Mr. Justice Roberts

delivered the opinion of the Court.

The petitioner was indicted for robbery in the Circuit Court of Carroll County, Maryland. Due to lack of funds, *457he was unable to employ counsel, and so informed the judge at his arraignment. He requested that counsel be appointed for him. The j udge advised him that this would not be done, as it was not the practice in Carroll County to appoint counsel for indigent defendants, save in prosecutions for murder and rape.

Without waiving his asserted right to counsel, the petitioner pleaded not guilty and elected to be tried without a jury. At his request witnesses were summoned in his behalf. He cross-examined the State’s witnesses and examined his own. The latter gave testimony tending to establish an alibi. Although afforded the opportunity, he did not take the witness stand. The judge found him guilty and imposed .a sentence of eight years.

While serving his sentence, the petitioner filed with a judge of the Circuit Court for Washington County, Maryland, a petition for a writ of habeas corpus alleging that he had been deprived of the right to assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution. The writ issued, the cause was heard, his contention was rejected, and he was remanded to the custody of the prison warden.

Some months later, a petition for a writ of habeas corpus was presented to Hon. Carroll T. Bond, Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals of Maryland, setting up the same grounds for the prisoner’s release as the former petition. The respondent answered, a hearing was afforded, at which an agreed statement of facts was offered by counsel for the parties, the evidence taken at the petitioner’s trial was incorporated in the record, and the cause was argued. Judge Bond granted the writ but, for reasons set forth in an opinion, denied the relief prayed and remanded the petitioner to the respondent’s custody.

The petitioner applied to this court for certiorari directed to Judge Bond. The writ was issued on account of the importance of the jurisdictional questions involved *458and conflicting decisions1 upon the constitutional question presented. In awarding the writ, we requested counsel to discuss the jurisdiction of this court, “particularly (1) whether the decision below is that of a court within the meaning of § 2372 of the Judicial Code, and (2) whether state remedies, either by appeal or by application to other judges or any other state court, have been exhausted.”

1. Sec. 237 of the Judicial Code declares this court competent to review, upon certiorari, “any cause wherein a final judgment . . . has been rendered ... by the highest court” of a State “in which a decision could be had” on a federal question. Was Judge Bond’s judgment that of a court within the meaning of the statute? ■ Answer must be made in the light of the applicable law of Maryland.

Art. 4, § 6 of the State Constitution provides: “All Judges shall by virtue of their offices be Conservators of the Peace throughout the State; . . .” Sec. 1 of Art. 42 of the Public General Laws of Maryland (Flack’s 1939 Edition) invests the Court of Appeals and the Chief Judge thereof, the Circuit Courts for the respective counties, and the several judges thereof, the Superior Court of Baltimore City, the Court of Common Pleas of that city, the Circuit Court and Circuit Court No. 2 of Baltimore City, the Baltimore City Court, and the judges of the said courts, out of court, and the Judge of the Court of Appeals from the City of Baltimore, with power to grant writs of habeas corpus and to exercise jurisdiction in all matters pertaining thereto.

*459Although it is settled that the grant to the Court of Appeals of the power to issue the writ is unconstitutional and void,3 and although the statute does not confer on individual judges of the Court of Appeals the power to issue a writ and proceed thereon, nevertheless, those judges, as conservators of the peace, have the power under the quoted section of the Constitution. 4 In any event, Judge Bond is the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals and the judge of that court from the City of Baltimore and, as such, is empowered to act.

Sections 2 to 6, inclusive, 9 to 12 inclusive, and 17 of the statute prescribe the procedure governing the issue of the writ, its service, the return, and the hearing. No question is made but that Judge Bond complied with these provisions. It is, therefore, apparent that in all respects he acted in a judicial capacity and that, in his proper person, he was a judicial tribunal having jurisdiction, upon pleadings and proofs, to hear and to adjudicate the issue of the legality of the petitioner’s detention. If Judge Bond had been sitting in term time as a member of a court, clothed with power to act as one of the members of that court, his judgment would be that of a court within the scope of § 237. Doubt that his judgment in the present instance is such arises out of our decision in McKnight v. James, 155 U. S. 685, where we refused to review the denial of a discharge by a judge of an inferior court of Ohio who issued the writ and heard the case at chambers. It appeared that the petitioner had addressed his petition to a judge of the Circuit Court instead of the court itself; and that, for this reason, the order of the judge was not reviewable by the Supreme Court of Ohio as it would have been had the writ been addressed *460to the Circuit Court though heard by a single judge. The petitioner had not exhausted his state remedy since, though he could have obtained a decision by the highest court of the State, he had avoided doing so, and then sought to come to this court directly from the order of the Circuit Judge on the theory that that judge’s order was the final order of the highest court of the State which could decide his case. In a later decision, we referred to this and other cognate cases as deciding that appeals do not lie to this court from orders by judges at chambers,5 but the fundamental reason for denying our jurisdiction was that the appellant had not exhausted state remedies.

In view of what has been said of the power of Judge Bond as a judicial tribunal to hear and finally decide the cause, and of the judicial quality of his action we are of opinion that his judgment was that of a court within the intendment of § 237.

2. Did the judgment entered comply with the requirement of § 237 that it must be a final judgment rendered by the highest court in which a decision could be had? Again answer must be made in the light of the applicable law of Maryland. The judgment was final in the sense that an order of'a Maryland judge in a habeas corpus case, whatever the court to which he belongs, is not reviewable by any other court of Maryland except in specific instances named in statutes which are here inapplicable.6 It is true that the order was not final, and the petitioner has not exhausted state remedies in the sense that in Maryland, as in England, in many of the States, and in the federal courts, a prisoner may apply succes*461sively to one judge after another and to one court after another without exhausting his right.7 We think this circumstance does not deny to the judgment in a given case the quality of finality requisite to this court’s jurisdiction. Although the judgment is final in the sense that it is not subject to review by any other court of the State, we may, in our discretion, refuse the writ when there is a higher court of the State to which another petition for the relief sought could be addressed,8 but this is not such a case. To hold that, since successive applications to courts and judges of Maryland may be made as of right, the judgment in any case is not final, would be to deny all recourse to this court in such cases.

Since Judge Bond’s order was a final disposition by the highest court of Maryland in which a judgment could be had of the issue joined on the instant petition we have jurisdiction to review it.

3. Was the petitioner’s conviction and sentence a deprivation of his liberty without due process of law, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, because of the court’s refusal to appoint counsel at his request?

The Sixth Amendment of the national Constitution applies only to trials in federal courts.9 The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not incorporate, *462as such, the specific guarantees found in the Sixth Amendment,10 although a denial by a State of rights or privileges specifically embodied in that and others of the first eight amendments may, in certain circumstances, or in connection with other elements, operate, in a given case, to deprive a litigant of due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth.11 Due process of law is secured against invasion by the federal Government by the Fifth Amendment, and is safeguarded against state action in identical words by the Fourteenth. The phrase formulates a concept less rigid and more fluid than those envisaged in other specific and particular provisions of the Bill of Rights. Its application is less a matter of rule. Asserted denial is to be tested by an appraisal of the totality of facts in a given case. That which may, in one setting, constitute a denial of fundamental fairness, shocking to the universal sense of justice, may, in other circumstances, and in the light of other considerations, fall short of such denial.12 In the application of such a concept, there is always the danger of falling into the habit of formulating the guarantee into a set of hard and fast rules, the application of which in a given case may be to ignore the qualifying factors therein disclosed.

The petitioner, in this instance, asks us, in effect, to apply a rule in the enforcement of the due process clause. He says the rule to be deduced from our former decisions is that, in every case, whatever the circumstances, one charged with crime, who is unable to obtain counsel, must be furnished counsel by the State. Expressions in the *463opinions of this court lend color to the argument,13 but, as the petitioner admits, none of our decisions squarely adjudicates the question now presented.

In Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45, ignorant and friendless negro youths, strangers in the community, without friends or means to obtain counsel, were hurried to trial for a capital offense without effective appointment of counsel on whom the burden of preparation and trial would rest, and without adequate opportunity to consult even the counsel casually appointed to represent them. This occurred in a State whose statute law required the appointment of counsel for indigent defendants prosecuted for the offense charged. Thus the trial was conducted in disregard of every principle of fairness and in disregard of that which was declared by the lav/ of the State a requisite of a fair trial. This court held the resulting convictions were without due process of law. It said that, in the light of all the facts, the failure of the trial court to afford the defendants reasonable time and opportunity to secure counsel was a clear denial of due process. The court stated further that “under the circumstances . . . the necessity of counsel was so vital and imperative that the failure of the trial court to make an effective appointment of counsel was likewise a denial of due process,” but added: “Whether this would be so in other criminal prosecutions, or under other circumstances, we need not determine. All that it is necessary now to decide, as we do decide, is that, in a capital case, where the defendant is unable to employ counsel, and is incapable adequately of making his own defense because of ignorance, feeble-mindedness, illiteracy, or the like, it is the duty of the court, whether requested or not, to assign *464counsel for him as a necessary requisite of due process of law, . . .”

Likewise, in Avery v. Alabama, 308 U. S. 444, the state law required the appointment of counsel. The claim which we felt required examination, as in the Powell case, was that the purported compliance with this requirement amounted to mere lip service. Scrutiny of the record disclosed that counsel had been appointed and the defendant had been afforded adequate opportunity to prepare his defense with the aid of counsel. We, therefore, overruled the contention that due process had been denied.

In Smith v. O’Grady, 312 U. S. 329, the petition for habeas corpus alleged a failure to appoint counsel but averred other facts which, if established, would prove that the trial was a mere sham and pretense, offensive to the concept of due process. There also, state law required the appointment of counsel for one on trial for the offense involved.

Those cases, which are the petitioner’s chief reliance, do not rule this. The question we are now to decide is whether due process of law demands that in every criminal case, whatever the circumstances, a State must furnish counsel to an indigent defendant. Is the furnishing of counsel in all cases whatever dictated by natural, inherent, and fundamental principles of fairness? The answer to the question may be found in the common understanding of those who have lived under the Anglo-American system of law. By the Sixth Amendment the people ordained that, in all criminal prosecutions, the accused should “enjoy the right ... to have the assistance of counsel for his defence.” We have construed the provision to require appointment of counsel in all cases where a defendant is unable to procure the services of an attorney, and where the right has not been intentionally and *465competently waived.14 Though, as we have noted, the Amendment lays down no rule for the conduct of the States, the question recurs whether the constraint laid by the Amendment upon the national courts expresses a rule so fundamental and essential to a fair trial, and so, to due process of law, that it is made obligatory upon the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. Relevant data on the subject are afforded by constitutional and statutory provisions subsisting in the colonies and the States prior to the inclusion of the Bill of Rights in the national Constitution, and in the constitutional, legislative, and judicial history of the States to the present date. These constitute the most authoritative sources for ascertaining the considered judgment of the citizens of the States upon the question.

The Constitutions of the thirteen original States, as they were at the time of federal union, exhibit great diversity in respect of the right to have counsel in criminal cases. Rhode Island had no constitutional provision on the subject until 1843, North Carolina and South Carolina had none until 1868. Virginia has never had any. Maryland, in 1776, and New York, in 1777, adopted provisions to the effect that a defendant accused of crime should be “allowed” counsel. A constitutional mandate that the accused should have a right to be heard by himself and by his counsel was adopted by Pennsylvania in 1776, New Hampshire in 1774, by Delaware in 1782, and by Connecticut in 1818. In 1780 Massachusetts ordained that the defendant should have the right to be heard by himself or his counsel at his election. In 1798 Georgia provided that the accused might be heard by himself or counsel, or both. In 1776 New Jersey guaranteed the accused the same privileges of witnesses and counsel as their prosecutors “are or shall be entitled to.”

*466The substance of these provisions of colonial and early-state constitutions is explained by the contemporary common law. Originally, in England, a prisoner was not permitted to be heard by counsel upon the general issue of not guilty on any indictment for treason or felony.15 The practice of English judges, however, was to permit counsel to advise with a defendant as to the conduct of his case and to represent him in collateral matters and as respects questions of law arising upon the trial.16 In 1695 the rule was relaxed by statute17 to the extent of permitting one accused of treason the privilege of being heard by counsel. The rule forbidding the participation of counsel stood, however, as to indictments for felony, until 1836, when a statute accorded the right to defend by counsel against summary convictions and charges of felony.18 In misdemeanor cases and, after 1695, in prosecutions for treason, the rule was that the defense must be conducted either by the defendant in person or by counsel, but that both might not participate in the trial.19

In the light of this common law practice, it is evident that the constitutional provisions to the effect that a defendant should be “allowed” counsel or should have a right “to be heard by himself and his counsel,” or that he might be heard by “either or both,” at his election, were intended to do away with the rules which denied representation, in whole or in part, by counsel in criminal prosecutions, but were not aimed to compel the State to provide counsel for a defendant. At the least, such a construction by State courts and legislators can not be said to lack reasonable basis.

*467The statutes in force in the thirteen original States at the time of the adoption of the Bill of Rights are also illuminating. It is of interest that the matter of appointment of counsel for defendants, if dealt with at all, was dealt with by statute rather than by constitutional provision. The contemporary legislation exhibits great diversity of policy.20

The constitutions of all the States, presently in force, save that of Virginia, contain provisions with respect to the assistance of counsel in criminal trials. Those of nine *468States21 may be said to embody a guarantee textually the same as that of the Sixth Amendment, or of like import. In the fundamental law of most States, however, the language used indicates only that a defendant is not to be denied the privilege of representation by counsel of his choice.22

In three States, the guarantee, whether or not in the exact phraseology of the Sixth Amendment, has been held to require appointment in all cases where the defendant *469is unable to procure counsel.23 In six, the provisions (one of which is like the Sixth Amendment) have been held not to require the appointment of counsel for indigent defendants.24 In eight, provisions, one of which is the same as that of the Sixth Amendment, have evidently not been viewed as requiring such appointment, since the courts have enforced statutes making appointment discretionary, or obligatory only in prosecutions for capital offenses or felonies.25

In twelve States, it seems to be understood that the constitutional provision does not require appointment of *470counsel, since statutes of greater or less antiquity call for such appointment only in capital cases or cases of felony or other grave crime,26 or refer the matter to the discretion of the court.27 In eighteen States the statutes now require the court to appoint in all cases where defendants are unable to procure counsel.28 But this has not always been *471the statutory requirement in some of those States.29 And it seems to have been assumed by many legislatures that the matter was one for regulation from time to time as deemed necessary, since laws requiring appointment in all cases have been modified to require it only in the case of certain offenses.30

This material demonstrates that, in the great majority of the States, it has been the considered judgment of the people, their representatives and their courts that appointment of counsel is not a fundamental right, essential to a fair trial. On the contrary, the matter has generally been deemed one of legislative policy. In the light of this evidence, we are unable to say that the concept of due process incorporated in the Fourteenth Amendment obligates the States, whatever may be their own views, to furnish counsel in every such case. Every court has power, if it deems *472proper, to appoint counsel where that course seems to be required in the interest of fairness.

The practice of the courts of Maryland gives point to the principle that the States should not be straight-jacketed in this respect, by a construction of the Fourteenth Amendment. Judge Bond’s opinion states, and counsel at the bar confirmed the fact, that in Maryland the usual practice is for the defendant to waive a trial by jury. This the petitioner did in the present case. Such trials, as Judge Bond remarks, are much more informal than jury trials and it is obvious that the judge can much better control the course of the trial and is in a better position to see impartial justice done than when the formalities of a jury trial are involved.31

In this case there was no question of the commission of a robbery. The State’s case consisted of evidence identifying the petitioner as the perpetrator. The defense was an alibi. Petitioner called and examined witnesses to prove that he was at another place at the time of the commission of the offense. The simple issue was the veracity of the testimony for the State and that for the defendant. As Judge Bond says, the accused was not helpless, but was a man forty-three years old, of ordinary intelligence, and ability to take care of his own interests on the trial of that narrow issue. He had once before been in a criminal court, pleaded guilty to larceny and served a sentence and was not wholly unfamiliar with criminal procedure. It is quite clear that in Maryland, if the situation had been otherwise and it had appeared that the petitioner was, for any reason, at a serious disadvantage by reason of the lack *473of counsel, a refusal to appoint would have resulted in the reversal of a judgment of conviction. Only recently the Court of Appeals has reversed a conviction because it was convinced on the whole record that an accused, tried without counsel, had been handicapped by the lack of representation.32

To deduce from the due process clause a rule binding upon the States in this matter would be to impose upon them, as Judge Bond points out, a requirement without distinction between criminal charges of different magnitude or in respect of courts of varying jurisdiction. As he says: “Charges of small crimes tried before justices of the, peace and capital charges tried in the higher courts would equally require the appointment of counsel. Presumably it would be argued that trials in the Traffic Court would require it.” And, indeed, it was said by petitioner’s counsel both below and in this court, that as the Fourteenth Amendment extends the protection of due process to property as well as to life and liberty, if we hold with the petitioner, logic would require the furnishing of counsel in civil cases involving property.

As we have said, the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the conviction and incarceration of one whose trial is offensive to the common and fundamental ideas of fairness and right, and while want of counsel in a particular case may result in a conviction lacking in such fundamental fairness, we cannot say that the Amendment embodies an inexorable command that no trial for any offense, or in any court, can be fairly conducted and justice accorded a defendant who is not represented by counsel.

The judgment is

Affirmed,

[Over]

*474Mr. Justice Black, dissenting, with whom Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Murphy concur.

To hold that the petitioner had a constitutional right to counsel in this case does not require us to say that “no trial for any offense, or in any court, can be fairly conducted and justice accorded a defendant who is not represented by counsel.” This case can be determined by a resolution of a narrower question: whether in view of the nature of the offense and the circumstances of his trial and conviction, this petitioner was denied the procedural protection which is his right under the Federal Constitution. I think he was.

The petitioner, a farm hand, out of a job and on relief, was indicted in a Maryland state court on a charge of robbery. He was too poor to hire a lawyer. He so informed the court and requested that counsel be appointed to defend him. His request was denied. Put to trial without a lawyer, he conducted his own defense, was found guilty, and was sentenced to eight years’ imprisonment. The court below found that the petitioner had “at least an ordinary amount of intelligence.” It is clear from his examination of witnesses that he was a man of little education.

If this case had come to us from a federal court, it is clear we should have to reverse it, because the Sixth Amendment makes the right to counsel in criminal cases inviolable by the Federal Government. I believe that the Fourteenth Amendment made the Sixth applicable to the states.1 But this view, although often urged in dissents, has never been accepted by a majority of this Court *475and is not accepted today. A statement of the grounds supporting it is, therefore, unnecessary at this time. I believe, however, that, under the prevailing view of due process, as reflected in the opinion just announced, a view which gives this Court such vast supervisory powers that-I am not prepared to accept it without grave doubts, the judgment below should be reversed.

This Court has ju^t declared that due process of law is denied if a trial is conducted in such manner that it is “shocking to the universal sense of justice” or “offensive to the common and fundamental ideas of fairness and right.” On another occasion, this Court has recognized that whatever is “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty” and “essential to the substance of a hearing” is within the procedural protection afforded by the constitutional guaranty of due process. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319, 325, 327.

The right to counsel in a criminal proceeding is “fundamental.” Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45, 70; Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U. S. 233, 243-244. It is guarded from invasion by the Sixth Amendment, adopted to raise an effective barrier against arbitrary or unjust deprivation of liberty by the Federal Government. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458, 462.

An historical evaluation of the right to a full hearing in criminal cases, and the dangers of denying it, were set out in the Powell case, where this Court said: “What . . . does a hearing include? Historically and in practice, in our own country at least, it has always included the right to the aid of counsel when desired and provided by the person asserting the right . . . Even the in*476telligent and educated layman . , . lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he have a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel in every step in the proceedings against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he does not know how to establish his innocence." Powell v. Alabama, supra, 68-69. Cf. Johnson v. Zerbst, supra, 462-463.

A practice cannot be reconciled with “common and fundamental ideas of fairness and right,” which subjects innocent men to increased dangers of conviction merely because of their poverty. Whether a man is innocent cannot be determined from a trial in which, as here, denial of counsel has made it impossible to conclude, with any satisfactory degree of certainty, that the defendant’s case was adequately presented. No one questions that due process requires a hearing before conviction and sentence for the serious crime of robbery. As the Supreme Court of Wisconsin said, in 1859, “ . . . would it not be a little like mockery to secure to a pauper these solemn constitutional guaranties for a fair and full trial of the matters with which he was charged, and yet say to him when on trial, that he must employ his own counsel, who could alone render these guaranties of any real permanent value to him. . . . Why this great solicitude to secure him a fair trial if he cannot have the benefit of counsel?” Carpenter v. Dane County, 9 Wis. 274, 276-277.

Denial to the poor of the request for counsel in proceedings based on charges of serious crime has long been regarded as shocking to the “universal sense of justice” throughout this country. In 1854, for example, the Supreme Court of Indiana said: “It is not to be thought of, in a civilized community, for a moment, that any citizen put in jeopardy of life or liberty, should be debarred of counsel because he was too poor to employ such aid. No Court could be respected, or respect itself, to sit and hear *477such a trial. The defence of the poor, in such cases, is a duty resting somewhere, which will be at once conceded as essential to the accused, to the Court, and to the public.” Webb v. Baird, 6 Ind. 13,18. And most of the other States have shown their agreement by constitutional provisions, statutes, or established practice judicially approved, which assure that no man shall be deprived of counsel merely because of his poverty.2 Any other practice seems to me to defeat the promise of our democratic society to provide equal justice under the law.

Appendix

I. States which require that indigent defendants in non-capital as well as capital criminal cases be provided with counsel on request:

A. By Statute. Arizona: Revised Statutes of Arizona Territory, 1901, Penal Code, Pt. II, Title VII, § 858; Arizona Code Ann. 1939, Vol. Ill, § 44-904. Arkansas: Compiled Laws, Arkansas Territory, 1835, Crimes and Misdemeanors, § 37; Pope’s Digest, 1937, Vol. I, c. 43, § 3877. California: California Penal Code of 1872, § 987; Deering’s Penal Code, 1937, § 987. Idaho: Territorial Criminal Practice Act, 1864, § 267; Idaho Code, 1932, §§ 19-1412, 19-1413. Illinois: Rev. Stat. 1874, Criminal Code, § 422; Jones’s 111. Stat. Ann. 1936, § 37.707. *478Cf. Laws, 1933, 430-431. See also, Vise v. County of Hamilton, 19 Ill. 78, 79 (1857). Iowa: Territorial Laws, 1839, Courts, § 64; Iowa Code, 1939, § 13773. Kansas: See Compilation published in 1856 as S. Doc. No. 23, 34th Cong., 1st Sess., 520 (c. 129, Art. V, §4). Laws, 1941, c. 291. Louisiana: Act of May 4, 1805, of the Territory of Orleans, § 35; Dart’s Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure, 1932, Title XIII, Art. 143. Minnesota: Minnesota General Laws, 1869, c. LXXII, § 1; Mason’s Minnesota Statutes, 1927, §§ 9957, 10667. Missouri: Digest of Laws of Missouri Territory, 1818, Crimes and Misdemeanours, § 35; Rev. Stat. 1939, § 4003. Montana: Montana Territory Criminal Practice Act of 1872, § 196 (Laws of Montana, Codified Stat. 1871-1872,220); Revised Code, 1935, § 11886. Nebraska: General Statutes, 1873, c. 58, § 437; Compiled Stat. 1929, § 29-1803. Nevada: Act of November 26, 1861 (Compiled Laws, 1861-1873, Vol. I, 477, 493); Compiled Laws, 1929, Vol. 5, § 10883. New Hampshire: Laws, 1907, c. 136; Laws, 1937, c. 22. New Jersey: Act of March 6, 1795, §2; New Jersey Stat. § 2.190-3. New York: Code of Criminal Procedure, § 308 (enacted in 1881, still in force). See People v. Supervisors of Albany County, 28 How. Pr. 22, 24 (1864). North Dakota: Dakota Territory Code of Procedure, 1863, § 249 (Rev. Codes, 1877, Criminal Procedure, 875); Compiled Laws, 1913, Vol. II, §§ 8965, 10721. Ohio: Act of February 26, 1816, § 14 (Chase, Statutes of Ohio, 1788-1833, Vol. II, 982); Throckmorton’s Ohio Code Ann. 1940, Vol. II, § 13439-2. Oklahoma: Oklahoma Territorial Stat. 1890, c. 70, § 10; Stat. Ann. 1941 Supp., Title 22, § 464. Oregon: Act of October 19, 1864 (General Laws, 1845-1864, c. 37, § 381; Laws 1937, c. 406 (Compiled Laws Ann., Vol. Ill, § 26-804). South Dakota: Dakota Territory Code of Procedure, 1863, § 249 (Rev. Codes, 1877, Criminal Procedure 875); Code of 1939, Vol. II, § 34.1901. Tennessee: Code of 1857-1858, §§ 5205, 5206; Code of 1938, *479§§ 11733, 11734. Utah: Laws of Territory of Utah, 1878, Criminal Procedure, § 181; Rev. Stat. 1933, § 105-22-12. Washington: Statutes of Territory of Washington, 1854, Criminal Practice Act, § 89; Remington’s Revised Statutes, 1932, Yol. IV, §§ 2095, 2305. Wyoming: Laws of Wyoming Territory, 1869, Criminal Procedure, § 98; Rev. Stat. 1931, § 33-501.

B. By judicial decision or established practice judicially approved. Connecticut: For an account of early practice in Connecticut, see Zephaniah Swift “A System of the Laws of the State of Connecticut,” Vol. II, 392: “The chief justice then, before the prisoner is called upon to plead, asks the prisoner if he desires counsel, which if requested, is always granted, as a matter of course. On his naming counsel, the court will appoint or assign them. If from any cause, the prisoner decline to request or name counsel, and a trial is had, especially in the case of minors, the court will assign proper counsel. When counsel are assigned, the court will enquire of them, whether they have advised with the prisoner, so that he is ready to plead, and if not, will allow them proper time for that purpose. But it is usually the case that the prisoner has previously employed and consulted counsel, and of course is prepared to plead.” See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45, footnote, 63-64. See also, Connecticut General Statutes, Revision of 1930, §§ 2267, 6476. Florida: Cutts v. State, 54 Fla, 21, 23, 45 So. 491 (1907). See Compiled General Laws, 1927, § 8375 (capital crimes). Indiana: Webb v. Baird, 6 Ind. 13, 18 (1854). See also Knox County Council v. State ex rel. McCormick, 217 Ind. 493, 497-498, 29 N. E. 2d 405 (1940); State v. Hilgemann, 218 Ind. 572, 34 N. E. 2d 129, 131 (1941). Michigan: People v. Crandell, 270 Mich. 124, 127, 258 N. W. 224 (1935). Pennsylvania: Commonwealth v. Richards, 111 Pa. Super. 124, 169 A. 464 (1933). See Commonwealth ex rel. McGlinn v. Smith, 344 Pa. 41, 49, 59, 24 A. 2d 1. Virginia: Watkins v. Commonwealth, 174 Va. 518, 521-525, 6 S. E. 2d 670 (1940). *480West Virginia: State v. Kellison, 56 W. Va. 690, 692-693, 47 S. E. 166 (1904). Wisconsin: Carpenter v. Dane County, 9 Wis. 274 (1859). See Stat. 1941, § 357.26.

C. By constitutional provision. Georgia: Constitution of 1865, Art. 1, Par. 8. See Martin v. Georgia, 51 Ga. 567, 568 (1874). Kentucky: Kentucky Constitution, § 11. See Fugate v. Commonwealth, 254 Ky. 663, 665, 72 S. W. 2d 47 (1934).

