7 Non-Legislative Rules 7 Non-Legislative Rules
7.1 Community Nutrition Institute v. Young 7.1 Community Nutrition Institute v. Young
818 F.2d 943 (1987)
COMMUNITY NUTRITION INSTITUTE, et al., Appellants, Laura A. Rogers
v.
Frank YOUNG, Commissioner, Food and Drug Administration.
No. 84-5223.
United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.
Argued December 19, 1986.
Decided May 15, 1987.
[944] William B. Schultz, with whom Alan B. Morrison and Katherine A. Meyer, Washington, D.C., were on the brief for appellants.
Michael J. Ryan, Asst. U.S. Atty., with whom Joseph E. diGenova, U.S. Atty., Royce C. Lamberth, Craig Lawrence, Asst. U.S. Attys., Washington, D.C., Thomas Scarlett, Chief Counsel, Rockville, Md., and Michael M. Landa, Associate Chief Counsel for Enforcement, Food and Drug Admin., were on the brief for appellee. Patricia J. Kenney, Asst. U.S. Atty., Washington, D.C., Stephen D. Terman, Counsel, Food and Drug Admin., Rockville, Md., Richard K. Willard, Atty. Gen., Leonard Schaitman and John M. Rogers, Attorneys, Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C., entered appearances for appellee.
[945] Philip C. Olsson, Washington, D.C., was on the brief for amicus curiae in support of appellee, State of South Carolina, urging affirmance of the Dist. Court decision.
Before MIKVA, EDWARDS and STARR, Circuit Judges.
Opinion PER CURIAM.
Opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part filed by Circuit Judge STARR.
PER CURIAM:
This case makes its second appearance before this court. It presents a challenge by a consortium of organizations and private citizens (collectively referred to as CNI) to the Food and Drug Administration's regulation of certain unavoidable contaminants in food, most particularly, aflatoxins in corn.[1] Pursuant to its statutory mandate to limit the amount of "poisonous or deleterious substances" in food, see 21 U.S.C. § 346, FDA establishes "action levels" informing food producers of the allowable levels of unavoidable contaminants such as aflatoxins. Producers who sell products that are contaminated above the action level, which for aflatoxins in corn is currently set at 20 parts per billion, are subject to enforcement proceedings initiated by FDA.
CNI filed suit in federal district court, launching a three-pronged attack on FDA's action level for aflatoxins in corn: (1) in issuing the action level, FDA failed to comply with the rulemaking requirements of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDC Act), see 21 U.S.C. § 346; (2) the action level violated the Administrative Procedure Act because it constitutes a legislative rule issued without the requisite notice-and-comment procedures, see 5 U.S.C. § 553; and (3) FDA's decision to permit adulterated corn to be blended with unadulterated corn to bring the total contamination within the action level violated the FDC Act. The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of FDA on each issue.
In our initial opinion, we confined ourselves to CNI's first argument. We concluded that the FDC Act, by stating that FDA "shall promulgate regulations," 21 U.S.C. § 346, required that FDA issue formal regulations or "tolerances," rather than informal action levels. Having invalidated the action level on this ground, we concluded that CNI's APA argument was thus rendered moot and that the blending issue stood in need of reevaluation on remand. See 757 F.2d 354 (D.C.Cir.1985).
The Supreme Court reversed our decision, ___ U.S. ___, 106 S.Ct. 2360, 90 L.Ed.2d 959, holding that the FDC Act was not so clear as to preclude FDA's interpretation of the statute under which the agency could lawfully proceed by way of action levels. 106 S.Ct. 2360 (1986). Since the Court did not reach the APA or blending issues, it remanded the case to this court for "further proceedings consistent with [its] opinion." Id. at 2366. Thus, with the first issue resolved by the High Court, we must now address the still pending APA and blending issues.
I
Under the APA, agency rules[2] may be issued only after the familiar notice-and-comment procedures enumerated in the statute are completed. See 5 U.S.C. § 553. It is undisputed that the action level at issue here was promulgated sans those procedures. FDA, however, argues that notice-and-comment requirements do not apply by virtue of subsection (b)(3)(A) of section 553, which carves out an exception for "interpretative rules [and] general statements of policy." According to the [946] FDA, action levels represent nothing more than nonbinding statements of agency enforcement policy. CNI, on the other hand, argues that the action levels restrict enforcement discretion to such a degree as to constitute legislative rules.
The distinction between legislative rules and interpretative rules or policy statements has been described at various times as "tenuous," Chisholm v. FCC, 538 F.2d 349, 393 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 890, 97 S.Ct. 247, 50 L.Ed.2d 173 (1976), "fuzzy," Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. FPC, 506 F.2d 33, 38 (D.C.Cir.1974), "blurred," Saunders, Interpretative Rules With Legislative Effect: An Analysis and a Proposal For Public Participation, 1986 Duke L.J. 346, 352, and, perhaps most picturesquely, "enshrouded in considerable smog." Noel v. Chapman, 508 F.2d 1023, 1030 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 824, 96 S.Ct. 37, 46 L.Ed.2d 40 (1975), quoted in American Bus Association v. United States, 627 F.2d 525, 529 (D.C. Cir.1980).[3] As Professor Davis puts it, "the problem is baffling." 2 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise 32 (2d ed. 1979). By virtue of Congress' silence with respect to this matter, it has fallen to the courts to discern the line through the painstaking exercise of, hopefully, sound judgment. Guardian Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. FSLIC, 589 F.2d 658, 667 (D.C.Cir.1978).
Despite the difficulty of the terrain, prior cases do provide some useful guideposts. In this circuit, we are particularly guided by American Bus. There, in speaking for the court, Judge McGowan identified "two criteria" that courts have used in their efforts to fathom the interpretative/legislative distinction:
First, courts have said that, unless a pronouncement acts prospectively, it is a binding norm. Thus ... a statement of policy may not have a present effect: "a `general statement of policy' is one that does not impose any rights and obligations"....
The second criterion is whether a purported policy statement genuinely leaves the agency and its decisionmakers free to exercise discretion.
627 F.2d at 529 (quoting Texaco v. FPC, 412 F.2d 740, 744 (3d Cir.1969)).[4]
In conducting our analysis of these two criteria, we consider and give some, albeit "not overwhelming," deference to an agency's characterization of its statement. Brock v. Cathedral Bluffs Shale Oil Co., 796 F.2d 533, 537 (D.C.Cir.1986).[5] As befits a principled exercise in interpretation, courts are to give far greater weight to the language actually used by the agency; we have, for example, found decisive the choice between the words "will" and "may." Compare American Bus, 627 F.2d at 532 (use of "will" indicates statement is in fact a binding norm) with Guardian Federal, 589 F.2d at 666 (use of "may" indicates statement is a "general statement of policy").
Applying these principles to the case at hand, we are persuaded that the FDA action levels are legislative rules and thus subject to the notice-and-comment requirements of section 553. While FDA [947] now characterizes the action levels as policy statements, see, e.g., Supplemental Brief for Appellee at 7 ("In sum, action levels do not bind courts, food producers or FDA."), a variety of factors, when considered in light of the criteria set out in American Bus, indicate otherwise.
First. The language employed by FDA in creating and describing action levels suggests that those levels both have a present effect and are binding. Specifically, the agency's regulations on action levels explain an action level in the following way:
[A]n action level for an added poisonous or deleterious substance ... may be established to define the level of contamination at which food will be deemed to be adulterated. An action level may prohibit any detectable amount of substance in food.
21 C.F.R. § 109.4 (1986) (emphasis added).[6] This language, speaking as it does of an action level "defin[ing]" the acceptable level and "prohibit[ing]" substances, clearly reflects an interpretation of action levels as presently binding norms.[7] This type of mandatory, definitive language is a powerful, even potentially dispositive, factor suggesting that action levels are substantive rules. Cf. Cathedral Bluffs, 796 F.2d at 538. Moreover, the regulations provide that an action level may appropriately be established whenever there exist the same conditions required to establish a formal tolerance, if, in addition, the "appropriateness" of the tolerance may change in the near future because, for example, of technological changes. 21 C.F.R. § 109.6(c); see also id. § 109.6(b) (requirements for establishing a tolerance).[8]
Second. This view of action levels — as having a present, binding effect — is confirmed by the fact that FDA considers it necessary for food producers to secure exceptions to the action levels. A specific regulatory provision allows FDA to "exempt from regulatory action and permit the marketing of any food that is unlawfully contaminated with a poisonous or deleterious substance" if certain conditions exist. Id. § 109.8(a). This language implies that in the absence of an exemption, food with aflatoxin contamination over the action level is "unlawful." This putatively unlawful status can derive only from the action level, which, again, indicates that the action level is a presently binding norm. If, as the agency would have it, action levels did indeed "not bind courts, food producers or FDA," Supplemental Brief for Appellee at 7, it would scarcely be necessary to require that "exceptions" be obtained.
