shield of our blessed constitution and our equal ’laws.” 3

We are aware of the general/ feeling-amounting to positive hostility — prevailing, in California against the Chinese, which would prevent their further immigration hither and expel from the state those already here. Their dissimilarity in physical characteristics, in language, manners and religion would seem, from past experience, to prevent the possibility of their assimilation with our people. And thoughtful persons, looking at the millions which crowd the opposite shores of ,the Pacific, and the possibility at no distant day of their pouring over in vast hordes, among us, giving rise to fierce antagonisms of race, hope that some way may be devised to prevent their further immigration. We feel the forcé and importance of these considerations; but the remedy for the apprehended evil is to be sought from the general government, where, except in certain special cases, all power over the subject lies. To that government belong exclusively the treaty-making power and the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, which includes intercourse as well as traffic, and, with the exceptions presently mentioned, the power to prescribe the conditions of immigration or importation of persons. The state in these particulars, with those exceptions, is powerless, and nothing is gained by the attempted assertion of a control which can. never be admitted. The state may exclude from its limits paupers and convicts of other countries, persons incurably diseased, and others likely to become a burden upon its resources. It may perhaps also exclude persons whose presence would be dangerous to its established institutions. But there its-power ends. Whatever is done by way of exclusion beyond this must come from the general government. That government alone can determine what aliens shall be permitted to land within the United States and upon what conditions they shall be permitted to remain; whether they shall be restricted in business transactions to such as appertain to foreign commerce, as is practically the case with our people in China, or whether they shall be allowed to engage in all pursuits, equally with citizens. Bor restrictions necessary or desirable in these matters, the appeal must be made to the general government; and it is not believed that the appeal will ultimately be disregarded. Be that as it may, nothing can be accomplished in that direction by hostile and spiteful legislation! on the part of the state, or of its municipal bodies, like the ordinance in question — legislation which is unworthy of a brave and *257manly people. Against such legislation it will always be the duty of the judiciary to declare and enforce the paramount law of the nation.

The plaintiff must have judgment on the demurrer to the defendant’s plea of justification; and it is so ordered.