4 Period II. Jurisdiction and Remedies under the Civil Rights Act of 1871 to Enforce Fourteenth Amendment Rights 4 Period II. Jurisdiction and Remedies under the Civil Rights Act of 1871 to Enforce Fourteenth Amendment Rights
4.1 Part A. The Supreme Court Tilts the Federalism Balance Toward Federal Interests, 1931-1970 4.1 Part A. The Supreme Court Tilts the Federalism Balance Toward Federal Interests, 1931-1970
4.1.1 Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States 4.1.1 Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States
4.1.2 The Idea of a Federal Courts Course 4.1.2 The Idea of a Federal Courts Course
4.1.3 Chapter 5. The Supreme Court Expands Fourteenth Amendment Rights and Jurisdiction and Equitable Remedies under the 1871 Act 4.1.3 Chapter 5. The Supreme Court Expands Fourteenth Amendment Rights and Jurisdiction and Equitable Remedies under the 1871 Act
4.1.3.1 Introductory Note 4.1.3.1 Introductory Note
In the last chapter, we saw that as long as Fourteenth Amendment rights were principally the substantive due process rights of corporations like railroads, the 1871 Act had little or no work to do. But in the 1930s, things began to change. First Amendment rights became incorporated into Fourteenth Amendment due process. And after World War II, equal protection rights began to grow.
With the growth of Fourteenth Amendment individual rights, the 1871 Act, its text unchanged, had plenty to do. This chapter will consider the growth of the “proper” “suit in equity”, while Chapter 7 will consider the growth of the “proper” “action at law”.
4.1.3.2 A. Jurisdiction under the 1871 Act 4.1.3.2 A. Jurisdiction under the 1871 Act
Hague v. C.I.O. (1939)
4.1.3.3 B. Fourteenth Amendment Civil Liberties 4.1.3.3 B. Fourteenth Amendment Civil Liberties
Carolene Products Footnote (1938)
4.1.3.4 C. Fourteenth Amendment Civil Rights and Equitable Remedies 4.1.3.4 C. Fourteenth Amendment Civil Rights and Equitable Remedies
Brown v. Board of Education (1954)
Brown II (1955)
4.1.4 Chapter 6. “Equitable Abstention”: A Collection of Doctrines that Serve a Function Akin to Removal from Federal to State Court 4.1.4 Chapter 6. “Equitable Abstention”: A Collection of Doctrines that Serve a Function Akin to Removal from Federal to State Court
4.1.4.1 Introductory Note 4.1.4.1 Introductory Note
Chapter 2 raised the question whether a state court defendant could remove the case to federal court based on the defendant’s federal defense. This chapter raises a question somewhat in reverse: When is a federal plaintiff raising a federal question directed to file in state court instead or to await or abide state court proceedings? This question is at the heart of various doctrines that travel under the banner of “equitable abstention”. As we will see, the functions and rationales of these doctrines vary widely.
4.1.4.2 A. “Younger Abstention”: Whereby the Federal Plaintiff Seeking an Equitable Remedy is Directed to Raise the Federal Question as a Defense in State Court 4.1.4.2 A. “Younger Abstention”: Whereby the Federal Plaintiff Seeking an Equitable Remedy is Directed to Raise the Federal Question as a Defense in State Court
Douglas v. City of Jeannette (1943)
How Did the Plaintiffs in Barnette Avoid the Douglas Remedial Bar?
Hague v. C.I.O. (1939)
Younger v. Harris (1971)
Younger and Declaratory Judgments
Samuels v. Mackell (1971)
Steffel v. Thompson (1974)
Hicks v. Miranda (1975)
4.1.4.3 B. “Clarification Abstention”: Whereby the Federal Plaintiff is Directed to Seek Clarification in State Court of the State Law Being Challenged, so that the Federal Question Might be Modified or its Decision Avoided 4.1.4.3 B. “Clarification Abstention”: Whereby the Federal Plaintiff is Directed to Seek Clarification in State Court of the State Law Being Challenged, so that the Federal Question Might be Modified or its Decision Avoided
Harrison v. NAACP (1959)
4.1.4.4 C. “Pullman Abstention”: Whereby the Federal Plaintiff is Directed to Seek Relief in State Court under State Law, so that Decision of the Federal Question Might be Avoided 4.1.4.4 C. “Pullman Abstention”: Whereby the Federal Plaintiff is Directed to Seek Relief in State Court under State Law, so that Decision of the Federal Question Might be Avoided
4.1.4.5 D. Certification 4.1.4.5 D. Certification
4.1.5 Chapter 7. The Supreme Court Incorporates Fourth Amendment Rights into Fourteenth Amendment Due Process and Expands the Damages Remedy under the 1871 Act 4.1.5 Chapter 7. The Supreme Court Incorporates Fourth Amendment Rights into Fourteenth Amendment Due Process and Expands the Damages Remedy under the 1871 Act
4.1.5.1 Introductory Note 4.1.5.1 Introductory Note
In the last chapter, we were introduced to “abstention” doctrines that are potentially applicable when a federal plaintiff seeks an equitable remedy. Is abstention applicable if the plaintiff seeks a damages remedy? In other words, if a federal plaintiff seeks damages in federal court for a federal constitutional violation, when, if ever, should the court decide that the plaintiff should seek damages in state court under state law instead?