II. States which are without constitutional provision, statutes, or judicial decisions clearly establishing this requirement:

Colorado: General Laws, 1877, §§ 913-916; Colorado Stat. Ann. 1935, Vol. 2, c. 48, §§ 502, 505, as amended by Laws of 1937, 498, § 1. See Abshier v. People, 87 Colo. 507, 517, 289 P. 1081. Delaware: See 6 Laws of Delaware 741; 7 id. 410; Rev. Code, 1935, §§ 4306, 4310. Maine: See Rev. Stat. 1857, 713; Rev. Stat. 1930, c. 146, §14. Massachusetts: See McDonalds. Commonwealth, 173 Mass. 322, 327, 53 N. E. 874 (1899). New Mexico. North Carolina. Rhode Island: See State v. Hudson, 55 R. I. 141, 179 A. 130 (1935); General Laws, 1938, c. 625, § 62. South Carolina: See State v. Jones, 172 S. C. 129, 130, 173 S. E. 77 (1934); Code, 1932, Vol. I, § 980. Vermont.

III. States in which dicta of judicial opinions are in harmony with the decision by the court below in this case:

Alabama: Gilchrist v. State, 234 Ala. 73, 74, 173 So. 651. Mississippi: Reed v. State, 143 Miss. 686, 689, 109 So. 715.

IV. States in which the requirement of counsel for indigent defendants in non-capital cases has been affirmatively rejected:

Maryland: See, however, Coates v. State, 180 Md. 502, 25 A. 2d 676. Texas: Gilley v. State, 114 Tex. Cr. 548, 26 S. W. 2d 1070. But cf. Brady v. State, 122 Tex. Cr. 275, 278, 54 S. W. 2d 513.

Mr. Justice Rehnquist

delivered the opinion of the Court.

We granted certiorari in this case to resolve a conflict among state and lower federal courts regarding the proper application of our decision in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U. S. 25 (1972).1 436 U. S. 925. Petitioner Scott was convicted of theft and fined $50 after a bench trial in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Ill. His conviction was affirmed by the state intermediate appellate court and then by the Supreme Court of Illinois, over Scott's contention that the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution required that Illinois provide trial counsel to him at its expense.

Petitioner Scott was convicted of shoplifting merchandise valued at less than $150. The applicable Illinois statute set the maximum penalty for such an offense at a $500 fine or one year in jail, or both.2 The petitioner argues that a line of this Court’s cases culminating in Argersinger v. Hamlin, supra, requires state provision of counsel whenever imprisonment is an authorized penalty.

*369The Supreme Court of Illinois rejected this contention, quoting the following language from Argersinger:

“We hold, therefore, that absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was represented by counsel at his trial.” 407 U. S., at 37.

“Under the rule we announce today, every judge will know when the trial of a misdemeanor starts that no imprisonment may be imposed, even though local law permits it, unless the accused is represented by counsel. He will have a measure of the seriousness and gravity of the offense and therefore know when to name a lawyer to represent the accused before the trial starts.” Id., at 40.

The Supreme Court of Illinois went on to state that it was “not inclined to extend Argersinger” to the case where a defendant is charged with a statutory offense for which imprisonment upon conviction is authorized but not actually imposed upon the defendant. 68 Ill. 2d 260, 272, 360 N. E. 2d 881, 882 (1077). We agree with the Supreme Court of Illinois that the Federal Constitution does not require a state trial court to appoint counsel for a criminal defendant such as petitioner, and we therefore affirm its judgment.

In his petition for certiorari, petitioner referred to the issue in this case as “the question left open in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U. S. 25 (1072).” Pet. for Cert. 5. Whether this question was indeed “left open” in Argersinger depends upon whether one considers that opinion to be a point in a moving line or a holding that the States are required to go only so far in furnishing counsel to indigent defendants. The Supreme Court of Illinois, in quoting the above language from Argersinger, clearly viewed the latter as Argersinger’s holding. *370Additional support for this proposition may be derived from the concluding paragraph of the opinion in that case:

“The run of misdemeanors will not be affected by today’s ruling. But in those that end up in the actual deprivation of a person’s liberty, the accused will receive the benefit of ‘the guiding hand of counsel’ so necessary where one’s liberty is in jeopardy.” 407 U. S., at 40.

Petitioner, on the other hand, refers to language in the Court’s opinion, responding to the opinion of Mr. Justice Powell, which states that the Court “need not consider the requirements of the Sixth Amendment as regards the right to counsel where loss of liberty is not involved . . . for here petitioner was in fact sentenced to jail.” Id., at 37.

There is considerable doubt that the Sixth Amendment itself, as originally drafted by the Framers of the Bill of Rights, contemplated any guarantee other than the right of an accused in a criminal prosecution in a federal court to employ a lawyer to assist in his defense. W. Beaney, The Right to Counsel in American Courts 27-30 (1955). In Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45 (1932), the Court held that Alabama was obligated to appoint counsel for the Scottsboro defendants, phrasing the inquiry as “whether the defendants were in substance denied the right of counsel, and if so, whether such denial infringes the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id., at 52. It concluded its opinion with the following language:

“The United States by statute and every state in the Union by express provision of law, or by the determination of its courts, make it the duty of the trial judge, where the accused is unable to employ counsel, to appoint counsel for him. In most states the rule applies broadly to all criminal prosecutions, in others it is limited to the more serious crimes, and in a very limited number, to capital cases. A rule adopted with such unanimous *371accord reflects, if it does not establish, the inherent right to have counsel appointed, at least in cases like the present, and lends convincing support to the conclusion we have reached as to the fundamental nature of that right." Id., at 73.

Betts v. Brady, 316 U. S. 455 (1942), held that not every indigent defendant accused in a state criminal prosecution was entitled to appointment of counsel. A determination had to be made in each individual case whether failure to appoint counsel was a denial of fundamental fairness. Betts was in turn overruled in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335 (1963). In Gideon, Betts was described as holding “that a refusal to appoint counsel for an indigent defendant charged with a felony did not necessarily violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . .” 372 U. S., at 339.

Several Terms later the Court held in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145 (1968), that the right to jury trial in federal court guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment was applicable to the States by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court held, however: “It is doubtless true that there is a category of petty crimes or offenses which is not subject to the Sixth Amendment jury trial provision and should not be subject to the Fourteenth Amendment jury trial requirement here applied to the States. Crimes carrying possible penalties up to six months do not require a jury trial if they otherwise qualify as petty offenses . . . .” Id., at 159 (footnote omitted). In Baldwin v. New York, 399 U. S. 66, 69 (1970), the controlling opinion of Mr. Justice White concluded that “no offense can be deemed 'petty’ for purposes of the right to trial by jury where imprisonment for more than six months is authorized.”

In Argersinger the State of Florida urged that a similar dichotomy be employed in the right-to-counsel area: Any offense punishable by less than six months in jail should not *372require appointment of counsel for an indigent defendant.3 The Argersinger Court rejected this analogy, however, observing that “the right to trial by jury has a different genealogy and is brigaded with a system of trial to a judge alone.” 407 U. S., at 29.

The number of separate opinions in Gideon, Duncan, Baldwin, and Argersinger, suggests that constitutional line drawing becomes more difficult as the reach of the Constitution is extended further, and as efforts are made to transpose lines from one area of Sixth Amendment jurisprudence to another. The process of incorporation creates special difficulties, for the state and federal contexts are often different and application of the same principle may have ramifications distinct in degree and kind. The range of human conduct regulated by state criminal laws is much broader than that of the federal criminal laws, particularly on the “petty” offense part of the spectrum. As a matter of constitutional adjudication, we are, therefore, less willing to extrapolate an already extended line when, although the general nature of the principle sought to be applied is clear, its precise limits and their ramifications become less so. We have now in our decided cases departed from the literal meaning of the Sixth Amendment. And we cannot fall back on the common law as it existed prior to the enactment of that Amendment, since it perversely gave less in the way of right to counsel to accused felons than to those accused of misdemeanors. See Powell v. Alabama, supra, at 60.

In Argersinger the Court rejected arguments that social cost or a lack of available lawyers militated against its holding, in some part because it thought these arguments were factually incorrect. 407 U. S., at 37 n. 7. But they were rejected in much larger part because of the Court’s conclusion that incarceration was so severe a sanction that it should not be imposed as a result of a criminal trial unless an indigent *373defendant had been offered appointed counsel to assist in his defense, regardless of the cost to the States implicit in such a rule. The Court in its opinion repeatedly referred to trials “where an accused is deprived of his liberty,” id., at 32, and to “a case that actually leads to imprisonment even for a brief period,” id., at 33. The Chief Justice in his opinion concurring in the result also observed that “any deprivation of liberty is a serious matter.” Id., at 41.

Although the intentions of the Argersinger Court are not unmistakably clear from its opinion, we conclude today that Argersinger did indeed delimit the constitutional right to appointed counsel in state criminal proceedings.4 Even were the matter res nova, we believe that the central premise of Argersinger — that actual imprisonment is a penalty different in kind from fines or the mere threat of imprisonment— is eminently sound and warrants adoption of actual imprisonment as the line defining the constitutional right to appointment of counsel. Argersinger has proved reasonably workable, whereas any extension would create confusion and impose unpredictable, but necessarily substantial, costs on 50 quite diverse States.5 We therefore hold that the Sixth *374and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution require only that no indigent criminal defendant be sentenced to a term of imprisonment unless the State has afforded him the right to assistance of appointed counsel in his defense. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Illinois is accordingly

Affirmed.

Mr. Justice Powell,

concurring.

For the reasons stated in my opinion in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U. S. 25, 44 (1972), I do not think the rule adopted by the Court in that case is required by the Constitution. Moreover, the drawing of a line based on whether there is imprisonment (even for overnight) can have the practical effect of precluding provision of counsel in other types of cases in which conviction can have more serious consequences. The Argersinger rule also tends to impair the proper functioning of the criminal justice system in that trial judges, in advance of hearing any evidence and before knowing anything about the case except the charge, all too often will be compelled to forgo the legislatively granted option to impose a sentence of imprisonment upon conviction. Preserving this option by providing counsel often will be impossible or impracticable — particularly in congested urban courts where scores of cases are heard in a single sitting, and in small and rural communities where lawyers may not be available.

Despite my continuing reservations about the Argersinger rule, it was approved by the Court in the 1972 opinion and four Justices have reaffirmed it today. It is important that this Court provide clear guidance to the hundreds of courts across the country that confront this problem daily. Accordingly, and mindful of stare decisis, I join the opinion of the *375Court. I do so, however, with the hope that in due time a majority will recognize that a more flexible rule is consistent with due process and will better serve the cause of justice.

Mr. Justice Brennan,

with whom Mr. Justice Marshall and Mr. Justice Stevens join, dissenting.

The Sixth Amendment provides: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.” (Emphasis supplied.) Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335 (1963), extended the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment and held that the right includes the right of the indigent to have counsel provided. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U. S. 25 (1972), held that the right recognized in Gideon extends to the trial of any offense for which a convicted defendant is likely to be incarcerated.

This case presents the question whether the right to counsel extends to a person accused of an offense that, although punishable by incarceration, is actually punished only by a fine. Petitioner Aubrey Scott was charged with theft in violation of Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 38, § 16-1 (1969), an offense punishable by imprisonment for up to one year or by a fine of up to $500, or by both. About four months before Argersinger was decided, Scott had a bench trial, without counsel, and without notice of entitlement to retain counsel or, if indigent,1 to have counsel provided. He was found guilty as charged and sentenced to pay a $50 fine.

The Court, in an opinion that at best ignores the basic principles of prior decisions, affirms Scott’s conviction without *376counsel because he was sentenced only to pay a fine. In my view, the plain wording of the Sixth Amendment and the Court’s precedents compel the conclusion that Scott’s uncounseled conviction violated the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments and should be reversed.

I

The Court’s opinion intimates that the Court’s precedents ordaining the right to appointed counsel for indigent accuseds in state criminal proceedings fail to provide a principled basis for deciding this case. That is demonstrably not so. The principles developed in the relevant precedents are clear and sound. The Court simply chooses to ignore them.

Gideon v. Wainwright held that, because representation by counsel in a criminal proceeding is “fundamental and essential to a fair trial,” 372 U. S., at 342, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel was applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment:

“[R]eason and reflection require us to recognize that in our adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him. This seems to us to be an obvious truth. Governments, both state and federal, quite properly spend vast sums of money to establish machinery to try defendants accused of crime. Lawyers to prosecute are everywhere deemed essential to protect the public’s interest in an orderly society. Similarly, there are few defendants charged with crime, few indeed, who fail to hire the best lawyers they can get to prepare and present their defenses. That government hires lawyers to prosecute and defendants who have the money hire lawyers to defend are the strongest indications of the widespread belief that lawyers in criminal courts are necessities, not luxuries. The right of one charged with crime to counsel may not be deemed *377fundamental and essential to fair trials in some countries, but it is in ours. From the very beginning, our state and national constitutions and laws have laid great emphasis on procedural and substantive safeguards designed to assure fair trials before impartial tribunals in which every defendant stands equal before the law. This noble ideal cannot be realized if the poor man charged with crime has to face his accusers without a lawyer to assist him.” Id., at 344.

Earlier precedents had recognized that the assistance of appointed counsel was critical, not only to equalize the sides in an adversary criminal process,2 but also to give substance to other constitutional and procedural protections afforded criminal defendants.3 Gideon established the right to appointed counsel for indigent accuseds as a categorical *378requirement, making the Court’s former case-by-case due process analysis, cf. Betts v. Brady, 316 U. S. 455 (1942), unnecessary in cases covered by its holding. Gideon involved a felony prosecution, but that fact was not crucial to the decision ; its reasoning extended, in the words of the Sixth Amendment, to “all criminal prosecutions.” 4

Argersinger v. Hamlin took a cautious approach toward implementing the logical consequences of Gideon’s rationale. The petitioner in Argersinger had been sentenced to jail for 90 days after conviction — at a trial without counsel — of carrying a concealed weapon, a Florida offense carrying an authorized penalty of imprisonment for up to six months and a fine of up to $1,000. The State, relying on Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145 (1968), and Baldwin v. New York, 399 U. S. 66 (1970), urged that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, like the right to jury trial, should not apply to accuseds charged with “petty” offenses punishable by less than six months’ imprisonment. But Argersinger refused to extend the “petty” offense limitation to the right to counsel. The Court pointed out that the limitation was contrary to the express words of the Sixth Amendment, which guarantee its enumerated rights “[i]n all criminal prosecutions”; that the right to jury trial was the only Sixth Amendment right applicable to the States that had been held inapplicable to “petty offenses”;5 that this *379limitation had been based on historical considerations peculiar to the right to jury trial; 6 and that the right to counsel was more fundamentally related to the fairness of criminal prosecutions than the right to jury trial and was in fact essential to the meaningful exercise of other Sixth Amendment protections.7

Although its analysis, like that in Gideon and other earlier cases, suggested that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel should apply to all state criminal prosecutions, Argersinger held only that an indigent defendant is entitled to appointed counsel, even in petty offenses punishable by six months of incarceration or less, if he is likely to be sentenced to incarceration for any time if convicted. The question of the right to counsel in cases in which incarceration was authorized but would not be imposed was expressly reserved.8

II

In my view petitioner could prevail in this case without extending the right to counsel beyond what was assumed to exist in Argersinger. Neither party in that case questioned *380the existence of the right to counsel in trials involving “non-petty” offenses punishable by more than six months in jail.9 The question the Court addressed was whether the right applied to some “petty” offenses to which the right to jury trial did not extend. The Court's reasoning in applying the right to counsel in the case before it — that the right to counsel is more fundamental to a fair proceeding than the right to jury trial and that the historical limitations on the jury trial right are irrelevant to the right to counsel — certainly cannot support a standard for the right to counsel that is more restrictive than the standard for granting a right to jury trial. As my Brother Powell commented in his opinion concurring in the result in Argersinger, 407 U. S., at 45-46: “It is clear that wherever the right-to-counsel line is to be drawn, it must be drawn so that an indigent has a right to appointed counsel in all cases in which there is a due process right to a jury trial.” Argersinger thus established a “two dimensional” test for the right to counsel: the right attaches to any “nonpetty” offense punishable by more than six months in jail and in addition to any offense where actual incarceration is likely regardless of the maximum authorized penalty. See Duke, The Right to Appointed Counsel: Argersinger and Beyond, 12 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 601 (1975).

The offense of “theft” with which Scott was charged is certainly not a “petty” one. It is punishable by a sentence of up to one year in jail. Unlike many traffic or other “regulatory” offenses, it carries the moral stigma associated with common-law crimes traditionally recognized as indicative of moral depravity.10 The State indicated at oral argument that the *381services of a professional prosecutor were considered essential to the prosecution of this offense. Tr. of Oral Arg. 39; cf. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U. S., at 49 (Powell, J., concurring in result). Likewise, nonindigent defendants charged with this offense would be well advised to hire the “best lawyers they can get.” 11 Scott’s right to the assistance of appointed counsel is thus plainly mandated by the logic of the Court’s prior cases, including Argersinger itself.12

Ill

But rather than decide consonant with the assumption in regard to nonpetty offenses that was both implicit and explicit *382in Argersinger, the Court today retreats to the indefensible position that the Argersinger "actual imprisonment” standard is the only test for determining the boundary of the Sixth Amendment right to appointed counsel in state misdemeanor cases, thus necessarily deciding that in many cases (such as this one) a defendant will have no right to appointed counsel even when he has a constitutional right to a jury trial. This is simply an intolerable result. Not only is the “actual imprisonment” standard unprecedented as the exclusive test, but also the problems inherent in its application demonstrate the superiority of an “authorized imprisonment” standard that would require the appointment of counsel for indigents accused of any offense for which imprisonment for any time is authorized.

First, the “authorized imprisonment” standard more faithfully implements the principles of the Sixth Amendment identified in Gideon. The procedural rules established by state statutes are geared to the nature of the potential penalty for an offense, not to the actual penalty imposed in particular cases. The authorized penalty is also a better predictor of the stigma and other collateral consequences that attach to conviction of an offense.13 With the exception of Argersinger, authorized penalties have been used consistently by this Court as the true measures of the seriousness of offenses. See, e. g., Baldwin v. New York, 399 U. S., at 68-70; Frank v. United States, 395 U. S. 147, 149 (1969); United States v. Moreland, 258 U. S. 433 (1922). Imprisonment is a sanction particularly associated with criminal offenses; trials of offenses punishable by imprisonment accordingly possess the characteris*383tics found by Gideon to require the appointment of counsel. By contrast, the “actual imprisonment” standard, as the Court’s opinion in this case demonstrates, denies the right to counsel in criminal prosecutions to accuseds who suffer the severe consequences of prosecution other than imprisonment.

Second, the “authorized imprisonment” test presents no problems of administration. It avoids the necessity for time-consuming consideration of the likely sentence in each individual case before trial and the attendant problems of inaccurate predictions, unequal treatment, and apparent and actual bias. These problems with the “actual imprisonment” standard were suggested in my Brother Powell’s concurrence in Argersinger, 407 U. S., at 52-55, which was echoed in scholarly criticism of that decision.14 Petitioner emphasizes these defects, arguing with considerable force that implementation of the “actual imprisonment” standard must assuredly lead to violations of both the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Constitution. Brief for Petitioner 47-59.

Finally, the “authorized imprisonment” test ensures that courts will not abrogate legislative judgments concerning the appropriate range of penalties to be considered for each offense. Under the “actual imprisonment” standard,

“[t]he judge will ... be forced to decide in advance of trial — and without hearing the evidence — whether he will forgo entirely his judicial discretion to impose some sentence of imprisonment and abandon his responsibility to consider the full range of punishments established by the legislature. His alternatives, assuming the availability *384of counsel, will be to appoint counsel and retain the discretion vested in him by law, or to abandon this discretion in advance and proceed without counsel.” Argersinger v. Hamlin, supra, at 53 (Powell, J., concurring in result).

The “authorized imprisonment” standard, on the other hand, respects the allocation of functions between legislatures and courts in the administration of the criminal justice system.

The apparent reason for the Court’s adoption of the “actual imprisonment” standard for all misdemeanors is concern for the economic burden that an “authorized imprisonment” standard might place on the States. But, with all respect, that concern is both irrelevant and speculative.

This Court’s role in enforcing constitutional guarantees for criminal defendants cannot be made dependent on the budgetary decisions of state governments. A unanimous Court made that clear in Mayer v. Chicago, 404 U. S. 189, 196-197 (1971), in rejecting a proposed fiscal justification for providing free transcripts for appeals only when the appellant was subject to imprisonment:

“This argument misconceives the principle of Griffin [v. Illinois, 351 U. S. 12 (1956)] .... Griffin does not represent a balance between the needs of the accused and the interests of society; its principle is a flat prohibition against pricing indigent defendants out of as effective an appeal as would be available to others able to pay their own way. The invidiousness of the discrimination that exists when criminal procedures are made available only to those who can pay is not erased by any differences in the sentences that may be imposed. The State’s fiscal interest is, therefore, irrelevant.”15

In any event, the extent of the alleged burden on the States is, as the Court admits, ante, at 373-374, n. 5, speculative. Al*385though more persons are charged with misdemeanors punishable by incarceration than are charged with felonies, a smaller percentage of persons charged with misdemeanors qualify as indigent, and misdemeanor cases as a rule require far less attorney time.16

Furthermore, public defender systems have proved economically feasible, and the establishment of such systems to replace appointment of private attorneys can keep costs at acceptable levels even when the number of cases requiring appointment of counsel increases dramatically.17 The public defender system alternative also answers the argument that an “authorized imprisonment” standard would clog the courts with inexperienced appointed counsel.

Perhaps the strongest refutation of respondent’s alarmist prophecies that an “authorized imprisonment” standard would wreak havoc on the States is that the standard has not produced that result in the substantial number of States that already provide counsel in all cases where imprisonment is *386authorized — States that include a large majority of the country’s population and a great diversity of urban and rural environments.18 Moreover, of those States that do not yet *387provide counsel in all cases where any imprisonment is authorized, many provide counsel when periods of imprisonment longer than 30 days,19 3 months,20 or 6 months21 are author*388ized. In fact, Scott would be entitled to appointed counsel under the current laws of at least 33 States.22

It may well be that adoption by this Court of an “authorized imprisonment” standard would lead state and local governments to re-examine their criminal statutes. A state legislature or local government might determine that it no longer desired to authorize incarceration for certain minor offenses in light of the expense of meeting the requirements of the Constitution. In my view this re-examination is long overdue.23 In any *389event, the Court’s “actual imprisonment” standard must inevitably lead the courts to make this re-examination, which plainly should more properly be a legislative responsibility.

IV

The Court’s opinion turns the reasoning of Argersinger on its head. It restricts the right to counsel, perhaps the most fundamental Sixth Amendment right,24 more narrowly than the admittedly less fundamental right to jury trial.25 The abstract pretext that “constitutional line drawing becomes more difficult as the reach of the Constitution is extended further, and as efforts are made to transpose lines from one area of Sixth Amendment jurisprudence to another,” ante, at 372, cannot camouflage the anomalous result the Court reaches. Today’s decision reminds one of Mr. Justice Black’s description of Betts v. Brady: “an anachronism when handed down” that “ma[kes] an abrupt break with its own well-considered precedents.” Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S., at 345, 344.

Mr. Justice Blackmun,

dissenting.

For substantially the reasons stated by Mr. Justice Brennan in Parts I and II of his dissenting opinion, I would hold that the right to counsel secured by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments extends at least as far as the right to jury trial secured by those Amendments. Accordingly, I would hold that an indigent defendant in a state criminal case must be afforded appointed counsel whenever the defendant is prose*390cuted for a nonpetty criminal offense, that is, one punishable by more than six months’ imprisonment, see Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145 (1968); Baldwin v. New York, 399 U. S. 66 (1970), or whenever the defendant is convicted of an offense and is actually subjected to a term of imprisonment, Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U. S. 25 (1972).

This resolution, I feel, would provide the “bright line” that defendants, prosecutors, and trial and appellate courts all deserve and, at the same time, would reconcile on a principled basis the important considerations that led to the decisions in Duncan, Baldwin, and Argersinger.

On this approach, of course, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Illinois upholding petitioner Scott’s conviction should be reversed, since he was convicted of an offense for which he was constitutionally entitled to a jury trial. I, therefore, dissent.

Mr. Justice Black

delivered the opinion of the Court.

About three o’clock on the morning of Thursday, June 5, 1941, Mrs. Zelma Ida Ashcraft got in her automobile at her home in Memphis, Tennessee, and set out on a trip to visit her mother’s home in Kentucky. Late in the afternoon of the same day, her car was observed a few miles out of Memphis, standing on the wrong side of a road which she would likely have taken on her journey. Just off the road, in a slough, her lifeless body was found. On her head were cut places inflicted by blows sufficient to have caused her death. Petitioner Ware, age 20, a Negro, was indicted in a state court and found guilty of her murder. Petitioner Ashcraft, age 45, a white man, husband of the deceased, charged with having hired Ware to commit the murder, was tried jointly with Ware and convicted as an accessory before the fact. Both were sentenced to ninety-nine years in the state peniten*145tiary. The Supreme Court of Tennessee affirmed the convictions.

In applying to us for certiorari, Ware and Ashcraft urged that alleged confessions were' used at their trial which had been extorted from them by state law enforcement officers in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, and that “solely and alone” on the basis of these confessions they had been convicted. Their contentions raised a federal question which the record showed to be substantial and we brought both cases here for review. Upon oral argument before this Court Tennessee’s legal representatives conceded that the convictions could not be sustained without the confessions but defended their use upon the ground that they were not compelled but were “freely and voluntarily made.”

The record discloses that neither the trial court nor the Tennessee Supreme Court actually held as a matter of fact that petitioners’ confessions were “freely and voluntarily made.” The trial court heard evidence on the issue out of the jury’s hearing, but did not itself determine from that evidence that the confessions were voluntary. Instead it overruled Ashcraft’s objection to the use of his alleged confession with the statement that, “This Court is not able to hold, as a matter of law, that reasonable minds might not differ on the question of whether or not that alleged confession was voluntarily obtained.” And it likewise overruled Ware’s objection to use of his alleged confession, stating that “the reasonable minds of twelve men might . . . differ as to . . . whether Ware’s confession was voluntary, and . . . therefore, that is a question of fact for the jury to pass on.”1 Nor did the *146State Supreme Court review the evidence pertaining to the confessions and affirmatively hold them voluntary. In sustaining the petitioners’ convictions, one Justice dissenting, it went no further than to point out that, “The trial judge . . . held ... he could not say that the confessions were not voluntarily made and, therefore, permitted them to go to the jury,” and to declare that it, likewise, was “unable to say that the confessions were not freely and voluntarily made.” 2

If, therefore, the question of the voluntariness of the two confessions was actually decided at all it was by the jury. And the jury was charged generally on the subject of the two confessions as follows:

“I further charge you that if verbal or written statements made by the defendants freely and voluntarily and without fear of punishment or hope of reward, have been proven to you in this case, you may take them into consideration with all of the other facts and circumstances in the case. ... In statements made at the time of the arrest, you may take into consideration the condition of the minds of the prisoners owing to their arrest and *147whether they were influenced by motives of hope or fear, to make the statements. Such a statement is competent evidence against the defendant who makes it and is not competent evidence against the other defendant . . . You cannot consider it for any purpose against the other defendant.”

Concerning Ashcraft’s alleged confession this general charge constituted the sole instruction to the jury.3 But with regard to Ware’s alleged confession the jury further was instructed:

“It is his [Ware’s] further theory that he was induced by the fear of violence at the hands of a mob and by fear of the officers of the law to confess his guilt of the crime charged against him, but that such confession was false and that he had nothing whatsoever to do with, and no knowledge of the alleged crime. If you believe the theory of the defendant, Ware, ... it is your duty to acquit him.”

Having submitted the two alleged confessions to the jury in this manner, the trial court instructed the jury that: “What the proof may show you, if anything, that the defendants have said against themselves, the law presumes to be true, but anything the defendants have said in their own behalf, you are not obliged to believe. . . .”

This treatment of the confessions by the two state courts, the manner of the confessions’ submission to the jury, and the emphasis upon the great weight to be given confessions make all the more important the kind of “independent examination” of petitioners’ claims which, in *148any event, we are bound to make. Lisenba v. California, 314 U. S. 219, 237-238. Our duty to make that examination could not have been “foreclosed by the finding of a court, or the verdict of a jury, or both.” Id. We proceed therefore to consider the evidence relating to the circumstances out of which the alleged confessions came.

