Claims Against the Federal Government and Federal Agencies

As discussed in an earlier section, Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), recognized an implied cause of action for constitutional claims seeking damages against federal officers. In F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471 (1994), the Court declined to extend Bivens to permit a damages action against a federal agency. The Court explained, among other reasons, that "sovereign immunity shields the Federal Government and its agencies from suit." 

For well over a century, federal courts have recognized that the federal government and its agencies generally may not be sued without the sovereign's consent. That immunity has deep common law roots. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 205-08 (1882); The Siren, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 152, 153-54 (1869) ("It is a familiar doctrine of the common law, that the sovereign cannot be sued in his own courts without his consent.").

Accordingly, claims for damages against the United States or a federal agency ordinarily may proceed only where Congress has expressly waived sovereign immunity. The paradigmatic example is the Federal Tort Claims Act, under which the United States has consented, subject to specified limits and exceptions, to be sued for certain torts committed by federal employees acting within the scope of their employment. 

*Federal courts retain equitable authority, in appropriate cases, to enjoin unconstitutional or ultra vires conduct by federal officers. See Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Center, Inc., 575 U.S. 320, 327 (2015) ("What our cases demonstrate is that, 'in a proper case, relief may be given in a court of equity . . . to prevent an injurious act by a public officer.'" (quoting Carroll v. Safford, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 441, 463 (1845))). But sovereign immunity is not categorically irrelevant to claims for injunctive relief. Rather, suits seeking nonmonetary relief against federal agencies or officers acting in their official capacities typically proceed, if at all, through the officer-suit framework and/or a statutory waiver of immunity, such as 5 U.S.C. § 702. See, e.g., Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 689-91 (1949); Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 621-23 (1963).