Third. On several occasions, in authorizing blending of adulterated with unadulterated corn, see infra Part II, the FDA has made statements indicating that action levels establish a binding form. For example, in a telegram to the Commissioner of the South Carolina Department of Agriculture, [948] in which it indicated its approval of a blending plan, the FDA stated that "[a]ny shipments made independent of this plan would, if found to exceed the 20 ppb level, be considered adulterated and subject to condemnation." Joint Appendix (J.A.) at 112 (emphasis added). But we need not resort to informal communications, cf. Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. EPA, 801 F.2d 430 (D.C.Cir.1986), where precision of draftsmanship may understandably be wanting. For, in a formal notice published in the Federal Register of a decision to permit blending and interstate shipment, FDA wrote:
Any food that contains aflatoxin in excess of 20 ppb ... is considered by FDA to be adulterated under section 402(a)(1) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 342(a)(1)), and therefore may not be shipped in interstate commerce.
46 Fed.Reg. 7447 (1981) (emphasis added), reprinted in J.A. at 49. Both statements, one informal and the other elaborately formal, indicate that, when judged under the American Bus criteria, action levels constitute substantive rules. The agency's own words strongly suggest that action levels are not musings about what the FDA might do in the future but rather that they set a precise level of aflatoxin contamination that FDA has presently deemed permissible. Action levels inform food producers what this level is; indeed, that is their very purpose.
We are not unmindful that in a suit to enjoin shipment of allegedly contaminated corn, it appears that FDA would be obliged to prove that the corn is "adulterated," within the meaning of the FDC Act, rather than merely prove non-compliance with the action level. See United States v. Boston Farm Center, Inc., 590 F.2d 149, 151 (5th Cir.1979).[9] The action level thus does not bind food producers in the sense that producers are automatically subject to enforcement proceedings for violating the action level. This factor, accordingly, points in favor of the agency's characterization. But the fact that action levels do not completely bind food producers as would a more classic legislative rule (where the only issue before the court would be if the agency rule were in fact violated) is not determinative of the issue. For here, we are convinced that FDA has bound itself. As FDA conceded at oral argument, it would be daunting indeed to try to convince a court that the agency could appropriately prosecute a producer for shipping corn with less than 20 ppb aflatoxin. And this type of cabining of an agency's prosecutorial discretion can in fact rise to the level of a substantive, legislative rule. Cf. Nader v. CAB, 657 F.2d 453 (D.C.Cir.1981); Guardian Federal, 589 F.2d at 666-67 ("If it appears that a so-called policy statement is in purpose or likely effect one that narrowly limits administrative discretion, it will be taken for what it is — a binding rule of substantive law.") (emphasis added). That is exactly what has happened here.
In sum, consideration of a variety of factors leads us to conclude that the FDA's action levels are not within the section 553(b)(3)(A) exception to notice-and-comment requirements.[10] Since all agree that [949] those procedures were not followed, the action level at issue here cannot stand.
We pause to observe that nothing in our decision today generally precludes FDA from proceeding by way of informal action levels. The Supreme Court has, of course, decided that such a course is permissible under the FDC Act. Our limited holding is that the current action levels are treated as substantive rules by FDA and, as such, can only be permitted if notice-and-comment procedures are employed. If it so chooses, FDA could proceed by action levels that are pure policy statements. But in order to do so, FDA must avoid giving action levels the kind of substantive significance that it now so plainly attaches to them.
We add one additional caveat. Our holding today in no way indicates that agencies develop written guidelines to aid their exercise of discretion only at the peril of having a court transmogrify those guidelines into binding norms. We recognize that such guidelines have the not inconsiderable benefits of apprising the regulated community of the agency's intentions as well as informing the exercise of discretion by agents and officers in the field. It is beyond question that many such statements are non-binding in nature and would thus be characterized by a court as interpretative rules or policy statements. We are persuaded that courts will appropriately reach an opposite conclusion only where, as here, the agency itself has given its rules substantive effect.
In sum, our holding today is narrow. We conclude that in the circumstances of this case, FDA by virtue of its own course of conduct has chosen to limit its discretion and promulgated action levels which it gives a present, binding effect. Having accorded such substantive significance to action levels, FDA is compelled by the APA to utilize notice-and-comment procedures in promulgating them.
II
The FDA has, on several occasions, granted exemptions to permit the blending of contaminated corn with uncontaminated corn. See, e.g., 43 Fed.Reg. 14,122 (1978), reprinted in J.A. at 41. This blending is typically permitted to help food producers cope with seasonal weather variations which may result in a particular harvest yielding corn with a higher level of aflatoxin. See Supplementary Brief of the State of South Carolina as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellee at 1-4. In such circumstances, the FDA may permit blending to bring the total level of aflatoxin contamination in the final, blended corn within acceptable levels.
CNI contends that this blending practice causes the final product to be "adulterated" within the meaning of 21 U.S.C. § 342(a)(2)(A). This section reads, in relevant part, as follows:
A food shall be deemed to be adulterated — ... if it bears or contains any added poisonous or added deleterious substance ... which is unsafe within the meaning of section 346 of this title.
Section 346, in turn, states that
[a]ny poisonous or deleterious substance added to any food, except where such substance ... cannot be avoided ... shall be deemed to be unsafe for purposes of the application of clause (2)(A) of section 342(a).
21 U.S.C. § 346. The intentional blending of contaminated corn obviously cannot in reason be considered unavoidable. Surely there can be little doubt that blended corn therefore stands branded as "adulterated" for purposes of the FDC Act; indeed, in its initial brief FDA conceded as much:
The Government does not dispute [CNI's] contention that use of an adulterated feed as an ingredient in another feed causes the finished (blended) feed to be adulterated.
Brief for Appellee at 36. But as FDA goes on to point out, a conclusion that a particular food product is "adulterated," in the abstract, means little other than that FDA [950] could choose to initiate enforcement proceedings. CNI does not, and could not, point to any provision in the FDC Act requiring FDA to initiate enforcement action against every food falling within the Act's definition of "adulterated." Rather, the Act makes clear that these enforcement decisions are vested, as they traditionally are, with the agency. Section 336, for example, expressly recognizes that FDA need not "report for prosecution, or for the institution of libel or injunction proceedings, minor violations of this [Act]." 21 U.S.C. § 336.
Upon analysis, therefore, the gravamen of CNI's complaint is that FDA failed to initiate enforcement proceedings. But as the Supreme Court held in Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 105 S.Ct. 1649, 84 L.Ed.2d 714 (1985), FDA enjoys complete discretion not to employ the enforcement provisions of the FDC Act, and those decisions are not subject to judicial review. As this court recently concluded, the "provisions [of the FDC Act] authorize, but do not compel the FDA to undertake enforcement activity; they `commit complete discretion to the [FDA] to decide how and when they should be exercised.'" Schering Corp. v. Heckler, 779 F.2d 683, 686 (D.C.Cir.1985) (quoting Heckler v. Chaney, 105 S.Ct. at 1658). In light of this principle, CNI's arguments on the blending issue must fall.
III
In conclusion, we find FDA's action levels to be invalid in that they were issued without the requisite notice-and-comment procedures, but we reject CNI's challenge to FDA's disinclination to initiate enforcement action against certain blended corn. Accordingly, the case is remanded to the District Court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
STARR, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I fully concur in section II of the panel opinion, holding that FDA's decision to permit blending fell within the agency's enforcement discretion. I am also persuaded that the majority's careful treatment of the substantive rules-policy statements distinction is not unfaithful to the teachings of this circuit's more recent precedents. Nonetheless, I am constrained to conclude that the correct rule was that laid down by our court thirteen years ago in Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. FPC, where we held:
The critical distinction between a substantive rule and a general statement of policy is the different practical effect that these two types of pronouncements have in subsequent administrative proceedings.... A properly adopted substantive rule establishes a standard of conduct which has the force of law.
506 F.2d 33, 38 (D.C.Cir.1974). The Pacific Gas-enunciated factor — whether the pronouncement has the force of law in subsequent proceedings — should be deemed determinative of the issue. Because there is no doubt that the agency pronouncements at issue here have no such effect, I respectfully dissent from section I of the panel opinion.
I
The abiding characteristic of a legislative rule is that it is law. It defines a standard of conduct that regulated individuals or entities ignore at their peril, in the face of possible enforcement action. Significantly, the only issue in any such proceeding is whether the rule applies to the facts at hand. "The underlying policy embodied in the rule is not generally subject to challenge before the agency." Id., at 38.
Before such rules are sanctioned one would think that they should be carefully crafted, with the "underlying polic[ies] embodied in the rule" recognized, openly discussed, and deliberately weighed. To return to basic civics for a moment, statutes passed by Congress have been refined in this manner by the very nature of the legislative process. Bills are considered by committees, hearings are held, debate is conducted, compromises are reached, and votes are taken. And all this is carried on in a bicameral legislative body with the final result presented to the President for [951] his approval or rejection. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 103 S.Ct. 2764, 77 L.Ed.2d 317 (1983). A statute therefore possesses important attributes justifying placement of the coercive power of the state behind a particular policy framed in accordance with the process ordained at the Founding.