First, as to Ashcraft. Ashcraft was born on an Arkansas farm. At the age of eleven he left the farm and became a farm hand working for others. Years later he gravitated into construction work, finally becoming a skilled dragline and steam-shovel operator. Uncontra-dicted evidence in the record was that he had acquired for himself “an excellent reputation.” In 1929 he married the deceased Zelma Ida Ashcraft. Childless, they accumulated, apparently through Ashcraft’s earnings, a very modest amount of jointly held property including bank accounts and an equity in the home in which they lived. The Supreme Court of Tennessee found “nothing to show but what the home life of Ashcraft and the deceased was pleasant and happy.” Several of Mrs. Ash-craft’s friends who were guests at the Ashcraft home on the night before her tragic death testified that both husband and wife appeared to be in a happy frame of mind.

The officers first talked to Ashcraft about 6 P. M. on the day of his wife’s murder as he was returning home from work. Informed by them of the tragedy, he was taken to an undertaking establishment to identify her body which previously had been identified only by a driver’s license. From there he was taken to the county jail where he conferred wjth the officers until about 2 A. M. No clues of ultimate value came from this conference, though it did result in the officers’ holding and interrogating the Ashcrafts’ maid and several of her friends. During the following week the officers made extensive investigations jn Ashcraft’s neighborhood and *149elsewhere and further conferred with Ashcraft himself on several occasions, but none of these activities produced tangible evidence pointing to the identity of the murderer.

Then, early in the evening of Saturday, June 14, the officers came to Ashcraft’s home and “took him into custody.” In the words of the Tennessee Supreme Court,

“They took him to an office or room on the northwest corner of the fifth floor of the Shelby County jail. This office is equipped with all sorts of crime and detective devices such as a fingerprint outfit, cameras, high-powered lights, and such other devices as might be found in a homicide investigating office. ... It appears that the officers placed Ashcraft at a table in this room on the fifth floor of the county jail with a light over his head and began to quiz him. They questioned him in relays until the following Monday morning, June 16, 1941, around nine-thirty or ten o’clock. It appears that Ashcraft from Saturday evening at seven o’clock until Monday morning at approximately nine-thirty never left this homicide room on the fifth floor.” 4

Testimony of the officers shows that the reason they questioned Ashcraft “in relays” was that they became so tired they were compelled to rest. But from 7:00 Saturday evening until 9:30 Monday morning Ashcraft had no rest. One officer did say that he gave the suspect a single five minutes’ respite, but except for this five minutes the procedure consisted of one continuous stream of questions.

As to what happened in the fifth-floor jail room during this thirty-six hour secret examination the testimony *150follows the usual pattern and is in hopeless conflict.5 Ashcraft swears that the first thing said to him when he was taken into custody was, “Why in hell did you kill your wife?”; that during the course of the examination he was threatened and abused in various ways; and that as the hours passed his eyes became blinded by a powerful electric light, his body became weary, and the strain on his nerves became unbearable.6 The officers, on the other hand, swear that throughout the questioning they were kind and considerate. They say that they did not accuse Ashcraft of the murder until four hours after he was brought to the jail building, though they freely admit that from that time on their barrage of questions was constantly directed at him on the assumption that he was *151the murderer. Together with other persons whom they brought in on Monday morning to witness the culmination of the thirty-six hour ordeal the officers declare that at that time Ashcraft was “cool,” “calm,” “collected,” “normal”; that his vision was unimpaired and his eyes not bloodshot; and that he showed no outward signs of being tired or sleepy.

As to whether Ashcraft actually confessed, there is a similar conflict of testimony. Ashcraft maintains that although the officers incessantly attempted by various tactics of intimidation to entrap him into a confession, not once did he admit knowledge concerning or participation in the crime. And he specifically denies the officers’ statements that he accused Ware of the crime, insisting that in response to their questions he merely gave them the name of Ware as one of several men who occasionally had ridden with him to work. The officers’ version of what happened, however, is that about 11 P. M. on Sunday night, after twenty-eight hours’ constant questioning, Ashcraft made a statement that Ware had overpowered him at his home and abducted the deceased, and was probably the killer. About midnight the officers found Ware and took him into custody, and, according to their testimony, Ware made a self-incriminating statement as of early Monday morning, and at 5:40 A. M. signed by mark a written confession in which appeared the statement that Ashcraft had hired him to commit the murder. This alleged confession of Ware was read to Ashcraft about six o’clock Monday morning, whereupon Ashcraft is said substantially to have admitted its truth in a detailed statement taken down by a reporter. About 9:30 Monday morning a transcript of Ashcraft’s purported statement was read to him. The State’s position is that he affirmed its truth but refused to sign the transcript, saying that he first wanted to consult his lawyer. As to *152this latter 9:30 episode the officers’ testimony is reinforced by testimony of the several persons whom they brought in to witness the end of the examination.

In reaching our conclusion as to the validity of Ash-craft’s confession we do not resolve any of the disputed questions of fact relating to the details of what transpired within the confession chamber of the jail or whether Ash-craft actually did confess.7 Such disputes, we may say, are an inescapable consequence of secret inquisitorial practices. And always evidence concerning the inner details of secret inquisitions8 is weighted against an accused, *153particularly where, as here, he is charged with a brutal crime, or where, as in many other cases, his supposed offense bears relation to an unpopular economic, political, or religious cause.

Our conclusion is that if Ashcraft made a confession it was not voluntary but compelled. We reach this conclusion from facts which are not in dispute at all. Ash-craft, a citizen of excellent reputation, was taken into custody by police officers. Ten days’ examination of the Ashcrafts’ maid, and of several others, in jail where they were held, had revealed nothing whatever against Ash-craft. Inquiries among his neighbors and business associates likewise had failed to unearth one single tangible clue pointing to his guilt. For thirty-six hours after Ashcraft’s seizure during which period he was held incommunicado, without sleep or rest, relays of officers, experienced investigators, and highly trained lawyers questioned him without respite. From the beginning of the questioning at 7 o’clock on Saturday evening until 6 o’clock on Monday morning Ashcraft denied that he had anything to do with the murder of his wife. And at a hearing *154before a magistrate about 8:30 Monday morning Ashcraft pleaded not guilty to the charge of murder which the officers had sought to make him confess during the previous thirty-six hours.

We think a situation such as that here shown by un-contradicted evidence is so inherently coercive that its very existence is irreconcilable with the possession of mental freedom by a lone suspect against whom its full coercive force is brought to bear.9 It is inconceivable that any court of justice in the land, conducted as our courts are, open to the public, would permit prosecutors serving in relays to keep a defendant witness under continuous cross-examination for thirty-six hours without rest or sleep in an effort to extract a “voluntary” confession. Nor can we, consistently with Constitutional due process of law, hold voluntary a confession where prosecutors do the same thing away from the restraining influences of a public trial in an open court room.10

*155The Constitution of the United States stands as a bar against the conviction of any individual in an American court by means of a coerced confession.11 There have been, and are now, certain foreign nations with governments dedicated to an opposite policy: governments which convict individuals with testimony obtained by police organizations possessed of an unrestrained power to seize persons suspected of crimes against the state, hold them in secret custody, and wring from them confessions by physical or mental torture. So long as the Constitution remains the basic law of our Republic, America will not have that kind of government.

Second, as to Ware. Ashcraft and Ware were jointly tried, and were convicted on the theory that Ashcraft hired Ware to perform the murder. Ware’s conviction was sustained by the Tennessee Supreme Court on the assumption that Ashcraft’s confession was properly admitted and his conviction valid. Whether it would have been sustained had the court reached the conclusion we have reached as to Ashcraft we cannot know. Doubt as to what the state court would have done under the changed *156circumstances brought about by our reversal of its decision as to Ashcraft is emphasized by the position of the State’s representatives in this Court. They have asked that if we reverse Ashcraft’s conviction we also reverse Ware’s.

In disposing of cases before us it is our responsibility to make such disposition as justice may require. “And in determining what justice does require, the Court is bound to consider any change, either in fact or in law, which has supervened since the judgment was entered.” Patterson v. Alabama, 294 U. S. 600, 607; State Tax Commission v. Van Cott, 306 U. S. 511, 515-516. Application of this guiding principle to the case at hand requires that we send Ware’s case back to the Tennessee Supreme Court. Should that Court in passing on Ware’s conviction in the light of our ruling as to Ashcraft adopt the State Attorney General’s view and reverse the conviction there then would be no occasion for our passing on the federal question here raised by Ware. Under these circumstances we vacate the judgment of the Tennessee Supreme Court affirming Ware’s conviction, and remand his case to that Court for further proceedings.

The judgment affirming Ashcraft’s conviction is reversed and the cause is remanded to the Supreme Court of Tennessee for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Mr. Justice Jackson,

dissenting:

A sovereign State is now before us, summoned on the charge that it has obtained convictions by methods so unfair that a federal court must set aside what the state courts have done. Heretofore the State has had the benefit of a presumption of regularity and legality. A confession made by one in custody heretofore has been *157admissible in evidence unless it was proved and found that it was obtained by pressures so strong that it was in fact involuntarily made, that the individual will of the particular confessor had been overcome by torture, mob violence, fraud, trickery, threats, or promises. Even where there was excess and abuse of power on the part of officers, the State still was entitled to use the confession if upon examination of the whole evidence it was found to negative the view that the accused had “so lost his freedom of action that the statements made were not his but were the result of the deprivation of his free choice to admit, to deny, or to refuse to answer.” Lisenba v. California, 314 U. S. 219, 241.

In determining these issues of fact, respect for the sovereign character of the several States always has constrained this Court to give great weight to findings of fact of state courts. While we have sometimes gone back of state court determinations to make sure whether the guaranties of the Fourteenth Amendment have or have not been violated, in close cases the decisions of state courts have often been sufficient to tip the scales in favor of affirmance. Lisenba v. California, supra, 238, 239; Buchalter v. New York, 319 U. S. 427, 431; cf. Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U. S. 287, 294.

As we read the present decision the Court in effect declines to apply these well-established principles. Instead, it: (1) substitutes for determination on conflicting evidence the question whether this confession was actually produced by coercion, a presumption that it was, on a new doctrine that examination in custody of this duration is “inherently coercive”; (2) it makes that presumption irre-buttable — i. e., a rule of law — because, while it goes back of the state decisions to find certain facts, it refuses to resolve conflicts in evidence to determine whether other of *158the State’s proof is sufficient to overcome such presumption; and, in so doing, (3) it sets aside the findings by the courts of Tennessee that on all the facts this confession did not result from coercion, either giving those findings no weight or regarding them as immaterial.

We must bear in mind that this case does not come here from a lower federal court over whose conduct we may assert a general supervisory power. If it did, we should be at liberty to apply rules as to the admissibility of confessions, based on our own conception of permissible procedure, and in which we may embody restrictions even greater than those imposed upon the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. See Bram v. United States, 168 U. S. 532; Wan v. United States, 266 U. S. 1; McNabb v. United States, 318 U. S. 332, 341; United States v. Mitchell, 322 U. S. 65. But we have no such supervisory power over state courts. We may not lay down rules of evidence for them nor revise their decisions merely because we feel more confidence in our own wisdom and rectitude. We have no power to discipline the police or law-enforcement officers of the State of Tennessee nor to reverse its convictions in retribution for conduct which we may personally disapprove.

The burden of protecting society from most crimes against persons and property falls upon the State. Different States have different crime problems and some freedom to vary procedures according to their own ideas. Here, a State was forced by an unwitnessed and baffling murder to vindicate its law and protect its society. To nullify its conviction in this particular case upon a consideration of all the facts would be a delicate exercise of federal judicial power. But to go beyond this, as the Court does today, and divine in the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment an exclusion of confessions on an irrebuttable presumption that custody and examination are “inherently coercive” if of some unspecified duration within *159thirty-six hours, requires us to make more than a passing expression of our doubts and disagreements.

I.

The claim of a suspect to immunity from questioning creates one of the most vexing problems in criminal law — that branch of the law which does the courts and the legal profession least credit. The consequences upon society of limiting examination of persons out of court cannot fairly be appraised without recognition of the advantage criminals already enjoy in immunity from compulsory examination in court. Of this latter Mr. Justice Cardozo, for an all but unanimous Court, said: “This too might be lost, and justice still be done. Indeed, today as in the past there are students of our penal system who look upon the immunity as a mischief rather than a benefit, and who would limit its scope, or destroy it altogether. No doubt there would remain the need to give protection against torture, physical or mental.” Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319, 325-26.

This Court never yet has held that the Constitution denies a State the right to use a confession just because the confessor was questioned in custody where it did not also find other circumstances that deprived him of a “free choice to admit, to deny, or to refuse to answer.” Lisenba v. California, 314 U. S. 219, 241. The Constitution requires that a conviction rest on a fair trial. Forced confessions are ruled out of a fair trial. They are ruled out because they have been wrung from a prisoner by measures which are offensive to concepts of fundamental fairness. Different courts have used different terms to express the test by which to judge the inadmissibility of a confession, such as “forced,” “coerced,” “involuntary,” “extorted,” “loss of freedom of will.” But always where we have professed to speak with the voice of the due process clause, the test, in whatever words stated, has been *160applied to the particular confessor at the time' of confession.

It is for this reason that American courts hold almost universally and very properly that a confession obtained during or shortly after the confessor has been subjected to brutality, torture, beating, starvation, or physical pain of any kind is prima facie “involuntary.” The effect of threats alone may depend more on individual susceptibility to fear. But men are so constituted that many will risk the postponed consequences of yielding to a demand for a confession in order to be rid of present or imminent physical suffering. Actual or threatened violence have no place in eliciting truth and it is fair to assume that no officer of the law will resort to cruelty if truth is what he is seeking. We need not be too exacting about proof of the effects of such violence on the individual involved, for their effect on the human personality is invariably and seriously demoralizing.

When, however, we consider a confession obtained by questioning, even if persistent and prolonged, we are in a different field. Interrogation per se is not, while violence per se is, an outlaw. Questioning is an indispensable instrumentality of justice. It may be abused, of course, as cross-examination in court may be abused, but the principles by which we may adjudge when it passes constitutional limits are quite different from those that condemn police brutality, and are far more difficult to apply. And they call for a more responsible and cautious exercise of our office. For we may err on the side of hostility to violence without doing injury to legitimate prosecution of crime; we cannot read an undiscriminating hostility to mere interrogation into the Constitution without unduly fettering the States in protecting society from the criminal.

It probably is the normal instinct to deny and conceal any shameful or guilty act. Even a “voluntary confes*161sion” is not likely to be the product of the same motives with which one may volunteer information that does not incriminate or concern him. The term “voluntary” confession does not mean voluntary in the sense of a confession to a priest merely to rid one’s soul of a sense of guilt. “Voluntary confessions” in criminal law are the product of calculations of a different order, and usually proceed from a belief that further denial is useless and perhaps prejudicial. To speak of any confessions of crime made after arrest as being “voluntary” or “uncoerced” is somewhat inaccurate, although traditional.

A confession is wholly and incontestably voluntary only if a guilty person gives himself up to the law and becomes his own accuser. The Court bases its decision on the premise that custody and examination of a prisoner for thirty-six hours is “inherently coercive.” Of course it is. And so is custody and examination for one hour. Arrest itself is inherently coercive, and so js detention. When not justified, infliction of such indignities upon the person is actionable as a tort. Of course such acts put pressure upon the prisoner to answer questions, to answer them truthfully, and to confess if guilty.

But does the Constitution prohibit use of all confessions made after arrest because questioning, while one is deprived of freedom, is “inherently coercive”? The Court does not quite say so, but it is moving far and fast in that direction. The step it now takes is to hold this confession inadmissible because of the time taken in getting it.

The duration and intensity of an examination or Inquisition always have been regarded as one of the relevant and important considerations in estimating its effect on the will of the individual involved. Thirty-six hours is a long stretch of questioning. That the inquiry was prolonged and persistent is a factor that in any calculation *162of its effect on Ashcraft would count heavily against the confession. But some men would withstand for days pressures that would destroy the will of another in hours. Always heretofore the ultimate question has been whether the confessor was in possession of his own will and self-control at the time of confession. For its bearing on this question the Court always has considered the confessor’s strength or weakness, whether he was educated or illiterate, intelligent or moronic, well or ill, Negro or white.

But the Court refuses in this case to be guided by this test. It rejects the finding of the Tennessee courts and says it must make an “independent examination” of the circumstances. Then it says that it will not “resolve any of the disputed questions of fact” relating to the circumstances of the confession. Instead of finding as a fact that Ashcraft’s freedom of will was impaired, it substitutes the doctrine that the situation was “inherently coercive.” It thus reaches on a part of the evidence in the case a conclusion which I shall demonstrate it could not properly reach on all the evidence. And it refuses to resolve the conflicts in the other evidence to determine whether it rebuts the presumption thus reached that the confession is a coerced one.

If the constitutional admissibility of a confession is no longer to be measured by the mental state of the individual confessor but by a general doctrine dependent on the clock, it should be capable of statement in definite terms. If thirty-six hours is more than is permissible, what about 24? or 12? or 6? or 1? All are “inherently coercive.” Of course questions of law like this often turn on matters of degree. But are not the States entitled to know, jf this Court is able to state, what the considerations are which make any particular degree decisive? How else may state courts apply our tests?

*163The importance of defining these new constitutional standards of admissibility of confessions is emphasized by the decision to return the companion case of Ware to the Supreme Court of Tennessee for reconsideration “in the light of our ruling as to Ashcraft.” Except for Ware’s own testimony, all of the evidence is that when he confronted Ashcraft in custody Ware confessed immediately, voluntarily, and almost spontaneously. But he had been arrested, taken from bed into custody, and detained and questioned. Does the doctrine of inherent coerciveness condemn the Ware confession? Should the Tennessee court decide whether Ware, obviously a much weaker character than Ashcraft, was actually coerced into confessing? It already has decided that question and this Court does not hold the fact determined wrongly. Ware’s case is properly in this Court. Why should not this Court decide Ware’s case on the merits and thus test and expound its novel ruling as applied to a different set of circumstances?

No one can regard the rule of exclusion dependent on the state of the individual’s will as an easy one to apply. It leads to controversy, speculation, and variations in application. To eliminate these evils by eliminating all confessions made after interrogation while in custody is a drastic alternative, but it is the logical consequence of today’s ruling, as its application to the facts of Ashcraft’s case will show.

II.

Apart from Ashcraft’s uncorroborated testimony, which the Tennessee courts refused to believe, there is much evidence in this record from persons whom they did believe and were justified in believing. This evidence shows that despite the “inherent coerciveness” of the circumstances of his examination, the confession when made was delib*164erate, free, and voluntary in the sense in -which that term is used in criminal law. This Court could not, in our opinion, hold this confession an involuntary one except by substituting its presumption in place of analysis of the evidence and refusing to weigh the evidence even in rebuttal of its presumption.

As in most such cases, we start with some admitted facts. In the early morning Mrs. Ashcraft left her home in an automobile to visit relatives. She was found murdered. She had not been robbed nor ravished, although an effort had been made to give the crime an appearance of robbery. The officers knew of no other motive for the killing and naturally turned to her husband for information.

On the afternoon of the crime, Thursday, June 5, 1941, they took Ashcraft to the morgue to identify the body, and to the county jail, where he was kept and interviewed until 2:00 a. m. He makes no complaint of his treatment at this time. In this and several later interviews he made a number of statements with reference to the condition of the car, and as to Mrs. Ashcraft’s having taken a certain drug, and as to money which she was accustomed to carry on her person, which further investigation indicated to be untrue. Still Ashcraft was not arrested. He professed to be willing to assist in identifying the killer. At last, on Saturday evening, June 14, an officer brought Ashcraft to the jail for further questioning. He was taken to a room on the fifth floor and questioned intermittently by several officers over a period of about thirty-six hours.

There are two versions as to what happened during this period of questioning. According to the version of the officers, which was accepted by the court which saw the witnesses, what happened? On Saturday evening Ash-craft was taken to the jail, where he was questioned by Mr. Becker and Mr. Battle. Becker is in the Intelligence *165Service of the United States Army at the present time and before that was in charge of the Homicide Bureau of the Sheriff’s office of Shelby County, Tennessee. Battle has for eight years been an Assistant Attorney General of the County. They began questioning Ashcraft about 7:00 p. m. They recounted various statements of his which had proved untrue. About 11:00 o’clock Ashcraft said he realized the circumstances all pointed to him and that he could not explain the circumstances. They then accused him of the murder, but he denied it. About 3:00 á. m. Becker and Battle retired and left Ashcraft in charge of Ezzell, a special investigator connected with the Attorney General’s office. He questioned Ashcraft and discussed the crime with him until about 7:00 on Sunday morning. Becker and Battle then returned and interviewed him intermittently until about noon, when Ezzell returned and remained until about 5:00. Becker then returned, and about 11:00 o’clock Sunday night Ashcraft expressed a desire to talk with Ezzell. Ezzell was sent for and Ashcraft told him he wanted to tell him the truth. He said, “Mr. Ezzell, a Negro killed my wife.” Ezzell asked the Negro’s name, and Ashcraft said, “Tom Ware.” Up to this time Ware had not been suspected, nor had his name been mentioned. Ashcraft explained that he did not tell the officers before because “I was scared; the Negro said he would burn my house down if I told the law.”

Thereupon Becker, Battle, Ezzell, and Mr. Jayroe, connected with the Sheriff’s office, took Ashcraft in a car and found Ware. When questioned at the jail, Ware turned to Ashcraft and said in substance that he had told Ash-craft when this thing happened that he did not intend to take the entire blame. The officers thereupon turned their attention to Ware. He promptly admitted the killing and said Ashcraft hired him to do it. Waldauer, the court reporter, was called to take down this confession, and *166completed his transcript at about 5:40 a. m. He read it to Ware and told him he did not have to sign it unless he so chose. Ware made his mark upon it and swore to it before Waldauer as a Notary Public. A copy was given to Ashcraft, and he then admitted that he had hired Ware to kill his wife. He was given breakfast and then in response to questions made a statement which was taken down by the court reporter, Waldauer. It was transcribed, but Ashcraft declined to sign it, saying that he wanted his lawyer to see it before he signed it. No effort was made to compel him to sign the confession. However, two business men of Memphis, Mr. Castle, vice president of a bank, and Mr. Pidgeon, president of the Coca-Cola Bottling Company, were called in. Both testified that Ashcraft in their presence asserted that the transcript was correct but that he declined to sign it. The officers also called Dr. McQuiston to the jail to make a physical examination of both Ashcraft and Ware. He had practiced medicine in Memphis for twenty-eight years and both Mr. and Mrs. Ashcraft had been his patients for something like five years. In the presence of this friendly doctor Ash-craft might have complained of his treatment and avowed his innocence. The doctor testified, however, that Ash-craft said he had been treated all right, that he made no complaint about his eyes, and that they were not bloodshot. The doctor made a physical examination, and says Ashcraft appeared normal. He further testified as to Ash-craft, “Well, sir, he said he had not been able to get along with his wife for some time; that her health had been bad; that he had offered her a property settlement, and that she might go her way and he his way; and he also stated that he offered this colored man, Ware, a sum of money to make away with his wife.”1 The doctor says *167that that statement was entirely voluntary. No matter what pressure had been put on Ashcraft before, the courts below could reasonably believe that he made this statement voluntarily to a man of whom he had no fear and who knew his family relations.

Ashcraft’s story of torture could only be accepted by disbelieving such credible and unimpeached contradiction. Ashcraft testified that he was refused food, and was not allowed to go to the lavatory, and was denied even a drink of water. Other testimony is that on Saturday night he was brought a sandwich and coffee about midnight; that he drank the coffee but refused the sandwich; that on Sunday morning he was given a breakfast and was fed again about noon a plate lunch consisting of meat and vegetables and coffee. Both Waldauer, the Reporter, and Dr. McQuiston testified that they saw breakfast served to Ashcraft the next morning before the statement taken down by Waldauer. Ashcraft claims he was threatened and that a cigarette was slapped out of his mouth. This is all denied.

This Court rejects the testimony of the officers and disinterested witnesses in this case that the confession was voluntary not because it lacked probative value in itself nor because the witnesses were self-contradictory or were impeached. On the contrary, it is impugned only on grounds such as that such disputes “are an inescapable consequence of secret inquisitorial practices.” We infer from this that since a prisoner’s unsupported word often conflicts with that of the officers, the officer’s testimony for constitutional purposes is always prima jade false. We know that police standards often leave much to be desired, but we are not ready to believe that the democratic proc*168ess brings to office men generally less believable than the average of those accused of crime.

Reference also is made to the fact that when petitioner was questioned investigation had failed “to unearth one single tangible clue pointing to his guilt.” We cannot see the relevance of such circumstances on the question of the voluntary or involuntary character of his statements to the officers. Is the suggestion that if they had probable clews to his guilt, their questioning of him would have been better justified?

This questioning is characterized as a “secret inquisition,” invoking all of the horrendous historical associations of those words. Certainly the inquiry was participated in by a good many persons, and we do not see how it could have been much less “secret” unless the press should have been called in. Of course, any questioning may be characterized as an “inquisition,” but the use of such characterizations is no substitute for the detached and judicial consideration that the court below gave to the case.

We conclude that even going behind the state court decisions into the facts, no independent judgment on the whole evidence that Ashcraft’s confession was in fact coerced is possible. And against this background of facts the extreme character of the Court’s ruling becomes apparent.

I am not sure whether the Court denies the State all right to arrest and question the husband of the slain woman. No investigation worthy of the name could fail to examine him. Of all persons, he was most likely to know whether she had enemies or rivals. Would not the State have a constitutional right, whether he was accused or not, to arrest and detain him as a material witness? If it has the right to detain one as a witness, presumably it has the right to examine him.

*169Could the State not confront Ashcraft with his false statements and ask his explanation? He did not throw himself at any time on his rights, refuse to answer, and demand counsel, even according to his own testimony. The strategy of the officers evidently was to keep him talking, to give him plenty of rope and see if he would not hang himself. He does not claim to have made objection to this. Instead he relied on his wits. The time came when it dawned on him that his own story brought him under suspicion, and that he could not meet it. Must the officers stop at this point because he was coming to appreciate the uselessness of deception?

Then he became desperate and accused the Negro. Certainly from this point the State was justified in holding and questioning him as a witness, for he claimed to know the killer. That accusation backfired and only turned up a witness against him. He had run out of expedients and inventions; he knew he had lost the battle of wits. After all, honesty seemed to be the best, even if the last, policy. He confessed in detail.

At what point in all this investigation does the Court hold that the Constitution commands these officers to send Ashcraft on his way and give up the murder as insoluble ? If the State is denied the right to apply any pressure to him which is “inherently coercive” it could hardly deprive him of his freedom at all. I, too, dislike to think of any man, under the disadvantages and indignities of detention being questioned about his personal life for thirty-six hours or for one hour. In fact, there is much in our whole system of penology that seems archaic and vindictive and badly managed. Every person in the community, no matter how inconvenient or embarrassing, no matter what retaliation it exposes him to, may be called upon to take the witness stand and tell all he knows about a crime — except the person who knows most about it. *170Efforts of prosecutors to compensate for this handicap by violent or brutal treatment or threats we condemn as passionately and sincerely as other members of the Court. But we are not ready to say that the pressure to disclose crime, involved in decent detention and lengthy examination, although we admit them to be “inherently coercive,” are denied to a State by the Constitution, where they are not proved to have passed the individual’s ability to resist and to admit, deny, or refuse to answer.

III.

The Court either gives no weight to the findings of the Tennessee courts or it regards their inquiry as to the effect on the individuals involved as immaterial. We think it was a material inquiry and that respect is due to their conclusion.