This was the underlying issue in Monroe v. Pape (1961), which the Court resolved as a matter of interpretation of language in the 1871 Act, not as a matter of “abstention”.
4.1.5.2 A. The Court Incorporates Fourth Amendment Rights into Fourteenth Amendment Due Process 4.1.5.2 A. The Court Incorporates Fourth Amendment Rights into Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
Wolf v. Colorado (1949)
4.1.5.3 B. Monroe v. Pape (1961) Expands the Damages Remedy by Rejecting the Proposition that the Federal Plaintiff Must First Seek Relief in State Court under State Law 4.1.5.3 B. Monroe v. Pape (1961) Expands the Damages Remedy by Rejecting the Proposition that the Federal Plaintiff Must First Seek Relief in State Court under State Law
Facts as Stated in Justice Douglas’ Majority Opinion
Facts as Stated in Justice Frankfurter’s Dissent
The Opinions
4.1.5.4 C. Justice Scalia’s Lament 4.1.5.4 C. Justice Scalia’s Lament
4.1.5.5 D. The Court Limits the Damages Remedy by Establishing a “Personal Immunity” Defense to the “Personal Capacity” Action for Damages 4.1.5.5 D. The Court Limits the Damages Remedy by Establishing a “Personal Immunity” Defense to the “Personal Capacity” Action for Damages
Pierson v. Ray (1967)
4.2 Part B. The Supreme Court Tilts the Federalism Balance Toward State Interests, 1971-2021 4.2 Part B. The Supreme Court Tilts the Federalism Balance Toward State Interests, 1971-2021
4.2.1 The Nixon Court 4.2.1 The Nixon Court
4.2.2 Chapter 8. The Supreme Court Limits the Institutional Injunction by Declining to Recognize the Underlying Fourteenth Amendment Right 4.2.2 Chapter 8. The Supreme Court Limits the Institutional Injunction by Declining to Recognize the Underlying Fourteenth Amendment Right
4.2.2.1 Introductory Note 4.2.2.1 Introductory Note
In Chapter 5 we saw that the justices deciding Brown v. Board of Education (1954) understood and worried about the enforceability of the expanded equitable relief that would be required by its decision. Beyond schools, federal courts subsequently enjoined unconstitutional conditions in prisons and mental hospitals. These federal constitutional decrees involving the running of schools, prisons, and mental hospitals took on the rubric of “institutional injunctions”.
With the advent of the Nixon Court, the institutional injunction came under increasing pressure. The Court’s preferred instrument of limitation was to decline to recognize the underlying Fourteenth Amendment right.
4.2.2.2 A. The Institutional Injunction in School Desegregation Cases 4.2.2.2 A. The Institutional Injunction in School Desegregation Cases
Milliken v. Bradley (1974)
4.2.2.3 B. Brown v. Board of Education and Originalism 4.2.2.3 B. Brown v. Board of Education and Originalism
4.2.2.4 C. The Institutional Injunction in Prisoners’ Rights Cases 4.2.2.4 C. The Institutional Injunction in Prisoners’ Rights Cases
Rhodes v. Chapman (1981)
4.2.3 Chapter 9. The Supreme Court Moves the Law in the Direction of Justice Frankfurter’s Dissent in Monroe v. Pape (1961): It Limits the Damages Remedy Either Directly or by Declining to Recognize the Underlying Fourteenth Amendment Right 4.2.3 Chapter 9. The Supreme Court Moves the Law in the Direction of Justice Frankfurter’s Dissent in Monroe v. Pape (1961): It Limits the Damages Remedy Either Directly or by Declining to Recognize the Underlying Fourteenth Amendment Right
4.2.3.1 Introductory Note 4.2.3.1 Introductory Note
Justice Frankfurter’s interpretation of the 1871 Act in Monroe v. Pape (1961) (Chapter 7) garnered no votes, but his federalism arguments bore fruit in the Nixon Court, which built on them to limit the damages remedy under the 1871 Act by direct and indirect means.