In the modern administrative state, many "laws" emanate not from Congress but from administrative agencies, inasmuch as Congress has seen fit to vest broad rulemaking power in the executive branch, including independent agencies. See Synar v. United States, 626 F.Supp. 1374, 1383-84 (D.D.C.) (three judge court), aff'd, ___ U.S. ___, 106 S.Ct. 3181, 92 L.Ed.2d 583 (1986); K. Davis Administrative Law Treatise § 3.8 (1982 Supp.); cf. Ticor Title Insurance Co. v. FTC, 814 F.2d 731, 732 (D.C.Cir.1987) (dismissing on procedural grounds a challenge to the delegation of law enforcement powers to an independent agency). This rulemaking power is obviously cabined by whatever requirements may exist in the particular statute delegating rulemaking authority, a subject which we treated in our initial decision in this case. See 757 F.2d 354 (D.C.Cir.1985). But Congress has also provided in the APA for certain procedural protections before that which achieves the lofty status of "law" is promulgated by an agency acting in its Congressionally authorized lawmaking capacity. Chief among these protections are the notice-and-comment requirements laid down in the familiar provision of 5 U.S.C. § 553. In a sense, notice-and-comment procedures serve as a Congressionally mandated proxy for the procedures which Congress itself employs in fashioning its "rules," as it were, thereby insuring that agency "rules" are also carefully crafted (with democratic values served by public participation) and developed only after assessment of relevant considerations. It is thus, in theory, important for APA procedures to be followed before an agency pronouncement is deemed a binding legislative rule not merely because the APA says so, but because in saying so the APA is protecting a free people from the danger of coercive state power undergirding pronouncements that lack the essential attributes of deliberativeness present in statutes. Because of the value inhering in such procedures, it is well-established that "`only reluctantly should courts recognize exceptions therefrom.'" American Bus Association v. United States, 627 F.2d 525, 528 (D.C.Cir.1980) (quoting Humana of South Carolina v. Califano, 590 F.2d 1070, 1082 (D.C.Cir.1978)).
Nonetheless, in crafting the APA, Congress directed that courts should recognize certain exceptions to the statute's notice-and-comment requirements. Specifically, Congress recognized that not all agency pronouncements, even those of considerable moment, rise to the dignity of law. Thus, the APA excepts, as the panel opinion recounts, interpretative rules and general statements of policy from the general notice-and-comment requirements. While it is no doubt true, and indeed is frequently recognized, that such agency pronouncements may have a direct effect on the regulated community, and may even be judicially reviewable, see, e.g., AFL-CIO v. Donovan, 757 F.2d 330, 341-43 (D.C.Cir.1985); cf. Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 18 L.Ed.2d 681 (1967), these pronouncements still lack the dignity of "law." Before that status can be achieved, the agency must run its policies through the notice-and-comment gantlet. Perhaps in part because the agency here has avoided testing its pronouncements in this way, it must in any future proceeding defend and justify its chosen standard in the face of a challenge to that standard. Cf. United States v. Boston Farm Center, Inc., 590 F.2d 149, 151 (5th Cir.1979).
II
The majority is quite correct when it chronicles the difficulty courts have found in attempting to fathom the distinction between legislative or substantive rules on one hand, and interpretative rules or policy statements on the other.[11] Inasmuch as our [952] decisional law over the last decade avowedly reflects considerable uncertainty in discerning the line between agency pronouncements that are "law" and those that are "policy," see Majority Opinion at 946, it seems advisable to return to the pristine teaching of Pacific Gas. In that case, this court articulated a rule which is clearly preferable to the present muddy state of the law. The wisdom of the Pacific Gas principle is in no small measure found in the fact that the case reflects the "core principles" which I sought briefly to adumbrate in the preceding section of this opinion. As I read the case, Pacific Gas deems as "critical" the effect of the agency pronouncement in future proceedings. This is as it should be, for as I discussed above, it is this element that is the essence of "law." Not only is the Pacific Gas approach therefore the most principled manner in which to draw the legislative-interpretative line (in view of the fact that the determination is whether a pronouncement is "law" or not), but it has the not insignificant practical benefit in an unclear world of providing great clarity where previously there has been "considerable smog." See American Bus, 627 F.2d at 529.
We should reembrace our Pacific Gas test as the determinative factor in analyzing whether a particular pronouncement is legislative or interpretative in nature. If the pronouncement has the force of law in future proceedings, it is a legislative rule. Unless that critical feature is present, however, the agency statement should be considered to be a lower form of pronouncement, a "non-law" as it were, or in APA terms an "interpretative rule" or "general statement of policy." The correct measure of a pronouncement's force in subsequent proceedings is a practical one: must the agency merely show that the pronouncement has been violated or must the agency, if its hand is called, show that the pronouncement itself is justified in light of the underlying statute and the facts.
Application of this test can readily be illustrated by the case at hand.[12] Action levels offer guidance to the regulated community with respect to what products FDA deems adulterated within the meaning of the FDC Act. But in an enforcement proceeding in which FDA seeks either to impose sanctions for shipment of an adulterated product or to enjoin shipment of an adulterated product, the agency must prove the product is "adulterated." That is, FDA cannot merely show that the product at issue fails to comply with the action level. See Boston Farm Center, 590 F.2d at 151. Rather, FDA must offer scientific or other probative evidence to support its contention that the product is adulterated. Thus, the action level does not have the force of law in the subsequent proceeding. Indeed, it has no "force" at all.
Let me quickly observe that I am not encouraging rebellion and sedition within the circuit. While the law has certainly evolved since Pacific Gas, at no point has this court disavowed that decision.[13] Quite to the contrary, the leading case since Pacific Gas, American Bus, expressly embraced the earlier decision. See 627 F.2d at [953] 529. Moreover, post-American Bus decisions grappling with the legislative rule-interpretative rule distinction have often emphasized the Pacific Gas factor. Just the other day, for example, Judge Bork, in writing for the court in The National Latino Media Coalition v. FCC, 816 F.2d 785, 788 (D.C.Cir.1987), emphasized that "an interpretative rule does not have the force of law and is not binding upon anyone" in holding that the agency pronouncements at issue there were not legislative rules and thus not subject to the APA's notice-and-comment requirements. To my eye, this represents an application, albeit not explicit, of Pacific Gas. Thus, I view Pacific Gas as not only "good" law, in the sense that it has never been overruled, but can discern in our precedents examples, including very fresh ones, of its being heartily applied. I would therefore urge that the "force of law" factor from Pacific Gas be explicitly recognized anew as the polestar guiding the legislative-interpretative determination. Such a modest step would not only be faithful to fundamental principles informing the nature of legislative rules but would have the happy practical consequence of bringing clarity to a troubled area.
While I thus view this step as warranted, I recognize a potential danger lurking in the embrace of a single-factor, Pacific Gas test. Agencies may yield to temptation and seek to shield their regulations from the scrutiny occasioned by notice-and-comment procedures, choosing instead to cast would-be regulations as interpretative rules. The rule would still, of course, be subject to scrutiny in a subsequent proceeding, but this fact may be of little comfort to prospective commentors, given the deference accorded agency views in any such proceedings. See generally Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). But upon analysis, the danger is more theoretical than real. Indeed, Congress not atypically provides agencies with a direct command to promulgate regulations, cf., e.g., Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute, 448 U.S. 607, 100 S.Ct. 2844, 65 L.Ed.2d 1010 (1980), thereby imposing a duty that would not be satisfied with issuance of an humble interpretative rule. In this case, of course, the Supreme Court has now ruled that FDA is not required by the organic statute to issue formal regulations, but can instead proceed by way of informal action levels. ___ U.S. ___, 106 S.Ct. 2360, 90 L.Ed.2d 959 (1986). But if Congress prefers a traditional model of command to the agencies to issue regulations, it can embrace that model through legislation, informed by the need, reiterated by the Supreme Court in this very case, to avoid dangling participles and other forms of that omnipresent occupational hazard of the draftsman's workshop, ambiguity. But see INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, ___ U.S. ___, 107 S.Ct. 1207, 94 L.Ed.2d 434 (1987); Board of Governors v. Dimension Financial Corp., 474 U.S. 361, 106 S.Ct. 681, 88 L.Ed.2d 691 (1986). Because Pacific Gas, and the basic principles upon which it stands, points the way to a quite different result than that reached by my colleagues, I am constrained to dissent in part.
[1] Aflatoxins are by-products of certain common molds that grow on various crops, including corn.
[2] The APA defines "rule" as "the whole or a part of an agency statement of general or particular applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy...." 5 U.S.C. § 551(4). FDA does not dispute that its action levels are indeed "rules." The notice-and-comment requirements of section 553 are thus unquestionably triggered and the only question before us is whether one of the statutory exceptions to notice and comment is applicable.
[3] See also Brock v. Cathedral Bluffs Shale Oil Co., 796 F.2d 533, 536-37 (D.C.Cir.1986) ("[T]here is no axiom to distinguish between a regulation and general statements of policy.").
[4] The first criterion from American Bus could be read as facially inconsistent with the APA. Specifically, criterion one appears to indicate that interpretative rules must be solely prospective: "[C]ourts have said that, unless a pronouncement acts prospectively, it is a binding norm." 627 F.2d at 529. Since under the APA, interpretative rules can be developed and offered as present indications of the agency's enforcement policy, this "present-is-legislative" reading of American Bus would create a conflict with the statutory definition. In our view, however, criterion one from American Bus is addressed to the binding effect of the agency pronouncement; if a statement has a present-day binding effect, it is legislative. Mere pronouncements of what the agency intends, whether for the present or for the future, which do not have a binding effect, are properly classified as interpretative rules. Thus, it is the binding effect, not the timing, which is the essence of criterion one.
[5] As now-Justice Scalia put it when writing for this court: "[T]here is deference and there is deference — and the degree accorded to the agency on a point such as this is not overwhelming." Cathedral Bluffs, 796 F.2d at 537.