The Supreme Court of Tennessee, writing in this case, stated the law of that State by which it reviewed and affirmed the action of the trial court. It said, “When confessions are offered as evidence, their competency becomes a preliminary question to be determined by the court. This imposes upon the presiding judge the duty of deciding the fact whether the party making the confession was influenced by hope or fear. This rule is so well established, that if the judge allow the jury to determine the preliminary fact, it is error, for which the judgment will be reversed.

“In the instant case the trial judge heard the witnesses as to their confessions out of the presence of the jury, and he held that under the facts he could not say that the confessions were not voluntarily made and, therefore, permitted them to go to the jury.” (Emphasis supplied.)

The rule of law thus laid down complied with the law as this Court had settled it at the time of trial.

The Tennessee Supreme Court made a painstaking examination of the evidence in the light of the claim that *171the confessions were coerced. It concluded that it was “unable to say that the confessions were not freely and voluntarily made. Both of the plaintiffs in error have had a fair trial and we decline to disturb the conviction.”

That court, it is clear, renders no mere lip service to the guaranties of the Constitution. In other cases it has set aside convictions because confessions used at trials were found to have been coerced.2 There is not the least indication that the court was passionate or biased or that the result does not represent the honest judgment of a high-minded court, sensitive to these problems.

A trial judge out of hearing of the jury saw and heard Ashcraft and saw and heard those whom Ashcraft accused of coercing him. In determining a matter of this kind no one can deny the great advantage of a court which may see and hear a man who claims that h,is will succumbed and those who, it is claimed, were so overbearing. The real issue is strength of character, and a few minutes’ observation of the parties in the courtroom is more informing than reams of cold record. There is not the slightest indication that the trial judge was prejudiced or indifferent to the prisoner’s rights. Ashcraft’s counsel moved to exclude his confession “for the reason that the statements contained therein were not freely and voluntarily made, nor were they free from duress and restraint, but were secured by compulsion. . . .” The court said, “. . . the sole proposition, as the Court sees it from this testimony, is that he was confined and questioned for a period of approximately thirty-six hours. I think counsel concedes that is practically the main ground upon which he rests his motion. There was no physical violence offered to the defendant Ashcraft, and none claimed.” He overruled the motion and received the confession. This *172Court, not one of whose members ever saw Ashcraft or any one of the State’s witnesses, overturns the decision by the trial judge.

Moreover, a jury held Ashcraft’s statements incredible. After the trial judge, out of their presence, heard the evidence and decided the confession was admissible, the jury heard the evidence to decide whether the confession should be believed. Ashcraft again testified and so did all of the witnesses for the State. Conduct of the hearing both by the judge and the prosecutors was above criticism. The Court observes: “If, therefore, the question of the voluntariness of the two confessions was actually decided at all it was by the jury.” Is it suggested that a State consistently with the Constitution may not leave this question to the sole determination of a jury? I had supposed that the constitutional duty of a State when such questions of fact arise is to furnish due process of law for deciding them. Does not jury trial meet this test? Here Tennessee, and I think very commendably, provided the double safeguards of a preliminary trial by the judge and a final determination by the jury.

The Court’s opinion makes a critical reference to the charge of the trial judge. However, diligent counsel took no exception to the part of the charge quoted, made no request for further instruction on the subject, and assigned no error to the charge. Even if we think the charge inadequate, does the inadequacy of a charge constitute want of due process? And if so, do we review questions as to the charge although counsel for the petitioner made no objection during the trial when the judge could have corrected the error, but after the trial was over assigned it as one of twelve reasons for demanding a new trial?

No conclusion that this confession was actually coerced can be reached on this record except by reliance upon the utterly uncorroborated statements of defendant Ashcraft. *173His testimony does not carry even ordinary guaranties of truthfulness, and the courts and jury were not bound to accept it. Perjury is a light offense compared to murder and they may well have believed that Ashcraft was ready to resort to a lesser crime to avoid conviction of a greater one. Furthermore, the very grounds on which this Court now upsets his conviction Ashcraft repudiated at the trial. He asserts that he was abused, but he does not testify as this Court holds that it had the effect of forcing an involuntary confession from him. On the contrary, he flatly insists that it had no such effect and that he never did confess at all.

Against Ashcraft’s word the state courts and jury accepted the testimony of several apparently disinterested witnesses of high standing in their communities, in addition to that of the accused officers. One of the witnesses to Ashcraft’s admission of guilt was his own family physician, two were disinterested businessmen of substance and standing, another was an experienced court reporter who had long held this position of considerable trust. Another was a member of the bar. Certainly, the state courts were not committing an offense against the Constitution of the United States in refusing to believe that this whole group of apparently reputable citizens entered into a conspiracy to swear a murder onto an innocent man, against whom not one of them is shown to have had a grievance or a grudge.

This is not the case of an ignorant and unrepresented defendant who has been the victim of prejudice. Ashcraft was a white man of good reputation, good position, and substantial property. For a week after this crime was discovered he was not detained, although his stories to the officers did not hang together, but was at large, free to consult his friends and counsel. There was no indecent haste, but on the contrary evident deliberation, in suspect*174ing and accusing him. He was not sentenced to death, but for a term that probably means life. He was defended by resourceful and diligent counsel.

The use of the due process clause to disable the States in protection of society from crime is quite as dangerous and delicate a use of federal judicial power as to use it to disable them from social or economic experimentation. The warning words of Mr. Justice Holmes in his dissenting opinion in Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U. S. 586, 595, seem to us appropriate for rereading now.

Mr. Justice Roberts and Mr. Justice Frankfurter join in this opinion.

Mr. Chief Justice Warren

delivered the -opinion of the Court.

This is another in the long line of cases presenting the question whether a confession was properly admitted into evidence under the Fourteenth' Amendment. As in all such cases, we are forced to resolve a conflict between two fundamental interests of society; its interest in prompt and efficient law enforcement, and’its interest in preventing the rights of its individual members from being abridged by unconstitutional methods of law enforcement. *316Because of the delicate nature of the- constitutional determination which we must make, we cannot escape' the responsibility of making our own examination of the record. Norris v. Alabama, 294 U. S. 587.

The State’s evidence reveals the following: Petitioner Vincent Joseph Spano is a derivative citizen of this country, having been born in Messina, Italy. He was 25 years old at the time of the shooting in question and had graduated from junior high school. He had a record of regular employment. The shooting took place on January 22,1957.

On that day, petitioner was drinking in a bar. The decedent, a former professional boxer weighing almost 200 pounds who had fought in Madison Square Garden, took some of petitioner’s money from the bar. Petitioner followed him out of the bar to recover it. A fight ensued, with the decedent knocking petitioner down and then kicking him in the head three or four times. Shock from the force of these blows caused petitioner to vomit. After •the bartender applied some ice to his head, petitioner left the bar, walked to his apartment; secured a gun, and walked eight or nine blocks to a candy store where, the decedent was frequently to be found. He entered the store in which decedent, three friends of decedent, at least two of whom were ex-convicts, and a. boy who was supervising the store were present. He fired five shots, two of which entered the decedent’s body, causing his death. The boy was the only eyewitness; the three friends of decedent did not see the person who.fired the shot. Petitioner then disappeared for the next week or so.

On February 1, 1957, the.Bronx County Grand Jury returned an indictment for first-degree murder against petitioner'. Accordingly, a bench warrant was issued for his arrest, commanding that he be forthwith brought beforé the court to answer the indictment, or, if the court had adjourned for the term, that he be delivered into the *317custody of the Sheriff of Bronx County. .See N. Y. Code. Crim. Proc. § 301.

On February 3, 1957, petitioner called one Gaspar Bruno,.a close friend of 8 or 10 years’ standing who had attended school with him. Bruno was a fledgling police officer, having at that time not yet finished attending police academy. According to Bruno’s testimony, petitioner told;him “that he took a terrific beating, that the deceased hurt him real bad and he dropped him a couple of times and he was dazed; he didn’t, know what he was doing and that he went and shot at him.” Petitioner told Bruno.that he intended to get a lawyer and give himself up. Bruno relayed this information to his superiors.

The following day, February 4, at 7:10 p. m., petitioner, accompanied by counsel, surrendered himself to the authorities in front of th& Bronx County Building, where both the office of the Assistant District Attorney who ultimately prosecuted, his case and the courtroom in which he was ultimately tried were located. His attorney had cautioned him to answer n» questions, and left him in the custody of the officers. He was promptly taken to the office of the Assistant District Attorney, and at 7:15 p. m. the questioning began, being conducted by Assistant District Attorney Goldsmith, Lt. Gannon, Detectives Farrell, Lehrer and Motta, and Sgt. Clarke. The record reveals that the questioning was both persistent and continuous. Petitioner, in accordance with his attorney’s instructions, steadfastly refused to answer. Detective Motta testified: “He refused to talk to me.”, “He just looked up to the ceiling and refused to talk to me.” Detective Farrell testified:

“Q. And you started to interrogate him?

“A. That is right.

“Q.: What did he say?

*318“A. He said 'you would have to see my attorney. I tell you nothing but my name.’

"Q. Did you continue to examine him?

“A. Verbally, yes, sir.”

He asked.one officer, Detective Ciccone, if he could speak to his attorney, but that request was denied. Detective Ciccone testified that he could not find the attorney’s name in the telephone book.1 He was given two sandwiches, coffee and cake at. 11 p. m.

At 12:15 a. m. on the morning of February 5, after five hours of questioning in which it became evident that petitioner was following his attorney’s instructions, on the Assistant District Attorney’s orders petitioner was transferred to the 46th Squad, Ryer Avenue Police Station. The Assistant District Attorney also went to the police station and to some extent continued to participate in the interrogation.. Petitioner arrived at 12:30 and questioning was resumed at 12:40. The character of the questioning is revealed by the testimony of Detective Farrell:'

“Q. Who did you leave him in the room with?

“A. With Detective Lehrer and Sergeant Clarke came in and Mr. Goldsmith came in or Inspector Halk came in. It was back, and forth. People just came in, spoke a few words to the defendant or they listened a few minutes and they left.”

But petitioner persisted in his refusal to answer, and again requested permission to see his attorney, this time from Detective Lehrer. His request was again denied.

It was then that those in .charge of the investigation decided that petitioner’s close friend, Bruno, could be of *319use. He had been called out on the case around 10 or 11 p. m., although he was not connected with the 46th Squad or Precinct in any way. Although, in fact, his job was in no way threatened, Bruno was told tó tell petitioner that petitioner’s telephone'call had gotten him “in a lot of trouble,” and that he should seek to extract sympathy from petitioner for Bruno’s pregnant wife and three children. Bruno developed this theme with petitioner without success, and petitioner, also without success, again sought to see his attorney, a request which Bruno relayed unavailingly to his superiors. After this first session with petitioner, Bruno was again directed by Lt. Gannon to play on petitioner’s sympathies, but again no confession was forthcoming. But the Lieutenant a third time ordered Bruno falsely to importune his friend to confess, but again petitioner clung to his attorney’s advice. Inevitably, in the fourth such session directed by the Lieutenant, lasting a full hour, petitioner succumbed to his friend’s prevarications and agreed to make a statement. Accordingly, at 3:25 a. m. the Assistant District Attorney, a stenographer, and several other law enforcement officials entered the room where petitioner was being questioned, and took his statement in question and answer form with the Assistant District Attorney asking the questions. The statement was completed at 4:05 a. m.

But this was not the end. At 4:30 a. m. three detectives took petitioner to Police Headquarters in Manhattan. On the way they attempted to find the bridge from which petitioner said he had thrown the murder weapon. They crossed • the Triborough Bridge into Manhattan, arriving at Police Headquarters at 5 a. m., a,nd left Manhattan for the Bronx at 5:40 a. m. via the Willis Avenue Bridge. When petitioner recognized neither bridge as the one from which he had thrown the weapon, they reentered Manhattan via the Third Avenue Bridge, which petitioner stated was the right one, and then returned to *320the Bronx well after 6 a. m. During that trip the officers also elicited a statement from petitioner that the deceased was'always “on [his] .brick,” “always pushing” him and that he was “not-sorry” he had shot the deceased. All three detectives testified to that, statement at the trial..

Court opened at 10 a. ,m. that morning, and. petitioner was arraigned at. 10:15..

At the trial, the confession was introduced in evidence over appropriate objections. The jury was instructed that it could rely pri it only if it was found to be voluntary. The jury-returned a guilty, verdict arid-petitioner was sentenced to death. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction over three dissents, 4 N. Y. 2d 256, 173 N Y. S. 2d 793, 150 N. E. 2d 226, and we granted certiorari td resolve the serious problem preserited under the Fourteenth Amendment. 358 U. S. 919.

Petitioner’s, first contention is that his absolute right to counsel in a capital case, Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45, became operative on the return of an indictment against him, for at that time he was in every sense a defendant in a criminal case, the grand jury having found sufficient cause to believe that he had committed thé crime. He argues accordingly that following indictment no confession obtained in the absence of counsel can be used without violating the Fourteenth Amendment. He seeks to distinguish Crooker v. California, 357 U. S. 433, and Cicenia v. Lagay, 357 U. S. 504, on the ground that in those cases no indictment had been returned. We find it unnecessary to reach' that contention, for we find use of the- confession-obtained here inconsistent with the Forirteenth Amendment under traditional principles.

The abhorrence of society to the use of involuntary confessions does not turn alone on their inherent untrustworthiness. It also turns on the deep-rooted -feeling that the police must obey the law while enforcing the law; that in the end life and liberty can be "as much endangered *321from illegal methods used to convict those thought to be criminals as from the actual criminals themselves. Accordingly, the actions of police in obtaining, confessions have come under scrutiny in a long series of cases.2 Those cases suggest that in recent years law enforcement' officials have become increasingly aware of the burden which they share, along with our courts, in protecting fundamental rights.of our citizenry, including, that portion of our citizenry suspected of crime. The facts of no case recently in this Court have quite approached the brutal beatings in Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U. S. 278 (1936), or the 36 consecutive hours of questioning present in Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U. S. 143 (1944). But as law-enforcement officers become more responsible, and the methods used to extract confessions more sophisticated, our duty to enforce federal constitutional protections does not cease. It only becomes more difficult because of the more delicate judgments to be made. Our judgment here is that, on all the facts, this conviction cannot-stand.

Petitioner was a foreign-born young man of 25 with no past history of law violation or of subjection to official interrogation, at least insofar as the record shows. He *322had progressed only one-half year into high , school and the record indicates that he had a history of emotional instability.3 He did not make a narrative statement, but was subject to the leading questions of 'a skillful prosecutor in a question and.answer confession. He was subjected to questioning not by a few men, but by many. They included Assistant District Attorney Goldsmith, one Hyland of the District Attorney’s Office, Deputy Inspector Halks,4 Lieutenant Gannon, Detective Ciccone, Detective Motta, Detective Lehrer, Detective Marshal, Detective- Farrell, Detective Leira,5 Detective Murphy, •Detective Murtha, Sergeant Clarke, Patrolman Bruno and Stenographer Baldwin. All played some part, and the effect of such massive official interrogation must have been felt. Petitioner was questioned for virtually eight straight hours before he confessed, with his only respite being a transfer to-an arena presumably considered more appropriate by the police for the task at hand. Nor was the questioning conducted during normal business hours, but began in early evening, continued into the night, and did not bear- fruition until the not-too-early morning. ■ The drama was not played out, with the final admissions obtained, until almost sunrise.' In such cir-. cumstances .slowly mounting fatigue does, and is calculated to, play its part. The questioners persisted in the face of his repeated refusals to answer on the advice of his *323attorney, and they ignored his reasonable requests to contact the local attorney whom he had already retained and who had personally delivered him into the custody of these officers in obedience to the bench warrant.'

The use of Bruno, characterized-in this Court by counsel for the State as a “childhood, friend” of petitioner’s, is another factor which deserves mention in the totality of the situation. Bruno’s was the one face visible to • petitioner in which' he could put some trust. There was a bond of friendship between them going back a decade into adolescence. It was with this material that the officers felt that they could overcome petitioner’s will. They instructed Bruno falsely to state that petitioner’s telephone call had gotten him into trouble, that his job was in jeopardy, and that loss of his job would be disastrous to his three children, his wife and his unborn child. And Bruno played this part of a worried father, harried by his superiors, in not one, but four different acts', the final one lasting an hour. Cf. Leyra v. Denno, 347 U. S. 556. Petitioner was apparently unaware of John Gay’s famous couplet:

“An open foe may prove a curse,

But a pretended friend is worse,”

and he yielded to his false friend’s entreaties.

.We conclude that petitioner’s will was overborne by official pressure, fatigue and sympathy falsely aroused, after considering all the facts in their post-indictment setting.6 Here a grand jury had already found sufficient cause to require petitioner to face trial on a charge of first-degree murder, and the' police had an eyewitness to the shooting. The police were not therefore merely trying to solve a crime, or even to absolve a suspect. Com*324pare Crooker v. California, supra, and Cicenia v. Lagay, supra. They were rather concerned primarily with securing a statement from defendant On which they coiild convict him. The undeviating intent of the officers to extract a confession from petitioner is therefore patent. .When such an intent is shown, this Court has held that the confession obtained must be examined with the most careful scrutiny, and has reversed a.conviction on facts less compelling than these. Malinski v. New York, 324 U. S. 401. Accordingly, we hold that petitioner’s conviction cannot stand under the Fourteenth Amendment.

The State suggests, however, that we are not free to reverse this conviction, since there is sufficient other evidence in the record, from which the jury might have found guilt, relying on Stein v. New York, 346 U. S. 156. But Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U. S. 560, 568, authoritatively establishes that Stein did not hold that a conviction may be sustained on the basis of other evidence if a confession found to be involuntary by this Court was used, even though limiting instructions were given. Stein held only that when a confession is not found by this Court to be involuntary, this .Court will not reverse on the ground that the jury might have found it involuntary and might have relied on it. The judgment must be .

Reversed.

Mr. Justice Douglas,

with whom Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Brennan join, concurring.

While I join the opinion of the Court, I add what-for me is an even more important ground of decision.

We have often divided on whether state authorities may question a suspect for hours on end when he has no lawyer present and when he has demanded that he have the benefit of legal advice. See Crooker v. California, 357 U. S. 433, and cases cited. But here we deal not with a suspect but with a man who has been formally charged *325with á crime. The question is whether after the indictment and before the trial the Government can interrogate the accused in secret when he asked for his lawyer and when his request was denied. This is a capital case; and under the rule of Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45, the defendant was entitled to be represented by counsel. This representation by counsel is not restricted to the trial. As stated in Powell v. Alabama, supra, p. 57:

“during perhaps the most critical period of the proceedings against these defendants, that is to say, from the time of their arraignment until the beginning of their trial, when consultation, thoroughgoing investigation and preparation were vitally important, the defendants did not have the aid of counsel in any real sense, although they were as much entitled to such aid.during that period as at the trial itself.”

Depriving a person, formally charged with a crime, of counsel during the period prior to trial may be more damaging than denial of counsel during the trial itself.

We do not have here mere suspects who are being secretly interrogated by the police as in Crooker v. California, supra, nor witnesses who are being questioned in secret administrative or judicial proceedings as in In re Groban, 352 U. S. 330, and Anonymous Nos. 6 & 7 v. Baker, ante, p. 287. This is a case of an accused, who is scheduled to be tried by a judge and jury, being tried in a preliminary way by the police. This is a kangaroo court procedure whereby the police produce the vital evidence in the form of a confession which is useful or necessary to obtain a conviction. They in effect deny him effective representation by counsel. This seems to me to be a flagrant violation of the principle announced in Powell v. Alabama, supra, that the right of counsel extends to the' preparation for trial, as well as to the trial itself. As' Professor Chafee once said, “A person accused of crime *326needs a lawyer right after his arrest probably more than at any other time.” Chafee, Documents on Fundamental Human Rights, Pamphlet 2 (1951-1952), p. 541. When ■he is deprived of that right after indictment and before ■trial, he may indeed be denied effective representation by counsel at the only stage when legal aid and advice would help him. This secret inquisition by the police when defendant asked for and was denied counsel was as serious an invasion of his constitutional rights as the denial of a continuance in order to employ counsel was held to be in Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U. S. 3, 10. What we said in Avery v. Alabama, 308 U. S. 444, 446, has relevance here:

“. , . the denial of opportunity for appointed counsel' to confer, to consult' with the accused and to prepare his defense, could convert the appointment of counsel into a sham and nothing more than a formal compliance with the Constitution’s requirement that an accused be given the assistance of counsel.”

I join with Judges Desmond, Fuld, and Van Voorhis of the New York Court of Appeals (4 N. Y. 2d 256, 266, 173 N. Y. S. 2d 793, 801, 150 N. E. 2d 226, 231-232); in asking, what use is a defendant’s right to effective counsel at-every stage of a criminal case if, while he is-held awaiting trial, he can be questioned in the absence of .counsel until he confesses? In that event the secret trial in the police precincts effectively supplants the public trial- guaranteed by the Bill of Rights.

Mr. Justice Stewart,

whom Mr. . Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Brennan join, concurring.

While I concur in the opinion of the Court, it is. my view that the absence of counsel when this confession was elicited was alone enough to render it inadmissible under the Fourteenth Amendment. '

*327Let it be emphasized at the outset that this is not a ease where the police were questioning a suspect in the course of investigating an unsolved crime. See Crooker v. California, 357 U. S. 433; Cicenia v. Lagay, 357 U. S. 504. When the petitioner surrendered to the New York authorities he was. under indictment for first degree murder.

Under our system of justice an indictment is supposed to be followed by an. arraignment and a trial. At every stage in those proceedings the accused has an absolute right to a lawyer’s help if the case is one in which a death sentence may be imposed. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45. Indeed the right to the assistance of counsel whom the accused has himself retained is absolute, whatever the offense for which he is on trial. Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U. S. 3.

' What followed the petitioner’s surrender in this case was not arraignment in a court of law, but an all-night inquisition in a prosecutor’s office, a police station, and an automobile. Throughout the night the petitioner repeatedly asked to be allowed to send for his lawyer, and his requests were repeatedly denied. He finally was induced to make a confession. That confession was used to secure a verdict sending him to the electric chair.

Our-Constitution guarantees the assistance of counsel to a man on trial for his life in-an orderly courtroom, presided over by a judge, open to the public, and protected by all the:procedural safeguards of the law. Surely a Constitution which promises that much can vouchsafe no less to the same man under midnight inquisition in the squad room of a police station.

Mr. Justice Roberts

delivered the opinion of the Court.

The petitioner was convicted of murder, and sentenced to death, in the Superior Court of California for Los Ange-les County. The Supreme Court of California affirmed the judgment March 21, 1939, two judges dissenting.1 A rehearing was granted, the case was reargued and, October 5, 1939, the decision was reaffirmed and the former opinion adopted and amplified, two justices dissenting.2 No question arising under the Constitution of the United States had been raised or decided. In a second petition for rehearing, the petitioner, for the first time, asserted that his conviction violated the Fourteenth Amendment. November 3, 1939, the Court ruled: “The petition for a rehearing herein is denied.”

The Chief Justice of the State allowed an appeal, November 6,1939, and, November 8,1939, executed a certificate in which he enumerated the constitutional questions presented by the second petition for rehearing; stated that the court entertained the petition, and explicitly overruled each of the contentions made therein; certified *222that the decision denying rehearing “is to be interpreted and considered as holding against the appellant’s contention that his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States . . . were violated”; and concluded: “It is ordered that this certificate be filed in this court and made a part of the record on appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States.” On the record so made, this Court has jurisdiction to review the judgment.3

The appellant did not draw in question the constitutional validity of any statute of California. We, therefore, dismissed the appeal4 but, treating the papers as a petition for certiorari,5 we granted the writ. This case is No. 4.

October 31, 1939, the petitioner prayed the Supreme Court of California for a writ of habeas corpus on the theory that his trial and conviction had deprived him of his life without due process. He submitted affidavits of one Hope, who had turned state’s evidence against him. In these, Hope asserted that his testimony was false, had been coerced by threats, and induced by promises of leniency and by fraud.

November 9, 1939, habeas corpus was denied, without prejudice. The Chief Justice of California allowed an appeal and made, and ordered filed of record, a certificate respecting the constitutional questions presented and decided by the court, similar to that entered in No. 4. We followed the same course as in No. 4, and the case is here as No. 5.

The appeals were presented in forma pauperis. The typewritten record is of great length. In the belief that *223only by briefs and oral argument, and on a record printed by the court, could proper consideration and decision be had of certain apparently important questions presented, we issued the writs. The cases were argued at the October 1940 term, and the judgments were affirmed by a divided Court. A petition for rehearing before a full Court was granted, the affirmances set aside, and the causes set for rehearing at this term.6

The petitioner, who used, and was commonly known by, the name of Robert S. James (and will be so called), and one Hope were indicted, May 6, 1936, for the murder of James’ wife on August 5, 1935. Hope pleaded guilty and was sentenced to life imprisonment. James pleaded not guilty, was tried, convicted, and sentenced to death. The trial was a long one in which the petitioner made objections to rulings and to the charge, which raise questions of state law decided by the opinion below, with which we have no concern. We shall refer only to so much of the evidence as bears upon the constitutional questions open here.

The State’s theory is that the petitioner conceived the plan of marrying, insuring his wife’s life by policies providing double indemnity for accidental death, killing her in a manner to give the appearance of accident, and collecting double indemnity.

James employed Mary E. Busch as a manicurist in his barber shop in March, 1935, and, about a month later, went through a marriage ceremony with her, which was not legal, as he then had a living wife. While they were affianced, insurance was negotiated on her life, with James as beneficiary. Upon the annulment of the earlier marriage, a lawful ceremony was performed. The petitioner made sure that the policies were not annulled by the fact that, when they were issued, Mary had not been his lawful wife.

*224The allegation is that James enlisted one Hope in a conspiracy to do away with Mary and collect and divide the insurance on her life. Hope testified that, at James’ instigation, he procured rattlesnakes which were to bite and kill Mary; that they appeared not to be sufficiently venomous for the purpose, but he ultimately purchased others and delivered them to James; that James, on August 4,1935, blindfolded his wife’s eyes, tied her to a table, had Hope bring one of the snakes into the room, and caused the reptile to bite her foot; that, during the night, James told Hope the bite did not have the desired effect; and, in the early morning of August 5, he told Hope that he was going to drown his wife; that later he said to Hope, “That is that”; and still later, at his request, Hope aided him in carrying the body to the yard, and James placed the body face down at the edge of a fish pond with the head and shoulders in the water.

James was at his barber shop on August 5. On that evening he took two friends home for dinner. When they arrived the house was dark and empty, and, upon a search of the grounds, his wife’s body was found in the position indicated. An autopsy showed the lungs were almost filled with water. The left great toe showed a puncture and the left leg wag greatly swollen and almost black. Nothing came of the investigation of the death.

James attempted to collect double indemnity; the insurers refused to pay; suits were instituted and one of them settled. As a result of this activity, a fresh investigation of Mary James’ death was instituted. On April 19, 1936, officers arrested James for the crime of incest. He was booked on this charge on the morning of April 21, was given a hearing and remanded to jail. On May 2 and 3 he made statements respecting his wife’s death to the prosecuting officials.

At the trial, in addition to that of Hope, testimony was adduced as to the finding and condition of the body, other *225evidence to connect James with the death, and expert testimony that the condition of the left leg could be attributed to rattlesnake bites. The purchase of snakes by Hope was proved by him and several other witnesses, one of whom said he sold the two snakes to Hope, one of which, Hope claimed, had bitten Mary James. Two snakes were brought into court, which the witness identified as those sold to Hope and by Hope resold to the witness.

James’ statements were offered in evidence. Objection was made that they were not voluntary. Before they were admitted the trial judge heard testimony offered by the State and the defendant on that issue. He ruled that the confessions were admissible, and they were received in evidence.

The State offered evidence with respect to the death of a former wife of James, in 1932. This tended to prove that, while driving down Pike’s Peak, their automobile went off the road. James went for aid. When the persons called upon reached the automobile they found James’ wife lying partly outside the car with her head badly crushed and a bloody hammer in the back of the car. James appeared unhurt. The woman recovered from her injuries, but, shortly afterwards, was discovered, by James and another man, drowned in the bathtub in a house James had temporarily leased at Colorado Springs. James collected double indemnity from insurance companies for her death, the insurance having been placed at about the time he married her and her death having occurred within a few months thereafter. This evidence was admitted over objection and, at the close of the State’s case, defendant’s counsel moved for an adjournment so that they might take depositions of witnesses in Colorado. The court refused the application for want of a sufficient showing.

