Claims Against Federal Officials

Section 1983, per its text, provides a cause of action only for claims against parties acting under color of state law. Recall as well that Section 1983, also pursuant to its text, allows for a court to award retrospective and prospective (damages and injunctive) relief where appropriate. 

There is no parallel statutory cause of action for constitutional rights claims against individuals acting pursuant to federal authority. The availability of such a cause of action depends on the nature of the relief sought. 

For constitutional claims for damages against parties acting in a federal capacity, the cause of action originated with the Court's 1971 decision in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics. What became known as "the Bivens doctrine" has since expanded and then quickly contracted, to a point today where many believe the doctrine is no longer viable. After examining the cases in this Section, consider whether you see a route for a Bivens claim today and, if so, what that claim might look like. If you do not see a viable path for a Bivens claim, how should the law respond (if at all)? 

For constitutional claims for injunctive relief against parties acting pursuant to federal authority, most federal courts recognize their own inherent power to enjoin unconstituitonal conduct (meaning no express cause of action is necessary). See Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Center, Inc., 575 U.S. 320, 326-27 (2015) ("[W]e have long held that federal courts may in some circumstances grant injunctive relief against state officers who are violating, or planning to violate, federal law . . . But that has been true not only with respect to violations of federal law by state officials, but also with respect to violations of federal law by federal officials . . . What our cases demonstrate is that, in a proper case, relief may be given in a court of equity . . . to prevent an injurious act by a public officer." (quotations omitted, citing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908); Carroll v. Safford, 44 U.S. 441, 463 (1845)).

As you examine the Court's reasoning in Bivens, and the doctrine's subsequent evolution, consider the justifications for distinguishing between claims against federal officials (and those acting pursuant to federal authority) on the basis of the relief sought. Are those justifications appropriate? Which branch of government is best-positioned to regulate the conduct of federal officials, either constitutionally or practically or both?