[6] The conditional "may" in this provision refers only to the agency's discretion in deciding whether to establish an action level. It does not suggest that, once established, an action level is non-binding. Rather, with respect to binding effect, the regulation speaks in non-conditional terms.
[7] See also Action Levels for Poisonous or Deleterious Substances in Human Food and Animal Feed (FDA Publication 1980) ("Action levels and tolerances represent limits at or above which FDA will take legal action to remove adulterated products from the market.") (emphasis added), reprinted in Joint Appendix (J.A.) at 76, 77.
[8] The specific action level for aflatoxin in corn was published in the Federal Register. In Cathedral Bluffs, this court indicated that such publication did not necessarily suggest that "the matter published was meant to be a regulation, since the APA requires general statements of policy to be published as well." 796 F.2d at 539 (emphasis in original). Rather, the Cathedral Bluffs court indicated that the "real dividing point between regulations and general statements of policy is publication in the Code of Federal Regulations." Id. This factor, among others, led the court to conclude that the pronouncement at issue there was a general statement of policy. In our case, however, the line cannot be so simply drawn. While the specific action level itself was not published in the Code of Federal Regulations, FDA did publish in the C.F.R. regulations authorizing establishment of action levels which, as noted above, indicate that action levels are to have a binding effect. Thus, we deal with a mixed Federal Register-C.F.R. publication, and accordingly find ourselves unable to divine persuasive indications, one way or another, from what may be called the "publication factor."
[9] Boston Farm Center could be read to indicate that the Fifth Circuit viewed action levels as mere general statements of policy. In reviewing the Government's argument that a court should defer to the action level as positively indicating a violation of the Act, the Boston Farm Center court noted that "[t]he deference principle is less compelling when the agency threshold is a matter of prosecutorial discretion instead of rule-making." 590 F.2d at 149. But see United States v. Ewig Bros., 502 F.2d 715, 725 (7th Cir.1974) (An action level is "meant to operate more like a rule of general applicability than a mere prediction of how the agency would choose to exercise its prosecutorial discretion."), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 945, 95 S.Ct. 1324, 43 L.Ed.2d 423 (1975). We may well prefer the Seventh Circuit's characterization, but neither court was addressing the issue before us: whether action levels are within the interpretative rules/general statements of policy exception to APA notice-and-comment requirements. Thus, these casual characterizations are of limited help in our inquiry.
[10] Our conclusion is buttressed by the Supreme Court's opinion in this case, which could be read to reflect an understanding of the action levels as substantive rules. Specifically, the Court described action levels in the following terms: "In setting an action level, the FDA essentially assures food producers that it ordinarily will not enforce the general adulteration provisions of the Act against them." 106 S.Ct. at 2363. This characterization of the action levels as an agency assurance is consistent with our holding that the action levels are substantive rules subject to notice-and-comment procedures.
[11] In addition, the difficulty can be seen in attempts by courts to quite understandably make sense of this area by seeking simple, easily-applied rules. In Brock v. Cathedral Bluffs Shale Oil Co., 796 F.2d 533, 539 (D.C.Cir.1986), now-Justice Scalia intimates that "[t]he real dividing point between regulations and general statements of policy is publication in the Code of Federal Regulations." Such an approach would certainly be simple, if arguably inconsistent with the notion that the deference entitled to an agency's own characterizations of its statements is "not overwhelming." Id., at 537. I prefer the Pacific Gas approach, which has a much firmer rooting in the core principles at issue.
[12] I recognize that in many ways, nothing can be "readily" demonstrated by the case at hand; action levels, as the FDA has fashioned them, are a rather curious hybrid. Under a functionalist analysis, this form of agency action comes tantalizingly close to a substantive rule. I find particularly compelling the fact that FDA considers it necessary to grant "exceptions" to its action levels. See 21 C.F.R. § 109.8 (1986). Thus, I must confess in candor that I view the majority's approach not only as faithful to our circuit's more recent pronouncements, but as buttressed by common sanse.
[13] What seems to have taken place as the law has evolved (and arguably become obfuscated) is that the Pacific Gas factor has been consigned to a supporting role, as one aspect of what seems to be a multi-factor test.
7.2 Pacific Gas & Electric Co v. Federal Power Commission 7.2 Pacific Gas & Electric Co v. Federal Power Commission
PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY, Petitioner, v. FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION, Respondent, General Motors Corporation et al., Intervenors. MISSISSIPPI POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY, Petitioner, v. FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION, Respondent, General Motors Corporation et al., Intervenors.
Nos. 73-1358, 73-1485.
United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.
Argued Feb. 21, 1974.
Decided June 26, 1974.
*34Daniel E. Gibson, Oakland, Cal., with whom Malcolm H. Furbush and Howard V. Golub, San Francisco, Cal., were on the brief, for petitioner in No. 73-1358.
Peyton G. Bowman, III, Washington, D. C., with whom Richard M. Merriman and J. Richard Tiano, Washington, D. C., were on the brief, for petitioner in No. 73-1485.
John Staffier, Atty., Federal Power Commission, for respondent. Leo E. Forquer, Gen. Counsel, Federal Power Commission, and George W. McHenry, Jr., Sol., Federal Power Commission, were on the brief, for respondent. Platt W. Davis, III, Atty., Federal Power Commission, also entered an appearance for respondent.
Edward J. Grenier, Jr^.Washington, D. C., with whom Richard P. Noland, Richard J. Pierce, Jr., and David C. Evans, Washington, D. C., were on the brief, for intervenors in No. 73-1358 and intervenors, Gen. Motors Corp., JohnsManville Corp., Brick Institute of America and Georgia Industrial Group in No. 73-1485.
Arnold D. Berkeley, Washington, D. C., and David R. Straus, Chicago, 111., were on the brief, for intervenors, State of Louisiana, Louisiana Municipal Association, Louisiana Public Service Commission and St. James Parish Utilities in No. 73-1485.
Raymond P. Buschmann, Chicago, 111., entered an appearance for intervenor, Illinois Power Co. in No. 73-1485.
Before BAZELON, Chief Judge, and MacKINNON, Circuit Judge, and A. SHERMAN CHRISTENSEN* United States Senior District Judge for the District of Utah.
Petitioners assert that we have jurisdiction under section 19(b) of the Natural Gas Act1 to review Order No. 467, 49 F.P.C. 85,2 which the Federal Power Commission issued on January 8, 1973. Order No. 467 is a “Statement of Policy” on “priorities-of-deliveries by jurisdictional pipelines during periods of curtailment” which the Commission indicated it proposes to implement in all matters arising under the Act. The petitioning customers of pipeline companies, whose deliveries are subject to curtailment during natural gas shortages, contend that Order No. 467 is proeedurally defective for failure to comply with the Administrative Procedure Act,3 substantively defective for failure to compile an adequate record, and environmentally defective for failure to comply with the National Environmental Policy Act.4
We hold that as a general statement of policy, Order No. 467 is exempt from the rulemaking requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act. We further hold that Order No. 467 is not reviewable under section 19(b) of the Natural Gas Act because this general statement of policy does not ‘have a sufficiently immediate and significant impact upon petitioners and because the record in this case is inadequate to permit meaningful judicial review.
I. BACKGROUND
This country appears to be experiencing a natural gas shortage5 which necessitates the curtailment of supplies to certain customers during peak demand periods. The problem confronting many pipeline companies is whether to curtail on the basis of existing contractual commitments or on the basis of the most efficient end use of the gas. In some instances the pipeline companies are concerned that withholding gas due under existing contracts may subject them to civil liability.
Recognizing these uncertainties and mindful of the desirability of providing uniform curtailment regulation,6 the FPC in 1971 issued a Statement of General Policy in the form of Order No. 431 directing jurisdictional pipeline companies which expected periods of shortages to file tariff sheets containing a curtailment plan.7 Order No. 431 hinted that curtailment priorities should be based on the end use of the gas and stated that curtailment plans approved by the Commission “will control in all respects notwithstanding inconsistent provisions in [prior] sales contracts . ” 8 In response to Order No. *36431, numerous pipeline companies which had not already done so submitted a variety of curtailment plans for the Commission’s approval. As could be expected, the curtailment plans reflected a wide range of views as to the proper priorities for delivery. Some plans were based on end use; others, on contract entitlements. The industry was forced to speculate as to which priorities would later be found to be just and reasonable by the Commission, and the absence of any stated Commission policy hindered effective long range planning by pipelines, distributors and consumers.
Sensing a need for guidance and uniformity in the curtailment area, on January 8, 1973 the Commission promulgated Order No. 467, the order presently under review, which is reprinted in the Appendix to this opinion. Entitled “Statement of Policy,” Order No. 467 was issued without prior notice or opportunity for comment. The statement sets forth the Commission’s view of a proper priority schedule and expresses the Commission’s policy that the national interest would be best served by assigning curtailment priorities on the basis of end use rather than on the basis of prior contractual commitments. Order No. 467 further states the Commission’s intent to follow this priority schedule unless a particular pipeline company demonstrates that a different curtailment plan is more in the public interest. On January 15, 1973 the Commission issued Order No. 467-A, 49 F.P.C. 217, which corrected an inadvertent omission in Order No. 467 of procedures to provide for emergency situations that may occur during curtailment periods.