The petitioner’s contentions, based upon the Fourteenth Amendment, are: that the conduct of the prosecuting *226officials and police officers denied him the equal protection of the laws; that his conviction deprivéd him of his life without due process, because the testimony of Hope, an accomplice, was not corroborated as required by the Penal Code of California, and was, therefore, insufficient to sustain a conviction; because Hope’s affidavits filed since the trial showed that his testimony was obtained by deceit, fraud, collusion, and coercion, and was known to the prosecutor to be false, and hence the trial was a mere pretense; because the alleged occurrences in Colorado were wholly disconnected from the crime charged, and petitioner was afforded no opportunity to answer the State’s evidence respecting them; because the production of the rattlesnakes in the court was solely for the purpose of inflaming the jury; and because physical violence, threats, and other coercive means produced the confessions, and denial of requested opportunity to consult counsel preceded and accompanied their procurement.

First. The contention that illegal conduct on the part of the State’s officers deprived petitioner of the equal protection of the laws hardly needs notice; The claim is that where officers violate the law so that some defendants are treated as was petitioner, and others are treated as the law requires, inequality and discrimination results which denies equal protection. The contention is frivolous. The record is bare of any proof to support it.

Second. The petitioner asserts that Hope’s testimony was not corroborated. Under California law, the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice is not sufficient to sustain a conviction.7 Petitioner contends that, in consideration of Hope’s confessing and turning state’s evidence, leniency was extended him by the court. Petitioner says that Hope’s affidavits show that the prosecuting officials well knew that Hope’s testimony was a *227fabrication; that he was persuaded so to testify by fraud, promises of leniency, and threats, and the trial was a mere sham.8

These contentions need but brief notice. The Fourteenth Amendment does not forbid a state court to construe and apply its laws with respect to the evidence of an accomplice. There is no adequate showing that there was a corrupt bargain with Hope, and the practice of taking into consideration, in sentencing an accomplice, his aid to the State in turning state’s evidence can be no denial of due process to a convicted confederate. Hope’s affidavits not only were prepared after the State Supreme Court had passed upon the case and its opinion had been published but after the lapse of nearly three years from the trial. They could, therefore, be considered only in the habeas corpus case. The State contends that it had no opportunity to answer them. This is contested by the petitioner. In any event, it was stipulated that the record on appeal in the other case should be part of the record on the habeas corpus hearing; and comparison of the testimony at the trial with the allegations of the affidavits raises serious doubts as to their truthfulness. The appraisal of the conflicting evidence was for the court below. Even if its refusal to believe Hope’s depositions were erroneous, the error would be no more a denial of due process than was its approval, on appeal, of the trial judge’s refusal to direct a verdict on the ground of insufficiency of evidence.

Third. Testimony was admitted concerning the death of James’ former wife, on the widely recognized principle that similar but disconnected acts may be shown to establish intent, design, and system.9 The Fourteenth Amendment leaves California free to adopt a rule of relevance *228which the court below holds was applied here in accordance with the State’s law.

The insistence that the trial judge’s refusal to grant a continuance, so that petitioner could take answering depositions, was a denial of due process goes even farther afield. Counsel had notice at the opening of the trial, or shortly thereafter, that the State intended to introduce evidence on this subject, — but waited until the State had rested before asking the continuance. Even then the showing was inadequate as to the identity of the witnesses and the nature of the expected evidence. The judge, in the exercise of his discretion, denied the motion. The Fourteenth Amendment gives this Court no mandate to review his action or inquire whether he abused his discretion in such a field.

Fourth. A part of the State’s case was that Hope had purchased snakes and brought them to the petitioner in pursuance of the conspiracy. Two snakes were brought into the courtroom to be identified by the witness who said he sold them to Hope. The petitioner says that the sole purpose of the production of the snakes was to prejudice the jury against him and that those in the courtroom, including the jury, were in a panic as a result of the incident. For this he cites current newspaper accounts and affidavits of his counsel. The State denies any improper purpose and, to rebut the assertions of petitioner, relies on a counter-affidavit and a statement by the trial judge. The record discloses that at a subsequent stage of the trial the snakes were brought into court at the defendant’s request.

We do not sit to review state court action on questions of the propriety of the trial judge’s action in the admission of evidence. We cannot hold, as petitioner urges, that the introduction and identification of the snakes so infused the trial with unfairness as to deny due process of law. The fact that evidence admitted as relevant by *229a court is shocking to the sensibilities of those in the courtroom cannot, for that reason alone, render its reception a violation of due process.

Fifth. The important question is whether the use of the confessions rendered petitioner’s conviction a deprivation of his life without due process of law. Recital of the relevant facts is essential to a decision.

The petitioner, while having almost no formal education, is a man of intelligence and business experience. After his arrest, on the charge of incest, on the morning of Sunday, April 19, 1936, he was taken for a short time to the adjoining house and shown a dictaphone there installed. He was brought to the District Attorney’s offices, where he was lodged in the Bureau of Investigation. He says that during the two or three hours he stayed there he was not questioned. He was taken into an office where the District Attorney showed him a statement made by a Miss Wright respecting the incest charge and asked him what he cared to say about it. He replied that he would not talk about it. He was questioned for about an hour. He says he was asked about his wife’s death; others who were present deny this.

He was held in the District Attorney’s suite until 5 or 6 o’clock, was given supper at a cafe, and then conducted to the house next door to his home, where he arrived about 7 or 7:30. Various officers questioned him there, in relays throughout the night, concerning his wife’s death. He sat in a chair fully dressed and had no sleep. Monday morning he was taken out for breakfast and went with the officers to point out to them a house at 9th and Alvarado Streets, after which he was taken to the District Attorney’s offices. He was brought back to the house next door to his home, and the questioning was resumed, and continued until about 3 o’clock Tuesday morning, when, he says, he fainted; and others present say he fell asleep and slept until 7 or 8 o’clock. After he had breakfasted he was *230booked at the jail, arraigned before a magistrate, and committed on the incest charge.

James testified that about 10 P. M. Monday, April 20, the officers began to beat him; that his body was made black and blue; that the beating impaired his hearing, and caused a hernia; that later that night an Assistant District Attorney questioned him and that, after this ordeal, he collapsed. It is admitted that an officer slapped his face that night. This is said to have occurred as the result of an offensive remark James made concerning his wife; he denies having made the remark. In corroboration of James’ testimony two witnesses said they noticed that one or both of his ears were bruised and swollen when he was lodged in the j ail. All of this testimony is contradicted by numerous witnesses for the State, save only that it is admitted James was repeatedly and persistently questioned at intervals during the period from Sunday night until Tuesday morning. It is testified that, except for the one slap, no one laid a hand on James; that no inducement was held out to him; that no threats were made; that he answered questions freely and intelligently; and that he was at ease, cool, and collected. He admits that no promises or threats were made or maltreatment administered on the occasions when he was in the District Attorney’s office. It is significant that James stated to one of the other officers that Officer Southard had slapped him and that when, May 2, the District Attorney asked how he had been treated, he again referred to the slap. In neither case did he say anything of any other mistreatment. During the period April 19-21 James made no incriminating admission or confession.

James says that shortly after his arrest on Sunday morning, he asked, and was refused, permission to get into touch with Mr. Silverman, who had been his attorney for a number of years. This is denied. There is evidence that he saw Mr. Silverman on Monday, April 20, at the District *231Attorney’s office. Mr. Silverman testified that he saw the petitioner immediately after his formal arrest; that he was with the petitioner at the arraignment on Tuesday, April 21st; and again on April 25th in the jail. It is not suggested that James was not allowed to see his attorney as often as he desired or that any obstacle was interposed to the attorney’s interviewing him between April 21 and May 2.

There is no claim that from April 21, when he was lodged in the jail, until May 2, he was interviewed, questioned, threatened, or mistreated by anyone. During this period his attorney told him that he would be indicted for his wife’s murder and should not answer any questions unless his attorney was present.

May 1, Hope was arrested and made a statement. On the morning of May 2, James was brought from his cell to the chaplain’s room in the prison and confronted with Hope. An Assistant, District Attorney outlined Hope’s story and asked James whether he had anything to say, to which he replied: “Nothing.”

He went back to his cell and, about noon, an order of court was obtained to remove him from the prison. He was taken to his former home by two deputy sheriffs. The evidence does not disclose clearly either the purpose or the incidents of this trip. He was then brought to the District Attorney’s office and that official began to question him. He requested that his attorney be sent for. In his presence a telephone call was made which disclosed that Mr. Silverman was not in Los Angeles. He asked that another attorney be summoned. He states that the District Attorney said it would take too long to acquaint any other attorney with the facts; others say that James did not give the name of the other attorney he wanted and it took some time to discover whom he had in mind. The attorney was not summoned.

The District Attorney and, at times, others questioned James until supper time. Sandwiches and coffee were *232procured. James says he had coffee but someone took his sandwiches. There is testimony that he had them. The questioning, based on Hope’s confession, was continued into the night without James having refused to answer questions or having made any incriminating answers.

There is a sharp conflict as to how the session terminated. James says that Officer Southard, who had struck him on April 20, occupied the room alone with him, all others having left; that the officer told him he had been lying all evening and that if he did not tell the truth the officer would take him back to the house and beat him; that this so frightened him that he agreed to do his best to recite to the District Attorney the same story Hope had told. There is much evidence that no such incident occurred. Deputy Sheriff Killion says that sometime before midnight the others had left petitioner alone with him, and that petitioner turned to him and said something to the effect: “Why can’t we go out and get something to eat; if we do I’ll tell you the story.” To this Killion replied that they could go out. Killion and another Deputy Sheriff, Gray, a lady friend, and another person accompanied petitioner to a public cafe, where they had a supper and afterwards had cigars. James testified that neither Killion nor Gray nor the District Attorney ever laid hand on him, threatened him or offered him any inducement to confess.

The State’s evidence is that, after they started to smoke, James told a story, of which Killion took notes. Killion narrated at the trial what James had told him. The party returned to the District Attorney’s office and there, responding to a question by the District Attorney, James said he had told Killion the story, and, in answer to questions, he repeated that story. The interview was steno-graphically recorded. Most of the questions were asked by the District Attorney, some few by Killion and one or two *233other officers who were present. The group seems to have consisted of the District Attorney, an Assistant District Attorney, two officers, the two deputy sheriffs, and the stenographer.

Hope’s statement laid on James the initiation of the murder plot, the attempt to consummate it with snake poison, the drowning and the disposition of her body. The account James gave Bullion and the District Attorney, which he now says was an attempt to retell the tale Hope had told, which had been constantly dinned into his ears, is by no means a reiteration of Hope’s story. On the contrary, James insisted that Hope suggested the destruction of Mary James, and the rattlesnake expedient, which Hope carried out; that when this failed Hope suggested that he, Hope, burn down the house to make it appear that Mrs. James died by accident; and that Hope also volunteered to commit an abortion on Mrs. James and also to do away with her. James asserted that, while he was absent from his home on the morning of August 5, 1935, Hope drowned his wife in the bathtub and told James that he had done so.

It is also to be noted that James’ statement presents a lurid picture of the heavy drinking and intoxication of Hope, James, and Mary James during the three days anterior to the death of the latter. The effort evidently was to suggest that all were more or less irresponsible for their actions.

If Hope’s story is true, James planned and accomplished the murder of his wife to obtain the insurance on her life. If James’ statement is true, Hope planned the murder, James desired to abandon the scheme and thought that all Hope ultimately intended to do was to commit an abortion on James’ wife, and was shocked and surprised to learn that Hope had murdered her.

James said during supper at the cafe, and stated on another occasion, that there were not enough men in the *234District Attorney’s office to make him talk, and if Hope had not talked he would never have told the story.

Scrutiny of the two statements indicates that James carefully considered what Hope had said, and made up his mind to tell a story consistent with his intimacy with Hope, and with various incidents James could not deny, and then depict a drunken orgy as a result of which his will power was so enfeebled that he could not resist Hope’s determination to make away with Mrs. James.

At the trial, James contradicted the essential particulars of Hope’s testimony and most of his own confession, including the evidence respecting the snakes. He swore all Hope was to do was to attempt an abortion; he believed Hope did not accomplish this, and that his wife died as a result of falling into the pond in a fainting fit due to her pregnancy.

The evidence as to the treatment of James and the conduct of officials and officers, from the moment of his arrest until the close of his statement to the District Attorney, was heard preliminarily by the trial judge in order to determine whether the State had, as required by California law, carried its burden of proving the confessions voluntary. The ruling was that it had; and the confessions were admitted. The trial judge, at defendant’s request, charged the jury, in accordance with the State law, that the confessions must be utterly disregarded unless they were voluntary, that is, not the result of inducements, promises, threats, violence, or any form of coercion.

The failure of the arresting officers promptly to produce the petitioner before an examining magistrate, their detention of him in their custody from Sunday morning to Tuesday morning, and any assault committed upon him, were violations of state statutes10 and criminal offenses.11

*235We find no authority for the issue of the court order under which the sheriff’s deputies took the accused from jail to his former home, and to the District Attorney’s office for questioning.12 The denial of opportunity to consult counsel, requested on May 2nd, was a misdemeanor.13 It may be assumed this treatment of the petitioner also deprived him of his liberty without due process and that the petitioner would have been afforded preventive relief if he could have gained access to a court to seek it.

But illegal acts, as such, committed in the course of obtaining a confession, whatever their effect on its admissibility under local law, do not furnish an answer to the constitutional question we must decide. The effect of the officers’ conduct must be appraised by other considerations in determining whether the use of the confessions was a denial of due process. Moreover, petitioner does not, and cannot, ask redress in this proceeding for any disregard of due process prior to his trial. The gravamen of his complaint is the unfairness of the use of his confessions, and what occurred in their procurement is relevant only as it bears on that issue.

*236On the other hand, the fact that the confessions have been conclusively adjudged by the decision below to be admissible under State law, notwithstanding the circumstances under which they were made, does not answer the question whether due process was lacking. The aim of the rule that a confession is inadmissible unless it was voluntarily made is to exclude false evidence. Tests are invoked to determine whether the inducement to speak was such that there is a fair risk the confession is false.14 These vary in the several States.15 This Court has formulated those which are to govern in trials in the federal courts.16 The Fourteenth Amendment leaves California free to adopt, by statute or decision, and to enforce, such rule as she elects, whether it conform to that applied in the federal or in other state courts. But the adoption of the rule of her choice cannot foreclose inquiry as to whether, in a given ease, the application of that rule works a deprivation of the prisoner’s life or liberty without due process of law. The aim of the requirement of due process is not to exclude presumptively false evidence, but to prevent fundamental unfairness in the use of evidence, whether true or false. The criteria for decision of that question may differ from those appertaining to the State’s rule as to the admissibility of a confession.

As applied to a criminal trial, denial of due process is the failure to observe that fundamental fairness essential to the very concept of justice. In order to declare a denial of it we must find that the absence of that fairness fatally infected the trial; the acts complained of must be of such quality as necessarily prevents a fair trial. Such unfairness exists when a coerced confession is used as a means *237of obtaining a verdict of guilt. We have so held in every instance in which we have set aside for want of due process a conviction based on a confession.

To extort testimony from a defendant by physical torture in the very presence of the trial tribunal is not due process. The case stands no better if torture induces an extra-judicial confession which is used as evidence in the courtroom.17

A trial dominated by mob violence in the courtroom is not such as due process demands.18 The case can stand no better if mob violence anterior to the trial is the inducing cause of the defendant’s alleged confession.

If, by fraud, collusion, trickery, and subornation of perjury, on the part of those representing the State, the trial of an accused person results in his conviction, he has been denied due process of law.19 The case can stand no better if, by the same devices, a confession is procured, and used in the trial.

The concept of due process would void a trial in which, by threats or promises in the presence of court and jury, a defendant was induced to testify against himself. The case can stand no better if, by resort to the same means, the defendant is induced to confess and his confession is given in evidence. As we have said, “due process of law . . . commands that no such practice . . . shall send any accused to his death.”20

Where the claim is that the prisoner’s statement has been procured by such means, we are bound to make an independent examination of the record to determine the validity of the claim. The performance of this duty cannot be foreclosed by the finding of a court, or the verdict *238of a jury, or both.21 If the evidence bearing upon the question is uncontradicted, the application of the constitutional provision is unembarrassed by a finding or a verdict in a state court; even though, in ruling that the confession was admissible, the very tests were applied in the state court to which we resort to answer the constitutional question.22

There are cases, such as this one, where the evidence as to the methods employed to obtain a confession is conflicting, and in which, although denial of due process was not an issue in the trial, an issue has been resolved by court and jury, which involves an answer to the due process question. In such a case, we accept the determination of the triers of fact, unless it is so lacking in support in the evidence that to give it effect would work that fundamental unfairness which is at war with due process.

Here, judge and jury passed on the question whether the petitioner’s confessions were freely and voluntarily made, and the tests applied in answering that question rendered the decision one that also answered the question whether the use of the confessions involved a denial of due process; this notwithstanding the issue submitted was not eo nomine one concerning due process. Furthermore, in passing on the petitioner’s claim, the Supreme Court of the State found no violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Our duty, then, is to determine whether the evidence requires that we set aside the finding of two courts and a jury, and adjudge the admission of the confessions so fundamentally unfair,, so contrary to the common concept of ordered liberty, as to amount to a taking of life without due process of law.

*239In view of the conflicting testimony, we are unable to say that the finding below was erroneous so far as concerns the petitioner’s claims of physical violence, threats, or implied promises of leniency. There remains the un-contradicted fact that on two occasions, separated by an interval of eleven days, the petitioner was questioned for protracted periods. He made no admission implicating him in his wife’s death during, or soon after, the interrogations of April 19, 20, and 21. If, without more, eleven days later, confessions had been forthcoming, we should have no hesitation in overruling his contention respecting the admission of his confessions.

Does the questioning on May 2nd, in and of itself, or in the light of his earlier experience, render the use of the confessions a violation of due process? If we are so to hold, it must be upon the ground that such a practice, irrespective of the result upon the petitioner, so tainted his statements that, without considering other facts disclosed by the evidence, and without giving weight to accredited findings below that his statements were free and voluntary, as a matter of law, they were inadmissible in his trial. This would be to impose upon the state courts a stricter rule than we have enforced in federal trials.23 There is less reason for such a holding when we reflect that we are dealing with the system of criminal administration of California, a quasi-sovereign; that if federal power is invoked to set aside what California regards as a fair trial, it must be plain that a federal right has been invaded.

We have not hesitated to set aside convictions based in whole, or in substantial part, upon confessions extorted in graver circumstances. These were secured by protracted and repeated questioning of ignorant and untutored persons, in whose minds the power of officers *240was greatly magnified; who sensed the adverse sentiment of the community and the danger of mob violence; who had been held incommunicado, without the advice of friends or of counsel; some of whom had been taken by officers at night from the prison into dark and lonely places for questioning.24 This case is outside the scope of those decisions.

Like the Supreme Court of California, we disapprove the violations of law involved in the treatment of the petitioner, and we think it right to add that where a prisoner, held incommunicado, is subjected to questioning by officers for long periods, and deprived of the advice of counsel, we shall scrutinize the record with care to determine whether, by the use of his confession, he is deprived of liberty or life through tyrannical or oppressive means. Officers of the law must realize that if they indulge in such practices they may, in the end, defeat rather than further the ends of justice. Their lawless practices here took them close to the line. But on the facts as we have endeavored fairly to set them forth, and in the light of the findings in the state courts, we cannot hold that the illegal conduct in which the law enforcement officers of California indulged, by the prolonged questioning of the prisoner before arraignment, and in the absence of counsel, or their questioning on May 2, coerced the confessions, the introduction of which is the infringement of due process of which the petitioner complains. The petitioner has said that the interrogation would never have drawn an admission from him had his confederate not made a statement; he admits that no threats, promises, or acts of physical violence were offered him during this questioning or for eleven days preceding it. Counsel had been afforded full opportunity to see him and had advised him. *241He exhibited a self-possession, a coolness, and an acumen throughout his questioning, and at his trial, which negatives the view that he had so lost his freedom of action that the statements made were not his but were the result of the deprivation of his free choice to admit, to deny, or to refuse to answer.

The judgments are

Affirmed.

Mr. Justice Black,

dissenting,

with whom Mr. Justice Douglas concurs:

I believe the confession used to convict James was the result of coercion and compulsion, and that the judgment should be reversed for that reason. The testimony of the officers to whom the confession was given is enough, standing alone, to convince me that it could not have been free and voluntary. Cf. Bram v. United States, 168 U. S. 532. In brief, those officers admitted the following:

Suspecting the defendant of murder, they entered his home on Sunday, April 19,1936, at 9 a. m. He was taken to a furnished house next door, in which the State’s Attorney’s office had installed a dictaphone. For the next forty-eight hours, or a little longer, the State’s Attorney, his assistants, and investigators held James as their prisoner. He was so held, not under indictment or warrant of arrest, but by force. At about 4 a. m. Monday, one Southard, an investigator, “slapped” the defendant, whose left ear was thereafter red and swollen. James was apparently kept at the State’s Attorney’s office during the daylight hours; the full extent to which he was questioned there is not clear. But on Monday and Tuesday nights, at the furnished house, with no one present but James and the officers, he was subjected to constant interrogation. The questioning officers divided themselves into squads, so that some could sleep while the others continued the question-*242mg. The defendant got no sleep during the first forty-two hours after the officers seized him. And about 3:30 or 4 a. m. Tuesday morning, while sitting in the chair he occupied while being interrogated, at the very moment a question was being asked him, the defendant fell asleep. There he remained asleep until about 7 or 8 a. m. At about 11 a. m. the officers took him to jail and booked him on a charge of incest. During the entire forty-two hours defendant was held, he repeatedly denied any complicity in or knowledge of the murder of his wife.

The second episode during which the officers held defendant incommunicado, and which produced the confession, was on May 2 and in the early hours of May 3. About 11 a. m. on May 2, an investigator for the District Attorney took James from his cell to the chaplain’s room of the jail. In the presence of an Assistant District Attorney he was confronted by Hope and told that Hope had made a confession implicating James in his wife’s murder. James refused to talk and was then carried back to his cell. A short time later, under a purported order of court, the nature or authority of which does not appear, James was taken from the jail to his home, and then, somewhere between 1 and 4 p. m., to the District Attorney’s office. The doors were locked. From then until about midnight the District Attorney, his Assistants, and investigators, subjected James to constant interrogation. Upon asking for his attorney, James was told he was out of the city. He then asked for another, but whatever efforts the officers made to satisfy this request were unsuccessful. He was again confronted with Hope, but neither this nor the questioning had elicited an admission of any nature, by midnight. At that time, according to the investigators, James said to one of them, “Can’t we go out and get something to eat — if you fellows will take me out to eat now, I will *243tell you the story.”1 He was taken out to eat by some of the officers; remained about an hour and a half; while at the restaurant made damaging admissions, and upon his return to the District Attorney’s office made the full statement which was used to bring about his conviction, completing it at about 3 a. m. Southard, the investigator who had previously “slapped” him, was one of the signed witnesses of the confession.2

I think the facts set out are sufficient to make applicable the principles announced in Chambers v. Florida, 309 U. S. 227, and the conclusion there announced that: “Due process of law, preserved for all by our Constitution, commands that no such practice as that disclosed by this record shall send any accused to his death.” White v. Texas, 310 U. S. 530, 533; Canty v. Alabama, 309 U. S. 629; Vernon v. Alabama, 313 U. S. 547. Cf. Bram v. United States, supra.

*479Mr. Justice Goldberg

delivered the opinion of the Court.

The critical question in this case is whether, under the circumstances, .the refusal by the police to honor petitioner’s request to consult with his lawyer during the course of an interrogation constitutes a denial of “the Assistance of Counsel” in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution as “made obligatory upon the States by the Fourteenth Amendment,” Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335, 342, and thereby renders inadmissible in a state criminal trial any incriminating statement elicited by the police during the interrogation.

On the night of January 19, 1960, petitioner’s brother-in-law was fatally shot. In the early hours of the next morning, at 2:30 a. m., petitioner was arrested without a warrant and interrogated. Petitioner made no statement to the police and was released at 5 that afternoon pursuant to a state court writ of habeas corpus obtained by Mr. Warren Wolfson, a lawyer who had been retained by petitioner.

On January 30, Benedict DiGerlando, who was then in police custody and who was later indicted for the murder along with petitioner, told the police that petitioner had fired the fatal shots. Between 8 and 9 that evening, petitioner and his sister, the widow of the deceased, were arrested and taken to police headquarters. En route to the police station, the police “had handcuffed the defendant behind his back,” and “one of the arresting officers told defendant that DiGerlando had named him as the one who shot” the deceased. Petitioner testified, without contradiction, that the “detectives said they had us pretty well, up pretty tight, and we might as well admit to this crime,” and that he replied, “I am sorry but I would like to have advice from my lawyer.” A police officer testified that although petitioner was not formally charged “he was in custody” and “couldn’t walk out the door.”

*480Shortly after petitioner reached police headquarters, his retained lawyer arrived. The lawyer described the ensuing events in the following terms:

“On that day I received a phone call [from “the mother of another defendant”] and pursuant to that phone call I went to the Detective Bureau at 11th and State. The first person I talked to was the Sergeant on duty at the Bureau Desk, Sergeant Pidgeon. I asked Sergeant Pidgeon for permission to speak to my client, Danny Escobedo. . . . Sergeant Pidgeon made a call to the Bureau lockup and informed me that the boy had been taken from the lockup to the Homicide Bureau. This was between 9:30 and 10:00 in the evening. Before I went anywhere, he called the Homicide Bureau and told them there was an attorney waiting to see Escobedo. He told me I could not see him. Then I went upstairs to the Homicide Bureau. There were several Homicide Detectives around and I talked to them. I identified myself as Escobedo’s attorney and asked permission to see him. They said I could not. . . . The police officer told me to see Chief Flynn who was on duty. I identified myself to Chief Flynn and asked permission to see my client. He said I could not. . . . I think it was approximately 11:00 o’clock. He said I couldn’t' see him because they hadn’t completed questioning. . . . [F]or a second or two I spotted him in an office in the Homicide Bureau. The door was open and I could see through the office. ... I waved to him and. he waved back and then the door was closed, by one of the officers at Homicide.1 There were four or five officers milling *481around the Homicide Detail that night. As to whether I talked to Captain Flynn any later that day, I waited around for another hour or two and went back again and renewed by [sic] request to see my client. He again told me I could not. . . . I filed an oficial complaint with Commissioner Phelan of the Chicago Police Department. I had a conversation with every police officer I could find. I was told at Homicide that I couldn’t see him and I would have to get a writ of habeas corpus. I left the Homicide Bureau and from the Detective Bureau at 11th and State at approximately 1:00 A. M. [Sunday morning] I had no opportunity to talk to my client that night. I quoted to Captain Flynn the Section of the Criminal Code which allows an attorney the right to see his client.” 2

Petitioner testified that during the course of the interrogation he repeatedly asked to speak to his lawyer and that the police said that his lawyer “didn’t want to see” him. The testimony of the police officers confirmed these accounts in substantial detail.

Notwithstanding repeated requests by each, petitioner and his retained lawyer were afforded no opportunity to consult during the course of the entire interrogation. At one point, as previously noted, petitioner and his attorney came into each other’s view for a few moments but the attorney was quickly ushered away. Petitioner testified “that he heard a detective telling the attorney the latter would not be allowed to talk to [him] ‘until they *482were done’ ” and that he heard the attorney being refused permission to remain in the adjoining room. A police officer testified that he had told the lawyer that he could not see petitioner until “we were through interrogating” him.