4.2.3.2 Justice Frankfurter’s Dissent in Monroe v. Pape (1961) 4.2.3.2 Justice Frankfurter’s Dissent in Monroe v. Pape (1961)
4.2.3.3 A. The Court Limits the Damages Remedy by Declining to Recognize the Underlying Fourteenth Amendment Right 4.2.3.3 A. The Court Limits the Damages Remedy by Declining to Recognize the Underlying Fourteenth Amendment Right
Paul v. Davis (1976)
Daniels v.Williams (1986)
DeShaney v. Winnebago County (1989)
Would It Have Been an Allowable Defense in Rhodes v. Chapman (1981) that Governor Rhodes Lacked the Requisite Culpable State of Mind?
Wilson v. Seiter (1991)
Sandin v. Conner (1995)
4.2.3.4 B. The Court Limits the Damages Remedy by Greatly Expanding the Qualified Immunity Defense 4.2.3.4 B. The Court Limits the Damages Remedy by Greatly Expanding the Qualified Immunity Defense
Malley v. Briggs (1986)
Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd (2011)
San Francisco v. Sheehan (2015)
4.2.3.5 C. Which Issue Should be Decided First: Constitutional Violation or Remedy? 4.2.3.5 C. Which Issue Should be Decided First: Constitutional Violation or Remedy?
Which Issue Should be Decided First: Constitutional Violation or Remedy?
4.2.3.6 D. The Court Enforces its Limitations by Per Curiam Summary Reversals of Courts of Appeals, 2015- 4.2.3.6 D. The Court Enforces its Limitations by Per Curiam Summary Reversals of Courts of Appeals, 2015-
The Court Enforces its Limitations by Per Curiam Summary Reversals of Courts of Appeals, 2015-
4.2.3.7 E. What Should be the Way Forward? 4.2.3.7 E. What Should be the Way Forward?
4.2.4 Chapter 10. The Supreme Court Continues to Disallow Remedies that Impact the State Treasury Too Directly, But Does so in a Confusing Way 4.2.4 Chapter 10. The Supreme Court Continues to Disallow Remedies that Impact the State Treasury Too Directly, But Does so in a Confusing Way
4.2.4.1 Introductory Note 4.2.4.1 Introductory Note
In Chapter 3, we were introduced to the issue whether a remedy against a state officer could reach the state treasury. In Osborn v. Bank of the United States (1824), Chief Justice Marshall avoided the issue because the Bank’s money was in a trunk, but Louisiana v. Jumel (1883) decided to disallow the remedy.
Officer suits under the 1871 Act allowed remedies that had some impact on the state treasury. Institutional injunctions were allowed (Chapter 5), as were damages in the Monroe v. Pape (1961) mold (Chapter 7). The issue, in terms of the 1871 Act, was whether the remedy was “proper”.
A confusing development began in 1974 with the advent of the Nixon Court. A (5-4) majority led by Justice Rehnquist launched a campaign to deploy the Eleventh Amendment to take a hand in regulating remedies under the 1871 Act. This was bound to cause confusion. Why deploy the jurisdictional/constitutional doctrine of the Eleventh Amendment when remedies were already being regulated by interpretation of the Act?
Hang on for a bumpy ride.
4.2.4.2 A. The Court Deploys the Eleventh Amendment to Disallow Remedies against State Officers that It Deems Impact the State Treasury Too Directly 4.2.4.2 A. The Court Deploys the Eleventh Amendment to Disallow Remedies against State Officers that It Deems Impact the State Treasury Too Directly
Edelman v. Jordan (1974)
Facts as Stated by Justice Rehnquist
Justice Rehnquist’s Treatment of Ex Parte Young and the Eleventh Amendment
4.2.4.3 B. Remedies that Are Not Deemed to Impact the State Treasury Too Directly 4.2.4.3 B. Remedies that Are Not Deemed to Impact the State Treasury Too Directly
Scheuer v. Rhodes (1974)
Milliken v. Bradley (1977)
4.2.4.4 C. The Court Tries to Clear Up the Confusion It Has Caused 4.2.4.4 C. The Court Tries to Clear Up the Confusion It Has Caused
In What Capacity Was Governor Milliken Sued?
Kentucky v. Graham (1985)
Will v. Michigan Department of State Police (1989)
Hafer v. Melo (1991)
Alden v. Maine (1999)
Tanzin v. Tanvir (2020)