The Commission immediately received numerous petitions for rehearing, reconsideration, modification or clarification of Orders Nos. 467 and 467-A, and several parties requested permission to intervene. Most of the petitioners were customers of pipeline companies subject to curtailment, particularly electric generating companies to whom Order No. 467 had assigned a low priority. Few pipeline companies objected to Order No. 467, apparently because the pipelines sell all the gas they can during periods of shortage and consequently are not overly concerned with which customers receive it. On March 2, 1973 the Commission issued Order No. 467-B, 49 F.P.C. 583, which affirmed the policy expressed in Order No. 467, amended that order in some minor instances and otherwise denied the petitions for rehearing and intervention.
Petitioners seek review of Order No. 467 9 in this court under section 19(b) of the Natural Gas Act10 and advance the following three arguments: (1) that Order No. 467 is in effect a substantive rule which the Commission should have promulgated after a rulemaking proceeding under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) 11; (2) that there is an insufficient factual basis for the priorities announced in Order No. 467; and (3) that the Commission failed to comply with the National Environmental Policy Act.
II. STATEMENTS OF POLICY
The principal issue is whether this court has jurisdiction to review Order No. 467 under section 19(b) of the Natural Gas Act. In resolving this issue it is necessary first to determine whether *37Order No. 467 is a substantive rule or merely a general statement of policy. We recognize that a decision on the latter question effectively disposes of petitioner’s procedural challenge under the APA. However, since many of the same considerations are relevant to both issues, disposition of the APA issue is an unavoidable incident to disposition of the jurisdictional issue.
A. General Principles
The APA requires that before an agency adopts a substantive rule, it must publish a notice of the proposed rule and provide interested persons an opportunity to comment. 5 U.S.C. § 553. The FPC did not utilize this rulemaking procedure in adopting Order No. 467. However, section 553(b) (A) of the APA provides an exception to the general rule-making requirements:
Except when notice or hearing is required by statute, this subsection does not apply—
(A) to interpretative rules, general statements of policy, or rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice; ....
Id. § 553(b) (A) (emphasis added).12 The Commission maintains that Order No. 467 was exempt from the rulemaking requirements because it is a “general statement of policy” within the meaning of section 553(b) (A).
The APA never defines “general statements of policy” but it does define “rule” to ,
[mean] the whole or a part of an agency statement of general or particular applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy or describing the organization, procedure, or practice requirements of an agency
Id. § 551(4). This broad definition obviously could be read literally to encompass virtually any utterance by an agency, including statements of general policy.13 But the statutory provision of an exception to the rulemaking requirements for “general statements of policy” indicates that Congress did not intend the definition of “rule” to be construed so broadly. Congress recognized that certain administrative pronouncements did not require public participation in their formulation. These types of pronouncements are listed in section 553(b) (A) and include “general statements of policy.” 14
Professor Davis has described the distinction between substantive rules and general statements of policy as a “fuzzy product.” 15 Unfortunately the issues in *38this case compel us to attempt to define the fuzzy perimeters of a general statement of policy.
An administrative agency has available two methods for formulating policy that will have the force of law. An agency may establish binding policy through rulemaking procedures by which it promulgates substantive rules, or through adjudications which constitute binding precedents.16 A general statement of policy is the outcome of neither a rulemaking nor an adjudication; it is neither a rule nor a precedent but is merely an announcement to the public of the policy which the agency hopes to implement in future rulemakings or adjudications.17 A general statement of policy, like a press release, presages an upcoming rulemaking or announces the course which the agency intends to follow in future adjudications.
As an informational device, the general statement of policy serves several beneficial functions. By providing a formal method by which an agency can express its views, the general statement of policy encourages public dissemination of the agency’s policies prior to their actual application in particular situations. Thus the agency’s initial views do not remain secret but are disclosed well in advance of their actual application. Additionally, the publication of a general statement of policy facilitates long range planning within the regulated industry and promotes uniformity in areas of national concern.
The critical distinction between a substantive rule and a general statement of policy is the different practical effect that these two types of pronouncements have in subsequent administrative proceedings. See Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. United States, 316 U.S. 407, 416-417, 62 S.Ct. 1194, 86 L.Ed. 1563 (1942); Public Service Comm’n of New York v. FPC, 126 U.S.App.D.C. 26, 37, 373 F.2d 816, 827 (1967), rev’d on other grounds, 391 U.S. 9, 88 S.Ct. 1526, 20 L.Ed.2d 388 (1968). A properly adopted substantive rule establishes a standard of conduct which has the force of law. In subsequent administrative proceedings involving a substantive rule, the issues are whether the adjudicated facts conform to the rule and whether the rule should be waived or applied in that particular instance. The underlying policy embodied in the rule is not generally subject to challenge before the agency.
A general statement of policy, on the other hand, does not establish a “binding norm.”18 It is not finally determinative of the issues or rights to which it is addressed. The agency cannot apply or rely upon a general statement of policy as law because a general statement of policy only announces what the agency seeks to establish as policy. A policy statement announces the agency’s tentative intentions for the future. When the agency applies the policy in a particular situation, it must be prepared to support the policy just as if the policy statement had never been issued.19 An agency cannot escape its responsibility to present evidence and reasoning supporting its substantive *39rules by announcing binding precedent in the form of a general statement of policy.
Often the agency’s own characterization of a particular order provides some indication of the nature of the announcement. The agency’s express purpose may be to establish a binding rule of law not subject to challenge in particular cases. On the other hand the agency may intend merely to publish a policy guideline that is subject to complete attack before it is finally applied in future cases. When the agency states that in subsequent proceedings it /will thoroughly consider not only the policy’s applicability to the facts of a given case but also the underlying validity of the policy itself, then the agency intends to treat the order as a general statement of policy.20
Airport Commission v. CAB, 300 F.2d 185 (4th Cir. 1962), provides a good illustration of the proper effect of a general statement of policy in subsequent administrative proceedings. In that case the CAB issued a press release jointly with the Chairman of the FAA stating that it generally favored the rendition of air line service to reasonably adjacent communities through a single airport rather than through separate airports. When the Board later directed consolidated service to a tri-city area in North Carolina, petitioners contended that the Board’s decision was illegally based upon a policy pronouncement which was never published in the Federal Register in compliance with the APA. Affirming the Board’s decision, the court described the effect of a general statement of policy:
[The statement] did not involve a rule which the public is required to obey or with which it is to avoid conflict. . It was intended as a general statement of policy to guide the public in future planning. . . . The so-called policy or pronouncement did not operate in and of itself to deny any rights to the petitioners.
Id. at 188. The court emphasized that the Board’s decision under review was firmly grounded upon substantial and extensive record evidence and that the Board had not attempted to apply the policy statement as a rule of law.
The tentative effect of a general statement of policy has ramifications in subsequent judicial review proceedings as well as in administrative proceedings. Because a general statement of policy is adopted without public participation, the scope of review may be broader than the scope of review for a substantive rule. The rulemaking process prescribed by the APA insures a thorough exploration of the relevant issues. The public is notified of the proposed rule and interested parties submit arguments supporting their positions. The rulemaking process culminates in the agency applying its experience and expertise to the issues. A court reviewing a rule that was adopted pursuant to this extensive rulemaking process will defer to the agency’s judgment if the rule satisfies the minimal criterion of reasonableness.21
*40But when an agency promulgates a general statement of policy, the agency does not have the benefit of public exploration of the issues. Judicial review may be the first stage at which the policy is subjected to full criticism by interested parties. Consequently a policy judgment expressed as a general statement of policy is entitled to less deference than a decision expressed as a rule or an adjudicative order. Although the agency’s expertise and experience cannot be ignored, the reviewing court has some leeway to assess the underlying wisdom of the policy and need not affirm a general statement of policy that merely satisfies the test of reasonableness.22
B. Order No. 467
Applying these general principles to the problem at hand, we conclude that Order No. 467 is a general statement of policy. Order No. 467 is entitled and consistently referred to by the Commission as a general statement of policy.23 Recognizing the “need for Commission guidance in curtailment planning,” the Commission announced in Order No. 467 the curtailment policy which it “proposes to implement,” the “plan preferred by the Commission” which “will serve as a guide in other proceedings.” See Appendix. Thus, the stated purpose of Order No. 467 was not to provide an inflexible, binding rule but to give advance notice of the general policy with respect to curtailment priorities that the Commission prefers.
Order' No. 467 does not establish a curtailment plan for any particular pipeline. The effect of the order is to inform the public of the types of plans which will receive initial and tentative FPC approval, but there is no assurance that any such plan will be finally approved. As the Commission stated:
When applied in specific cases, opportunity will be afforded interested parties to challenge or support this policy through factual or legal presentation as may be appropriate in the circumstances presented.
49 F.P.C. at 85.
[Order No. 467 is] not finally determinative of the rights and duties of a given pipeline, its customers or ultimate consumers; it expressly envisions further proceedings.
49 F.P.C. at 585.
Many applicants seek clarification of Order No. 467 by Commission definition of all terms used, or modification of the substance of Order No. 467 by a reordering of priorities. These applicants err in treating Order Nos. 467 and 467-A as a rule of substance, which precisely defines the curtailment rights and obligations of all pipelines and all pipeline customers. We ascribe no such effect to Order Nos. 467 and 467-A, for, as already stated, these Orders are intended only to state initial guidelines as a means of facilitiating curtailment planning and the adjudication of curtailment cases.