There is testimony by the police that during the interrogation, petitioner, a 22-year-old of Mexican extraction with no record of previous experience with the police, “was handcuffed” 3 in a standing position and that he “was nervous, he had circles under his eyes and he was upset” and was “agitated” because “he had not slept well in over a week.”

It is undisputed that during the course of the interrogation Officer Montejano, who “grew up” in petitioner’s neighborhood, who knew his family, and who uses “Spanish language in [his] police work,” conferred alone with petitioner “for about a quarter of an hour. . . .” Petitioner testified that the officer said to him “in Spanish that my sister and I could go home if I pinned it on Benedict DiGerlando,” that “he would see to it that we would go home and be held only as witnesses, if anything, if we had made a statement against DiGerlando . . . , that we would be able to go home that night.” Petitioner testified that he made the statement in issue because of this assurance. Officer Montejano denied offering any such assurance.

A police officer testified that during the interrogation the following occurred:

“I informed him of what DiGerlando told me and when I did, he told me that DiGerlando was [lying] and I said, ‘Would you care to tell DiGer-lando that?’ and he said, ‘Yes, I will.’ So, I *483brought . . . Escobedo in and he confronted DiGer-lando and he told him that he was lying and said, 'I didn’t shoot Manuel, you did it.’ ”

In this way, petitioner, for the first time, admitted to some knowledge of the crime. After that he made additional statements further implicating himself in the murder plot. At this point an Assistant State’s Attorney, Theodore J. Cooper, was summoned “to take” a statement. Mr. Cooper, an experienced lawyer who was assigned to the Homicide Division to take “statements from some defendants and some prisoners that they had in custody,” “took” petitioner’s statement by asking carefully framed questions apparently designed to assure the admissibility into evidence of the resulting answers. Mr. Cooper testified that he did not advise petitioner of his constitutional rights, and it is undisputed that no one during the course of the interrogation so advised him.

Petitioner moved both before and during trial to suppress the incriminating statement, but the motions were denied. Petitioner was convicted of murder and he appealed the conviction.

The Supreme Court of Illinois, in its original opinion of February 1, 1963, held the statement inadmissible and reversed the conviction. The court said:

“[I]t seems manifest to us, from the undisputed evidence and the circumstances surrounding defendant at the time of his statement and shortly prior thereto, that the defendant understood he would be permitted to go home if he gave the statement and would be granted an immunity from prosecution.”

Compare Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U. S. 528.

The State petitioned for, and the court granted, rehearing. The court then affirmed the conviction. It said: “[T]he *484officer denied making the promise and the trier of fact believed him. We find no reason for disturbing the trial court’s finding that the confession was voluntary.” 4 28 Ill. 2d 41, 45-46, 190 N. E. 2d 825, 827. The court also held, on the authority of this Court’s decisions in Crooker v. California, 357 U. S. 433, and Cicenia v. Lagay, 357 U. S. 504, that the confession was admissible even though “it was obtained after he had requested the assistance of counsel, which request was denied.” 28 Ill. 2d, at 46, 190 N. E. 2d, at 827. We granted a writ of certiorari to consider whether the petitioner’s statement was constitutionally admissible at his trial. 375 U. S. 902. We conclude, for the reasons stated below, that it was not and, accordingly, we reverse the judgment of conviction.

In Massiah v. United States, 377 U. S. 201, this Court observed that “a Constitution which guarantees a defendant the aid of counsel at . . . trial could surely vouchsafe no less to an indicted defendant under interrogation by the police in a completely extrajudicial proceeding. Anything less . . . might deny a defendant 'effective representation by counsel at the only stage when *485legal aid and advice would help him.’ ” Id., at 204, quoting Douglas, J., concurring in Spano v. New York, 360 U. S. 315, 326.

The interrogation here was conducted before petitioner was formally indicted. But in the context of this case, that fact should make no difference. When petitioner requested, and was denied, an opportunity to consult with his lawyer, the investigation had ceased to be a general investigation of “an unsolved crime.” Spano v. New York, 360 U. S. 315, 327 (Stewart, J., concurring). Petitioner had become the accused, and the purpose of the interrogation was to “get him” to confess his guilt despite his constitutional right not to do so. At the time of. his arrest and throughout the course of the interrogation, the police told petitioner that they had convincing evidence that he had fired the fatal shots. Without informing him of his absolute right to remain silent in the face of this accusation, the police urged him to make a statement.5 As this Court observed many years ago:

“It cannot be doubted that, placed in the position in which the accused was when the statement was made to him that the other suspected person had charged him with crime, the result was to produce upon his mind the fear that if he remained silent it would be considered an admission of guilt, and therefore render certain his being committed for trial as the guilty person, and it cannot be conceived that the converse impression would not also have nat*486urally arisen, that by denying there was hope of removing the suspicion from himself.” Bram v. United States, 168 U. S. 532, 562.

Petitioner, a layman, was undoubtedly unaware that under Illinois law an admission of “mere” complicity in the murder plot was legally as damaging as an admission of firing of the fatal shots. Illinois v. Escobedo, 28 Ill. 2d 41, 190 N. E. 2d 825. The “guiding hand of counsel” was essential to advise petitioner of his rights in this delicate situation. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45, 69. This was the “stage when legal aid and advice” were most critical to petitioner. Massiah v. United States, supra, at 204. It was a stage surely as critical as was the arraignment in Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U. S. 52, and the preliminary hearing in White v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 59. What happened at this interrogation could certainly “affect the whole trial,” Hamilton v. Alabama, supra, at 54, since rights “may be as irretrievably lost, if not then and there asserted, as they are when an accused represented by counsel waives a right for strategic purposes.” Ibid. It would exalt form over substance to make the right to counsel, under these circumstances, depend on whether at the time of the interrogation, the ¿uthorities had secured a formal indictment. Petitioner had, for all practical purposes, already been charged with murder.

The New York Court of Appeals, whose decisions this Court cited with approval in Massiah, 377 U. S. 201, at 205, has recently recognized that, under circumstances such as those here, no meaningful distinction can be drawn between interrogation of an accused before and after formal indictment. In People v. Donovan, 13 N. Y. 2d 148, 193 N. E. 2d 628, that court, in an opinion by Judge Fuld, held that a “confession taken from a defendant, during a period of detention [prior to indictment], after his attorney had requested and been denied access *487to him” could not be used against him in a criminal trial.6 Id., at 151, 193 N. E. 2d, at 629. The court observed that it “would be highly incongruous if our system of justice permitted the district attorney, the lawyer representing the State, to extract a confession from the accused while his own lawyer, seeking to speak with him, was kept from him by the police.” Id., at 152, 193 N. E. 2d, at 629.7

In Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335, we held that every person accused of a crime, whether state or federal, is entitled to a lawyer at trial.8 The rule sought by the State here, however, would make the trial no more than an appeal from the interrogation; and the “right to use counsel at the formal trial [would be] a very hollow thing [if], for all practical purposes, the conviction is already assured by pretrial examination.” In re Groban, 352 U. S. *488330, 344 (Black, J., dissenting).9 “One can imagine a cynical prosecutor saying: 'Let them have the most illustrious counsel, now. They can’t escape the noose. There is nothing that counsel can do for them at the trial.’ ” Ex parte Sullivan, 107 F. Supp. 514, 517-518.

It is argued that if the right to counsel is afforded prior to indictment, the number of confessions obtained by the police will diminish significantly, because most confessions are obtained during the period between arrest and indictment,10 and “any lawyer worth his salt will tell the suspect in no uncertain terms to make no statement to police under any circumstances.” Watts v. Indiana, 338 U. S. 49, 59 (Jackson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). This argument, of course, cuts two ways. The fact that many confessions are obtained during this period points up its critical nature as a “stage when legal aid and advice” are surely needed. Massiah v. United States, supra, at 204; Hamilton v. Alabama, supra; White v. Maryland, supra. The right to counsel would indeed be hollow if it began at a period when few confessions were obtained. There is necessarily a direct relationship between the importance of a stage to the police in their quest for a confession and the criticalness of that stage to the accused in his need for legal advice. Our Constitution, unlike some others, strikes the balance in favor of the right of the accused to be advised by his lawyer of his privilege against self-incrimination. See Note, 73 Yale L. J. 1000, 1048-1051 (1964).

We have learned the lesson of history, ancient and modern, that a system of criminal law enforcement *489which comes to depend on the “confession” will, in the long run, be less reliable11 and more subject to abuses12 than a system, which depends on extrinsic evidence independently secured through skillful investigation. As Dean Wigmore so wisely said:

“[A]ny system of administration which permits the prosecution to trust habitually to compulsory self-disclosure as a source of proof must itself suffer morally thereby. The inclination develops to rely mainly upon such evidence, and to be satisfied with an incomplete investigation of the other sources. The exercise of the power to extract answers begets a forgetfulness of the just limitations of that power. The simple and peaceful process of questioning breeds a readiness to resort to bullying and to physical force and torture. If there is a right to an answer, there soon seems to be a right to the expected answer,— that is, to a confession of guilt. Thus the legitimate use grows into the unjust abuse; ultimately, the innocent are jeopardized by the encroachments of a bad system. Such seems to have been the course of experience in those legal systems where the privilege was not recognized.” 8 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed. 1940), 309. (Emphasis in original.)

*490This Court also has recognized that “history amply shows that confessions have often been extorted to save law enforcement officials the trouble and effort of obtaining valid and independent evidence . . . .” Haynes v. Washington, 373 U. S. 503, 519.

We have also learned the companion lesson of history that no system of criminal justice can, or should, survive if it comes to depend for its continued effectiveness on the citizens' abdication through unawareness of their constitutional rights. No system worth preserving should have to fear that if an accused is permitted to consult with a lawyer, he will become aware of, and exercise, these rights.13 If the exercise of constitutional rights will thwart the effectiveness of a system of law enforcement, then there is something very wrong with that system.14

We hold, therefore, that where, as here, the investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect, the sus*491pect has been taken into police custody, the police carry out a process of interrogations that lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements, the suspect has requested and been denied an opportunity to consult with his lawyer, and the police have not effectively warned him of his absolute constitutional right to remain silent, the accused has been denied “the Assistance of Counsel” in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution as “made obligatory upon the States by the Fourteenth Amendment,” Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S., at 342, and that no statement elicited by the police during the interrogation may be used against him at a criminal trial.

Crooker v. California, 357 U. S. 433, does not compel a contrary result. In that case the Court merely rejected the absolute rule sought by petitioner, that “every state denial of a request to contact counsel [is] an infringement of the constitutional right without regard to the circumstances of the case.” Id., at 440. (Emphasis in original.) In its place, the following rule was announced:

“[S]tate refusal of a request to engage counsel violates due process not only if the accused is deprived of counsel at trial on the merits, . . . but also if he is deprived of counsel for any part of the pretrial proceedings, provided that he is so prejudiced thereby as to infect his subsequent trial with an absence of 'that fundamental fairness essential to the very concept of justice. . . .’ The latter determination necessarily depends upon all the circumstances of the case.” 357 U. S., at 439-440. (Emphasis added.)

The Court, applying “these principles” to “the sum total of the circumstances [there] during the time petitioner was without counsel,” id., at 440, concluded that he had not been fundamentally prejudiced by the denial of his request for counsel. Among the critical circumstances which distinguish that case from this one are that the petitioner there, but not here, was explicitly advised by the police of his constitutional right to remain silent and *492not to “say anything” in response to the questions, id., at 437, and that petitioner there, but not here, was a well-educated man who had studied criminal law while attending law school for a year. The Court’s opinion in Cicenia v. Lagay, 357 U. S. 504, decided the same day, merely said that the “contention that petitioner had a constitutional right to confer with counsel is disposed of by Crooker v. California . . . That case adds nothing, therefore, to Crooker. In any event, to the extent that Cicenia or Crooker may be inconsistent with the principles announced today, they are not to be regarded as controlling.15

Nothing we have said today affects the powers of the police to investigate “an unsolved crime,” Spano v. New York, 360 U. S. 315, 327 (Stewart, J., concurring), by gathering information from witnesses and by other “proper investigative efforts.” Haynes v. Washington, 373 U. S. 503, 519. We hold only that when the process shifts from investigatory to accusatory — when its focus is on the accused and its purpose is to elicit a confession— our adversary system begins to operate, and, under the circumstances here, the accused must be permitted to consult with his lawyer.

The judgment of the Illinois Supreme Court is reversed and the case remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

Reversed and remanded.

Mr. Justice Harlan,

dissenting.

I would affirm the judgment of the Supreme Court of Illinois on the basis of Cicenia v. Lagay, 357 U. S. 504, *493decided by this Court only six years ago. Like my Brother White, post, p. 495, I think the rule announced today is most ill-conceived and that it seriously and unjustifiably fetters perfectly legitimate methods of criminal law enforcement.

Mr. Justice Stewart,

dissenting.

I think this case is directly controlled by Cicenia v. Lagay, 357 U. S. 504, and I would therefore affirm the judgment.

Massiah v. United States, 377 U. S. 201, is not in point here. In that case a federal grand jury had indicted Massiah. He had retained a lawyer and entered a formal plea of not guilty. Under our system of federal justice an indictment and arraignment are followed by a trial, at which the Sixth Amendment guarantees the defendant the assistance of counsel.* But Massiah was released on bail, and thereafter agents of the Federal Government deliberately elicited incriminating statements from him in the absence of his lawyer. We held that the use of these statements against him at his trial denied him the basic protections of the Sixth Amendment guarantee. Putting to one side the fact that the case now before us is not a federal case, the vital fact remains that this case does not involve the deliberate interrogation of a defendant after the initiation of judicial proceedings against him. The Court disregards this basic differenbe between the present case and Massiah’s, with the bland assertion that “that fact should make no difference.” Ante, p. 485.

It is “that fact,” I submit, which makes all the difference. Under our system of criminal justice the institution of formal, meaningful judicial proceedings, by way of indictment, information, or arraignment, marks the *494point at which a criminal investigation has ended and adversary proceedings have commenced. It is at this point that the constitutional guarantees attach which pertain to a criminal trial. Among those guarantees are the right to a speedy trial, the right of confrontation, and the right to trial by jury. Another is the guarantee of the assistance of counsel. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335; Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U. S. 52; White v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 59.

The confession which the Court today holds inadmissible was a voluntary one. It was given during the course of a perfectly legitimate police investigation of an unsolved murder. The Court says that what happened during this investigation “affected” the trial. I had always supposed that the whole purpose of a police investigation of a murder was to “affect” the trial of the murderer, and that it would be only an incompetent, unsuccessful, or corrupt investigation which would not do so. The Court further says that the Illinois police officers did not advise the petitioner of his “constitutional rights” before he confessed to the murder. This Court has never held that the Constitution requires the police to give any “advice” under circumstances such as these.

Supported by no stronger authority than its own rhetoric, the Court today converts a routine police investigation of an unsolved murder into a distorted analogue of a judicial trial. It imports into this investigation constitutional concepts historically applicable only after the onset of formal prosecutorial proceedings. By doing so, I think the Court perverts those precious constitutional guarantees, and frustrates the vital interests of society in preserving the legitimate and proper function of honest and purposeful police investigation.

Like my Brother ClaRK, I cannot escape the logic of my Brother White’s conclusions as to the extraordinary implications which emanate from the Court’s opinion in *495this case, and I share their views as to the untold and highly unfortunate impact today’s decision may have upon the fair administration of criminal justice. I can only hope we have completely misunderstood what the Court has said.

Mr. Justice White,

with whom Mr. Justice Clark and Mr. Justice Stewart join,

dissenting.

In Massiah v. United States, 377 U. S. 201, the Court held that as of the date of the indictment the prosecution is disentitled to secure admissions from the accused. The Court now moves that date back to the time when the prosecution begins to “focus” on the accused. Although the opinion purports to be limited to the facts of this case, it would be naive to think that the new constitutional right announced will depend upon whether the accused has retained his own counsel, cf. Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U. S. 335; Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U. S. 12; Douglas v. California, 372 U. S. 353, or has asked to consult with counsel in the course of interrogation. Cf. Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U. S. 506. At the very least the Court holds that once the accused becomes a suspect and, presumably, is arrested, any admission made to the police thereafter is inadmissible in evidence unless the accused has waived his right to counsel. The decision is thus another major step in the direction of the goal which the Court seemingly has in mind — to bar from evidence all admissions obtained from an individual suspected of crime, whether involuntarily made or not. It does of course put us one step “ahead” of the English judges who have had the good sense to leave the matter a discretionary one with the trial court.* I reject this step and *496the invitation to go farther which the Court has now issued.

By abandoning the voluntary-involuntary test for admissibility of confessions, the Court seems driven by the notion that it is uncivilized law enforcement to use an accused’s own admissions against him at his trial. It attempts to find a home for this new and nebulous rule of due process by attaching it to the right to counsel guaranteed in the federal system by the Sixth Amendment and binding upon the States by virtue of the due process guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment. Gideon v. Wainwright, supra. The right to counsel now not only entitles the accused to counsel’s advice and aid in preparing for trial but stands as an impenetrable barrier to any interrogation once the accused has become a suspect. From that very moment apparently his right to counsel attaches, a rule wholly unworkable and impossible to administer unless police cars are equipped with public defenders and undercover agents and police informants have defense counsel at their side. I would not abandon the Court’s prior cases defining with some care and analysis the circumstances requiring the presence or aid of counsel and substitute the amorphous and wholly unworkable principle that counsel is constitutionally required whenever he would or could be helpful. Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U. S. 52; White v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 59; Gideon v. *497Wainwright, supra. These cases dealt with the requirement of counsel at proceedings in which definable rights could be won or lost, not with stages where probative evidence might be obtained. Under this new approach one might just as well argue that a potential defendant is constitutionally entitled to a lawyer before, not after, he commits a crime, since it is then that crucial incriminating evidence is put within the reach of the Government by the would-be accused. Until now there simply has been no right guaranteed by the Federal Constitution to be free from the use at trial of a voluntary admission made prior to indictment.

It is incongruous to assume that the provision for counsel in the Sixth Amendment was meant to amend or supersede the self-incrimination provision of the Fifth Amendment, which is now applicable to the States. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U. S. 1. That amendment addresses itself to the very issue of incriminating admissions of an accused and resolves it by proscribing only compelled statements. Neither the Framers, the constitutional language, a century of decisions of this Court nor Professor Wigmore provides an iota of support for the idea that an accused has an absolute constitutional right not to answer even in the absence of compulsion — the constitutional right not to incriminate himself by making voluntary disclosures.

Today’s decision cannot be squared with other provisions of the Constitution which, in my view, define the system of criminal justice this Court is empowered to administer. The Fourth Amendment permits upon probable cause even compulsory searches of the suspect and his possessions and the use of the fruits of the search at trial, all in the absence of counsel. The Fifth Amendment and state constitutional provisions authorize, indeed require, inquisitorial grand jury proceedings at which a potential defendant, in the absence of counsel, *498is shielded against no more than compulsory incrimination. Mulloney v. United States, 79 F. 2d 566, 578 (C. A. 1st Cir.); United States v. Benjamin, 120 F. 2d 521, 522 (C. A. 2d Cir.); United States v. Scully, 225 F. 2d 113, 115 (C. A. 2d Cir.); United States v. Gilboy, 160 F. Supp. 442 (D. C. M. D. Pa.). A grand jury witness, who may be a suspect, is interrogated and his answers, at least until today, are admissible in evidence at trial. And these provisions have been thought of as constitutional safeguards to persons suspected of an offense. Furthermore, until now, the Constitution has permitted the accused to be fingerprinted and to be identified in a line-up or in the courtroom itself.

The Court chooses to ignore these matters and to rely on the virtues and morality of a system of criminal law enforcement which does not depend on the “confession.” No such judgment is to be found in the Constitution. It might be appropriate for a legislature to provide that a suspect should not be consulted during a criminal investigation ; that an accused should never be called before a grand jury to answer, even if he wants to, what may well be incriminating questions; and that no person, whether he be a suspect, guilty criminal or innocent bystander, should be put to the ordeal of responding to orderly non-compulsory inquiry by the State. But this is not the system our Constitution requires. The only “inquisitions” the Constitution forbids are those which compel incrimination. Escobedo’s statements were not compelled and the Court does not hold that they were.

This new American judges’ rule, which is to be applied in both federal and state courts, is perhaps thought to be a necessary safeguard against the possibility of extorted confessions. To this extent it reflects a deep-seated distrust of law enforcement officers everywhere, unsupported by relevant data or current material based upon our own *499experience. Obviously law enforcement officers can make mistakes and exceed their authority, as today’s decision shows that even judges can do, but I have somewhat more faith than the Court evidently has in the ability and desire of prosecutors and of the power of the appellate courts to discern and correct such violations of the law.

The Court may be concerned with a narrower matter: the unknowing defendant who responds to police questioning because he mistakenly believes that he must and that his admissions will not be used against him. But this worry hardly calls for the broadside the Court has now fired. The failure to inform an accused that he need not answer and that his answers may be used against him is very relevant indeed to whether the disclosures are compelled. Cases in this Court, to say the least, have never placed a premium on ignorance of constitutional rights. If an accused is told he must answer and does not know better, it would be very doubtful that the resulting admissions could be used against him. When the accused has not been informed of his rights at all the Court characteristically and properly looks very closely at the surrounding circumstances. See Ward v. Texas, 316 U. S. 547; Haley v. Ohio, 332 U. S. 596; Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U. S. 560. I would continue to do so. But in this case Danny Escobedo knew full well that he did not have to answer and knew full well that his lawyer had advised him not to answer.

I do not suggest for a moment that law enforcement will be destroyed by the rule announced today. The need for peace and order is too insistent for that. But it will be crippled and its task made a great deal more difficult, all in my opinion, for unsound, unstated reasons, which can find no home in any of the provisions of the Constitution.

Mr. Justice Stewart

delivered the opinion of the Court.

An Iowa trial jury found the respondent, Robert Williams, guilty of murder. The judgment of conviction was affirmed in the Iowa Supreme Court by a closely divided vote. In a subsequent habeas corpus proceeding a Federal District *390Court ruled that under the United States Constitution Williams is entitled to a new trial, and a divided Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit agreed. The question before us is whether the District Court and the Court of Appeals were wrong.

I

On the afternoon of December 24, 1968, a 10-year-old girl named Pamela Powers went with her family to the YMCA in Des Moines, Iowa, to watch a wrestling tournament in which her brother was participating. When she failed to return from a trip to the washroom, a search for her began. The search was unsuccessful.

Robert Williams, who had recently escaped from a mental hospital, was a resident of the YMCA. Soon after the girl’s disappearance Williams was seen in the YMCA lobby carrying some clothing and a large bundle wrapped in a blanket. He obtained help from a 14-year-old boy in opening the street door of the YMCA and the door to his automobile parked outside. When Williams placed the bundle in the front seat of his car the boy “saw two legs in it and they were skinny and white.” Before anyone could see what was in the bundle Williams drove away. His abandoned car was found the following day in Davenport, Iowa, roughly 160 miles east of Des Moines. A warrant was then issued in Des Moines for his arrest on a charge of abduction.

On the morning of December 26, a Des Moines lawyer named Henry McKnight went to the Des Moines police station and informed the officers present that he had just received a long-distance call from Williams, and that he had advised Williams to turn himself in to the Davenport police. Williams did surrender that morning to the police in Davenport, and they booked him on the charge specified in the arrest warrant and gave him the warnings required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436. The Davenport police then tele*391phoned their counterparts in Des Moines to inform them that Williams had surrendered. McKnight, the lawyer, was still at the Des Moines police headquarters, and Williams conversed with McKnight on the telephone. In the presence of the Des Moines chief of police and a police detective named Leaming, McKnight advised Williams that Des Moines police officers would be driving to Davenport to pick him up, that the officers would not interrogate him or mistreat him, and that Williams was not to talk to the officers about Pamela Powers until after consulting with McKnight upon his return to Des Moines. As a result of these conversations, it was agreed between McKnight and the Des Moines police officials that Detective Leaming and a fellow officer would drive to Davenport to pick up Williams, that they would bring him directly back to Des Moines, and that they would not question him during the trip.

In the meantime Williams was arraigned before a judge in Davenport on the outstanding arrest warrant. The judge advised him of his Miranda rights and committed him to jail. Before leaving the courtroom, Williams conferred with a lawyer named Kelly, who advised him not to make any statements until consulting with McKnight back in Des Moines.

Detective Leaming and his fellow officer arrived in Davenport about noon to pick up Williams and return him to Des Moines. Soon after their arrival they met with Williams and Kelly, who, they understood, was acting as Williams’ lawyer. Detective Leaming repeated the Miranda warnings, and told Williams:

“[W]e both know that you’re being represented here by Mr. Kelly and you’re being represented by Mr. McKnight in Des Moines, and ... I want you to remember this because we’ll be visiting between here and Des Moines.”

Williams then conferred again with Kelly alone, and after this conference Kelly reiterated to Detective Leaming that *392Williams was not to be questioned about the disappearance of Pamela Powers until after he had consulted with McKnight back in Des Moines. When Leaming expressed some reservations, Kelly firmly stated that the agreement with McKnight was to be carried out—that there was to be no interrogation of Williams during the automobile journey to Des Moines. Kelly was denied permission to ride in the police car back to Des Moines with Williams and the two officers.

The two detectives, with Williams in their charge, then set out on the 160-mile drive. At no time during the trip did Williams express a willingness to be interrogated in the absence of an attorney. Instead, he stated several times that “[w]hen I get to Des Moines and see Mr. McKnight, I am going to tell you the whole story.” Detective Leaming knew that Williams was a former mental patient, and knew also that he was deeply religious.

The detective and his prisoner soon embarked on a wideranging conversation covering a variety of topics, including the subject of religion. Then, not long after leaving Davenport and reaching the interstate highway, Detective Leaming delivered what has been referred to in the briefs and oral arguments as the “Christian burial speech.” Addressing Williams as “Reverend,” the detective said:

“I want to give you something to think about while we’re traveling down the road. . . . Number one, I want you to observe the weather conditions, it’s raining, it’s sleeting, it’s freezing, driving is very treacherous, visibility is poor, it’s going to be dark early this evening. They are predicting several inches of snow for tonight, and I feel that you yourself are the only person that knows where this little girl’s body is, that you yourself have only been there once, and if you get a snow on top of it you yourself may be unable to find it. And, since we will be going right past the area on the way into *393Des Moines, I feel that we could stop and locate the body, that the parents of this little girl should be entitled to a Christian burial for the little girl who was snatched away from them on Christmas [E]ve and murdered. And I feel we should stop and locate it on the way in rather than waiting until morning and trying to come back out after a snow storm and possibly not being able to find it at all.”

Williams asked Detective Leaming why he thought their route to Des Moines would be taking them past the girl’s body, and Leaming responded that he knew the body was in the area of Mitchellville—a town they would be passing on the way to Des Moines.1 Leaming then stated: “I do not want you to answer me. I don’t want to discuss it any further. Just think about it as we’re riding down the road.”

As the car approached Grinnell, a town approximately 100 miles west of Davenport, Williams asked whether the police had found the victim’s shoes. When Detective Leaming replied that he was unsure, Williams directed the officers to a service station where he said he had left the shoes; a search for them proved unsuccessful. As they continued towards Des Moines, Williams asked whether the police had found the blanket, and directed the officers to a rest area where he said he had disposed of the blanket. Nothing was found. The car continued towards Des Moines, and as it approached Mitchellville, Williams said that he would show the officers where the body was. He then directed the police to the body of Pamela Powers.