49 F.P.C. at 586. Not only will petitioners have an opportunity to challenge the merits of the proposed plan, they will also have an opportunity to demonstrate that the plan is inappropriate in particular circumstances.
As discussed below, Order No. 467 is a policy statement and is not intended to initiate a proceeding or to provide a binding rule without further proceedings directed towards curtailment problems on specific pipelines.
49 F.P.C. at 583.
*41The stated priorities are intended to be a safe starting point from which deviations may be made based on an evidentiary record.
Order Denying Motions for Reconsideration, Clarification or Modification of Order 467-B (April 25, 1973); Jt.App. at 80.
We recognized that some flexibility is essential as curtailments first occur, in order to ameliorate the economic dislocations which necessarily ensue, and for that reason we made clear in Order No. 467 that the policy therein stated could, and would, be adjusted in appropriate cases where the hearing record so required.
49 F.P.C. at 584.
We, of course, recognize that extraordinary circumstances may preclude the strict adherence to the priorities established and, consequently, we will permit those persons who allege that their circumstances require such extraordinary treatment to file petitions for relief under Section 1.7(b) of our Rules of Practice and Procedure. Barring such circumstances, our review of those curtailment proceedings and our knowledge of the industry convinces us that the priorities-of-delivery set forth below should be applied to all jurisdictional pipeline companies during periods of curtailment.
49 F.P.C. at 85-86.
This does not mean that the parties may not propose or the commission may not adopt variations on the See. 2.78(a) plan, but there must be evidence in the record to support any such variations. Nor does it mean that adversely affected pipeline customers may not claim a right to special relief from the operation of a Sec. 2.78(a) plan, but in such instances there must be evidence to support any such claim. In this way, Sec. 2.78(a) will assist the parties and the Administrative Law Judge in arriving at a curtailment plan which will meet the problems created by diverse needs for gas in the face of a nation-wide gas shortage and at the same time be adapted to the peculiarities, if any, of the particular pipeline system involved.
49 F.P.C. at 586. Thus it is apparent from Order No. 467 itself that there is no final, inflexible impact upon the petitioners. And since the statement will be applied prospectively, the courts are in a position to police the Commission’s application of the policy and to insure that the Commission gives no greater effect to Order No. 467 than the order is entitled to as a general statement of policy.
The FPC of course was under no compulsion to issue Order No. 467. The Commission issued the policy statement because the curtailment plans being submitted reflected sharp differences in philosophy which necessitated Commission guidance in the curtailment area. In the absence of such a policy statement, the Commission could have proceeded on an ad hoc basis and tentatively approved curtailment plans filed under section 4 of the Act which the Commission found to be just and reasonable. In following such a course the only difference from the present situation would be that the Commission would be acting under a secret policy rather than under the publicized guidelines of Order No. 467. The argument that an agency must follow rulemaking procedures when it elects to formulate policy by a substantive rule24 has no application in this case. Order No. 467 does not establish a substantive rule. Although the Commission is free to initiate a rulemaking proceeding to establish a binding substantive rule, the Commission apparently intends to establish its curtailment policies by proceeding through individual adjudications. Order No. 467 merely announces the general policy which the Commission hopes to establish in subsequent proceedings.
A comparison of the present case with Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. *42United States, 316 U.S. 407, 62 S.Ct. 1194, 86 L.Ed. 1563 (1942), provides a good illustration of the difference between a substantive rule and a general statement of policy. After conducting extensive hearings with public participation, the Federal Communications Commission promulgated regulations purporting to require the Commission to refuse to grant or renew a license to any station which entered into certain types of contracts with a chain broadcasting network. Plaintiff, a chain broadcasting network, sued in district court for injunctive relief against the regulation. Although the FCC maintained that the regulations merely announced a general policy and were no more subject to review than a press release similarly announcing policy, id. at 422, 62 S.Ct. 1194, the Supreme Court concluded that the regulations had the effect of a substantive rule and were subject to immediate judicial review.25
A distinguishing feature of the regulations in Columbia Broadcasting was their immediate and significant impact upon plaintiff’s business. There was evidence that the issuance of the regulations caused the immediate cancellation of or failure to renew plaintiff’s contracts. These “wholesale cancellations” seriously disorganized plaintiff’s organization and impaired plaintiff’s very “ability to conduct its business.” Id. at 413, 414-415, 418, 423, 62 S.Ct. 1194. The effect of Order No. 467 in the present case is not so direct or immediate. Any abrogation of contractual commitments will occur only after individual curtailment plans have been filed and approved by the Commission. In those proceedings all interested parties can appear, present their ease and, if aggrieved, obtain judicial review.26 Assuming the Commission approves curtailment plans that override some contractual obligations, the result will be that during occasional periods of shortage coupled with high demand, deliveries to some customers rather than others might be curtailed. The possibility that petitioners might receive a lower curtailment priority at some future time as the result of a subsequent tariff filing does not compare with the significant and immediate impact of the regulations in Columbia Broadcasting.
A further important distinction between Columbia Broadcasting and the present case is that the FCC regulations in that case had the “force of law.” Unlike Order No. 467, the FCC regulations were the product of a full rulemaking procedure, see id. at 409, 62 S.Ct. 1194, were “avowedly” adopted in the exercise of rulemaking power, and were “couched in terms of command.” There was no assurance that the underlying validity of the regulations could be challenged in subsequent adjudications — the only issue in future proceedings would be whether a particular contract was within the regulations. Indeed, the FCC acknowledged that the regulations afforded a “legal basis” for subsequent administrative action. Id. at 417-423, 62 S.Ct. 1194. None of these featui'es are present here. In this case the FPC has consistently viewed Order No. 467 as a general statement of policy and, as discussed *43at length above, the order does not have the binding force of a substantive rule.
Petitioners contend that Order No. 467 has an immediate and significant practical effect by shifting the burden of proof in curtailment cases from the pipeline companies to their customers, because the order “established a presumption that the curtailment rules prescribed are consistent with the Natural Gas Act in any and all situations . ” 27 Under section 4 of the Natural Gas Act a pipeline company filing a new curtailment plan has the burden of proving that its plan is reasonable and fair. FPC v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 406 U.S. 621, 645, 92 S.Ct. 1827, 32 L.Ed.2d 369 (1972); see 15 U.S.C. § 717c(e) (1970). Petitioners maintain that by stating that tariffs which conform to the proposed plan will be permitted to become effective, Order No. 467 relieves the pipeline companies of their burden of justifying their plans. However, the language of Order No. 467 is as follows:
Proposed tariff sheets which conform to the policies expressed in [Order No. 467] will be accepted for filing, and permitted to become effective, subject to the rights of intervenors to hearing and adjudication of any claim of preference, discrimination, unjustness or unreasonableness of the provisions contained in the proposed tariff sheets, and subject to the further right of anyone adversely affected to seek individualized special relief because of extraordinary circumstances.
49 F.P.C. at 585 (emphasis added). We interpret the italicized proviso to mean that in appropriate cases the Commission will conduct a section 4 proceeding to consider a challenge to the underlying validity of a curtailment plan, even though the plan conforms to Order No. 467. Section 4 renders unlawful curtailment plans which are preferential, discriminatory, unreasonable or unfair and provides for a hearing concerning the lawfulness of newly filed curtailment plans. See FPC v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., supra at 642-645, 92 S.Ct. 1827. The Commission has processed curtailment plans under section 4 in the past, and the Supreme Court recently emphasized that section 4 is by far the most appropriate mechanism for evaluating such plans. Id. at 643-645, 92 S.Ct. 1827. We expect the Commission generally to continue processing curtailment plans in section 4 proceedings, in which the pipeline company has the burden of proof, and to refrain from treating Order No. 467 as anything more than a general statement of policy.28
*44Petitioners rely heavily upon the Third Circuit’s decision in Texaco, Inc. v. FPC, 412 F.2d 740 (3rd Cir. 1969). In Texaco the court considered the validity of FPC Order No. 362 which established for the first time a compound interest rate that would be required on amounts ordered refunded when a proposed rate increase was disallowed. The order had been adopted without complying with the APA rulemaking procedures. In deciding that Order No. 362 was not a general statement of policy, the court rejected arguments by the Commission that the order was merely a public announcement of the policy which otherwise would be applied on an ad hoc basis 29 and that the order did not harm the petitioner until a refund was actually required. According to the Texaco court, the petitioner’s burden of overcoming the general rule embodied in Order No. 362 was evidence of the substantive nature of the order.30
The situation in Texaco was quite different from the present case. Texaco arose in part from an adjudication in which the Commission had refused to waive Order No. 362 as a substantive rule. Since the inception of Order No. 362 the Commission had treated it as a substantive rule. Indeed, the order itself stated that “the amendments herein prescribed may be interpreted as substantive amendments under § 553 of Title 5 of the United States Code . ... ” 412 F.2d at 742 & n. 4. The Commission had maintained that section 553(b) (B) of the APA31 made a rulemaking procedure unnecessary because Order No. 362 was minor, routine, insignificant and unimportant, and it was only on appeal that the Commission suggested for the first time that the order was excused *45from rulemaking under section 553(b) (A) as a general statement of policy. Id. at 743, 744 n. 9. Under these circumstances, and having just concluded that Order No. 362 was not minor, routine, insignificant or unimportant, the court was unwilling to treat the order as a general statement of policy without substantive effect.
Order No. 467 is not the first instance where the FPC has utilized a general statement of policy to advise the public of the manner in which it intends to regulate the natural gas industry. For example, after the Supreme Court held in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672, 74 S.Ct. 794, 98 L.Ed. 1035 (1954), that the Commission’s jurisdiction extends to independent producers of natural gas, the Commission promulgated a “Statement of General Policy” which tentatively designated various geographic areas as producing units for the purpose of rate regulation and established maximum rates for each area. 24 F.P.C. 818 (1960). This statement provided that rates exceeding the maximum levels would not be approved and announced that the tentative rates would remain in effect until final rates and geographic boundaries were determined in future proceedings. Id. at 820. The first of the future proceedings to be completed culminated in the landmark Supreme Court decision in Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 88 S.Ct. 1344, 20 L.Ed.2d 312 (1968). Order No. 467 is similar in both purpose and effect to the general statement of policy which led to the area rate structure adjudicated in the Permian case.
We conclude that Order No. 467 is a general statement of policy and that it was therefore unnecessary for the Commission to conduct rulemaking proceedings under the Administrative Procedure Act.
III. JURISDICTION
Having concluded that Order No. 467 is a general statement of policy, we must now decide whether this court has jurisdiction to review the order. Although circumstances might arise under which a general statement of policy is subject to immediate judicial review,32 Order No. 467 does not present such a situation.
Petitioners contend that we have jurisdiction to review Order No. 467 under section 19(b) of the Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717r(b) (1970), which provides:
Any party to a proceeding under this chapter aggrieved by an order issued by the Commission in such proceeding may obtain a review of such order in the court of appeals of the United States for any circuit wherein the natural-gas company to which the order relates is located or has its principal place of business, or in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, by filing in such court, within sixty days after the order of the Commission upon the application for rehearing, a written petition praying that the order of the Commission be modified or set aside in whole or in part.33
Under this statute this court has jurisdiction only where there is a “party to *46a proceeding” who is “aggrieved by an order.”
The Commission first contends that petitioners were not “parties” to a proceeding before the Commission because petitioners’ only involvement with Order No. 467 was the filing of petitions for rehearing. The Commission argues that for petitioners to have been “parties” to the proceeding, it was necessary to file petitions to intervene. Whatever merit the Commission’s argument may have in another context,34 in the present case petitioners need not have requested intervention. The Commission actually denied one request for intervention. Moreover, the Commission stated:
[0]rder No. 467 is a policy statement . Therefore petitions to intervene are unnecessary, and petitions for rehearing do not lie. We treat the filings as petitions for reconsideration and deny the same.
49 F.P.C. at 583. In light of this statement by the Commission, it was unnecessary to file futile petitions to intervene in order to become “parties” to the proceeding. It was sufficient for petitioners to file petitions for rehearing.
The Commission further contends that Order No. 467 is not sufficiently definitive to be a reviewable “order” under section 19(b). This argument finds support in a line of decisions beginning with United Gas Pipeline Co. v. FPC, 86 U.S.App.D.C. 314, 181 F.2d 796, cert. denied, 340 U.S. 827, 71 S.Ct. 63, 95 L.Ed. 607 (1950). In that ease, after conducting a formal rulemaking, the FPC promulgated a rule that pipeline companies must file their rates in tariff-schedule form instead of as percentage contracts. We held that the rule was not “a decision based on evidence presented in a quasi-judicial proceeding before the Commission,” and hence not a reviewable “order” under section 19(b) because the record compiled during the rulemaking proceedings was insufficient to permit meaningful review.35 For example, the central question was the effect the rule would have upon petitioner’s contracts, but none of the contracts appeared in the record before the court.36
*47In administrative law the phrase “quasi-judicial” generally describes a proceeding which at least in part involves an adjudication of specific facts relating to particular parties.37 By limiting judicial review to orders arising from “quasi-judicial” administrative proceedings, the United Gas Pipeline decision seemed to distinguish adjudicative orders from all other agency pronouncements. For a while the courts followed United Gas Pipeline’s apparent interpretation of section 19(b) allowing judicial review only of orders arising from adjudicative proceedings.38 However, in recent years the courts have been more inclined to accept jurisdiction over rules as well as adjudicative orders, and our decision in United Gas Pipeline has been repeatedly questioned.39
We thoroughly discussed the United Gas Pipeline decision in Chicago v. FPC, 147 U.S.App.D.C. 312, 458 F.2d 731 (1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1074, 92 S.Ct. 1495, 31 L.Ed.2d 808 (1972). In Chicago, the FPC promulgated an order directing that certain gas produced by natural gas pipeline companies should be valued at the area rate applicable to independent producers. The issue had arisen in an adjudicative proceeding but the FPC recognized the potential importance of the issue and enlarged the proceeding to a rule-making which complied fully with the APA rulemaking requirements.40 The Commission argued that the court lacked jurisdiction to review the order under the United Gas Pipeline interpretation of section 19(b). However, analyzing the United Gas Pipeline decision, we concluded that the distinction between rulemaking and adjudication was not dispositive of the jurisdictional issue. We there said that the “determining factor” was whether the record was' sufficient to allow meaningful review, and since the Commission had compiled a “full and complete evidentiary record of extensive hearings,” we accepted jurisdiction under section 19(b). Id. at 321-322; 458 F.2d at 740-741. We also emphasized the “controlling nature of the rule, the predominantly legal nature of the questions presented [and] the necessity for swift determination of the questions involved . ,” and held the rule final “for all practical purposes” even though the *48rule was yet to be enforced in an adjudication. Id. at 321 n. 43; 458 F.2d at 740 n. 43.
The effect of the Chicago decision is virtually to eliminate the arbitrary distinction which United Gas Pipeline seemed to have erected between adjudicative orders and other agency pronouncements. In place of that distinction, the Chicago decision employed a more practical analysis, concentrating on whether the issues and the record were suitable for judicial review and whether the agency’s order had an immediate and significant impact upon the petitioners. This analysis incorporates substantially the same factors as those enunciated by the Supreme Court for determining the appropriateness of preenforcement review of agency action by a suit for injunctive and declaratory relief. See Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 18 L.Ed.2d 681 (1967); Toilet Goods Ass’n, Inc. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 158, 87 S.Ct. 1520, 18 L.Ed.2d 697 (1967); Gardner v. Toilet Goods Ass’n, Inc., 387 U.S. 167, 87 S.Ct. 1526, 18 L.Ed.2d 704 (1967). In those cases the Supreme Court adopted a twofold analysis for determining whether an administrative announcement is final and ripe for judicial review. A court must “evaluate both the fitness of the issues for judicial decision and the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration.”41 We find these factors to be equally applicable and persuasive in determining whether petitioners are “aggrieved by an order” within the meaning of section 19(b) of the Natural Gas Act.42
The extensive discussion in section 11(B) of this opinion demonstrates that Order No. 467 does not have an immediate and significant impact upon petitioners. As a general statement of policy, the order merely announces the tentative curtailment policy which the Commission considers to be “just and reasonable, nondiscriminatory and nonpreferential.” 49 F.P.C. at 486. It is the policy which the Commission hopes to apply in future proceedings but there is no assurance that this specific policy will be imposed on all pipelines and their customers. Thus petitioners will not suffer undue hardship if judicial review is denied.
*49Moreover, the issues raised by petitioners are not suitable for judicial review at this time. Petitioners contend that the curtailment priorities of Order No. 467 were formulated without factual support in the record and that implementation of Order No. 467 will unlawfully abrogate existing contracts. Judicial review of these issues would be difficult if not impossible to review on the record before us. There is nothing here like the “full and complete evidentiary record of extensive hearings” which was before the court in the Chicago case. Although evidentiary hearings are not always a prerequisite to judicial review,43 the petitions for rehearing filed before the Commission in this case do not constitute a sufficient record to resolve petitioner’s challenges to Order No. 467. Indeed, the very contracts which petitioners allege will be abrogated are not in the record.44
Since Order No. 467 has no immediate and significant impact upon the petitioners and since the record would not permit meaningful review of the issues, the present case fails to satisfy either of the criteria necessary for judicial review under section 19(b). Without jurisdiction over the order, we are precluded from considering the other issues in this case. Thus we do not decide whether the FPC violated the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970), when it promulgated Order No. 467. In American Smelting & Refining Co. v. FPC, 161 U.S.App.D.C. 6 at 28-30, 494 F.2d 925, 947-949 (1974) we held that an environmental impact statement need not accompany an interim emergency curtailment plan. However, the FPC recognizes its duty to prepare an impact statement at least when it approves a final permanent curtailment plan. Id. at 6, 494 F.2d at 925.