Williams was indicted for first-degree murder. Before trial, his counsel moved to suppress all evidence relating to or resulting from any statements Williams had made during the automobile ride from Davenport to Des Moines. After *394an evidentiary hearing the trial judge denied the motion. He found that “an agreement was made between defense counsel and the police officials to the effect that the Defendant was not to be questioned on the return trip to Des Moines,” and that the evidence in question had been elicited from Williams during “a critical stage in the proceedings requiring the presence of counsel on his request.” The judge ruled, however, that Williams had “waived his right to have an attorney present during the giving of such information.” 2

The evidence in question was introduced over counsel’s continuing objection at the subsequent trial. The jury found Williams guilty of murder, and the judgment of conviction was affirmed by the Iowa Supreme Court, a bare majority of whose members agreed with the trial court that Williams had “waived his right to the presence of his counsel” on the automobile ride from Davenport to Des Moines. State v. Williams, 182 N. W. 2d 396, 402. The four dissenting justices expressed the view that “when counsel and police have agreed defendant is not to be questioned until counsel is present and defendant has been advised not to talk and repeatedly has stated he will tell the whole story after he talks with counsel, the state should be required to make a stronger showing of intentional voluntary waiver than was made here.” Id., at 408.

Williams then petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa. Counsel for the State and for Williams stipulated that “the case would be submitted on the record of facts and proceedings in the trial court, without taking of further testimony.” The District Court made findings of fact as summarized above, and concluded as a matter of law that the evidence in question had been wrongly admitted at *395Williams’ trial. This conclusion was based on three alternative and independent grounds: (1) that Williams had been denied his constitutional right to the assistance of counsel; (2) that he had been denied the constitutional protections defined by this Court’s decisions in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U. S. 478, and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436; and (3) that in any event, his self-incriminatory statements on the automobile trip from Davenport to Des Moines had been involuntarily made. Further, the District Court ruled that there had been no waiver by Williams of the constitutional protections in question. 375 F. Supp. 170.

The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, with one judge dissenting, affirmed this judgment, 509 F. 2d 227, and denied a petition for rehearing en banc. We granted certiorari to consider the constitutional issues presented. 423 U. S. 1031.

II

A

Before turning to those issues, we must consider the petitioner’s threshold claim that the District Court disregarded the provisions of 28 U. S. C. § 2254 (d) in making its findings of fact in this case. That statute, which codifies most of the criteria set out in Townsend v. Sain, 372 U. S. 293, provides that, subject to enumerated exceptions, federal habeas corpus courts shall accept as correct the factual determinations made by the courts of the States.3

*396We conclude that there was no disregard of § 2254 (d) in this case. Although either of the parties might well have requested an evidentiary hearing in the federal habeas corpus proceedings, Townsend v. Sain, supra, at 322, they both instead voluntarily agreed in advance that the federal court should decide the case on the record made in the courts of the State. In so proceeding, the District Court made no *397findings of fact in conflict with those of the Iowa courts. The District Court did make some additional findings of fact based upon its examination of the state-court record, among them the findings that Kelly, the Davenport lawyer, had requested permission to ride in the police car from Davenport to Des Moines and that Detective Leaming had refused this request. But the additional findings were conscientiously and carefully explained by the District Court, 375 F. Supp., at 175-176, and were reviewed and approved by the Court of Appeals, which expressly held that “the District Court correctly applied 28 U. S. C. § 2254 in its resolution of the disputed evidentiary facts, and that the facts as found by the District Court had substantial basis in the record,” 509 F. 2d, at 231. The strictures of 28 U. S. C. § 2254 (d) require no more.4

B

As stated above, the District Court based its judgment in this case on three independent grounds. The Court of Appeals appears to have affirmed the judgment on two of those grounds.5 We have concluded that only one of them need be considered here.

Specifically, there is no need to review in this case the doctrine of Miranda v. Arizona, a doctrine designed to secure the constitutional privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U. S. 433, 438-439. It is equally unnecessary to evaluate the ruling of the District Court that Williams’ self-incriminating statements were, indeed, involuntarily made. Cf. Spano v. New York, 360 U. S. 315. For it is clear that the judgment before us must in any event be affirmed upon the ground that Williams was deprived *398of a different right—constitutional right—the right to the assistance of counsel.

This right, guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, is indispensable to the fair administration of our adversary system of criminal justice. Its vital need at the pretrial stage has perhaps nowhere been more succinctly explained than in Mr. Justice Sutherland’s memorable words for the Court 44 years ago in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45, 57:

“[D]uring perhaps the most critical period of the proceedings against these defendants, that is to say, from the time of their arraignment until the beginning of their trial, when consultation, thoroughgoing investigation and preparation were vitally important, the defendants did not have the aid of counsel in any real sense, although they were as much entitled to such aid during that period as at the trial itself.”

There has occasionally been a difference of opinion within the Court as to the peripheral scope of this constitutional right. See Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U. S. 682; Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U. S. 1. But its basic contours, which are identical in state and federal contexts, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335; Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U. S. 25, are too well established to require extensive elaboration here. Whatever else it may mean, the right to counsel granted by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments means at least that a person is entitled to the help of a lawyer at or after the time that judicial proceedings have been initiated against him—“whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment.” Kirby v. Illinois, supra, at 689. See Powell v. Alabama, supra; Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458; Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U. S. 52; Gideon v. Wainwright, supra; White v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 59; Massiah v. United States, 377 U. S. 201; United *399 States v. Wade, 388 U. S. 218; Gilbert v. California, 388 U. S. 263; Coleman v. Alabama, supra.

There can be no doubt in the present case that judicial proceedings had been initiated against Williams before the start of the automobile ride from Davenport to Des Moines. A warrant had been issued for his arrest, he had been arraigned on that warrant before a judge in a Davenport courtroom, and he had been committed by the court to confinement in jail. The State does not contend otherwise.

There can be no serious doubt, either, that Detective Leaming deliberately and designedly set out to elicit information from Williams just as surely as—and perhaps more effectively than—if he had formally interrogated him. Detective Leaming was fully aware before departing for Des Moines that Williams was being represented in Davenport by Kelly and in Des Moines by McKnight. Yet he purposely sought during Williams’ isolation from his lawyers to obtain as much incriminating information as possible. Indeed, Detective Leaming conceded as much when he testified at Williams’ trial:

“Q. In fact, Captain, whether he was a mental patient or not, you were trying to get all the information you could before he got to his lawyer, weren’t you?

“A. I was sure hoping to find out where that little girl was, yes, sir.

“Q. Well, I’ll put it this way: You was [sic] hoping to get all the information you could before Williams got back to McKnight, weren’t you?

“A. Yes, sir.” 6

*400The state courts clearly proceeded upon the hypothesis that Detective Leaming’s “Christian burial speech” had been tantamount to interrogation. Both courts recognized that Williams had been entitled to the assistance of counsel at the time he made the incriminating statements.7 Yet no such constitutional protection would have come into play if there had been no interrogation.

The circumstances of this case are thus constitutionally indistinguishable from those presented in Massiah v. United States, supra. The petitioner in that case was indicted for violating the federal narcotics law. He retained a lawyer, pleaded not guilty, and was released on bail. While he was free on bail a federal agent succeeded by surreptitious means in listening to incriminating statements made by him. Evidence of these statements was introduced against the petitioner at his trial, and he was convicted. This Court reversed the conviction, holding “that the petitioner was denied the basic protections of that guarantee [the right to counsel] when there was used against him at his trial evidence of his own incriminating words, which federal agents had deliberately elicited from him after he had been indicted and in the absence of his counsel.” 377 U. S., at 206.

That the incriminating statements were elicited surreptitiously in the Massiah case, and otherwise here, is constitutionally irrelevant. See ibid.; McLeod v. Ohio, 381 U. S. 356; United States v. Crisp, 435 F. 2d 354, 358 (CA7); *401 United States ex rel. O’Connor v. New Jersey, 405 F. 2d 632, 636 (CA3); Hancock v. White, 378 F. 2d 479 (CA1). Rather, the clear rule of Massiah is that once adversary proceedings have commenced against an individual, he has a right to legal representation when the government interrogates him.8 It thus requires no wooden or technical application of the Massiah doctrine to conclude that Williams was entitled to the assistance of counsel guaranteed to him by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.

III

The Iowa courts recognized that Williams had been denied the constitutional right to the assistance of counsel.9 They held, however, that he had waived that right during the course of the automobile trip from Davenport to Des Moines. The state trial court explained its determination of waiver as follows:

“The time element involved on the trip, the general circumstances of it, and more importantly the absence on the Defendant’s part of any assertion of his right or desire not to give information absent the presence of his attorney, are the main foundations for the Court’s conclusion that he voluntarily waived such right.”

*402In its lengthy opinion affirming this determination, the Iowa Supreme Court applied “the totality-of-circumstances test for a showing of waiver of constitutionally-protected rights in the absence of an express waiver,” and concluded that “evidence of the time element involved on the trip, the general circumstances of it, and the absence of any request or expressed desire for the aid of counsel before or at the time of giving information, were sufficient to sustain a conclusion that defendant did waive his constitutional rights as alleged.” 182 N. W. 2d, at 401, 402.

In the federal habeas corpus proceeding the District Court, believing that the issue of waiver was not one of fact but of federal law, held that the Iowa courts had “applied the wrong constitutional standards” in ruling that Williams had waived the protections that were his under the Constitution. 375 F. Supp., at 182. The court held “that it is the government which bears a heavy burden . . . but that is the burden which explicitly was placed on [Williams] by the state courts.” Ibid. (emphasis in original). After carefully reviewing the evidence, the District Court concluded:

“[U]nder the proper standards for determining waiver, there simply is no evidence to support a waiver. . . . [T]here is no affirmative indication . . . that [Williams] did waive his rights. . . . [T]he state courts' emphasis on the absence of a demand for counsel was not only legally inappropriate, but factually unsupportable as well, since Detective Leaming himself testified that [Williams], on several occasions during the trip, indicated that he would talk after he saw Mr. McKnight. Both these statements and Mr. Kelly's statement to Detective Leaming that [Williams] would talk only after seeing Mr. McKnight in Des Moines certainly were assertions of [Williams’] ‘right or desire not to give information absent the presence of his attorney . . . .' Moreover, the statements were obtained only after Detective *403Leaming’s use of psychology on a person whom he knew to be deeply religious and an escapee from a mental hospital—with the specific intent to elicit incriminating statements. In the face of this evidence, the State has produced no affirmative evidence whatsoever to support its claim of waiver, and, a fortiori, it cannot be said that the State has met its ‘heavy burden’ of showing a knowing and intelligent waiver of . . . Sixth Amendment rights.” Id., at 182-183 (emphasis in original; footnote omitted).

The Court of Appeals approved the reasoning of the District Court:

“A review of the record here . . . discloses no facts to support the conclusion of the state court that [Williams] had waived his constitutional rights other than that [he] had made incriminating statements. . . . The District Court here properly concluded that an incorrect constitutional standard had been applied by the state court in determining the issue of waiver. . . .

“[T]his court recently held that an accused can voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently waive his right to have counsel present at an interrogation after counsel has been appointed. . . . The prosecution, however, has the weighty obligation to show that the waiver was knowingly and intelligently made. We quite agree with Judge Hanson that the state here failed to so show.” 509 F. 2d, at 233.

The District Court and the Court of Appeals were correct in the view that the question of waiver was not a question of historical fact, but one which, in the words of Mr. Justice Frankfurter, requires “application of constitutional principles to the facts as found . . . .” Brown v. Allen, 344 U. S. 443, *404507 (separate opinion). See Townsend v. Sain, 372 U. S., at 309 n. 6, 318; Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U. S. 1, 4.

The District Court and the Court of Appeals were also correct in their understanding of the proper standard to be applied in determining the question of waiver as a matter of federal constitutional law—that it was incumbent upon the State to prove “an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S., at 464. That standard has been reiterated in many cases. We have said that the right to counsel does not depend upon a request by the defendant, Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U. S. 506, 513; cf. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S., at 471, and that courts indulge in every reasonable presumption against waiver, e. g., Brookhart v. Janis, supra, at 4; Glasser v. United States, 315 U. S. 60, 70. This strict standard applies equally to an alleged waiver of the right to counsel whether at trial or at a critical stage of pretrial proceedings. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U. S. 218, 238-240; United States v. Wade, 388 U. S., at 237.

We conclude, finally, that the Court of Appeals was correct in holding that, judged by these standards, the record in this case falls far short of sustaining petitioner’s burden. It is true that Williams had been informed of and appeared to understand his right to counsel. But waiver requires not merely comprehension but relinquishment, and Williams’ consistent reliance upon the advice of counsel in dealing with the authorities refutes any suggestion that he waived that right. He consulted McKnight by long-distance telephone before turning himself in. He spoke with McKnight by telephone again shortly after being booked. After he was arraigned, Williams sought out and obtained legal advice from Kelly. Williams again consulted with Kelly after Detective Leaming and his fellow officer arrived in Davenport. Throughout, Williams was advised not to make any statements before seeing McKnight in Des Moines, and was *405assured that the police had agreed not to question him. His statements while in the car that he would tell the whole story after seeing McKnight in Des Moines were the clearest expressions by Williams himself that he desired the presence of an attorney before any interrogation took place. But even before making these statements, Williams had effectively asserted his right to counsel by having secured attorneys at both ends of the automobile trip, both of whom, acting as his agents, had made clear to the police that no interrogation was to occur during the journey. Williams knew of that agreement and, particularly in view of his consistent reliance on counsel, there is no basis for concluding that he disavowed it.10

Despite Williams’ express and implicit assertions of his right to counsel, Detective Leaming proceeded to elicit incriminating statements from Williams. Leaming did not preface this effort by telling Williams that he had a right to the presence of a lawyer, and made no effort at all to ascertain whether Williams wished to relinquish that right. The circumstances of record in this case thus provide no reasonable basis for finding that Williams waived his right to the assistance of counsel.

The Court of Appeals did not hold, nor do we, that under the circumstances of this case Williams could not, without notice to counsel, have waived his rights under the Sixth and *406Fourteenth Amendments.11 It only held, as do we, that he did not.

IV

The crime of which Williams was convicted was senseless and brutal, calling for swift and energetic action by the police to apprehend the perpetrator and gather evidence with which he could be convicted. No mission of law enforcement officials is more important. Yet “[d]isinterested zeal for the public good does not assure either wisdom or right in the methods it pursues.” Haley v. Ohio, 332 U. S. 596, 605 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in judgment). Although we do not lightly affirm the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus in this case, so clear a violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments as here occurred cannot be condoned. The pressures on state executive and judicial officers charged with the administration of the criminal law are great, especially when the crime is murder and the victim a small child. But it is precisely the predictability of those pressures that makes imperative a resolute loyalty to the guarantees that the Constitution extends to us all.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.12

It is so ordered. 13

Mr. Justice Marshall,

concurring.

I concur wholeheartedly in my Brother Stewart’s opinion for the Court, but add these words in light of the dissenting *407opinions filed today. The dissenters have, I believe, lost sight of the fundamental constitutional backbone of our criminal law. They seem to think that Detective Leaming’s actions were perfectly proper, indeed laudable, examples of “good police work.” In my view, good police work is something far different from catching the criminal at any price. It is equally important that the police, as guardians of the law, fulfill their responsibility to obey its commands scrupulously. For “in the end life and liberty can be as much endangered from illegal methods used to convict those thought to be criminals as from the actual criminals themselves.” Spano v. New York, 360 U. S. 315, 320-321 (1959).

In this case, there can be no doubt that Detective Leaming consciously and knowingly set out to violate Williams’ Sixth Amendment right to counsel and his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, as Leaming himself understood those rights. Leaming knew that Williams had been advised *408by two lawyers not to make any statements to police until he conferred in Des Moines with his attorney there, Mr. McKnight. Leaming surely understood, because he had overheard McKnight tell Williams as much, that the location of the body would be revealed to police. Undoubtedly Leaming realized the way in which that information would be conveyed to the police: McKnight would learn it from his client and then he would lead police to the body. Williams would thereby be protected by the attorney-client privilege from incriminating himself by directly demonstrating his knowledge of the body’s location, and the unfortunate Powers child could be given a “Christian burial.”

Of course, this scenario would accomplish all that Learning sought from his investigation except that it would not produce incriminating statements or actions from Williams. Accordingly, Leaming undertook his charade to pry such evidence from Williams. After invoking the no-passengers rule to prevent attorney Kelly from accompanying the prisoner, Leaming had Williams at his mercy: during the three- or four-hour trip he could do anything he wished to elicit a confession. The detective demonstrated once again “that the efficiency of the rack and the thumbscrew can be matched, given the proper subject, by more sophisticated modes of 'persuasion.’ ” Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U. S. 199, 206 (1960).

Leaming knowingly isolated Williams from the protection of his lawyers and during that period he intentionally “persuaded” him to give incriminating evidence. It is this intentional police misconduct—not good police practice—that the Court rightly condemns. The heinous nature of the crime is no excuse, as the dissenters would have it, for condoning knowing and intentional police transgression of the constitutional rights of a defendant. If Williams is to go free—and given the ingenuity of Iowa prosecutors on retrial or in a civil commitment proceeding, I doubt very much that there is any chance a dangerous criminal will be loosed on the streets, the *409bloodcurdling cries of the dissents notwithstanding—it will hardly be because he deserves it. It will be because Detective Leaming, knowing full well that he risked reversal of Williams’ conviction, intentionally denied Williams the right of every American under the Sixth Amendment to have the protective shield of a lawyer between himself and the awesome power of the State.

I think it appropriate here to recall not Mr. Justice Cardozo’s opinion in People v. Defore, 242 N. Y. 13, 150 N. E. 585 (1926), see opinion of The Chief Justice, post, at 416, and n. 1, but rather the closing words of Mr. Justice Brandeis’ great dissent in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438, 471, 485 (1928):

“In a government of laws, existence of the government will be imperilled if it fails to observe the law scrupulously. Our Government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example. Crime is contagious. If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy. To declare that in the administration of the criminal law the end justifies the means—to declare that the Government may commit crimes in order to secure the conviction of a private criminal—would bring terrible retribution. Against that pernicious doctrine this Court should resolutely set its face.”

Mr. Justice Powell,

concurring.

As the dissenting opinion of The Chief Justice sharply illustrates, resolution of the issues in this case turns primarily on one’s perception of the facts. There is little difference of opinion, among the several courts and numerous judges who have reviewed the case, as to the relevant constitutional principles: (i) Williams had the right to assistance of coun*410sel; (ii) once that right attached (it is conceded that it had in this case), the State could not properly interrogate Williams in the absence of counsel unless he voluntarily and knowingly waived the right; and (iii) the burden was on the State to show that Williams in fact had waived the right before the police interrogated him.

The critical factual issue is whether there had been a voluntary waiver, and this turns in large part upon whether there was interrogation. As my dissenting Brothers view the facts so differently from my own perception of them, I will repeat briefly the background, setting, and factual predicate to the incriminating statements by Williams—even though the opinion of the Court sets forth all of this quite accurately.

I

Prior to the automobile trip from Davenport to Des Moines, Williams had been arrested, booked, and carefully given Miranda warnings. It is settled constitutional doctrine that he then had the right to the assistance of counsel. His exercise of this right was evidenced uniquely in this case. Williams had consulted counsel prior to his arrest, and surrendered to the police on advice of counsel. At all times thereafter Williams, to the knowledge of the police, had two attorneys: McKnight, whom Williams consulted initially and who awaited his arrival in Des Moines, and Kelly, who had represented Williams in Davenport where he surrendered. Significantly, the recognition by the police of the status of counsel was evidenced by the express agreement between McKnight and the appropriate police officials that the officers who would drive Williams to Des Moines would not interrogate him in the absence of counsel.

The incriminating statements were made by Williams during the long ride while in the custody of two police officers, and in the absence of his retained counsel. The dissent of The *411Chief Justice concludes that prior to these statements, Williams had “made a valid waiver” of his right to have counsel present. Post, at 417. This view disregards the record evidence clearly indicating that the police engaged in interrogation of Williams. For example, the District Court noted:

“According to Detective Leaming’s own testimony, the specific purpose of this conversation [which was initiated by Leaming and which preceded Williams’ confession] was to obtain statements and information from [Williams] concerning the missing girl.” 375 F. Supp. 170, 174.

In support of that finding, the District Court quoted extensively from Leaming’s testimony, including the following:

“Q. In fact, Captain, whether [Williams] was a mental patient or not, you were trying to get all the information you could before he got to his lawyer, weren’t you?

“A. I was sure hoping to find out where that little girl was, yes, sir.

“Q. Well, I’ll put it this way: You were hoping to get all the information you could before Williams got back to McKnight, weren’t you?

“A. Yes, sir.” Ibid.

After finding, upon a full review of the facts, that there had been “interrogation,” the District Court addressed the ultimate issue of “waiver” and concluded not only that the State had failed to carry its burden but also that

“there is nothing in the record to indicate that [Williams] waived his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights except the fact that statements eventually were obtained.” Id., at 182. (Emphasis in original.)

The Court of Appeals stated affirmatively that “the facts *412as found by the District Court had substantial basis in the record.” 509 F. 2d 227, 231.1

I join the opinion of the Court which also finds that the efforts of Detective Leaming “to elicit information from Williams,” as conceded by counsel for petitioner at oral argument, ante, at 400 n. 6, were a skillful and effective form of interrogation. Moreover, the entire setting was conducive to the psychological coercion that was successfully exploited. Williams was known by the police to be a young man with quixotic religious convictions and a history of mental disorders. The date was the day after Christmas, the weather was ominous, and the setting appropriate for Detective Leaming’s talk of snow concealing the body and preventing a “Christian burial.” Williams was alone in the automobile with two police officers for several hours. It is clear from the record, as both of the federal courts below found, that there was no evidence of a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to have counsel present beyond the fact that Williams ultimately confessed. It is settled law that an inferred waiver of a constitutional right is disfavored. Estelle v. Williams, 425 U. S. 501, 515 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring). I find no basis in the record of this case—or in the dissenting opin*413ions—for disagreeing with the conclusion of the District Court that “the State has produced no affirmative evidence whatsoever to support its claim of waiver.” 375 F. Supp., at 183.

The dissenting opinion of The Chief Justice states that the Court's holding today “conclusively presumes a suspect is legally incompetent to change his mind and tell the truth until an attorney is present.” Post, at 419. I find no justification for this view. On the contrary, the opinion of the Court is explicitly clear that the right to assistance of counsel may be waived, after it has attached, without notice to or consultation with counsel. Ante, at 405-406. We would have such a case here if petitioner had proved that the police officers refrained from coercion and interrogation, as they had agreed, and that Williams freely on his own initiative had confessed the crime.

II

In discussing the exclusionary rule, the dissenting opinion of The Chief Justice refers to Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465 (1976), decided last Term. In that case, we held that a federal court need not apply the exclusionary rule on habeas corpus review of a Fourth Amendment claim absent a showing that the state prisoner was denied an opportunity for a full and fair litigation of that claim at trial and on direct review.

This case also involves review on habeas corpus of a state conviction, and the decisions that the Court today affirms held that Williams’ incriminating statements should have been excluded.2 As Stone was decided subsequently to these *414decisions, the courts below had no occasion to consider whether the principle enunciated in Stone may have been applicable in this case. That question has not been presented in the briefs or arguments submitted to us,3 and we therefore have no occasion to consider the possible applicability of Stone. The applicability of the rationale of Stone in the Fifth and Sixth Amendment context raises a number of unresolved issues. Many Fifth and Sixth Amendment claims arise in the context of challenges to the fairness of a trial or to the integrity of the factfinding process. In contrast, Fourth Amendment claims uniformly involve evidence that is “typically reliable and often the most probative information bearing on the guilt or innocence of the defendant.” Stone v. Powell, supra, at 490. Whether the rationale of Stone should be applied to those Fifth and Sixth Amendment claims or classes of claims that more closely parallel claims under the Fourth Amendment is a question as to which I intimate no view, and which should be resolved only after the implications of such a ruling have been fully explored.

Mr. Justice Stevens,

concurring.

Mr. Justice Stewart, in his opinion for the Court which I join, Mr. Justice Powell, and Mr. Justice Marshall have *415accurately explained the reasons why the law requires the result we reach today. Nevertheless, the strong language in the dissenting opinions prompts me to add this brief comment about the Court's function in a case such as this.

Nothing that we write, no matter how well reasoned or forcefully expressed, can bring back the victim of this tragedy or undo the consequences of the official neglect which led to the respondent's escape from a state mental institution. The emotional aspects of the case make it difficult to decide dispassionately, but do not qualify our obligation to apply the law with an eye to the future as well as with concern for the result in the particular case before us.

Underlying the surface issues in this case is the question whether a fugitive from justice can rely on his lawyer’s advice given in connection with a decision to surrender voluntarily. The defendant placed his trust in an experienced Iowa trial lawyer who in turn trusted the Iowa law enforcement authorities to honor a commitment made during negotiations which led to the apprehension of a potentially dangerous person. Under any analysis, this was a critical stage of the proceeding in which the participation of an independent professional was of vital importance to the accused and to society. At this stage—as in countless others in which the law profoundly affects the life of the individual—the lawyer is the essential medium through which the demands and commitments of the sovereign are communicated to the citizen. If, in the long run, we are seriously concerned about the individual’s effective representation by counsel, the State cannot be permitted to dishonor its promise to this lawyer.*

Mr. Chief Justice Burger,

dissenting.

The result in this case ought to be intolerable in any society which purports to call itself an organized society. It con*416tinues the Court—by the narrowest margin—on the much-criticized course of punishing the public for the mistakes and misdeeds of law enforcement officers, instead of punishing the officer directly, if in fact he is guilty of wrongdoing. It mechanically and blindly keeps reliable evidence from juries whether the claimed constitutional violation involves gross police misconduct or honest human error.

Williams is guilty of the savage murder of a small child; no member of the Court contends he is not. While in custody, and after no fewer than five warnings of his rights to silence and to counsel, he led police to the concealed body of his victim. The Court concedes Williams was not threatened or coerced and that he spoke and acted voluntarily and with full awareness of his constitutional rights. In the face of all this, the Court now holds that because Williams was prompted by the detective’s statement—not interrogation but a statement— the jury must not be told how the police found the body.

Today’s holding fulfills Judge (later Mr. Justice) Cardozo’s grim prophecy that someday some court might carry the exclusionary rule to the absurd extent that its operative effect would exclude evidence relating to the body of a murder victim because of the means by which it was found.1 In so ruling *417the Court regresses to playing a grisly game of “hide and seek,” once more exalting the sporting theory of criminal justice which has been experiencing a decline in our jurisprudence. With Justices White, Blackmun, and Rehnquist, I categorically reject the remarkable notion that the police in this case were guilty of unconstitutional misconduct, or any conduct justifying the bizarre result reached by the Court. Apart from a brief comment on the merits, however, I wish to focus on the irrationality of applying the increasingly discredited exclusionary rule to this case.

The Court Concedes Williams’ Disclosures Were Voluntary

Under well-settled precedents which the Court freely acknowledges, it is very clear that Williams had made a valid waiver of his Fifth Amendment right to silence and his Sixth Amendment right to counsel when he led police to the child’s body. Indeed, even under the Court’s analysis I do not understand how a contrary conclusion is possible.

The Court purports to apply as the appropriate constitutional waiver standard the familiar “intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege” test of Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458, 464 (1938). Ante, at 404. The Court assumes, without deciding, that Williams’ conduct and statements were voluntary. It concedes, as it must, ibid., that Williams had been informed of and fully understood his constitutional rights and the consequences of their waiver. Then, having either assumed or found every element necessary to make out a valid waiver under its own test, the *418Court reaches the astonishing conclusion that no valid waiver has been demonstrated.

This remarkable result is compounded by the Court’s failure to define what evidentiary showing the State failed to make. Only recently, in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U. S. 218, 238 n. 25 (1973), the Court analyzed the distinction between a voluntary act and the waiver of a right; there Mr. Justice Stewart stated for the Court:

“[T]he question whether a person has acted ‘voluntarily’ is quite distinct from the question whether he has ‘waived’ a trial right. The former question, as we made clear in Brady v. United States, 397 U. S. [742,] 749, can be answered only by examining all the relevant circumstances to determine if he has been coerced. The latter question turns on the extent of his knowledge.”

Similarly, in McMann v. Richardson, 397 U. S. 759, 766 (1970), we said that since a guilty plea constituted a waiver of a host of constitutional rights, “it must be an intelligent act ‘done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.’” If the Court today applied these standards with fidelity to the Schneckloth and McMann holdings it could not reach the result now announced.