In this appeal the FPC brief contends that it was unnecessary for an environmental impact statement to accompany Order No. 467 because a general statement of policy does not have a direct environmental impact. Cf. First Nat’l Bank of Homestead v. Watson, 363 F.Supp. 466, 472-475 (D.D.C.1973). Petitioners contend that an impact statement should have accompanied the general statement of policy, see Jones v. District of Columbia Redevelopment Land Agency, 162 U.S.App.D.C. 366, 499 F.2d 502 .(1974); Scientists’ Institute for Public Information, Inc. v. AEC, 156 U.S.App.D.C. 395, 481 F.2d 1079 (1973), or in the alternative that the FPC at least should have explained why an impact statement was not required, see Arizona Public Service Co. v. FPC, 157 U.S.App.D.C. 263, 483 F.2d 1274 (1973). Since we lack jurisdiction over Order No. 467, petitioners are free to pursue their NEPA claims in the district court. See Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. Southern Natural Gas Co., 338 F.Supp. 1039, 1050 (N.D.Ga.1972), modified on other grounds sub nom. Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. FPC, 476 F.2d 142 (5th Cir. 1973).
The petitions for review are therefore dismissed.
Judgment accordingly.
*50APPENDIX
ORDER NO. 467
STATEMENT OF POLICY
This order contains a statement of policy by the Commission on priorities-of-deliveries by jurisdictional pipeline companies during periods of curtailment. The Commission proposes to implement such policy in all matters .arising under the Natural Gas Act.
When applied in specific cases, opportunity will' be afforded interested parties to challenge or support this policy through factual or legal presentation as may be appropriate in the circumstances presented. It is the Commission’s intention in this statement .to focus the attention of all parties concerned with the natural gas industry upon the general policy views of the Commission in advance of the filing of particular applications with the Commission and hereby to permit affected entities the opportunity to evolve a rational energy resource development program considering national energy goals and objectives as they may be stated from time-to-time, and to minimize the complexity and length of administrative proceedings before this Commission.
Concurrently, the Commission is issuing, in Docket No. R-467, Utilization and Conservation of Natural Resources— Natural Gas, a notice of proposed policy statement pertaining to the priorities of usage of our natural gas supply. In this notice, we discussed the critical shortage of natural gas supply and its effect on this Nation’s progress. We then found that it was necessary to promulgate procedures that would maximize high priority of usage for this natural resource. We adopt that discussion here and find, based on that analysis, that procedures should be adopted to maximize the high priority usage of natural gas during curtailment periods on a pipeline’s system.
General Discussion — As stated in that notice, the Commission has been called upon to determine the propriety of curtailment procedures to be invoked by jurisdictional pipeline companies during periods of curtailed deliveries. In reaching its decisions, the Commission has reviewed the records in those proceedings and, based upon those reviews, has concluded that the customers’ use of the natural gas fall into certain set categories. Accordingly, we believe that those categories are generally applicablé industry-wide and can be utilized for establishing priorities-of-delivery during periods of short supply on any jurisdictional pipeline’s system. We, of course, recognize that extraordinary circumstances may preclude the strict adherence to the priorities established and, consequently, we will permit those persons who allege that their circumstances require such extraordinary treatment to file petitions for relief under Section 1.7(b) of our Rules of Practice and Procedure; Barring such circumstances, our review of those curtailment proceedings and our knowledge of the industry convinces us that the priorities-of-delivery set forth below should be applied to all jurisdictional pipeline companies during periods of curtailment.
The curtailment procedures to be followed must have as their basic objective the protection of deliveries for the residential and small volume consumers who cannot be safely curtailed on a daily basis and requiring, as the initial level of curtailment, reduction in deliveries for large volume interruptible sales. As we pointed out in our Ark-La decision1 issued concurrently herewith (supra, pp. 66-67):
We are impelled to direct curtailment on the basis of end use rather than on the basis of contract simply because contracts do not necessarily serve the public interest requirement of efficient allocation of this wasting resource. In time of shortage, performance of a firm contract to deliver gas for an inferior use, at the expense of reduced deliveries for priority uses,
*51is not compatible with consumer protection.
Secondly, we have determined that interruptible sales are for the most part, predicated on end-use considerations; those customers, be they direct sales or indirect sales, who require gas for human needs service or nonsubstitutable industrial service do not contract on an interruptible basis. Interruptible service, at the lower rates charged for such service, envisions interruption. And accordingly, interruptible customers can most reasonably be expected to have alternate fuel facilities already operational. We conclude, therefore, that curtailment should first fall on those who have not historically borne .the full-fixed costs of providing gas service, particularly since these customers are best prepared to accept interruptions in service and clearly do not require uninterrupted service for protection of life or property.
Finally, if curtailment reaches beyond the level of interruptible service into firm contract service, we commit ourselves to the proposition that large volume boiler fuel usage is inferior and should be curtailed before other firm service. Aside from the established physical fact that combustion of natural gas for raising steam in boilers and its subsequent conversion into electricity or mechanical energy results in a loss of roughly two-thirds of the heating value of the gas used — which we regard as unacceptably inefficient in time of shortage — we note also that those who use gas as boiler fuel generally can substitute other fuels more readily and at lower overall cost than other gas users; additionally, pollution control is more practical because of the large size of individual installations. Other fuels generally can be physically substituted in large boiler fuel applications with less inconvenience and less possible adverse consequences than in other industrial applications, such as direct fired uses, and other uses demanding precise temperature control, flame characteristics, instantaneous response and atmosphere quality. Finally, subordinating boiler fuel use with its comparative ease of substitutability, to other large scale industrial and commercial uses should tend to minimize plant and business closings and the attendant economic loss from decreased production and payrolls, and the personal hardships of unemployment [Footnote omitted]. In establishing the priorities-of-service for the use of the natural gas supply, it is obvious that some direct and indirect customers use their supply of natural gas for similar end-use purposes. Customers with similar usages for the fuel should be accorded the same treatment to avoid any undue discrimination or preference among them. Accordingly, we will place .the direct and indirect customers in the same priority-of-service position when their use of natural gas is comparable.
In determining our priority-of-service listing, we are cognizant of the economic impacts that will flow from that listing. However, we believe that we have no choice but to impose certain restrictions on the sale of natural gas within the limits of our jurisdiction during this time of supply shortages. Our decision is made with full knowledge that certain sales to ultimate consumers are beyond our jurisdiction. In those instances, we solicit the cooperation of State authorities to aid implementation of this program.
The Commission finds:
(1) The notice and effective date provisions of 5 U.S.C. § 553 do not apply with respect to the policy statement here adopted.
(2) It is appropriate and in the public interest in administering the Natural Gas Act to adopt the policy statement as herein ordered.
The Commission, acting pursuant to the provisions of the Natural Gas Act, as amended, particularly Sections 4, 5 and 7 (52 Stat. 822, 823, 824, 825; 56 Stat. *5283, 84; 61 Stat. 459; 76 Stat. 72; 15 U.S.C. §§ 717c, 717d, 717f), orders:
(A) Part 2 of the Commission’s General Rules of Practice and. Procedure, General Policy and Interpretations, Sub-chapter A, Chapter I, Title 18 of the Code of Federal Regulations is amended by adding new Section 2.78(a) as follows: [The following § 2.78(a) includes the amendments made by Orders Nos. 467-A and 467-B.]
§ 2.78 Utilization and Conservation of Natural Resources — Natural Gas
(а) The national interests in the development and utilization of natural gas resources throughout the United States will be served by recognition and implementation of the following priority-of-service categories for use during periods of curtailed deliveries by jurisdictional pipeline companies:
(1) Residential, small commercial (less than 50 Mcf on a peak day).
(2) Large commercial requirements (50 Mcf or more on a peak day), firm industrial requirements for plant protection, feedstock and process needs, and pipeline customer storage injection requirements.
(3) All industrial requirements not specified in (2), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), or (9).
(4) Firm industrial requirements for boiler fuel use at less than 3,000 Mcf per day, but more than 1,500 Mcf per day, where alternate fuel capabilities can meet such requirements.
(5) Firm industrial requirements for large volume (3,000 Mcf or more per day) boiler fuel use where alternate fuel capabilities can meet such requirements.
(б) Interruptible requirements of more than 300 Mcf per day, but less than 1,500 Mcf per day, where alternate fuel capabilities can meet such requirements.
(7) Interruptible requirements of intermediate volumes (from 1,500 Mcf per day through 3,000 Mcf per day), where alternate fuel capabilities can meet such requirements.
(8) Interruptible requirements of more than 3,000 Mcf per day, but less than 10,000 Mcf per day, where alternate fuel capabilities can meet such requirements.
(9) Interruptible requirements of more than 10,000 Mcf per day, where alternate fuel capabilities can meet such requirements.
The priorities-of-deliveries set forth above will be applied to the deliveries of all jurisdictional pipeline companies during periods of curtailment on each company’s system; except, however, that, upon a finding of extraordinary circumstances after hearing initiated by a petition filed under Section 1.7(b) of the Commission’s Rules of Practice and Procedure, exceptions to those priorities may be permitted.
The above list of priorities requires the full curtailment of the lower priority category volumes to be accomplished before curtailment of any higher priority volumes is commenced. Additionally, the above list requires both the direct and indirect customers of the pipeline that use gas for similar purposes to be placed in the same category of priority.
The tariffs filed with this Commission should contain provisions that will reflect sufficient flexibility to permit pipeline companies to respond to emergency situations (including environmental emergencies) during periods of curtailment where supplemental deliveries are required to forestall irreparable injury to life or property.
(B) The amendment provided for herein shall be effective as of the date of issuance of this order.
(C) The Secretary shall cause prompt publication of this order to be made in the Federal Register.