The evidence is uncontradicted that Williams had abundant knowledge of his right to have counsel present and of his right to silence. Since the Court does not question his mental competence, it boggles the mind to suggest that Williams could not understand that leading police to the child’s body would have other than the most serious consequences. All of the elements necessary to make out a valid waiver are shown by the record and acknowledged by the Court; we thus are left to guess how the Court reached its holding.

One plausible but unarticulated basis for the result reached is that once a suspect has asserted his right not to talk without the presence of an attorney, it becomes legally impossible *419for him to waive that right until he has seen an attorney. But constitutional rights are personal, and an otherwise valid waiver should not be brushed aside by judges simply because an attorney was not present. The Court’s holding operates to “imprison a man in his privileges,” Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U. S. 269, 280 (1942); it conclusively presumes a suspect is legally incompetent to change his mind and tell the truth until an attorney is present. It denigrates an individual to a nonperson whose free will has become hostage to a lawyer so that until the lawyer consents, the suspect is deprived of any legal right or power to decide for himself that he wishes to make a disclosure. It denies that the rights to counsel and silence are personal, nondelegable, and subject to a waiver only by that individual.2 The opinions in support of the Court’s judgment do not enlighten us as to why police conduct—whether good or bad—should operate to suspend Williams’ right to change his mind and “tell all” at once rather than waiting until he reached Des Moines.3

In his concurring opinion Me. Justice Powell suggests that the result in this case turns on whether Detective Leaming’s remarks constituted “interrogation,” as he views them, or whether they were “statements" intended to prick the conscience of the accused. I find it most remarkable that a murder case should turn on judicial interpretation that a statement becomes a question simply because it is followed by an *420incriminating disclosure from the suspect. The Court seems to be saying that since Williams said he would “tell the whole story” at Des Moines, the police should have been content and waited; of course, that would have been the wiser course, especially in light of the nuances of constitutional jurisprudence applied by the Court, but a murder case ought not turn on such tenuous strands.

In any case, the Court assures us, ante, at 405-406, this is not at all what it intends, and that a valid waiver was possible in these circumstances, but was not quite made. Here, of course, Williams did not confess to the murder in so many words; it was his conduct in guiding police to the body, not his words, which incriminated him. And the record is replete with evidence that Williams knew precisely what he was doing when he guided police to the body. The human urge to confess wrongdoing is, of course, normal in all save hardened, professional criminals, as psychiatrists and analysts have demonstrated. T. Reik, The Compulsion to Confess (1972).

(2)

The Exclusionary Rule Should Not be Applied to Non-egregious Police Conduct

Even if there was no waiver, and assuming a technical violation occurred, the Court errs gravely in mechanically applying the exclusionary rule without considering whether that Draconian judicial doctrine should be invoked in these circumstances, or indeed whether any of its conceivable goals will be furthered by its application here.

The obvious flaws of the exclusionary rule as a judicial remedy are familiar. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388, 411 (1971) (Burger, C. J., dissenting); Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465, 498-502 (1976) (Burger, C. J., concurring); Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. Chi. L. Rev. 665 (1970); Williams, The Exclusionary Rule Under Foreign Law—Eng*421land, 52 J. Crim. L. 272 (1961). Today’s holding interrupts what has been a more rational perception of the constitutional and social utility of excluding reliable evidence from the truth-seeking process. In its Fourth Amendment context, we have now recognized that the exclusionary rule is in no sense a personal constitutional right, but a judicially conceived remedial device designed to safeguard and effectuate guaranteed legal rights generally. Stone v. Powell, supra, at 482; United States v. Janis, 428 U. S. 433, 443-447 (1976); United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338, 347-348 (1974); see Alderman v. United States, 394 U. S. 165, 174—175 (1969). We have repeatedly emphasized that deterrence of unconstitutional or otherwise unlawful police conduct is the only valid justification for excluding reliable and probative evidence from the criminal factfinding process. Stone v. Powell, supra, at 485-486; United States v. Janis, supra, at 446, 458-459, n. 35; United States v. Peltier, 422 U. S. 531, 536-539 (1975).

Accordingly, unlawfully obtained evidence is not automatically excluded from the factfinding process in all circumstances.4 In a variety of contexts we inquire whether ap*422plication of the rule will promote its objectives sufficiently to justify the enormous cost it imposes on society. “As with any remedial device, the application of the rule has been restricted to those areas where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served.” United States v. Calandra, supra, at 348; accord, Stone v. Powell, supra, at 486-491; United States v. Janis, supra; Brown v. Illinois, 422 U. S. 590, 606, 608-609 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring in part); United States v. Peltier, supra, at 538-539:

This is, of course, the familiar balancing process applicable to cases in which important competing interests are at stake. It is a recognition, albeit belated, that “the policies behind the exclusionary rule are not absolute,” Stone v. Powell, supra, at 488. It acknowledges that so serious an infringement of the crucial truth-seeking function of a criminal prosecution should be allowed only when imperative to safeguard constitutional rights. An important factor in this amalgam is whether the violation at issue may properly be classed as “egregious.” Brown v. Illinois, supra, at 609 (Powell, J., concurring in part). The Court understandably does not try to characterize the police actions here as “egregious.”

Against this background, it is striking that the Court fails even to consider whether the benefits secured by application of the exclusionary rule in this case outweigh its obvious social costs. Perhaps the failure is due to the fact that this case arises not under the Fourth Amendment, but under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966), and the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The Court apparently perceives the function of the exclusionary rule to be so different in these varying contexts that it must be mechanically and uncriti*423cally applied in all cases arising outside the Fourth Amendment.5

But this is demonstrably not the case where police conduct collides with Miranda's procedural safeguards rather than with the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. Involuntary and coerced admissions are suppressed because of the inherent unreliability of a confession wrung from an unwilling suspect by threats, brutality, or other coercion. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U. S., at 242; Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U. S. 618, 638 (1965); Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S., at 496-497 (Burger, C. J., concurring) ; Kaufman v. United States, 394 U. S. 217, 237 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting). We can all agree on “ ‘[t]he abhorrence of society to the use of involuntary confessions,’ ” Linkletter v. Walker, supra, at 638, and the need to preserve the integrity of the human personality and individual free will. Ibid.; Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U. S. 199, 206-207 (1960).

But use of Williams’ disclosures and their fruits carries no risk whatever of unreliability, for the body was found where he said it would be found. Moreover, since the Court makes no issue of voluntariness, no dangers are posed to individual dignity or free will. Miranda’s safeguards are premised on presumed unreliability long associated with confessions extorted by brutality or threats; they are not personal constitutional rights, but are simply judicially created prophylactic measures. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U. S. 433 (1974); Doyle *424v. Ohio, 426 U. S. 610, 617 (1976); Brown v. Illinois, supra, at 606 (Powell, J., concurring in part).

Thus, in cases where incriminating disclosures are voluntarily made without coercion, and hence not violative of the Fifth Amendment, but are obtained in violation of one of the Miranda prophylaxes, suppression is no longer automatic. Rather, we weigh the deterrent effect on unlawful police conduct, together with the normative Fifth Amendment justifications for suppression, against “the strong interest under any system of justice of making available to the trier of fact all concededly relevant and trustworthy evidence which either party seeks to adduce. . . . We also 'must consider society’s interest in the effective prosecution of criminals ....’” Michigan v. Tucker, supra, at 450.6 This individualized consideration or balancing process with respect to the exclusionary sanction is possible in this case, as in others, because Williams’ incriminating disclosures are not infected with any element of compulsion the Fifth Amendment forbids; nor, as noted earlier, does this evidence pose any danger of unreliability to the factfinding process. In short, there is no reason to exclude this evidence.

Similarly, the exclusionary rule is not uniformly implicated in the Sixth Amendment, particularly its pretrial aspects. We have held that

“the core purpose of the counsel guarantee was to assure 'Assistance’ at trial, when the accused was confronted with both the intricacies of the law and the advocacy of the public prosecutor.” United States v. Ash, 413 U. S. 300, 309 (1973).

Thus, the right to counsel is fundamentally a “trial” right necessitated by the legal complexities of a criminal prosecu*425tion and the need to offset, to the trier of fact, the power of the State as prosecutor. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, supra, at 241. It is now thought that modern law enforcement involves pretrial confrontations at which the defendant’s fate might effectively be sealed before the right of counsel could attach. In order to make meaningful the defendant’s opportunity to a fair trial and to assistance of counsel at that trial—the core purposes of the counsel guarantee—the Court formulated a per se rule guaranteeing counsel at what it has characterized as “critical” pretrial proceedings where substantial rights might be endangered. United States v. Wade, 388 U. S. 218, 224-227 (1967); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, supra, at 238-239.

As we have seen in the Fifth Amendment setting, violations of prophylactic rules designed to safeguard other constitutional guarantees and deter impermissible police conduct need not call for the automatic suppression of evidence without regard to the purposes served by exclusion; nor do Fourth Amendment violations merit uncritical suppression of evidence. In other situations we decline to suppress eyewitness identifications which are the products of unnecessarily suggestive lineups or photo displays unless there is a “very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.” Simmons v. United States, 390 U. S. 377, 384 (1968). Recognizing that “ [i]t is the likelihood of misidentification which violates a defendant’s right to due process,” Neil v. Biggers, 409 U. S. 188, 198 (1972), we exclude evidence only when essential to safeguard the integrity of the truth-seeking process. The test, in short, is the reliability of the evidence.

So, too, in the Sixth Amendment sphere failure to have counsel in a pretrial setting should not lead to the “knee-jerk” suppression of relevant and reliable evidence. Just as even uncounseled “critical” pretrial confrontations may often be conducted fairly and not in derogation of Sixth Amendment values, Stovall v. Denno, 388 U. S. 293, 298-299 (1967), evi*426dence obtained in such proceedings should be suppressed only when its use would imperil the core values the Amendment was written to protect. Having extended Sixth Amendment concepts originally thought to relate to the trial itself to earlier periods when a criminal investigation is focused on a suspect, application of the drastic bar of exclusion should be approached with caution.

In any event, the fundamental purpose of the Sixth Amendment is to safeguard the fairness of the trial and the integrity of the factfinding process.7 In this case, where the evidence of how the child’s body was found is of unquestioned reliability, and since the Court accepts Williams’ disclosures as voluntary and uncoerced, there is no issue either of fairness or evidentiary reliability to justify suppression of truth. It appears suppression is mandated here for no other reason than the Court’s general impression that it may have a beneficial effect on future police conduct; indeed, the Court fails to say even that much in defense of its holding.

Thus, whether considered under Miranda or the Sixth Amendment, there is no more reason to exclude the evidence in this case than there was in Stone v. Powell;8 that holding was *427premised on the utter reliability of evidence sought to be suppressed, the irrelevancy of the constitutional claim to the criminal defendant's factual guilt or innocence, and the minimal deterrent effect of habeas corpus on police misconduct. This case, like Stone v. Powell, comes to us by way of habeas corpus after a fair trial and appeal in the state courts. Relevant factors in this case are thus indistinguishable from those in Stone, and from those in other Fourth Amendment cases suggesting a balancing approach toward utilization of the exclusionary sanction. Rather than adopting a formalistic analysis varying with the constitutional provision invoked,9 we should apply the exclusionary rule on the basis of its benefits and costs, at least in those cases where the police conduct at issue is far from being outrageous or egregious.

In his opinion, Mr. Justice Powell intimates that he agrees there is little sense in applying the exclusionary sanction where the evidence suppressed is “ 'typically reliable and often the most probative information bearing on the guilt or innocence of the defendant.' ” Ante, at 414. Since he seems to concede that the evidence in question is highly reliable and probative, his joining the Court’s opinion can be explained only by an insistence that the “question has not been presented in the briefs or arguments submitted to us.” Ibid. But petitioner has directly challenged the applicability of the exclusionary rule to this case, Brief for Petitioner 31-32, and has invoked principles of comity and federalism against reversal of the conviction. Id., at 69-73. Moreover, at oral argument—the first opportunity to do so—petitioner argued *428that our intervening decision in Stone v. Powell should be extended to this case, just as respondent argued that it should not. Tr. of Oral Arg. 26-27, 49-50.

At the least, if our intervening decision in Stone makes application of the exclusionary rule in this case an open question which “should be resolved only after the implications of such a ruling have been fully explored,” the plainly proper course is to vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case for reconsideration in light of that case. Indeed, only recently we actually applied the intervening decision of Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229 (1976), to resolve the constitutional issue in Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U. S. 252 (1977). There, we found no difficulty in applying the intervening holding ourselves without a remand to give the Court of Appeals an opportunity to reconsider its holding; we reached the correct result directly, over Mr. Justice White's dissent urging a remand. Today, the Court declines either to apply the intervening case of Stone v. Powell, which Mr. Justice Powell admits may well be controlling, or to remand for reconsideration in light of that case; this is all the more surprising since Mr. Justice Powell wrote Stone v. Powell and today makes the fifth vote for the Court's judgment.

The bizarre result reached by the Court today recalls Mr. Justice Black’s strong dissent in Kaufman v. United States, 394 U. S., at 231. There, too, a defendant sought release after his conviction had been affirmed on appeal. There, as here, the defendant’s guilt was manifest, and was not called into question by the constitutional claims presented. This Court granted relief because it thought reliable evidence had been unconstitutionally obtained. Mr. Justice Black’s reaction, foreshadowing our long overdue holding in Stone v. Powell, serves as a fitting conclusion to the views I have expressed:

“It is seemingly becoming more and more difficult to gain acceptance for the proposition that punishment of *429the guilty is desirable, other things being equal. One commentator, who attempted in vain to dissuade this Court from today’s holding, thought it necessary to point out that there is ‘a strong public interest in convicting the guilty.’ . . .

". . . I would not let any criminal conviction become invulnerable to collateral attack where there is left remaining the probability or possibility that constitutional commands related to the integrity of the fact-finding process have been violated. In such situations society has failed to perform its obligation to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime. But it is quite a different thing to permit collateral attack on a conviction after a trial according to due process when the defendant clearly is, by the proof and by his own admission, guilty of the crime charged. . . . In collateral attacks whether by habeas corpus or by § 2255 proceedings, I would always require that the convicted defendant raise the kind of constitutional claim that casts some shadow of a doubt on his guilt. This defendant is permitted to attack his conviction collaterally although he conceded at the trial and does not now deny that he had robbed the savings and loan association and although the evidence makes absolutely clear that he knew what he was doing. Thus, his guilt being certain, surely he does not have a constitutional right to get a new trial. I cannot possibly agree with the Court.” 394 U. S., at 240-242.

Like Mr. Justice Black in Kaufman, I cannot possibly agree with the Court.

Mr. Justice White,

with whom Mr. Justice Blackmun and Mr. Justice Rehnquist join, dissenting.

The respondent in this case killed a 10-year-old child. The majority sets aside his conviction, holding that certain *430statements of unquestioned reliability were unconstitutionally obtained from him, and under the circumstances probably makes it impossible to retry him. Because there is nothing in the Constitution or in our previous cases which requires the Court’s action, I dissent.

I

The victim in this case disappeared from a YMCA building in Des Moines, Iowa, on Christmas Eve in 1968. Respondent was seen shortly thereafter carrying a bundle wrapped in a blanket from the YMCA to his car. His car was found in Davenport, Iowa, 160 miles away on Christmas Day. A warrant was then issued for his arrest. On the day after Christmas respondent surrendered himself voluntarily to local police in Davenport where he was arraigned. The Des Moines police, in turn, drove to Davenport, picked respondent up and drove him back to Des Moines. During the trip back to Des Moines respondent made statements evidencing his knowledge of the whereabouts of the victim’s clothing and body and leading the police to the body. The statements were, of course, made without the presence of counsel since no counsel was in the police car. The issue in this case is whether respondent—who was entitled not to make any statements to the police without consultation with and/or presence of counsel1—validly waived those rights.

The relevant facts are as follows. Before the Des Moines police officers arrived in Davenport, respondent was twice advised, once by Davenport police and once by a judge, of his right to counsel under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. *431436 (1966). Respondent had in any event not only retained counsel prior to the arrival of the Des Moines police, but had consulted with that counsel on the subject of talking to the police. His attorney, Mr. McKnight, spoke with him from the Des Moines police office when respondent was in the Davenport police office. He advised respondent not to talk to the Des Moines police officers during the trip back to Des Moines, but told him that he was “going to have to tell the officers where she [the victim] is” when he arrived in Des Moines. Respondent also consulted with a lawyer in Davenport, who also advised him against talking to the police during the ride back to Des Moines. Thus, prior to the arrival of the Des Moines police, respondent had been effectively informed by at least four people that he need not talk to the police in the absence of counsel during his trip to Des Moines. Then, when the Des Moines police arrived, one of them advised respondent, inter alia, “that he had a right to an attorney present during any questioning.” The Des Moines police officer asked respondent: “[D]o you fully understand that?” Respondent said that he did. The officer then “advised him that [the officer] wanted him to be sure to remember what [the officer] had just told him because it was a long ride back to Des Moines and he and [the officer] would be visiting.” Respondent then consulted again with the Davenport attorney, who advised him not to make any statements to the police officers and so informed the officers—directing them not to question him. After this series of warnings by two attorneys, two sets of police officers, and a judge, the trip to Des Moines commenced.

Sometime early in the trip one of the officers, Detective Learning, said:

“I want to give you something to think about while we’re traveling down the road. . . . Number one, I want you to observe the weather conditions, it’s raining, it’s sleeting, it’s freezing, driving is very treacherous, visi*432bility is poor, it’s going to be dark early this evening. They are predicting several inches of snow for tonight, and I feel that you yourself are the only person that knows where this little girl’s body is, that you yourself have only been there once, and if you get a snow on top of it you yourself may be unable to find it. And, since we will be going right past the area on the way into Des Moines, I feel that we could stop and locate the body, that the parents of this little girl should be entitled to a Christian burial for the little girl who was snatched away from them on Christmas [E]ve and murdered. And I feel we should stop and locate it on the way in rather than waiting until morning and trying to come back out after a snow storm and possibly not being able to find it at all.”

Respondent asked Detective Leaming why he thought their route to Des Moines would be taking them past the girl’s body, and Leaming responded that he knew the body was in the area of Mitchellville—a town they would be passing on the way to Des Moines. Leaming then stated: “I do not want you to answer me. I don’t want to discuss it any further. Just think about it as we’re riding down the road.” On several occasions during the trip, respondent told the officers that he would tell them the whole story when he got to Des Moines and saw Mr. McKnight—an indication that he knew he was entitled to wait until his counsel was present before talking to the police.2

*433Some considerable time thereafter,3 without any prompting on the part of any state official so far as the record reveals, respondent asked whether the police had found the victim's shoes. The subject of the victim’s clothing had never been broached by the police nor suggested by anything the police had said. So far as the record reveals, the subject was suggested to respondent solely by the fact that the police car was then about to pass the gas station where respondent had hidden the shoes. When the police said they were unsure whether they had found the shoes, respondent directed them to the gas station. When the car continued on its way to Des Moines, responded asked whether the blanket had been found. Once again this subject had not previously been broached. Respondent directed the officers to a rest area where he had left the blanket. When the car again continued, respondent said that he would direct the officers to the victim’s body, and he did so.

II

The strictest test of waiver which might be applied to this case is that set forth in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458, 464 (1938), and quoted by the majority, ante, at 404. In order to show that a right has been waived under this test, the State must prove “an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” The majority creates no new rule preventing an accused who has retained a lawyer from waiving his right to the lawyer’s presence during questioning. The majority simply finds that no waiver was proved in this case. I disagree. That respondent knew of his right not to say anything to the officers without advice and presence of counsel is established on this record to a moral *434certainty. He was advised of the right by three officials of the State—telling at least one that he understood the right—and by two lawyers.4 Finally, he further demonstrated his knowledge of the right by informing the police that he would tell them the story in the presence of McKnight when they arrived in Des Moines. The issue in this case, then, is whether respondent relinquished that right intentionally.

Respondent relinquished his right not to talk to the police about his crime when the car approached the place where he had hidden the victim’s clothes. Men usually intend to do what they do, and there is nothing in the record to support the proposition that respondent’s decision to talk was anything but an exercise of his own free will. Apparently, without any prodding from the officers, respondent—who had earlier said that he would tell the whole story when he arrived in Des Moines—spontaneously changed his mind about the timing of his disclosures when the car approached the places where he had hidden the evidence. However, even if his statements were influenced by Detective Leaming’s above-quoted statement, respondent’s decision to talk in the absence of counsel can hardly be viewed as the product of an overborne will. The statement by Leaming was not coercive; it was accompanied by a request that respondent not respond to it; and it was delivered hours before respondent decided to make any statement. Respondent’s waiver was thus knowing and intentional.

The majority’s contrary conclusion seems to rest on the fact that respondent “asserted” his right to counsel by retaining and consulting with one lawyer and by consulting with another. How this supports the conclusion that respondent’s later relinquishment of his right not to talk in the *435absence of counsel was unintentional is a mystery. The fact that respondent consulted with counsel on the question whether he should talk to the police in counsel’s absence makes his later decision to talk in counsel’s absence better informed and, if anything, more intelligent.

The majority recognizes that even after this “assertion” of his right to counsel, it would have found that respondent waived his right not to talk in counsel’s absence if his waiver had been express—i. e., if the officers had asked him in the car whether he would be willing to answer questions in counsel’s absence and if he had answered “yes.” Ante, at 405. But waiver is not a formalistic concept. Waiver is shown whenever the facts establish that an accused knew of a right and intended to relinquish it. Such waiver, even if not express,5 was plainly shown here. The only other con*436ceivable basis for the majority’s holding is the implicit suggestion, ante, at 400-401, that the right involved in Massiah v. United States, 377 U. S. 201 (1964), as distinguished from the right involved in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966), is a right not to be asked any questions in counsel’s absence rather than a right not to answer any questions in counsel’s absence, and that the right not to be asked questions must be waived before the questions are asked. Such wafer-thin distinctions cannot determine whether a guilty murderer should go free. The only conceivable purpose for the presence of counsel during questioning is to protect an accused from making incriminating answers. Questions, unanswered, have no significance at all. Absent coercion6—no matter how the *437right involved is defined—an accused is amply protected by a rule requiring waiver before or simultaneously with the giving by him of an answer or the making by him of a statement.

III

The consequence of the majority’s decision is, as the majority recognizes, extremely serious. A mentally disturbed killer whose guilt is not in question may be released. Why? Apparently the answer is that the majority believes that the law enforcement officers acted in a way which involves some risk of injury to society and that such conduct should be deterred. However, the officers’ conduct did not, and was not likely to, jeopardize the fairness of respondent’s trial or in any way risk the conviction of an innocent man—the risk against which the Sixth Amendment guarantee of assistance of counsel is designed to protect. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45 (1932) ; Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458 (1938); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U. S. 52 (1961); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335 (1963); White v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 59 (1963); United States v. Wade, 388 U. S. 218 (1967); Gilbert v. California, 388 U. S. 263 (1967); Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U. S. 1 *438(1970); and Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U. S. 25 (1972). But see Massiah v. United States, supra. The police did nothing “wrong,” let alone anything “unconstitutional.” To anyone not lost in the intricacies of the prophylactic rules of Miranda v. Arizona, the result in this case seems utterly senseless; and for the reasons stated in Part II, supra, even applying those rules as well as the rule of Massiah v. United States, supra, the statements made by respondent were properly admitted. In light of these considerations, the majority’s protest that the result in this case is justified by a “clear violation” of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments has a distressing hollow ring. I respectfully dissent.

Mr. Justice Blackmun,

with whom Mr. Justice White and Mr. Justice Rehnquist join, dissenting.

The State of Iowa, and 21 States and others, as amici curiae, strongly urge that this Court’s procedural (as distinguished from constitutional) ruling in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966), be re-examined and overruled. I, however, agree with the Court, ante, at 397, that this is not now the case in which that issue need be considered.

What the Court chooses to do here, and with which I disagree, is to hold that respondent Williams’ situation was in the mold of Massiah v. United States, 377 U. S. 201 (1964), that is, that it was dominated by a denial to Williams of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel after criminal proceedings had been instituted against him. The Court rules that the Sixth Amendment was violated because Detective Learning “purposely sought during Williams’ isolation from his lawyers to obtain as much incriminating information as possible.” Ante, at 399, and Powell, J., concurring, ante, at 410-413. I cannot regard that as unconstitutional per se.

First, the police did not deliberately seek to isolate Williams from his lawyers so as to deprive him of the *439assistance of counsel. Cf. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U. S. 478 (1964). The isolation in this case was a necessary incident of transporting Williams to the county where the crime was committed.1

Second, Leaming’s purpose was not solely to obtain incriminating evidence. The victim had been missing for only two days, and the police could not be certain that she was dead. Leaming, of course, and in accord with his duty, was “hoping to find out where that little girl was,” ante, at 399, but such motivation does not equate with an intention to evade the Sixth Amendment.2 Moreover, the Court seems to me to place an undue emphasis, ante, at 392, 400, and aspersion on what it and the lower courts have chosen to call the “Christian burial speech,” and on Williams’ “deeply religious” convictions.

Third, not every attempt to elicit information should be regarded as “tantamount to interrogation,” ante, at 400. I am not persuaded that Leaming’s observations and comments, made as the police car traversed the snowy and slippery miles between Davenport and Des Moines that winter afternoon, were an interrogation, direct or subtle, of Williams. Contrary to this Court’s statement, ibid., the Iowa Supreme Court appears to me to have thought and held otherwise, State v. Williams, 182 N. W. 2d 396, 403-405 (1970), and I agree. Williams, after all, was counseled by lawyers, and warned by the arraigning judge in Davenport and by the *440police, and yet it was he who started the travel conversations and brought up the subject of the criminal investigation. Without further reviewing the circumstances of the trip, I would say it is clear there was no interrogation. In this respect, I am in full accord with Judge Webster in his vigorous dissent, 509 F. 2d 227, 234-237, and with the views implicitly indicated by Chief Judge Gibson and Judge Stephenson, who joined him in voting for rehearing en banc.

In summary, it seems to me that the Court is holding that Massiah is violated whenever police engage in any conduct, in the absence of counsel, with the subjective desire to obtain information from a suspect after arraignment. Such a rule is far too broad. Persons in custody frequently volunteer statements in response to stimuli other than interrogation. See, e. g., United States v. Cook, 530 F. 2d 145, 152-153 (CA7), cert. denied, 426 U. S. 909 (1976) (defendant engaged officers in conversation while being transported to magistrate); United States v. Martin, 511 F. 2d 148, 150-151 (CA8 1975) (agent initiated conversation with suspect, provoking damaging admission); United States v. Menichino, 497 F. 2d 935, 939-941 (CA5 1974) (incriminating statements volunteered during booking process); Haire v. Sarver, 437 F. 2d 1262 (CA8), cert. denied, 404 U. S. 910 (1971) (statements volunteered in response to questioning of defendant’s wife). When there is no interrogation, such statements should be admissible as long as they are truly voluntary.3

The Massiah point thus being of no consequence, I would vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand *441the case for consideration of the issue of voluntariness, in the constitutional sense, of Williams’ statements, an issue the Court of Appeals did not reach when the case was before it.

One final word: I can understand the discomfiture the Court obviously suffers and expresses in Part IV of its opinion, ante, at 406, and the like discomfiture expressed by Justice (now United States District Judge) Stuart of the Iowa court in the dissent he felt compelled to make by this Court’s precedents, 182 N. W. 2d, at 406. This was a brutal, tragic, and heinous crime inflicted upon a young girl on the afternoon of the day before Christmas. With the exclusionary rule operating as the Court effectuates it, the decision today probably means that, as a practical matter, no new trial will be possible at this date eight years after the crime, and that this respondent necessarily will go free. That, of course, is not the standard by which a case of this kind strictly is to be judged. But, as Judge Webster in dissent below observed, 509 F. 2d, at 237, placing the case in sensible and proper perspective: “The evidence of Williams’ guilt was overwhelming. No challenge is made to the reliability of the fact-finding process.” I am in full agreement with that observation.